SENT VIA ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION
Senator Charles E. Grassley
135 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
June 5, 2017
Senator Grassley,
I read with great interest your February 09, 2017 letter to President Trump encouraging him to empower
whistleblowers who bring attention to fraud, waste and abuse in government. I agree whistleblowers can be
instrumental in helping to “drain the swamp” in Washington by shedding light on abuses within the bureaucracy.
However, rather than holding a White House Rose Garden ceremony to honor the work of whistleblowers, I
suggest President Trump vigorously support legal reform that would protect whistleblowers in federal court. This
is the only way to send a clear message that bureaucratic misbehavior and retaliation against those who report
such atrocities will not be tolerated. As you aptly stated:
“After eight years under the leadership of what even the press has described as 'the least transparent
administration in history' that prosecuted more whistle blowers than any other previous administration,
the time is ripe to finally recognize the immeasurable value that whistle blowers bring to our
democracy.”
I hope President Trump will usher in sweeping changes and renewed optimism to a problem that has been allowed
to fester far too long. Laws need to be enacted to protect the Intelligence Community's contractor employees.
Presently, contractors receive very little protection. We are not simply "being treated like skunks at a picnic," we
are intelligence professionals who are not afforded the same protection under federal law like our federal
government counterparts. We are professionals that the internal reporting system has failed. The current system
stands in stark opposition to your claim that the “government is transparent and accountable to the American
people.” As I will demonstrate below, the internal system available to contractors is undeniably unfair and highly
unethical due to lapses in integrity by Offices of the Inspector General within the Intelligence Community. Until
contractors receive robust protection under the law, the specter of intelligence employees going outside the
internal system and risking the disclosure of classified information will be forever present. This is a threat to the
safety and security of America.
I know you are a champion for whistleblower protection. Your office has been aware of my case for the past three
years. The intent of this letter is to provide you a clear understanding of where my case currently stands, point out
specific problems with the current state of Intelligence Community whistleblowing, and to request that you and
the Senate Whistleblower Caucus take immediate action to help rectify ongoing problems with several Inspector
Generals.
I understand why your office had to allow both the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of the Inspector General
(CIA IG) and the Intelligence Community Inspector General’s Office (ICIG) handle my case. It is their
responsibility. Their reviews have concluded. However, due to both offices committing fraud (by outright lying
and intentional misrepresentation), as well as blatantly ignoring several conflicts of interests within my case, the
time for inaction has passed. This letter also serves as a warning to all Intelligence Community contractors about
the pitfalls of engaging the internal process. Several contractor whistleblowers have claimed that the system is

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 broken. Unfortunately, the evidence to back up their claims was sparse. This is not the case for me as I have taken
great care over the years to document the systematic shortcomings of the process. These are presented herein.
Make no mistake about it - the current system is horribly broken and quite frankly beyond repair. The President is
correct; we need to drain the swamp. For the sake of national security, the Intelligence Community Inspector
General apparatus needs to be drained. The Intelligence Community whistleblower policies and procedures need
immediate attention. It is a virtual quagmire ensnaring intelligence professionals who are trying to abide by their
legal duty to report fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement. The nation will be at risk until the fear of reprisal is
removed and the internal system addresses its integrity shortcomings.
Major Concerns
A defense contractor would be extremely foolish to engage the Inspector General system as a whistleblower.
Whistleblowers must keep in mind that this process is designed to frustrate you, isolate you, exhaust you, and
stress you out. The process will financially destroy you and grossly effect your family members. A whistleblower
needs to be courageous and not deviate from their moral convictions. Our country needs whistleblowers to let the
government know when there are problems hindering national security or wastes of taxpayers' money. The
following are my major concerns. Further detail (and the exact complaints submitted to the Inspector Generals)
are provided below.
1. The number one reason to avoid at all costs the Inspector Generals is that they are ethically challenged. In
my case, both the CIA IG and the ICIG have committed fraud by lying/misrepresenting the facts. There is
no consistency in how they deal with apparent, potential and actual conflicts of interest. The ICIG is
aware of these transgressions. They were provided sufficient documentary evidence to back up these
claims. I filed a formal request to the ICIG to vacate both the CIA IG whistleblower retaliation decision
as well as the ICIG External Review Panel's decision on whistleblower retaliation. I requested an
impartial IG office be assigned the case. If granted it would render the past three years of investigations
meaningless and a complete waste of taxpayer funds.
As the press has widely reported, unethical actions are not limited to these two IG offices. It is an
epidemic contaminating the Intelligence Community and Department of Defense. No matter the facts of a
case, no matter which laws are applicable, if the Inspector General's Offices acts unethically, one is better
off bringing their concerns elsewhere.
2. As a whistleblower, if you choose to seek legal representation, your attorney will have very limited access
to the details of your case. Without knowing the facts of your case, your lawyer can not provide sufficient
legal counsel. You will have to handle a majority of the case by yourself. In my case, an attorney was
granted a clearance by the DNI to review my case, however, the CIA declined to grant access to any of
“their” information, rendering the clearance useless.
3. I had no access to government documents to support my claims. More than four years and seven months
after filing the first of dozens of Freedom of Information and Privacy Act requests, the government has
only provided me the documents I supplied to them. The government has not provided a single document.
Transparency and accountability cannot occur while this practice continues. Requests for my security file,
requests for regulations on whistleblower protection, requests for derogatory emails written by the
government, requests for completed investigative reports - all fall into a bureaucratic black hole. A
whistleblower does not stand a chance of prevailing without access to critical documents.
4. Presidential Policy Directive-19 provides little to no protection for whistleblowers. It is poorly conceived
and does not contain sufficient detail nor teeth to make it an effective tool to stop reprisals. Federal laws
are desperately needed.
5. The Inspector Generals will not provide a speedy resolution to claims. My Presidential Policy Directive19 allegation that the CIA retaliated against my whistleblowing by delaying and terminating the
adjudication of my clearance took three years and two months to decide. One of my fraud, waste, abuse

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 and mismanagement claims was initiated in 2009. To this day, it remains unresolved.
6. Finally, the government will not even acknowledge whether issues you have reported are being
investigated. Over 30 months after I brought concerns to the attention of the ICIG, neither the CIA nor the
ICIG will confirm any investigation is taking place. Further, neither office has interviewed me nor made a
single attempt to collect evidence on any issues besides processing of my clearance. All other issues have
been ignored. When Inspector Generals do not conduct timely investigations, pertinent evidence can be
lost or forgotten as time passes.
These issues have been reported to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence. To date, they have chosen to let CIA handle my concerns. I believe these Committees
need to take a more proactive stance. I requested the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of Central
Intelligence open investigations on their respective IG staffs' behavior. I strongly recommend every effort is made
to support you and Senator McCaskill in your efforts to pass legislation designed to protect whistleblowers in the
Intelligence Community. Every elected official has a vested interest in protecting whistleblowers because their
efforts make the country safer.
Reports in May 2017 indicated that you planned to block Courtney Elwood's nomination as CIA General Counsel
until CIA responds to your 2014 request for the declassifying of whistleblowing letters and the release of CIA
internal whistle blowing regulations. You are an elected official. You represent U.S. citizens. Yet, the CIA refuses
to accommodate you. If you are being stonewalled, what chance does the average citizen like me stand against the
CIA? Three years ago, I requested that you be given access to my case. CIA refused. You have jurisdiction over
my case in several areas that CIA will never admit. This is not a pure intelligence matter under CIA's purview.
Laws have been broken. Laws have not been enforced. These are the responsibility of the Judicial Branch and not
the Executive Branch. As Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I urge you to open a full investigation into the
illegal activity I have reported.
I engaged the Inspector General system hoping for the best. What I experienced is disheartening. I brought my
initial contract concerns to the CIA IG in 2009 and here I am in 2017 with very little addressed in a professional
manner. The system needs an overhaul. These issues are beyond the Intelligence Community to resolve in a
timely and equitable manner. Whistleblowers need to be protected by robust federal law. Nothing short of
legislation can remove the institutional bias and inherent conflicts of interest that would allow whistleblowers to
safely report and substantiate their claims. If a defense contractor chooses to still blow the whistle, it is not
inconceivable you will be treated in a similar manner.
Unethical Behavior by the Inspector Generals
I filed complaints with the Council of Inspector General for Integrity and Ethics (CIGIE) and the DNI ethics
board over the handling of my case by the ICIG and the CIA. CIGIE has refused to open any investigation on any
issues. They can only investigate complaints about specific individuals and not the offices. Until I receive more
documents, it is impossible to identify everyone who has made inappropriate decisions in my case. The
allegations range from inadequate investigative practices to failure to avoid all conflicts of interest. Both Inspector
General Offices have held on to my case simply to keep others from scrutinizing their combined investigative
incompetence and their failure to abide by the law, presidential orders, and agency specific regulations. The press
has correctly described the CIA IG as the “Keystone Cops" due to their inept efforts. I can honestly say the ICIG
deserves the same moniker.
If the CIA IG and the ICIG are not held accountable when they perform unethical acts, there is little incentive for
whistleblowers to engage these offices. There have been several instances in my case where the Inspector
Generals were deceitful and intentionally failed to apply commonly accepted ethical legal principles.
Fraud
I made the ICIG aware that their office and the CIA IG perpetrated fraud. Fraud is a false representation of a

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 matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of what
should have been disclosed, that deceives and is intended to deceive another so that the individual will act upon it
to his legal injury. The ICIG and the CIA falsely represented their justification as to why my case was sent back
to CIA after my appeal. Initially, the ICIG Director of Whistle Blowing and Source Protection claimed the case
was being remanded because the CIA failed to "exhaust" their initial investigation. Later an attorney in the ICIG's
office made the same claim. Their claims are in stark contrast to information another ICIG attorney reported. She
claimed the case was sent back because CIA failed to analyze the case under the applicable whistle blower
protection laws and executive orders. I believe the latter claim to be true simply because the ICIG had to certify
that the case was exhausted prior to accepting my appeal. If the CIA failed to investigate my concerns it sets up an
apparent conflict of interest. This is very problematic as the primary ethical issue is lies were told. These
misrepresentations consequentially altered the course of the investigation and both offices tried to conceal them
for their own benefit.
Enclosed with this letter are my complaints and supporting email below:
A. "Urgent Concern ICIG conspiracy and fraud"
B. "McClanahan email"
C. "ICD 120 ERP 45 days"
Conflict of Interest
The CIA IG and the ICIG do not consistently apply the legal concept of a conflict of interests in their
investigations. In September 2016, I filed a concern that a staff member in the ICIG office should have recused
himself from my case because he was intimately involved in the facts of the case. This individual also had a
retaliation claim against CIA. This is an actual conflict of interest that CIA recognized but the ICIG conveniently
ignored. The individual was removed from my case due to "workload reasons." The ICIG will not confirm
whether the individual who was the primary decision maker in my case was removed for failing to recuse himself
or failure by his superiors to remove him. This individual should have been removed in 2014, not 2016. This
oversight calls into question the integrity of the investigative process as well as the entire ICIG's ability to
recognize ethical issues.
Recognizing and de-conflicting conflicts of interest are mandated by the Council of Inspector General for
Integrity and Ethics. Whistleblowers should realize there are three types of conflicts of interest: actual, potential
and apparent. Actual conflicts of interests arise in situations where an individual has an actual conflict between
competing interest. Potential damage is mitigated by removing the individual in question from the investigation.
From January 2014 until September 2016, the ICIG would not remove several compromised individuals from my
investigation.
More disturbing is the fact that the CIA IG and the ICIG do not consistently recognize the legal concept of an
apparent conflict of interest. An apparent conflict of interest occurs when it could reasonably appear to a third
party that a situation or a relationship between individuals and organizations involves a potential or actual conflict
of interest. The conflicted parties must be removed from the situation. Since 2014, I implored the ICIG to the
prohibit CIA IG from investigating its own retaliatory acts and their previous investigations. The ICIG ignored
this obvious conflict and made no attempt for another Inspector General's Office to investigate CIA's misconduct.
The ICIG is aware that remanding my case back to CIA is a conflict of interest, yet they allowed CIA to make that
determination.
See the enclosed:
D. "Failure to Recuse"
E. "Dan Meyer ICIG removal"
The CIA IG determined in 2014 that no whistleblower retaliation occurred. After my appeal in October 2014, the
ICIG sent the case back to CIA to re-investigate. Dan Meyer of the ICIG claimed the case was sent back because
the CIA IG failed to "exhaust" the investigative process. However, the PPD-19 process required the ICIG to get a
certification from CIA that the process had been "exhausted" in 2014. The ICIG refuses to explain the inherent

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 disparity. In 2015, an ICIG attorney claimed the case was sent back to CIA because CIA failed to apply PPD-19
to my retaliation allegations. The retaliation occurred after PPD-19 was issued. The ICIG will not elaborate on the
two explanations given by its office as to why my case was "remanded." The CIA IG provided me a written
statement that their PPD-19 investigation found no evidence of retaliation. I was promised a sanitized version of
the findings by the ICIG, yet months later I have not received the report. CIA's written reason and the ICIG's
explanation do not match. I filed a complaint to the ICIG for an explanation as to why my case was given back to
CIA. Once again, there is an apparent conflict of interest in allowing the CIA IG to investigate my case and its
own misconduct if they failed to apply Presidential Policy Directive-19.
Finally, I raised apparent conflicts of interest regarding the ICIG handling of my case. The contentious
relationship between the ICIG and the CIA IG when it comes to the handling of whistleblower cases has been
reported in the press. They have a toxic relationship. Contact with your office over the treatment of
whistleblower is at the center of that conflict. It would appear to a reasonable person that both the CIA IG and the
ICIG should have removed themselves from my case, but they did not.
The ICIG has never recognized an apparent conflict of interest in my case. This is unacceptable. CIA has
recognized this ethical issue in other cases, but not in mine. This too is unacceptable. I also raised this issue with
the ICIG.
See the enclosed:
F. "ICIG Complaint"
G. "CIA recognizes apparent conflict of interest in whistle blower case"
Compromise of Integrity in the ICIG System
Recent press reporting and my experience with both the Intelligence Community Inspector General's Office and
the Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General's Office have called into question the integrity of the entire
Intelligence Community Inspector General system.
According to the Council of Inspector Generals on Integrity and Ethics:
“Integrity is the cornerstone of all ethical conduct, ensuring adherence to accepted codes of ethics and
practice. Objectivity, independence, professional judgment, and confidentiality are all elements of
integrity. Objectivity imposes the obligation to be impartial, intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of
interest.”
“Independence is a critical element of objectivity. Without independence, both in fact and in appearance,
objectivity is impaired.”
“Professional judgment requires working with competence and diligence. Competence is a combination
of education and experience and involves a commitment to learning and professional improvement.”
“Diligence requires that services be rendered promptly, carefully, and thoroughly, and by observing the
applicable professional and ethical standards.”
The evidence I am providing, along with the reports in the press, undermine the integrity of the Inspector General
process. If left unchecked and broken, it will undermine the public's faith in the very institutions that are
responsible for safeguarding national security. This cannot continue.
I have reported urgent concerns about both IGs lack of objectivity. My conflict of interest allegations is well
documented. Both offices have issues with honesty. As Kel McClanahan reported to the ICIG on why my case
was given back to CIA, either the ICIG or the CIA IG lied. I believe they both lied. CIA lied that it had completed
an investigation using the correct laws, Presidential Policy directives, Executive Orders and practices. The ICIG
lied in telling me why the cause was sent back. The ICIG refuses to explain the contradiction. The CIA final
investigative reports will clearly show who is telling the truth. I have not received them under my legal FOIA and
Privacy Act requests.

