CGNFORMEQ COPY QBIQINAL FILED Superior @mm at @alifornla TROY SLATEN, SBN 237468 County of Las Angeles FLOYD, SKEREN, KELLY, LLP . 7 8383 WILSHIRE BLVD, SUITE 800 JUL 0 5 2017 BEVERLY HILLS, CA 90211 Tel: (310) 824-8896 Sherri R. C?l?l?f. EXRCUNVB DHicer/Clerk 1 Fax: (310) 824-1237 By. Runakolnnas Dapu y. Attorney for the Petitioner SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES CENTRAL DISTRICT SEAN RICHARD WEBER, Case No.2 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO REQUEST FOR CIVIL HARASSMENT RESTRAINING ORDER Petitioner, vs. BRETT HADDOCK, Date: Jul 11, 2017 Time: 8:30 am. Place: Dept. 2C Complaint ?led on: May 9, 2017 Respondent. REPLY SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Respondent characterizes his conduct directed at Mr. Weber as ordinary political discourse and analysis. Respondent, however, posted Mr. Weber?s home address, he posted Mr. Weber?s date of birth, he posted Mr. Weber?s phone number, he posted a photograph of Mr. Weber?s license plate, he refers to Mr. Weber as his target, and he posted incompletely redacted court records containing Mr. Weber?s parents? address and phone number. Respondent also has a history of self-righteous, over-the-top crusades using his website as the primary medium for delivering his attacks. On top of Mr. Weber?s worry about being the subject of Respondent?s newest obsession, Mr. Weber?s alarm only grew upon learning Respondent has two open Worker's Compensation law suits for injury and he has not treated for them untreated injuries that are so debilitating that he cannot work. Moreover, Respondent?s social media pro?les refer to Mr. Weber as his ?target? and contain posts with violent images and language including discussions of murderous rampages, suicide by self?in?icted gunshot wound, and postings about self-immolation. Never mind all that, Respondent argues, such conduct is nothing more than ?political speech and requests for comment.? Petitioner begs to differ. ARGUMENT I. Respondent Has Engaged In A Course Of Willful Conduct That Harassed, Annoyed And Alarmed Petitioner And Petitioner?s Family Perhaps the best judge of whether this conduct falls within the purview of ordinary politics is Respondent himself. In Exhibit 3 to Respondent?s Opposition, Respondent expresses the motivations for attacks directed at Petitioner writing, ?the last thing I wanted was for this to be seen as a mere political squabble, or as typical mudslinging? and am morally obligated to bring this to light.? (Exh. 3, Respondent?s Opposition.) Respondent?s own statements make clear that this conduct towards Mr. Weber goes beyond ordinary politics and is motivated by personal animus. Respondent further concedes in the Opposition that his crusade against Mr. Weber has been carried out with a zealotry that is ?perhaps? unfair. (Respondent?s Opposition, p. REPLY 2 With that in mind, consider what Respondent has actually done. Although Respondent declares under penalty of perjury to the contrary (Declaration of Brett Haddock, 2:15-17, 4:28?5zl) and opposing counsel asserts otherwise (Opposition, p. 6:1-4) his website shows court documents with Mr. Weber?s unredacted home address. (Exh. 3, Respondent?s Opposition, p. 10.) Since the filing of this Petition, Respondent has gone through in an attempt to clean up his ?mistakes.? (Compare Petitioner?s Exhibit A, p. 17 to Respondent?s Exhibit 3, p. 25.) It is notable that Respondent attempted to pass off this ?corrected? version as the only version ever posted to his website. Prior to his attempts to clean up after his purportedly accidental inclusion of names, phone numbers, dates of birth and addresses, Respondent?s woefully incomplete redactions did little to shield the privacy of Petitioner?s parents?~who are completely unrelated to the interactions giving rise to Respondent?s obsessive persecution of Mr. Weber. (Exhibit A.) As was asserted in Petition and will be shown by testimony at the hearing, Petitioner?s parents have been subject to harassing phone calls and other alarming conduct due to Respondent?s public disclosure of their phone number and address. Respondent, even after attempts to correct his errors by redacting more completely, leaves the cities and zip codes of residence unaltered. (See Exh. 3, Respondent?s Opposition, p. 10.) While it is certainly better than posting the actual street address, this still subjects Petitioner and his family to constant fear of being tracked down. Respondent also posted online a photograph of Petitioner?s license plate and claims that it was posted with someone?s apparent consent?it is not clear whether Respondent is referring to having consent from Mr. Weber or the person who took the photo?but provides no support for that assertion. That ?consent? appears to be outside Respondent?s personal knowledge giving rise to questions of how he can credibly declare it to be true. (Declaration of Brett Haddock, 521-4.) Turning to the legal framework at issue, Respondent?s