UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS:
Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman
Kristine L. Svinicki
George Apostolakis
William D. Magwood, IV
William C. Ostendorff

In the Matter of
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
and SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE
AUTHORITY (ALSO REFERRED TO AS
SANTEE COOPER)

Docket Nos. 52-027-COL & 52-028-COL

(Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3)
CLI-12-09
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On October 12-13, 2011, we held a hearing on the application of South Carolina Electric
& Gas Company and South Carolina Public Service Authority (also known as Santee Cooper)
(together, SCE&G or Applicants) for combined licenses (COLs) to build and operate two
additional power reactors at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station in Fairfield County, South
Carolina (VCSNS).1 The application has been under review by the NRC Staff since 2008.2 The
purpose of the evidentiary hearing was to consider the sufficiency of the Staff‘s review of the

1

See South Carolina Public Service Authority (also Referred to as Santee Cooper); Combined
License for Virgil C. Summer Station, Units 2 and 3; Notice of Hearing, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,492
(Aug. 26, 2011) (Notice of Hearing).
2

South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G) and the South Carolina Public Service
Authority (Santee Cooper); Notice of Receipt and Availability of Application for a Combined
License, 73 Fed. Reg. 39,339 (July 9, 2008).

 -2COL application.3 As discussed below, we conclude that the Staff‘s review has been adequate
to support the findings set forth in 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.97(a) and 51.107(a), and we authorize the
issuance of the COLs.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Proposed Action
The Applicants seek to build two new units of the AP1000 reactor design, which is a
design certified in our regulations as a standard design.4 The AP1000 design is described in a
design control document (DCD), to which referencing applications must conform. The VCSNS
application therefore incorporated by reference the material in the AP1000 certified design. The
Staff‘s evaluation of that material is found in its safety evaluation for the AP1000 design.5 The
COL application underwent five revisions during the review process, reflecting, in part, changes
necessitated by Staff requests for additional information (RAIs) during the review process.6 The
AP1000 design was undergoing revisions while the VCSNS application was under review;
therefore, the application also was updated several times to reflect the revisions to the AP1000
DCD.7 The VCSNS application review could not be finalized, and the licenses granted, until the

3

See Notice of Hearing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 53,493.

4

See 10 C.F.R. pt. 52, app. D.

5

See ―Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the AP1000 Standard Design,‖
NUREG-1793 (Sept. 2004) (ADAMS accession numbers ML043450344, ML043450354,
ML043450284, ML043450290, ML043450274); NUREG-1793, Supp. 1 (Dec. 2005)
(ML060330557).
6

See South Carolina Electric & Gas, V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 & 3 COL
Application (Rev. 5), (Exs. NRC00001A to NRC0001BH). The application includes a Final
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and an Environmental Report (ER).
See generally ―Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the AP1000 Standard
Plant Design,‖ NUREG-1793, Vol. 1, Supp. 2 (Sept. 2011), § 1.1 (ML11293A120).
7

 -3amendment to the AP1000 certified design also was finalized. The amendment was affirmed on
December 22, 2011; the rule became effective December 30, 2011.8
The Applicants did not pursue an early site permit for the VCSNS site.9 Therefore, all
relevant site characteristics, including site geology, hydrology, seismology, manmade hazards,
and the characteristics of the local population were studied in the course of the COL application
review.
The Office of New Reactors (NRO) led the review and provided much of the Staff
expertise in the review. Other NRC offices supported the effort, with the Office of Nuclear
Security and Incident Response, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, the Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental
Management Programs, and Staff in Regions 1 and 2 all contributing expertise. In addition,
other federal agencies—including the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE)—also
contributed to NRC evaluations.10 State agencies, including the South Carolina Historic
Preservation Office, and the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, also were
consulted.11 The Staff utilized the Standard Review Plan,12 the Environmental Standard Review

8

Final Rule, AP1000 Design Certification Amendment, 76 Fed. Reg. 82,079 (Dec. 30, 2011).
The effectiveness date of the rule for those entities who receive actual notice of the rule is the
date of receipt. Id.
9

See 10 C.F.R. pt. 52, subpt. A.

10

Tr. at 51-52 (Testimony of Michael Johnson). See also Ex. NRC000017, Staff Responses to
Commission Post-Hearing Questions (Oct. 27, 2011), at 23 (Staff Post-Hearing Responses).
11

12

See Tr. at 62 (Flanders), 49 (Rice).

―Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analyses Report for Nuclear Power Plants:
LWR Edition,‖ NUREG-0800 (2007) (NUREG–0800) (see http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/nuregs/staff/sr0800/cover/).

 -4Plan,13 and applicable regulatory guides, interim staff guidance documents, and office
instructions in reviewing the application.14
Shortly before our hearing on this matter, we held an uncontested hearing on the first
COL application to receive complete Staff review, for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units
3 and 4.15 Also referencing the AP1000 design, Vogtle was designated as the ―reference
combined license application‖ (―reference COLA‖ or ―RCOLA‖) by NuStart Energy Development,
LLC (NuStart), a consortium of companies whose mission includes facilitating the licensing of
advanced nuclear power reactors. Consistent with the design-centered review approach, the
subsequent COL applications (or ―SCOLAs‖), such as the VCSNS application, were modeled
after the RCOLA. RAI responses, and any subsequent application revisions, were coordinated
between the reference COL applicant and subsequent COL applicants, so that each subsequent
COL applicant could adopt those RAI responses and application changes, except where sitespecific factors made such adoption inappropriate.16 This approach allows the NRC Staff to
review each issue a single time, and thus enhances efficiency and consistency.17

13

―Standard Review Plan for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power Plants: Environmental
Review Plan,‖ NUREG-1555 (2007) (ML003701937).
14

See Ex. NRC000003, ―Staff Statement in Support of the Uncontested Hearing for Issuance of
Combined Licenses for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3 (Docket Nos. 52027 and 52-028),‖ Commission Paper SECY–11–0115 (Aug. 19, 2011) (Staff Testimony).
15

See Southern Nuclear Operating Co. et al; Combined Licenses for Vogtle Electric Generating
Plant, Units 3 and 4, and Limited Work Authorizations; Notice of Hearing, 76 Fed. Reg. 50,767
(Aug. 16, 2011).
16
17

See Tr. at 28-29 (Monroe).

Under the ―design-centered review approach,‖ the NRC uses, to the maximum extent
practical, a ―one issue, one review, one position‖ strategy to promote effective use of resources
for performing reviews, and to optimize application review schedules. In particular, ―the [S]taff
will conduct one technical review for each reactor design issue and use this one decision to
support the decision on a [design certification] and on multiple COL applications.‖ NRC
Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-06, ―New Reactor Standardization Needed to Support the
Design-Centered Licensing Review Approach‖ (May 31, 2006) (ML053540251). See generally
(continued . . .)

 -5B. Review Standards
The requirement for a hearing at the construction permit phase of new reactor
generation facilities is stated in § 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA or
Act).18 Interested parties are given the opportunity to contest the sufficiency of the application.
Even in the absence of a contested hearing, however, AEA § 189(a) requires the Commission
to hold an ―uncontested‖ or mandatory hearing. We consider environmental issues as required
by § 102(2)(A), (C), and (E) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended
(NEPA). The Notice of Hearing for this uncontested proceeding articulates the standards for our
review.19 The determination we must make ―is whether the review of the application by the
Commission‘s [S]taff has been adequate to support the findings found in
10 C.F.R. [§] 52.97 and 10 C.F.R. [§] 51.107 for each of the COL‘s to be issued.‖20 In particular,
we must determine whether:
(1)

The applicable standards and requirements of the Act and the
Commission‘s regulations have been met;

(2)

Any required notifications to other agencies or bodies have been duly
made;21

―Semiannual Update of the Status of New Reactor Licensing Activities and Future Planning for
New Reactors,‖ Commission Paper SECY–06–0019 (Jan. 31, 2006), at 5-6 (ML053530315).
18

Section 189(a) provides: ―The Commission shall hold a hearing after thirty days‘ notice and
publication once in the Federal Register, on each application under section 103 or 104b. for a
construction permit for a [utilization or production] facility . . . .‖ 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a).
19

See Notice of Hearing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 53,493.

20

Id.

21

AEA § 182(c) requires the publication of notice of the application in the Federal Register for
four consecutive weeks. This requirement has been satisfied. See South Carolina Electric and
Gas Company (SCE&G) and the South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper),
Notice of Availability of Application for a Combined License, 76 Fed. Reg. 11,522 (Mar. 2,
2011); South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G) and the South Carolina Public
Service Authority (Santee Cooper), Notice of Availability of Application for a Combined License,
76 Fed. Reg. 12,998 (Mar. 9, 2011); South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G) and
the South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper), Notice of Availability of
Application for a Combined License, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,436 (Mar. 16, 2011); South Carolina
(continued . . .)

 -6(3)

There is reasonable assurance that the facility will be constructed and will
operate in conformity with the license, the provisions of the Act, and the
Commission‘s regulations;

(4)

The applicant is technically and financially qualified to engage in the
activities authorized; and

(5)

Issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense and
security or to the health and safety of the public.22

Also as described in the Notice of Hearing, our regulations implementing NEPA require
us, in an uncontested hearing, to:
(1)

Determine whether the requirements of Section 102(2)(A), (C), and (E) of NEPA
and the applicable regulations in 10 C.F.R. Part 51 have been met;

(2)

Independently consider the final balance among conflicting factors contained in
the record of the proceeding with a view to determining the appropriate action to
be taken;

(3)

Determine, after weighing the environmental, economic, technical, and other
benefits against environmental and other costs, and considering reasonable
alternatives, whether the combined license should be issued, denied, or
appropriately conditioned to protect environmental values; and

(4)

Determine whether the NEPA review conducted by the NRC staff has been
adequate.23

We do not review SCE&G‘s application de novo; rather, we consider the sufficiency of
the Staff‘s review of that application.24
C. Contested COL Proceeding
The ―contested‖ portion of this proceeding was resolved without reaching an evidentiary
hearing. The NRC published in the Federal Register a notice of opportunity for hearing in

Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G) and the South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee
Cooper), Notice of Availability of Application for a Combined License, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,456 (Mar.
23, 2011). See also 10 C.F.R. § 50.43(a)(3).
22

10 C.F.R. § 52.97(a)(1).

23

Notice of Hearing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 53,493. See also 10 C.F.R. § 51.107(a).

24

See generally Exelon Generation Co. (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), CLI-05-17,
62 NRC 5, 39 (2005); Clinton ESP, CLI-06-20, 64 NRC 15, 21-22 (2006).

 -7October 2008.25 In response, two organizational petitioners, the Sierra Club and Friends of the
Earth (filing jointly), and one individual, Mr. Joseph Wojcicki, requested a hearing before the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. The Board found that only the Sierra Club had
demonstrated standing. The Board found, however, that none of the proposed contentions
offered by any petitioner was admissible, and therefore denied the hearing requests in February
2009.26
Both the joint petitioners and Mr. Wojcicki appealed. On appeal, we affirmed the Board‘s
decision in all respects save one: we reversed the Board‘s ruling with respect to the admissibility
of one proposed contention offered by the Sierra Club regarding alternatives to the proposed
action.27 The joint petitioners‘ proposed ―energy alternatives‖ contention had argued that
―demand-side management‖ was an alternative to the proposed project that should have been
considered in the application. We held that the Board had read too narrowly a prior
Commission decision relating to a differently-situated applicant, and we therefore remanded that
issue to the Board for further consideration in light of our ruling.28 We found that for a public
utility such as Santee Cooper, who is proposing to produce power for state-designated service
territories in which customers have no choice of alternative electric service providers, promoting
energy efficiency by the end users may be a viable alternative. In contrast, the Clinton early site
permit case involved a merchant power producer proposing to sell power on the open market;
25

South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, Acting for Itself and as Agent for the South
Carolina Public Service Authority (Also Referred to as Santee Cooper); Application for the Virgil
C. Summer Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3; Notice of Order, Hearing, and Opportunity to Petition
for Leave to Intervene, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,362 (Oct. 10, 2008).
26

LBP-09-2, 69 NRC 87 (2009). See also Order (Denying Motion for Reconsideration) (Mar.
12, 2009) (unpublished).
27
28

CLI-10-1, 71 NRC 1, 20-21 (2010).

Id. at 20 (contrasting the VCSNS application with that in Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early
Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), CLI-05-29, 62 NRC 801 (2005), aff’d, Envtl. Law & Policy
Center v. NRC, 470 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2006)).

 -8such an applicant had ―neither the mission nor the ability to implement ‗energy efficiency‘
alternatives.‖29
In the same decision, we affirmed the Board‘s rejection of the joint petitioners‘ other two
proposed contentions. This included one contention that argued that the COL application
necessarily was incomplete because it referenced a version of the design (at that time, DCD
Revision 17) that was still undergoing review.30 In rejecting this contention, we explained that
an applicant may reference an as-yet-uncertified design ―at its own risk.‖31 We also affirmed the
Board‘s rejection of a contention concerning both safety and environmental aspects of potential
hazards from aircraft impacts. The proposed contention had failed to challenge the Applicants‘
probabilistic risk calculation of the likelihood of such a crash, and, moreover, was mooted by the
publication of the final rule on consideration of aircraft impacts at new nuclear power plants.32
On remand of the ―energy alternatives‖ contention, the Board concluded that the joint
petitioners had not submitted an otherwise admissible contention on the subject of whether
energy efficiency is a viable alternative to the proposed project.33 We subsequently affirmed the
Board‘s decision on appeal, ending the contested portion of the proceeding.34
In April 2011, Friends of the Earth and the South Carolina Chapter of the Sierra Club
joined in a petition, filed on multiple dockets, to (among other things) suspend licensing

29

Id.

30

See id. at 8-10.

31

See id. (citing Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 2
and 3), CLI-08-15, 68 NRC 1, 3-4 (2008) (in turn citing 10 C.F.R. § 52.55(c) and 10 C.F.R.
§ 2.335(a))).
32

Id. at 12-13 (citing Final Rule, Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power
Plants, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,112 (June 12, 2009)).
33

LBP-10-6, 71 NRC 350 (2010).

34

CLI-10-21, 72 NRC 197 (2010).

 -9decisions while the Commission considered the impacts of the accident at the Fukushima
Dai-ichi plant in Japan.35 We granted the petition in part, and denied it in part.36
D. Uncontested Proceeding
1. Prehearing Activities
As part of its COL review, the Staff and the ACE, as a cooperating agency, prepared an
environmental impact statement. The Staff‘s environmental review was conducted in
cooperation with the ACE under a memorandum of understanding. The Applicants also must
obtain permits from the ACE under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act37 and Section 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 189938 in order to complete construction activities that may potentially
affect wetlands.
The Final Environmental Impact Statement was released in April 2011.39 It concluded,
among other things, that unavoidable adverse environmental impacts during operation would be
small, and that unavoidable adverse environmental impacts during construction for NRC-

35

See generally Emergency Petition to Suspend All Pending Reactor Licensing Decisions and
Related Rulemaking Decisions Pending Investigation of Lessons Learned from Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident (Apr. 18, 2011). See also Supplemental Comments by
Friends of the Earth and the South Carolina Chapter of the Sierra Club in Support of Emergency
Petition Regarding NEPA Requirement to Address Safety and Environmental Implications of the
Fukushima Task Force Report (Aug. 10, 2011).
36

Union Electric Co. d/b/a Ameren Missouri (Callaway Plant, Unit 2), CLI-11-5, 74 NRC __
(Sept. 9, 2011) (slip op.).
37

33 U.S.C. § 1344.

38

33 U.S.C. § 403.

39

Exs. NRC00006A & NRC00006B, ―Final Environmental Impact Statement for Combined
Licenses for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3,‖ NUREG-1939 (Apr. 2011)
(FEIS). See South Carolina Electric and Gas; Notice of Availability of the Final Environmental
Impact Statement for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3, Combined Licenses
Application Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,734 (Apr. 22, 2011).

