



**U.S. Department of Justice**

National Security Division

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*Washington, D.C. 20530*

EMAIL: [REDACTED]@nytimes.com

NSD FOIA/PA #16-148  
September 1, 2017

Mr. Charlie Savage  
The New York Times  
1627 I Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

*Charlie:*  
Dear Mr. Savage:

This is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated May 10, 2016, for "previously unreleased documents from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court docket for the case that resulted in Judge John Bates' October 3, 2011, and November 30, 2011, rulings, both of which were declassified and made public in August 2013 but with their docket number and case name redacted." Your request was received on May 10, 2016.

In response to your request, we conducted a search of the National Security Division Office of Intelligence (NSD/OI), and we have located responsive records. We have processed twelve documents for today's response under the FOIA. We are withholding the records in part pursuant to one or more of the following FOIA exemptions set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552(b):

- (1) which permits the withholding of information properly classified pursuant to Executive Order No. 13526;
- (3) which permits the withholding of information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, including but not limited to Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947;
- (6) which permits the withholding of information when the disclosure of such information "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.;" and
- (7)(C) which permits the withholding of records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes the release of which could "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement information and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. §552(c). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the

FOIA. This is standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

Although this request is now the subject of litigation, we are including the following information on FOIA mediation and administrative appeals.

You may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, or at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov), or 202-741-5770, or toll free at 1-877-684-6448, or facsimile at 202-741-5769. Or you may contact our Public Liaison at 202-233-0756.

If you are not satisfied with this response, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA portal by creating an account at: <https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or transmitted electronically within 90 days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit an appeal by mail, both the letter and envelope should be clearly marked, "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

Sincerely,



Kevin G. Tiernan  
Records and FOIA



U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

U.S. FOREIGN  
INTELLIGENCE  
SURVEILLANCE COURT

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Washington, D.C. 20530

May 2, 2011

LEEANN FLYNN HALL  
CLERK OF COURT

The Honorable John D. Bates  
United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court  
333 Constitution Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20001

Re: Clarification of National Security Agency's  
Upstream Collection Pursuant to Section 702 of  
FISA ~~(S//SI//NF)~~

Dear Judge Bates:

On April 21, 2011, the National Security Agency (NSA) provided the National Security Division (NSD) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) information clarifying the manner in which NSA acquires certain communications through its upstream collection platforms pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (FISA). Although NSA, NSD, and ODNI are still reviewing this matter and assessing its import, we are providing preliminary notice at this time pursuant to Rule 13(a) of the Rules of Procedure for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, effective November 1, 2010, in order provide the Court with this additional clarifying information. We have worked closely in these efforts with NSA officials, who have assisted in drafting and reviewing this notice to the Court. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

As previously described to the Court, in conducting upstream collection using electronic communication accounts/addresses/identifiers (hereinafter "selectors") pursuant to Section 702, NSA acquires Internet communications that are to or from a tasked selector, or which contain a reference to a tasked selector. The term "Internet communications," as described by the Director of NSA in affidavits supporting DNI/AG 702(g) certifications, "is intended to include electronic communications that [REDACTED]

702(g) Certification  
Director, NSA, filed

2010, ¶ 6.

[REDACTED]  
See, e.g., DNI/AG  
Affidavit of General Keith B. Alexander,

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Classified by: Tashina Gauhar, Deputy Assistant  
Attorney General, NSD, DOJ

Reason: 1.4(c)

Declassify on: May 2, 2036

OI Tracking No. 104876

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[REDACTED]

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

In past representations to the Court, the Government used as an example of upstream collection the acquisition of [REDACTED] that contained a selector that NSA had tasked under Section 702, such that NSA acquired the [REDACTED] while it was being transmitted to or from a user of the non-tasked account.<sup>1</sup> [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Based on recent discussions among NSA, NSD, and ODNI regarding one specified category of Internet communications acquired through upstream collection—"electronic communications" [REDACTED]<sup>2</sup>—and in view of the complexity of this issue and the prior representations to the Court, the Government believes that further description of the scope of NSA's upstream collection is warranted. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

One type of "electronic communications" [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

<sup>2</sup> ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

Depending on [REDACTED], the data transmitted [REDACTED] may also include [REDACTED]

<sup>1</sup> [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

<sup>2</sup> [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

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[REDACTED] including e-mail messages that are not to, from, or about a Section 702-targeted individual. For example, [REDACTED]

The content of [REDACTED] would be acquired through NSA's Section 702 upstream collection if a tasked selector appeared anywhere [REDACTED]

(~~TS//SI//NF~~)

As this example demonstrates, an individual Internet communication can contain a single piece of information [REDACTED], or it could contain multiple pieces of information [REDACTED]

(~~TS//SI//NF~~)

Additionally, as described in the NSA's targeting procedures, "in those cases where NSA seeks to acquire communications about the target that are not to or from the target, NSA will employ either an Internet Protocol filter to ensure that the person from whom it seeks to obtain foreign intelligence information is located overseas, or [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., DNI/AG 702(g) Certification Exhibit A at 2. It is through these measures that NSA prevents the intentional acquisition of Internet communications that contain a reference to a targeted selector where the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States. See, e.g., In re DNI/AG Certification [REDACTED] No. 702(i)-08-01, Mem. Op. at 19 (USFISC Sept. 4, 2008). NSA, NSD, and ODNI are continuing to examine what affect, if any, the type of Internet communications collection discussed in this letter has on the efficacy of these measures.

(~~TS//SI//NF~~)

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NSA, NSD, and ODNI are continuing to review and assess this matter and will provide additional information to the Court as appropriate. We appreciate the Court's consideration of this matter and welcome additional opportunities to present further information to the Court.  
~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

Respectfully submitted,

[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
Office of Intelligence, NSD  
U.S. Department of Justice

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UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



**BRIEFING ORDER**

On April 20, 2011, the United States filed with this Court the "Government's Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification and Related Procedures, Ex Parte Submission of Amended Certifications, and Request for an Order Approving Such Certification and Amended Certifications" for DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] On May 2, 2011, the government filed with this Court a letter pursuant to FISC Rule 13(a) titled “Clarification of National Security Agency’s Upstream Collection Pursuant to Section 702 of FISA” (May 2 Letter).

The May 2 Letter describes an aspect of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) upstream collection through which [REDACTED] is acquired “if [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] contains [REDACTED] that NSA has tasked for acquisition under Section 702.” May 2 Letter at 2. Such [REDACTED] acquisitions may contain data that is wholly unrelated to the tasked selector, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] or about the targeted facility. See id. The letter further acknowledges that NSA is ‘[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] information in a single Internet communication” and that NSA acquires such “single Internet communications” in their entirety whenever a Section 702 tasked selector is contained in them. Id. at 3. Finally, the May 2 Letter notes that NSA uses Internet Protocol (IP) filters and [REDACTED] to ensure that “the person from who it seeks to obtain foreign intelligence information is located overseas,” but suggests that the government may lack confidence that such measures are effective in the context of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] See id.

This is a matter of serious concern to this Court, as the acquisitions described in the May 2 Letter may exceed the scope of collection previously disclosed by the government and

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approved by the Court, and may, in part, fall outside the scope of Section 702. Based upon its review of the May 2 Letter and upon the substance of preliminary discussions between the Court staff and the government, the Court has identified several questions that merit briefing.

Accordingly, the government is hereby directed to file a written memorandum with any necessary supporting documentation addressing the following questions:

1. The government's May 2 Letter can be read to take the position that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] are communications authorized for collection under the Section 702 Certifications that have previously been approved by the Court.
  - a. For how long has NSA been acquiring [REDACTED] through its upstream collection?
  - b. According to the May 2 Letter, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] They also may include discrete communications as to which all communicants are within the United States. Please explain how the acquisition of such transmissions:
    - i. comports with the government's representations to the Court regarding the scope of upstream collection under Section 702 and the approvals granted by the Court in reliance upon those representations in Dockets 702(i) 08-01, [REDACTED] (see, e.g., Docket No. 702(i)-08-01, Aug. 27, 2008 Hearing Transcript at 19-26, 40-41 and Sept. 4, 2008 Memorandum Opinion at 15-20, 38);
    - ii. meets the requirements of Section 702, including, but not limited to, the requirement that targeting procedures must be reasonably designed to "prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States"; and,
    - iii. is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
2. The May 2 Letter describes [REDACTED] as "single Internet communication[s]" or "individual Internet communication[s]." May 2 Letter at 3.
  - a. Please identify all "single Internet communications," [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that might be acquired by NSA through the targeting of a single tasked selector.
  - b. Please identify and fully describe each category of information that might be contained in each such "single Internet communication."

