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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KENNETH SAVAGE,
ASHLEY DANYELLE FRANKLIN
Plaintiffs,
v.

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CITY OF DETROIT, AND
POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE #1,
POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE #2,
SGT. JOHN DOE #3
Defendants.

Case No.

COMPLAINT
Plaintiff

KENNETH

SAVAGE

and

ASHLEY

DANYELLE

FRANKLIN (“Plaintiffs”), by and through their attorney, Olson PLLC, state
the following for their Complaint against Defendant City of Detroit (“City”)
and Police Officer John Doe (“Doe #1”), Police Officer John Doe #2 (“Doe
#2) and Sgt. John Doe #3 (“Sgt. Doe #3):
1.

This is a civil action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

common law avenues of recovery for deprivations of Plaintiffs’ rights.
2.

Plaintiffs sue the individual Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and

Sgt. Doe #3 in their individual capacity.
JURISDICTION
3.

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331, 1367(a) and § 1341.

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VENUE
4.

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

5.

At all times relevant herein, Plaintiffs resided in and were

citizens of Detroit, Michigan.
6.

Defendant City is a political subdivision of the State of

Michigan acting under color of State law, and is a person for purposes of a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
7.

Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3 were at all

relevant times police officers employed by Defendant City.
COLOR OF STATE LAW
8.

At all times relevant herein, Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and

Sgt. Doe #3 acted under color of state law.
9.

Particularly, Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3 acted

under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies, customs
and usages of the State of Michigan, and its political subdivisions.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
10.

On July 22, 2016, Plaintiffs owned three dogs named Isis, Heru

and Beautiful.
11.

On July 22, 2016, Plaintiffs, Ms. Franklin’s son, Dejon and

three dogs resided at 16892 Cruse, Detroit, Michigan 48235.

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On July 22, 2016 at approximately 11:00 a.m., eight of

Defendant City’s police officers arrived Plaintiffs’ residence to execute a
search warrant.
13.

The Search Warrant Affidavit indicated that:
a.

On July 20, 2016, City of Detroit police officers were
conducting an investigation unrelated to Plaintiffs when
the Affiant observed marijuana growing in Plaintiffs’
back yard;

b.

The Affiant was “aware of a medical marijuana card
holder and able to grow plants [sic]”;

c.

“Due to plants being in an unsecure structure and visible
to the public [sic] is a violation”;

d.

“Affiant also took a picture of the marijuana at the
location while on the non related investigation”;

e.

“Due to the above observations, Affiant believes that the
target location is functioning as a covert marijuana grow
operation”;

f.

“Affiant has been involved in the execution of numerous
narcotics search warrants at locations in the City of

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Detroit and has found that firearms and dogs are often
found inside to protect the narcotics trade”; and
g.

“Affiant seeks to remove any firearms and dogs found on
the premises.”

14.

Thus, Defendants knew in advance that Plaintiffs had dogs at

their home.
15.

Plaintiff Savage is an electrician.

16.

At the time of the raid, Plaintiff Franklin announced to City of

Detroit police officers that Plaintiffs’ marijuana was legal and that Plaintiffs
had marijuana paperwork posted by the front door.
17.

Plaintiff Franklin was detained.

18.

According to the police report, City of Detroit police officers,

including the Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3, entered through
the front door and cleared the residence finding no one else inside.
19.

According to the police report, City of Detroit police officers,

including Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3, observed marijuana
growing in the back yard of the Plaintiffs’ home but were unable to access
the subject marijuana because Plaintiffs’ three dogs were in the back yard
that was surrounded with an eight-foot high privacy fence.

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Plaintiffs’ back yard gate was chained and locked with a master

lock and key at the time.
21.

Plaintiffs had moved the plants, still in their pots, out into the

yard to get some natural sunlight.
22.

At the time of the raid, all of Plaintiffs’ dogs were securely

contained in the back yard surrounded by an eight-foot high chain link fence
that was padlocked shut.
23.

Plaintiff Franklin asked Defendant City of Detroit police

officers for a warrant, to which a police officer Defendant stated that “if you
keep asking for a warrant, we are gonna kill those dogs and call child
protective services to pick up your kid.”
24.

Defendant City of Detroit’s police report states that Defendant

City of Detroit police officers contacted City of Detroit Animal Control to
control the dogs and safely access the marijuana in the back yard.
25.

The police report falsely states that Defendant City of Detroit

police officers, including Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3, next
unsuccessfully tried to capture Plaintiffs’ dogs in the back yard before City
of Detroit Animal Control arrived. They did not.

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The police report states that Sgt. Doe #3 “determined that it

would be unsafe for crewmembers to attempt to capture the dogs and gave
the order to destroy them.”
27.

Plaintiffs observed Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3

shoot Plaintiffs’ dogs from behind the fence while the dogs presented no
imminent threat to police.
28.

Isis screamed in pain and died in the back yard behind the

house.
29.

Next, Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3 shot the lock

off the gate, entered Plaintiffs’ back yard and followed Heru and Beautiful
who ran into the back of garage.
30.