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 See the enclosed:
H. "ICIG CIAIG lying"
I. "CIA July 2014 letter claiming it investigated"
J. "Dan Meyer claiming CIA IG did not exhaust investigation"
K. "Urgent Concern - Fraud, Waste, Abuse and Mismanagement - exhaustion of case"
McClatchy’s article published in July 20141 describes the toxic relationship between the CIA IG and the ICIG as
it pertains to whistleblowers and calls into question the independence of the offices and their personnel, “The
email controversy points to holes in the intelligence community’s whistleblower protection systems and raises
fresh questions about the extent to which intelligence agencies can elude congressional oversight.” The
appearance of not being independent is strictly prohibited.
The last paragraph points to the CIA IG's lack of professional judgement and competence, “The email related to
allegations that the agency’s inspector general, David Buckley, failed to properly investigate CIA retaliation
against an agency official who cooperated in the committee’s probe, said the knowledgeable people, who asked
not to be further identified because of the sensitivity of the matter."
I have attached investigative documents collected in connection to a complaint against CIA IG David Buckley. I
present these as evidence of issues present during the processing of my case but also to highlight that the head of
the CIA IG called out short comings of his own investigators. The suggested reassigning of top investigators is
particularly concerning given my case was investigated during this time and apparently, the junior staff were
assigned projects they were not qualified to investigate. It demonstrates that even the CIA IG staff feared internal
reprisal.
See the enclosed:
L. "FBI-CIGIE investigation" (added as last document due to the number of pages)
On May 16, 2016, Michael Isikoff of Yahoo News2 reported:
“The CIA inspector general’s office — the spy agency’s internal watchdog — has acknowledged it
“mistakenly” destroyed its only copy of a mammoth Senate torture report at the same time lawyers for the
Justice Department were assuring a federal judge that copies of the document were being preserved,
Yahoo News has learned.”
“The deletion of the document has been portrayed by agency officials to Senate investigators as an
“inadvertent” foul-up by the inspector general. In what one intelligence community source described as a
series of errors straight “out of the Keystone Cops,” CIA inspector general officials deleted an uploaded
computer file with the report and then accidentally destroyed a disk that also contained the document,
filled with thousands of secret files about the CIA’s use of “enhanced” interrogation methods.”
When the newspaper refers to you as “the Keystone Cops,” there is a public image concern. There are several
instances of incompetence and a failure to be diligent in my case. The public trust in the CIA IG's office continues
to erode.
I will present further proof of the ICIG's competence in subsequent complaints once my FOIA/privacy act
requests are complied with.
I have highlighted my issues with both the CIA IG and the ICIG's diligence. The PPD-19 investigation took three
and two months. This is not prompt and it certainly does not follow applicable professional and ethical standards.
Failure to Investigate
1

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article24771052.html

2

https://www.yahoo.com/news/senate-report-on-cia-torture-1429636113023030.html

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 Whistle blower retaliation under PPD-19 is not the only allegation I brought to the ICIG in October 2014. I have
filed five “urgent concerns” reports to the ICIG because they failed to investigate significant concerns that are the
responsibility of the Director of National Intelligence to address. The ICIG kept control of my case, but allowed
CIA to investigate all the claims in my 2014 complaint. In two years and 6 months, neither the CIA IG nor the
ICIG has interviewed me or asked a single follow-up question the other allegations. I did not receive prompt
services. I did not receive feedback on status or a decision that parties committed a wrongdoing. I was not
interviewed. I was not afforded the opportunity to provide additional evidence. Further, I do not believe either the
CIA or the ICIG have investigated any of the issues that fall under the False Claims Act. In 2012, I filed the
appropriate FOIA/Privacy Act requests for the final investigative reports concerning several investigations. I have
not received a single report.
See the enclosed concerns to the ICIG:
M. "Urgent Concern - Failure to Investigate Intelligence Failures"
N. "Urgent Concern - Failure to Investigate ManTech International"
O. "Urgent Concern - Failure to Investigate Raytheon CIA contract Officer"
P. "Urgent Concern - Failure to Investigate SAIC CIA contract Officer"
Q. "Urgent Concern - Failure to Investigate Fraud, Waste and Abuse (CIA Contractors)
The ICIG will not confirm or deny which of these issues were reported to HPSCI and SSCI. They would only say
that they were not urgent concerns because they were derived from my 2014 complaint. This is a very limited
definition of what is a "new" concern.
Integrity Issues within the Intelligence Community Inspector General System
The Government Accountability Project republished Patrick Eddington’s Just Security article on March 2, 20173
which states, “The role of an Inspector General (IG) office in a federal agency or department is to root out waste,
fraud, and abuse, and where necessary refer criminal conduct to the Justice Department for prosecution. But
what happens when the IG itself is corrupt, especially in a national security context where secrecy can be used to
conceal malfeasance?"
This question is at the heart of the problem. What happens when the IG is corrupt? What happens when there is
no transparency? What happens when you ask the ICIG who investigates their misbehavior seven times and your
query goes unanswered?
Further evidence that the IG’s behavior constitute a threat to national security and are thus an "urgent concern”
include the following facts within the article:
“In March 2016, the Office of Special Counsel announced that it had uncovered evidence of Drake
prosecution-related document destruction by the DoD IG, involving a “substantial likelihood” that IG
personnel had potentially violated the law.”
“Those allegations received additional support when former DoD IG Assistant Inspector General John
Crane went public in May 2016 with allegations that he had witnessed retaliation against Drake while
working in the DoD IG office.”
“And in July 2016, former DoD IG ombudsman Dan Meyer officially claimed that he had experienced
retaliation for exposing attempts by DoD IG officials to manipulate a final version of an investigative
report into allegations that then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta “had leaked classified information to
the makers of the film ‘Zero Dark Thirty."
“On December 13, 2016, The Intercept reported that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) had
“quietly launched an investigation into the ‘integrity’ of the Pentagon’s whistleblower protection
3

https://www.whistleblower.org/multimedia/just-security-whistleblower-retaliation-governmental-accountability-and-national-security

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 program.” Whether Drake’s case is one of the subjects of the GAO probe is unknown, but the fact that the
entire Pentagon Inspector General operation is now the subject of an external investigation is virtually
unprecedented.”
“And just three days after The Intercept’s story on the GAO inquiry broke, Government Executive
reported that NSA IG George Ellard had been recommended for termination for whistleblower retaliation
by NSA Director Adm. Mike Rogers, based on the recommendations of a three-person external IG review
panel established under an Obama-era presidential directive, PPD-19."
See McClatchy Article published on March 21, 2016 about a Pentagon Inspector General possibly destroying
whistle blower evidence.4
See McClatchy article published September 30th, 2016 showing retaliation against whistle blower Dan Meyer and
highlights why ICIG excused his questionable behavior in my case.5
“As part of the agreement, the Pentagon inspector general’s office said it would give Meyer an
undisclosed monetary settlement, according to three people with knowledge of the negotiations. They
asked to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the matter.”
“The inspector general’s office also promised to give Meyer two awards in “recognition for his
services,” a Sept. 19 settlement document obtained by McClatchy says.”
“Kathie Scarrah, spokeswoman for the inspector general’s office, said her office and Meyer had come to
a ‘mutually satisfactory resolution’ including giving him an award. Scarrah added that ‘Meyer withdraws
and repudiates, unconditionally and completely, all allegations’ against the officials he accused.”
“Meyer and the Pentagon inspector general’s office agreed the settlement did not ‘constitute an
admission of any violation of law, rule or regulation,’ the Sept. 19 document says.”
It is imperative for you to take a proactive interest in my case for all the reasons stated above. It will have
ramifications on how whistleblowers engage the internal IC mechanism for reporting and how they are treated.
The IC is not equipped to handle complex investigations. They just delay, delay, and delay and hope the problem
goes away. This practice must end. You will be instrumental in creating change and the country will be safer for
your actions.
Finally, I bring to your attention a Marcy Wheeler article.6 I have never in my entire career been involved in
Chinese operations. As a result, those who can investigate my intelligence failure claims should get to the bottom
of what I reported least we repeat, and continue to repeat, past mistakes.
Thank you,
//signed//
John Reidy
Twitter @ICwhistleblower
icwhistleblowingstopthemadness@gmail.com
“But what happens when the IG itself is corrupt, especially in a national security context where secrecy can be
used to conceal malfeasance?" - Patrick Eddington

4

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article67392097.html

5

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article105229571.html

6

http://www.radiofree.org/us/were-shitty-saic-systems-the-cause-of-the-cias-china-disaster/

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 Urgent Concern - Inspector General
Conspiracy and Fraud
John Reidy
4/7/2017 6:55 PM
To PaulJ.Wogaman Copy cigie.information@cigie.gov, icig_complaints@dni.gov, ic_com
plaints@ic.fbi.gov, margaret_daum@hsgac.senate.gov, Patrick (Judiciary-Rep) Davis
Paul,
Please record this as a reporting under 50 USC Section 3033 (k)(5) Complaint of an 'Urgent
Concern' to the ICIG. Please include it as part of my complaint to CIGIE and DNI ethics board.
Please transmit my entire email and attachments as my entire complete, accurate complaint.
Please consider this complaint under any and all federal law that proscribes inappropriate
behavior by Inspector Generals. Please report this under applicable fraud, waste, abuse and
mismanagement laws. Please forward to the Department of Justice any issues that fall within
their purview.
Fraud is a false representation of a matter of fact—whether by words or by conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of what should have been disclosed—that deceives
and is intended to deceive another so that the individual will act upon it to his legal injury.
Fraud must be proved by showing that the defendant's actions involved five separate elements:
(1) a false statement of a material fact (2) knowledge on the part of the defendant that the
statement is untrue, (3) intent on the part of the defendant to deceive the alleged victim, (4)
justifiable reliance by the alleged victim on the statement, and (5) injury to the alleged victim as
a result.
The ICIG and the CIA IG have consistently and continue to perpetrate a fraud. Howard Cox
stated in the attached document that the CIA IG conducted an investigation into my PPD-19
allegations. The CIA IG also claimed the contracting company stopped processing my clearance.
This is untrue. The CIA IG stated that the matter was closed and no further action was taken.
The ICIG certified that the CIA IG investigation was exhausted during the intake process after
Cox's letter. Dan Meyer claimed the matter was sent back to CIA because the matter was not
"exhausted." (see attachment). Jeanette McMillian claimed the case was sent back because the
CIA IG did not apply PPD-19. CIA's report will whether PPD-19 was applied. Finally, you state
"Next, our requesting an initial investigating IG to address unresolved issues impeding agency
exhaustion, and thus depriving an ERP of jurisdiction, is not itself a conflict of interest; nor is
our having done so unique to your request for ERP review." You are back claiming the case was
not exhausted. When CIA makes a mistake of law or fact or they fail to follow basic
investigation policy (not interviewing me or collecting evidence), it is not failure to exhaust a
case. It is incompetence.

 If more than one ICIG or CIA IG investigator or attorney made a pact to lie or mislead then a
conspiracy occurs, Conspiracy - an agreement between two or more persons to engage jointly in
an unlawful or criminal act.
To your comment that sending a case back to CIA is not itself a conflict of interest. I disagree.
There is an inherent apparent conflict of interest if the CIA IG is reviewing its own misconduct.
No reasonable person would miss the conflicting interests.
The fraud and conspiracy issues also represents an apparent conflict of interest for both IG staffs.
The IG’s primary duty is to investigate wrongdoings. Neither can investigate their own
malfeasance.
Thank you,
John Reidy

 Subject:
Reidy appeal/complaint -- further supplement
Date:
Thu, 12 Nov 2015 03:43:00 -0500
From:
Kel McClanahan, Esq. <kel@nationalsecuritylaw.org> kel@nationalsecuritylaw.org
To:
Dan Meyer (ICIG) <DANIEPM5@ucia.gov> DANIEPM5@ucia.gov
Hello Dan,
As you are likely aware, I had a lengthy conversation with Jeanette McMillian on Tuesday, which
unfortunately resolved none of the lingering problems, and in fact raised a few new ones. In light of that
conversation, I reluctantly must again supplement/amend Mr. Reidy's PPD-19 appeal/ICWPA complaint
with the following items:
1) Jeanette informed me that neither she nor anyone else at the ICIG would make any inquiries into the
progress of the CIA OIG investigation beyond simply asking, "Is this matter under review?" She clearly
stated that if the CIA OIG responded, "Yes, it's under review," the ICIG would not inquire further, for
example, asking where in the review process it was, or how long the CIA OIG expects it to take. This is
extremely problematic when the CIA OIG has demonstrated a clear pattern of misleading the ICIG and
Mr. Reidy regarding the progress of its investigations, to the point of issuing a final response to the
investigation without actually investigating anything, such that the ICIG had to send the matter back to
be reinvestigated. As noted previously, the ICIG requested further information from the CIA OIG while
retaining control over the appeal (rather than simply remanding the matter to the CIA OIG), which
means that the ICIG still controls the case. As such, it is negligent at best and complicit at worst for the
ICIG to take a completely hands-off approach to whatever "investigation" the CIA OIG is conducting and
simply let that office take as long as it likes without any pressure from your office. Jeanette stated that
your office "has to trust the CIA OIG," but such a sentiment is dangerously misplaced when the
complainant is alleging reprisal by the CIA OIG. An OIG cannot simply "trust" the office being accused of
reprisal.
2) You informed me in April or May of this year that the CIA had a regulation which governs the way in
which it conducts whistleblower reprisal investigations, and you claimed that it was a "good" one. You
stated, however, that you could not tell me the name or number of the regulation or provide me a copy.
You also could not tell me what deadline it established for the completion of such investigations.
Accordingly, please incorporate that regulation into the file for this appeal/complaint, for the following

 purpose. Please review that regulation, and if the CIA OIG is not meeting the deadline established in its
own regulations (which we strongly suspect is the case), and if the ICIG remains content to allow the CIA
OIG as much time as it wants to complete this investigation (as Jeanette implies it is), then consider that
both the CIA OIG and the ICIG are contributing to the ongoing whistleblower reprisal which started at
the CIA. This is a formal request for the ICIG to set a deadline for the completion of CIA's investigation
and then adjudicate Mr. Reidy's appeal promptly after that deadline passes, with whatever information
the CIA OIG has given you by that time. If the ICIG does not do so, and instead refers this complaint to
the congressional intelligence committees, we hereby request of the committees that one of them
obtain a copy of this CIA regulation and proceed accordingly.
3) Jeanette also clarified the nature of the CIA's failure to exhaust its administrative process, which
actually gives rise to another previously-unknown reprisal complaint. According to her, when the CIA
OIG issued its final response in July 2014, it had only investigated the allegations which predated PPD19, and specifically had not investigated any of the allegations related to Mr. Reidy's security clearance.
According to her, it was for this reason that the ICIG sent the matter back to the CIA OIG, so that that
office could investigate the more recent allegations and apply PPD-19. However, if this is accurate, it
demonstrates yet another act of reprisal by the CIA OIG. On 27 January 2014, Mr. Reidy executed an
affidavit in your office appealing the previous determination by the CIA OIG and complaining of an
urgent concern, specifically invoking PPD-19 and the ICWPA. Shortly thereafter, you contacted the CIA
to ask about the status of Mr. Reidy's security clearance, which we allege was being delayed as an act of
reprisal. Within two weeks, the CIA "lost jurisdiction" over Mr. Reidy's security clearance and
administratively closed the security investigation. On 10 February 2014, you informed Mr. Reidy that the
ICIG had not classified any of his disclosures as an "urgent concern," and so would not be forwarding the
affidavit to the DNI. You then concluded your letter, "As this is a reprisal allegation, we are forwarding
the complaint to the CIA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for intake. Should the CIA OIG find they
are conflicted out, we will assist them in finding an appropriate OIG to conduct an inquiry. Once you
have exhausted the applicable administrative processes pursuant to PPD-19, Section B, you may then
appeal to the External Review Panel through the IC IG Hotline." It was therefore this referral, including
the security clearance-related allegations, which the CIA OIG allegedly investigated and found to be
meritless, and responded to in July 2014. If, as Jeanette claims, the CIA OIG never applied PPD-19 until
asked to do so this year and did not investigate the allegations which postdated its issuance, and that
failure caused the referral back earlier this year, then that means that the CIA OIG intentionally refused
to apply PPD-19 or investigate the recent allegations (including the clearance-related ones) even though
they were the core of the referred complaint. This is another reason that the CIA OIG should not be
allowed to take its time doing whatever it is doing without being required to adhere to any sort of
timetable or even keep the ICIG apprised of its progress. That office now appears to have deliberately
ignored the content of the complaint the ICIG referred to it, instead "reinvestigated" the earlier
allegations without any consideration for PPD-19, and then closed the investigation, stating, "This office
plans to take no further action and considers the matter closed." That last sentence is very strange for
an office which then turned around and claimed this year that it needs another chance to exhaust its
administrative process.
4) It is difficult, though, to reconcile one part of Jeanette's statement with the CIA OIG's 25 July 2014
letter: "Mr. Reidy has also alleged that the CIA stopped processing his clearance for a position with an

 industrial contractor in reprisal for Mr. Reidy contacting the ICIG. Our investigation of that allegation
determined that the CIA stopped the processing of his clearance when the contractor involved notified
the Agency it was withdrawing the request because they were not going to fill the position with Mr.
Reidy. This Office advised the ICIG of the above in May 2014." If, as Jeanette stated on Tuesday, the CIA
OIG did not exhaust its administrative process because it did not investigate the clearance-related
allegations, then this letter explicitly claiming to have done so is a clear falsehood and evidence of
reprisal by the CIA OIG and is another reason that that office should not continue to be allowed to
investigate itself. If, however, this letter correctly stated that the CIA OIG did investigate the clearancerelated allegations, then Jeanette misinformed me (in rather explicit detail) of the nature of the CIA's
failure to exhaust, although I do not know why she would do so. However, both cannot be true, resulting
in the unfortunate but unavoidable conclusion that either the CIA OIG or the ICIG have misled us about
the nature of this investigation and/or the reasons for determining that the administrative process was
not exhausted.
5) Jeanette also explained that the ICIG's use of the term "intake" in the 10 February 2014 letter was
significantly more ambiguous than the normal definition. According to her, the statement, "We are
forwarding the complaint to the CIA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for intake," does not mean
that the CIA OIG was under any duty to investigate the complaint, and does not even mean that the ICIG
instructed the CIA OIG to investigate the complaint. She stated that "intake" could simply mean "putting
a copy in their files," and that, in the ICIG's opinion, a perfectly acceptable outcome to the 10 February
2014 referral would be the CIA OIG placing a copy of the complaint in its files and doing nothing further.
This is an extremely troubling position for any OIG to take, especially one tasked with overseeing the
entire Intelligence Community, and we respectfully request that the ICIG reverse its position on this and
take an unambiguous position that it is never appropriate for an OIG to simply ignore a referral of a
whistleblower reprisal complaint, and that the ICIG will never consider "intake" to mean anything less
than "proper processing and investigation" and will clearly impose this rule on the OIGs it oversees.
6) Jeanette also advised me that the ICIG had no intention of allowing me to sign the non-disclosure
agreement referenced by the ODNI Office of Security in its email to you or be briefed on my
responsibilities by officials from that office as long as the CIA OIG was conducting its new investigation,
"because there is no classified DNI information for me to look at." By taking the position that, even
though the ODNI granted me an LSA, nobody in the ODNI would allow me to actually review any
classified information "because it's CIA information," the ICIG is deliberately obstructing Mr. Reidy's
ability to communicate with his attorney, since the ICIG will also not do anything to compel the CIA OIG
to process me for an LSA itself, or even compel it to respond to my inquiries about the subject. If the
position of the ODNI is that my LSA only allows me to access classified ODNI information, and this case
does not involve any classified ODNI information according to the ICIG, then the LSA is worthless and
was nothing more than a delay imposed by the ICIG, and I should have been processed for an actual full
security clearance, with reciprocity which would apply to the CIA, as I originally expected when you
instructed me to complete the full SF-86. I therefore request that the ICIG either (a) reach an agreement
with the CIA OIG which would allow me to review the classified information; (b) unilaterally grant me
access to the unredacted appeal and allow me to discuss relevant classified information with my client;
or (c) process me for an actual security clearance which the CIA OIG would be forced to recognize.
Respectfully, this dilemma too would be resolved if the ICIG would simply recognize that it still retains

 control over this matter and can compel the CIA OIG to allow me to represent Mr. Reidy in the
investigation, which would force the CIA OIG to process me for an LSA of its own. Alternatively, if this
complaint is referred to the congressional intelligence committees instead of the ICIG taking action, I
request that the committees get immediately involved and take whatever measures are necessary to
ensure that I am correctly processed for access to the classified information at issue in this case,
regardless of which agency it belongs to.
Please consider this email an amendment to the existing PPD-19 appeal and ICWPA complaint and
process it as such, including making a determination as to whether or not it constitutes an urgent
concern and informing the DNI of that determination within 14 days, so that he may forward the
transmittal within 7 days to the congressional intelligence committees.
On a related note, as 14 days from the submission of our last amendment expired yesterday, 11
November 2015, please also advise me as to your determinations regarding that amendment, so that we
may contact the intelligence committees directly if the ICIG did not determine that that amendment
constituted an urgent concern.
Thank you,
Kel McClanahan