 - 10 authorized construction activities would be small.40 The Staff concluded that construction and
operation of the proposed units would have accrued benefits that most likely would outweigh the
economic, environmental, and other societal costs.41 The Staff‘s recommendation to the
Commission related to the environmental aspects was that the COLs be issued, based on: the
COL applications; consultation with other federal, state, tribal, and local agencies; the Staff‘s
independent review; the Staff‘s consideration of comments during the scoping process and on
the draft EIS; and the assessments and mitigation measures in the ER and FEIS.42
The Staff completed its safety review with the issuance of the Final Safety Evaluation
Report in August, 2011.43 The Staff concluded that the COL application complied with
applicable safety regulations and recommended that the Commission make the findings
necessary for issuance of the COLs.44
Consistent with 10 C.F.R. § 52.87, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
(ACRS) reviewed those portions of the application that concern safety. The ACRS reviewed the
Staff‘s Advanced Safety Evaluation Report, and the full committee reviewed its concerns with
the Staff at a meeting in February 2011.45 The ACRS concluded that there was ―reasonable

40

NRC00006A, FEIS, Table 10-1 at 10-5 to 10-8. For some ACE-authorized construction and
pre-construction activities, such as land use impacts from building transmission lines, the
unavoidable adverse environmental impacts were rated ―moderate.‖ Id.
41

Id. at 10-27.

42

Id. at xxxiii and 10-27.

43

Ex. NRC000004, Final Safety Evaluation Report for Combined Licenses for Virgil C. Summer
Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3 (Aug. 2011) (FSER).
44

45

Id. at ii-iii.

See Abdel-Khalik, Said, Chairman, ACRS, letter to Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman, NRC
―Report of the Safety Aspects of the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Combined
License Application for V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3‖ (Feb. 17, 2011)
(ML110450490) (ACRS Report).

 - 11 assurance that VCSNS, Units 2 and 3, can be built and operated without undue risk to the
health and safety of the public.‖46
Following completion of its safety review and issuance of the FSER, the Staff filed a
statement in support of the uncontested hearing, which constituted its prehearing testimony, as
is consistent with the Internal Commission Procedures.47 SCE&G (representing both
applicants) filed as hearing exhibits prehearing testimony and the curriculum vitae of principal
witnesses who were to serve as panelists. Both parties also filed answers to the
Commissioners‘ pre-hearing questions, as well as their exhibit lists for the October 12-13, 2011,
hearing.48
In the Notice of Hearing, State and local government bodies, as well as any affected
federally-recognized Indian Tribes, were given the opportunity to file a statement including their
position on any issues associated with the application or any questions they would like us to
pose at the hearing.49 We received no responses to this notice.
Prior to the hearing, the Secretary issued a scheduling order detailing matters such as
the identification and swearing-in of witnesses, the process that would be used for formally

46

Id. at 5. The Staff subsequently responded to the ACRS Report, describing specific changes
to the application and the final safety evaluation report, together with an explanation for actions
taken. See Borchardt, R.W., Executive Director for Operations, NRC, letter to Said Abdel-Khalik,
Chairman, ACRS, ―Report on the Safety Aspects of the South Carolina Electric and Gas
Company Combined License Application for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3‖
(Mar. 26, 2011) (ML110560591).
47

See generally Ex. NRC000003, Staff Testimony.

48

Ex. NRC000007, NRC Staff Responses to Commission Pre-Hearing Questions (Sept. 28,
2011) (Staff Pre-Hearing Responses); Ex. SCE000001, South Carolina Electric & Gas
Company’s Answers to the Commission Questions for the V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3
Mandatory Hearing (SCE&G Pre-Hearing Responses). See generally Order (Transmitting PreHearing Questions) (Sept. 15, 2011) (unpublished) (Pre-Hearing Order).
49

Notice of Hearing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 53,493.

 - 12 admitting evidence, and the format of presentations.50 This was followed by a Scheduling Note
prescribing the content and time allotment of the presentations to be provided at the hearing by
SCE&G and by the Staff.51
2. Hearing
At the hearing, small witness panels for SCE&G and for the Staff gave presentations on
topics we previously had determined to be of interest, followed by a question and answer
period. During the question and answer period, witnesses for both the Staff and SCE&G (some
of whom did not serve on the presentation panels) answered questions related to their particular
areas of expertise. These witnesses all had been involved in either the development or review
of the COL application.
a. Witnesses for the Overview Panel and Safety Panels
The Staff provided fifty-nine witnesses to be sworn in by the Chairman.52 Eighteen of
these sworn witnesses were scheduled panelists, as described below. The remainder stood by
to answer our questions concerning topics of their expertise; about thirteen of these ―standby‖
witnesses had the opportunity to testify. SCE&G provided sixteen witnesses, including several
who were not panelists, but were available to answer our questions.53
Michael Johnson, Director, NRO; Scott Flanders, Director, Division of Site and
Environmental Reviews, NRO; and Frank Akstulewicz, Deputy Director, Division of New Reactor
Licensing, NRO, gave an overview of the COL application review, including the topic of the

50

Scheduling Order (Sept. 28, 2011) (unpublished).

51

Vietti-Cook, Annette, Secretary of the Commission, Memorandum to Counsel for Applicant
and Staff (Enclosure: Scheduling Note) (Sept. 30, 2011); Scheduling Note (Revised) (Oct. 6,
2011) (Revised Scheduling Note).
52
53

See Revised Staff Witness List (Oct. 5, 2011). See also Tr. at 16-18, 167, 277.

Non-panelist SCE&G witnesses were Dave H. Carroll, Ronald B. Clary, Julie M. Giles, Gerald
A. Loignon, Mark E. Stella, and Allan D. Torres. See Tr. at 15-16.

 - 13 design-centered review approach for the AP1000 COL applications and a summary of the
regulatory findings.54
Testifying for the Applicants were Stephen A. Byrne, Executive Vice President,
Generation & Transmission, and Chief Operating Officer of SCE&G, and Alfred M. Paglia, Jr.,
Manager, Nuclear Licensing, New Nuclear Deployment, for SCE&G. These witnesses offered
pre-filed written testimony as well as live testimony at the hearing.55 They provided background
information and an overview of the VCSNS project, including a discussion of the COL
application, incorporation by reference of the AP1000 DCD, and the relationship between the
VCSNS COL application and the AP1000 Reference COL application.
The first safety panel addressed site characteristics of the VCSNS site and SCE&G‘s
request for a site-specific regulatory exemption involving a departure from AP1000 site
parameters. Testifying for the Staff were three Staff members from NRO: Joseph Sebrosky,
Senior Project Manager and Lead Safety Project Manager for the Summer COL Review;
Michelle Hayes, Reactor Systems Engineer; and John Segala, Chief, Balance of Plant Branch
1.56
Testifying for the Applicants on safety matters was Amy M. Monroe, SCE&G Licensing
Engineer, New Nuclear Deployment, who provided pre-filed written and live testimony during all

54

See generally id. at 50-77.

55

See Ex. SCE000002, Testimony of Stephen A. Byrne and Alfred M. Paglia, Jr. in Support of
the Mandatory Hearing for V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 Combined Licenses. Mr. Byrne has a
Bachelor of Science degree in chemical engineering from Wayne State University in Michigan
and has over twenty-seven years‘ experience in the nuclear industry. He also has chaired the
industry‘s New Plant Working Group for the past three years, and is currently chair of the New
Plant Oversight Committee. Id. at 1-2. See also Ex. SCE000005, Curriculum Vitae of Stephen
A. Byrne. Mr. Paglia holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from the
University of South Carolina, and has thirty-one years‘ experience in the nuclear industry. See
Ex. SCE000006, Curriculum Vitae of Alfred M. Paglia, Jr., P.E.
56

See generally Tr. at 94-130.

 - 14 three panels addressing safety issues.57 During the first safety panel, addressing general site
characteristics of the VCSNS site, Ms. Monroe was joined in testifying at the hearing by
Stephen E. Summer, Supervisor, Environmental Services, SCANA Services, Inc.58
The second safety panel addressed site hydrology, geology, seismology, and
geotechnical engineering. Testifying for the Staff were four Staff members from NRO: Kenneth
See, Senior Hydrologist; Gerry Stirewalt, Senior Geologist; Sarah Tabatabai, Geophysicist; and
Malcolm Patterson, Reliability and Risk Analyst.59 For the Applicants, Robert B. Whorton, P.E,
consulting engineer for SCE&G,60 testified along with Ms. Monroe and Mr. Summer.
The third safety panel addressed emergency planning, including relocation of the
technical support center and control room habitability, engineered safety features, and auxiliary
systems including the raw water and wastewater systems, and offsite power. The Staff‘s
testimony was presented by Donald Habib, Project Manager, NRO, and Daniel Barss, Team
Leader, New Reactor Licensing Branch, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.61

57

See Ex. SCE000003, Testimony of Amy M. Monroe in Support of the Mandatory Hearing for
V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 Combined Licenses. Ms. Monroe holds a Bachelor of Science
degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of South Carolina, has twenty-four years‘
experience in nuclear power plant engineering in the fields of licensing and system
performance, and has worked at SCE&G for twenty-eight years. Id. at 1. See also Ex.
SCE000007, Curriculum Vitae of Amy M. Monroe.
58

See Ex. SCE000011, Curriculum Vitae of Stephen E. Summer. Mr. Summer holds a Master
of Science in Wildlife Biology from Clemson University and a Bachelor of Science in Biology
from University of South Carolina. He has over thirty-three years‘ experience in environmental
licensing, permitting, monitoring and assessment relating to electric generating facilities. Id. at
1.
59

See Tr. at 137-82.

60

See Ex. SCE000009, Curriculum Vitae of Robert B. Whorton. Mr. Whorton holds a Bachelor
of Science in Civil–Structural Engineering from the University of South Carolina and has over
forty years‘ experience. He has worked on the VCSNS Units 2 and 3 project since 2005. He
was involved in the initial site layout for the new units and participated in geological,
geotechnical, and seismic investigations for the COL application. Id. at 2-3.
61

See Tr. at 191-235.

 - 15 For the Applicants, Ms. Monroe was joined on that panel by Robert E. Williamson, III, Manager,
Emergency Planning, SCE&G;62 Timothy Schmidt, Engineer, New Nuclear Deployment,
SCE&G;63 and James C. Laborde, Consulting Engineer, New Nuclear Deployment, SCE&G.64
b. Witnesses for Environmental Panels
The first environmental panel discussed the scoping process, consultations with other
governmental agencies, public outreach, and environmental impacts. Testifying for the Staff
were four Staff members from NRO: Scott Flanders; Ryan Whited, Chief of Environmental
Projects, Branch 2; Patricia Vokoun, Project Manager for the Summer Environmental Review;
and Jack Cushing, Senior Project Manager.65 In addition, Nancy Kohn, Senior Research
Scientist with contractor Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and Deputy Team Leader for
the VC Summer Environmental Review, spoke on the Staff‘s panel.66 April R. Rice, Licensing
Supervisor and Project Manager for the environmental review for the VCSNS project, provided
SCE&G‘s principal testimony on environmental issues.67 She was joined in testifying by

62

See Ex. SCE000010, Curriculum Vitae of Robert E. Williamson. Mr. Williamson holds a
Bachelor of Science in Workforce Education from Southern Illinois University and started his
career in the nuclear field at the U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Training Unit in 1990. He worked at
Cooper Nuclear Station and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station prior to starting at VCSNS in 2003.
Id.
63

See Ex. SCE000020, Curriculum Vitae of Timothy Schmidt. He holds a Bachelor of Science
in Chemical Engineering from the University of South Carolina and is a registered professional
engineer in South Carolina. He joined SCE&G‘s office for New Nuclear Deployment in 2006,
and, prior to that, worked at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant for four years. Id.
64

See Ex. SCE000019, Curriculum Vitae of James C. LaBorde. He holds a Bachelor of
Science in Engineering from the University of South Carolina. He is a registered professional
engineer in South Carolina and has worked for SCE&G since 1974. Id.
65

See Tr. at 249-52, 257-64, 267-71, 274-89.

66

See id. at 252-57.

67

Ex. SCE000004, Testimony of April R. Rice in Support of the Mandatory Hearing for V.C.
Summer Units 2 and 3 Combined Licenses. Ms. Rice has Bachelor of Science degree in
Nuclear Engineering from N.C. State University and has thirty years‘ experience in the nuclear
(continued . . .)

 - 16 Stephen Summer and by Lisa A. Matis, Project Manager and Regulatory Specialist for Tetra
Tech, an environmental contractor.68
The final environmental panel discussed the environmental justice review and the Staff‘s
collaboration with the ACE to produce the FEIS.69 Panelists included Scott Flanders; Ryan
Whited; Patricia Vokoun; Daniel Mussatti, Economist, NRO; and David Anderson, Senior
Research Economist, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.
3. Post-Hearing Questions
After the hearing, the Secretary issued orders setting deadlines for proposed transcript
corrections, and for responses to additional questions.70 The Staff and SCE&G filed a joint
motion for proposed transcript corrections.71 Following the hearing, the Staff and SCE&G
provided additional responses to questions posed during and following the hearing.72 The

industry. She has worked as a supervisor at SCE&G for nine years. Id. at 1. See also Ex.
SCE000008, Curriculum Vitae of April R. Rice.
68

See Ex. SCE000018, Curriculum Vitae of Lisa Matis. She holds a Master of Science in
Mechanical Engineering from Stevens Institute of Technology and a Bachelor of Science in
Chemical Engineering from Stanford University, and has more than 26 years‘ experience in the
field of environmental management services. Id.
69

See Tr. at 296-309.

70

See Order (Setting Deadline for Proposed Transcript Corrections) (Oct. 17, 2011); Order
(Supplemental Responses and Post-Hearing Questions) (Oct. 20, 2011) (unpublished) (PostHearing Order).
71

72

Joint Motion for Transcript Corrections (Oct. 24, 2011).

Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses; South Carolina Electric & Gas Company’s
Supplemental Responses to In-Hearing Questions and Responses to Post-Hearing Questions
for the V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 Mandatory Hearing (Oct. 27, 2011) (Ex. SCE000027,
SCE&G Post-Hearing Responses). In addition, the Staff filed a letter making revisions to the
FSER and to the draft combined license. Martin, Jody C., Counsel for the NRC Staff, letter to
Chairman and Commissioners, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Nov. 1, 2011). The letter
(with its enclosure) was assigned Exhibit number NRC000018.

 - 17 Secretary subsequently issued an order admitting all additional exhibits into the record, adopting
transcript corrections, and closing the evidentiary record.73
II.

DISCUSSION

A. Site-Specific Issues Addressed at Hearing
We asked a series of pre-hearing questions to inform our consideration of the sufficiency
of the Staff‘s review of the COL application.74 The hearing itself focused on issues that are of
particular concern due to their novelty or specificity to the VCSNS site. The presentation topics
were selected to correspond to areas of the Staff‘s FSER or FEIS where we required additional
information or clarifications as part of our evaluation. We asked detailed questions during the
hearing and followed up in areas of concern with post-hearing questions. Although the hearing
focused on particular issues and did not give equal weight to all subjects considered in the
Staff‘s environmental and safety reviews, we base today‘s decision on the entire record of this
proceeding.
1. Response to Japan Task Force Recommendations75
a. Near-Term Task Force Recommendations and Emergency Petitions
As described above, we recently granted in part, and denied in part, a petition for
emergency action in this, and a number of other licensing proceedings, relating to the events at
the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, following the March 11, 2011, earthquake and
tsunami.76 We granted the petitioners‘ request for a safety analysis, to the extent that the

73

Order (Adopting Proposed Transcript Corrections, Admitting Post-Hearing Responses, and
Closing the Record of the Proceeding) (Nov. 7, 2011) (unpublished).
74

See Pre-Hearing Order.