While Heru and Beautiful cowered in the back of the garage,

Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3 shot Heru and Beautiful
multiple times.
31.

Beautiful died in the garage.

32.

Shortly after the shooting was over, City of Detroit Animal

Control Unit #D-30 responded to the scene and recovered the deceased dogs.
33.

Heru walked into the Animal Control van but later died from

his wounds.
34.

Animal Control refused to give Plaintiffs the dogs’ bodies.

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At no time did City of Detroit police officers give Plaintiffs an

opportunity to sequester the dogs to permit them to access the back yard
where the subject marijuana was located.
36.

Plaintiff Franklin offered to take the marijuana from the back

yard and give it to the police but Defendant police officers refused.
37.

All three dogs died from the gunshot wounds.

38.

It was not necessary, reasonable or legal for Defendants Doe

#1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3, to shoot Plaintiffs’ 3 dogs because they were
secured inside of Plaintiffs’ backyard behind a locked fence.
39.

In other words, Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3

shot Plaintiffs’ dogs while they presented no imminent threat to Defendants
or anyone else for that matter.
40.

Moreover, there was no exigency because Defendants could

plainly see the marijuana they had come to seize and it was not going
anywhere because police had secured the location and detained Plaintiff
Franklin and police could watch the marijuana with no risk of the marijuana
being destroyed.
41.

Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3 calmly, carefully

and cowardly shot and killed Plaintiffs’ three dogs from a position where the
dogs presented no imminent danger to them.

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Furthermore, Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3

could have gained access to Plaintiffs’ back yard by simply waiting for City
of Detroit Animal Control to control the dogs before killing Plaintiffs’ three
dogs under circumstances where waiting for Animal Control would have
posed no threat to Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3 or the police
objective of seizing Plaintiffs’ marijuana.
43.

Sadly, City of Detroit Animal Control arrived less than ten

minutes after Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3 finished shooting
Plaintiffs’ dogs.
44.

Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3 killed Plaintiffs’

three dogs for no reason.
45.

Plaintiffs’ dogs were all properly licensed at the time of the

shooting.
COUNT I
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND FOURTH AMENDMENT
AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT
FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEY’S FEES
46.

Plaintiffs re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs.

47.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, U.S.

Const. amend. IV, prohibits the government from unreasonably destroying
or seizing a citizen’s property.
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"The destruction of property by state officials poses as much of

a threat, if not more, to people's right to be 'secure . . . in their effects' as
does the physical taking of them." Fuller v. Vines, 36 F.3d 65, 68 (9th Cir.
1994), overruled on other grounds, Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d
1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
49.

"The killing of [a] dog is a destruction recognized as a seizure

under the Fourth Amendment" and can constitute a cognizable claim under §
1983. Id.
50.

Dogs are more than just a personal effect. San Jose Charter of

the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 975 (9th
Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant police’s shooting of plaintiff’s dogs was
an unreasonable seizure in particular where defendant police officers had
notice of the dog’s presence and were not surprised by them and had no plan
to deal with the dog other than by shooting it).
51.

The emotional attachment to a family's dog is not comparable

to a possessory interest in furniture. Id.
52.

Indeed, Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment interests involved are

substantial because "the bond between a dog owner and his pet can be strong
and enduring," and Plaintiffs thinks of their three dogs “in terms of an

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emotional relationship, rather than a property relationship." Altman v. City of
High Point, N.C., 330 F.3d 194, 205 (4th Cir. 2003).
53.

In circumstances where, as here, the dogs do not pose an

imminent threat, or the officer is not surprised by the dog and has had time
to make alternate plans to control the dog, other than shooting, the shooting
of the dog has been found to be an unreasonable seizure. Dziekan v. Gaynor,
376 F. Supp. 2d 267, 270-71 (D. Conn. 2005). (citing cases and discussing
San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, 402 F.3d at 975).
54.

Defendants’

acts

described

herein

were

objectively

unreasonable allowing for the fact that police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S. Ct.
1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989).
55.

Indeed, Defendants’ acts described herein were intentional,

grossly negligent, amounted to reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights.
56.

Defendants’ shooting and killing of Plaintiffs’ three dogs was

unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances and therefore
constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment because

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there was no exigency and police officers could have conducted their
business without killing Plaintiffs’ three dogs.
57.

Defendants shooting and killing of Plaintiffs’ three dogs was

more intrusive than necessary. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504 (1983)
(“A seizure becomes unlawful when it is 'more intrusive than necessary”).
58.

No governmental interest justifies the intrusion involved in this

59.

Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3 shooting and

case.

killing Plaintiffs’ three dogs was objectively unreasonable because
Plaintiffs’ three dogs were secured inside of Plaintiffs’ back yard and
Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3 could have accessed Plaintiffs’
back yard and the marijuana contained therein without exposing themselves
to any imminent danger if they had simply waited ten more minutes until
Animal Control arrived (or by simply having Plaintiff Franklin give it to
them).
60.

In other words, Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe

#3could have conducted their police business by merely waiting for Animal
Control, which tragically arrived shortly after Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2
and Sgt. Doe #3 lost patience and killed all of Plaintiffs’ dogs.

