Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 1 of 27 1 2 3 4 CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC Hank Bates (SBN 167688) hbates@cbplaw.com Allen Carney acarney@cbplaw.com David Slade dslade@cbplaw.com 519 West 7th St. Little Rock, AR 72201 Telephone: 501.312.8500 Facsimile: 501.312.8505 LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP Michael W. Sobol (SBN 194857) msobol@lchb.com 275 Battery Street, 29th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-3339 Telephone: 415.956.1000 Facsimile: 415.956.1008 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP Nicholas Diamand ndiamand@lchb.com Douglas I. Cuthbertson dcuthbertson@lchb.com Abbye R. Klamann (SBN 311112) aklamann@lchb.com 250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor New York, NY 10013-1413 Telephone: 212.355.9500 Facsimile: 212.355.9592 Attorneys for Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of all others similar situated 13 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 16 SAN FRANCISCO/OAKLAND DIVISION 17 18 19 AMANDA RUSHING, and her child, L.L., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 21 v. 22 THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY; DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.; DISNEY ELECTRONIC CONTENT, INC.; UPSIGHT, INC.; UNITY TECHNOLOGIES SF; and KOCHAVA, INC., 24 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Plaintiffs, 20 23 Case No. 3:17-cv-4419 25 Defendants. 26 27 28 1359709.1 -1- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 2 of 27 1 I. 2 INTRODUCTION 1. This is an action brought by and on behalf parents of children1 who, while playing 3 online games via smart phone apps, have had their personally identifying information exfiltrated 4 by The Walt Disney Company and its partners, for future commercial exploitation, in direct 5 violation of the federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501– 6 6506. Plaintiffs bring claims under state laws to obtain an injunction to cease these practices, 7 sequester illegally obtained information, and damages. 8 II. 9 Plaintiffs 10 11 PARTIES 2. Plaintiffs are a parent and her child who used an online gaming app via websites or online services operated by Defendants. 12 3. Plaintiff Amanda Rushing, and her child, “L.L,” reside in San Francisco, 13 California. Ms. Rushing brings this action on behalf of herself, L.L., and all others similarly 14 situated. L.L. was under the age of 13 while using the gaming app Disney Princess Palace Pets. 15 Defendants The Walt Disney Company, Disney Enterprises, Inc., and Disney Electronic Content, Inc. (together, “Disney”) 16 4. 17 Defendant The Walt Disney Company is a diversified worldwide entertainment 18 company that (i) runs major media networks; (ii) operates parks and resorts; (iii) produces live 19 and animated films; and (iv) licenses, develops, and publishes consumer products and interactive 20 media, including games for children on mobile platforms through Disney’s “Consumer Products 21 & Interactive Media” segment. This segment generates revenue primarily from – among other 22 things – the sale of online games, in-game purchases, and advertising through online video 23 content. Disney developed and marketed the online gaming app used by Plaintiffs, and apps used 24 by millions of people in the United States. It is headquartered at 500 South Buena Vista Street, 25 Burbank, CA 91521. 26 27 28 1 All references to “children” contained herein refer to persons under the age of 13 pursuant to COPPA’s definition of children. See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2. 1359709.1 -1- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 3 of 27 1 5. Defendant Disney Enterprises, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Walt 2 Disney Company that functions as the merchandising and licensing division of The Walt Disney 3 Company, and is the registered owner of Disney-branded trademarks, copyrights and other 4 intellectual property assets. It is headquartered at 500 South Buena Vista Street, Burbank, CA 5 91521. 6 6. Defendant Disney Electronic Content, Inc. is identified as the “Seller” in the Apple 7 App Store and the “Developer” in the Google Play Store, for many of Disney’s Apps. It is 8 headquartered at 500 South Buena Vista Street, Burbank, CA 91521. 9 The SDK Defendants 10 7. The “SDK Defendants” – identified in paragraphs 8 through 10 below – are 11 entities which provided their own proprietary computer code to Disney, known as software 12 development kits (“SDK”), for installation and use in Disney’s gaming apps, including Disney 13 Princess Palace Pets. Each of the SDK Defendants named herein embedded their respective 14 SDKs in Disney’s gaming apps, causing the transmittal of app users’ personally identifying 15 information to the SDK Defendants to facilitate subsequent behavioral advertising. 16 17 8. headquartered at 501 Folsom St., San Francisco, CA 94105. 18 19 SDK Defendant Upsight, Inc. (“Upsight”) is an American technology company 9. SDK Defendant Unity Technologies SF (“Unity”) is an American technology headquartered at 30 3rd Street, San Francisco, CA 94103 20 10. SDK Defendant Kochava, Inc. (“Kochava”) is an American technology company 21 headquartered at 201 Church Street, Sandpoint, ID 83864. 22 III. 23 JURISDICTION AND VENUE 11. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 24 §§ 1332 and 1367 because this is a class action in which the matter or controversy exceeds the 25 sum of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and in which some members of the proposed 26 Classes are citizens of a state different from some defendants. 27 28 12. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they transact business in the United States, including in this District, have substantial aggregate contacts with 1359709.1 -2- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 4 of 27 1 the United States, including in this District, engaged and are engaging in conduct that has and had 2 a direct, substantial, reasonably foreseeable, and intended effect of causing injury to persons 3 throughout the United States, and purposely availed themselves of the laws of the United States. 4 13. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is proper in this district because a 5 substantial part of the conduct giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this District, 6 Defendants transact business in this District, and because multiple Defendants reside in this 7 District. 8 IV. 9 INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT 14. Pursuant to Civil L.R. 3-2(c), assignment to this Division is proper because a 10 substantial part of the conduct which give rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this District. 11 Defendants market their products throughout the United States, including in San Francisco and 12 Alameda counties. In addition, two of the three SDK Defendants are headquartered in San 13 Francisco. 14 V. 15 ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS A. The Programming of Mobile Online Gaming Apps Enables the Collection of Personal Data. 15. The number of Americans using and relying on mobile devices connected to the 16 17 18 internet (“smart” phones, tablets, and other devices) had increased to 77% of Americans by 19 November 2016. Consumers increasingly use smart devices to play their favorite online games, 20 or “apps.” Many apps are aimed at children, who increasingly use smart devices to play their 21 favorite games. 