 From: John Reidy <reidy@form3defense.com>
To: Paul J. Wogaman
Cc: jeanejm@dni.gov
Date: March 7, 2017 at 2:25 PM
Subject: ICD 120
Paul,
Please address in any response specifically the ICD 120 text below:
1. IC IG Request Intake Process: Once the IC IG Hotline Manager receives a complete external review
request package from a covered employee, the IC IG will:
1. request any and all official records, documents, materials, or accurate copies thereof from both the
department or agency head and the IG who conducted the initial IG review; and
2. request a written certification from the department or agency that the requesting employee
exhausted the applicable review process required under PPD- 19
3. To ensure that the IC IG's review includes the official agency record and can consider relevant
materials in addition to those materials provided by the requesting employee, materials requested from
the agency should be provided to the IC IG within two (2) weeks of the IC IG's request.
1. An agency employee's failure to provide requested materials in a timely manner, may result in
administrative disciplinary action as stated in section I.
1. IC IG Initial Review: The IC IG will review all relevant materials submitted by the requesting employee,
the head of the department or agency, and the IG who conducted the initial PPD- 19 review. The IC IG
will make a determination, based upon his or her discretion as outlined in IC IG guidance, whether to
convene an external review panel (ERP) within forty-five (45) calendar days of receiving the requesting
employee's complete external review request package.
I filed an appeal with Dan Meyer on in January 2014. The IC IG sent back to CIA even with conflict of
interest. The IC IG maintained control of my case. IC IG was notified by CIA of their investigation in May
2014 (attachment). I was not notified until July 2014. I appealed this decision in October 2014. I
provided all necessary documents and information asked for by ICD 120. The intake process required
the ICIG to request a written certification from the department or agency that the requesting employee
exhausted the applicable review process required under PPD- 19
and
The IC IG will review all relevant materials submitted by the requesting employee, the head of the

 department or agency, and the IG who conducted the initial PPD- 19 review. The IC IG will make a
determination, based upon his or her discretion as outlined in IC IG guidance, whether to convene an
external review panel (ERP) within forty-five (45) calendar days of receiving the requesting employee's
complete external review request package.
On April 21, 2015 Dan Meyer sent an email stating the CIA did not exhaust its process (attached). The IC
IG was required to certify the fact the CIA was done months before. In May 2016, CIA provided a second
decision. I appealed on 11 May 2016. The IC IG did not grant my request for ERP until September 23,
2016. Delays again.
I provided everything required of me both times yet a decision was not reached to convene a panel
within 45 days.
The IC IG has the power to make CIA provide required documents pursuant to ICD 120 yet delays
resulted (An agency employee's failure to provide requested materials in a timely manner, may result in
administrative disciplinary action as stated in section I.)
Actions by the IC IG have delayed a decision on my case for over a year.
John Reidy

 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

 

OFFICE or INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
DIRECTOR FOR COMMUNITY
8: SOURCE 
DC 205] 1

MEMORANDUM FOR: John A. Reidy, Applicant for CIA Contractor Employment

SUBJECT: (S) Congressional Disclosure of Alleged National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Wrongdoing

REFERENCES: A. (U) 50 U.S.C. 3033 (A)
B. (U) Title 50 Disclosure of an Urgent Concern

Pursuant to ref. (A), on 27 January 2014, this office received your
complaint alleging CIA, SAIC and Raytheon are engaged in wrongdoing, ref. (B). In
accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (the we have
determined that your allegations do not meet the statutory de?nition for an ?urgent
concern.? Accordingly, we will not forward the complaint to the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) at this time.

(U) The Act provides, however, that you may communicate your allegations of
wrongdoing to the congressional intelligence committees directly, notwithstanding our
determination. To do so, you must:

1. Provide a statement of your complaint or information, and a notice of
your intent to contact the congressional intelligence committees; and

2. Follow established security practices as we direct on how to contact the
congressional intelligence committees.

(U) Should you choose to proceed, this of?ce can assist you with continued
processing of your disclosure. will accept your statement and notice on
behalf of the IC IG and forward it to the DN1. We will also advise on, and coordinate,
the security practices necessary to ensure that your disclosure protects classified
information and is provided to appropriately cleared congressional staff. If you would
like to proceed with contacting the committees directly, please contact me within 30
days of receipt of this memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED 

SUBJECT: (U) Congressional Disclosure of Alleged CIA Wrongdoing

(U) As this is a reprisal allegation, we are forwarding the complaint to the CIA
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for intake. Should the CIA OIG ?nd they are
con?icted out, we will assist them in ?nding an appropriate OIG to conduct an
inquiry. Once you have exhausted the applicable administrative processes pursuant
to PPD-19, Section B, you may then appeal to the External Review Panel through the
IC IG Hotline.

(U) I want to thank you for your service to the Intelligence Community in this
matter. Your complaint and participation in this review process are IC IG protected
disclosures and as such any action constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal for
making these disclosures is prohibited under 50 U.S.C. 3033 If you have
any additional questions or cements, please contact me on 571-204?8003.

   
 

I16 

er - Date
Executi Director, 

 

2

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

From: John Reidy <reidy@form3defense.com>
To: Paul J. Wogaman
Cc: Davis, Patrick (Judiciary-Rep), margaret_daum@hsgac.senate.gov
Date: March 23, 2017 at 9:01 PM
Subject: IC IG conflict of interest and recusal
Paul,
In 2015, per the email below, Dan Meyer stated that if I alleged misbehavior (wrong doing), the
ICIG would not be able to review my case. On several instances since the email below and in
several emails I sent directly to you I provided documentary evidence demonstrating
"wrongdoing" by the ICIG. How was the ICIG able to continue reviewing my case when Dan
Meyer stated it would not be possible. How was Erin Copeland, an ICIG investigator allowed to
sit on the External Review Panel given the allegations of misconduct.
As I have stated before, both the CIA IG and the ICIG needed to be recused from my case.
Please consider this as a separate act of retaliation pursuant to 50 USC Sec 3033 Reports. Please
consider this an urgent concern and notify me within 14 calendar days if you have sent the matter
to the Director of National Intelligence.
Sincerely,
John Reidy
On 11/13/2015 11:16 AM, DANIEPM5 wrote:
Are you alleging wrongdoing by the IC IG; that is the key point. If
we are in the facts of your client's complaint, we won't be in a
position to review it.
w/r
Dan Meyer
Executive Director for Intelligence Community Whistleblowing & Source
Protection (ICW&SP)
Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG)
Reston 3
Washington, D.C. 20511
(571) 204.8003   (202) 253-0284 mobile
IC IG Hotline (855) 731-3260

 CIA IG and ICIG Complaint
4/3/2017 1:14 PM
John Reidy
To Paul J. Wogaman Copy cigie.information@cigie.gov and 2 others

Paul,
I find the following article in Vice News very troublesome.
https://news.vice.com/article/a-cia-interrogator-said-the-agency-punished-him-for-cooperatingwith-torture-probe
The pertinent points are:
"The CIA Office of Inspector General (OIG) had received a separate complaint months earlier
from Daniel P. Meyer, the Pentagon's top whistleblower advocate, according to interviews with
US officials and documents VICE News obtained. He said he too was a whistleblower, and that
the CIA was retaliating against him over a confidential email he sent to Senator Chuck Grassley,
which was intercepted by the OIG, that said the watchdog's office failed to investigate
interrogators' claims that they weren't reimbursed for legal fees."
Dan Meyer had alleged CIA was retaliating against him. His complaint was not just about DOD
IG retaliation. This CIA allegation automatically sets up a conflict of interest with his duties of
handling my case.
"The allegations leveled by Meyer were reviewed by the CIA Office of Inspector General
between December 20, 2012 and June 14, 2013, and then passed to the Intelligence Community's
Inspector General (ICIG) due to an undisclosed conflict of interest."
CIA can recognize conflicts of interest.
"'The Assistant Inspector General for Investigations determined that because of a potential
appearance of a conflict of interest, a full independent investigation into the allegations is not
appropriate and directed the matter be referred to the Intelligence Community Inspector General
for investigation,' the CIA watchdog's closing memo in the case said."
CIA can recognize the legal concept of "a potential appearance of a conflict of interest." CIA has
had an appearance of a conflict of interest in my allegations since their failure to investigate

 claims in 2012. All CIA decisions across the board on my whistle blower retaliation, PPD-19 and
fraud waste, abuse and mismanagement claims are rendered meaningless.
CIA IG does understand the difference between the appearance of a conflict of interest and an
actual conflict of interest. They just chose to ignore it on several occasions in my case.
"'The ICIG determined that Meyer 'did not use proper channels when communicating with
Congressional committees' and the 'ICIG may be a fact witness in the matter, creating a conflict
and precluding the them [sic] from initiating an investigation.'"
The CIA has the ability to recognize conflicts of interest that preclude the ICIG and Dan Meyer
from handling a case. From the beginning when Dan Meyer asked CIA about my security
clearance, the ICIG was a fact witness in the matter creating a conflict precluding the ICIG from
investigating. The ICIG further became a factor in my case with how Dan Meyer made (or
received) legal and regulatory interpretations.
I have attached the CIA memorandum.
Please consider this a separate report under 50 USC section 3033 K Reports of an Urgent
Concern.
CIGIE,
Please use these facts as further evidence of my allegations against Dan Meyer. Furthermore
please use these facts as proof that other officers in both the CIA IG and the ICIG were aware of
the ethical problems in my case and several people chose to ignore them. My FOIA requests to
the DNI will cover the documents mentioned in the article.
Thank you,
John Reidy

 

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Reidy appeal/complaint -- further
supplement
Esq. Kel McClanahan
11/12/2015 3:43 AM
To Dan Meyer (ICIG)
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Hello Dan,
As you are likely aware, I had a lengthy conversation with Jeanette
McMillian on Tuesday, which unfortunately resolved none of the lingering
problems, and in fact raised a few new ones. In light of that
conversation, I reluctantly must again supplement/amend Mr. Reidy's
PPD-19 appeal/ICWPA complaint with the following items:
1) Jeanette informed me that neither she nor anyone else at the ICIG
would make any inquiries into the progress of the CIA OIG investigation
beyond simply asking, "Is this matter under review?" She clearly stated
that if the CIA OIG responded, "Yes, it's under review," the ICIG would
not inquire further, for example, asking where in the review process it
was, or how long the CIA OIG expects it to take. This is extremely
problematic when the CIA OIG has demonstrated a clear pattern of
misleading the ICIG and Mr. Reidy regarding the progress of its
investigations, to the point of issuing a final response to the
investigation without actually investigating anything, such that the
ICIG had to send the matter back to be reinvestigated. As noted
previously, the ICIG requested further information from the CIA OIG
while retaining control over the appeal (rather than simply remanding
the matter to the CIA OIG), which means that the ICIG still controls the
case. As such, it is negligent at best and complicit at worst for the
ICIG to take a completely hands-off approach to whatever "investigation"
the CIA OIG is conducting and simply let that office take as long as it
likes without any pressure from your office. Jeanette stated that your

 office "has to trust the CIA OIG," but such a sentiment is dangerously
misplaced when the complainant is alleging reprisal by the CIA OIG. An
OIG cannot simply "trust" the office being accused of reprisal.
2) You informed me in April or May of this year that the CIA had a
regulation which governs the way in which it conducts whistleblower
reprisal investigations, and you claimed that it was a "good" one. You
stated, however, that you could not tell me the name or number of the
regulation or provide me a copy. You also could not tell me what
deadline it established for the completion of such investigations.
Accordingly, please incorporate that regulation into the file for this
appeal/complaint, for the following purpose. Please review that
regulation, and if the CIA OIG is not meeting the deadline established
in its own regulations (which we strongly suspect is the case), and if
the ICIG remains content to allow the CIA OIG as much time as it wants
to complete this investigation (as Jeanette implies it is), then
consider that both the CIA OIG and the ICIG are contributing to the
ongoing whistleblower reprisal which started at the CIA. This is a
formal request for the ICIG to set a deadline for the completion of
CIA's investigation and then adjudicate Mr. Reidy's appeal promptly
after that deadline passes, with whatever information the CIA OIG has
given you by that time. If the ICIG does not do so, and instead refers
this complaint to the congressional intelligence committees, we hereby
request of the committees that one of them obtain a copy of this CIA
regulation and proceed accordingly.
3) Jeanette also clarified the nature of the CIA's failure to exhaust
its administrative process, which actually gives rise to another
previously-unknown reprisal complaint. According to her, when the CIA
OIG issued its final response in July 2014, it had only investigated the
allegations which predated PPD-19, and specifically had not investigated
any of the allegations related to Mr. Reidy's security clearance.
According to her, it was for this reason that the ICIG sent the matter
back to the CIA OIG, so that that office could investigate the more
recent allegations and apply PPD-19. However, if this is accurate, it
demonstrates yet another act of reprisal by the CIA OIG. On 27 January
2014, Mr. Reidy executed an affidavit in your office appealing the
previous determination by the CIA OIG and complaining of an urgent
concern, specifically invoking PPD-19 and the ICWPA. Shortly
thereafter, you contacted the CIA to ask about the status of Mr. Reidy's
security clearance, which we allege was being delayed as an act of
reprisal. Within two weeks, the CIA "lost jurisdiction" over Mr.
Reidy's security clearance and administratively closed the security
investigation. On 10 February 2014, you informed Mr. Reidy that the
ICIG had not classified any of his disclosures as an "urgent concern,"
and so would not be forwarding the affidavit to the DNI. You then

 concluded your letter, "As this is a reprisal allegation, we are
forwarding the complaint to the CIA Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) for intake. Should the CIA OIG find they are conflicted out, we
will assist them in finding an appropriate OIG to conduct an inquiry.
Once you have exhausted the applicable administrative processes pursuant
to PPD-19, Section B, you may then appeal to the External Review Panel
through the IC IG Hotline." It was therefore this referral, including
the security clearance-related allegations, which the CIA OIG allegedly
investigated and found to be meritless, and responded to in July 2014.
If, as Jeanette claims, the CIA OIG never applied PPD-19 until asked to
do so this year and did not investigate the allegations which postdated
its issuance, and that failure caused the referral back earlier this
year, then that means that the CIA OIG intentionally refused to apply
PPD-19 or investigate the recent allegations (including the
clearance-related ones) even though they were the core of the referred
complaint. This is another reason that the CIA OIG should not be
allowed to take its time doing whatever it is doing without being
required to adhere to any sort of timetable or even keep the ICIG
apprised of its progress. That office now appears to have deliberately
ignored the content of the complaint the ICIG referred to it, instead
"reinvestigated" the earlier allegations without any consideration for
PPD-19, and then closed the investigation, stating, "This office plans
to take no further action and considers the matter closed." That last
sentence is very strange for an office which then turned around and
claimed this year that it needs another chance to exhaust its
administrative process.
4) It is difficult, though, to reconcile one part of Jeanette's
statement with the CIA OIG's 25 July 2014 letter: "Mr. Reidy has also
alleged that the CIA stopped processing his clearance for a position
with an industrial contractor in reprisal for Mr. Reidy contacting the
ICIG. Our investigation of that allegation determined that the CIA
stopped the processing of his clearance when the contractor involved
notified the Agency it was withdrawing the request because they were not
going to fill the position with Mr. Reidy. This Office advised the ICIG
of the above in May 2014." If, as Jeanette stated on Tuesday, the CIA
OIG did not exhaust its administrative process because it did not
investigate the clearance-related allegations, then this letter
explicitly claiming to have done so is a clear falsehood and evidence of
reprisal by the CIA OIG and is another reason that that office should
not continue to be allowed to investigate itself. If, however, this
letter correctly stated that the CIA OIG did investigate the
clearance-related allegations, then Jeanette misinformed me (in rather
explicit detail) of the nature of the CIA's failure to exhaust, although
I do not know why she would do so. However, both cannot be true,
resulting in the unfortunate but unavoidable conclusion that either the

