National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of the Administrator Washington, DC 20546-0001 July 24, 2017 TO: Distribution FROM: Administrator (Acting) SUBJECT: Crew Study Results Summary At the request of the Administration, NASA conducted a study of the feasibility of ?ying crew on the ?rst integrated ?ight of the Orion spacecraft, Space Launch System (SLS) and associated ground systems. Based on this study, NASA concluded crew could have ?own on Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1), provided timely and suf?cient funding, with an increased risk acceptance and moving the launch schedule to most likely early 2020. After considering all factors and variables and coordinating with the Administration, we elected to stay on course of our current plan and ?y uncrewed. The current approach of a ?rst integrated test ?ight without crew is best in light of all factors including cost, technical development, and risk. This mission remains an important next step toward our longer term exploration goals of moving human presence farther into deep Space. The six-week review was intense and involved detailed analysis by a large team of NASA and contractor personnel. While we may not be adding crew to this ?ight, the review was extremely bene?cial as it allowed our teams to assess past program decisions and plans and to offer suggestions to improve development activities for This effort was bene?cial and has improved overall planning for SLS, Orion, and ground systems for and beyond. The following describes the major factors and ?ndings of the study: Hardware and Software Requirements As planned, lacks some systems necessary to support crew. This was done to reduce budget costs and spread development costs across early missions due to budget uncertainty. Most notably, systems needed to support crew on include: - Environmental control and life support system (to provide 02 and remove C02 and control humidity). - Crew displays and controls, plus signi?cant software development. - Active abort system. - Miscellaneous crew support items such as the ability for the crew to open the hatches from the inside. These systems can be added to for crew but will add cost and take additional time to design and implement. To accommodate installation of these systems, several areas on the Orion vehicle also would need to be reworked and disassembled, given the progress made to date. The need for additional budget and schedule to ?y crew on was known prior to the study and was more de?ned as part of the study. The additional costs and schedule impacts needed for crew on would place additional pressure on the development. Technical Risk Typically, crew is not ?own on the ?rst ?ight of a vehicle to allow for systems-level ?ight tests. ?rst Space Shuttle ?ight was unique as it required crew to operate the vehicle for landing and, therefore, crew was on the ?rst ?ight. Flying crew on the ?rst ?ight of a new integrated system increases risk to crew safety that must be identi?ed and mitigated or accepted. The additional risk of ?ying crew must be weighed against the bene?ts of ?ying crew. NASA has signi?cant experience in identifying, understanding, and mitigating crew risks and would not ?y crew on any mission without a detailed review. In this study, the team did a thorough job characterizing increased risk and describing bene?ts. Placing crew on EM?lwould result in the acceptance of additional risk for the crew. Some of this risk would have been mitigated by mission design and keeping Orion close to Earth for return as the life support system is tested. NASA also considered the following in its review: - The ?ight heritage of the propulsion systems on SLS are signi?cantly more mature than typical ?rst crew ?ight maturity levels; - The abort system on provides a level of risk mitigation not available on the ?rst Space Shuttle mission. Further, the abort system will be tested at altitude before ?ight of crew; - Orion?s uncrewed Exploration Flight Test-l 1), ?own in 2014, provided risk reduction for critical ascent and entry ?ight systems and provided an opportunity to develop crew and capsule extraction procedures at the end of the mission; - For the proposed mission design, the lunar ?y-by includes a free return trajectory to minimize the need for propulsion systems support should a failure occur after the Trans-Lunar Injection burn; - Mission constraints to protect crew safety will also limit the launch window and might result in moving launch into 2020; and - The largest technical risk identi?ed is the ?rst use of a block heat shield con?guration. This block design is not easy to analyze or test; however, a sub-scale heat shield test could be added prior to to provide further evidence of acceptable heat shield performance. This testing, and adherence to norrnal safety processes, would make the risk associated with crew on acceptable. As with all crewed ?ights, additional accepted risks would have needed approval if they were determined to be safe. As discussed, the risks could have been mitigated, but the uncertainty and added complexity for crew on must be considered. Additional Considerations and Bene?ts The bene?ts of crew on are signi?cant, though dif?cult to directly measure. Flying crew on would create a heightened level of focus in resolution of dif?cult problems. Technically, it removes the operational constraint of a free return trajectory required on EM-2. This would have resulted in a better overall ?ow of future mission content, presenting an opportunity for acceleration of objectives for all deep space exploration missions slated in the 2020s as we continue to push human presence further into space. Flying crew systems early would have completed non-recurring engineering development activities earlier than currently planned. This would have allowed NASA to move into lower cost production and operations earlier and provide an immediate mission focus we might not otherwise have had. Adding crew would also have created additional enthusiasm and forced a new precision and velocity in decision making. This was evidenced by the effort expended by the study team, including industry partners. Assuming resources exist to achieve a cadence of one mission per year after EM-2, as currently planned, ?ying crew on would have created a new momentum for human exploration re?ective of the 2017 NASA Transition Authorization Act one our Nation and our partners would support. Summarv NASA determined it was feasible to ?y crew on . However, in the balancing of the cost, schedule, and technical risks, and the fact this is a long-term exploration program, it was determined that the current baseline program was the better long-term solution. The study was bene?cial and has improved overall planning for SLS, Orion, and ground systems. Given the decision not to ?y crew on NASA continues working toward an uncrewed ?rst ?ight as the ?rst mission in a series of deep space missions beyond the Moon in preparation for sending humans to Mars in the 203 Os. Robert M. Lightfoot, Jr. Distribution: Gerstenmaier Hill Roe Cremins Williams Wilcutt Roe Polk Kavandi Ochoa Geyer Kelly SCer. Kirasich Cabana Petra Bolger May Singer Honeycutt Gilbrech