22 16. Most consumers, including parents of children consumers, do not know that apps 23 created for children are engineered to surreptitiously and unlawfully collect the child-users’ 24 personal information, and then exfiltrate that information off the smart device for advertising and 25 other commercial purposes. 26 17. App developers contract with third-parties for the right to embed third-party 27 computer code into the developers’ apps, for various purposes. For example, a developer may 28 incorporate Google’s “In-App Billing SDK,” so that app users may make purchases and payments 1359709.1 -3- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 5 of 27 1 directly to the developer. In this way, app developers are like vehicle manufacturers, which also 2 incorporate third-party components, such as airbags or brake pads, into their vehicles, rather than 3 developing their own component parts from scratch. 4 18. Advertising-specific SDKs are blocks of computer code which operate to secretly 5 collect an app user’s personal information and track online behavior to facilitate behavioral 6 advertising or marketing analysis. In the case of an advertising SDK, the creator of the SDK will 7 embed its SDK code into the underlying code of the app itself, collect personal information to 8 serve behavioral advertisements, and then pay the app developer based on the number of ads 9 shown. This practice is a substantial source of many app developers’ revenue, enabling app 10 developers to allow users to download the apps without charging a purchase price.2 11 19. App developers and their SDK-providing partners can track children’s behavior 12 while they play online games with their mobile devices by obtaining critical pieces of data from 13 the mobile devices, including “persistent identifiers,” typically a unique number linked to a 14 specific mobile device (e.g., an individual’s smart phone may be identified as “45 125792 45513 15 7”). SDK providers, such as the SDK Defendants, use their advertising SDKs, embedded into an 16 app in conjunction with an app developer, such as Disney, to capture and collect persistent 17 identifiers associated with a particular child user from her mobile device. These persistent 18 identifiers allow SDK providers to detect a child’s activity across multiple apps and platforms on 19 the internet, and across different devices, effectively providing a full chronology of the child’s 20 actions across devices and apps. This information is then sold to various third-parties who sell 21 targeted online advertising. 22 23 20. identifier alone facilitates behavioral advertising: 24 25 26 27 28 Key digital privacy and consumer groups described why and how a persistent With the increasing use of new tracking and targeting techniques, 2 “Only 33% of US Mobile Users Will Pay for Apps This Year,” eMarketer (Feb. 5, 2015), available at https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Only-33-of-US-Mobile-Users-Will-Pay-AppsThis-Year/1011965 (last visited August 3, 2017) (“Put a dollar sign in front of an app, and the number of people who are willing to download and install it drops dramatically. According to a new forecast from eMarketer, 80.1 million US consumers will pay for mobile apps at least once this year, representing only 33.3% of all mobile users.”). 1359709.1 -4- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 6 of 27 1 any meaningful distinctions between personal and so-called nonpersonal information have disappeared. This is particularly the case with the proliferation of personal digital devices such as smart phones and Internet-enabled game consoles, which are increasingly associated with individual users, rather than families. This means that marketers do not need to know the name, address, or email of a user in order to identify, target and contact that particular user. 2 3 4 5 6 See Comments of The Center for Digital Democracy, et al., FTC, In the Matter of Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule at 13-14 (Dec. 23, 2011). 7 8 9 10 11 12 21. longer turns upon obtaining the kinds of data with which most consumers are familiar (email addresses, etc.), but instead on the surreptitious collection of persistent identifiers, which are used in conjunction with other data points to build robust online profiles. Permitting technology companies to obtain persistent identifiers associated with children exposes them to the behavioral advertising (as well as other privacy violations) that COPPA was designed to prevent. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 In other words, the ability to serve behavioral advertisements to a specific user no 22. When children are tracked over time and across the internet, various activities are linked to a unique and persistent identifier to construct a profile of the user of a given smart device. Viewed in isolation, a persistent identifier is merely a string of numbers uniquely identifying a user, but when linked to other data points about the same user, such as app usage, geographic location (including likely domicile), and internet navigation, it discloses a personal profile that can be exploited in a commercial context. The chain of events typically works as follows: an app developer installs an SDK in an app, which collects persistent identifiers, permitting the SDK entity to sell the child’s persistent identifier to an advertising network or third-party data aggregator (who then further resells the data to additional partners). An “Ad Network” will store the persistent identifiers on its servers. Later, other app or SDK developers sell that same child’s persistent identifier to the Ad Network, bolstering the Ad Network’s profile of the child, increasing the value of the child’s data and, relatedly, the ability to serve a more highly-targeted ad to a specific device. Multiple Ad Networks or other third-parties can then buy and sell data, exchanging databases amongst themselves, creating an increasingly sophisticated 27 28 1359709.1 -5- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 7 of 27 1 and merchantable profile of how, when, and why a child uses her mobile device, along with all of 2 the demographic and psychographic inferences that can be drawn therefrom. 3 23. The Ad Networks, informed by the surreptitious collection of data from children, 4 will assist in the sale of advertising placed within the gaming apps and targeted specifically to 5 children. 6 24. In sum, children’s personal information is captured from them, as is information of 7 their online behavior, which is then sold to third-parties who track multiple data points associated 8 with a personal identifier, analyzed with the sophisticated algorithms of Big Data to create a user 9 profile, and then used to serve behavioral advertising to children whose profile fits a set of 10 demographic and behavioral traits. 11 B. COPPA Outlaws the Collection of Children’s Personal Information Without Verifiable Parental Consent. 25. Children are especially vulnerable to online tracking and the resulting behavioral 12 13 advertising. As children’s cognitive abilities still are developing, they have limited understanding 14 or awareness of sophisticated advertising and therefore are less likely than adults to distinguish 15 between the actual content of online gaming apps and the advertising content that is targeted to 16 them alongside it. Thus, children may engage with advertising content without realizing they are 17 doing so. See Comments of The Center for Digital Democracy, et al., FTC, In the Matter of 18 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule at 13-14 (Dec. 23, 2011). 