75

See Ex. NRC000003, Staff Testimony, at 9; Ex. NRC000007, Staff Pre-Hearing Responses,
at 1-2; Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses at 1-3, 9-12; Ex. SCE000027, SCE&G
Post-Hearing Responses, at 7; Tr. at 52-53, 67-69, 72, 76-78, 83, 331-32.
76

Callaway, CLI-11-5, 74 NRC __ (slip op.).

 - 18 requested analyses had already been undertaken.77 Specifically, the NRC‘s Near-Term Task
Force already had completed a short-term analysis of the implications of that accident.78 The
Near-Term Task Force was established in the weeks following the accident, and it completed its
report with recommendations for future agency actions by July 2011.79 At the time of our ruling
on the ―emergency petitions,‖ we already had directed the Staff to commence a longer-term
review of the implications of the accident, and to recommend priorities for future regulatory
actions.80
We denied, however, the petitioners‘ requests to suspend various licensing proceedings,
pending completion of the long-term analyses and the issuance of any resulting regulatory
changes.81 We found that continuing the licensing processes in accordance with our current
regulations would cause ―no imminent risk to public health and safety,‖ because our current
regulations provide for incorporating new requirements into existing licenses as they are shown
to be necessary:
We have well-established processes for imposing any new requirements
necessary to protect public health and safety and the common defense and
security. Moving forward with our decisions and proceedings will have no effect
on the NRC‘s ability to implement necessary rule or policy changes that might
come out of our review of the Fukushima [Dai-ichi] events.82
77

Id. at __ (slip op. at 31-32, 41).

78

See id. at __ (slip op. at 4-6).

79

See also ―Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, The NearTerm Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident‖ (July 12, 2011)
(Near-Term Report) (transmitted to the Commission via ―Near-Term Report and
Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan,‖ Commission Paper
SECY–11–0093 (July 12, 2011) (ML11186A950 (package)).
80

See Staff Requirements—SECY–11–0093—Near-Term Report and Recommendations for
Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan (Aug. 19, 2011) (ML112310021), for our direction
to the Staff in response to the Near-Term Report.
81

Callaway, CLI-11-5, 74 NRC at __ (slip op. at 20-29).

82

Id. at 29.

 - 19 In its information paper supporting the issuance of the VCSNS COLs, the Staff noted
that three of the Near-Term Task Force recommendations apply specifically to the COL
application: (1) confirmation of station blackout and spent fuel capabilities of the AP1000 design,
(2) enhancement of on-site emergency response capability by integrating emergency operating
procedures, severe accident management guidelines, and extensive damage mitigation
guidelines, and (3) enhancement of emergency planning to address prolonged station blackout
and multi-unit accidents.83 The Staff also discussed two options for implementing these
recommendations: (1) to formulate license conditions implementing the recommendations; or
(2) to issue the licenses without conditions relating specifically to the recommendations, and
later use the applicable regulations at 10 C.F.R. § 52.98 and 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 to amend the
licenses to add appropriate conditions (depending on whether the conditions are within the
scope of the certified design).84 At that time, the Staff did not articulate a preferred course of
action.85
In response to our pre-hearing questions, the Staff indicated that there are generally
fewer regulatory and administrative requirements to follow in imposing license conditions prior to
issuing a license than in imposing similar requirements retrospectively. 86 But because the
VCSNS COL application references a certified design, elements of the licensing basis already
have been established. Thus, the NRC would have to establish a regulatory basis for any
change to the established design regardless of whether the COLs have issued.87 Therefore, the

83

Ex. NRC000003, Staff Testimony, at 9.

84

Id.

85

See id.

86

Ex. NRC000007, Staff Pre-Hearing Responses, at 1.

87

Id. See also 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.83, 52.63(a) (―. . . the Commission may not modify, rescind or
impose new requirements on the certification information . . . unless [it] determines in a
rulemaking‖ that the change meets one of several conditions, such as that the change is
(continued . . .)

 - 20 Staff recommended that the NRC proceed with issuing the licenses, and use appropriate
regulatory tools to impose new requirements in the event that new requirements are
established.88
At the hearing, the NRC Staff witnesses recommended proceeding with issuance of the
licenses without delay regardless of whether we decide to impose license conditions pertaining
to the Near-Term Task Force recommendations.89 As noted above, Mr. Johnson, NRO Director,
indicated that if the COLs issue without including license conditions, our regulations relevant to
the finality of decisions could result in some additional administrative requirements to satisfy in
imposing new requirements on the licensee.90 He also testified that, ultimately, the licensee
would be subject to the same requirements regardless of the timing of license issuance.91 In
response to our post-hearing questions on this topic, the Staff clarified that some Near-Term
Task Force recommendations are not appropriate for implementation in the short term because
their specifics are not yet established.92
After completion of the evidentiary hearing, the Staff transmitted to us SECY–12–0025,
in which it proposed, among other things, to issue orders on certain topics to the Vogtle COL
holder, based on its determination that additional requirements were needed to provide

―necessary to provide adequate protection to the public health and safety or the common
defense and security,‖ or that it ―[s]ubstantially increases overall safety, reliability, or security of
facility design, construction, or operation and the direct and indirect costs of implementation of
the rule change are justified in view of the increased safety.‖).
88

Ex. NRC000007, Staff Pre-Hearing Responses, at 1.

89

Tr. at 71-72 (Johnson).

90

Id. at 76 (citing 10 C.F.R. § 50.109) (Johnson)).

91

Id. at 76, 77, 83 (Johnson).

92

Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 9-11 (citing ―Prioritization of
Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,‖ Commission
Paper SECY–11–0137 (Oct. 3, 2011) (ML11269A204)).

 - 21 adequate protection to public health and safety.93 Contemporaneously, the Staff filed a notice of
material new information relevant to this adjudication, noting the pendency of SECY–12–0025,
and stating that, if we agreed that the orders proposed for the Vogtle COLs ―are necessary to
provide adequate protection of the public health and safety,‖ then the Staff was prepared to
include the substance of those orders as license conditions in the VCSNS COLs.94
The first order relates to the development of strategies to address beyond-design basis
external events resulting in the simultaneous loss of all alternating current (AC) power and loss
of normal access to the ultimate heat sink.95 For Part 50 licensees, the Staff proposed a
―phased‖ approach for mitigating these events. The ―initial‖ phase requires the use of installed
equipment and resources to maintain core, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling
capabilities. The ―transition‖ phase requires providing portable onsite equipment to maintain or
restore these functions until they can be accomplished with resources brought from off site. The
third and ―final‖ phase requires obtaining sufficient offsite resources to sustain those functions
indefinitely.96

See ―Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons Learned from
Japan‘s March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami,‖ Commission Paper
SECY–12–0025 (Feb. 17, 2012) (ML12039A103) (package). The Staff also recommended
issuance of orders requiring reliable hardened vents in BWR Mark I and Mark II containments—
an issue not relevant to the AP1000 reactor design.
93

94

See Notice to Commission of Information Relevant to the V.C. Summer Uncontested Hearing
(Feb. 22, 2012). The Secretary of the Commission subsequently provided an opportunity for the
Applicants to respond to the Staff‘s notification. See Order (Feb. 24, 2012) (unpublished). In
response, SCE&G indicated that, ―if the Commission already has concluded that the Vogtle
Orders or any other actions proposed in SECY–12–0025 are necessary for adequate protection,
then SCE&G agrees to their inclusion as license conditions.‖ South Carolina Electric & Gas
Company’s Response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff’s February 22, 2012 Notice
(Feb. 27, 2012). We include these filings as part of the adjudicatory record of this proceeding.
95

SECY–12–0025 at 7.

Id., Enclosure 4, Attachment 3, ―Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-DesignBasis External Events at COL Holder Reactor Sites (Vogtle Units 3 and 4).‖
96

 - 22 The Staff observed that the AP1000 standard design includes passive design features
that provide core, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capability for 72 hours, without
reliance on AC power.97 The Staff therefore proposed that the Vogtle COL holder address only
those requirements relative to the ―final‖ phase. We approved issuance of this order to the
Vogtle COL holder, finding that issuance of the order was warranted ―as necessary for ensuring
adequate protection under . . . 10 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(4)(ii).‖98 For the same reasons, we
impose the following condition on the licenses for VCSNS Units 2 and 3:
Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events
The Licensees shall address the following requirements:
1. The Licensees shall develop, implement, and maintain guidance and
strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment and spent fuel
pool cooling capabilities following a beyond-design-basis external event.
2. These strategies must be capable of mitigating a simultaneous loss of all AC
power and loss of normal access to the normal heat sink and have adequate
capacity to address challenges to core cooling, containment, and spent fuel
pool cooling capabilities at all units on the VCSNS site.
3. The Licensees must provide reasonable protection for the associated
equipment from external events. Such protection must demonstrate that
there is adequate capacity to address challenges to core cooling,
containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities at all units on the
VCSNS site.
4. The Licensees must be capable of implementing the strategies in all modes.
5. Full compliance shall include procedures, guidance, training, and acquisition,
staging, or installing of equipment needed for the strategies.
97

98

SECY–12–0025 at 11.

Staff Requirements—SECY–12–0025—Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in
Response to Lessons Learned from Japan‘s March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and
Tsunami (Mar. 9, 2012) (ML120690347), at 1 (Staff Requirements—SECY–12–0025). Section
50.109(a)(4)(ii) provides an exception to the ―Backfit Rule‖ where the Commission determines
―[t]hat regulatory action is necessary to ensure that the facility provides adequate protection to
the health and safety of the public and is in accord with the common defense and security.‖ The
order notes that additional guidance, discussing an acceptable approach for complying with the
order will be contained in final Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) scheduled to be issued by the NRC
in August 2012. SECY–12–0025, Enclosure 7, at 4.

 - 23 6. The Licensees shall promptly start implementation of the requirements stated
in this condition and shall complete full implementation prior to initial fuel
load.
6.1
The Licensees shall, within twenty (20) days of issuance of this
license, notify the Commission (1) if they are unable to comply with any of
these requirements, (2) if compliance with any of the requirements is
unnecessary in their specific circumstances, or (3) if implementation of
any of the requirements would cause the Licensees to be in violation of
the provisions of any Commission regulation or this license. The
notification shall provide the Licensees‘ justification for seeking relief from
or variation of any specific requirement.
6.2
If the Licensees consider that implementation of any of these
requirements would adversely impact safe and secure operation of the
facility, the Licensees must notify the Commission, within twenty (20)
days of issuance of the license, of the adverse safety impact, the basis for
their determination that the requirement has an adverse safety impact,
and either a proposal for achieving the same objectives specified in this
license condition, or a schedule for modifying the facility to address the
adverse safety condition. If neither approach is appropriate, then the
Licensees must supplement their response to Section 6.1 of this license
condition to identify the condition as a requirement with which they cannot
comply, with attendant justifications as required in Section 6.1.
6.3
The Licensees shall, within one (1) year after issuance of the
NRC‘s final Interim Staff Guidance detailing an acceptable approach for
complying with these requirements, submit to the Commission for review
an overall integrated plan, including a description of how compliance with
the requirements described in this license condition will be achieved.
6.4
The Licensees shall provide an initial status report sixty (60) days
following issuance of the final Interim Staff Guidance and at six (6)-month
intervals following submittal of the overall integrated plan, as required in
Section 6.3 of this license condition, which delineates progress made in
implementing the requirements of this license condition.
6.5
The Licensees shall report to the Commission when full
compliance with the requirements described in this license condition is
achieved.
6.6
Licensee responses to conditions 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5,
above, shall be submitted in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 52.3.
In SECY–12–0025, the Staff also proposed to issue orders to licensees requiring reliable
indication of the water level in site spent fuel storage pools, capable of supporting identification,
by trained personnel, of three pool water level conditions: (1) a water level adequate to support
operation of the normal spent fuel pool cooling system, (2) a water level adequate to provide

 - 24 substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck, and
(3) a water level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement makeup water addition
should no longer be deferred.99
The AP1000 design basis, as incorporated by reference in the VCSNS 2 and 3 COL
application, addresses many of these attributes of spent fuel pool level instrumentation. The
Staff reviewed these design features in conjunction with its review for the certification of the
AP1000 design. The spent fuel pool instruments in the AP1000 certified design measure the
water level from the top of the spent fuel pool to the top of the fuel racks to address the range
requirements listed above. The safety-related classification provides for several additional
design features: (1) seismic and environmental qualification of the instruments; (2) independent
power supplies; (3) electrical isolation and physical separation between instrument channels;
(4) display in the control room as part of the post-accident monitoring instrumentation; and
(5) routine calibration and testing.100
In view of the above, we approved issuance of an order to the Vogtle COL holder to
address spent fuel pool instrumentation requirements not specified in the certified design as
enhanced protective measures that represent a substantial increase in the protection of public
health and safety.101 In contrast to the order regarding mitigation strategies, the provisions of
this order are not being incorporated as a license condition for the COLs for VCSNS Units 2 and
3. The Commission did not issue the spent fuel pool instrumentation requirements as an action
See SECY–12–0025, Enclosure 6, Attachment 3, ―Requirements for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
Level Instrumentation at COL Holder Reactor Sites.‖
99

100

Id.

See Staff Requirements—SECY–12–0025 at 1. See also id., Attachment 3, ―Revisions to
SECY–12–0025, Enclosure 6,‖ at 4, 6-8 (unnumbered). We decided to ―administratively
exempt‖ this order from the provisions of the Backfit Rule (10 C.F.R. § 50.109), and the issue
finality requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 52.63 and 10 C.F.R. Part 52, Appendix D, Paragraph VIII.
This determination was based on insights gained to date from the agency‘s review of the
accident, including its initiating cause and particular failure sequence, as well as extensive
stakeholder engagement, and broad endorsement for timely action. Id. at 7 (unnumbered).
101

 - 25 that was necessary to ensure adequate protection. We recognize that the timing of the VCSNS
COL licensing review presented a unique circumstance relative to Vogtle in determining how to
impose the two applicable Fukushima orders to VCSNS. Similar to the Vogtle COL review,
these requirements were not embedded in the existing Staff licensing review before the
Commission; however, future licensing reviews will take into account these requirements.
Furthermore, we have the authority to take necessary regulatory action, either by directing
issuance of an order modifying the license or by directing inclusion of a license condition in the
license where appropriate, with respect to these lessons learned. The spent fuel pool
instrumentation order represents a substantial increase in the protection of public health and
safety, and therefore, we direct the Director of the Office of New Reactors to issue Order
EA-12-051 to SCE&G, concurrent with the issuance of the COLs for VCSNS Units 2 and 3.
In addition, in SECY–12–0025, the Staff informed us of its intent to issue requests for
information addressing seismic and flooding reevaluations (Task Force Recommendation 2.1),
seismic and flooding hazard walkdowns (Task Force Recommendation 2.3), and a request for
licensees to address their current communications system and equipment under conditions of
onsite and offsite damage and prolonged station blackout, and to perform a staffing study to
determine the number and qualifications of staff required to fill all necessary positions in
response to a multi-unit event (Task Force Recommendation 9.3).102 On March 12, 2012, the
Staff sent the request for information to the sole existing COL holder (for the Vogtle site), and
stated that it is not requesting responses from COL holders under 10 C.F.R. Part 52 with
respect to Recommendations 2.1 and 2.3 because the issues related to the seismic and
flooding reevaluations and walkdowns are resolved.103 Promptly after the VCSNS COLs are

See generally SECY–12–0025 at 8; Enclosure 7, ―Draft 50.54(f) Letter—External Hazards
Reevaluation, Walkdown and Emergency Staffing.‖
102

103

Regarding Recommendation 2.1, the Staff states that, as part of its COL review, the Vogtle
licensee used an NRC-endorsed seismic source characterization model that had recently been
(continued . . .)