interpretation of section does not make sense. The Opposition argues that for a course of conduct to fall within the de?nition of ?directed at? under section it must involve personal messages exchanged between a petitioner and a respondent or some other direct contact. (Opposition, p. Neither paragraph (3) nor subdivision contains any such requirement. In essence, REPLY 3 Respondent attempts to re-write the statute to read that the course of conduct must be ?directed to? to the petitioner. ?Directed at? is not the same as ?directed to.? For example, Mr. Haddock referred to Mr. Weber as his ?target? on Respondent?s Twitter feed. (Exhibit A, p. 13-14.) This was not a statement directed to Mr. Weber in personal communication between Petitioner and Respondent but it surely was directed at him. Of course, this must be read in conjunction with the other language of the statute at issue. Paragraph (3) defines harassment as conduct that ?seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person.? Plenty of conduct falls within the domain of alarming, annoying or harassing conduct that is not addressed directly to someone. Consider an extreme hypothetical: we can imagine a disgruntled employee posting a false claim on the intemet that his boss is a pedophile, posting his boss?s address and phone number, telling his co- workers about the web posting and engaging in confrontational messages directly to the boss. The intemet posts and rumor mongering are not, strictly speaking, directed to the boss. After all, why would the boss need to know his or her own address? Nevertheless, we can certainly discern that the entire course of conduct is, in fact, directed at the boss. It is this important facet? considering all the conduct in totality?that Respondent misses. To that end, Respondent argues that it Mr. Weber was not afraid, should not be afraid and could not have suffered emotional distress due to Respondent?s actions because each individual act by the Respondent may seem innocent enough. The totality of the conduct is what the Court must treat with here and the Court need not even hear directly from Petitioner on the matter of emotional distress where the evidence is clear that such distress would follow from the conduct at issue. (Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal App 3d 1105.) For example, Respondent declares that it ?strains credulity? that someone would fear him simply because of his claims of injury. (Opposition, p. Petitioner?s fears are based, in part, on two untreated WC claims.1 These concerns regarding claimed injury only serve to enhance Mr. Weber?s fear when combined with Respondent?s other postings to social media and comments 1 A brief aside: to borrow a phrase from Respondent?s Opposition, curious that he only provides information about one of the two claims and such sparing information at that. Respondent never actually addresses Petitioner?s contention that these injuries have gone untreated. REPLY 4 about Mr. Weber. Respondent refers to topics typically associated with individuals who are disposed to erratic (and possibly violent) behavior. To wit, ?I?m thoroughly convinced that I?m locked into a system designed to make me go on a murderous rampage.? (Exhibit A.) The only way Respondent felt he could deal with a bureaucracy was through self-immolation. (Exhibit A.) Respondent, at one point, also expressed disappointment that he had not antagonized anyone enough to have been threatened with a lawsuit. (Exhibit A.) Contrary to Respondent?s attempts to imply otherwise, this question involves a consideration of the totality of the circumstances; such is the nature of analyzing a course of conduct. Each of these acts individually may not rise to a level causing a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety or suffer emotional distress but all of them, taken together, surely do. The question before the court is whether, based on Respondent?s actions and what Petitioner knows about Respondent, is it reasonable to be - alarmed and suffer emotional distress? Reasonableness has never required that there be no alternative explanations, only that the conclusion reached be supported by some facts such that it would reasonable to reach the same conclusion. A reasonable person, upon learning that he is the ?target? of someone with untreated injuries who has posted comments online about murderous rampages and showed his and his parents? addresses for all the world to see, would be right to be afraid and alarmed. II. Legally Inaccurate Statements About Petitioner?s Criminal Record vel non Serve Legitimate Purpose Respondent claims that the phrase ?serves no legitimate purpose? in dooms this Petition because of Mr. Weber?s ?criminal past.? (Opposition, p. As an initial matter, Mr. Weber does not have a conviction. According to Respondent?s own exhibits, the ?plea, verdict or ?nding of guilt? that Respondent claims as fact was ?set aside and vacated.? (Exh. 3, Opposition, p. 10.) The