19 26. Recognizing the vulnerability of children in the internet age, in 1999 Congress 20 enacted COPPA. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506. COPPA’s express goal is to protect children’s 21 privacy while they are connected to the internet.3 Under COPPA, developers of child-focused 22 apps, and any third-parties working with these app developers, cannot lawfully obtain the 23 personal information of children under 13 years of age without first obtaining verifiable consent 24 from their parents. 25 26 27 28 3 See Federal Trade Commission, “New Rule Will Protect Privacy of Children Online,” Oct. 20, 1999, available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1999/10/new-rule-will-protectprivacy-children-online (last visited August 3, 2017). 1359709.1 -6- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 8 of 27 1 27. COPPA applies to any operator of a commercial website or online service 2 (including an app) that is directed to children and that: (a) collects, uses, and/or discloses personal 3 information from children, or (b) on whose behalf such information is collected or maintained. 4 Under COPPA, personal information is “collected or maintained on behalf of an operator when . 5 . . [t]he operator benefits by allowing another person to collect personal information directly 6 from users of” an online service. 16 C.F.R. § 312.2. In addition, COPPA applies to any 7 operator of a commercial website or online service that has actual knowledge that it collects, uses, 8 and/or discloses personal information from children. 9 28. Under COPPA, “personal information” includes more commonly understood 10 information like names, email addresses, and social security numbers, but it also includes 11 “persistent identifier[s] that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different Web 12 sites or online services.” 16 C.F.R. § 312.2. COPPA’s broad definition of “personal 13 information” is as follows: 14 “individually identifiable information about an individual collected online,” which includes (1) a first and last name; (2) a physical address including street name and name of a city or town; (3) online contact information (separately defined as “an email address or any other substantially similar identifier that permits direct contact with a person online”); (4) a screen name or user name; (5) telephone number; (6) social security number; (7) a media file containing a child’s image or voice; (8) geolocation information sufficient to identify street name and name of a city or town; (9) a “persistent identifier that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different Web sites or online services” (including but not limited to “a customer number held in a cookie, an Internet Protocol (IP) address, a processor or device serial number, or unique device identifier”); and (10) any information concerning the child or the child’s parents that the operator collects then combines with an identifier. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 29. The FTC regards “persistent identifiers” as “personally identifiable” information 24 that can be reasonably linked to a particular child. The FTC amended COPPA’s definition of 25 “personal information” to clarify the inclusion of persistent identifiers. See 26 https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/04/keeping-online-advertising- 27 industry (2016 FTC Blog post from Director of the FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection) (last 28 visited August 3, 2017). 1359709.1 -7- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 9 of 27 1 2 30. In order to lawfully collect, use, or disclose personal information, COPPA requires that an operator meet specific requirements, including each of the following: 3 i. Posting a privacy policy on its website or online service providing 4 clear, understandable, and complete notice of its information practices, including what 5 information the website operator collects from children online, how it uses such information, its 6 disclosure practices for such information, and other specific disclosures as set forth in the Rule; 7 8 ii. information practices, including specific disclosures, directly to parents; and 9 10 Providing clear, understandable, and complete notice of its iii. Obtaining verifiable parental consent prior to collecting, using, and/or disclosing personal information from children. 11 31. Under COPPA, “[o]btaining verifiable consent means making any reasonable 12 effort (taking into consideration available technology) to ensure that before personal information 13 is collected from a child, a parent of the child. . . [r]eceives notice of the operator's personal 14 information collection, use, and disclosure practices; and [a]uthorizes any collection, use, and/or 15 disclosure of the personal information.” 16 C.F.R. § 312.2. 16 32. The FTC recently clarified acceptable methods for obtaining verifiable parental 17 consent, which include: (i) providing a consent form for parents to sign and return; (ii) requiring 18 the use of a credit card/online payment that provides notification of each transaction; (iii) 19 connecting to trained personnel via video conference; (iv) calling a staffed toll-free number; (v) 20 emailing the parent soliciting a response email plus requesting follow-up information from the 21 parent; (vi) asking knowledge-based questions; or (vii) verifying a photo ID from the parent 22 compared to a second photo using facial recognition technology. See https://www.ftc.gov/tips- 23 advice/business-center/guidance/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule-six-step-compliance 24 (last visited August 3, 2017). 25 C. Defendants Collect and Use Children’s Personal Information Through Their Game Tracking Apps. 33. Disney developed the mobile online gaming app Disney Princess Palace Pets 26 27 28 which they have marketed since 2013. 1359709.1 -8- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 10 of 27 1 34. In 2011, Disney subsidiary Playdom Inc. (“Playdom”) paid a $3 million civil 2 penalty for violating COPPA when it allegedly collected and disclosed personal information from 3 hundreds of thousands of children without obtaining their parents’ prior verifiable consent. This 4 settlement is the largest civil penalty for a violation of COPPA.4 As part of a consent decree 5 governing the settlement, Playdom, and “all persons in active concert or participation with them,” 6 were enjoined from, among other things, not obtaining verifiable parental consent before 7 collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children from any website or online 8 service directed to children.5 9 35. In 2014, privacy watchdog the Center for Digital Democracy (“CDC”) approached 10 the FTC regarding Disney’s MarvelKids.com website, which contained a privacy policy in which 11 Disney (i) acknowledged that it collected personal information from children, including persistent 12 identifiers, for reasons not permissible under COPPA and (ii) indicated that Disney permitted 13 third party advertising SDKs, including SDK Defendants Kochava and Unity, to collect and use 14 children’s persistent identifiers.6 The CDC concluded that Disney’s MarvelKids.com website 15 was violating COPPA and the same was likely true “on Disney’s other child-directed websites.” 16 See id. at 9. 