 - 26 issued, the Staff shall pose the same request for information to the VCSNS licensees previously
issued to the Vogtle COL holder.
Our review of the remaining recommended actions associated with lessons learned from
the Fukushima events is ongoing. We approved and provided direction on certain near-term
actions identified by the Near-Term Task Force to be initiated without delay and shortly
thereafter approved the prioritization of all of the recommendations and supported the Staff‘s
proposed actions on the top two tiers of recommendations.104 SECY–12–0025, as discussed
above, represents only the first of the Staff‘s substantive recommendations for action. We will
act on the Staff‘s recommended actions to implement the remaining recommendations,
including those that result from the Staff‘s review of the responses to our information requests.
The Staff‘s review is proceeding expeditiously.

updated, and that the use of a newer, recently-endorsed model would not result in differences in
the seismic hazard characterizations that would affect the plant design for this site. The Staff
stated that it intends to confirm this position by developing seismic hazard curves for each of the
sites, using the new source model. SECY–12–0025 at 11. Regarding the flooding reevaluation
in Recommendation 2.1, the Staff stated that, because of the experience gained by both the
NRC and the industry in preparing and reviewing numerous ESPs and COLs, present-day
methodologies associated with evaluating flooding hazards at plant sites are well documented.
Leeds, E.J., and Michael R. Johnson, NRC, letter to All Power Reactor Licensees and Holders
of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status, ―Request for Information Pursuant to Title
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3,
of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident‖ (Mar.
12, 2012) at Enclosure 2 (ML12053A340). Recommendation 2.3 is not applicable to a facility
that has not yet been constructed. SECY–12–0025 at 11.
104

See Staff Requirements—SECY–11–0124—Recommended Actions to be Taken Without
Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report (Oct. 18, 2011) (ML112911571). Among other
things, we directed that the agency ―should strive to complete and implement the lessons
learned from the Fukushima accident within five years—by 2016.‖ Id. at 1. See also Staff
Requirements—SECY–11–0137—Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in
Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned (Dec. 15, 2011) (ML113490055); ―Prioritization of
Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,‖ Commission
Paper SECY–11–0137 (Oct. 3, 2011) (ML11272A111) (package).

 - 27 As we stated in CLI-11-5, we have in place well-established regulatory processes by
which to impose any new requirements or other enhancements that may be needed.105 The
applicability of any new requirement will be determined when the justification is fully developed
and we evaluate the Staff‘s bases. While these processes are well under way, it takes time to
complete the steps necessary to ensure that any new requirements are technically justified and
implemented appropriately. We are confident that the Commission‘s approach—using rigorous,
well-established processes rather than the Chairman‘s loosely-defined proposed license
condition—will assure timely implementation of new requirements based on Fukushima lessons
learned. Indeed, this is the same approach we took in Vogtle. As we stated there, departing
from our stable, predictable licensing process may unintentionally impact the Staff‘s disciplined
work.106 Moreover, all affected licensees ultimately will be required to comply with NRC
direction resulting from lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, regardless of the timing
of issuance of the affected licenses. 107 We therefore expect that the new VCSNS units will
comply with all applicable ―post-Fukushima‖ requirements in a timely fashion as they are
developed, and we impose no additional Fukushima-related license conditions today.
2. Maximum Safety Wet Bulb (Noncoincident) Temperature Departure
a. Wet Bulb Noncoincident Temperature and Need for the Departure

105

See generally Callaway, CLI-11-5, 74 NRC at __ (slip op. at 24-25).

106

Southern Nuclear Operating Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), CLI-12-2,
75 NRC __ (Feb. 9, 2012) (slip op.).
107

As discussed above, we have the regulatory flexibility to choose the appropriate vehicle
(including imposition of a specific order or license condition, or promulgation of a generallyapplicable rule) to implement new requirements arising from our review of the Fukushima
accident. The mechanisms used have no bearing on the underlying result—the imposition of
identical, binding requirements upon the affected licensees.

 - 28 The Staff found that the VCSNS site falls within the AP1000 site parameters, with only
one exception.108 The VCSNS COL application included a request for a departure from the wet
bulb noncoincident temperature as described in the AP1000 DCD. Because the wet bulb
noncoincident temperature is considered ―Tier 1 information,‖ or, part of the AP1000 certified
design, a regulatory exemption is required.109 This is the only site-specific exemption request
for the VCSNS COL application.110
Michelle Hayes, testifying for the Staff, explained this value:
The wet bulb temperature is a derived temperature. It represents the lowest dry
bulb temperature that can be obtained by evaporating water into the air at
constant pressure. A higher wet bulb temperature means the air is wetter, and
can therefore absorb less water vapor than a lower wet bulb temperature. The
wet bulb temperature is derived from observations of dry bulb temperature, dew
point temperature and atmospheric pressure. It is directly related to the relative
humidity of the air.111
Ms. Hayes also explained that a ―coincident‖ wet bulb temperature is a wet bulb temperature
that was recorded at the same time as the dry bulb temperature, whereas a ―non-coincident‖
temperature was not.112 The Applicants noted that the maximum safety wet bulb
(noncoincident) air temperature is the highest such temperature at a site, excluding peaks of
less than two hours duration, that is allowable by the DCD.113
SCE&G calculated the wet bulb temperature for the site, using individual daily maximum
wet bulb temperatures recorded over thirty years at Columbia South Carolina National Weather

108

Tr. at 100 (Sebrosky). See also Ex. NRC000004, FSER, at 2-7.

109

See 10 C.F.R. pt. 52, app. D, §§ IV A.2.d and VIII.A.4.

110

Id. This is not the only site-specific departure, however. See, e.g., discussion infra regarding
the relocation of the Technical Support Center.
111

Tr. at 100-01 (Hayes).

112

Id. (Hayes).

113

Id. at 89 (Monroe).

 - 29 Service Station, and performing a linear regression analysis to derive a 100-year return value.114
The DCD-specified site parameter of maximum safety wet bulb, noncoincident air temperature,
86.1 degrees Fahrenheit, is slightly lower than the value SCE&G derived for the VCSNS site—
87.3 degrees Fahrenheit.115
Because the cooling towers use evaporation to cool process water, a higher wet bulb
temperature would reduce their cooling efficiency.116 Evaluations therefore were performed to
determine how the change could affect various systems, including the service water system.117
The service water system supplies water to the component cooling water system, which in turn
supports twelve systems.118 SCE&G calculated that with the slight decrease in evaporative
cooling resulting from the change, the maximum component cooling water temperature would
increase by about 0.3 degrees Fahrenheit, remaining within the AP1000 DCD design parameter
of less than 100 degrees Fahrenheit.119 SCE&G evaluated all twelve of the systems cooled by
the component cooling system, and determined that the existing design could accommodate the
higher temperatures.120
Another potentially affected system is the nuclear island non-radioactive ventilation
system. This is considered a non-safety system, although it provides ventilation to two safety-

114

Id. (Monroe).

115

Id. at 31-32 (Monroe).

116

Ex. NRC000003, Staff Testimony, at 14-15.

117

Tr. at 90 (Monroe). See Ex. NRC00001P, COL Application Part 7, at 859-61.

118

See generally Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 9.2.2.

119

Tr. at 106 (Hayes). See generally Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 9.2.2.

120

Tr. at 106 (Hayes). See Ex. NRC00001P, COL Application, Part 7, at 859-60; Ex.
NRC000004, FSER, § 9.2.2.

 - 30 related areas: the control room and the battery rooms.121 SCE&G determined that the existing
chillers could accommodate the higher heat load.122
As a result of these analyses, SCE&G concluded that the departure would have no
detrimental effect on safety- and non-safety-related systems. Moreover, SCE&G performed an
additional review to ensure that these conclusions would remain valid after incorporating
Revision 19 of the AP1000 DCD into its application.123
b. The Staff’s Review and Findings Related to Wet Bulb Temperature Departure
The Staff first reviewed the Applicants‘ method for deriving the wet-bulb temperature,
and also performed an independent analysis using thirty-two years of data from the Columbia
weather station. 124 The Staff concluded that the Applicants‘ analysis was acceptable and
conservative.125
The Staff then confirmed the Applicants‘ evaluations of the effects of the slightly higher
temperature on a variety of systems.126 Systems that could be affected by the change are
systems that rely on evaporative cooling or systems used to maintain relative humidity.127
―Systems of interest‖ included the passive containment cooling system, the service water
system, and the nuclear island non-radioactive ventilation system.128

121

Tr. at 106 (Hayes).

122

Id. (Hayes).

123

Id. at 91 (Monroe).

124

Id. at 103-04 (Hayes). See generally Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 2.3.1.

125

Id.

126

Tr. at 104 (Hayes).

127

Id. (Hayes).

128

Id. The Staff‘s evaluations of the effects that the higher temperature has on the operation of
the AP1000 design are found in Ex. NRC000004, FSER, §§ 2.3.1, 5.4 (reactor coolant
systems), 6.2 (containment systems),6.4 (habitability systems), 9.1.3 (spent fuel pool cooling
(continued . . .)

 - 31 The passive containment cooling system is a safety-related system designed to use
evaporative cooling and air and water convection to cool the inside of the containment following
an accident.129 The Staff performed an independent analysis, utilizing the CONTAIN thermohydraulic model, which was developed during the review of the AP1000 DCD.130 The Staff
undertook a specific effort to independently evaluate this system—rather than simply
―confirming‖ results of the Applicants‘ analysis— because it is safety-related.
For non-safety related systems, the Staff reviewed the application and the Applicants‘
RAI responses, and also audited the Applicants‘ calculations to confirm their analyses.131 The
Staff found the calculations to be acceptable.132
The Staff evaluation found that the exemption associated with the wet-bulb temperature
departure should be granted because it is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to
public health or safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security, and that
special circumstances are present.133 In addition, the Staff found that application of the
regulation is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.134 The Staff

system), 9.2.2 (component cooling water system for reactor auxiliaries), and 9.2.7 (component
cooling water system for reactor auxiliaries – HVAC system).
129

Tr. at 104 (Hayes).

130

Id. at 104-05, 117-18, 123-24, 128 (Hayes). See generally Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 6.2.4.

131

Id. at 106 (Hayes). See id. at 128-29 (Segala) (discussion of margins of conservatism in
service water and component cooling water systems, and with ventilation system chillers).
132

Id. at 106-07 (Hayes). See generally Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 9.2.7.

133

Tr. at 102-03 (Hayes). See Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 2.0.4, at 2-6 to 2-7 (Staff finding on
exemption). See also 10 C.F.R. § 50.12(a)(2)(ii) (standard for granting exemption);
NRC000003, Staff Testimony, at 14-16.
134

Tr. at 121-22 (Hayes, Sebrosky). The Commission will only grant an exemption from a
regulation where ―special circumstances‖ are shown. A demonstration that application of the
regulation is not necessary to achieve its underlying purpose is listed as one such special
circumstance. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.12(a)(2)(ii).

 - 32 concluded that the exemption will not result in a decrease in the level of safety otherwise
provided by the design.135
3. Site Characteristics: Demography, Geography, Hydrology and Manmade Hazards136
Safety Panel One also addressed site characteristics of the VCSNS site that are covered
in Chapter 2 of the FSER, including nearby populations and hazards associated with industrial,
transportation, and military facilities.137 Safety Panel Two discussed, among other things,
flooding scenarios addressed in FSER section 2.4.138
a. General Site Characteristics
The VCSNS site is located in central South Carolina, in the Piedmont section of the
State, approximately 140 miles east of the Atlantic Coast, and approximately ninety miles from
the base of the Blue Ridge Mountains.139 The site is in a sparsely populated rural area; the
largest town located within a ten-mile radius of this site is Chapin, with a population of 628.140
The largest nearby population center is Columbia, South Carolina, approximately fourteen miles
southeast of VCSNS.141
The site is south of the Monticello Reservoir, and it is bounded on the west by the Parr
Reservoir and the Broad River.142 There is no commercial navigation on these water bodies.143
135

See id. at 118-20 (Hayes, Sebrosky).

136

See Ex. NRC000007, Staff Pre-Hearing Responses, at 5; Ex. SCE000001, SCE&G PreHearing Responses, at 1-2; Tr. at 134-35, 141-52, 155-56, 158-77.
137

Revised Scheduling Note at 3 (unnumbered).

138

Id.

139

Tr. at 91 (Summer).

140

Id. (citing 2000 Census data).

141

See Ex. NRC000009, Safety Panel One, Staff Slide 21.

142

Tr. at 91 (Summer); Ex. SCE000014, Safety Panel Two, SCE&G Slide 3.

143

Tr. at 93 (Summer).

 - 33 The site is situated on a ridge top at an elevation of 400 feet, approximately 135 feet above the
Parr Reservoir. Accordingly, SCE&G found that flooding from the adjacent water bodies is not a
concern at the site.144
The application analyzed military facilities, industrial facilities, and transportation facilities
and found that they presented no potential hazard to the site. For example, several small
airports are located within a 25-mile radius of the plant site, but due to their low activity level and
distance from the site, they were found to present an insignificant risk.145 In addition, of the few
major industrial facilities located within a five-mile radius, all are located approximately one mile
or more from the VCSNS site.146 The Applicants found overall that accidents from marine,
military, aeronautical, and industrial hazards are probabilistically insignificant.147
b. Staff Analysis of Demography, Geography, Hydrology and Manmade Hazards
The purpose of the geography and demography review in FSER section 2.1 is to
determine whether the COL applicant has proposed an acceptable site, including acceptable
site boundaries, with appropriate consideration of nearby populations and natural and manmade features. The Staff described the steps in its review, as follows:
(1) The Staff verified that no publicly used transportation modes or public roads cross
the proposed exclusion area boundary, confirming that it would not be necessary to
arrange for traffic control in the event of an emergency.148
(2) The Staff reviewed the Applicants‘ demography and population estimates and
performed independent calculations using census data to estimate the future
144

Id. at 133 (Summer). See Ex. SCE000014, Safety Panel Two, SCE&G Slide 4 (map of site
topography).
145

Tr. at 93 (Summer), 110 (Sebrosky). See also Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 2.2.1.4, at 2-25 to
2-26).
146

Tr. at 92 (Summer).

147

See Ex. SCE000013, Safety Panel One, SCE&G Slide 14 (overview of nearby industrial,
transportation, and military facilities). ―Probabilistically insignificant‖ is interpreted to mean a
probability of 1 x 10-7, or one in ten million. See Tr. at 136 (Monroe).
148

Tr. at 108-09 (Sebrosky).