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- c. The May 2 Letter states that NSA is not presently capable of "separating out individual pieces of information" contained within an [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. May 2 Letter at 3. Please explain why and state whether it would be feasible for NSA to implement such capability, either at the time of acquisition or thereafter.
  - d. Can [REDACTED] be identified as distinct from other, discrete communications between users, either at the time of acquisition or thereafter? If so, can NSA filter its Section 702 collection on this basis?
3. The May 2 Letter notes that NSA uses Internet Protocol (IP) filtering and [REDACTED] to prevent the intentional acquisition of communications as to which the sender and all known recipients are inside the United States. May 2 Letter at 3.
- a. Please describe how NSA applies IP filtering in the context of [REDACTED]
    - i. [REDACTED]
    - ii. [REDACTED]
  - b. In the collection of "to/from" communications, are the communicants always the individual users of particular facilities [REDACTED], or does NSA sometimes consider [REDACTED]? Please explain.
4. How, in terms of numbers and volume, does NSA's collection [REDACTED] under Section 702 compare with the collection of discrete Internet communications (such as e-mail messages) between or among individual users?
5. Given that some of the information acquired through upstream collection is likely to constitute "electronic surveillance" as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(2) that has not been approved by this Court, how does the continued acquisition of, or the further use or dissemination of, such information comport with the restrictions of 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) and (a)(2)?
6. Please provide an update regarding the [REDACTED] overcollection incidents described in the government's letter to the Court dated April 19, 2011.
7. Are there any other issues or additional information that should be brought to the Court's

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attention while it is considering the certifications and amendments filed in the above-captioned dockets?

In order to ensure that the Court has sufficient time to consider the information provided by the government, to seek whatever additional information from the government that might be needed, and to conduct the review and analysis that is required by Section 702, the government's memorandum shall be submitted no later than 5 p.m. on June 1, 2011.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED this [REDACTED] day of May 2011.

  
JOHN D. BATES  
Judge, United States Foreign  
Intelligence Surveillance Court

I, [REDACTED]  
FISC, certify that this document  
is a true and correct copy of  
the original [REDACTED]

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b(6) and b(7)(C)

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UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

IN RE DNI/AG 702(g) CERTIFICATION [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

ORDER

This matter is before this Court on the motion of the United States for an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended ("the Act"), further extending to September 20, 2011, the time limits established by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(B) and (C) and extended by the Court's order of [REDACTED] 2011, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), for this Court to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED]

In entertaining the government's motion, this Court has considered the following:

1. DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] reauthorizes DNI/AG 702(g) Certification

[REDACTED] which expires on [REDACTED] 2011.

2. Included within DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] are amendments to

DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] These amendments

authorize the use of the minimization procedures attached as Exhibits B and E to

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DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] in connection with foreign intelligence information acquired in accordance with DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED]

3. The government submitted DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] to the Court on [REDACTED] 2011.

4. By operation of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(B) and (C), this Court was required to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] 2011.

5. By operation of the Court's order of [REDACTED] 2011, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), this Court is required to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] 2011.

6. The government is continuing to work to address the Court's concerns about the scope of NSA's upstream collection pursuant to section 702. The government has asserted that it will be able to supplement the record concerning these matters in a manner that will aid the Court in reviewing DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED], and in making the determinations necessary to issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3).

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However, the government has represented that a sixty-day extension is necessary because of the additional time needed to supplement the record.

7. Because the record presently before this Court concerning these matters remains incomplete, this Court will not be able to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] before [REDACTED] 2011.

8. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) permits this Court, by order for reasons stated, to extend, as necessary for good cause in a manner consistent with national security, the time limit for this Court to issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED]

9. By operation of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(5)(B), the authorization in the certification to be reauthorized, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED], continues beyond its stated expiration date until this Court issues an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED].

Having given full consideration to these matters and the representations in the government's motion, this Court finds that there is good cause to extend the time limit for its review of DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG

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
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702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] beyond [REDACTED], 2011, and that such extension is consistent with national security.

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the government's motion is GRANTED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), that the time limit for this Court to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] is EXTENDED to September 20, 2011.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_ -2011 P05:02 Eastern Time  
Date Time

  
JOHN D. BATES  
Judge, United States Foreign  
Intelligence Surveillance Court

b(6) and b(7)(C)


FISC certifying that [REDACTED]  
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the original [REDACTED]

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All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) unless otherwise noted.

Approved for public release.

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
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Approved for public release.

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


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
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
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[REDACTED]  
FISC, verify that this document  
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the original [REDACTED]

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
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


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
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FISC, certify that this document  
is a true and correct copy of  
the original [REDACTED]

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UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

IN RE DNI/AG 702(g) CERTIFICATION [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

**NOTICE OF EXTENSION**

This matter is before this Court on the motion of the United States for an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended ("the Act"), further extending to September 20, 2011, the time limit established by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(B) of the Act and extended by the Court's order of [REDACTED] 2011, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), for this Court to complete its review of, and issue an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In entertaining the government's motion, this Court has considered the following:

1. DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] reauthorizes DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED], which expires on [REDACTED] 2011.
2. The government submitted DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] to the Court on [REDACTED] 2011.

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3. By operation of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(B), this Court was required to complete its review of, and issue an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] by [REDACTED], 2011.

4. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), however, permits this Court, by order for reasons stated, to extend, as necessary for good cause in a manner consistent with national security, the time limit for this Court to issue an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3).

5. One such extension has already been granted by the Court. By operation of the Court's order of [REDACTED] 2011, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), this Court is required to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] by [REDACTED], 2011.

6. By operation of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(5)(B), the authorization in the certification to be reauthorized, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] continues beyond its stated expiration date until this Court issues an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED]

Having given full consideration to these matters and the representations in government's motion, this Court has found, for the reasons set forth in its separate order of this date in the above-captioned matter, that there is good cause to again extend the time limit for its review of DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] (previously set at [REDACTED] 2011, by operation of the Court's order of [REDACTED] 2011), and that such

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extension is consistent with national security. Accordingly, the government's second motion has been granted, and the time limit for this Court to complete its review of, and issue an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification

[REDACTED] has been extended to September 20, 2011.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_ 2011 P05:02  
Date Time Eastern Time

  
JOHN D. BATES  
Judge, United States Foreign  
Intelligence Surveillance Court

b(6) and b(7)(C)


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the original

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All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) unless otherwise noted.

Approved for public release.

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
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
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[b(6) and b(7)(C)]


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
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
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
SEPTEMBER 7, 2011

[REDACTED]

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS  
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN D. BATES  
JUDGE, UNITED STATES FOREIGN  
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

APPEARANCES:

DOJ: [REDACTED]

TASHINA GAUHAR

LISA MONACO

ODNI: [REDACTED]

NSA: [REDACTED]

CHRIS INGLIS

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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2

## PROCEEDINGS

2 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Will everyone please state your  
3 names for the record.

4 [REDACTED] ..., NSA.

5 [REDACTED]: [REDACTED] NSA Office of General  
6 Counsel.

7 [REDACTED]: [REDACTED] NSA Office of General  
8 Counsel.

9 [REDACTED] NSA.

10 [REDACTED] , NSA.

11 [REDACTED] : Good morning. [REDACTED] Acting  
12 General Counsel, NSA.

13 MR. INGLIS: Chris Inglis, Deputy Director, NSA.

14 MS. MONACO: Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General.

15 MS. GAUHAR: Tashina Gauhar, Deputy Assistant Attorney  
16 General.

18 |  NSD.

19 [REDACTED] : [REDACTED] ODNI, Office of General  
20 Counsel.

21                   THE COURT: Welcome to all of you. Please be seated,  
22 and thank you all for coming today. We have a full house,  
23 fuller than we usually get in this courtroom.

Now, my view of this proceeding is going to be mainly that I'm going to ask a bunch of questions. I hadn't intended that

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1 anyone give any argument to begin with or opening statement or  
2 anything like that. We've been dealing with this issue, the  
3 upstream collection and the certifications under 702 for several  
4 months, so I don't think there's any need for that.

5 I'm sure that there will be both lawyers and nonlawyers  
6 responding to some of the questions. Since this is a formal  
7 hearing on the record, we need to swear, particularly those  
8 nonlawyers who will be responding to questions.

9 It might be easiest if everybody who's going to be  
10 responding simply stands up as [REDACTED] swears those who absolutely  
11 need to be sworn. I think that's probably the easiest  
12 procedure. So everyone who's going to be speaking and  
13 potentially responding to factual issues, please stand be sworn.

14 (Attendees are sworn.)

15 THE COURT: All right. So first of all, I want to  
16 thank everyone not only for being here but for all the very  
17 helpful materials that have been supplied over the past few  
18 months. We've looked at them closely, taken them all into  
19 account, obviously had questions with respect to certain things,  
20 and you've followed up with responses, and all of that is very  
21 much appreciated and has advanced this matter considerably.

22 We wind up at this point with some continuing questions  
23 that I thought it would be useful to have you come in and talk  
24 with us about, and they are in many areas. By "many areas," I  
25 mean they include minimization concerns; they include some

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1       questions about the submissions, looking not all the way back  
2       but back one or two submissions; they include definitional  
3       questions relating to intent; and they include Fourth Amendment  
4       issues. There just are a number of areas.

5           As I said already, I understand that different people may  
6       be responding to those different areas, but let me just jump  
7       right in and start with a couple of questions mainly about the  
8       August 16 submission, although the questions obviously relate to  
9       some of the earlier and the most recent August 30 submission as  
10      well.

11          In the August 16 submission -- I think it's in footnote 5  
12       on page 2 -- the government has discussed and indicated that  
13       some of the Internet communications that have been acquired and  
14       are continuing to be acquired under section 702 were purged  
15       prior to the July 14, 2011, time point in dealing with this  
16       statistical assessment and therefore were not included in the  
17       NSA sample. I have a few questions about that body of  
18       communications that were purged.