17 36. Indeed, in addition to Disney Princess Palace Pets, Disney has developed and 18 marketed other gaming apps which, like Disney Princess Palace Pets, track their users, including: 19 AvengersNet, Beauty and the Beast: Perfect Match, Cars Lightening League, Club Penguin 20 Island, Color by Disney, Disney Color and Play, Disney Crossy Road, Disney Dream Treats, 21 Disney Emoji Blitz, Disney Gif, Disney Jigsaw Puzzle!, Disney LOL, Disney Princess: Story 22 Theater, Disney Store Become, Disney Story Central, Disney's Magic Timer by Oral-B, Disney 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/05/operators-online-virtual-worlds-pay-3million-settle-ftc-charges (last visited August 3, 2017). 5 See https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/05/110512playdomstip.pdf. 6 Letter from Eric G. Null, et al, to Donald S. Clark, Federal Trade Commission, Updating the Request for Investigation of Disney and Marvel’s Violation of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule in Connection with Marvelkids.com, (Mar. 20, 2014) (available at https://dlbjbjzgnk95t.cloudfront.net/0520000/520581/FTC%20Letter%20FINAL%20SUBMITTE D.pdf (last visited August 3, 2017). 1359709.1 -9- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 11 of 27 1 Princess: Charmed Adventures, Dodo Pop, Disney Build It Frozen, DuckTales: Remastered, 2 Frozen Free Fall, Frozen Free Fall: Icy Shot, Good Dinosaur Storybook Deluxe, Inside Out 3 Thought Bubbles, Maleficent Free Fall, Miles from Tomorrowland: Missions, Moana Island Life, 4 Olaf's Adventures, Palace Pets in Whisker Haven, Sofia the First Color and Play, Sofia the First 5 Secret Library, Star Wars: Puzzle Droids™, Star Wars™: Commander, Temple Run: Oz, Temple 6 Run: Brave, The Lion Guard, Toy Story: Story Theater, Where’s My Water?, Where's My 7 Mickey?, Where's My Water? 2, Where’s My Water? Lite/ Where’s My Water? Free, Zootopia 8 Crime Files: Hidden Object (with Disney Princess Palace Pets, these apps are collectively 9 referred to as the “Game Tracking Apps”). Disney offers the Games Tracking Apps for 10 download from Apple’s App Store, Google Play Store, and/or Amazon. 11 37. Disney collects and maintains personal information about the users of the Game 12 Tracking Apps, including users under the age of 13, and permits the SDK Defendants to embed 13 their advertising SDKS to collect those users’ personal information and use that information to 14 track those users over time and across different websites and online services. 15 38. Disney has control over and responsibility for any advertising and data mining 16 permitted by or undertaken in the Game Tracking Apps. Disney has failed to safeguard 17 children’s personal information and ensure that third-parties’ collection of data from children is 18 lawful, in part, by allowing the SDK Defendants to embed advertising SDKs in the Game 19 Tracking Apps directed at children. 20 39. Each SDK Defendant has an SDK placed in Disney Princess Palace Pets which 21 collects persistent identifiers to track children app users over time and across the internet. In 22 addition to Disney Princess Palace Pets, the other Game Tracking Apps contain SDKs that 23 surreptitiously track child users for behavioral advertising, analytics, or both. Disney Princess 24 Palace Pets and the other Game Tracking Apps contain multiple SDKs, each operating 25 independently from and in concert with one another. 26 40. Each SDK Defendant facilitates behavioral advertising in the mobile app space by 27 collecting personal information about app users that enables advertisers and other third-parties to 28 reach those users over time and across different websites and online services. Each SDK 1359709.1 - 10 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 12 of 27 1 Defendant does so through its proprietary SDK embedded in Disney’s Apps – including Disney 2 Princess Palace Pets – which collect personal information about children under the age of 13 so 3 that advertisers and other third-parties can target those children over time and across different 4 websites and online services. 5 41. Analytics and network analysis tools have detected the persistent identifiers that 6 each Game Tracking App accessed in real time, determined which SDKs reside in the Game 7 Tracking Apps’ code, and recorded all network traffic, including encrypted data. That 8 documentation contains raw network data, which shows the presence of persistent identifiers and 9 documents (i) when the Game Tracking Apps first attempted to access persistent identifiers, (ii) 10 which persistent identifiers were sent from a users’ device, and (iii) the SDK Defendant to which 11 they were sent. 12 42. Extensive analysis conducted as to each of Disney’s Game Tracking Apps and as 13 to each SDK Defendant, found substantial evidence that each of these child-directed apps collects 14 and uses children’s persistent identifiers. 15 2. 16 43. Disney’s Game Tracking Apps Are Directed to Children. COPPA defines “children” as individuals under the age of 13. See 16 C.F.R. 17 § 312.2. An app is directed to children if the “subject matter, visual content, use of animated 18 characters or child-oriented activities and incentives, music or other audio content, age of models, 19 presence of child celebrities or celebrities who appeal to children, language or other 20 characteristics of the Web site or online service, as well as whether advertising promoting or 21 appearing on the Web site or online service is directed to children.” See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2. 22 44. Disney Princess Palace Pets and the other Game Tracking Apps are directed to 23 children under age 13.7 For example, Disney Princess Palace Pets is a game in which users can 24 groom, bathe, accessorize, and play with about with 10 different pets. The app description in the 25 Google Play Store states: “Enter the enchanted world of the Disney Princess Palace Pets. Meet 26 Pumpkin, Teacup, Blondie, Treasure, Berry, Beauty, Lily, Summer, Sultan, and petit! These 27 7 28 A description of the additional Game Tracking Apps, including screenshots of the games from the Google Play Store, is appended hereto as Exhibit A. 1359709.1 - 11 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 13 of 27 1 adorable pets are all different, but each one loves to be cared for and can’t wait to go on new 2 adventures with you. Learn how the pets met the princesses, find out their unique talents, and 3 treat them to a delightful day at the Royal Pet Salon!” Below is a screenshot from the game: 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 45. In the Apple Store, Google Play Store, and Amazon, Disney Princess Palace Pets is rated as a game for children younger than 5, or for “everyone or “all ages.” 22 46. Even if the Game Tracking Apps were not directed to children, on information and 23 belief, Defendants have actual knowledge that they collected personal information from children. 24 The Game Tracking Apps contain child-oriented “subject matter, visual content, use of animated 25 characters or child-oriented activities and incentives, music or other audio content, age of models, 26 presence of child celebrities or celebrities who appeal to children, language or other 27 characteristics of the Web site or online service, as well as whether advertising promoting or 28 appearing on the Web site or online service is directed to children.” 16 C.F.R. § 312.2. 1359709.1 - 12 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 14 of 27 1 3. 47. 