 CIA OIG or the ICIG have misled us about the nature of this
investigation and/or the reasons for determining that the administrative
process was not exhausted.
5) Jeanette also explained that the ICIG's use of the term "intake" in
the 10 February 2014 letter was significantly more ambiguous than the
normal definition. According to her, the statement, "We are forwarding
the complaint to the CIA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for
intake," does not mean that the CIA OIG was under any duty to
investigate the complaint, and does not even mean that the ICIG
instructed the CIA OIG to investigate the complaint. She stated that
"intake" could simply mean "putting a copy in their files," and that, in
the ICIG's opinion, a perfectly acceptable outcome to the 10 February
2014 referral would be the CIA OIG placing a copy of the complaint in
its files and doing nothing further. This is an extremely troubling
position for any OIG to take, especially one tasked with overseeing the
entire Intelligence Community, and we respectfully request that the ICIG
reverse its position on this and take an unambiguous position that it is
never appropriate for an OIG to simply ignore a referral of a
whistleblower reprisal complaint, and that the ICIG will never consider
"intake" to mean anything less than "proper processing and
investigation" and will clearly impose this rule on the OIGs it oversees.
6) Jeanette also advised me that the ICIG had no intention of allowing
me to sign the non-disclosure agreement referenced by the ODNI Office of
Security in its email to you or be briefed on my responsibilities by
officials from that office as long as the CIA OIG was conducting its new
investigation, "because there is no classified DNI information for me to
look at." By taking the position that, even though the ODNI granted me
an LSA, nobody in the ODNI would allow me to actually review any
classified information "because it's CIA information," the ICIG is
deliberately obstructing Mr. Reidy's ability to communicate with his
attorney, since the ICIG will also not do anything to compel the CIA OIG
to process me for an LSA itself, or even compel it to respond to my
inquiries about the subject. If the position of the ODNI is that my LSA
only allows me to access classified ODNI information, and this case does
not involve any classified ODNI information according to the ICIG, then
the LSA is worthless and was nothing more than a delay imposed by the
ICIG, and I should have been processed for an actual full security
clearance, with reciprocity which would apply to the CIA, as I
originally expected when you instructed me to complete the full SF-86.
I therefore request that the ICIG either (a) reach an agreement with the
CIA OIG which would allow me to review the classified information; (b)
unilaterally grant me access to the unredacted appeal and allow me to
discuss relevant classified information with my client; or (c) process
me for an actual security clearance which the CIA OIG would be forced to

 recognize. Respectfully, this dilemma too would be resolved if the ICIG
would simply recognize that it still retains control over this matter
and can compel the CIA OIG to allow me to represent Mr. Reidy in the
investigation, which would force the CIA OIG to process me for an LSA of
its own. Alternatively, if this complaint is referred to the
congressional intelligence committees instead of the ICIG taking action,
I request that the committees get immediately involved and take whatever
measures are necessary to ensure that I am correctly processed for
access to the classified information at issue in this case, regardless
of which agency it belongs to.
Please consider this email an amendment to the existing PPD-19 appeal
and ICWPA complaint and process it as such, including making a
determination as to whether or not it constitutes an urgent concern and
informing the DNI of that determination within 14 days, so that he may
forward the transmittal within 7 days to the congressional intelligence
committees.
On a related note, as 14 days from the submission of our last amendment
expired yesterday, 11 November 2015, please also advise me as to your
determinations regarding that amendment, so that we may contact the
intelligence committees directly if the ICIG did not determine that that
amendment constituted an urgent concern.
Thank you,
Kel McClanahan
--This electronic mail (email) transmission is meant solely for the
person(s) to whom it is addressed. It contains confidential information
that may also be legally privileged. Any copying, dissemination or
distribution of the contents of this email by anyone other than the
addressee or his or her agent for such purposes is strictly prohibited.
If you have received this email in error, please notify me immediately
by telephone or email and purge the original and all copies thereof.
Thank you.
Kel McClanahan, Esq.
Executive Director
National Security Counselors
"As a general rule, the most successful man in life is the man who has
the best information."
Benjamin Disraeli, 1880

  

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED

Central Intelligence Agency

 

Washington, DC. 20505

JUL 2 5 #2012:

Mr. Kel McClanahan

1200 South Courthouse Rd.
Suite 124

Arlington, Virginia 22204

Reference: Mr. John Reidy
Dear Mr. McClanahan,

'On 21 February 2014, the Intelligence Community Inspector General
(ICIG) contacted the CIA Office of Inspector General (OIG) regarding
claims by your client, John Reidy, that he was the subject of CIA
reprisals. Mr. Reidy alleged these reprisals were the result of his
engaging in whistleblowing activities since his posthIA staff
employment.

In 2010 and 2012, the CIA OIG investigated Mr. Reidy?s complaints
that his terminations from CIA contracts were reprisals. Mr. Reidy?s
allegations were not substantiated. In March and April 2014, the CIA
OIG rewexamined these cases and affirmed the original findings.

Mr. Reidy has also alleged that the CIA stopped processing his
clearance for a position with an industrial contractor in reprisal for
Mr. Reidy contacting the ICIG. Our investigation of that allegation
determined that the CIA stopped-the processing of his clearance when
the contractor involved notified the Agency it was withdrawing the
request because they were not going to fill the position with Mr.
Reidy.

This Office advised the ICIG of the above in May 2014. The ICIG
returned the matter to our office for follow?up with Mr. Reidy. This
office plans to take no further action and considers the matter
closed.

Sincerely,

Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations



 

 

Original Message 
Subject: Status of PPD-19 Request for Appeal i.c.o. John A. Reidy

Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2015 13:39:30 +0000
From: 
To: 'Kel McClanahan, Esq.? i rit I w. 

Mr. McClanahan:

Thanks for your question regarding the status of your client's 
appeal with the IC IG. Upon review of your client's record, the PPD-19
agency review process has not been exhausted. The local agency lG has
agreed to provide a PPD-19 review, which will achieve exhaustion of the
local agency review process. The local lG will be reaching out you and
your client shortly.

After the completion of that lG review, should your client wish to

submit a request for appeal of that review, then the IC IG will consider
the request for appeal in accordance with the ERP procedures.

Dan Meyer

Executive Director for Intelligence Community Whistleblowing Source
Protection 

Office of the Inspector General of the lntelligence Community (IC IG)
Reston 3

Washington, DC. 20511

(571) 204.8003 (202) 253-0284 mobile

IC lG Hotline (855) 731-3260

cia. ni ui. v>

 

 

"Urgent Concern" and Fraud, Waste, Abuse
and Mismanagement Claim
3/6/2017 5:10 PM
John Reidy
To Paul J. Wogaman,

jeanejm@dni.gov

Paul,
I have not received an answer as to who would handle the issues I have with how my case was
handled. I consider the actions taken by the IC IG in connection with my October 21, 2014
whistle blower appeal to be misconduct prohibited by federal fraud, waste, abuse and
mismanagement statutes. I also consider the referral of my case back to CIA without regard to
the inherent conflict of interest to be an act of retaliation prohibited by federal law. An act of
retaliation by an Inspector General's Office is an ‘Urgent Concern’ (50 U.S.C. § 3033(k).
The IC IG has never answered my requests for information on how it considered CIA's written
decision not "exhausted." The IC IG has not provided a rational reason why it failed to follow
ICD 120 twice in not having CIA provide documents within the 2 week time frame cited by the
order not has it explained why it could not meet the 45 day decision to convene a panel. Citing
that as a whistle blower I did not provide the CIA's decision is a very weak answer. The ICIG
has not explained why Dan Meyer or Charles McCullough were involved in my case after the
press reported that Dan Meyer reported to Senator Grassley that CIA IG Buckley did not
adequately investigate a whistle blower retaliation case in July 2014. The IC IG has not
explained why Dan Meyer was allowed to participate in my case after the CIA raised a conflict
of interest issue.
Simply put, the ICIG and the CIA have shown a lack of ethical responsibility several times in
this case. Both offices' integrity is suspect. A conflict of interest (COI) is a situation in which a
person or organization is involved in multiple interests, financial or otherwise, one of which
could possibly corrupt the motivation or decision-making of that individual or organization.
The presence of a conflict of interest is independent of the occurrence of impropriety . Therefore,
a conflict of interest can be discovered and voluntarily defused before any corruption occurs. A
conflict of interest exists if the circumstances are reasonably believed (on the basis of past
experience and objective evidence) to create a risk that a decision may be unduly influenced by
other, secondary interests, and not on whether a particular individual is actually influenced by a
secondary interest.

 A widely used definition is: "A conflict of interest is a set of circumstances that creates a risk
that professional judgement or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by
a secondary interest."
I provided this in a previous email and it bears repeating:
"The CIGIE states that any activity that undermines the integrity of the IG institution is not
appropriate.
Questionable Behavior
1. During my initial emails with Dan Meyer in January 2014, he gave me "advice" on how to
proceed and instructed me to keep it hidden. I am aware that his management reprimanded him
for this act. Both the act by Meyer and the subsequent allowing of Meyer to continue by his
superior undermines the IG. Please report both individuals.
2. In October 2014, I was allowed access to the ICIG SCIF to write my classified appeal. I was
told I would have 3 days. On the third day at approximately noon, I was told by Meyer that I had
to finish my appeal in 1/2 an hour because I had to leave the facility. He said the decision was his
boss's and it was because they had an award ceremony. I had to leave hours before I was
finished. I was told I would be allowed to complete my appeal. I was never given that chance. I
can't see how an award ceremony takes precedence over a whistle blower writing an appeal that
was planned ahead of time. I would like both individual's actions reported. Meyer has my email
explaining my issue with what happened.
3. Meyer routinely failed to provide adequate updates and answer questions related to my appeal.
You will see in his emails that he often stated that he was precluded by regulation and when
asked to provide the regulations and rational, he never followed through.
4. I regularly asked for status and Meyer did not provide it, however, when a Senate staffer asked
for an update on the same issue, Meyer responded immediately. Meter was able to get a response
from CIA within days. This undermines the IG's integrity because it goes against the IG being
independent in both fact and appearance. The whistle blower is ignored but a Senate request is
immediately satisfied. Dan Meyer has the emails.
5. Dan Meyer should have been conflicted out due to his dispute with CIA. Ethically Meyer
should have recused himself. I am aware that it was Dan Meyer's boss who allowed him to stay.
Both the action's of each individual are reportable.
If it turns out that ICIG McCullough made some of these decisions, what is the ICIG process of
reporting these actions?

 Please consider these complaints against the CIA IG for intake:
1. Special Agent Ricardo Martinez's email that stated that the CIA IG did not have the time or
the resources to look into the 80 emails and 53 documents I presented the CIA IG with
highlighting illegal and unethical contracting behavior.
2. The CIA IG made a decision in regards to my PPD-19 complaint without interviewing me nor
collecting any documents. Howard Cox sent me the CIA IG decision. I would like all Special
Agents and CIA IG management involved in this poorly conducted investigation reported.
3. Any decisions made by CIA IG Sharpley in regards to my case or its delays should be
reported.
Per your instruction, I have cc'd the IC IG hotline for all ethical issues.
Please handle all my concerns to the Intelligence Committee as "urgent." They qualify as urgent
because they are acts of reprisal committed by an Inspector General. If there are other reasons for
qualifying these concerns as urgent please do so. I would like all my correspondence with you
and Ms. McMillian attached to a complaint and transmitted to the Intelligence Committees.
1. CIA's inadequate FOIA and Privacy Act - please convey to the committees that these are not
regular FOIA and privacy act requests. These requests are in response to a whistle blower
retaliation complaint. I have filed approximately 20 FOIA and privacy act complaint since
October 2014. I have not received a single government document. This severely interferes with a
whistle blower's abiltiy to seek justice through the executive branch whistle blower system. I
consider it further retaliation.
2. Your remanding the appeal back to CIA - I agree that in normal situations handing a case back
to the local agency is the right move but not in this case. CIA has a history of retaliation against
whistle blowers that the ICIG is aware of. Further, the CIA IG has a history of retaliation against
whistle blowers. The CIA IG also has a history of poor investigations and improper actions
(Director Brennan had to create a committee headed by Evan Bayh because he was unsatisfied
with the CIA IG torture report investigation and CIA IG Sharpley destroyed evidence he was
instructed to preserve). Specifically for my case, the CIA IG has previously stated they did not
have the time or resources to investigate my issues. They made decisions without following
proper investigative technique on the first PPD-19 investigation and they refuse to hand over any
investigative material that can be scrutinized or called into question in a whistle blower
investigation. Yet, the ICIG gave the case back to the CIA IG. As you will see below the CIGIE
has stated that a threats to IG independence include self interest and self review. CIA IG can not
escape the appearance that their objectivity (independence in fact and appearance) has been
compromised.
Below I have added the exact wording of the CIGIE guidance. I will put in BOLD where I think

 actions are reportable.
Office of the Inspector General’s staff shall adhere to the highest ethical principles by conducting
their work with integrity. Integrity is the cornerstone of all ethical conduct, ensuring adherence to
accepted codes of ethics and practice. Objectivity, independence, professional judgment, and
confidentiality are all elements of integrity.
-Objectivity imposes the obligation to be impartial, intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of
interest.
All conflicts of interest by ICIG and CIA IG staff are precluded. Both the individual and
supervisors are responsible for identifying the COI and remedying the situation. Actual conflicts
of interests are potentially mitigated. The appearance of a conflict of interest is also not allowed
and these are almost impossible to remedy by law.
-Independence is a critical element of objectivity. Without independence, both in fact and in
appearance, objectivity is impaired.
Meyer responding to Senate request. CIA IG reinvestigating itself in general and specifically
after I raised a retaliation claim against the CIA IG in my October 2014 appeal.
-Professional judgment requires working with competence and diligence. Competence is a
combination of education and experience and involves a commitment to learning and
professional improvement.
CIA IG practices in general. When the newspaper refers to you as "The Keystone Cops," there is
an issue. There are several instances of incompetence and a failure to be diligent in my case. I
would have more examples but I have yet to receive any CIA IG investigative reports after 4
years.
Diligence requires that services be rendered promptly, carefully, and thoroughly, and by
observing the applicable professional and ethical standards.
CIA IG did not follow applicable professional standards by not interviewing me nor collecting
exculpatory evidence. CIA IG Sharpley and all Special Agents involved should be held to the
standard.
OIG staff should also consult with the Designated Agency Ethics Official or similar official
within their office, agency or organization regarding application of the Ethical Standards.
Please consult with the applicable ethics office on all these items of concern.
In conducting its work, OIG staff must be both independent in fact and in appearance. This

 requires staff to act with integrity and exercise objectivity and professional skepticism and avoid
circumstances that would cause a reasonable and informed third party to believe that staff is not
capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment or that an OIG’s work had been
compromised.
Previously addressed.
The steps to assessing OIG independence are as follows:
1. apply safeguards as necessary to eliminate the threats or reduce them to an acceptable level.
Threats to Independence:
There are generally seven categories of threats that may apply to OIG work:
1. Self-interest: the threat that a financial or other interest will inappropriately influence an
auditor’s judgment or behavior;
2. Self-review: the threat that an OIG employee or OIG that has provided non-audit services will
not appropriately evaluate the results of previous judgments made or services performed as part
of the non-audit services when forming a judgment significant to an audit;
1. Bias: the threat that an OIG employee will, as a result of political, ideological, social, or other
convictions, take a position that is not objective;
I had asked for Ms. McMillian to be removed because of a potential bias involved in her opinion
that whistle blower's do not require legal representation. I do not think it was appropriate for the
subject of a COI claim to respond in her own defense. Also, Dan Meyer previous whistle
blowing activities and his ongoing dispute with CIA may hinder his objectivity.
1. Familiarity: the threat that aspects of a relationship with management or personnel of an
audited entity, such as a close or long relationship, or that of an immediate or close family
member, will lead an OIG employee to take a position that is not objective;
2. Undue influence: the threat that external influences or pressures will impact an OIG
employee’s ability to make independent and objective judgments;
Dan Meyer was susceptible to influence by a Senate staffer. Previously mentioned.
Safeguards:
Safeguards are controls designed to eliminate or reduce threats to an acceptable level, but vary
with the specific facts and circumstances under which threats to independence exist. Safeguards
may exist or develop from various sources, both external and internal. Several noted external
safeguards are created by legislation, regulation, or applicable professional governing bodies.
Internal safeguards are created generally pursuant to OIG policies and practices or entity

 directives.
Examples of internal safeguards include but are not limited to:
(1) OIG selection of a replacement non-impaired auditor,
(2) utilizing separate engagement teams to avoid threats to independence,
(3) implementing secondary reviews, and
(4) involving another OIG or audit organization to perform or re-perform part of an audit. OIGs
should evaluate threats to independence both individually and in the aggregate because threats
can have a cumulative effect on an OIG employee’s independence.
The ICIG should have instituted this safeguard and allowed anothe IG to investigate claims
against the CIA IG and allowed another IG to look at the PPD-19 claim.
GENERAL STANDARDS
DUE PROFESSIONAL CARE
Another general standard for investigative organizations is:
Due professional care must be used in conducting investigations and in preparing related reports.
This standard requires a constant effort to achieve quality and professional performance. It does
not imply infallibility or absolute assurances that an investigation will reveal the truth of a
matter.
This standard requires:
Thoroughness—
All investigations must be conducted in a diligent and complete manner, and reasonable steps
should be taken to ensure that pertinent issues are sufficiently resolved and to ensure that all
appropriate criminal, civil, contractual, or administrative remedies are considered.
CIA IG's PPD-19 investigation failed this requirement.
Impartiality—
All investigations must be conducted in a fair and equitable manner, with the perseverance
necessary to determine the facts.

 All CIA IG investigations fail this requirement because they are one sided. No documents are
presented to the whistle blower to provide evidence. No facts, arguments or rulings can be
scrutinized or called into question.
Objectivity—
Evidence must be gathered and reported in an unbiased and independent manner in an effort to
determine the validity of an allegation or to resolve an issue. This includes inculpatory and
exculpatory information.
CIA IG does not allow for evidence or arguments against their investigation because they do not
provide whistle blowers with their investigations.
Ethics— At all times, the actions of the investigator and the investigative organization must
conform with all applicable standards of ethical conduct.
Timeliness
—All investigations should be conducted and reported in a timely manner.
The CIA IG does not disclose their timeline for investigation regulations and there investigations
drag on.
This is especially critical given the impact investigations have on the lives of individuals and
activities of organizations. Hence, the effectiveness of an investigator depends, in part, on the
promptness of finished work products, such as prepared findings and memorialized witness
interviews.
Whistle blowers are particularly susceptible to damages as a result of lengthy investigations. The
financial impact is devastating. PPD-19 tries to make the process quick by adding language that
should quicken the decision making process. However, after 2 and a half years, I am back to the
appeal being heard. From here it will take a few weeks to decide the ERP decision. Then 6
months for the panel to decide. Then it could take months for the panel's remedies to be carried
out. The process is too long.
QUALITATIVE STANDARDS
1. EXECUTING INVESTIGATIONS
The second qualitative standard for investigative organizations is:
Investigations must be conducted in a timely, efficient, thorough, and objective manner.