19          Does the government know how many communications were  
20       purged and why they were purged?

21           [REDACTED] : We do not have an exact account at this  
22       point of how many were purged.

23           THE COURT: Do you have any sense of why they were  
24       purged?

25           [REDACTED] : There could be a number of reasons:

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1 roamers, overcollect of sorts, and things we would have filed of  
2 incidents.

3 THE COURT: Do we know if any were purged because they  
4 were determined to be wholly domestic?

5 [REDACTED]: I don't believe any of those were purged  
6 because they were wholly domestic.

7 THE COURT: You don't believe, or you're sure that  
8 they weren't?

9 [REDACTED]: In our previous filings, we have indicated  
10 that prior to our statistical analysis we had not identified any  
11 communications of the MCT type that were wholly domestic, which  
12 would require purge.

13 THE COURT: Now, since we don't know much about this  
14 purged group -- and this again is just focusing on the  
15 statistical sample -- how do we know that the sample is  
16 representative of the actual collection of Internet  
17 communications? If we don't know what's been purged and what  
18 the nature of those purged communications is, doesn't that  
19 affect the validity of the sample to the extent that it's a  
20 sample of the collection of Internet communications?

21 [REDACTED]: The sample that we evaluated were the  
22 sample that were in there and available to us.

23 THE COURT: I understand.

24 [REDACTED]: In our evaluation of this sample set, there  
25 were some communications that were purged during our evaluation,

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1       but we believe that given the six-month period, the number of  
2       items that were included in that six-month period and then the  
3       number that we manually evaluated has a statistical  
4       representation of that whole body with a 95 percent confidence.

5             THE COURT: But it seems -- to a fairly ignorant  
6       mathematician, it seems that if you're trying to get a  
7       representative sample and that representative sample is to be  
8       representative of the collected Internet communications but you  
9       first take a chunk out of the collected Internet communications,  
10      that could affect the validity of that sample.

11       I don't know how it would affect it or whether it would  
12      affect it significantly, but I'm just trying to probe whether it  
13      does have some impact mathematically on the validity of that  
14      sample as being representative of the collected Internet  
15      communications.

16             [REDACTED] Your Honor, if I might try to answer that  
17      from the General Counsel's Office. We know that the sample that  
18      we took was one specific date, and so it's representative a  
19      snapshot of time what was in our system.

20       The reason, Your Honor, that we can't articulate the number  
21      of items that had been purged is because we can't put our finger  
22      on those in the same way that we can put our finger on what's in  
23      our systems at any one point in time. As you may be aware from  
24      prior filings, when we discover a compliance incident, it may be  
25      several months in time beyond the time that the actual item was

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1           collected.

2           So that 13.25 million sample that you saw is reflective of  
3           what was in our systems as of that particular date. As you  
4           march forward in time from the time we took that sample, you  
5           would expect that other items that were collected during that  
6           time could also be similarly identified through our compliance  
7           process and purged.

8           THE COURT: Well, let me -- this is not intended to be  
9           reflective of the truth and is simply for demonstrative  
10          purposes, but if you purged 13 million from during that time  
11          period, then all the numbers that you're presenting would really  
12          only be half of the picture in terms of what's collected.

13          See, I'm interested ultimately in what's being collected,  
14          not what happens to be sitting in your data files at a  
15          particular point in time. If the purging that takes place as a  
16          normal course of business is half of the material, then it  
17          changes everything just from that perspective even without  
18          knowing what the purged material is, whether it's of a different  
19          nature and richer in terms of wholly domestic communications or  
20          not. Just in terms of raw numbers, it would really alter  
21          things.

22          So to the extent that you can tell me something about how  
23          much has been purged -- 10 percent, .0001 percent, 50 percent --  
24          it certainly is helpful for me in assessing the impact of the  
25          statistical presentation you make.

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1 [REDACTED]: Right. Your Honor, I think we understand  
2 that and appreciate the point. My understanding, though, of the  
3 Court's underlying concern was how many of the communications  
4 were wholly domestic.

5 THE COURT: Ultimately, yes.

6 [REDACTED]: Right. It has been an unusual occurrence  
7 for our folks to find wholly domestic communications in the 702  
8 collections. So, although I can't say it with a certainty, it  
9 seems to me that of the communications that would have been  
10 purged in the normal course of our compliance regime because  
11 either it was a roamer communication or we misidentified a task  
12 selector, that those were not likely to have been wholly  
13 domestic communications that would have affected the validity of  
14 the sample in the sense that we were going through the sample  
15 size to actually try to find wholly domestic communications.

16 THE COURT: I understand that based on your  
17 presumptions and the presentation you've made, but even  
18 accepting the presentation you've made and assuming that the  
19 nature of the purged materials we're talking about right now is  
20 the same as the sample you looked at, if the volume of the  
21 purged materials is equal to what's left, then the numbers that  
22 you've given me have to be doubled.

23 [REDACTED] Your Honor, I think it's fair to say that  
24 we don't believe that it would be that high, but we haven't come  
25 prepared with numbers in terms of --

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1                   THE COURT: And you certainly could assess that for  
2                   the future at some point, because you can look at what's  
3                   collected and look at what's left during a six-month period, but  
4                   for now you can't tell me anything more with respect to the  
5                   six-month period that was analyzed.

6                   [REDACTED] Those are certainly numbers that we can  
7                   try to get to Your Honor, but we don't have those today.

8                   THE COURT: Okay. Let's move on.

9                   MR. INGLIS: Your Honor, could we, though, take the  
10                  action and respond back to you within this week with what we can  
11                  reconstruct in terms of that purged list?

12                  THE COURT: Yes. I think what we should do is at the  
13                  end of this discussion decide what you would like to present  
14                  further and talk about a timeline for it. Let's not do it on  
15                  one item, because there may be four items by the time we're  
16                  through.

17                  Staying on the same vein with respect to the August 16  
18                  submission, the government states later on in that submission --  
19                  I think it's on page 7 -- that NSA cannot determine whether 224  
20                  of the roughly 5,000 MCTs examined contained wholly domestic  
21                  communications. Then a little bit later, it's noted that 23 of  
22                  the 224 MCTs were not further analyzed because they were  
23                  subsequently purged or placed on the NSA's master purged list.

24                  With respect to those 23, do we know why those were purged,  
25                  or are they just part of this broader category that were purged?

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1 [REDACTED]: Yes, Your Honor. In fact, I believe some  
2 of the ones that were purged during the sample time were  
3 responsive to the [REDACTED] incident that was previously  
4 reported to the Court in the prior filing. If you recall, I  
5 believe NSA purged somewhere upwards of [REDACTED] total  
6 transactions as a result of that [REDACTED] incident. I can't  
7 remember the exact number, but a specific number of that 23 were  
8 related to that purge.

9 THE COURT: Were any of the 23 purged because they  
10 were wholly domestic communications?

11 [REDACTED]: No, Your Honor.

12 THE COURT: All right. Then also in the August 16  
13 submission, we have this sort of unknown category which is the  
14 -- 45,359 I think is the accurate -- no, I'm sorry. Not the  
15 unknown category, but there are 45,359 of the overall sample of  
16 50,440 transactions reviewed that were determined to be single  
17 discrete communications. So those were sort of set aside with  
18 no further analysis.

19 In an earlier submission, I think the June 1 submission on  
20 page 6, you noted that communications are nearly always  
21 transmitted from a sender to a recipient through multiple legs  
22 before reaching their final destinations, and certainly that  
23 seems obvious to all of us who have dealt with these things.

24 Because NSA's IP filters [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED] the government has

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1 indicated that NSA could intercept the communication [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]

5 And then based on a further explanation on pages 7 and 8, I  
6 think, of the June 1 submission, should the Court understand  
7 that NSA's upstream collection filters wouldn't prevent [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED]

12 Do you understand the question?

13 [REDACTED] : The filters would not prevent that, and  
14 those are examples of the 10 wholly domestic communications that  
15 we reference in the August 16 filing. That was exactly the  
16 case.

17 THE COURT: So those communications would all -- those  
18 about communications would all be subsumed in the category that  
19 is identified in the August 16 submission on page 9 as between  
20 996 and 4,965, or would they be in one of these other  
21 categories? I don't think they're in that group. Aren't these  
22 part of the single discrete communications that you didn't even  
23 analyze further?

24 [REDACTED] : That's correct, Your Honor.

25 THE COURT: Aren't there going to be some wholly

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1 domestic communications in that group that you didn't analyze  
2 further?

3 [REDACTED] : It's possible, Your Honor, but we --

4 THE COURT: It's more than possible, isn't it? Isn't  
5 it likely there will be some *about* communications [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED], and it's actually a  
7 communication that is between two U.S.-located persons?

8 [REDACTED] : Your Honor, that is possible. However,  
9 typically,

10 [REDACTED]  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
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19  
20

21 THE COURT: How about [REDACTED]  
22 [REDACTED]  
23

24 [REDACTED] : Yes. It is possible, but the reason  
25 why --

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1                   THE COURT: It's more than possible. Aren't there  
2 going to be a fair number of things?

3                   [REDACTED]: Correct. There definitely will be.  
4 However, the way they're designed is, as I said, [REDACTED]

5  
6  
7  
8                   THE COURT: The problem that I'm left with is to the  
9 extent that there's a statistical presentation to convince the  
10 Court of a low volume of wholly domestic communications, this is  
11 another category that exists that -- you're using the word  
12 "possible," but I have no way to quantify it or know how many in  
13 this sample -- just talking about the sample -- knowing how many  
14 might be of that category.