2 3 The Defendants Are Operators under COPPA. Each Defendant is an “operator” pursuant to COPPA. Specifically, COPPA defines an “operator,” in pertinent part, as: 4 any person who operates a Web site located on the Internet or an online service and who collects or maintains personal information from or about the users of or visitors to such Web site or online service, or on whose behalf such information is collected or maintained, or offers products or services for sale through that Web site or online service, where such Web site or online service is operated for commercial purposes involving commerce among the several States or with 1 or more foreign nations; in any territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such territory and another such territory or any State or foreign nation; or between the District of Columbia and any State, territory, or foreign nation. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 16 C.F.R. § 312.2. 12 48. Both Disney and the SDK Defendants operate the Game Tracking Apps entirely 13 online. Indeed, without a connection to the internet, Plaintiffs could not have downloaded and 14 played Disney Princess Palace Pets. 15 4. Defendants Engaged in the Foregoing Acts Without Obtaining Verifiable Parental Consent. 16 49. 17 Defendants collected, used, or disclosed the personal information of Plaintiff’s 18 child without notifying her parents. Disney never obtained Plaintiff’s verifiable parental consent 19 to collect, use, or disclose her child’s personal information. The SDK Defendants failed to 20 adequately ensure that when they embedded their advertising SDKs on the Game Tracking Apps 21 or when they collected, used, or disclosed personal information from children via their advertising 22 SDKs on the Game Tracking Apps, that Disney had obtained verifiable parental consent for those 23 children’s use of the Game Tracking Apps. 50. 24 Plaintiff never knew that Defendants collected, disclosed, or used her child’s 25 personal information because Defendants at all times failed to provide Plaintiff any of the 26 required disclosures, never sought verifiable parental consent, and never provided a mechanism 27 by which Plaintiff could provide verifiable consent. 28 1359709.1 - 13 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 15 of 27 1 5. 2 51. 3 4 Disney’s Disney Princess Palace Pets app contains each of the SDK Defendant’s behavioral advertising SDKs. 52. 5 6 Each SDK Defendant, in Coordination with Disney, Collects, Uses, or Discloses Children’s Personal Information Within Disney Princess Palace Pets without Verifiable Parental Consent. Each SDK Defendant knows or should know that it operates within Disney Princess Palace Pets. 53. 7 Each SDK Defendant knows or should know the age rating or suggested guidance 8 for Disney Princess Palace Pets listed in the Google Play Store, the Apple App Store, or Amazon, 9 within which the SDK Defendant operates. 54. 10 Accordingly, each SDK Defendant knows or should know that its behavioral 11 advertising SDK is contained within Disney Princess Palace Pets, among other child-directed 12 apps. 55. 13 Disney did not inform Plaintiff, her child, or class members that the SDK 14 Defendants’ behavioral advertising SDKs are incorporated into and operate within the Game 15 Tracking Apps, including Disney Princess Palace Pets, to collect Plaintiff’s child’s and class 16 members’ personal information in the form of persistent identifiers. 56. 17 Each SDK Defendant failed to inform the Plaintiff, her child, or class members 18 that its behavioral advertising SDK is incorporated into and operates within Disney Princess 19 Palace Pets to collect Plaintiff’s child’s and class members’ personal information in the form of 20 persistent identifiers. 57. 21 Disney did not obtain verifiable parental consent to track children playing the 22 Game Tracking Apps, including Disney Princess Palace Pets, via persistent identifiers, over time 23 and across different websites and online services. 58. 24 Each SDK Defendant failed to obtain verifiable parental consent to track children 25 playing Disney Princess Palace Pets, via persistent identifiers, over time and across different 26 websites and online services. 27 28 1359709.1 - 14 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 16 of 27 1 59. Each SDK Defendant systemically tracks each user of Disney Princess Palace 2 Pets, including users under the age of 13, over time and across different websites and online 3 services, through its behavioral advertising SDK. 4 5 60. Each SDK Defendant does this by operating within Disney Princess Palace Pets to collect, use, and share persistent identifiers from children who play Disney Princess Palace Pets. 6 61. Accordingly, each SDK Defendant, in coordination with Disney, collects, uses, 7 and/or discloses the personal information of Plaintiff’s child and class members under the age of 8 13, in the form of persistent identifiers, to track children’s activity over time and across different 9 websites and online services. 10 62. By affirmatively incorporating the SDK Defendants’ behavioral advertising SDKs 11 into their child-directed apps and permitting them to track children by collecting, using, or 12 disclosing their persistent identifiers without verifiable parental consent, Disney violated COPPA. 13 63. Further, each SDK Defendant knew or should have known that its SDK had been 14 incorporated into Disney Princess Palace Pets and that engaging in the above-described tracking 15 and collection of children’s personal information violated COPPA. 16 6. 17 18 19 64. Disney Engages in Substantially Similar Conduct in Its Other Game Tracking Apps by Incorporating the SDK Defendants’ Behavioral Advertising SDKs into Those Game Tracking Apps. Disney’s other Game Tracking Apps also contain the behavioral advertising SDKs, which operate in a substantially similar manner as in Disney Princess Palace Pets. 20 65. Defendant Upsight’s Upsight or Fuse Powered SDKs are incorporated into the 21 following additional Game Tracking Apps developed by Disney: Palace Pets in Whisker Haven, 22 Color by Disney, Disney Jigsaw Puzzle!, Disney Princess: Charmed Adventures, and Disney 23 Story Central. 24 66. Defendant Unity’s Unity SDK is incorporated into the following additional Game 25 Tracking Apps developed by Disney: Disney Crossy Road, Disney Emoji Blitz, Disney Dream 26 Treats, Inside Out Thought Bubbles, Frozen Free Fall, Where’s My Water? 2, Maleficent Free 27 Fall, Temple Run: Brave, Zootopia Crime Files: Hidden Object, Beauty and the Beast: Perfect 28 Match, Dodo Pop, Club Penguin Island, Frozen Free Fall: Icy Shot, Temple Run: Oz, 1359709.1 - 15 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 17 of 27 1 AvengersNet, Disney Princess: Story Theater, Disney Color and Play, Disney's Magic Timer by 2 Oral-B, Sofia the First Secret Library, Olaf's Adventures, The Lion Guard, Miles from 3 Tomorrowland: Missions, Disney Princess: Charmed Adventures, Toy Story: Story Theater, 4 Good Dinosaur Storybook Deluxe, Sofia the First Color and Play, Cars Lightening League, and 5 Moana Island Life. 6 67. Defendant Kochava’s Kochava SDK is incorporated into the following additional 7 Game Tracking App developed by Disney: Disney Crossy Road, Disney Emoji Blitz, Disney 8 Dream Treats, Inside Out Thought Bubbles, Frozen Free Fall, Where's My Mickey?, Where’s My 9 Water?, Where’s My Water? 