 Collecting Evidence
—Evidence should be collected in such a way as to ensure that all known or obviously relevant
material is obtained, the chain of custody is preserved, and the evidence is admissible in any
subsequent proceeding. The validity of information and evidence obtained during an
investigation should be verified. A procedure for the disposal of physical evidence by an
independent party must be followed. When using the work of a specialist, such as criminal
laboratory examiners, computer forensic examiners, and financial experts, investigators should
assess the specialist’s ability to perform and report on the work in an impartial manner and
should understand the scope and objective required of the specialist. Investigators should also
consider the specialist’s professional certification, experience, and relevant standards.
The CIA IG did not collect all evidence when it failed to interview me or collect any of my
documentary evidence."
Thank you,
John Reidy

 Urgent Concern - Failure to Investigate
(Intelligence Operations)
John Reidy
3/25/2017 6:38 PM
To PaulJ.Wogaman, cigie.information@cigie.gov,
s@ic.fbi.gov, DNI-FOIA

icig_complaints@dni.gov,

ic_complaint

Please record this letter as a reporting under 50 USC Section 3033 (k)(5)Complaint of an Urgent
Concern to the ICIG, please include it as part of my complaint to CIGIE and DNI ethics, and
finally as a FOIA/Privacy Act request. Please see applicable paragraphs
Paul,
In October 2014, I filed a complaint with the Intelligence Community Inspector General's Office.
The complaint consisted of a Presidential Policy Directive - 19 allegation, violations of the
Intelligence Community Whistle Blower Protection Act and various other fraud, waste and abuse
claims. It also included information on intelligence operations failures.
The IC IG kept control of my case and sent aspects back to CIA to investigate. To date neither
the CIA IG nor the IC IG has interviewed me or asked any follow-up questions on my reported
intelligence failures. This lack of follow-up is troublesome. Since the IC IG maintained authority
over my case, the responsibility to make sure my claims were investigated rests with you office.
In waiting 2 years and 5 months without asking me for additional information, you are letting
valuable evidence erode to events transpiring years ago. Please process the IC IG's lack of
appropriate follow-up and not enforcing CIA to do so either as an urgent concern. An urgent
concern is defined as:
"A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law Executive order, or deficiency relating to
the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information, but does not
include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters."
Please notify me within 14 days whether this complaint will be referred to the Director of
National Intelligence. If so, please pass on this email in its entirety to both the DNI and the
Intelligence Committees.
CIGIE and DNI Ethics,
Please consider the IGIG's lack of appropriate follow-up as further in evidence that they should
have conflicted out of my case. Just so we are clear, I am not talking about an actual conflict of

 interest (which can be mitigated), I am claiming an apparent conflict of interest that a reasonable
person would recognize. There are no legal remedies nor ways to mitigate this issue.
Also, please consider this a violation of established IG practices. Timeliness is a problem. Not
interviewing me is a problem. The failure to preserve evidence is a problem.
DNI FOIA
I hereby file this FOIA and Privacy Act ("FOIA/PA") request for any/all documents to
demonstrate that the IC IG has investigated any of my intelligence failure claims since October
2014.
As this request is for a small number of pages which are easily locatable, I do not agree to pay
any fees for this request. I do,
however, have no commercial interest in the requested records.
Please release the requested documents in electronic format.
Thank you,
John Reidy

 Failure to Investigate - Whistle Blower
Retaliation Claims (Mantech)
John Reidy
3/25/2017 6:53 PM
To PaulJ.Wogaman, cigie.information@cigie.gov,
s@ic.fbi.gov, DNI-FOIA

icig_complaints@dni.gov,

ic_complaint

Please record this letter as a reporting under 50 USC Section 3033 (k)(5)Complaint of an Urgent
Concern to the ICIG, please include it as part of my complaint to CIGIE and DNI ethics, and
finally as a FOIA/Privacy Act request. Please see applicable paragraphs
Paul,
To date neither the CIA IG nor the IC IG has interviewed me or asked any follow-up questions
on my allegations of whistle blower retaliation against Mantech for reporting illegal and
unethical behavior committed by Raytheon and CIA contract officers. Since the ICIG maintained
authority over my case, the responsibility to make sure my claims were investigated rests with
your office. Please process the IC IG's lack of appropriate follow-up and not enforcing CIA to do
so as an urgent concern. An urgent concern is defined as:
"A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law Executive order, or deficiency relating to
the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information, but does not
include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters."
Please notify me within 14 days whether this complaint will be referred to the Director of
National Intelligence. If so, please pass on this email in its entirety to both the DNI and the
Intelligence Committees.
CIGIE and DNI Ethics,
Please consider the IGIG's lack of appropriate follow-up with the additional documentary
evidence I have supplied.
DNI FOIA
I hereby file this FOIA and Privacy Act ("FOIA/PA") request for any/all documents to
demonstrate that the IC IG has investigated any of my whistle blower retaliation claims against
Mantech since October 2014.

 As this request is for a small number of pages which are easily locatable, I do not agree to pay
any fees for this request. I do, however, have no commercial interest in the requested records.
Please release the requested documents in electronic format.
Thank you,
John Reidy

 Failure to Investigate - Fraud, Waste and
Abuse (Raytheon)
John Reidy
3/25/2017 6:49 PM
To PaulJ.Wogaman, cigie.information@cigie.gov,
s@ic.fbi.gov, DNI-FOIA

icig_complaints@dni.gov,

ic_complaint

Please record this letter as a reporting under 50 USC Section 3033 (k)(5)Complaint of an Urgent
Concern to the ICIG, please include it as part of my complaint to CIGIE and DNI ethics, and
finally as a FOIA/Privacy Act request. Please see applicable paragraphs
Paul,
To date neither the CIA IG nor the IC IG has interviewed me or asked any follow-up questions
on my allegations of inappropriate behavior by Raytheon and CIA contract officers. Since the IC
IG maintained authority over my case, the responsibility to make sure my claims were
investigated rests with your office. Please process the IC IG's lack of appropriate follow-up and
not enforcing CIA to do so as an urgent concern. An urgent concern is defined as:
"A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law Executive order, or deficiency relating to
the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information, but does not
include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters."
Please notify me within 14 days whether this complaint will be referred to the Director of
National Intelligence. If so, please pass on this email in its entirety to both the DNI and the
Intelligence Committees.
CIGIE and DNI Ethics,
Please consider the IGIG's lack of appropriate follow-up with the additional documentary
evidence I have supplied.
DNI FOIA
I hereby file this FOIA and Privacy Act ("FOIA/PA") request for any/all documents to
demonstrate that the IC IG has investigated any of my fraud, waste, abuse claims involving
Raytheon and CIA contract officers contract officers since October 2014.
As this request is for a small number of pages which are easily locatable, I do not agree to pay
any fees for this request. I do,
however, have no commercial interest in the requested records.

 Please release the requested documents in electronic format.
Thank you,

John Reidy

Urgent Concern - Failure to Investigate
Fraud, Waste and Abuse (SAIC, CIA)
John Reidy
3/25/2017 6:45 PM
To PaulJ.Wogaman, cigie.information@cigie.gov,
s@ic.fbi.gov, DNI-FOIA

icig_complaints@dni.gov,

ic_complaint

Please record this letter as a reporting under 50 USC Section 3033 (k)(5)Complaint of an Urgent
Concern to the ICIG, please include it as part of my complaint to CIGIE and DNI ethics, and
finally as a FOIA/Privacy Act request. Please see applicable paragraphs
Paul,
To date neither the CIA IG nor the IC IG has interviewed me or asked any follow-up questions
on my allegations of inappropriate behavior by SAIC or CIA contract officers. Since the IC IG
maintained authority over my case, the responsibility to make sure my claims were investigated
rests with your office. In waiting 2 years and 5 months without asking me for additional
information, you are letting valuable evidence erode to events transpiring years ago. Please
process the IC IG's lack of appropriate follow-up and not enforcing CIA to do so as an urgent
concern. An urgent concern is defined as:
"A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law Executive order, or deficiency relating to
the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information, but does not
include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters."
Please notify me within 14 days whether this complaint will be referred to the Director of
National Intelligence. If so, please pass on this email in its entirety to both the DNI and the
Intelligence Committees.
CIGIE and DNI Ethics,
Please consider the IGIG's lack of appropriate follow-up with the additional documentary
evidence I have supplied.
DNI FOIA
I hereby file this FOIA and Privacy Act ("FOIA/PA") request for any/all documents to
demonstrate that the IC IG has investigated any of my fraud, waste, abuse claims involving
SAIC and CIA contract officers since October 2014.
As this request is for a small number of pages which are easily locatable, I do not agree to pay
any fees for this request. I do,

 however, have no commercial interest in the requested records.
Please release the requested documents in electronic format.
Thank you,
John Reidy

 Failre to Investigate - Fraud, Waste and
Abuse (CIA Contractors)
John Reidy
3/25/2017 7:23 PM
To
PaulJ.Wogaman, cigie.information@cigie.gov, icig_complaints@dni.gov, ic_complaints@i
c.fbi.gov, DNI-FOIA
Please record this letter as a reporting under 50 USC Section 3033 (k)(5)Complaint of an Urgent
Concern to the ICIG, please include it as part of my complaint to CIGIE and DNI ethics, and
finally as a FOIA/Privacy Act request. Please see applicable paragraphs
Paul,
To date neither the CIA IG nor the IC IG has interviewed me or asked any follow-up questions
on my allegations of CIA contractors providing products whose maintenance and design are
inherently flawed and yet they are still charging the government for the products. This is classic
fraud, waste and abuse. Since the ICIG maintained authority over my case, the responsibility to
make sure my claims were investigated rests with your office. Please process the IC IG's lack of
appropriate follow-up and not enforcing CIA to do so as an urgent concern. An urgent concern is
defined as:
"A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law Executive order, or deficiency relating to
the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information, but does not
include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters."
Please notify me within 14 days whether this complaint will be referred to the Director of
National Intelligence. If so, please pass on this email in its entirety to both the DNI and the
Intelligence Committees.
CIGIE and DNI Ethics,
Please consider the IGIG's lack of appropriate follow-up with the additional documentary
evidence I have supplied.
DNI FOIA
I hereby file this FOIA and Privacy Act ("FOIA/PA") request for any/all documents to
demonstrate that the IC IG has investigated any of my claims that CIA contractors provided
products whose maintenance and design were inherently flawed and they are still charged the
government for the products since October 2014.
As this request is for a small number of pages which are easily locatable, I do not agree to pay

 any fees for this request. I do, however, have no commercial interest in the requested records.
Please release the requested documents in electronic format.
Thank you,
John Reidy

 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) file 1338181-0:
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)
Integrity Committee Reports Related to Complaints Against
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector
General David Buckley
Section 1

 OCT.24.2012

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Central Intelligence Agency

•

WashillJl!On, D.C, 20505

Inspector General
. 703-874-2555

23 October 2012

Mr. Kevin L. Perkins
Chairman, Integrity Committee
Council of the Inspectors General
on Integrity and Efficiency
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Room 3973

Washington, D.C.
Dea~

20535-0001

Mr. Perkins;

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. Appendix 3, §ll(d) (4), I am.
referring to the Integrity Committee allegations made against
myself. These allegations are made as I continue to institute
policy and management reforms within the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) , which are
designed to increase the quality and professionalism of the
office.
I have been informed that some members of the OIG
investigations staff have alleged to the CIA Ombudsman that
I have engaged in "c:r:onyism, abuse of my office, misuse of
resources. and waste of funds.n The specific matters reported
to me are:
•

•

I allegedly improperly influenced a Congressionallymandated study of my off ice conducted by the
Inspector General for the Off ice of Personnel
Management,
I allegedly engaged in cronyism in the hiring of
Mr. christopher Sharpley as Deputy Inspector
General, the hiring of I...._______Ias an
IInvestigatione Staff division chief, and the

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Mr. Kevin L. Perkins

•

That I, or Mr. Sharpley acting on my behalf,
allegedly improperly removed certain individuals
from their positions and assigned tnem jobs not
commensurate with their grade and experience.

I will note that I have known Deputy Inspector General
Sharpley since 1981 and that he is a personal friend. However,
the friendship was not the basis for his hiring. The panel
selected Mr. Sharpley as best qualified, based in part on his
experience as a Deputy Inspector General at the Federal Housing
Finance Authority, the Special Inspector General for the
Troubled Asset Relief Program, and in the Off ice of Inspector
General for the Department of Energy.
While I do not believe there are any factual bases for the
allegations, I am requesting that the Committee independently
review them. Some of the complainants also allege age
discrimination. These complaints have been referred by the CIA
Ombudsman to the CIA's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity
(OEEO) .
The Ombudsman has provided my counsel,~I~......-~~~~~~-,...__.
with copies of two of the unsigned complaints.
also has a ~opy of the memorandum regarding the selection of
Mr. Sharpley. The Ombudsman, the Chief of OEEO, and the CIA
Human Resources Office may have other relevant information.
I
lean provide you with any necessary con~act
information.

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If you. need any additional information or have any
questions, please contact!
I
Sincerely,
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b6

David B. Buckley
Inspector General
cc:

Director, Central Intelligence Agency

 Memorandum for the Record
(Anonymous Complaint 

OCT.25.2012

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~
12 October 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
This memorandum for the record outlines specific instances and actions
undertaken during the current tenure of the OIG Inspector General (IG) Dave
Buckley beginning September 2010 to the present that I believe should be brought
to the attention of Director Petraeus. In my opinion, these actions not only fall into
the category of discrimination and hostile work environment, they reveal a pattern
of unethical behavior and abuse of position that impedes the ability of this office to
fulfill its statutory obligations to the Agency at large.

In a reorganization of the INV Staff announced Wednesday, 3 October 2012. I was
placed on an unnamed team that has inadequate substantive work commensurate
with my grade and experience. The standing Deputy AIGI
the
land most of the working-level officers were
Chief, Integrity Division!
blindsided last Wednesday in that neither they nor we were.given a headS-up or
apprised of the reasoning for the abrupt job description and assignment changes.

I

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This reorganization is one of many actions undertaken over the last two years that
constit:ute what I perceive as an ongoing effort by the IG to intimidate some of the
long-serving officers on the INV Staff. I am but one of several officers in INV
being marginalized, and the only message to be taken from this latest action is that
the IG intends to continue making the atmosphere intolerable so that I feel forced
to leave my job.

Notably, at least five other senior officers also were relieved of job responsibilities
that we were hired to do. To the best of my knowledge, none of us has ever been
advised of deficiencies in our work; rather we have received EPAs and other
professional recognition throughout our investigative careers.
'While the IG has great latitude to effect certain changes in staff make up and office
policy, I believe he is targeting me to leave. In a staff meeting on Thursday. 4
October the Acting Assistant IG for Investigations (Acting AIGl)1....._ _ ___
stated that hiring new officers is continuing in anticipation of the departure of
current officers. 1bis statement sounded to me like a warning given that this
statement was made at the staff meeting one day after being blindsided by the
organizational changes.
1

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To date no one on my newly established team has been given information to
understand why we were removed from groups that are responsible for conducting
substantive investigations. In the staff meeting, the Acting AIGI listed some
nebulous duties and t.asks that the new group would undertake, but they are
primarily administrative in nature and have little to do with investigating cases
involving fraud, waste, and abuse.
·
·
1

Generally, remarks directed to the staff by the IG usually include a note of
appreciation for the work we do, but the actions taken since his arrival in Sep 2010
demonstrate the opposite, and they have an element of cruelty and malice that
dishonors the position he occupies. Improvements _to practices and policy, when
clearly articulated and explained, could have been achieved in a transparent, above
··
board, and dignified manner. Instead, the IG has told 7ili floor principals and
Congress he "studiedtt this office and reached a determination that the current staff
lacks the necessary sk.ills training, and authorities to fulfill the OIG mission.
1

Absent information to support his claims, in a May 2011 letter

to ~o~gi:ess, the. IG -:·. :. _·-··

stated that the preponderance of investigations in this office ·appeared to include
violations of federal criminal law. Those officers who have worked here for years
and years can attest that there are some cases involving potential violations of
criminal law but very few have resulted in prosecution, and, the !G's assertions are
misrepresentations of the body of our work. However, contrary to the IG's
representation to Congress, in the limited criminal cases involving Agericy
officers, INV has established an excellent relationship with the Department of
Justice (DoJ) to effectively conclude cases. In fact, prosecutors have.commended
the work of INV officers with whom they have worked.

• In May 20111 INV officers requested a copy of the IG's letter to Congress.
No response was forthcoming on the letter or the IG's study. The letter was
posted to the OIG int.emal website a full year later, following a ~~e .~012 .
hearing during which the IG appeared before the SSCI.
r

• As the IG has continued to lobby to obtain law enforcement authority, the
staff has repeatedly asked for clarification to understand the basis upon
which he detennined that the OIG mission cannot be fulfilled without this
additional authority. Aside from stating the staff is not equipped! the IG has
not articulated any persuasive argument that has merit; rather he has
repeatedly told the staff that other IG's have this authority and he wants it.