15                  [REDACTED]: Your Honor, I think with respect to the  
16 sample that NSA conducted, we certainly endeavored to try to be  
17 as responsible as we could in the --

18                  THE COURT: Let me state, you've been very  
19 responsible. You've been very helpful. I know you're all doing  
20 the best you can. I'm just probing the information.

21                  [REDACTED]: Certainly. The focus of the sample -- I  
22 think you're correct -- was geared towards identifying MCTs  
23 within NSA's upstream collection holdings in order to be able to  
24 characterize the nature and scope of that collection  
25 specifically with respect to multi-communications transactions.

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1           So there may be a number of other things that weren't more  
2         specifically looked at within that particular sample which we  
3         could attempt to take back and answer for the Court at a later  
4         time, but the sample that was run was for the purpose of  
5         describing MCTs and the nature and scope of that feature of that  
6         collection.

7           THE COURT: All right. I think it's fair for me to  
8         say to you that I am concerned about this category within the  
9         sample of 45,000, which is most of the sample. It's by far the  
10        majority of the sample and the fact that it does seem to us that  
11        there are going to be some *about* communications that are  
12        probably wholly domestic communications in that grouping, and I  
13        don't have any way to quantify or assess how much it is.

14           I know you have cautiously, and appropriately, used the  
15        term "possible." It seems to me it's more than possible; it is  
16        highly likely, but I can't say what it means because I don't  
17        know what kind of volume we might be talking about. So let's  
18        put that down on the list of something that we may benefit from  
19        further information on.

20           I'm going to allow the legal advisors to follow up with  
21        questions on these subjects before I move to another one.

22           [REDACTED] : [REDACTED], FISC legal counsel. Just a  
23        follow-up. If someone's [REDACTED]  
24           [REDACTED]

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15

1 [REDACTED] Do you have a sense  
2 one way or another?

3 [REDACTED]: It's not necessarily the case that [REDACTED]  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8 [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]: But other than that sort of general  
10 observation, you don't have a sense percentage-wise of how many  
11 [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED]: No, we don't.

13 THE COURT: All right. Staying with the August 16  
14 submission for just a moment longer, the government has  
15 concluded -- I think it's on page 9 of that submission -- that  
16 of the 13.25 million Internet transactions acquired via the  
17 upstream collection during a six-month period, between 48,609,  
18 and 70,168 are MCTs containing one or more communications  
19 between nontargeted persons but lacking sufficient information  
20 for NSA to identify the location of the sender and all intended  
recipients of that communication.

21 It's a category that I call "the unknown category," which  
22 is fairly large, certainly larger than the category that you've  
23 identified as actually containing a wholly domestic  
24 communication. A little later in the submission, you indicate  
25 that NSA has no basis to believe that any of this category of

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1 transactions contain wholly domestic communications.

2 Now, that's a fairly absolute statement that's made in the  
3 submission. Doesn't the conclusion that between 996 and 4,965,  
4 which are pretty low percentages but nonetheless an actual  
5 determined amount on this sample, doesn't the conclusion that  
6 there are those wholly domestic communications acquired every  
7 six months, doesn't that undermine the presumption that none of  
8 these unknown transactions contain wholly domestic  
9 communications? Wouldn't one expect that at least that  
10 percentage of that unknown category would be wholly domestic?

11 MR. INGLIS: Your Honor, if I might, I'll defer to [redacted]  
12 to provide the detailed answer, but in that case, when presented  
13 with the possibility that these are either unknown or  
14 unknowable, we pushed our analysts further to do two checks  
15 against each and every one of these items, first to check to  
16 determine whether or not there was any information that might be  
17 attributable to a domestic communication, and second, to  
18 determine whether there was any information that might lead us  
19 to conclude that in fact it was a foreign communication.

20 In each case, both of those checks for each of these items  
21 came back showing that the preponderance of evidence -- not  
22 absolutely, but the preponderance of evidence which we had  
23 before us would say that there were no domestic communications  
24 in that pile.

25 THE COURT: So I guess what you're saying is that this

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1 grouping, you've determined, is not going to be -- it's going to  
2 be less rich in wholly domestic communications than the overall  
3 sample is.

4 [REDACTED] That's correct.

5 THE COURT: I mean less rich even to the point of  
6 containing no wholly domestic communication. Why is it that  
7 this grouping -- what is it about this grouping that should  
8 convince me that it is different than the rest of the sample and  
9 will contain no wholly domestic communications?

10 MR. INGLIS: That's more than a fair question. It  
11 wasn't that it was wholly devoid of contextual information, that  
12 it lacked information, a conclusive statement, but the remaining  
13 artifacts led us in every case into a -- if you had to decide  
14 yes or no based upon the available information that it was  
15 foreign as opposed to domestic. So in each case it wasn't that  
16 there was no information. There was insufficient information to  
17 say with absolute certainty.

18 [REDACTED] Correct. And the way we did that analysis  
19 stemmed from the data set we evaluated. Of that 224, we did  
20 this in-depth analysis that Chris described, and via a  
21 statistical analysis we were able to extrapolate that sample set  
22 with a 95 percent certainty across the entire 13 million. And  
23 there's a certain error associated with that, and that error is  
24 expressed in the confidence interval.

25 So based on the data set that we evaluated on page 7 and

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18

1 before, our statistician was able to draw conclusions based on  
2 that to the true proportion of those type of communication  
3 across the entire 13 million set within that certain confidence  
4 interval.

5 MR. INGLIS: But, Your Honor, if I understand your  
6 question, you would ask why do we believe that that population  
7 of data that we would declare as unknowable is statistically  
8 different than the larger set from which it was extracted,  
9 perhaps on a statistically relevant basis.

10 THE COURT: My guess would be that it goes in the  
11 opposite direction because it's a group that has already  
12 eliminated all these large portions that clearly don't contain  
13 any wholly domestic communications from your view. So why does  
14 it then --

15 MR. INGLIS: In the case of the 10 wholly domestic  
16 communications that clearly stood out as having artifacts that  
17 said they're wholly domestic. In the case of this pile, there  
18 were no artifacts associated with those that spoke to the  
19 possibility of domestic that we couldn't rule it absolutely out.

20 We also looked to see whether in each case there were  
21 artifacts that would lead us to conclude that if we had to make  
22 a judgment that they were foreign, not domestic, and in which  
23 case both of those tests led us to conclude that they were, not  
24 presumptively, but more likely, to be foreign than domestic.

25 There was no information I'm aware of in the file -- and we

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19

1       pushed our analysts very hard on this particular pile because we  
2       had the same question you did, which is could this be a soft  
3       underbelly in our analysis, and pushed them very hard, and they  
4       came back with no information that would lead them to conclude a  
5       strong possibility that they were domestic.

6                     [REDACTED]: That's correct. [REDACTED]

7  
8  
9  
10  
11

[REDACTED]

12                  THE COURT: Where -- and excuse me for asking the  
13       question this way, but I just want all the help I can get.  
14       Where should I look in this submission for the explanation that  
15       you've given me about the analysis of this unknown group that  
16       led you to conclude that it will not contain wholly domestic  
17       communications?

18                  [REDACTED]: It's on page 7 at the bottom.

19                  THE COURT: Page 7 where, sir?

20                  [REDACTED]: On the second bolder bullet.

21                  THE COURT: Of the 5,081 MCTs?

22                  [REDACTED]: Yes.

23                  THE COURT: All right. We can read that further and  
24       analyze it.

25                  MR. INGLIS: Your Honor, we're happy to be more

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1 responsive based upon what we have and do further analysis as  
2 the Court may please.

3 THE COURT: Well, you can look at it too, and you can  
4 mark this down as No. 3. If there's further analysis that  
5 you've done that supports the conclusion that you reach that  
6 you're now expressing that this unknown category is in fact  
7 unlikely, and you think highly unlikely to contain wholly  
8 domestic communications, then by all means be prepared to  
9 provide it, because on first reading, that's not the conclusion  
10 that we reached from assessing this submission.

11 All right.

12 [REDACTED] Your Honor, just to add into this, I know  
13 we haven't gotten into the 30 August --

14 THE COURT: And I'm not going to be going through it  
15 line by line. Don't worry.

16 [REDACTED] But I do think there were at least some  
17 portions of the 30 August filing that try to speak to that exact  
18 question, and when we get to them, I'll try to --

19 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

20 All right. Just give me one second to see -- all right.  
21 The last question in this area of examining submissions goes  
22 back early to the June 1 submission which is clear that the  
23 scope of the data that NSA actually acquires through the  
24 upstream collection is constantly evolving. And you explained  
25 that on pages 24 and 25, noting that [REDACTED]

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3 [REDACTED], and all of that can affect the amount and type  
4 of data included in a particular transaction.

5 What I'd like to get a fix on is what this means in terms  
6 of any particular sampling at any particular time. In view of  
7 that evolution, is it likely that if NSA did a similar analysis,  
8 a sampling type analysis of the upstream collection at some  
9 later date, two years later than the one done in the recent time  
10 period ending in July, is it likely that that analysis would  
11 wind up with something significantly or at least somewhat  
12 different? This evolution, is it material evolution that really  
13 would change things significantly? Or don't you know?