2, Where’s My Water? Lite/ Where’s My Water? Free, Color by 10 Disney, Disney Gif, Disney LOL, Maleficent Free Fall, Temple Run: Brave, Zootopia Crime 11 Files: Hidden Object, DuckTales: Remastered, Beauty and the Beast: Perfect Match, Dodo Pop, 12 Club Penguin Island, Frozen Free Fall: Icy Shot, Star Wars: Puzzle Droids™, Temple Run: Oz, 13 Star Wars™: Commander, Disney Store Become, Disney Princess: Story Theater, Disney Color 14 and Play, Disney Jigsaw Puzzle!, Sofia the First Secret Library, Olaf's Adventures, The Lion 15 Guard, Miles from Tomorrowland: Missions, Disney Princess: Charmed Adventures, Good 16 Dinosaur Storybook Deluxe, Moana Island Life, Disney Story Central, Cars Lightening League, 17 and Disney Build It Frozen. 18 D. Fraudulent Concealment and Tolling. 19 68. The applicable statutes of limitations are tolled by virtue of Defendants’ knowing 20 and active concealment of the facts alleged above. Plaintiffs and class members were ignorant of 21 the information essential to the pursuit of these claims, without any fault or lack of diligence on 22 their own part. 23 69. At the time the action was filed, Defendants were under a duty to disclose the true 24 character, quality, and nature of their activities to Plaintiffs and the Class and Subclass. 25 Defendants are therefore estopped from relying on any statute of limitations. 26 70. Defendants’ fraudulent concealment is common to the Class and Subclass. 27 28 1359709.1 - 16 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 18 of 27 1 E. 2 Plaintiff Amanda Rushing and Her Child, L.L. 3 71. Named Plaintiff Allegations On January 14, 2014, Ms. Rushing downloaded Disney’s App Disney Princess 4 Palace Pets onto L.L.’s device in order for her child, L.L., to play the game. L.L. thereafter 5 frequently played Disney Princess Palace Pets on this device on an ongoing and continuous basis. 72. 6 On information and belief, during the time L.L. played Disney Princess Palace 7 Pets, one or more of the SDK Defendants had, with the permission of Disney, embedded one or 8 more advertising SDKs which collected, disclosed, or used personal information and persistent 9 identifiers of L.L. Defendants did not collect L.L.’s personal information to provide support for 10 the internal operations of Disney Princess Palace Pets, but instead to profile L.L. for commercial 11 gain. 73. 12 The Defendants never asked Ms. Rushing for her verifiable parental consent – in 13 any form or at any time – to collect, disclose, or use her child’s personal information, including 14 persistent identifiers, as required by COPPA. 74. 15 The Defendants never provided direct notice – as required by COPPA – to Ms. 16 Rushing regarding Defendants’ practices with regard to collecting, using, and disclosing her 17 child’s personal information, or regarding the rights of Ms. Rushing or her child under COPPA, 18 either when Ms. Rushing initially downloaded the app, or afterwards, on the app’s home or 19 landing screen. 75. 20 Defendants’ tracking and collection of L.L.’s personal information without her 21 verifiable parental consent is highly offensive to Ms. Rushing and constitutes an invasion of her 22 child’s privacy and of Ms. Rushing’s right to protect her child from this invasion. 23 VI. 76. 24 25 CLASS ALLEGATIONS Plaintiffs seek class certification of the Class and Subclass set forth herein pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 77. 26 Plaintiffs seek class certification of claims for the common law privacy cause of 27 action “Intrusion Upon Seclusion,” on behalf of a multi-state class, with a class defined as 28 follows: 1359709.1 - 17 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 19 of 27 1 The Multi-state Class: all persons residing in the States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia who are younger than the age of 13, or were younger than the age of 13 when they played the Game Tracking Apps, and their parents and/or legal guardians, from whom Defendants collected, used, or disclosed personal information without verifiable parental consent. 2 3 4 5 6 78. 7 Plaintiffs seek class certification of a claim for violation of the State of California 8 Constitution Right to Privacy on behalf of a subclass of the Multi-state Class, with a subclass 9 defined as follows: 10 The California Subclass of the Multi-state Class: all persons residing in the State of California who are younger than the age of 13, or were younger than the age of 13 when they played the Game Tracking Apps, and their parents and/or legal guardians, from whom Defendants collected, used, or disclosed personal information without verifiable parental consent. 11 12 13 79. 14 Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or refine the Class or Subclass definitions 15 based upon discovery of new information and in order to accommodate any of the Court’s 16 manageability concerns. 80. 17 Excluded from the Class and Subclass are: (a) any Judge or Magistrate Judge 18 presiding over this action and members of their staff, as well as members of their families; (b) 19 Defendants, Defendants’ predecessors, parents, successors, heirs, assigns, subsidiaries, and any 20 entity in which any Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest, as well as Defendants’ 21 current or former employees, agents, officers, and directors; (c) persons who properly execute and 22 file a timely request for exclusion from the Class or Subclass; (d) persons whose claims in this 23 matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (e) counsel for Plaintiffs 24 and Defendants; and (f) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded 25 persons. 81. 26 27 Ascertainability. The proposed Class and Subclass are readily ascertainable because they are defined using objective criteria so as to allow class members to determine if they 28 1359709.1 - 18 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 20 of 27 1 are part of a Class or Subclass. Further, the Class and Subclass can be readily identified through 2 records maintained by Defendants. 3 82. Numerosity (Rule 23(a)(1)). The Class and Subclass are so numerous that joinder 4 of individual members herein is impracticable. The exact number of Class or Subclass members, 5 as herein identified and described, is not known, but download figures indicate that the Game 6 Tracking Apps have been downloaded hundreds of millions of times. 7 83. Commonality (Rule 23(a)(2)). Common questions of fact and law exist for each 8 cause of action and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class and Subclass 9 members, including the following: 10 11 i. 33 to75 via the Game Tracking Apps; 12 13 ii. Whether the SDK Defendants engaged in the activities referenced in paragraphs 33 to75 via the Game Tracking Apps; 14 15 Whether Disney engaged in the activities referenced in paragraphs iii. Whether Defendants provided disclosure of all the activities referenced in paragraphs 33 to75 on a website as required by COPPA; 16 iv. 17 referenced in paragraphs 33 to 42, 49-67, 71-75; 18 v. 19 Whether Defendants directly notified parents of any of the activities Whether Defendants sought verifiable parental consent prior to engaging in any of the activities referenced in paragraphs 33 to 42, 49-67, 71-75; 20 vi. Whether Defendants provided a process or mechanism for parents 21 to provide verifiable parental consent prior to engaging in any of the activities referenced in 22 paragraphs 33 to 42, 49-67, 71-75; 23 24 vii. engaging in any of the activities referenced in paragraphs 33 to 42, 49-67, 71-75; 25 26 viii. Whether Defendants’ acts and practices complained of herein ix. Whether Defendants’ acts and practices complained of herein violate COPPA; 27 28 Whether Defendants received verifiable parental consent prior to amount to acts of intrusion upon seclusion under the law of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 1359709.1 - 19 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 21 of 27 1 California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 2 Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 3 Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 4 Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia; 5 6 x. California constitutional Right to Privacy; 7 8 Whether Defendants’ conduct violated Subclass members’ xi. Whether members of the Class and Subclass have sustained damages, and, if so, in what amount; and 9 xii. What is the appropriate injunctive relief to ensure Defendants no 10 longer illegally collect children’s personal information to track them over time and across 11 different websites or online services. 