 - 34 population in the area up to the year 2060. The Staff determined that the Applicants‘
specified low population zone is acceptable because appropriate protective
measures could be taken in the event of an accident.149
The Staff also confirmed that various offsite and anthropogenic hazards presented little
danger to operations at the site. As one example, the Staff performed independent probability
calculations to verify SCE&G‘s analysis of aircraft hazards. SCE&G acknowledged that one of
the acceptance criteria provided in the Standard Review Plan used to assess nearby hazards—
that the plant is at least two miles beyond the nearest edge of a federal airway—was not met.150
Therefore, SCE&G used an alternative methodology to demonstrate that the risk of an aircraft
accident at the site was acceptably low. The Staff independently calculated the probability
using the most conservative total flight data within five miles of the plant, obtained from the
Federal Aviation Administration for the airway in question, and verified that the total aircraft
accident probability is on the order of one in ten million.151
The Staff independently evaluated SCE&G's analyses concerning hazards from
explosions at nearby industrial sites and transportation routes, and determined that any such
explosion hazards are at safe distances from the VCSNS site.152 Similarly, the Staff performed
independent evaluations of toxic gas and hazards from chemicals that are transported on the
rail line running beside the Broad River, that are stored at VCSNS Unit 1, and that are expected
to be stored at Units 2 and 3. The Staff determined that these chemical hazards would not
adversely affect control room habitability of the two new units.153
149

Id. at 109 (Sebrosky). See 10 C.F.R. § 100.21. See also Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 2.1.

150

Tr. at 110 (Sebrosky). NUREG-0800, § 3.5.1.6 provides three acceptance criteria for the
probability of aircraft accidents to be less than 10-7 per year. If all three criteria are met, then no
further analysis is performed.
151

Tr. at 110 (Sebrosky). See Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 2.2.1.4, at 2-25 to 2-26.

152

Tr. at 111 (Sebrosky). See generally Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 2.2.

153

Id.

 - 35 The Staff looked at hydrology to confirm that flooding presents no danger to operations
at the site and that operations at the site present no danger to surface and groundwater. The
Staff performed confirmatory analyses on SCE&G‘s flood scenarios, such as the local site
flooding caused by local intense precipitation, flooding on the Broad River and nearby
reservoirs, and the hypothetical breaching of upstream dams.154 Based on its review of various
flooding scenarios, including local intense precipitation and dam breach scenarios, the Staff
found that the VCSNS is a dry site and needs no flood protections.155 The Staff also analyzed
the potential impact of a postulated accidental effluent release on nearby water users.156 The
Staff confirmed SCE&G‘s calculations, using more conservative assumptions about
groundwater flow velocity, contaminant decay, adsorption and dilution. These conservatisms
resulted in larger concentrations of contaminants at receptor locations.157 The Staff concluded
that, even with the additional conservatisms, concentrations at potential receptor locations
resulting from these bounding accidental effluent release scenarios remained within applicable
regulatory limits.158
4. Site Characteristics: Geology, Seismology, Geotechnical Engineering
Safety Panel Two discussed geology of the VCSNS site, including ground motion
response spectra (GMRS) and the seismic margin analysis.159
a. Site Geology of VCSNS site

154

Tr. at 137-38 (See).

155

Id. at 138 (See).

156

Id. (See).

157

Id. at 139-40 (See).

158

Id. See 10 C.F.R. pt. 20, app. D.

159

Revised Scheduling Note at 3 (unnumbered).

 - 36 The VCSNS site is underlain by hard bedrock.160 Robert Whorton, testifying for the
Applicants, explained that the AP1000 certified seismic design response spectrum (CSDRS) is
based on NRC Regulatory Guide 1.60 recommendations and assumes a peak ground
acceleration of 0.30g at high frequency.161 The VCSNS GMRS, also known as the site-specific
safe shutdown earthquake, was developed through the probabilistic seismic hazards analysis
process, with a peak ground acceleration of 0.23g at 100 hertz (Hz).162 Mr. Whorton testified
that the VCSNS GMRS exceeds the CSDRS at frequencies of approximately 17 to 80 Hz in a
horizontal direction.163 Westinghouse, however, developed an AP1000 hard rock high
frequency response spectra (HRHF), to bound the first three hard rock site COL applications
and to address high frequency exceedences above the certified design.164 These high
frequency exceedences were evaluated and found to be acceptable to the Staff.165
b. Staff Review of Geology and Seismology
The Staff reviewed the application to ensure that there were no capable tectonic features
at the site or surrounding area that could present a hazard at the site.166 As explained by Staff
witness Mr. Stirewalt, ―capable tectonic features‖ are defined as tectonic features of quaternary
age, that is, 2.6 million years of age to the present.167

160

Tr. at 133-34 (Whorton).

161

Id. at 134 (Whorton). See Regulatory Guide 1.60, ―Design Response Spectra for Seismic
Design of Nuclear Power Plants‖ (Rev. 1) (1973) (ML003740207).
162

Tr. at 168-69 (Whorton).

163

Id. at 134 (Whorton). See Ex. SCE000014, Safety Panel Two, SCE&G Slide 7.

164

Id. at 134 (Whorton).

165

Id. at 134-35 (Whorton).

166

Id. at 140 (Stirewalt).

167

Id. at 140-41 (Stirewalt). It is assumed that tectonic features older than quaternary are
unlikely to become active. Id. at 155-56 (Stirewalt).

 - 37 The Staff visited the VCSNS site during the excavation performed for Unit 2 in August
2010 and April 2011 to directly examine the geologic features being mapped.168 The Staff
confirmed that no capable tectonic features were found. The Staff proposes a license condition
for Unit 3 geologic mapping, which has yet to be performed.169
The Staff confirmed that the only capable tectonic features in the site region are
associated with seismically-induced paleo-liquefaction along the South Carolina coast. These
features were generated by seismic shaking of saturated sediments during the 1886 and the
pre-1886 earthquakes, which occurred in the Charleston area.170 Based on its detailed
technical review of the application, independent review of references cited by the Applicants,
and knowledge of regional and site-specific geology for the VCSNS site, the Staff concluded
that there were no capable tectonic features requiring further investigation other than in the
Charleston area.171
Geophysicist Sara Tabatabai discussed the Staff‘s review of FSAR section 2.5.2, which
addresses vibratory ground motion.172 The Staff focused on ensuring that SCE&G adequately
had updated the seismic source model for its probabilistic seismic hazard analysis. According
to Ms. Tabatabai, the most significant seismic source is the Charleston seismic source. SCE&G

168

Id. at 143-44 (Stirewalt).

169

Id. According to the witness, geologic mapping for Unit 3 has not been performed because
excavation at the site is not yet at foundation grade level, which is twenty to forty meters below
the surface. Id. at 157 (Stirewalt). See generally Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 2.5.1.
170

Tr. at 141 (Stirewalt). See Ex. NRC000010, Safety Panel Two, Staff Slide 4 (map of geologic
and seismic features in VCSNS region).
171
172

Tr. at 141 (Stirewalt).

Id. at 146-50. See Ex. NRC00001I, COL Application Part 2, FSAR, § 2.5.2-i (Rev. 5),
subsection 2.5.2–vibratory ground motion.

 - 38 updated the 1986 Charleston seismic source model, prepared by the Electric Power Research
Institute, with an entirely new model, which was based on paleoseismic data.173
With respect to the GMRS, the Staff reviewed the methodology by which Westinghouse
derived the HRHF and found it consistent with Staff guidance.174 It also performed confirmatory
analysis to ensure that SCE&G had implemented properly the seismic modeling parameters.175
After reviewing, auditing, and verifying the Applicants‘ seismic design analysis, the Staff
concluded that the AP1000 standard design is acceptable for the VCSNS site.
5. Probabilistic Risk Assessment
a. Probabilistic Risk Assessment at VCSNS
Safety Panel Two discussed at length various hazards that contribute to overall risk.176
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is addressed in Chapter 19 of the FSER and includes
internally initiated events and external events including seismic events.
The VCSNS COL application incorporated by reference the AP1000 DCD PRA for
internally initiated events.177 External events, such as the hazards addressed in Chapters 2 and
3 of the FSAR (which correspond to Chapters 2 and 3 of the FSER), including high winds,
flooding, fire, transportation accidents and accidents at nearby facilities, also are addressed
probabilistically to determine their contributions to total plant risk.178 According to the

173

Tr. at 147-48 (Tabatabai). See Ex. NRC000010, Safety Panel Two, Staff Slide 10.

174

Tr. at 149 (Tabatabai).

175

Id. at 149-50 (Tabatabai).

176

Revised Scheduling Note at 3 (unnumbered).

177

See Ex. NRC000004, FSER, at 19-1 to 19-3 (listing AP1000 DCD sections relating to PRA
that were incorporated by reference in the COL application).
178

Tr. at 152 (Patterson).

 - 39 Applicants‘ analyses, risk from high winds, floods, and other external events were calculated to
be probabilistically insignificant, thus requiring no further analysis.179
b. Staff PRA Review
Testifying for the Staff, Malcolm Patterson explained that even though the external
events evaluated in Chapters 2 and 3 of the FSER may have a very low probability of
occurrence, they still may represent a ―significant percentage‖ of the estimated ―core damage
frequency‖ because the risk from internally initiated events is considered to be even lower.180
Mr. Patterson also explained that the Staff requires a seismic margin analysis to identify
the equipment needed to shut down the plant after a seismic event. Our regulations demand a
safety margin—―a cushion beyond the design basis‖—to account for ―uncertainty about how
much shaking a particular [earth]quake is going to cause on a given site,‖ Mr. Patterson
explained.181 According to the witness, the AP1000 DCD established a ―review level
earthquake‖ with a peak ground acceleration of 0.5g, to be used in the seismic margin analysis,
to demonstrate a margin of safety over the safe shutdown earthquake of 0.3g.182 Because the
VCSNS site falls within the AP1000 hard rock high frequency spectrum established by
Westinghouse, the Staff found the DCD seismic margin analysis to be conservative and
acceptable.183
6. Use of HABIT Code
Also discussed by Safety Panel Three was the Staff‘s use of the HABIT code to model
the dispersion of hazardous gasses in the case of a release from an offsite rail, truck, or pipeline
179

See id. at 136 (Monroe) (citing Ex. NRC00001J, FSAR Table 19.58-201, at 500).

180

Id. at 150 (Patterson).

181

Id. at 150-51 (Patterson).

182

Id. at 151 (Patterson). See generally Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 19.55.4.

183

Tr. at 151 (Patterson). See generally Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 19.55.4.

 - 40 accident or from chemicals stored at Unit 1.184 General Design Criterion 19 requires an
applicant to ensure that its control room remains habitable in case of accidental release of
hazardous gasses.185 Potential toxic hazards are reviewed in FSER section 2.2.3.
SCE&G first looked at the types of chemicals stored at or transported to nearby facilities,
and then used the Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) air dispersion model to
predict the dispersion of gasses released in a hypothetical accidents.186 ALOHA determines the
maximum distance a vapor cloud could travel before it disperses enough to fall below the
concentrations ―immediately dangerous to life and health.‖187
The Staff used the HABIT code to confirm SCE&G‘s calculations.188 The HABIT code is
an NRC-developed meteorological model and code used to determine control room habitability
in case of an accident involving hazardous gasses. In reviewing the advanced safety evaluation
report, the ACRS raised a concern with the Staff‘s use of the HABIT code.189 The ACRS
observed that HABIT is valid for gasses of neutral weight but not for heavy gasses.190 In
response, the Staff agreed that the HABIT code does not include an explicit heavy gas
dispersion model and that HABIT can and should be improved.191

184

Tr. at 198-200 (Habib). See ―General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,‖ 10 C.F.R.
pt. 50, app. A (Criterion 19–Control Room).
185

Id. at 199 (Habib).

186

Id. at 187 (Monroe). See also Ex. NRC00001C, FSAR, § 2.2.3.1.

187

Tr. at 187 (Monroe).

188

Id. at 199 (Habib).

189

Id. See also ACRS Report at 3.

190

See id.

191

Tr. at 200 (Habib). According to Mr. Habib, NRO has requested assistance from the Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research in improving the HABIT code. Id. See also Ex. NRC000003,
Staff Testimony, at 8 (Staff is taking steps to improve the HABIT code in response to ACRS
recommendation).

 - 41 Mr. Habib, speaking for the Staff, explained that the Staff and ACRS took the HABIT
code‘s limitations into consideration when making the safety finding.192 He stated that, as long
as these limitations are recognized and understood, the model can continue to be used
appropriately for evaluation of toxic gas threats to the control room.193 In its statement in
support of the uncontested hearing, the Staff affirmed its position that HABIT can be used
appropriately to perform independent confirmatory analyses.194
In response to our questioning at the hearing, John McKirgan, speaking for the Staff,
stated that SCE&G‘s analyses using the ALOHA code are the ―[analyses] of record‖ and the
analyses on which both the Staff and ACRS based their safety findings.195 Mr. McKirgan
explained that the Staff uses the HABIT code to look at concentrations at the intake to the
control room, so that ―if the concentrations at the intake to the control room are below the levels
of concern no further analysis is needed.‖196 He reasserted that the HABIT code was used only
to confirm the Applicants‘ analyses.197
7. Emergency Planning
The COL application provided an emergency plan for the site, in accordance with
10 C.F.R. § 52.79(a)(21).198 SCE&G proposes to use a consolidated emergency plan for the
192

Tr. at 200 (Habib).

193

Id. (Habib).

194

See Ex. NRC000003, Staff Testimony, at 8.

195

Tr. at 224 (McKirgan). See also ―ALOHA Analysis for On-Site Chemicals Stored at Unit 1‖
(Oct. 28, 2009) (ML103140719), ―ALOHA Railroad Calculation‖ (Dec. 29, 2009)
(ML103140720).
196

Tr. at 226 (McKirgan).

197

Id. at 224 (McKirgan).

198

See also ―Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response
Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants‖ (Rev. 1), NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1 (Nov. 1980) (ML040420012).

 - 42 three units at VCSNS, with unit-specific ―annexes‖ for each of the two new reactors and for the
existing Unit 1.199
Onsite emergency plans are developed by the applicant and reviewed by the NRC.
Offsite plans are developed by State and local emergency response authorities, and reviewed
by FEMA. The NRC Staff considered FEMA‘s findings in making its necessary finding of
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can, and will, be taken in the event of
a radiological emergency:200
FEMA has reviewed the emergency plans for the State of South Carolina and the
local government plans for Lexington, Newberry, Richland, and Fairfield counties
. . . . FEMA has determined that the plans are adequate, and there is reasonable
assurance that the plans can be implemented with no corrections needed. The
NRC staff has reviewed the FEMA report and based its overall reasonable
assurance finding on the FEMA findings and determinations regarding offsite
emergency planning.201
According to Staff witnesses, the NRC and FEMA periodically evaluate emergency
preparedness.202 The licensee holds drills and exercises throughout the year.203 Every two
years, the licensee stages full participation exercises, which are evaluated by both FEMA and
NRC.204
At the hearing, the Staff and SCE&G discussed emergency planning issues of particular
concern, including the use of a single, centrally-located technical support center (TSC) for all
three units, the size of the emergency planning zone, and the emergency action levels to be
developed for the emergency plan.
199

Tr. at 184 (Williamson).

200

See id. at 192 (Barss). See generally Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 13.3.1; 10 C.F.R.
§ 50.47(a)(2).
201

Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 13.3.4, at 13-17.

202

Tr. at 225 (Barss).

203

Id. (Barss).

204

Id. (Barss). See also 10 C.F.R. pt. 50, app. E, § IV.F.2.

 - 43 a. Relocation of the Technical Support Center205
The VCSNS COL application proposes to use a single TSC for existing Unit 1 and
proposed Units 2 and 3, to be co-located in the basement of the new nuclear operations
building, between the protected areas of the three units.206 Relocation of the technical support
centers to a central facility allows for the relocation of each of the new units‘ operational support
centers to the TSC locations designated in the AP1000 DCD, adjacent to the control room.207
Each unit will continue to have its own operational support center.208 This rearrangement is a
departure from the AP1000 DCD.209
The relocation of the TSCs also differs from current NRC guidance, implemented in
1981 after the Three Mile Island accident, which directs that the TSC be proximate to the control

205

See Ex. NRC000003, Staff Testimony, at 13; Ex. NRC000007, Staff Pre-Hearing Responses,
at 8, 14; Tr. at 185-86, 227-28, 233 (Williamson), 228-31 (Barss).
206

Tr. at 185-86 (Williamson). Relocation of Unit 1‘s TSC requires a separate NRC approval
under 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(q). Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 20. SCE&G
submitted a proposed revision of the Unit 1 emergency plan in February 2012. See Gatlin,
Thomas D., SCE&G, to USNRC Document Control Desk (Feb. 16, 2012) (ML12054A105)
(transmitting licensee‘s 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(q) evaluation of the proposed changes and proposed
changes to emergency plan). SCE&G expects to implement the multi-unit emergency plan
eighteen months prior to fuel load of the new units. Ex. SCE000027, SCE&G Post-Hearing
Responses, at 9.
207

Tr. at 186 (Williamson).