14 [REDACTED]: Your Honor, a lot of the analysis  
15 focused on identifying MCTs and their percentages showing up in  
16 our collection. It is possible that let's say two years down  
17 the road that the Internet is more rich with MCTs for a number  
18 of different reasons.

19 We could have [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED] and that would  
22 statistically increase the amount of MCTs.

23 Because of that unknowable factor of technology popularity  
24 in the future, that could change things. Certainly, several  
25 years ago, we've talked in the past about [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and as

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3 technologies have evolved, that has become more and more  
4 popular. So we could see somewhat different results if we were  
5 to conduct a similar study in the future. That is definitely  
6 something that could happen.

7

THE COURT: And there's no reason --

8

[REDACTED] The other thing I wanted to add,

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Your Honor, is one of the other factors here that can somewhat  
10 limit the evolution is that one of the factors in play here is

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THE COURT: I think that last explanation of a  
limiting factor is important because it affects the question I  
was about to ask, which is, we use the term evolution, and I  
take it we would look at this with respect to MCTs and say there  
has been an evolution to the extent that there are more MCTs now  
than was the case 10 years ago. Correct?

[REDACTED] I would say that in some cases -- so,

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1 for instance, [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED] So it's not just so much the MCTs; it's the nature  
5 of the MCTs that has evolved as well.

6 THE COURT: But, in light of the limiting factor that  
7 you just mentioned, can we make an assumption that the upstream  
8 collection -- let's just focus on that -- will become richer and  
9 richer in MCTs, or can we not make that assumption?

10 [REDACTED] I don't think we could or couldn't with  
11 any degree of competence.

12 THE COURT: All right. Let's move on to presumptions  
13 more generally here. There are several presumptions that the  
14 government has urged the Court to continue to rely upon with  
15 regard to the upstream collection. They include that [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] and that's included in the June  
19 1 submission on page 11.

20 There's also a presumption that the vast majority of  
21 persons outside the U.S. are non-U.S. persons and most of their  
22 communications are with other non-U.S. persons located overseas.  
23 That's referenced in the June 28 submission on page 5. And  
24 there's also a presumption that [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED] We've talked [REDACTED]

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1       about that a little bit, and that's certainly referenced as well  
2       in the June 1 submission.

3           In view of the analysis of the upstream collection that  
4       you've done -- and I know we're talking about numbers and  
5       percentages here, but in view of that analysis, and in  
6       particular the conclusion that the upstream collection does  
7       contain a certain number of or percentage of wholly domestic  
8       communications over a six-month period as analyzed, can the  
9       Court rely on those presumptions as really being absolute, or  
10      are they imperfect presumptions at best?

11                          [REDACTED] Your Honor, if I may, I think they are,  
12       like all presumptions, imperfect. I think the numbers we've  
13       generated from the study approximate what we expected; that is,  
14       a low number of domestic communications when something we think  
15       is aberrational is taking place. So we do not intend to say it  
16       can never be the case that, but the presumption is it's not the  
17       normal behavior, and I think that's what the study bore out.

18                          MR. INGLIS: And, Your Honor, I would add as the chief  
19       operating officer of the National Security Agency and having to  
20       then essentially sign up to our end of a representation, that I  
21       feel the same, that the preponderance of those assumptions has  
22       been borne out by the data to be correct but imperfect and that  
23       what we then have to apply are a set of procedures to ensure  
24       that we are looking for those exceptions and that we act  
25       appropriately when we discover those exceptions and that we can

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1 therefore offer back that the totality of that has a high  
2 probability, again not absolute, but a high probability of  
3 making the right call in terms of what our presumption should be  
4 and having a high probability of catching the exceptions that  
5 then ensue and dealing with those appropriately.

6 THE COURT: Let's just turn back the page a moment to  
7 something we were talking about a minute ago with the evolution  
8 of the Internet. Any sense of what, for example, [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED] might do to these issues and the way that  
10 Internet communications are routed?

11 [REDACTED]  
12 [REDACTED]  
13 [REDACTED]  
14 [REDACTED]  
15 [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED]

17 So at this point, we haven't seen any change, and I'm not  
18 too sure what we would expect to see just given the nature of  
19 [REDACTED]  
20 [REDACTED].

21 THE COURT: We're talking about imperfect  
22 presumptions. To the extent that NSA is acquiring [REDACTED]  
23 [REDACTED]  
24 [REDACTED] should the presumptions be reversed? In other  
25 words, should we instead presume that communications are within

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1           the United States and with U.S. persons?

2           MR. INGLIS: Your Honor, I think that question centers  
3       on [REDACTED]

4           [REDACTED], so I would ask [REDACTED] to talk to that.

5           [REDACTED] Just to clarify, the question is, is  
6       should we presume at some future date that a U.S. service  
7       provider is primarily servicing U.S. persons? Or...

8           THE COURT: It's a little less than that. It's just  
9       if the acquisition is [REDACTED]  
10      of someone in the United States, do the presumptions that you  
11       rely on and urge the Court to apply hold up, or should we  
12       actually think that the opposite would be true, that for those  
13       acquisitions, the presumptions, if you're going to apply a  
14       presumption, the presumption should be that the communications  
15       are within the United States and with U.S. persons?

16           [REDACTED]: So if the person was in the  
17       United States and [REDACTED] and we intercepted that,  
18       would we presume at some future date that that was -- I'm not  
19       sure I fully understand.

20           [REDACTED] If I can address it, Your Honor. I  
21       think that that would be an excellent presumption to reverse if  
22       not for the presence of the targeted selectors. So remember  
23       that the reason that we collect any particular transmission is  
24       that it contained the target selector which would be an  
25       independent determination that the target is reasonably to be

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1 outside the U.S. So that weakens otherwise what I think would  
2 be the natural inclination to reverse that presumption.

3 [REDACTED] If you've got a transaction that is [REDACTED]

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8 [REDACTED] With respect to those individual discrete  
9 communications, what presumption, if any, should be applied?

10 [REDACTED] In that scenario that you've described,

11 if [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED], we still are applying the IP filtering  
13 process. So if that user was [REDACTED]

14

15 [REDACTED] So that  
16 particular scenario wouldn't occur. [REDACTED]

17

18 [REDACTED] So that is what happened in the 10  
19 examples we have. [REDACTED]

20

21 [REDACTED] We  
22 think we're going to very, very rarely see that happen because  
23 the overall presumption of the statute, remember, is that the  
24 whole world out there is using the services here.  
25 [REDACTED]

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3 That's the scenario -- and we've seen it play out in this study  
4 on 10 occasions -- that's a scenario that you're raising. But  
5 it won't be somebody in the United States communicating with  
6 [REDACTED] in the United States.

7

8 [REDACTED] : Just to make sure the point is crystal  
9 clear for the Court, the concern that the Court has about what  
presumption to apply to communications [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] which was the exception in the study, not the rule.

Is that a fair statement?

[REDACTED] That's correct.

MR. [REDACTED] : And I think it's also important to

remember that the presumptions aren't the first resort. The

presumptions are in many senses a last resort. There can be

objective indicia of the location of the communicants that is

more reliable than the presumption. The presumptions apply

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1 ostensibly in the absence of information to the contrary, and  
2 implicit in that requirement is a due diligence requirement to  
3 actually try to assess whether there's any objective information  
4 that to the extent you need to rely on the presumption that  
5 would rebut the presumption.

6 I think NSA's manual review bears out that the digging can  
7 result in the location of reliable, objective information that  
8 is indicative of a person's location.

9 MS. MONACO: Just to press on that one bit, I think  
10 that's why the Court is struggling with the 224. NSA only  
11 arrived at that 224 because the NSA works through all of the  
12 objective indicia that [REDACTED] mentions, and then, only then,  
13 after discarding all of that and identifying all of that and  
14 making conclusions from it results in the 224 where there were  
15 no reliable indicia.

16 THE COURT: To round this out -- and [REDACTED] if you  
17 have more questions, please feel free to ask them -- but let's  
18 talk about the [REDACTED] situation for a moment that I  
19 already referred to. [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED] : [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]

23

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25 THE COURT: [REDACTED]

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5 [REDACTED] :  
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12 THE COURT:  
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20 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
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THE COURT: [REDACTED]

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THE COURT:

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: [REDACTED]

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THE COURT:

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: [REDACTED]

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3                   THE COURT: All right. Okay. Let's move on to the  
4 question of intent. This is sort of a difficult question to  
5 answer. It's an easy question to ask, but I'll throw it out  
6 there, and I can be more specific if you'd like me to be.

7                   The government's submissions do use various terms --  
8 intentional, unintentional, inadvertent, incidental -- when  
9 describing the upstream collection or aspects of the upstream  
10 collection. I'm a little confused as to what is meant, and  
11 rather than just throwing that out to you, let me ask one or two  
12 specific questions.

13                  Is unintentional the same as inadvertent? As you use those  
14 terms, are they the same? Do both mean "not intended?"

15                  [REDACTED] Your Honor, I think that's correct.  
16 "Inadvertent" is a term that's used in the NSA immunization  
17 procedures, and "unintentional" has been used in various  
18 documents as well. But I think "inadvertent" and  
19 "unintentional" can mean the same thing.

20                  THE COURT: And "intentional" is the opposite of both  
21 "unintentional" and "inadvertent."

22                  [REDACTED]: Yes.