12 84. Typicality (Rule 23(a)(3)). Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of members 13 of the proposed Class and Subclass because, among other things, Plaintiffs and members of the 14 Class and Subclass sustained similar injuries as a result of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct 15 and their legal claims all arise from the same events and wrongful conduct by Defendants. 16 85. Adequacy (Rule 23(a)(4)). Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the 17 interests of the proposed Class and Subclass. Plaintiffs’ interests do not conflict with the interests 18 of the Class and Subclass members and Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in complex 19 class action and data privacy litigation to prosecute this case on behalf of the Class and Subclass. 20 86. Predominance & Superiority (Rule 23(b)(3)). In addition to satisfying the 21 prerequisites of Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements for maintaining a class action under 22 Rule 23(b)(3). Common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only 23 individual Class and Subclass members, and a class action is superior to individual litigation and 24 all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The amount 25 of damages available to individual Plaintiffs is insufficient to make litigation addressing 26 Defendants’ conduct economically feasible in the absence of the class action procedure. 27 Individualized litigation also presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and 28 increases the delay and expense presented by the complex legal and factual issues of the case to 1359709.1 - 20 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 22 of 27 1 all parties and the court system. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer 2 management difficulties and provides the benefits of a single adjudication, economy of scale, and 3 comprehensive supervision by a single court. 4 87. Final Declaratory or Injunctive Relief (Rule 23(b)(2)). Plaintiffs also satisfy 5 the requirements for maintaining a class action under Rule 23(b)(2). Defendants have acted or 6 refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the proposed Class and Subclass, making final 7 declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the proposed Class and Subclass as a 8 whole. 9 88. Particular Issues (Rule 23(c)(4)). Plaintiffs also satisfy the requirements for 10 maintaining a class action under Rule 23(c)(4). Their claims consist of particular issues that are 11 common to all Class and Subclass members and are capable of class-wide resolution that will 12 significantly advance the litigation. 13 VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 14 COUNT I Intrusion Upon Seclusion (Brought on Behalf of the Multi-state Class) 15 16 89. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all preceding paragraphs contained herein. 17 90. Plaintiffs and Class members have reasonable expectations of privacy in their 18 mobile devices and their online behavior, generally. Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ private 19 affairs include their behavior on their mobile devices as well as any other behavior that may be 20 monitored by the surreptitious tracking employed or otherwise enabled by the Game Tracking 21 Apps. 22 91. The reasonableness of such expectations of privacy is supported by Disney’s 23 unique position to monitor Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ behavior through their access to 24 Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ private mobile devices. It is further supported by the 25 surreptitious, highly-technical, and non-intuitive nature of Defendants’ tracking. 26 92. Defendants intentionally intruded on and into Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ 27 solitude, seclusion, or private affairs by intentionally designing the Game Tracking Apps (as well 28 as all SDKs identified in this Complaint) to surreptitiously obtain, improperly gain knowledge of, 1359709.1 - 21 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 23 of 27 1 review, and/or retain Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ activities through the monitoring 2 technologies and activities described herein. 3 93. These intrusions are highly offensive to a reasonable person. This is evidenced by, 4 inter alia, the legislation enacted by Congress, rules promulgated and enforcement actions 5 undertaken by the FTC, and countless studies, op-eds, and articles decrying the online tracking of 6 children. Further, the extent of the intrusion cannot be fully known, as the nature of privacy 7 invasion involves sharing Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ personal information with potentially 8 countless third-parties, known and unknown, for undisclosed and potentially unknowable 9 purposes, in perpetuity. Also supporting the highly offensive nature of Defendants’ conduct is 10 the fact that Defendants’ principal goal was to surreptitiously monitor Plaintiffs and Class 11 members—in one of the most private spaces available to an individual in modern life—and to 12 allow third-parties to do the same. 13 14 94. affairs as detailed throughout this Complaint. 15 16 Plaintiffs and Class members were harmed by the intrusion into their private 95. Defendants’ actions and conduct complained of herein were a substantial factor in causing the harm suffered by Plaintiffs and Class members. 17 96. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs and Class members seek injunctive 18 relief, in the form of Defendants’ cessation of tracking practices in violation of COPPA, and 19 destruction of all personal data obtained in violation of COPPA. 20 97. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs and Class members seek nominal and 21 punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial. Plaintiffs and Class members seek 22 punitive damages because Defendants’ actions – which were malicious, oppressive, willful – 23 were calculated to injure Plaintiffs and made in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights. Punitive 24 damages are warranted to deter Defendants from engaging in future misconduct. 25 COUNT II California Constitutional Right to Privacy (Brought on Behalf of the California Subclass of the Multi-state Class) 26 27 98. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all preceding paragraphs contained herein. 