complaint was then dismissed pursuant to section 1203.4 of the Penal Code.2 (Exh. 3, Opposition, p. 10.) Accordingly, legally speaking, Respondent?s 2 There are, of course, limited exceptions to the relief granted to Mr. Weber under section 1203.4 but the only one that might apply is that the ?order does not relieve him or her of the obligation to disclose the conviction in response to any direct question contained in any questionnaire or application for public of?ce.? Cal. Pen. C. 9? REPLY - 5 statements are factually incorrect. Petitioner makes this claim not, as opposing counsel suggests, to circumvent a defamation lawsuit but rather to show that there is no legitimate purpose to Respondent?s conduct; especially as it relates to posting incorrect statements and court documents with names and addresses from a case that was legally dismissed. Civil harassment restraining orders do not violate the First Amendment when the restrained person's written communications were false, defamatory, and served no legitimate purpose. (Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.4th 1219.) What legitimate purpose is served by posting Mr. Weber?s and Mr. Weber?s family?s home addresses and phone numbers? What purpose is served by posting a photograph of Mr. Weber?s license plate? None. The most plausible explanation is that Respondent wished to enervate and intimidate the Petitioner by showing revealing such personal information; hoping that forcing Mr. Weber to constantly be on the lookout would somehow win the argument. Petitioner Is Not Seeking A Restraint 0n Protected Speech Respondent?s opposition contains many correct but irrelevant statements of law about the First Amendment and prior restraints. Petitioner does seek to enjoin all or even a lot of Respondent?s speech. Respondent is free to obsess over, fret about and attack Mr. Weber about politics and his Opinions of Mr. Weber?s ?tness for of?ce. That is not in dispute. But the crusade against Mr. Weber ought to be con?ned to public matters and include neither Mr. Weber?s personal information nor that of his family. Petitioner, instead, seeks to enjoin the Respondent from posting private information about Petitioner and Petitioner?s family. Resmndent has not provided any authority stating that posting someone?s home address and the address of uninvolved family members constitutes constitutionally protected activity. Although Respondent has corrected some of the offending online posts, Mr. Weber?s alarm and fear that Respondent may simply un-correct them with a few click is entirely legitimate. All that is necessary is that the possibility of future harassment be reasonably probable. (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 499.) Petitioner concedes Thus far, Respondent has yet to establish that he controls the application process for any public office and, therefore, would be in a position to assert that this portion of section applies to this case. REPLY - 6 that since the ?ling of this petition, Respondent has altered portions of the offending content of his website (and tried to pass them off as the only version posted). While Petitioner appreciates these subsequent remedial measures, without this Court intervening there is nothing preventing Respondent from undoing those remedial measures and re?posting private information again when his vitriolic infatuation with Petitioner consumes him anew. An injunction is proper where the enjoined party has abused the right in question before. (Parisi, supra, 5 Cal.App. at 1231.) Respondent has shown a willingness to engage in this type of inappropriate conduct before and has failed to completely correct his error. While the Court must exercise great caution in when issuing orders that prohibit speech, the Court can satisfy its duty by tailoring the injunction as precisely as possible. What Petitioner asks here is simple, specific and narrowly tailored: Respondent may not post online or publish to the public the phone number, license plate, address, zip code of residence, or date of birth of Petitioner or Petitioner?s family. Respectfully Submitted, FLOYD, SKEREN KELLY, LLP A Professional Co oration Date: July 3, 2017 TROY SL Attorney for Petitioner REPLY - 7 DECLARATION OF TROY W. SLATEN I, TROY SLATEN, declare: 1. I am the attorney for Petitioner, SEAN WEBER, in the above-entitled action. 2. I am licensed to practice law in the State of California 4. The Petitioner requested and was granted a temporary restraining order in this matter. 5. The case is now set for a trial on the merits as to whether a permanent order shall issue. 6. As to all the information in this motion, it is true and correct for matters that are within my personal knowledge and for all other maters I believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct for matters that are within my personal knowledge and for all other maters I believe them to be true. Dated: ,6 ?q Respectfully Submitted, ?Vii/Rm 237468 Attorney for Defendant