23                  THE COURT: And "incidental" means what?

24                  [REDACTED]: "Incidental," I think as we've framed it,  
25 means something that results as a consequence of an action that

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1 we take intentionally.

2 THE COURT: Is happening or a byproduct --

3 [REDACTED] It's not our intent in taking that action,  
4 but as you said, it's a byproduct of that action. So in an MCT,  
5 for example, our intent is to acquire a communication to, from,  
6 or about a targeted selector. At the time we acquire that  
7 transaction, we may not even know that it's an MCT that contains  
8 other communications.

9 So we acquire the MCT because we see, hey, that's a  
10 communication that has a targeted selector. We reasonably  
11 believe that that has foreign intelligence information in it.  
12 We acquire it, it's turns out it's MCT, it's got other  
13 communications in it. We still intended to acquire that  
14 transaction and anything contained within it such that to the  
15 extent there are these other communications in it, it's  
16 incidental to our acquisition of the transaction.

17 THE COURT: All right. Let's drill down a little  
18 more. The June 28 submission states that "acquisition of  
19 Internet transactions is intentional," and on the same page,  
20 page 6, further states that "given the government's knowledge  
21 that such transactions may also include information that is not  
22 to, from, or about a task selector, the acquisition of this  
23 additional information is not inadvertent."

24 [REDACTED]: I think that's correct.

25 THE COURT: Later in the same filing, and also in the

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1       August 30 filing, the government seems to be saying that any  
2       wholly domestic communication that is acquired as part of a  
3       transaction is obtained unintentionally or inadvertently. Is  
4       that also correct?

5                     [REDACTED] : Yes.

6       THE COURT: Now, NSA knows with certainty that both  
7       will be acquired. In other words, wholly domestic discrete  
8       communications are simply a subset of the nontarget discrete  
9       communications that you acquire as part of a transaction. So  
10      how do you reconcile that with these statements with respect to  
11      intentional or unintentional?

12      [REDACTED] : So we intentionally acquire MCTs because  
13      they contain the presence of a targeted selector that we believe  
14      is used by a non-U.S. person located outside the United States.  
15      However, we don't intentionally acquire all such MCTs. We know  
16      that we cannot acquire --

17      THE COURT: You knowingly acquire them, though.

18      [REDACTED] : But we don't intentionally acquire them.

19      THE COURT: Well, we'll get to that in a moment.

20      [REDACTED] : Understood. And we may not know at the  
21      time of acquisition that that MCT is something that contains --

22      THE COURT: With respect to a particular transaction.

23      [REDACTED] : Exactly. So we are intentionally  
24      acquiring MCTs, but we have also implemented [REDACTED] means to  
25      ensure that we are not intentionally acquiring wholly domestic

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1       communications, but we believe that those [REDACTED] means are  
2       reasonably designed to prevent that. Granted, they are not  
3       perfect, but we do believe that they are reasonably designed to  
4       prevent the acquisition of those communications.

5             THE COURT: Let's jump to the statute for a second.  
6       Under section 1881(a)(1), the Court is required to determine  
7       whether the targeting procedures are, in the language of the  
8       statute, "reasonably designed to prevent the intentional  
9       acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all  
10      intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to  
11      be located in the United States."

12       Let's look at those two parts of that statutory provision.  
13      Intentional acquisition.

14       In the government's view, what's the meaning of  
15      "intentional" as used in the statute? And to set the framework  
16      for you, I think in criminal law and in tort law it's generally  
17      settled that a person intends to produce a consequence either  
18      when he acts with a purpose of producing the consequence, which  
19      is what you've been focusing on I think in your papers and here  
20      for the moment, or, when he acts knowing that the consequence is  
21      substantially certain to occur.

22       It does seem to me that you really focus on the first part  
23      of that traditional definition, because you're really only  
24      talking about the specific-purpose definition and not the  
25      knowledge of substantial certainty aspect of intent. Am I

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1 right?

2 [REDACTED] : I think we need to focus on the fact that  
3 -- I mean, granted, the statute says that we are precluded from  
4 acquiring communications as to which the sender and all intended  
5 recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in  
6 the United States. I grant you that we may not have focused  
7 specifically on that aspect, our knowledge at the time of  
8 acquisition. I think NSA's manual review has shown that it can  
9 take a lot of drilling down into these communications to  
10 determine whether or not they are in fact wholly domestic.

11 THE COURT: Well, it doesn't take that much drilling  
12 anymore to determine that there are some that are wholly  
13 domestic. It does take a lot of drilling, if you even can, to  
14 determine that a particular transaction is wholly domestic or a  
15 communication within a transaction is wholly domestic.

16 Indeed, it's especially true or especially difficult when  
17 acquired, but it doesn't take much now to conclude, because  
18 that's what your analysis has concluded, that there will be  
19 wholly domestic communications acquired. Certainly will be.

20 [REDACTED] : No, no. I agree a hundred percent with  
21 that, Your Honor. But again, at the time of acquisition, we may  
22 not know it, and it's at the time of acquisition that the  
23 statute precludes us from intentionally acquiring a domestic  
24 communication.

25 THE COURT: Then we're getting a little bit semantic.

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1        It depends on what you mean by "acquisition," whether you mean  
2        acquisition of a particular communication, acquisition of a  
3        particular transaction, or the acquisition that takes place  
4        during the space of a day, or an hour. If it's either of the  
5        latter two, you know that there's some wholly domestic  
6        communications that are being acquired, statistically.

7                  [REDACTED]: Statistically, yes. Personally, the way  
8        that I've always viewed the way that that provision in the  
9        statute works is it's on an acquisition-by-acquisition basis,  
10      and "acquisition" meaning communication-by-communication basis,  
11      because we are targeting to acquire foreign intelligence  
12      information. That foreign intelligence information is contained  
13      in individual communications.

14                THE COURT: Do you think that definitionally, the  
15      Court, when it's interpreting and applying 1881(a) in this  
16      setting, should only be focused on the purpose portion of the  
17      definition that I went through a moment ago, or should the Court  
18      also be looking at the knowing aspect of it -- in other words,  
19      that part of the definition of "intention" as to be applied here  
20      is "not only acting with a purpose of producing the consequence  
21      but also acting knowing that the consequence is substantially  
22      certain to occur"?

23                Should I be jettisoning that portion of the traditional  
24      "intentional" definition and applying some narrower definition  
25      here? Or are you only saying that even applying both prongs of

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1       that definition you need to look at what's happening and what's  
2       known at the time of the acquisition of a specific transaction?

3                    [REDACTED]: I think it's the latter, and I also think  
4       that the fact that the statute says that the procedures have to  
5       be reasonably designed to prevent the acquisition of  
6       communications as to which the sender and all intended  
7       recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in  
8       the United States.

9                   I think given that language, the statute contemplates that  
10      there's not going to be a perfect system. It has to be a  
11      reasonably designed system, and I think the results of NSA's  
12      manual review bear out the fact that the system that NSA has  
13      designed, albeit not perfect, is reasonably designed to prevent  
14      the acquisition that the statute prohibits.

15                  [REDACTED]: Your Honor, if I could add one thing.  
16      If we could take away some of the complication of this  
17      discussion by focusing just on other than MCT, for what it's  
18      worth, I think the Court has already considered and countenanced  
19      the idea that some targets are going to roam into the  
20      United States, or we could turn out to be wrong and they would  
21      be in the United States. And some statistically, probably a  
22      very small percentage of those may have communications with  
23      other people in the United States.

24                  So, to a certain extent, this may be a threshold the Court  
25      has already crossed or at least walked up to and assessed. So I

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1       would just like the offer that in the context of this question  
2       about what the statute means.

3           THE COURT: I think that's a fair point in terms of we  
4       all know that systems are not going to be perfect. We've  
5       already faced some instances, and this may be another one that  
6       is an acceptable imperfection. But that's what we have to  
7       explore a little bit more before the Court is prepared to reach  
8       that conclusion.

9           We've already talked a little bit about the second part of  
10      the statutory term of the "known at the time of acquisition."  
11      So it would be your view that the knowledge or the certainty  
12      that the collection will result in the acquisition of thousands  
13      over the course of a year of wholly domestic communications does  
14      not mean that there's a violation of 1881. Set aside the  
15      "reasonably designed" language, which I think is important, but  
16      just set that aside for a second.

17           [REDACTED]: I'm not sure I understand the question.

18           THE COURT: Well, you know at the time of acquisition  
19      that there are thousands of transactions that are going to be  
20      wholly domestic over the course of a year. At the time of  
21      acquisition of a particular transaction, you don't know that  
22      that transaction is wholly domestic.

23           Your assessment is that even on this knowledge prong of the  
24      definition and looking at the "known at the time of acquisition"  
25      language of the statute, that the Court should really not be

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1 troubled by the fact that it's known that there are going to be  
2 thousands of wholly domestic communications acquired -- and  
3 again, I'm only focusing within the statutory language now; I'm  
4 not talking about the Fourth Amendment -- shouldn't be troubled  
5 by that because it's not known that any particular transaction  
6 is wholly domestic and that the Court therefore need not be  
7 troubled by the fact that everyone knows that there will be some  
8 wholly domestic communications acquired.