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Furthermore, the current JG is determined to have CIA/OIG conform to the
standards of regulatory agency OIGs and that includes obtaining law enforcement
authority.
Congress did not act on the IG s law enforcement proposals but rather p~sed
legislation calling for a review of the current OIG personnel authorities. The
results of the OPM study were posted to the OIG website in early 2012 and further
contributed to the hostile atmosphere. The OPM study contained anecdotal
information provided by only a few officers. Notably, it also contained numerous
factual inaccuracies that the IG has allowed to stand as truthful. Claiming he had ·
no opportunity to comment on the report and had no .hand in \vho ·was interviewed ··: ··· by OPM, the IG managed to further the perception and convey his own assessment
that the cUITent staff as it stands is not equipped to fulfill the OIG nlission.
1

.

~·

'

.

.

While the these events have occurred over a period of two years. the hostility
toward the current staff began with his arrival, and got into full swing when the IG
soon advised that he intended to immediately and.-arbifrarily~own~grade OIG · ·~ '· ·positions. This initiative failed. The IG had attempted to down gi-ade the GS-15s
en masse by using the PRA process. Subsequently, in an early 2011 INV staff
meeting, the IG announced that down grades were not imminent, and that it would
take him a little longer than he planned to implement the changes and
improvements he wished to make.
Below is a summary of the actions undertaken to date that have contributed to the
hostile atmosphere in INV t and which are indirectly and directly curtailing my
ability and contributions in advancing the OIG mission.
• Efforts by the IO to arbitrarily downgrade positions in INV. The majority of
the officers in this group are over the age of 40, and this is discrimination.
With the failure of this initiative, the IG has generally displayed frustration· · ·
and a level of contempt at the few staff meetings he has joined when officers
have attempted to obt.ain more information to better understand where he fs ·
taking the staff and why.
• Abruptly relieving certain managers and investigators of substantive

investigative case work.

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• Changes in policy and practices are presented as edicts. Simultaneously, the
IG seemingly asks for input and says he has an open door, but it is clear he is
not open to listening. (Questions submitted to the IG via MAG reps in May
2011 have never been fully addressed with the staff. The IG said he
objected to the tone of the officers' written questions.)
• No basis for the IG~s proposal to obtain law enforcement authorities other
than denigrating the current staff so that it appears to outsiders (7th Floor and
Congress) that we are unskilled, untrained, and inept at doing our job. The ·
body of work produced by this office speaks for itself. It ha·s ·coiis!Steritly ·
withstood the scrutiny of both internal (Personnel Evaluation Boards) and
ext.eroal (Congress) customers. I would ask anyone-who seeks objective,
independent assessment of tbe work produced here to sit
~ith U.S.
·.
Attorney I
IIn response to a query from the IG, I
Ipraised,.··.. -·· ·· ·:·:b7C
·bG
the professionalism, thoroughness, and quality he found in examining-···. ·. · · .. : .. · ·
numerous investigations completed by officers in ·iNv: :· ··-·· ··' -· ' ·· -,:--~

down

an

• Metrics with an emphasis on cases concluding in prosecutions and recovery
of funds. Evidence of the direction the IG appears to be taking this office is
the criminal case cited in the most recent issue of ''Wbae s Newsu (October
2012). I was told that at the commencement of this case,I
I
aggressively sought prosecution of this case. Subsequently, when the"t.J.S . . ·
District Court agreed to prosecute the case, the lead OIG investigator was
feted with a tee-shirt at an INV staff meeting to celebrate the officer's ''first
collar.'' Printed on the shirt in a foreign language was the equivalent of ''I
came, I saw, I got a conviction (or collar).', There is now obvious glee when
someone's life is ruined.
·
• Refusal by the IG to acknowledge that INV has long-establiShed protocols
and a working policy manual. This a-historical posture remains as his
position. despite the findings of a mock peer review· conducted in late 201 l.
That review found that the INV manual generally was in compliance with
standards set by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
·
Efficiency (CIGIB). Subsequently, upon his August 2012 arrival and
without reviewing the current INV manual, the new Deputy IG Chris
Sharpley, an external hire, declared that the Department of Energy (DoE)
investigations manual was going to be the new prototype for the INV
manual (ignoring the fact that DoE is a regulatory agency and we are not).
4

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Again, as recently as Se tember 2012, the De uty IG and newly-named
Actin De u AIGI
both claimed the INV manual is out of compliance.
...___....-....-....---....-....-----'
However, when queried for specifics so that immediate steps could be taken
to self correct deficiencies, the Deputy AIOI could not identify a single
practice or policy that required immediate correctio1i. · When one
··
investigator dared to raise the fact that certain elements in the existing
manual where INV fell short primarily related to law enforcement authority
(not yet granted to the CWOIG), the new Deputy AIGI shut down that · ·
officer's comment.
• The hiring and detailee process for selecting managers in INV has beeri used
for appearance sake only. Three of three new manager5.broughtinto OIG
are p~rsonal friends and/or former colleagues of the IG; all three··are external · ·
hires. Two of these individuals had previously served on the external
·
advisory board stood up by the IG upon his arrival in September 2010.
Acknowledging the existence, or at least the appearance·, a_ conflict ~f- . ,- ·
interest, the Deputy IG joined our 4 October INV st.aff meeting and
-emphasized several times that the newly-appointed Acting AIGI and Acting
Deputy AIGI were neither his personal friends nor were they former work
colleagues. He clarified that he had only known of them by their
reputations; the Deputy IG did not raise the'fact that he and the Deputy AIGf ·
are personal friends of the IG. Realizing this is hearsay, I believe the
circumstances surrounding the compensation and bonus package(s) these
managers may have received could be inappropriate at the least.

t

of

The reorganization announced last week is the latest in a series of.intimioarjrig anc!.
bullying tactics employed to move out current INV staff members an'.d make room
fol hew hires:- Management and oversight of all the substantive case work has
been delegated to the new "acting" Deputy AIGI who was detailed to the OIG in
March 2012. A number of officers on the existing staff, including me, have
essentially been marginalized so that we will leave and the IG can pursue an
agenda of appearing to address shortcomings here that primarily exist because he
has declared it so. By these actions, the IG has successfully achieved his goal of
effectively removing four investigators and two senior managers from their
positions.
By ~tering the conditions of my job description and. consequently, my
employment, I believe the condu~t of the IG and Deputy IG is offensive and an
abuse of the trust placed in them by virtue of the positions they hold. In summary,
5

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this is a continuing trend of the hostile work environment resulting from the IG' s
actions.
cc: OEEO
Agency Ombudsman

r·

 Memorandum for the Record
(Anonymous Complaint 

OCT.25.2012

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October 2012
To:

Whom it may concern

Subject:

Ongoing mobbing, career assassinations,
misuse of position, abuse of resources and more all charismatically executed by the CIA,
Off ice of the Inspector General

Backgroun.d: In the fall of 2010, David B. Buckley, a ·former Air
Force Sergeant turned politician, became the Inspector General
(IG). Until that point, CIA Senior Intelligence Services (SIS)
officer and former Deputy IG,
served as the
acting IG since early 2009, when long time CIA officer and IG,
John L. Helgerson, PhD, retired.

I

I

Agenda: Upon arrival, Buckley's agenda included a review of the
OIG investigative (INV) operation and function. This review was
conducte~ by an external advisory board comprised of friends of
Buckley under preconceived notions that the INV lacked
sufficient resources, principally qualified personnel t~ do the
job. This mockery study was then used to justify a 12 May 2011
letter to Dianne Feinstein, Chainman, Select Committee on
Intelligence, united States Senate, advising that for the OIG to
•effectively carry out the responsibilities to investigate
evidence and allegations of criminal conduct against agency
officers ... the OIG requires new statuto:ry authorities and skills
of personnel trained and designated as federal law enforcement
officers ... " In his letter I Buckley also stated: \\in order to
recruit, train, and maintain a cadre of experienced professional
criminal investigators, it is necessary to designate certain
positions· as primary and secondary law enforcement officers.•
GS-05-SIS.'' Furthermore, Buckley stated that it was ftdangerous•
to conduct such criminal investigations without law enforcement
authority and without the properly trained criminal
investigators.
In addition, following congressional legislation calling for a
review of the CIA OIG's authorities, Buckley orchestrated a
study by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) that
highlighted the -CIA OIG investigators lack basic training in
conduct:ing criminal investigations.'' The study ali:;o noted that,
1

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the "average age of CIA OIG investigators is Sl, versus 41 in
the ~est of the OIG community." In sum, based on anecdotal
input from a few selected officers, the OPM study concluded that
the current CIA/OIG/INV staff is not qualified to conduct
criminal investigations.

The OPM report is not factually accurate. It misrepresents the
qualifications, skills, and expertise of tbe investigations
staff and the substantive work conducted by the staff; and it
does not include the sources of their findings beyond the few
interviews cited. .Anecdotal data includes interview$ of two or
more selected OIG investigators, who aspire to carry loaded
weapons and handcuffs on the job. These same investigators
claim that their lives were end~ngered at least on one occasion
when these investigators, without the proper jurisdiction and/or
proper coordination with management and the appropriate local
authorities, conducted investigative·activities that were
outside the boundary of long established OIG/INV policy and
protocol.

The OIG/INV consists of a

mi~ture

of very competent
professionals, who are highly trained and experienced criminal
in~estigators with backgrounds that range from FBI, secret
Service, Air Force OSI, Army Criminal Investigations/CID (and
more) and of senior Agency officers with deep rooted
institutional knowledge and expertise that range from financial
officers to contracting, clandestine, intelligence, and more.
Working as one team, this highly professional intelligent staff
and skilled criminal investigators has conducted some of the
most complex and highly sensitive criminal inveetigations in the
entire intelligence community. Their findings are unassailable.
Many of these investigations are well known by the CIA Director
and have withstood the scrutiny of other high ranking officials,
to include congressional oversight committee.
In direct contrast to the assertions in the OIG's May 201l
letter to Senator Feinstein and in the OPM study, DOJ special
prosecutor!
!recently provided feedloack to IG Buckley
and DIG Sharpley on the body of investigative cases completed by
thie Office involving the Agency's detention and interrogation
program. When queried by the IG on areas for improvement with
respect to the work completed by INV staff, Durham h~d only

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positive remarks about what he found in the work effort and
s'cl,stantive reports produced by INV officers. In fact, \IJe were
advised in a recent INV staff meeting thatl
!said he found
the work on chese very complex cases to be of the highesc
quality, thorough, and professional.

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Cases/investigations of wrongdoing involving Agency programs and
operations are highly sophisticated and require highly educated,
highly intelligent, highly skilled and astute investigators. As
the May 2011 letter to Senator Feinstein points out, Buckley
believes that he needs junior level law enforcement/gun carrying
investigators to accomplish the mission. For him this is a
political dimension not- about the mission, . bv.t a conduit to put
a stamp on something during his brief journey at the CIA .
. Buckley's power agenda has greitly eranded afte:t" he
successfully ushered Deputy IG
out th~ door. He then
filled that position with one of his cronies and a member of the
external adviso:cy board, Christopher Sharpley, who is also an
· ··Air Force reservist and federal employee ;i:-eti:r;ed.
In September 2012, a short span after Sharpley's arrival,
Buckley announced thatl
Assistant Ipspector General
for Investigations (AIGI) had been.called to serve on an
Agency's ne·w1y created task force. This announcement was made
under the pretense that the task force desperately needed
!expertise and thatl
lwould be leaving his post in
O!G to serve in a more critical po'sition; we later lea:rned was
by far a stretch of the truth. Upon making the announcement,
Buckley said that he now faced the challenge of having to choose
an Acting AIGI.

I

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I

On September 24, Sharpley-announced that
l<another long time friend of Buckley) was designated
as the Acting AIGI. Sharply also announced thatl
(another long time friend) had been selected to serve as "second
deputy" AIGI. 'Because OIG/!NV already h~cumbent Deputy
(DAI'GI) since 2004, Sharpley stated that L___J "will join DAIGI
lin addressing ongoing critical investigative mission
requirements."
More·.Announcem.euts:

I

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I

I

.__~~----I also served as a member of Buckley's external advisory

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board (mentioned earlier) concluding that this OIG lacks the
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resources and has no qualified investigative staff to accomplish
the job and fulfill the OIG mission·. I
Iwas subsequently
ch 012 as an executive staff advisor
f rorn
Off ice of
Inspector General. Since his arrival,
has occupied an
office space in INV, while his official capacity in OIG remained
elusive, except for serving as note taker during INV staff
meetings. And in a recent INV staff meeting, Deputy IG Sharpley
noted that I
lhas responsibilities outside OIG/INV but oddly
provided no description regarding those duties.
On October 4, 2012, Sharpley andc==)stated that !NV was
undergoing organizational changes. They announced the cessation
of the Integrity Division effective immediately and the creation
of the leak investigative unit comprised of approximately four
senior staff members. These four staff members are mostly
senior ·and older· investigative personnel, including the senior
SIS and former chief of the Integrity Division. I
I, the
incumbent DAIGI was designated as head of the leak
investigations team. There is one problem: thi~ OIG has no
ongoing leak investigations. So, these senior special agents
and managers hardly have any meaningful reasons to show up to
work, except for preserving their spaces until they are
:·graciously·.ushered out the door by Buckley ·and/or Sharpley.
In addition, Sharpley and c=]specified thatl
~cting
Deputy, would oversee the entire investigative st~ff and would
be responsible· for ··all INV recruitment effo;r;t;:~ (previously
conducted by the Integrity Division Chief, now fired in place).
Sharpley stated these changes began over a year ago (unknown to
the staff) "but have accelerated with my arrival.n He added
that. ~these changes are only the beginn~ng.~_.Sharpley andc==]
noted that these changes are necessary to meet the standards
because we will be· "peer reviewed" and as of now, ''we are not in
compliance.n The INV staff however, has never been informed of
any particulars, or what exactly is or is not in compliance.
Since his arrival, Buckley has added several new positions to
the existing management layers under him and has created a
system of absolute autocracy. These layers, in addition to the
various career assassinations that he devised in lieu of firing
the existing management due to cercain legal restrictiona, h~ve
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contributed ~o inefficiency and lack of productivity at
taxpayers' expenses. Buckley has also added several new
investigator positions that are highly questiona.Ple. The
majority of these investigators have nothing to do or cases to
investigate. They report to work to warm up their chairs and
keep their space$ in INV. Acting AIGI c==J"told the staff that
new staff would continue to be hired in anticipation of some
current staff reciring in the future.

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The OIG/INV currently has two managers that have been relieved
of their duties and have virtually no place or subscantive work
in INV. The new table of organization says it all. These
·· managers ·are being targeted in a manner to effectively force
them to resign or retire so that Buckley can hire more friends
in their places. The morale is extremely low in INV and these
recent announcements have further aggravated an already hostile
work environment.
During his meeting with the INV staff on October ·4·,· ·2012,
··Sharpley told ·the staff: "make sure your perforrtlance is there
and your prof ess~onalism is there - I will do everyth~ng ! can
-~·ta· help you find a:· position in the Agency - we will be peer
reviewed - we need ·to meet the standards - if you don't want to
be on board see me --·I will use my contacts to help you find a
j o:P. ,,
In brief, this Inspector General fosters an environment that is

extremely hostile. He has successfully entr~nched himself with
cronies in a self asserted centralized regulatory body that may
easily qualify as the highest authoritarian hierarchy within
CIA. This is the result of misuse of position, abuse of
resourcea, including unnecessary use of IG suk>poenas,
corruption, waste of taxpayers' funds, and more. These are the
very elements that an IG is expected to pr~vent and protect the
Agency against.
An in depth/internal investigation should be launched
immedia'f:"ely· to ""unmask the corruption, stop the mobbing, and

restore an OIG that the officers of CIA expect and deserve.
Sincerely

5

 Memorandum Regarding the
Selection of Mr. Sharpley

OCT. 25. 2012

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Memorandum For The Record
From:

David B. Buckley
Inspector General,
Central Intelligence Agency

Subject:

Deputy Inspector General Candidate
Selection

Position Number:

AA079
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Former Incumbent:

I

Interview Advisory Panel: Chairperson- David B. Buckley,
OIG, I
C/HR {Female
Representative),
I D/GC,
I
loo/Ncs '{Minority
Representative) .1
l(sp) .
HR Represe~tative:~I~~~~~I DIR/HR

~

l.

This memorandum is intended to serve as
formal documentation of the candidate selection process
for the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) position for the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) .

2.

Background: The DIG position was advertised
through the CIA's internal agency vacancy system and was
also posted on the external IG vacancy website. The
OIG's advertisement yielded broad interest and
ultimately, a competitive pool of contenders.
Consequently, interest was expressed by a total of
fourteen applicants {10 external and 4 agency internals).
As a preliminary measure each applicant's package was
assessed against the required qualifications as outlined
in the vacancy notice. The most qualified applicants, a
total of six, were recommended for the second phase of
the competitive selection process, which included an
interview with the IG and his Selection Advisory Panel.

3.