208

SCE&G explains the relationship between the two support centers as follows:
The TSC is the lead facility for onsite emergency response and is the evaluation
and decisionmaking facility for the onsite mitigation strategies. The Operational
Support Centers (OSCs), one for each Unit, are the investigative and
implementation facilities for onsite actions and assessments being taken during
the emergency. Each OSC has a facility manager, the OSC Manager, who
reports to the TSC Emergency Director per the Emergency Plan. Although these
managers report to the TSC, the operation of each OSC is independent of the
other OSCs.

Ex. SCE000027, SCE&G Post-Hearing Responses, at 11.
209

Tr. at 184 (Williamson). See also Ex. NRC000003, Staff Testimony, at 13.

 - 44 room to facilitate communications in case of emergencies.210 Daniel Barss, testifying for the
Staff, stated that transit time between the TSC and the affected control rooms will be
―approximately 10 to 15 minutes [including] processing time through the exclusionary and
protected area security control points.‖211
According to the Staff, however, improvements in communications since the 1970s will
make it unnecessary for the TSC personnel to be physically present in or near the control room:
The TSC will have dedicated diverse communication capabilities between the
affected control rooms, technical support center, the OSC, and the emergency
operations facility or EOF. Use of the current technologies, such as updated
computer equipment, telecommunication—teleconferencing, real time system
monitoring of plant data, telephone and radio systems for primary and backup
emergency communications—will bridge this physical separation.212
The Staff witness stated that relocation of the TSCs will have advantages in terms of efficiency,
elimination of confusion, and avoidance of staffing multiple TSCs where an incident affects more
than one unit.213
The Staff also looked at other factors to assess the appropriateness of the change.
Relocation to a single TSC does not change any of the design parameters for external events
that the TSCs would otherwise have to withstand.214 In addition, the emergency planning Staff
worked with the Staff reviewing human factors engineering to resolve a concern that, during an
emergency, it could be unclear to the TSC staff which of the three units is giving information.215

210

See ―Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities – Final Report,‖ NUREG-0696
(Feb. 1981) at 9 (see http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0696)
(walking time between TSC and control room should not exceed two minutes).
211

Tr. at 194 (Barss).

212

Id. (Barss).

213

Id. at 194-95, 228-31 (Barss).

214

Id. at 233 (Williamson). See also Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 20.

215

Tr. at 221-22 (Sebrosky, Barss). This concern was first raised by the ACRS with respect to
the Vogtle application, which also proposes a single TSC for both the two new units and the two
(continued . . .)

 - 45 To address this issue, SCE&G will be required to design the displays within the TSC to ensure
that it is clear from which unit relevant information derives.216 The Staff therefore found that the
changed locations would meet regulatory requirements and were acceptable.
b. Emergency Planning Zone217
In accordance with applicable regulations, the existing emergency planning zone (EPZ)
is approximately a 10-mile radius around Unit 1, as adjusted to reflect the road network and land
use.218 Therefore, the boundary for the EPZ may be a bit greater than ten miles on one side of
this circle a little less than ten miles on another.219
The EPZ was developed in coordination with SCE&G, FEMA, and State and local
officials.220 In consultation between SCE&G, South Carolina emergency officials, and the

existing reactors. See Armijo, J.S., Vice-Chairman, ACRS, to Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman,
NRC (Jan. 24, 2011), at 4 (ML110170006).
216

Tr. at 221 (Sebrosky). The issue is addressed in the following ITAAC (Inspections, Tests,
Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria):
ITAAC 1.1: An inspection of the Control Rooms, Technical Support Center
(TSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be performed to verify that
they have displays for retrieving facility system and effluent parameters that are
specified in the Emergency Classification and EAL scheme and the displays are
functional.
Ex. NRC00004, FSER, § 18.2.5.
217

See Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 13.3; Ex. SCE000027, SCE&G‘s Pre-Hearing Responses, at
5 & Attachment 1 (map of EPZ); Ex. NRC000017, Staff‘s Post-Hearing Responses, at 17-18.
218

See Tr. 192-93 (Barss). See 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.33(g), 50.47(b) and 10 C.F.R. pt. 50, app. E,
―Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities. See also Ex.
NRC000003, Staff Testimony, at 13-14.
219
220

See Ex. NRC000003, Staff Testimony, at 14.

Once the EPZ is approved, the licensee is not required to update the EPZ boundaries to
reflect changes in land use. Any such change would be made on the recommendation of State
and local officials, and would not need prior NRC approval as long as the change does not
reduce the effectiveness of the emergency plan. See Ex. NRC000007, Staff Pre-Hearing
Responses, at 14-15.

 - 46 affected county governments, it was decided that the existing EPZ would be used for all three
VCSNS units.221
Because the new units are to be located approximately one mile southwest of the
existing Unit 1, the new units are one mile closer to the southwest boundary.222 FEMA therefore
investigated whether the original EPZ would be appropriate for use with the new units. FEMA‘s
investigation showed that the additional area that would be included in a 10-mile radius around
the new units was a sparsely populated area primarily used for logging.223 Based on this
information, FEMA agreed that use of the original EPZ for all three VCSNS units was
acceptable.224
In addition to reviewing the application and FEMA‘s findings, the NRC Staff conducted
two site visits to the proposed location for the new units, including various areas within the
10-mile EPZ.225 The Staff concluded, based on these reviews, that the EPZ for the new units is
acceptable and satisfies the applicable regulatory requirements.226
c. Emergency Action Levels227
Emergency action levels (EALs)—pre-determined, site-specific, observable thresholds
that determine the emergency classification level in a given event—are not yet available for
221

Tr. at 185 (Williamson). See also id. at 195-96 (Barss) (observing that South Carolina and all
four affected counties provided letters certifying their approval of the emergency plan, their
commitment to participating in exercises, their commitment to executing their responsibilities
under the plan, and their assurance that the plans are practicable).
222

See Ex. NRC000003, Staff Testimony, at 14.

223

Id.

224

Id.

225

Tr. at 197-98 (Barss).

226

Id. (Barss). See Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 13.3B, at 13-29.

227

See Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 13-14; Tr. at 184, 210-15
(Williamson, Barss).

 - 47 accidents involving the proposed new units.228 To address this, SCE&G proposed a license
condition, which would require it to submit a set of fully developed EALs to the NRC at least 180
days prior to fuel load:229
The licensee shall submit a fully developed set of plant-specific Emergency
Action Levels (EALs) for VCSNS Units 2 and 3 to the NRC in accordance with
NEI 07-01, Revision 0. These fully developed EALs shall be submitted to the
NRC for confirmation at least 180 days prior to initial fuel load. The submitted
EALs will be written with no deviations.230
The Staff accepted this proposed license condition with the addition of a provision that the EALs
will have been reviewed and approved by State and local officials prior to submission to NRC.231
Testifying for SCE&G, Robert Williamson explained that Westinghouse has not
completed the design of the radiation monitors that will be used at the VCSNS site (these
monitors are not part of the certified design for the AP1000).232 SCE&G therefore cannot
complete the offsite dose calculations now.233 Once those design details are known, SCE&G
will develop the EALs in accordance with NEI 07-01.234 The EALs then will be reviewed with,
and agreed upon by, State and local officials prior to submission to the NRC.235

228

An EAL can be an instrument reading, an equipment status indicator, a measurable
parameter, or an observable event (e.g., flooding, fire).
229

Tr. at 184 (Williamson).

230

Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 13.3, at 13-15.

231

See id. at 13-18.

232

Tr. at 210-11 (Williamson).

233

Id. (Williamson).

234

Id. at 211 (Barss). See Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI 07-01, Methodology for Development
of Emergency Action Levels Advanced Passive Light Water Reactors, Rev. 0 (Sept. 2007)
(ML072710311). The NEI approach has been approved by the NRC Staff. See Miller,
Christopher G., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Alan Nelson, Nuclear Energy
Institute (Aug. 12, 2009) (ML092190035).
235

Tr. at 184 (Williamson).

 - 48 The NRC Staff found that SCE&G‘s commitment, in the license condition, to develop the
EALs in accordance with the NEI guidance was sufficiently specific to satisfy the regulation.236
In response to our post-hearing question, the Staff stated that SCE&G did not require an
exemption from our regulations at Part 50, Appendix E, because there is sufficient information in
the application at this point ―to permit the Staff to make a finding of reasonable assurance that
[SCE&G] will meet the applicable requirements when the COL is issued‖ because it ―provided
an overview of the EAL scheme, including defining its four emergency classification levels.‖237
8. Squib Valves
During the mandatory hearing for the COL application associated with Vogtle Units 3
and 4, held two weeks before the VCSNS hearing, we discussed at length issues associated
with the inservice testing and inspection program for squib valves.238 Squib valves are
explosively actuated valves used in the AP1000 automatic depressurization system to reduce
reactor pressure in the event of a loss of coolant accident, and as part of the passive core
cooling system in the event of a severe accident. The design and qualification of the squib
valves is described in the AP1000 DCD and incorporated by reference into the COL
application.239 ITAAC specified in Tier 1 of the AP1000 DCD require squib valves to be tested
to demonstrate operational capability under design conditions.
The ACRS questioned the adequacy of inservice testing and inspection program for
squib valves during its review of the Vogtle COL application, because that testing program was
contingent on an American Society of Mechanical Engineers code provision that is still under

236

Id. at 213-15 (Barss).

237

Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 13-14.

238

See Southern Nuclear Operating Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), Tr. at
144-47, 160-64, 166-67, 168-70, 174-78, 179-80.
239

See generally NRC00001J, FSAR, § 3.9.

 - 49 development.240 Because the VCSNS COL application also references the AP1000 design, it
presents a similar concern. Although we did not hear a presentation on this issue during the
VCSNS hearing, we asked the Staff a post-hearing question on this topic.241
Although we find that the Staff‘s review of the squib valve issues was rigorous, we have
a concern similar to that initially raised by the ACRS regarding the status of the inservice
inspection/inservice testing program for this component. As such, we find that including a
license condition directing the implementation of a surveillance program, with the requirements
described below, prior to fuel load, is appropriate.242
We therefore impose the following condition on the licenses for VCSNS Units 2 and 3:
Before initial fuel load, the licensees shall implement a surveillance program for explosively
actuated valves (squib valves) that includes the following provisions in addition to the
requirements specified in the edition of the ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of
Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code) as incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a.
a. Preservice Testing
All explosively actuated valves shall be preservice tested by verifying the operational
readiness of the actuation logic and associated electrical circuits for each explosively
actuated valve with its pyrotechnic charge removed from the valve. This must include
confirmation that sufficient electrical parameters (voltage, current, resistance) are available
at the explosively actuated valve from each circuit that is relied upon to actuate the valve.
In addition, a sample of at least 20% of the pyrotechnic charges in all explosively actuated
valves shall be tested in the valve or a qualified test fixture to confirm the capability of each
sampled pyrotechnic charge to provide the necessary motive force to operate the valve to
perform its intended function without damage to the valve body or connected piping. The
sampling must select at least one explosively actuated valve from each redundant safety
train. Corrective action shall be taken to resolve any deficiencies identified in the
operational readiness of the actuation logic or associated electrical circuits, or the capability
of a pyrotechnic charge. If a charge fails to fire or its capability is not confirmed, all charges
with the same batch number shall be removed, discarded, and replaced with charges from
a different batch number that has demonstrated successful 20% sampling of the charges.
240

See Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 579th Meeting, Tr. at 44-52 (Jan. 13, 2011)
(ML110310213).
241
242

See NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 15-16.

Our action in formulating and imposing a license condition in an adjudicatory order has
precedent. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation),
CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23, 29-31 (2000).

 - 50 b. Operational Surveillance
Explosively actuated valves shall be subject to the following surveillance activities after
commencing plant operation:
(1)

At least once every 2 years, each explosively actuated valve shall undergo visual
external examination and remote internal examination (including evaluation and
removal of fluids or contaminants that may interfere with operation of the valve) to
verify the operational readiness of the valve and its actuator. This examination shall
also verify the appropriate position of the internal actuating mechanism and proper
operation of remote position indicators. Corrective action shall be taken to resolve any
deficiencies identified during the examination with post-maintenance testing conducted
that satisfies the preservice testing requirements.

(2)

At least once every 10 years, each explosively actuated valve shall be disassembled
for internal examination of the valve and actuator to verify the operational readiness of
the valve assembly and the integrity of individual components and to remove any
foreign material, fluid, or corrosion. The examination schedule shall provide for both of
the two valve designs used for explosively actuated valves at the facility to be included
among the explosively actuated valves to be disassembled and examined every 2
years. Corrective action shall be taken to resolve any deficiencies identified during the
examination with post-maintenance testing conducted that satisfies the preservice
testing requirements.

(3)

For explosively actuated valves selected for test sampling every 2 years in accordance
with the ASME OM Code, the operational readiness of the actuation logic and
associated electrical circuits shall be verified for each sampled explosively actuated
valve following removal of its charge. This must include confirmation that sufficient
electrical parameters (voltage, current, resistance) are available for each valve
actuation circuit. Corrective action shall be taken to resolve any deficiencies identified
in the actuation logic or associated electrical circuits.

(4)

For explosively actuated valves selected for test sampling every 2 years in accordance
with the ASME OM Code, the sampling must select at least one explosively actuated
valve from each redundant safety train. Each sampled pyrotechnic charge shall be
tested in the valve or a qualified test fixture to confirm the capability of the charge to
provide the necessary motive force to operate the valve to perform its intended
function without damage to the valve body or connected piping. Corrective action shall
be taken to resolve any deficiencies identified in the capability of a pyrotechnic charge
in accordance with the preservice testing requirements.

This license condition shall expire upon (1) incorporation of the above surveillance provisions for
explosively actuated valves into the facility‘s inservice testing program, or (2) incorporation of
inservice testing requirements for explosively actuated valves in new reactors (i.e., plants
receiving a construction permit, or combined license for construction and operation, after
January 1, 2000) to be specified in a future edition of the ASME OM Code as incorporated by
reference in 10 CFR 50.55a, including any conditions imposed by the NRC, into the facility‘s
inservice testing program.

 - 51 This license condition supplements the current requirements in the ASME OM code for
explosively actuated valves, and sets forth requirements for both pre-service testing and
operational surveillance, as well as any necessary corrective action. The license condition will
expire when either (1) the license condition is incorporated into the VCSNS IST program; or
(2) the updated ASME OM Code requirements for squib valves in new reactors, as accepted by
the NRC in 10 C.F.R. § 50.55a, are incorporated into the VCSNS IST program.243 For the
purpose of satisfying the license condition, the licensee retains the option of including in its IST
program either the requirements stated in this condition, or including updated ASME Code
requirements.
We note, however, that regardless of the option chosen to satisfy the license condition,
the relevant provisions of the OM Code may be subject to further revision in the future, and IST
requirements for the squib valve components may change. We do not expect the IST program
for squib valves necessarily to be a static one. As with any facility, the VCSNS units will be
subject to our rules providing for the application of future Code revisions to operating plants;
SCE&G ultimately may be required to comply with a later version of the OM Code, as accepted
by the NRC and incorporated by reference into 10 C.F.R. § 50.55a. In particular, section
50.55a(f)(4) requires that, throughout the service life of the plant, valves such as squib valves
must, to the extent practical, meet the IST requirements set forth in the ASME OM Code and
addenda that become effective during that time. Therefore, even if SCE&G chooses to satisfy
the license condition by incorporating the condition into its IST program, it still must comply with
section 50.55a(f)(4) throughout the life of the plant.