9 [REDACTED]: It's certainly reasonable to presume that  
10 we are going to be acquiring wholly domestic communications  
11 despite our best efforts, and that's why, as we've shown in the  
12 papers, we're relying heavily on the application of our  
13 minimization procedures.

14 So to the extent that the protections that we put into  
15 place at the time of acquisition don't work, then we have these  
16 substantial back-end protections to ensure that to the extent  
17 that one of these domestic communications resides in an NSA  
18 system because it couldn't be weeded out at the point of  
19 acquisition, and an analyst comes across it during the course of  
20 their regular analytical work, that that information is treated  
21 appropriately; i.e., we've committed to destroying any wholly  
22 domestic communications or MCTs containing even a single wholly  
23 domestic communication. So I think the two in tandem work  
24 together.

25 THE COURT: I have one or two more questions in this

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1 intent section, if you will, and then I think it'll be -- well,  
2 let me not assume that we won't have a few more than one or two  
3 questions. Some of this relates to Judge McLaughlin's 2008  
4 opinion, because you do rely on it to a certain extent, back in  
5 the June 28 submission, for example.

6 You rely on it for the proposition that NSA's acquisition  
7 of transactions continue discrete communications that are not  
8 to, from, or about a task selector is intentional because the  
9 acquisition of the additional information is a necessary yet  
10 unavoidable consequence of acquiring foreign communications to,  
11 from, or about a task selector.

12 Judge McLaughlin, in that opinion, also found that a  
13 communication would be unintentionally acquired for purposes of  
14 1806, if, for example, the acquisition resulted from a technical  
15 malfunction or an inadvertent misidentification of a selector.

16 Is the government's argument that its acquisition of wholly  
17 domestic communications is unintentional based on NSA's  
18 determination that its filters are not functioning properly, or  
19 is it instead that the filters have a limited capacity to  
20 prevent the acquisition of wholly domestic communications?

21 █ █ : I think it's both. I think we've  
22 previously asserted that to the extent that NSA's filters fail  
23 for a technical reason -- and that has happened in the past, and  
24 we have reported a compliance incident related to that, and we  
25 acquired wholly domestic communications as a result of that --

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1       that is a situation where we've unintentionally acquired a  
2       wholly domestic communication. In this instance, it's not --

3                 THE COURT: It's not a failure. Isn't it more a  
4       limited capacity?

5                 ████████: It's a very small limited capacity. But,  
6       yeah, I think it's pretty much --

7                 MR. INGLIS: But, Your Honor, I would offer and add  
8       that I think it's more the limited capacity, the limited  
9       technical possibility given the way the communications work,  
10      that if we had the means to devise it such that it would screen  
11      out at that moment in time -- discern, screen out -- we should  
12      be expected and would do so.

13                THE COURT: If it's that limited capacity or  
14       feasibility, why isn't the acquisition of those communications,  
15      to return to Judge McLaughlin's language, a necessary yet  
16      unavoidable consequence of acquiring communications to, from, or  
17      about a task selector and therefore intentional, under her  
18      opinion?

19                ████████ Under her opinion, and as we argued to the  
20      Court, we were basing our assertion that there were certain  
21      types of communications that were intentionally but mistakenly  
22      acquired based on our understanding of where the target was  
23      also. That's where our primary focus was.

24                This situation is a little bit different than that. In  
25       that instance, we were relying wholly on our reasonable but

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1 mistaken belief that our target was located outside the  
2 United States in assessing whether or not, to the extent that  
3 that person roams into the United States, 1806(i) applies in  
4 that case.

5 We determined that it didn't because we were at all times  
6 intending to acquire all communications from our targeted  
7 selector under the reasonable but mistaken belief that our  
8 target was located outside the United States.

In this context, it's a little bit different. Rather than relying on the application of the targeting procedures and relying on our reasonable belief, we are taking active technical measures to prevent the acquisition of wholly domestic communication. That's the distinction that I draw, and when those technical means don't necessarily work, that's when the acquisition becomes unintentional.

16 THE COURT: All right. So if we have an acquisition  
17 of wholly domestic communications in a circumstance where [redacted]

22 okay, so that's the situation -- would the acquisition of those  
23 transactions by the upstream collection be intentional?

24 [REDACTED] : I just want to make sure we understand the  
25 question.

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1                   THE COURT: I'm talking about acquiring wholly  
2 domestic communications in circumstances where [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]. In that situation, wouldn't acquisition through  
7 upstream collection be intentional, even though it's based on a  
8 mistaken belief that the target was outside the United States?

9                   [REDACTED]: I would argue that it's still intentional,  
10 because recall that the IP filtering and [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED] is intended to prevent the acquisition of  
12 wholly domestic *about* communications. In targeting procedures,  
13 we rely on the presence of the target to ensure that we're not  
14 acquiring any wholly domestic communications.

15                  The fact that in practice we apply the IP filters and [REDACTED]  
16 [REDACTED] to all  
17 communications, including those of the target, I think doesn't  
18 undermine the notion that we've relied on in the past that to  
19 the extent that a person believed to be located outside the  
20 United States roams into the United States and we continue  
21 acquiring their communications, albeit some of which may be  
22 domestic, that that is still intentional but unknowing.

23                  THE COURT: All right. [REDACTED], in particular, did you  
24 want to ask anything about the -- I guess it relates back to the  
25 [REDACTED] of the collection?

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1 [REDACTED] Sure. So, back in 2009, the government  
2 reported an overcollection [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] overcollection incident.

7 Immediately following that overcollection, the government  
8 took it upon itself to purge the overcollected communications  
9 from NSA systems in order to ensure that no information had been  
10 disseminated by NSA in any form and to deploy improved filtering  
11 systems to prevent the future acquisition of such nontarget  
12 communications.

13 In Judge McLaughlin's opinion in improving that  
14 surveillance following the [REDACTED] overcollection  
15 incident, she relied heavily on those remedial and preventative  
16 measures in concluding that the overcollection didn't preclude  
17 the approval of the certification and the procedures before her  
18 for renewal.

19 The approach being followed here seems quite different in  
20 that the NSA's proposing to continue collecting nontarget  
21 information as part of Internet transactions and to keep and  
22 potentially use much of that information. So can you address  
23 the difference in why you're treating them differently?

24 [REDACTED]: I think the key difference is in the [REDACTED]  
25 incident, the overcollection resulted in the acquisition of

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1 [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]

6 Here, we are only acquiring transactions because they  
7 contain a targeted selector. At the time of acquisition, we may  
8 not even know that there are other discrete communications  
9 within the transaction that aren't to, from, or about the  
10 targeted selector. I think that's a very key difference.

11 Also, another important difference between [REDACTED] and this  
12 situation is, in [REDACTED] there was a technological fix that could  
13 be implemented. The [REDACTED] was preventable, and NSA did a lot of  
14 great work in developing technical means to ensure that those  
15 types of overcollections don't happen again.

16 Again, those means aren't perfect and every once in a while  
17 something slips though, but by and large, those are technical  
18 means that NSA has implemented to prevent the sort of  
19 overcollection that occurred in [REDACTED]. Those technical means  
20 aren't available here. NSA lacks the technical means to prevent  
21 -- or can only acquire whole transactions. They can't unpack,  
22 generally speaking, transactions into their component discrete  
23 communications [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED] So I think that's another  
25 key difference.

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1           So, just to sum up, it's the nature of the overcollection.  
2       In [REDACTED] there was no nexus to the targeted selector at all,  
3       whereas here there is a nexus to the targeted selector that  
4       results in the acquisition, presence of the targeted selector in  
5       the transaction, and in [REDACTED] there was a technical fix that  
6       could prevent what was overcollection. Here, there's not a  
7       technical fix that will enable NSA to conduct the acquisition in  
8       a more discrete way.

9           THE COURT: All right. Let's talk about that for a  
10      second. Is it clear from your submissions and your assessment  
11      of your technology that NSA doesn't currently have or employ  
12      technology that would permit it to acquire everything it's  
13      authorized to acquire without also acquiring MCTs?

14           [REDACTED]: That's correct.

15           THE COURT: Is it technically possible -- in other  
16      words, within your knowledge of technology, is it technically  
17      possible to come up with a means to acquire everything but not  
18      MCTs? I know you don't have it right now, but I'm trying to  
19      examine whether it's possible.

20           [REDACTED]: There's sort of two components to that.  
21      One is that these technologies are not designed to do that by  
22      nature, and as a result, it is very technologically difficult to  
23      do that in many cases. Some cases it is impossible, but in  
24      terms of us being able to -- let's use [REDACTED] as an example.  
25      Could we develop a technology which could [REDACTED]

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3       However, the viability of that [REDACTED] would be very  
4       short-lived, largely because [REDACTED]  
5       [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]

6

7

8       Compound that by [REDACTED],  
9       it becomes a very hard and infeasible task to do, especially  
10      considering that NSA is only looking at [REDACTED]

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      However, the viability of that [REDACTED] would be very  
      short-lived, largely because [REDACTED]  
      [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]

      Compound that by [REDACTED],  
      it becomes a very hard and infeasible task to do, especially  
      considering that NSA is only looking at [REDACTED]

      THE COURT: Have you already looked at this issue and  
      made sort of the final determination by NSA that there isn't a  
      means to come up with a technological, as [REDACTED] put it, fix?

      [REDACTED]: Yes. We have concluded that it's  
      technologically infeasible to do this.