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Defendants Doe #1, Doe #2 and Sgt. Doe #3 (and indeed none

of the police officers) were not in any immediate danger that would have
justified the use of deadly force. Fuller v. Vines, 36 F.3d 65 (9th Cir. 1994).
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
62.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of

compensatory damages against each individual Defendant in his individual
capacity.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
63.

The individual Defendant’s actions were:
a.

Reckless;

b.

Showed callous indifference toward the rights of
Plaintiff; and

c.

Were taken in the face of a perceived risk that the actions
would violate federal law.

64.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of punitive damages against

the each individual Defendant in his individual capacity, in order to punish
him and to deter others.
ATTORNEY’S FEES

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Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in

this litigation, then they will be entitled to receive an award of reasonable
attorney’s fees, non-taxable expenses and costs.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and 1988 against each individual Defendant in his individual capacity, for
compensatory damages in a fair and reasonable amount, for punitive
damages, for reasonable attorney’s fees, for and non-taxable expenses, for
costs, and Plaintiffs pray for such other relief as may be just under the
circumstances and consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT II
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND FOURTH AMENDMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANT CITY
FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES
66.

Plaintiffs re-allege their prior allegations.
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
1ST ALTERNATIVE BASIS OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
DELEGATION TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT

67.

As the first alternate basis for liability against Defendant City,

the policy maker for Defendant City, the mayor, or someone else, and that
person delegated full authority and/or empowered
Defendant’s policy.

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That delegation of authority by the actual policy maker of

Defendant City placed the individual Defendant in a policy making position,
and the acts of the individual Defendant may fairly be said to be those of the
municipality. Id. at 483, and Kujawski v. Board of Com’rs of Bartholomew
County, Ind., 183 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1999).
69.

Those acts therefore subject Defendant City to liability for the

constitutional violations of the individual Defendant. Id. at 483; Kujawski v.
Board of Com’rs of Bartholomew County, Ind., 183 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir.
1999).
2ND ALTERNATIVE BASIS OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY – FAILURE TO TRAIN,
SUPERVISE, CONTROL
70.

As the second alternative basis for liability against Defendant

City, Defendant City failed to properly hire, train, supervise, control and/or
discipline the individual Defendants with respect to dogs such as Plaintiffs’
dogs, who live throughout the City.
71.

Defendant City was thus deliberately indifferent to the rights of

others in adopting its hiring and training practices, and in failing to
supervise, control and/or discipline each individual Defendant such that
those failures reflected a deliberate or conscious choice by Defendant City
made from among various alternatives. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 389 (1989).
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Those deficiencies were the moving force that caused

Plaintiffs’ damages. Larson By Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1454 (8th
Cir. 1996).
73.

In light of the fact that it was each individual Defendant who

engaged in the constitutional violations (and numerous other City of Detroit
police officers who needlessly and unconstitutionally killed citizens’ dogs),
the need to correct the deficiencies is so obvious, and the inadequacy so
likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers
of Defendant City can reasonably be said to have been deliberately
indifferent to the need. Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir.
1996).
74.

If Defendant City had properly hired, trained, supervised,

controlled and/or disciplined the individual Defendants, the constitutional
violations committed that the individual Defendants committed would not
have occurred.
75.

These failures by Defendant City to hire, train, supervise,

control and/or discipline the individual Defendants subject Defendant City to
liability for the constitutional violations committed by the individual
Defendant.

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On information and belief, Defendant City had no policy or

training in place in how to handle encounters with dogs secured inside of a
locked chain link fence, which was evident in Defendants’ actions alleged
herein.
77.

Such training was at all relevant times available online at no

cost to Defendant City.
78.

Defendant City has repeatedly been sued for unconstitutional

shootings of dogs, yet has done nothing to address the problem that is well
known to the City and has been widely covered in local, national and
international media.
79.

On information and belief, the City has never independently

determined that a police officer improperly shot any dog.
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
80.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of

compensatory damages against Defendant City.
ATTORNEY’S FEES
81.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in

this litigation, then they will be entitled to receive an award of reasonable
attorney’s fees, non-taxable expenses and costs.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and 1988 against Defendant City for compensatory damages in a fair and
reasonable amount, for reasonable attorney’s fees, and non-taxable expenses,
for costs and such other relief as may be just under the circumstances and
consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Respectfully submitted,
Olson PLLC

/s/Christopher S. Olson_______
Christopher S. Olson (P58780)
32121 Woodward Avenue
Suite 300
Royal Oak, Michigan 48073
(248) 672-7368
(248) 415-6263 Facsimile
colson@olsonpllc.mygbiz.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
June 28, 2017
Detroit, Michigan

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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs
demand trial by jury in this action of all issues so triable.
Respectfully submitted,
Olson PLLC

/s/Christopher S. Olson_______
Christopher S. Olson (P58780)
32121 Woodward Avenue
Suite 300
Royal Oak, Michigan 48073
(248) 672-7368
(248) 415-6263 Facsimile
colson@olsonpllc.mygbiz.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
June 28, 2017
Detroit, Michigan

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