243

While the proposed condition is based on a revision to the ASME OM Code currently under
consideration, the Code requirements ultimately might differ from the license condition when the
full ASME review process is complete.

 - 52 9. Environmental Impacts
The second day of the uncontested hearing focused on environmental issues, including
overall environmental impacts, environmental justice, and the cooperation between the NRC
and the ACE. Although the COL application includes the Applicants‘ own Environmental
Report, the NRC review team, which included more than forty experts from the NRC and its
contractor staff at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, working with the ACE as a cooperating
agency (collectively, the ―environmental review team‖),244 conducted an independent review in
fulfillment of their NEPA responsibilities. As discussed above, NRC regulations that implement
NEPA are found in 10 C.F.R. Part 51.
The Staff initiated its review with a Notice of Intent to conduct scoping to identify
environmental issues important to the stakeholders, and invited public participation.245 The
environmental review team issued a draft EIS,246 conducted additional public meetings to solicit
public comment on the draft EIS, and extended the comment period to ensure stakeholders had

244

See Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, at 1-2 and 1-6. See also Tr. at 61 (Flanders) and 252 (Vokoun).
Cooperating agencies have the responsibility to assist the lead agency, here the NRC, through
early participation in the NEPA process, including scoping, by providing technical input to the
EIS and by making staff support available as needed by the lead agency. Ex. NRC00006A,
FEIS, at 1-6. More information regarding the role of the ACE in the EIS process can be found
infra at § II.A.9.C, ―Cooperation with the Army Corps of Engineers in the Environmental
Review.‖
245

See Tr. at 251 (Vokoun). See South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Acting for Itself and
as Agent for the South Carolina Public Service Company (Also Referred to as Santee Cooper[,]
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3; Combined License Application; Notice of Intent
to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and Conduct Scoping Process, 74 Fed. Reg.
323 (Jan. 5, 2009).
246

See South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Acting for Itself and as Agent for the South
Carolina Public Service Authority (Also Referred to as Santee Cooper)[,] Notice of Availability of
the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Combined Licenses for Virgil C. Summer
Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3, 75 Fed. Reg. 21,368 (Apr. 23, 2010).

 - 53 an opportunity for meaningful comment.247 These efforts are described in Appendix E of the
FEIS.248
The environmental review for the COL application included an assessment of the
impacts from construction and operation of the new units on the human environment and
considered alternatives to the proposed project.249 The review also included audits of the
proposed and alternative sites, more than seventy requests for additional information to
SCE&G, confirmatory modeling and analyses, stakeholder interviews, and the review of relevant
databases and maps. The ACE also evaluated certain construction and maintenance activities
(onsite dredge-and-fill activities and construction of related transmission lines) proposed in U.S.
waters, including wetlands that would be affected by the proposed project under the requested
ACE permit.250 We review the FEIS and the record of the proceeding to see if the Staff‘s review
is reasonably supported in logic and fact and sufficient to support the Staff‘s conclusions.251
Under NEPA, we also independently ―consider the final balance among the conflicting factors
contained in the record‖ in determining whether the licenses should issue.252
The environmental review team found, for the most part, that the impacts from the
operation and construction of the project would be small. This includes impacts on:
247

See South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Acting for Itself and as Agent for the South
Carolina Public Service Company (Also Referred to as Santee Cooper)[,] Virgil C. Summer
Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3 Combined License Application; Notice of an Extension to the
Environmental Scoping Period, 74 NRC Fed. Reg. 9112 (Mar. 2, 2009).
248

Tr. at 251 (Vokoun).

249

See Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, at 1-3.

250

Id. at 1-2 and 1-5. The ACE evaluates these activities to determine whether to issue permits
pursuant to Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1344), as
amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977 (33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.) (Clean Water Act).
Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, at 1-1 and 1-6.
251

The NRC alone makes the licensing decision under the Atomic Energy Act regarding whether
the COLs should be issued. See, e.g., Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, at 1-1 and 1-6.
252

10 C.F.R. § 51.107(a)(2).

 - 54 groundwater and surface water resources; aquatic ecology; air quality; radiological health
(including radiological exposures to plant workers, the public and wildlife); and non-radiological
health effects on the public and workers.253 The Staff also considered postulated accidents
(from a risk perspective)254 and the uranium fuel cycle (including waste disposal, transportation
of radioactive material and decommissioning).255 The environmental review team consulted with
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which concurred in the finding that the project is unlikely to
adversely affect any endangered species.256 They also consulted with the State Historic
Preservation Officer concerning possible adverse effects on cultural resources.257 The
environmental review team found moderate impacts for land use and terrestrial ecology during
construction, due to construction of thirty-nine miles of new transmission lines.258 While the
NRC usually does not consider the impacts of building transmission lines, the ACE does,
because construction of the lines may impact wetlands.259
The principal benefits of the project were found to be providing sixteen to eighteen
million megawatt hours of reliable baseload power annually (depending on the capacity
reached),260 increased energy diversity, and the lack of carbon emissions from the units as

253

Tr. at 253 (Kohn).

254

Id. at 269-71 (Flanders). See Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 24-25.

255

Id. at 253 (Kohn).

256

Id. at 254 (Kohn).

257

Id. at 275 (Cushing).

258

Id. at 254-55 (Kohn) (stating that a total of 400 miles of transmission lines would be added,
but mostly within existing corridors, leading to moderate impacts on land use). See Ex.
NRC00006A, FEIS, §§ 4.1.2, 4.3.1.
259

Tr. at 300 (Whited).

260

Tr. at 262 (Cushing). See also id. at 247 (Matis).

 - 55 opposed to the emissions that would come from a coal- or gas-powered alternative.261 In
addition, the project is expected to generate 3,600 jobs during construction, 800 direct jobs
during operation, and an additional 1,700 indirect jobs during operation.262 The environmental
review team concluded that there would be a large positive economic impact in that the project
is expected to generate approximately $860 million in property tax revenue to Fairfield County
over the forty-year license period.263
As part of its review, the environmental review team conducted a week-long audit of the
proposed site, which involved over seventy-five people from the NRC Staff, SCE&G,
cooperating government agencies, and contractors Bechtel and Tetra Tech.264 The
environmental review team also conducted a separate audit of alternative sites in March
2009.265
At the hearing, the Staff summarized its recommendation that we find in favor of the
proposed project with respect to environmental impacts:
The basis for [NRC Staff's] recommendation includes [that] most of the
environmental impacts would be small; none of the reasonable alternatives would
be environmentally preferable; [and that] the short term use of the environment
from the production of electricity enhances the long term productivity of the
region and would not be equaled by any other use of the site.266
We addressed specific topics of interest at the hearing. In particular, we directed the
Staff and SCE&G to summarize, in Environmental Panel One, the process for developing the
261

Id. at 247 (Matis).

262

See id. at 262-63 (Cushing). See also Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, §§ 4.4.3.1 (jobs created
directly and indirectly, during construction), 5.4.3.1 (jobs created directly and indirectly, during
operation of the new units).
263

Tr. at 262 (Cushing). See also Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, §§ 5.4.3.2 and 5.4.3.3.

264

Tr. at 242 (Rice).

265

Id. (Rice).

266

Id. at 263 (Cushing).

 - 56 EIS, the environmental impacts for eleven specified topics, the alternatives analysis (including
energy alternatives and alternative sites), and the costs and benefits of the proposed action.267
Environmental Panel Two addressed the two novel issues identified in the Staff‘s information
paper: the environmental justice review, and interactions with the ACE.268
a. Environmental Justice
The Staff's environmental justice review follows the guidance in the relevant sections of
NUREG-1555, the environmental standard review plan, and our 2004 ―Policy Statement on the
Treatment of Environmental Justice Matters in NRC Regulatory and Licensing Actions.‖269
Ms. Matis discussed how SCE&G used census data to identify minority and low-income
populations in the region and vicinity of the VCSNS site.270 SCE&G evaluated census data for a
fifty-mile radius around the site. If a block group‘s minority or low income population exceeded
fifty percent, or exceeded the state‘s overall percentage of minority or low-income people by
more than twenty percent, then the block group was considered minority or low-income (as
applicable).271 Ms. Matis explained that, using this metric, much of Fairfield County was
deemed a minority population area.272 But SCE&G found no ―low income‖ block groups within
the immediate vicinity of the VCSNS site, using this method.273

267

Revised Scheduling Note at 4-5 (unnumbered).

268

Id. at 5 (unnumbered).

269

Policy Statement on the Treatment of Environmental Justice Matters in NRC Regulatory and
Licensing Actions, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,040 (Aug. 24, 2004). See generally Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS,
§ 2.6; Ex. NRC000003, Staff Testimony, at 16-19; Ex. NRC000007, Staff Pre-Hearing
Responses, at 18-21; Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 25; Ex. SCE000027,
SCE&G Post-Hearing Responses, at 16.
270

Tr. at 293-94 (Matis).

271

Id. at 294 (Matis).

272

Id. (Matis).

273

Id. (Matis).

 - 57 The Staff explained that census data is only a starting point for its review process for
identifying minority or low-income populations relevant to the environmental justice analysis.274
The Staff conducts its own investigation by visiting local communities to observe general
socioeconomic conditions, speaking with public officials and visiting with other community
leaders, including minority leaders, church officials and the managers of local philanthropic and
charitable organizations.275 The Staff conducted its own investigation, which involved ―driving
affected roadways, meeting with local stakeholders, visiting river and lake recreation sites used
by the local communities and visiting the cities and towns in the region.‖276
The Staff found that Fairfield County, particularly in the area immediately surrounding
the plant, and Jenkinsville, the nearest town, have high concentrations of low-income residents.
There is no scheduled public transportation, and many of the local residents walk as their
primary means of transportation.277
The Staff‘s initial investigation found that many of the low-income people in the area felt
disenfranchised from the political system in Fairfield County and that they would reap no
benefits from the project.278 The Staff therefore expanded its scoping process to reach out to
the community. For example, during the scoping process, the Staff personally would transcribe
comments so that the speaker would not have to speak publicly or use Internet comment
forms.279

274

See id. at 303-04 (Mussatti).

275

Id. at 304 (Mussatti), 306 (Anderson).

276

Id. at 305 (Anderson).

277

Id. at 305-06 (Anderson).

278

Id. at 322, 328 (Mussatti).

279

Id. at 306 (Anderson).

 - 58 The Staff found that the project‘s principal potential adverse impact, as it relates to
environmental justice considerations, was transportation impacts from trucks during construction
and commuters during operations.280 In response, SCE&G is drafting a traffic mitigation plan to
help mitigate these adverse impacts.281 Some of the mitigation measures described in the
Applicants‘ Environmental Report have been undertaken already.282 The Staff found that
SCE&G‘s commitment to implementing a traffic mitigation plan would serve to minimize these
adverse effects.283
The Staff found that benefits to the local community would be small during construction,
but potentially greater during operation due to tax revenue, and direct and indirect jobs,
generated by the plant.284 According to Staff and SCE&G witnesses, an effort is being made to
coordinate with local community colleges to train workers for jobs both in construction and
operation of the plant.285
We inquired during the hearing whether reported subsistence gardening, hunting, and
fishing by the low-income population would affect the estimated radiation dose to those
individuals. According to the Staff witnesses, many low-income residents in the area rely on
subsistence gardening or fishing.286 In response to our post-hearing question, the Staff
explained that radiological doses from subsistence gardening, hunting, and fishing do not raise

280

Id. at 307 (Anderson).

281

See id. at 273 (Rice), 294 (Matis).

282

Id. at 273-74 (Rice).

283

Id. at 307-08 (Anderson).

284

Id. at 256 (Kohn).

285

Id. at 328-29 (Anderson), 333 (Byrne).

286

Id. at 306 (Anderson).

 - 59 any environmental justice concerns.287 The Staff stated that this is because the hypothetical
―maximally exposed individual‖ already is conservatively assumed to subsist entirely on locally
produced foodstuffs.288 Impacts to the maximally exposed individual, and to the local
population, were found to be small overall.289 Therefore, the Staff concluded that minority or
low-income individuals engaged in subsistence behaviors would not experience
disproportionately high and adverse impacts from radiation exposures from the new units.290
b. Environmental Alternatives Analysis
The FEIS examines alternatives to the project, both in terms of using a different form of
energy (or conservation), and of building the proposed reactors at alternative sites.291 The
application included SCE&G‘s alternatives analysis, which serves as a starting point for the
Staff‘s review. Alternatives not requiring new generation capacity (purchased power, extending
the service life of existing plants, etc.) were not reasonable alternatives because the Staff
concluded that these alternatives were not useful to provide baseload power.292
SCE&G evaluated a number of energy alternatives, including wind, solar, hydropower,
geothermal power, biomass, coal and gas, and alternatives that do not involve building new
power sources, such as demand-side management.293 It then performed a more detailed
evaluation for those alternatives that were considered to be reasonable baseload power sources
287

See Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 7-8.

288

Id. See generally Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, § 5.9.3.

289

See Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 7-8. See generally Ex.
NRC00006A, FEIS, § 5.9.3.
290

See Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 8. See generally Ex. NRC00006A,
FEIS, § 5.5.4.
291

See generally Environmental Standard Review Plan, Ch. 9; Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, Ch. 9.

292

Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, § 9.2.1, at 9-3 to 9-5.

293

Tr. at 245 (Rice).

 - 60 in the region of interest—coal-fired and gas-fired options.294 The ER concluded that these
would not be environmentally preferable to new nuclear as energy alternatives, due to air quality
impacts.295
The Staff evaluated in detail the reasonable alternatives that could meet the project‘s
purpose to supply baseload power within SCE&G‘s and Santee Cooper‘s service territories, by
the time the new units are projected to go online.296 An alternative was not considered
reasonable if it could not supply baseload power.297 The Staff agreed with SCE&G‘s
conclusions that only coal or natural gas could, by themselves, provide sufficient baseload
power.298 The Staff also looked at combining alternative energies with natural gas to generate
the necessary baseload power.299
After narrowing down the alternative energy sources to those considered reasonable—
coal, natural gas, or a combination—the Staff compared their environmental effects.300 Primarily
due to air emissions, none of these was found to be environmentally preferable to the proposed
new AP1000 units.301
After the hearing, the Staff supplied a more in-depth response to our hearing question
asking for a comparison between the NRC‘s approach to energy alternatives and those of other

294

Id. (Rice).

295

Id. at 245-46 (Rice).

296

Id. at 258 (Cushing).

297

Id. (Cushing).

298

Id. at 261 (Cushing).

299

Id. (Cushing).

300

Id. (Cushing).

301

Id. (Cushing).