28 1359709.1 - 22 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 24 of 27 1 99. Plaintiffs and Subclass members have reasonable expectations of privacy in their 2 mobile devices and their online behavior, generally. Plaintiffs’ and Subclass members’ private 3 affairs include their behavior on their mobile devices as well as any other behavior that may be 4 monitored by the surreptitious tracking employed or otherwise enabled by the Game Tracking 5 Apps. 6 100. The reasonableness of such expectations of privacy is supported by Disney’s 7 unique position to monitor Plaintiffs’ and Subclass members’ behavior through their access to 8 Plaintiffs’ and Subclass members’ private mobile devices. It is further supported by the 9 surreptitious, highly-technical, and non-intuitive nature of Defendants’ tracking. 10 101. Defendants intentionally intruded on and into Plaintiffs’ and Subclass members’ 11 solitude, seclusion, right of privacy, or private affairs by intentionally designing the Game 12 Tracking Apps (as well as all SDKs identified in this Complaint) to surreptitiously obtain, 13 improperly gain knowledge of, review, and/or retain Plaintiffs’ and Subclass members’ activities 14 through the monitoring technologies and activities described herein. 15 102. These intrusions are highly offensive to a reasonable person, because they 16 disclosed sensitive and confidential information about children, constituting an egregious breach 17 of social norms. This is evidenced by, inter alia, the legislation enacted by Congress, rules 18 promulgated and enforcement actions undertaken by the FTC, and countless studies, op-eds, and 19 articles decrying the online tracking of children. Further, the extent of the intrusion cannot be 20 fully known, as the nature of privacy invasion involves sharing Plaintiffs’ and Subclass members’ 21 personal information with potentially countless third-parties, known and unknown, for 22 undisclosed and potentially unknowable purposes, in perpetuity. Also supporting the highly 23 offensive nature of Defendants’ conduct is the fact that Defendants’ principal goal was to 24 surreptitiously monitor Plaintiffs and Subclass members—in one of the most private spaces 25 available to an individual in modern life—and to allow third-parties to do the same. 26 27 103. Plaintiffs and Subclass members were harmed by the intrusion into their private affairs as detailed throughout this Complaint. 28 1359709.1 - 23 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 25 of 27 1 2 104. Defendants’ actions and conduct complained of herein were a substantial factor in causing the harm suffered by Plaintiffs and Subclass members. 3 105. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs and Subclass members seek 4 injunctive relief, in the form of Defendants’ cessation of tracking practices in violation of 5 COPPA, and destruction of all personal data obtained in violation of COPPA. 6 106. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs and Subclass members seek nominal 7 and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial. Plaintiffs and Class members seek 8 punitive damages because Defendants’ actions – which were malicious, oppressive, willful – 9 were calculated to injure Plaintiffs and made in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights. Punitive 10 damages are warranted to deter Defendants from engaging in future misconduct. 11 VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 12 13 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, respectfully request that this Court: 14 a) 15 Certify this case as a class action, appoint Plaintiff Rushing as Class and Subclass representative, and appoint Plaintiffs’ counsel to represent the Class and Subclass; 16 b) Find that Defendants’ actions, as described herein, constitute: (i) breaches of the 17 common law claim of intrusion upon seclusion in the states of Alabama, Alaska, 18 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, 19 Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, 20 Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, 21 Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, 22 Washington, and West Virginia and (2) a violation of the right to privacy under 23 California Constitution, Article I, Section 1; 24 c) Enter a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ actions of collecting, using, or 25 disclosing personal information of child users without first obtaining verifiable 26 parental consent violates COPPA; 27 d) 28 Enter an order permanently enjoining Defendants from collecting, using, or disclosing personal information of child users without first obtaining verifiable 1359709.1 - 24 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 26 of 27 1 parental consent; 2 e) Award Plaintiffs and Class and Subclass members appropriate relief, including 3 actual and statutory damages and punitive damages, in an amount to be determined 4 at trial; 5 f) Award equitable, injunctive, and declaratory relief as may be appropriate; 6 g) Award all costs, including experts’ fees, attorneys’ fees, and the costs of 7 prosecuting this action; and 8 9 h) Grant such other legal and equitable relief as the Court may deem appropriate. Dated: August 3, 2017 Respectfully Submitted, 10 /s/ Michael W. Sobol 11 Michael W. Sobol (State Bar No. 194857) msobol@lchb.com LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP 275 Battery Street, 29th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-3339 Telephone: 415.956.1000 Facsimile: 415.956.1008 12 13 14 15 Nicholas Diamand ndiamand@lchb.com Douglas I. Cuthbertson dcuthbertson@lchb.com Abbye R. Klamann (State Bar No. 311112) aklamann@lchb.com LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP 250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor New York, NY 10013-1413 Telephone: 212.355.9500 Facsimile: 212.355.9592 16 17 18 19 20 21 26 Hank Bates (State Bar No. 167688) hbates@cbplaw.com Allen Carney acarney@cbplaw.com David Slade dslade@cbplaw.com CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC 519 W. 7th St. Little Rock, AR 72201 Telephone: 501.312.8500 Facsimile: 501.312.8505 27 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the proposed Class 22 23 24 25 28 1359709.1 - 25 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419 Case 3:17-cv-04419-EDL Document 1 Filed 08/03/17 Page 27 of 27 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 1 2 3 Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury of all issues so triable. Dated: August 3, 2017 Respectfully Submitted, 4 /s/ Michael W. Sobol 5 Michael W. Sobol (State Bar No. 194857) msobol@lchb.com LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP 275 Battery Street, 29th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-3339 Telephone: 415.956.1000 Facsimile: 415.956.1008 6 7 8 9 Nicholas Diamand ndiamand@lchb.com Douglas I. Cuthbertson dcuthbertson@lchb.com Abbye R. Klamann (State Bar No. 31112) aklamann@lchb.com LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP 250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor New York, NY 10013-1413 Telephone: 212.355.9500 Facsimile: 212.355.9592 10 11 12 13 14 15 20 Hank Bates (State Bar No. 167688) hbates@cbplaw.com Allen Carney acarney@cbplaw.com David Slade dslade@cbplaw.com CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC 519 W. 7th St. Little Rock, AR 72201 Telephone: 501.312.8500 Facsimile: 501.312.8505 21 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class 16 17 18 19 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1359709.1 - 26 - CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 3:17-CV-4419