The interview process was limited to thirty
minutes. Each candidate was asked to respond to a
standard set of questions. Based on the int:erv_iew and a
review of the applicant's qualifications the panel
concluded that two of the applicants were the most:
qualified. The panel also provided the following
commentary co substantiate their decisions:

Christopher Sharpley - Mr. Sharpley
possesses thirty years of cumulative public service, which
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P.3

States Air Force and ten years of Government sector. While
serving in the military, Mr. Sharpley served as a
counterintelligence officer and commander. He has also served
in command IG and oversight positions with the Federal Housing
Finance Administration (2010 - present), us Treasury (20032009), Department of Energy (2001 - 2002). Mr. Sharpley is
also a Presidential Rank Award Recipient (Meritorious Category
2010 and 2002). The panel recognized Mr. Sharpley's
substantive experience with leading and instituting largescale oversight initiatives to augment organi~ational
operations. They also noted his consistent track record of
sustained superior performance specifically while managing
issues of extreme complexity and sensitivity. The IG endorsed
the panel's recommendations and also recognized Mr. Sharpley
as being the mos~ qualified candidate.
OIG Selection: Christopher Sharpley
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 OCT.25.2012

11:33AM

OIG

N0.210

P.4

.-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~b3

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David B. Buckley
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency

per CIA

 November 1, 2012
Chairman
CIGIE Integrity Committee
935 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Room 3973
Washington, DC 20535-0001

Dear Mr. Chairman:
It is my responsibility to bring the following two examples of possible

misconduct at the CIA OIG to your attention. I request your assessment,
investigation, and action, as appropriate.
First issue - The new Deputy IG (D/IG) at CIA is Chris Sharpley. He was
selected as the D/IG at CIA working for his friend, and fellow former
AFOSI agent, the IG, David Buckley. Following his selection at CIA, Mr.
Sharpley retired from another OIG. Reportedly, Mr. SharpleY, received a
$10.000 recruitment bonus as an inducement to work at CIA. I

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Like others, I question whether the applicability of the circumstances of Mr.
Sharpley's bonus is consistent with the terms and conditions of the I
I
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ICIA administrative guidance. Due to the extended
friendship of Mr. Buckley and Mr. Sharpley, should Mr. Buckley be
conflicted from seeking or facilitating a bonus for Mr. Sharpley? It is not
apparent what was known by those who had a role in proposing, assessing or
approving the bonus. Did they know that Mr. Sharpley intended to retire
from another Agency and that a bond of friendship existed with M. Buckley?
Was there an assertion that Mr. Sharpley required this or any inducement to
come to CIA as the D/IG? I encourage you to review the circumstances of
this alleged bonus and determine whether there was a false statement made
by Messer' s Buckley or Sharpley in order to justify it.

1

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Monday, November 05, 2012 7:31 PM
IFW: Referral of Anonymous
I
Complaint Re. IG, CIA

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:

[Untitled].pdf

Hi ... I think this e-mail goes to you.
-----Original Messa:e----From:
~~
----1
Sent: Monday, Novem er 05, 2012 12:22 PM
To: I
I
Subject: Referral of Anonymous Complaint Re. IG, CIA
LI...................................

....................-.....................,..,......,.,.,.......,.,.,.............................

Per our phone conversation, the ICIG is forwarding the attached anonymous complaint
against the Inspector General, CIA for action as the CIGIE deems appropriate. Due to our
close working relationship with the CIA Office of the Inspector General, the Office of the
ICIG must recuse itself from this matter.
It is my understanding that Mr. Buckley also received a copy of this complaint. If I can
be of any assistance, please contact me at the number below.
Respectfully,

Senior Investigator
Office of the Intelligence Community
Inspector General

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INSPECTOR GENERAL SENSITIVE INFORMATION
The information contained in this e-mail and any accompanying attachments may contain
Inspector General sensitive information, which is protected from mandatory disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 USC §552. Matters within IG records are often predecisional in nature and do not represent final approved government policy. Dissemination is
prohibited except as authorized under 50 USC §403-3h. Do not release outside of government
channels without prior authorization from The Intelligence Community Inspector General. If
you are not the intended recipient of this information, any disclosure, copying,
distribution, or the taking of any action in reliance on this information is prohibited. If
you received this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail.

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October 2012

Dear Sir/Madam:

l am reluctantly submitting this anonymous five page document in the hopes that your
office will review the following issues that are plaguing the Office of Inspector General
(OlG), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). I aml
land I
am deeply concerned about the policy and personnel changes being made by Mr. David
Buckley, the Inspector General. I have not revealed any classified information in this
complaint and all names are of overt officers.
While my concerns may or may raise legal issues, taken in its entirety, Buckley's tenure
at the CIA has created an atmosphere of mistrust, confusion and anger amongst the
Investigators. As a result of recent directed managerial changes, these issues are now
hindering the successful operation of our mission and are affecting the quality of our
work. As a result, the CIA employees and the public are not receiving the best possible
results. Therefore, l would like to raise the allegations of misuse of position, favoritism,
abuse of power, improper personnel actions, creating a hostile work environment and
wasting financial resources against Buckley.
I was in this office prior to his arrival and now, due to Buckley's managerial style, I. am
now contemplating leaving the office and career that I love. I never imagined having to
report a manager for misconduct, as I always try to address issues directly and face-toface. That attempt has been made in this office, but has failed. Therefore, I have no
·
other choice than to report it.
The CIA is treated different that other Federal Agencies - for a good reason. Our
mission is unlike any other Agency.
Since his first day in office, Buckley has harped on obtaining "law enforcement
authorities" for Investigators. This is not supported by all Investigators - many of us
came to this office specifically because it was not a "cop shop."
Buckley initiated an OPM IG study on the issue, which in June 2012, found in his favor,
but that was based the supporting information was supplied by Buckley. The OPM
investigators did not speak to any Investigator and the "criminal" case examples
presented to OPM were all by the same Investigator, who has .a reputation of being a
cowboy and placing himself in unnecessarily dangerous positions. You will note that
the report's footnotes do not include any reference to speaking or meeting with
investigators, only Buckley. Except footnotes like 181, which refer to an "internal Email"
- which is from the one cowboy investigator mentioned above.
Many investigators in this office are concerned that Buckley will hire criminal
investigators that will become too aggressive in conducting their investigations and will
bog down on-going and future CIA missions in needless IG bureaucracy and

 investigations. He has already begun hiring more investigators then is required for our
mission - a waste of funds.
One recently-hired investigator came from
She has
yet to receive a single case and is now working the team revising our investigations
manual. We have three more recently hired investigators coming into to Investigations.
There simply is not enough work (or space) for all of us - another reason why current
investigators have such low morale.

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Buckley is not a career CIA employee, having arrived at the Agency approximately three
years ago. Within that time, he has replaced our entire chain of command, who were all
Senior Intel Ii ence Service (SIS) Officers including
Ia Division Chief,
a De12ut Assistant Inspector General for Investigations (DAIGI),
!-------..........and
both Assistant Inspector General for Investigations
.....,..,,..,..,,,,..,.,....-...,....-------...,.,...___,,~
(AIGI), and
the Deputy Inspector General (DIG).
All these individuals were career CIA SIS officers and well respected within OIG and the
Agency. While I certainly recognize the ability for an IG to be able to choose his or her
own staff, it has become clear to us that Buckley has an agenda to remove career CIA
officers and replace them with personal friends from outside the CIA. As a result, the
OIG is losing a deep well of institutional knowledge and "inside" experience that has
served the CIA extremely well over the years. It is hard to fathom that four levels
between Buckley and his investigators have been removed and replaced within three
years.
Of course, there is also the personal side of the matter - five dedicated, motivated and
intelligent CIA SIS officers have been "involuntarily" removed, something that I would
imagine has not occurred previously in their careers. Could all of these managers have
been poor leaders or investigators which required such a drastic personnel action?
Their careers and personal lives are permanently scarred.
Of course Buckley will claim that these five SIS officers were not performing up to
standard, which is ridiculous. A review of each officer's career and work history will
certainly show their value to the CIA and the OIG.
Buckley will also claim that the officers were not fired or removed, but found other
opportunities. That is not true and it is simply act of "covering the tracks" by a very
astute and political sawy Presidential Appointee.
Early in his tenure, Buckley initiated an External Advisory Board (EAB) to review OIG's
operations. The four members of the EAB were friends of Buckley. Two members of
the EAB, Chris Sharpley andl
now work at OIG. This certainly speaks of
favoritism and a conflict of interest.

I

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who had been in the position for
About six weeks ago, Buckley fired the AIG!I
about a year. Though it was announced that the officer would be heading to another
"critical" position within the A enc , it was understood that he was not leavin
voluntaril . In fact
...._
It now appears that

________________________

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 critical job fell through and he remains in his office today - though not working on IG
matters, because an "acting" AlGl is in place.

la recent outside hire that Buckley made
Buckley replaced the AIGI withl
tvvas serving as a Division Chief, but was elevated above the
about 18 monthsc5
DAIGll
and
to become the "acting" AIGI.

I

Sharpley is the now the DIG, replacing._!_

__.la long serving and well respected DIG.

was initially the Executive Advisor to the Investigations Program. He was recently
named the DAIGI for Investigations, overseeing all on-going investigations, though he
has been at the Agency only since March 2012 Thjs js a newly created position. which
was not adyertjsed It js well s1eculated that

I

Buckley recently reorganized OIG Investigations from four divisions to three. WhileD
was moved up to AIGI, a Senior Investigator is his acting replacement as Division Chief.

.___. .Iwho was a Division Chief, was removed and now holds an ambiguous
investigative role in the Support Division with no management responsibilities.
The third Division Chief remained in place, but had previously announced his retirement
in May 2013.

,______,~as the long-serving OAIGI, was "down graded" to the equivalent of Davison
Chief, of a support division. For some reason, she was not selected to become the
"acting" AIGI, even though she has been the DAIGI for many years.

I

Therefore, in the Investigation Division today, there are three senior SIS officers
~ho must face the embarrassment of having been downgraded a....n_d...,./o_r_....
fired, but remain in place. This is totally unprofessional and shows no respect for their
rank, careers, their excellent past performance and OIG. It is my understanding that
did not know of their removal until lltold them during a management
meeting. Buckley did not speak to them privatel/or·~efore others found out.

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As a result of these changes, the Investigations Staff is confused and upset, which is
greatly affecting our work environment. Here is what many Investigators predict will
eventually occur:
becomes the AIGI
""="---,------,.,.,...,........w1 retire m em arrassment, frustration and disgust
Buckley will have replaced the entire Investigations staff with friends and external
candidates

Finally, Buckley is ordering the replacement of Investigations case management
system. The current system was put in place three years ago after much work and
expense - including purchasing many "stand alone" terminals for the staff. Special

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 Agen~

lhad the task of making changes to the system and worked with
management and the contractor to make expensive upgrades.

l1eft the position as office POC, because it was taking up too much time,
Whenl
the case management system fell under Special Agend
who has since
left the CIA, did not understand the system a~d in~tead of !eamj:~ jt recommend~d that
_
Ito work with a
the entire system be replaced. Buckley appointed_
strong y recommended the
contractor to create an entire new system. While
current system be maintained, he was overruled. Today, the current case management
system remains in use, however there is no instruction to newly arrived personnel and
our IT staff is not trained on it. This is a waste of the start-up costs, hundreds of
thousands of dollars by Buckley.

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I am very, very sorry someone has to review all this detail, therefore to provide some
support, I posed the following questions:
•

Why has Buckley only hired external candidates to be managers in
Investigations?
Why wer
really removed? (The
question must be asked to these officers, and not Buckley.)
How can Buckley remove five SIS officers in such a short period? Our entire
chain of command has been removed and we have no idea why or what direction
the office is heading.
Why did Bucklley hire
of the four members of his External Review Board?
(Sharpley and
Were these really the best candidates? Does this cross
the threshold of conflict of interest or favoritism? By appearance, it certainly
does.
Why was I
Without competition? He came
from a very small office with a tiny criminal case load, so there were certainly
better qualified candidates if an Executive Advisor was really required.
Why is ~
lnow overseeing all investigations when he has only been at the
CIA a very short time?I
I
...-~~~~~~~~~~~~~----.

•
•

•

•

•

•
•
•

•
•

10

Why was
not made acting AIGI, oncel
lwas removed?
Why was
a friend of Buckley, "promoted" to acting AIGI, though he was
outranked by
and has very limited CIA experience?
Why does Buckley treat the removed SIS officers with so little respect, in that he
did not discuss their removals with them personally and now has them working in
the same office, but in a fowng~aded position?
Why didn't Buckley allow
o remain a Division Chief and replace the other
Division Chief who will be retiring in a few months?
Why did Buckley order a new case management system to be created and
purchased while the current system is perfectly acceptable - and could be
~d if required? Many thousands of dollars in start-up costs were wasted.
L___Jshould be included in this discussion)

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 •

•

Why would Buckley allow a new case management system to be purchased
when thousands of dollars were spent on the current system, with upgrades paid
for just last year?
Why are so many investigators being hired, when the number of cases is not that
high? A comparison of the number of cases per investigator would be telling.

Please review these allegations. Additionally, I request that an external entity come info
the OIG to conduct a sensing session for all investigators. It would surely help us.

Thank you.

 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) file 1338181-0:
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)
Integrity Committee Reports Related to Complaints Against
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector
General David Buckley
Section 2

 l.TNC:I,.,,A.SSIFTED//~/IG SENSITIVE INFORMATION

Joseph s. Campbell
Chrur, Integrity Co1nn1lttee
Council for the Inspector General
On Integrity and Effldency
935.Pennsylvania Ave. , NW; Roorn 3973
Washington, .D, ()• .20535
SUBJ:F)CT: Reprj:sal Complaint Against CIA IG Officials... ICW&SP-D-1504

Dear Mr. Campbell:

(U/ ~) On 2 December 2014. the Office of the inspector General of
the lntelli enceCommuni . C IG received a com · laint on the IC IG hotline

fro11___r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J
assigned to . . . .. . ..... ·. . . . ...·. . .
. ... .... lnhis fonnal co-rnpla1nt
(attached).. healleges that Mr. David B. Buckley, CIA Inspector General, Mr.
Christopher Sharpley. Deputy Inspector General; I
I.Assistant
Inspector General for Investigations, and his imri:lediate supervisor. Speeial
!reprised against him fo~
IAgent in Charge.I

...._~~~~~~~

.
{U/~This complaint includes allegations of n1isconduct by covered
IG personnel; therefore. we are referring this cornpla.int to yon as Chair of the
Integdty Corrp::nittee, for the Council of lri$pectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIEJ for review and <.lctton in accordance with the Inspector
General Act of Hl78, ·as an1ended, the Intelligence .Comn1unity Whistleblower
Protection Act, as .a mended, and Presidential Policy Directive - 19 {PPD~ 19),
Protecting '\.Vhistleblowers with.Access to Classified. Information.....
I . ,. . . -. ,.,. ______.
consented to our releasing his name and contact information to the CIGIE
Integrity Committee.

tJNCLASS.IFTED/

~ /IG

SENSl'I'IVE INFORM.'\T!ON

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 UNCLASSIFIED//~ /IG

SENSITIVE INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Reprisal Complaint Against CIA IG Officials- lCW&SP-D-1504

u

SUMMARY OF REPRISAL COMPLAINT:

(home
telephone number
alleges that t 1e J.A Inspector General.
Deputy Inspector Ge11eraJ, Assistant. Inspector General for InvestWations (AIGI),
and his immediate supervisor, S ecial ent in Char e,
re •· rised a• amst hi:rn b
He

L..-..,,...------------..---------.....---.------~.--.---_J

~a~l~le-•.•••_e_s~.----------------------------....1...-

-------._.....-__,....,....______,,.....,by the CI.A Inspector General, Deputy
Inspector General, Assistant Inspector General for Investi ations, and his
itnmedlate s11 . ervisor S •ecial A· ent m Chat·. e,
He states that

u

Further

states that he

i---------------.-------------__._{~NOTE: The
L..-___________
__.met with
regarding the
potential investigative misconduct allegations and subsequentl referred these
alle .ations to the De••• artrnent of Justice for review..} A ain,
states
cairns a 1e
-...,,-------....,....-------------------__.1
informed his trnrnediate supervisor,
on "several occasions" that

.he reported the alleged wrongdoing ·of the Cl.A IG, Depttty HJ, and AIGI to the
appropriate authorities.,
_ ___.H........._.J/....,.~.
Istates that onl
told htmFinallvJ
to~l..._,.,_ _ _ ____,_"-"-=..;.._;;,---"-"-.;..;.;.L,----------I,

2

UNCLASS I FIED/~/IG

SENSITIVE INFORMATION

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 UNCLASSIFIED/~/IG SENSITIVE INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Reprisal Complaint.Against CIA IG Officials-- lCW&SP~D-1504

(Uf~ Ifyou have any questions regarding this referral, please
contact the IC IG Executive Director for Whistleblowing .and Source Protection,

I

la~

Deps1ty lnspcctp:r

I

u·e:ner~11,

Ofllce of the Ir:ispector General of the
Int.elliger1ce-t;ommunity

Attachment:

(U/~Letter.I

Ito Mr. I. Charles McCullough Ill,

Subj: Formal Coxnplaint of Reprisal (Dec. 2, 2014)

UNCLASSIFIED/~I~ SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

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2 December 2014

Mr. I. Charles McCultough Jlf

Inspector General of the lnte!Hgence Community

I

Washington. D.C. 20511

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SUBJECT: Formal Complaint of Reprisal

1.
(U) • •·By this letter I wish to formally file a complaint .of \/Vhistleblower
Reprisal and repqrt a violation of the Intelligence Community V\fhistleb!owet Protection
Act (lCWP·.A) .by
Central lotel!iqence Agency's Office of Inspector Generali. ......... . I

jbe

November2014,
.·
.....· ..·. .
. ..·. ·.. . .
.. .. . . .
!Headquarters
Operations Section, Investigations Staff, Office of Inspector General, Central
Intelligence Ag.ency (CIA), contacted me via sec re email and told me to report to
I
I Upon artivin · · at
directed me to a
conference room and we were joined qy
for
Intelligence and lntegrtty Investigations.
stated that i was being issued .a
Letter of Warning·(LOW) .forviolating the Office's .policy concerning accessing and
searching!
did not provide any proof of my having violated said policy and I
dehied any wron$doing . . tssuance ofthe LOW was a direct threat to my retention of a
Top Secret security clearance and came days after I was informed by
Executive Officer for lnvesttgations Staff, that I would not be interviewed for a vacancy I
had applied to. These adve
ctions are a continuation and an escalation
of retaliation I have endure
Senate and
House Intelligence Oversight ·• omm1t ees, t ·• e nspec or •· enera o e Intelligence
Community, and senior CIA management

I

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2.

