

~~TOP SECRET // NOFORN~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct

ROUTING			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
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REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.		DATE	

CONTROL NO: _____

COPY: 1 OF 1

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

WHEN NOT FILLED IN THIS COVER SHEET IS UNCLASSIFIED

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18 February 2010

DISPOSITION MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: (U//~~ATUO~~) Unauthorized Dissemination of Classified Material

CASE: 2009-09450

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

INTRODUCTION:

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

1. (S) On 19 June 2009, the []

[] notified the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that CIA employee [] formerly assigned to the []

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[] obtained and provided [] government-owned source code in an unauthorized manner to an uncleared contractor. Since February 2008, [] has been assigned to the []

[] During
OIG's investigation, additional allegations surfaced that CIA employee [] was also involved in this matter.

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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

2. (U//~~ATUO~~) OIG attempted to determine whether [] or [] obtained the [] government-owned source code improperly and then provided it to an uncleared vendor all in violation of Agency Regulation (AR) 10-40 c.(1), *Missing or Out of Control Agency Classified Information or Equipment* and AR 10-20 (b), *Protection of Classified Intelligence Information from Unauthorized Disclosure*.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(7)(c)

PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES

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(b)(6)
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3. (U/ATUO) OIG reviewed [] and [] security files. In addition, Agency cables, Agency contract information and other documentation and memoranda provided by [] were reviewed. OIG conducted interviews with four individuals having direct knowledge of [] actions.

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FINDINGS:

(b)(1)

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(b)(7)(c)

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

RESULTS:

10. (U//~~ATUO~~) Although [] was authorized to be in possession of the source code from [] she was not authorized to use the source code for [] contract. Additionally, according to the memorandum from [] was not aware of any participation by [] in obtaining and/or employing the code.

11. (U//~~ATUO~~) According to [] was apprehensive about providing the disks to [] but [] crossed out the [] classification on the disks, marked the disks "UNCLASSIFIED," and handed over the disks to [] [] was the only classification authority for these disks. [] Security and [] Security are currently handling the issue of [] unauthorized possession and declassification of the disks containing source code, specifically how the disks were obtained and declassified by [] and []

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provided to other individuals. According to [redacted] did not have clear guidelines on how to handle and classify source codes such as

(b)(3) CIAAct the ones involved in this matter. (b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(7)(c)

12. (S) The source code was classified [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct however, [redacted] and [redacted] allowed the source code to be copied to [redacted] unclassified [redacted] Although

(b)(1) [redacted] Security worked with [redacted] to contain and eradicate the unsanctioned (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct disclosure, the intentional, unauthorized release of classified (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) information could have caused irreparable damage [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

13. (U//~~ATUO~~) [redacted] said [redacted] returned the disks to [redacted] desk. (b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) [redacted] and [redacted] cannot account for the disks and the disks remain (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct missing. (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

DISPOSITION:

(b)(1) 14. (U//~~ATUO~~) OIG referred this matter to [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct for review and any action deemed necessary (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) regarding [redacted] and [redacted] This matter is closed.

(b)(3) CIAAct
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Special Agent

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Supervisory Special Agent