 - 61 federal agencies.302 Based on a survey, the Staff responded that the NRC‘s alternatives
analysis is broader in scope, which is likely due to the difference in the ―purpose and need‖ of
the proposed federal action.303 That is, the purpose and need of the VCSNS project was
defined broadly as ―providing baseload power‖ to the Applicants‘ service area, whereas the EISs
selected for comparison had a narrower focus (providing loan guarantees for a solar plant).304
Distinct from the energy alternatives evaluation is the evaluation of alternative sites.
Testifying for SCE&G, Ms. Rice stated that SCE&G conducted several siting studies in the
course of the project and evaluated twenty potential sites for suitability.305 SCE&G then
narrowed down the twenty sites using exclusionary criteria that would preclude the site for the
location of a nuclear power plant, such as geotechnical issues or the potential for significant
impacts to natural resources.306 This process eliminated nine of the twenty sites.307 SCE&G
then ranked the remaining eleven sites using site suitability criteria established by the Electric
Power Research Institute.308 The five sites receiving the highest score (including VCSNS) were
evaluated in the Environmental Report.309 The four alternative sites identified included two

302

Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 5-6. See also Tr. at 281-82 (Flanders).

303

Ex. NRC000017, Staff Post-Hearing Responses, at 5-6.

304

Id. at 5.

305

Tr. at 246 (Rice). See generally Ex. NRC00001O, Environmental Report, § 9.3.2.2.

306

Tr. at 246 (Rice).

307

Id. (Rice). See generally Ex. NRC00001O, Environmental Report, § 9.3.2.3.

308

Tr. at 246 (Rice). See Ex. NRC00001O, Environmental Report, Table 9.3-7 (comparing
results).
309

Tr. at 246-47 (Rice). See Ex. NRC00001O, Environmental Report, §§ 9.3.3.1 through
9.3.3.4 (evaluation of four site alternatives to VCSNS).

 - 62 greenfield sites, one site currently used for a coal generating plant, and the Savannah River site
owned by the Department of Energy.310
The Staff audited these alternative sites as well as the proposed site.311 These
alternative sites were then compared to the proposed action to determine if there was an
―environmentally preferable‖ or ―obviously superior‖ alternative site.312 Speaking for the Staff,
Andrew Kugler explained that the NRC uses the ―obviously superior‖ standard both in
recognition of the fact that the proposed site has been examined more thoroughly than the
alternatives, and to avoid situations where one alternative is superior with respect to one
resource but another is superior with respect to a different resource.313 Based on its review of
alternative sites, the Staff concluded that none of the alternatives analyzed was ―obviously
superior‖ to the VCSNS site.314
c. Cooperation with Army Corps of Engineers in the Environmental Review
On September 12, 2008, the NRC and the ACE signed an updated memorandum of
understanding (MOU) for the review of nuclear power plant applications.315 The MOU
established a framework for coordination and participation of both agencies, anticipating that the
NRC normally would serve as the lead agency and that the ACE would act as a cooperating
agency. 316 Its overall goal was to develop a single EIS that supported both the NRC's licensing

310

Tr. at 260 (Cushing).

311

Id. at 274 (Vokoun).

312

Id. at 320-21 (Kugler). See Dominion Nuclear North Anna, LLC (Early Site Permit for North
Anna ESP Site), CLI-07-27, 66 NRC 215, 222 (2007) (the ER must evaluate alternative sites to
determine whether any is ―obviously superior‖ to the proposed site).
313

Tr. at 320-21 (Kugler).

314

See Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, § 9.3.7.3.

315

Tr. at 297 (Whited).

316

Id. at 297 (Whited).

 - 63 process and the ACE's permitting process.317 ACE staff participated in site audits, developed
requests for additional information specific to its own informational needs, and also participated
in writing the EIS and responding to public comments on the draft EIS.318
At the hearing, the Staff explained some differences in approach between the ACE and
NRC in completing the EIS. The ACE‘s mission is to protect the nation‘s aquatic resources,
including wetlands under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and § 404 of the Clean
Water Act.319 Applicants for an ACE permit must demonstrate that they have taken ―all
appropriate and practicable steps to first avoid, then minimize and, finally, to mitigate
unavoidable impacts to aquatic resources.‖320 In making permit decisions, the ACE may only
issue the permit if it determines that the proposed action is the ―least environmentally damaging
practicable alternative.‖321
In addition, the ACE must consider environmental impacts of construction and preconstruction activities, such as site clearing and grading.322 The NRC, in contrast, limits the
scope of environmental analysis of pre-construction activities to activities falling within the scope
of its regulatory authority.323
At the time of the hearing, the Applicants had not received a Section 401 Water Quality
Certification from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control.324 The
317

Id. at 297-98 (Whited).

318

Id. at 299-300 (Whited).

319

Id. at 298 (Whited).

320

Id. (Whited).

321

Id. See generally Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, § 1.1.1.2.

322

Tr. at 299 (Whited). See Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, at 4-1 to 4-4.

323

Tr. at 299 (Whited). See Final Rule, Limited Work Authorizations for Nuclear Power Plants,
72 Fed. Reg. 57,416, 57,427-28 (Oct. 9, 2007); 10 C.F.R. § 51.45(c).
324

Tr. at 302 (Whited). See also Ex. NRC000007, Staff Pre-Hearing Responses, at 24.

 - 64 South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control granted the certification on
December 16, 2011.325
B. Findings
We have conducted an independent review of the sufficiency of the Staff‘s safety
findings, with particular attention to the topics discussed above, and in the Staff and Applicants‘
panel presentations. We posed a number of questions challenging the Staff‘s experts, both in
writing and at the hearing itself, and find no reason to question their conclusions. For each of
the topics discussed in these presentations, we determine that the Staff‘s review was
reasonably supported in logic and fact, and was sufficient to support its findings. We make the
same determination for topics addressed in the FSER that were not expressly discussed at the
hearing or in today‘s decision.
Based on the evidence presented in support of the uncontested hearing, including the
Staff‘s review documents and the testimony presented, we find that the applicable standards
and requirements of the Act and the Commission‘s regulations have been met. The required
notifications to other agencies or bodies have been duly made.326 The Applicants are
technically and financially qualified to engage in the activities authorized.327 We find that there
is reasonable assurance that the facility will be constructed and operated in conformity with the
license, the provisions of the Act, and the Commission‘s regulations; and that issuance of the
license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the
public.

325

See Clary, Ronald B., SCE&G, to USNRC Document Control Desk (Dec. 21, 2011)
(ML12011A028) (transmitting the § 401 Water Quality Certification).
326

See 10 C.F.R. § 50.43(a)(3); Notices, supra note 21. See generally Ex. NRC000004, FSER,
§ 1.5.3.2.
327

See generally Ex. NRC000004, FSER, § 1.5.1.

 - 65 We also conducted an independent review of the Staff‘s environmental analysis in the
FEIS—including with respect to those topics not expressly addressed at the hearing—taking
into account the particular requirements of NEPA, discussed briefly below. NEPA Section
102(2)(A) requires agencies to use ―a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure
the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts‖ in
decisionmaking that may impact the environment.328 We find that the environmental review
team used the systematic, interdisciplinary approach NEPA requires. The environmental review
team consisted of more than sixty individuals with expertise in disciplines including ecology,
geology, hydrology, radiological health, socioeconomics and cultural resources.329 Further, we
commend the team‘s scoping efforts and outreach to the community as described during the
hearing and in the FEIS.330
NEPA section 102(2)(E) calls for agencies to study, develop, and describe appropriate
alternatives. The alternatives analysis is the ―heart of the environmental impact statement.‖331
Based on the Staff‘s testimony at hearing as described above, as well as the discussion in the
FEIS, we find that the environmental review identified an appropriate range of alternatives with
respect to both alternative power sources and alternative sites, and adequately described the
environmental impacts of each alternative.332 We find reasonable the FEIS conclusion that

328

NEPA § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A).

329

See Ex. NRC00006B, FEIS, app. A (list of contributors).

330

Id., §1.1.1.1.

331

10 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. A. app. A, § 5. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (parallel provision in
Council on Environmental Quality regulations).
332

Tr. 258-61 (Cushing). See generally Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, ch. 9 (alternatives to the
proposed action); 10 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. A. app. A, § 5.

 - 66 none of the alternative power sources, and none of the alternative sites, is environmentally
preferable to the proposed action.333
NEPA section 102(2)(C) requires us to assess the relationship between local short-term
uses of the environment and the long-term productivity of the environment,334 and to describe
the unavoidable adverse environmental impacts335 and the irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources associated with the proposed action.336 These impacts were
considered in FEIS Chapter 10. The environmental review team found that the short-term use
of the site for electrical generation would have a positive long-term result: ―the enhancement of
regional productivity resulting from the electrical energy produced by the plant is expected to
result in a correspondingly large increase in regional long-term productivity that would not be
equaled by any other long-term use of the site.‖337 With respect to unavoidable adverse
environmental impacts, the environmental review team concluded that such impact from
operation of the two new facilities would be small.338 The environmental review team concluded
that the unavoidable adverse impacts from NRC-authorized construction activities would be
generally small, with the exception of the adverse impact on traffic, which would be moderate,
temporary, and highly localized.339 Finally, the environmental review team concluded that the
irretrievable commitment of resources for construction would be ―similar to that of any major

333

See Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS § 10.5 (conclusions).

334

NEPA § 102(2)(C)(iv), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iv).

335

NEPA § 102(2)(C)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ii).

336

NEPA § 102(2)(C)(v), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v).

337

Ex. NRC00006A, FEIS, § 10.3.

338

Id., § 10.2.1, Table 10-1.

339

Id., Table 10-1.

 - 67 construction project.‖340 During operation, the principal resource that would be irretrievably
committed would be uranium. On this point, the FEIS concluded that the impacts on the
availability of uranium would be negligible.341
We must weigh these unavoidable adverse environmental impacts and resource
commitments—the environmental ―costs‖ of the project—against its benefits.342 As described in
the FEIS, the Public Service Commission of South Carolina determined that there is a need for
power in the region, which the proposed generating plants would meet.343 We find that the
benefits to the local and regional population from the needed electricity and the resulting
increased productivity, jobs, and taxes, as described during the hearing and in the FEIS,344
outweigh the costs described above.
In sum, for each of the topics discussed at hearing, we find that the Staff‘s review was
reasonably supported in logic and fact and sufficient to support the Staff‘s conclusions. Based
on our review of the FEIS, we make the same determination for topics not directly addressed at
the hearing or in today‘s decision. Finally, in carrying out our review, we have considered
particularly each of the requirements of NEPA section 102(2)(C), and find nothing in the record
that would lead us to disturb the FEIS conclusions on those requirements. Overall, nothing in
the adjudicatory record of this proceeding (including the contested proceeding) leads us to
believe that the environmental findings are unreasonable. We conclude that the NEPA review
conducted by the NRC Staff has been adequate.

340

Id., § 10.4.2.

341

Id.

342

See Notice of Hearing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 53,493.

343

See NRC00006A, FEIS, § 8.4.

344

See Tr. at 247-48, 262. See generally NRC00006A, FEIS, §§ 4.4.3, 5.4.3.

 - 68 Therefore, as a result of our review of the FEIS environmental analysis, and in
accordance with the notice of hearing for this uncontested proceeding, we find that the
requirements of NEPA, § 102(2)(A), (C), and (E), and the applicable regulations in 10 C.F.R.
Part 51, have been satisfied with respect to the combined license application. We
independently considered the final balance among conflicting factors contained in the record of
this proceeding and we find, after weighing the environmental, economic, technical, and other
benefits against environmental and other costs, and considering reasonable alternatives, that
the combined licenses should be issued.

 - 69 III.

CONCLUSION

We find that the Staff‘s review of the safety and environmental issues related to
SCE&G‘s COL applications was sufficient to support the findings, identified in 10 C.F.R.
§§ 52.97 and 51.107(a), for each of the COLs to be issued. In addition, we direct the NRC Staff
to include in the VCSNS COLs the conditions described in today‘s decision relative to the
implementation of a surveillance program for squib valves, and the development of strategies to
address beyond-design-basis external events. Concurrent with the issuance of the licenses, the
Director of the Office of New Reactors shall issue Order EA-12-051, related to the enhancement
of reliable spent fuel pool instrumentation, to SCE&G. In addition, the Staff shall issue a request
for information relative to Task Force Recommendation 9.3. The Director of the Office of New
Reactors is authorized to issue the appropriate licenses for the construction and operation of
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Stations, Units 2 and 3.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
For the Commission

[NRC SEAL]

/RA/
___________________________
Andrew L. Bates
Acting Secretary of the Commission

Dated at Rockville, Maryland,
this 30th day of March 2012

 Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko, Dissenting
This COL decision is the second one we reach in a matter of months. In February, we
issued COLs for two new reactors at the Vogtle site using the same AP1000 reactor design as
Summer. Soon after, on March 12, 2012, we issued orders requiring safety enhancements
based on the unprecedented and catastrophic accident at Fukushima, two of which apply to a
COL holder using the AP1000 design. By virtue of this timing, the Vogtle licenses did not
require compliance with those new requirements. These Summer licenses, in contrast, will
include a license condition requiring compliance with one of these orders, directing development
of mitigation strategies to address loss of power and access to the ultimate heat sink.
I fully support the decision by my colleagues to include this license condition and I
consider this important progress in incorporating the lessons from Fukushima. However, I
continue to believe that we should require that all Fukushima-related safety enhancements are
implemented before these new reactors begin operating. To that end, I proposed a license
condition that would require implementation of all new requirements that are presently being
developed by the Staff, at our direction, to incorporate the lessons from Fukushima.
Unfortunately, I do not have the support of my colleagues for this license condition and,
therefore, cannot join them in approving the issuance of these COLs. My rationale for
concluding that we have sufficient information to form a concrete, well defined license condition
has already been explained in my dissenting opinion on the decision authorizing issuance of the
Vogtle licenses.1
This has not been the first COL we consider while our Fukushima review is ongoing, nor
will it be the last. Going forward, I continue to believe the best way to ensure safety, inspire
public confidence, and promote regulatory efficiency and stability is to impose a license
condition in each COL that requires implementation of all Fukushima safety enhancements

1

Vogtle, CLI-12-2, 75 NRC __ (slip op., Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko, Dissenting, at 1-13).

 -2before operation. This would apply a simple, logical and consistent standard to all new COL
holders.
We already see the inconsistency that will be inevitable under the majority approach.
The Summer COLs contain a license condition for a Fukushima-related requirement that was
not included in the Vogtle licenses issued only a few weeks ago. This type of happenstance
cannot justify issuing COLs with differing safety standards. But this will be the outcome if we
proceed with licensing without proactively imposing license conditions requiring compliance with
all Fukushima recommendations.
My proposed license condition will have the additional benefit of ensuring that future
licenses are not delayed by our Fukushima review activities. The recent orders imposing
Fukushima-related requirements were issued to licensees (including a COL holder), not
applicants. Likewise, the Staff‘s recent information requests were only issued to the COL
holder, not COL applicants. The Staff intends to obtain the necessary information and ensure
compliance with the recent orders and requests for information during the license review
process for future applications. This may delay issuance of the final safety review for the next
COL application we expect to consider, for new reactors at the Levy County site. We could
expect similar delays for future COLs, causing unnecessary uncertainty into our licensing
process. A simple license condition will serve our regulatory interest in ensuring the safe
operation of new reactors while, at the same time, ensuring a predictable process.
Over time, the safety of the nation‘s nuclear reactors has improved with technological
advances and better understanding of potential hazards. Events like the accidents at Three
Mile Island and Chernobyl, the September 2001 attacks, and the accident at Fukushima provide
real world experience that offer new insights into our regulatory requirements, programs and
processes. In the aftermath of Fukushima, we must move expeditiously to implement the
lessons learned and enhance the safety of our nuclear fleet. We should proceed deliberately
and thoughtfully when licensing new reactors. Without a binding requirement in the license, we

 -3know from past experience that licensees may be relieved from compliance based on cost
considerations or delay compliance for extended periods of time. We have seen this time and
again, most notably with fire protection, and should not allow that to happen here. We should
exercise our regulatory authority when we license these COLs to proactively require compliance
with all Fukushima safety enhancements before operation.