Admi
userid

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(U} The LOW stated that, during a routine audit of the O!G's Case
s •stem; two searches associated with

were identified for further review. The

h··. presu.·•m
. ..a. bty o~cur· r·7·d ..·.... . ug.u..s.t.•. 2.<0.14, an..d.·.·. rev. •.·.ealed ·t ·h·a. . tth.e keyw·· o
·.·. r.•;d...-.,
I first
.. .searc·
. lwas
associated with this search . . The second search reportedty occurred L_J

October 2014 and alleges that l had searched upon my own name. The LOW does not
cite Which OlG ppticy ! presumably violated or wh9t elements of said policy were not
adhered to, I am unaware ofany relevant policy that would be applicable given the
alleged offenses.• There is 01G 21~1 (U) Access Control for AgencyDatabases,
Research Applic(}tions, and Information Systems Owned by Outsicie Components.
However, it only $pplies to information systems outside of the 01(3, .The first search I
am accused of cqnducting was associate¢ with my m?eting with HPSCI Staffers and the

 document I provided Congress had resided on an OIG owned file server and I had
vetted its release through the Agency's ()ffice of Congressional.Affairs .. Although. I.have
no recollection ofthe secpntj alleged search, it too was ·on •an OIG owned information
system. Therefor~. I find the issuance ofthe LOW to be without merit and believe it was
concocted in reprisal as a harassing tactic to demoralize and Intimidate me.
3.
(U) As background: ln or aboutFebruary 2013, l wrote a Letter of Urgent
Concern to the oversight cornmitteesJowhichJraisedabusive management practices,
cronyism, and potentiakcrimlnalconduct by Davkf B. Buckley, Inspector General (JG) for
the CIA and his subordinates. lntne summetof 2013, I was interviewed by Staffers
from both oversight committees. In oraboutMay 2014, l wrote a second Letter of
Urgent Goncem to the committees regarding irregularpersonnel actions and potential
reprisal agah1st two· of··my·colleagues··· that·.had•••made••· Protected.·. communications. In •or
about June 2014, l metwithl
I
reported potential investigative miscoriductby GIA's OIG. Jn early August 2014, l met
~ith Sta~ers fr·o.m. th: Ho~s.·. · ~ Pe~m.anent Se···~·e·c.t. C.o.•.·. ·.m.··. ·. m
... .. itt.·.·~. for tntemn,nce···
···. ·. an.d. provide.d
1.nformat10n of potential w1thholdmg ofrnatenal evidence in_ . . . ..... . . _case that would
have·exonerated·•· seven•• industrial••contractors••that··had··· their.security •clearances revoked
and.employment terminated. Note: I had waived "confidentiality" for each of these
protected communications and on several occasions had informed 1...
Iand other
colleagues that l hadreportedwrongdoingtothe appropriate authorities. Further, I ha.d
filed an age discrimination and hostile workplace complaint against CiA's 01(3
management team withthe CIA's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity .(OEEO) in
April 2013 (OEEO Case Number: 13-21) fhafis awaiting final adjudicatiort OlG
management was interviewed by an OEEO lrwestigatorand was therefore witting of my

j

complaint.

·

4.
(U) ·• 1allege tbatBuckley, Christopher H. Sharpley, Deputy Inspector
General (DfG).;
·
have treated a hpstile work environment and e.mpowered subor ··inate•~·,_ ___,_ _ __.
I ....... . .. . Ito create derogatory documents that defame myreputation because .I.------.
engaged in protected activities and madec;:!isc;Iosures to Congress. I allege that....

I _ __.

has interfered with my opportunitl~s for career advancement in retaliation for making

disclosures. In his testimony to OEEOJ.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _...,...._______,
I .·....
... ... . ./. 1--because, in his opinion, l was not qualified. However, OEEO's
Report of Investigation indicated that I possessed more managerial experience than any
other applicant.I
lwas among those applicants
OEEO had compared my experience level to. ·1n or ·aboutOctober 2014, i applied to a
vacancy notice for the position ofDeputy AIGt, but was told in November 2014 that i
was being denie.9 an interview. However.I . . . ·. .· .·. twas interviewed for said vacancy.
The fact an emplpyee of lesser experience was interviewed and I was not indicates
biQs/reprisaL It is my perception that l have been unjustly denied opportunities for
career progression. OIG management's actions affe.cted the: terms and conditions of
my employment gnd have frustrated my efforts to perform myduties-making my Job
impossible in an ~pparent attempt to forc;:e my early separation .from the .Agency.

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 5. .
(U) J alle9ethatBuckJey, Sharp!ey,1-I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.....
engaged in a pattern of retaliatory conductthathas violated:

(U) Pertinent Federal·and Agency Re.gulations.,,.......
•

(U) PresldentiaJ Policy Directive 19 (PPD t9)expressly prohibits retaliation
against any officeroremployee ofa covered agency within the IC, prohibits
retaliation by affecting eligibility for .access to classifl~ information, and
allowsfor employeeswhoaUegereprisaJtorequestan.extema! review.by a
three-"member tnspector General panekif the applicable review .process ls
exhausted. PPD 19 states in part,

This Presidential Policy Directive ensures that employees (1 ) serving In
the Intelligence Community or (2) who are eligible for access to classified
informaUon can effeci.ive.ly report waste, fraud, and abuse while protecting
da$Sified national security information. ltprohibits retaliation against
employees for reporti11g waste, fraud, and abuse.
e

{U} Th(!;\ Intelligence Community WhisUeb!ower Protection Act {ICWPA) of
1998 provides. a secure means for employees to report matters of "urgent
concern" fo·· the··intell'gence•• cornrnittees •· of.Congress •and allegations
regarding classified information, !CWPA contains no explicit mechanism for
obtair1ing a remedy for retaliation stemming fromdfsclosure of an urgent
concern to Congress. ttmerely a!lows an IC whistleblower who has faced an
adverse personnel action because he disclosed an urgent concern to the
congressional inteUig.ence committees to then use the ICWPA's disclosure
procedures to.inform the committees oftheretaliation.
Ex~ctlti\/e

Order 12674, Principles ><Jf Ethical Conduct tor Government

Officers and Employees, speClfles in part that "employees shall endeavor
to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the
lawor ethi.cal standards."
6,
(U) • • The.US Office of Government Ethics (OGl3), Sfqndards of Ethical
Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, and Agency Regulation (AR) 13-2(j)(!},
Misuse of PositiPPr specify that an empl9yee shall not use his office for the private gain
of friends with wpomthe employee is affiliated, or to give preferential treatment to a

friend. ln particular,
e

AR1 3-2, Conflict of Interest, Lack of Impartiality .....Misuse of Posttion... ; cites
federal law and poHcy on federal ethi.cs regulations., including conflict of
interest and lack of impartiality, AR t 3-2{c)(6), Standards of Official Conduct,
specifies that all Agency employees must adhere to the Standards of Ethical

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 Condus~t for

Employees of thf3 Executive Branch, Which in part., governs
impartiality fn performing offieialdufles and misuse of po.sition. AR 13-2{d}(I}
specifies thar"Agenc:y employees are expected to act impartially in the
performance oftheirduties and notto give preferential treatment to any
private organization or individual.'' Jn addition, AR 13-20){1), Misuse of
Position, specifies that an employee shalt not use his office for ".. ,the private
gain offriends, relatives, or persons wifh Whom the ernp!Oyee is affiliated."
7.
(U) The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
Branch, published by OGE, is codified in Title. 5 C.F.R. Pertinent are:

Title. 5 c.F.Ft § 2635, ·101, which requires that• employees avoid any
actions that create the appearance thatthey are violating the taw or ethical
standards for federal employees ..
.

-

· .

.

Title. 5 C.t=.R § 2635.502 aiso re.quires employees whose dutieswou~d
affect the financial interests of a friend, relative, or person with whom he is
affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity to determine whether the
citC1.Jmstances of a matter would cause a reasonable person with
knowledge of relevantfacts to question their impartiality and if so, to not
participate in the matter.
Title 5 C .F. R. § 2635J701, Use of public office for private gain, specifies in
part: An employee shall not use his pubHc office for hrs own private gain,
for the endorsement of any product, service or enterprise, or for the
ptivate gain oHriends, relatives, or persons with whom the employee is
affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity, ·including nonprofit organizations
of which the ·employee Js an officer or member, and persons with whom
the employee has or seeks employment or business·relations.
.

.

Titte 5 ·C.F. R § 2635.702(d ), Performance ofofficial duties affecting a
private interest, provides: To ensure that the performance of his·official
duties does nptgive rise to an appearance of use of pub1ic office for
prh1ate gain or of giving preferential treatment., .an employee whose duties
would affect the financial interests of a friend, relative or person with
whom he is affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity shall oorop!y with any
appUcab!e requirements of [5 C .F.R.. § 2635.502].
8.
(U) To the layperson these individual acts may appear to be the result of
crass individuals nr an uncomfortable working environment, but I allege the perpetrators
[Buckfey, Sharpley, I
lare highly knowledgeable. of

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 investigative •techniques .•. and•• have.• conspited·· tq . . skillfuHy•• craft these •harassing · tactics •as
pretext .to· avoid···detection. ·•l t•• is on!y•• When•the§e•• acts·· are·•viewed ·• in·· the·· coUective. that •a
pattem·••is ··revealed•• that.•demonstrates • that•· • ~l.l<~l<ley• • and•••his ·subordinates .•have .• •created •a
dysfunctional•offipe•environment•••ln • which•• • rn~na~7rs• • routinely •berateand•• beliUle
personnel, show conternptforthe abilities of ~reergovemmentprofessionals, cause
staff to fear corning to work, anctengaged in acts ofrepdsallretaHation far having made
disclosures mat afford transparency into OIG operations. t atlege·these adverse
personnel actions were an effort by auckley and/or his subordinates to quash further
dissent by senior officers ofthe CIA.

9.
(U) Pet·JohnBrennan, DirectprofCentrallnte!ligence statementto ·CIA
employees on·1aMarch 2013, "You have my assurancethatl and my senior leadership
team will not tolerate any acts oft (apcisal .. . Harassmeflt al"ld discriminatory practices are
incompatible with our Agency's mission and simpty have no place at CIA. .."
lR

(U) • Therefore, l seekthe following resolutions andtor remedres:

., Harrassingbehaviorrnuststop!
o

An ·. examin.ation•••of•the••matters•• taised•• here·•to •determine •the
appropriateness•·and•• legality·df··the••·actions·• taken,

•

Estabiishameartingful overs.ightmechanisrnto ensure that at! of the
Inspector General's management practices and assignment processes
are kansparehtand fair, free of bias and discrimination, and in
accordance•With•laWs·and regulations.

(U) Punit~ve· Remedies"""""'
•

0

I

.

David B. Buckley, Christopher ft Sharpley,

I_________

lberequiredto attend IC
Wh!stfeblowerPr6tection Act trcjjining and then instruct employees on
the ICWPA.
.
o
.•..t ie .··y·.·.·.·e.·.· a··· r Le.tte.r J. Reprim~nd to be platedin the re.T···s· n. n. el fife of:
Buckley, Sharpley, I
Each t.o be
prohibited from receipt of Awards andPrornotion~ for On.~ ·vear.
0.

·. O.··.

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 (U) Liquidated darnag.e s-•! j

Any and allreferences.to a Letter of Warning are to be expunged from
Agency records and a·lefter on Agency letterhead to be provided to
Complainant verifying their record has been expunged.

11 . This Memorandum contains .information protected by the Privacy Act. .You
should consult with the Office of General Counsel prior to further dissemination of
any information to ensure compliance With the Privacy Act.

Respectfully,

Special Agent
Headquarters Operations Section
Investigattons
Office of Inspector General

Central lnte!Hgeoce Agency

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 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) file 1338181-0:
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)
Integrity Committee Reports Related to Complaints Against
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector
General David Buckley
Section 3

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UNCLASSIFIED//~

30 July 2014

Joseph S . Campbell
Chair, Integ1ity Committee
Council of Inspectors General
on Integrity and Efficiency
935 Pennsylvania Ave. N.\V.
Washington.. DC 20535

Dear Mr. Campbell:

(U//F~J On 29 July 2014. the Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community (IC IG) .received a complaint on the IC IG hotline from a
I.
Wlegh"lg reprtsal actions against the Inspector General of th.e
Central Intelligence Agency .(CIA), Mr. David B. Buckley,. and the Deputy Inspector
General of the CIA, Mr. Christopher Sharpley. Upon review of t..'le relevant facts of
the allegation as outlined below. we deterniined that our office would not be able to
review!
bllegations against the CIA IG or Deputy IG because it is not
feasible for our office to conduct the required objective review at this time.
Therefore, on behalf of the IC JG, lam referring this complaint to you as Chait of
the Integrity Co:m mittee, for the CotmcU of Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIEJ for review and action.
consented to our releasing her
name and contact information to the CIGIE Integrity Committee.

I .. . .·. . I

(U//~_____,lproVided the follovving relevant fads to this office:

I

On 29 July 20141
telephone nm:nberl
. .
lwho
identified herself a$ a ·fom1er employee of the CIA Office of Inspector General
(OIG) , contact ed an IC JG Investigator and Hotline manager, through the
IC IG Hotl.ine, to file a complaint of reprisal against the CIA IG and
DeputyIG.

@.

~

I

P11eged that the CIA IG and Deputy lG took personnel actions

against her

inl

lfor protected disclosures she made alleging, among

UNCLASSIF!ED//~

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UNCLASSIFIED//~
SUBJECT: Referral of Reprisal Complaint Against 1\vo CIA IG Officials
other things , abuse of authority, .a ge discrin1H1ation, and a hostile work
environ..'11ent.
19

I

I

At about the same time. the October 2012 ti111eframeJ
stated that
she made an anonymous infonna.1 com,plaiht to the CIA Office of Equal
Ernployrnent. Opportunity (OEEO) alleging age discri.rriination and a hostile
work environment within the CIA OIG. After these i!litial complaints in or
around October 20:12,I
lstated she frequently engaged with the
following offices within the ClA: the Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA},
Ombudsman, OEEO, Office of Medical Services {OMS}, and Office of General
Counsel (OGC) regarding her allegations against the CIA IG at1d Deputy lG.

o

&

Istated that she first taised concerns about the CIAIG and
Deputy IG to Congressional .staff members on the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSC!) in October 2012 through a memorandum from her to the
Com..mittees alleging abuse of authority by the CIA IG and Deputy IG.

I

el stated that she drafted a

second .memorandum in Ja..l1Uffi"y 2013

to
the C. IA O.mbu·d
·s···m
.· ttiie
·. an CIA
descri·
b·· i·n··f·•__he.·r . o. b.s. ervatio.
~.n. ·. s·· .V\i.rith····
1.·egar
.. ·.·.d . to
th.
··· e w
.. ·. o.· rk
environment
within
OlG.
Ifurther
stated
that
she
requested that the CIA Ombudsn1an fonvard her memorandum to the ClA
Director. According to
Ithe CIA OCA also received this
memorandu1n and received her permission to provide it to the CIA OGC.
Subsequently, CIA OCA informe(j
that. the CIA OGC provided a
copy of said memota..B.dum to th.e CIA OIG.

I

I

I

~ The following month, Februai-y 2013.J

. stated that she filed a
formal f~mnlajnt of age djscrimjnation ag:
.· inst the CIA OIG with the CIA
OEEO, _
____
CIA OIG:. .r=1=============:c==::::::::::;l;-:C:::]:-:A-O-=-::E::-:E:-:
.o=-.7in_v_e-.s-:-u-=-·g-·a7fa:--'
.on
intol
allegations were inconclusive.

I

~

I

Istated that she met with Congressional staffers in April and July

of 2013, presumably from HPSCI or SSCI; ·to discuss her various co.n1plaints
about CIA OIG ma:nagement.
&

~·

In April 2014, t11e CIA IG placed.I
Ion administrative leave after the
CIA Office of Security .suspended her security access. She stated that she
was not informed of the reasons behind her placement on admi.l}istrative
leave or why her security access was suspended. However, she surmised
that she was under investigation for mishandling of classified information
and systems.

In response to being placed on administrative leave and suspension of
security accessJ
jhired anattomeyto represent her, however,
2
C1NGLASSIFTED/ /~

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UNCLASSIFIED //~
SUBJECT: Referral of Reprisal Complaint Against Two CIA IG Officials

._____..,.I stated that the CIA OGC denied her attorney's request for the
n ecessary temporary security clearance required for representation. VVhile
on administrative leave, and befo1•e any administrative charges were brought
against hed
Iretired from Federal service with the CIA.

{U} If you have any questions regard!rtg this referral; please contact the IC JG
Assistant Inspector Gener al for Investigations.I
la t ...

I ________.

Sincerely,

f'ft1

....__....,-., ...
, ,...
J,,..
~_:P.'""'
::11
-.. .,..
l"'....
r ""i:n
-._..""'"
sp
.~..,.-e"'c.,...
"" -o.,..r--.....e-.n""""e...
.ra1~./

Office ~(ihe Inspector General of the
Intem11~~J1.ce

3

UNCLASSIFIED/~

Community

/

 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) file 1338181-0:
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)
Integrity Committee Reports Related to Complaints Against
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector
General David Buckley
Section 4

 Integrity Committee
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 3973
Washington, D.C. 20535

Personal

and~

October 14, 2014
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b7E

Deputy Inspector General
Office of the Inspector General
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511
IC Complaint re: David Buckley and Christopher Sharpley

Dea~.__ _ ___.
On July 30, 2014, you referred certain allegations including abuse of authority, age
discrimination, and hostile work environment concerning Inspector General David Buckley and Deputy
Inspector General Christopher Sharpley of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Integrity Committee
(IC) of the Council oflnspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). The IC recently reviewed
these allegations and determined the information provided did not meet the IC's threshold for further
consideration, and decided to close the matter.
While the IC is not able to consider this matter, section 5A of the IC's Policies and Procedures
permits you to refer the matter to an "uninvolved" OIG to conduct an independent and objective
investigation of the allegations.

! _____.I IC Program Manager, at

Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact ...

.---------.l or by email a~

I

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Timothy Delaney
Chair
Integrity Committee

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