      MR. INGLIS: I would go further to say that if [REDACTED]

      It will necessarily change, and we therefore will always design

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1       imperfect systems against tomorrow's probabilities.

2                 THE COURT: But not to be glib, that's your business,  
3       isn't it? Isn't that what you do every day in all of these  
4       multitude of settings?

5                 MR. INGLIS: That's exactly right, sir, and fairly  
6       put. I would say that we cannot perfectly anticipate those  
7       changes. So the machinery will fail before we detect it, and  
8       then upon detection, we will have to then correct it.

9                 MS. MONACO: I might add if I could, Your Honor, in  
10      our discussions on this issue preceding this hearing, we also  
11      discussed the fact that some of this relies on [REDACTED]

12     [REDACTED]

13     [REDACTED]

14     [REDACTED] if that's a fair statement for  
15      my colleagues.

16                 THE COURT: All right. Let's talk about minimization  
17      for a second. More than a second. In the most recent  
18      submission, NSA has indicated that it will require any analyst  
19      who wants to use a discrete communication within an MCT to first  
20      perform checks to determine the locations of the users of  
21      electronic communications or accounts or addresses, identifiers  
22      referenced in that discrete communication "to the extent  
23      reasonably necessary" to determine whether that communication is  
24      wholly domestic.

25                 If the analyst determines that the active user is a task

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1 selector or is located outside the United States, then no  
2 further checks would be done. If the active user is not a  
3 tasked selector or is not determined to be located outside the  
4 United States, what happens?

5 [REDACTED]: If the active user is determined to be not  
6 in the United States?

7 THE COURT: I think the way I'd actually say it is the  
8 active user is not a tasked selector or is not determined to be  
9 located outside the United States, what do you do then? Can the  
10 analyst use the communication, or are there additional checks  
11 that are necessary?

12 [REDACTED]: There were additional checks. In that case  
13 I think there were [REDACTED] of those that were identified in that  
14 filing, and for each of those the analyst went into deeper  
15 technical analysis of all those discrete communications and  
16 determined that those discrete communications were not wholly  
17 domestic.

18 [REDACTED]: But how can you describe the further  
19 checks?

20 [REDACTED]: They went into the content and verified  
21 that all of the [REDACTED]  
22 contained at least one foreign recipient.

23 THE COURT: That was done in the context of the  
24 sampling, you mean?

25 [REDACTED]: That was done in the evaluation of the case

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1 where the active user was located within the United States.

2 THE COURT: Is that what an analyst is going to do  
3 tomorrow when they have this circumstance?

4 [REDACTED]: If they were going to use that data, that's  
5 what they would do. That's correct.

6 THE COURT: And if the analyst is unable to determine  
7 that at least one of the communications is outside of the  
8 United States, what happens then?

9 [REDACTED]: If it was inconclusive, it would be likely  
10 that they would not use that piece of data.

11 THE COURT: Is that what the protocols and policies  
12 require? Can the analyst use the communication, or is the  
13 default, if you will, that he or she has to treat it as a wholly  
14 domestic communication?

15 (Pause)

16 If you need a second to consult, by all means take it.  
17 There's no harm to doing that. You're free to do so.

18 [REDACTED]: Thank you, Your Honor.

19 (Attendees conferring.)

20 [REDACTED]: Unless we could confirm, we would not use  
21 that piece of data.

22 THE COURT: So that would be the default position.

23 Just for a second, you referred to these [REDACTED] checks, and  
24 my question is really whether those are going to be used going  
25 forward, and where do we find in the submissions that you've

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1 indicated that those are going to be used going forward?

2 MR. INGLIS: Your Honor, I think the answer to your  
3 first question is yes, the checks that we have imposed will go  
4 forward, and as to where they are documented at that level of  
5 detail, we'll determine.

6 [REDACTED]: Your Honor, I think you're referring to  
7 things that are detailed on page 8 and 9 of the 30 August  
8 submission which details the very steps that NSA would take.

9 THE COURT: 8 and 9?

10 [REDACTED]: Yes, Your Honor.

11 THE COURT: Okay.

12 [REDACTED]: Your Honor, we may be mixing things.

13 THE COURT: Talking past each other or apples and  
14 oranges?

15 [REDACTED]: If you look at the August 30 submission,  
16 the first clarification that the government makes is one  
17 regarding wholly domestic communications and if an analyst who  
18 is confronted with an MCT wants to make use of some discrete  
19 communication within it, they will first do the checks that  
20 we've just been talking about to determine whether or not that  
21 communication is wholly domestic.

22 And I don't know that we got into it at this level of  
23 detail, but if you look at page 3, we do there talk about what  
24 the analyst will do in order to aid the analyst in attempting to  
25 recognize whether or not they are in fact dealing with a wholly

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1 domestic communication.

2 THE COURT: All right. And we can refer back to  
3 those. Thanks.

4 All right. Now, in the August 30 submission, another point  
5 made -- I think it's on page 9 -- is the government indicates  
6 that if NSA acquires, through this upstream collection, a  
7 discrete communication that is not to, from, or about a tasked  
8 selector but is to or from an identifiable U.S. person, that  
9 communication cannot be used for any purpose other than to  
10 protect against an immediate threat to human life.

11 Who's going to make that determination? An analyst? Or is  
12 there a process for how that determination is made and who makes  
13 that determination?

14 [REDACTED]: Your Honor, is the determination you're  
15 talking about whether or not the specific item could be used or  
16 whether or not the U.S. person could be identified?

17 THE COURT: Whether it can be used.

18 MR. INGLIS: It could only be used to protect the life  
19 of a person. We have a defined process at National Security  
20 Agency in which we involve our general counsel in in order to  
21 make that determination.

22 [REDACTED]: And, Your Honor, if I may, that language  
23 is similar to language that appears in NSA's minimization  
24 procedures at the very beginning, basically a threat-to-life  
25 carve-out. But like that threat-to-life carve-out and the

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1 minimization procedures, there's complete transparency on the  
2 part of the government because if NSA needs to take that action,  
3 they need to report that to DOJ and ODNI, and we in turn have to  
4 report that to the Court.

5 THE COURT: I understand that. I'm still interested  
6 in how that determination is made. The fact that it's reported  
7 to the Court later on that a determination was made and it was  
8 used is important, but it's also important to know that there's  
9 an appropriate process for making that determination within NSA.

10 Now, if there's no immediate threat to human life in that  
11 same circumstance, does NSA retain the communication?

12 [REDACTED] : We would, Your Honor.

13 THE COURT: And is it marked in some way to indicate  
14 that it cannot be used without that determination being made, or  
15 is it just there?

16 MR. INGLIS: Your Honor, I do not believe we marked  
17 that communication at that moment in time.

18 THE COURT: Do you think there's a need to, or do you  
19 think an analyst in the future, when confronted with this  
20 communication and making a decision on whether to use it, will  
21 be sufficiently apprised of the fact that it's a wholly domestic  
22 communication and that he or she needs to follow this process in  
23 terms of a threat to human life?

24 [REDACTED] : It wouldn't be a wholly domestic  
25 communication.

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1           THE COURT: I'm sorry. It's not a wholly domestic  
2 communication. You're right.

3           [REDACTED]: I think that it's pretty clear that it  
4 would be better if it were marked than not marked if the  
5 government knows about it. The feasibility of doing that I  
6 don't think we've assessed, so I don't think we can commit  
7 sitting at the table to do that. But we will seriously consider  
8 whether it's possible to do that, or when we review it, if it's  
9 tentatively possible.

10          MR. INGLIS: And so in the absence of that marking the  
11 confidence that is placed upon common-training standard that the  
12 analyst had, the fact that if it were determined to be wholly  
13 domestic a further check that it would be purged in all of its  
14 derivatives as well.

15          THE COURT: Let's move from the specific to the more  
16 general. Is it possible for NSA to segregate the upstream  
17 collection from the rest of its 702 collection?

18          [REDACTED]: It's possible.

19          [REDACTED]: The upstream collection in comparison to  
20 our PRISM collection, as we've referred to it, they are  
21 commingled in the database, but they are marked in such a way  
22 such that they can be identified from distinguishing sources.

23          THE COURT: So in a sense, it is separated by being  
24 marked. It's all commingled in the same database. Is that  
25 commingling in the same database just as good as a complete

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1 separation in terms of the use of tools to pull out the  
2 communications that can easily be identified as to, from, or  
3 about a task selector? In other words -- well, I think the  
4 question is a little confusing.

5 MR. INGLIS: Is your question, Your Honor, whether it  
6 can be better or worse depending upon how you choose to organize  
7 the data?

8 THE COURT: If you separate it rather than commingled  
9 and marked, would it be easier to deal with the concerns that  
10 exist with respect to a portion of the upstream collection  
11 technologically?

12 [REDACTED]: I don't think that the commingling is a  
13 factor in determining and marking the data for the analyst to  
14 know that this is from upstream versus not upstream or that  
15 there is an MCT involved or not. I don't think that the  
16 commingling is a factor of that.

17 MR. INGLIS: So, Your Honor, not to extend the  
18 conversation into an inappropriate corner of little interest to  
19 the Court, but NSA's strategy writ large for its technical  
20 architecture is in the face of increased commingling to  
21 concentrate on the marketing of such data element such that we  
22 can then determine its provenance.

23 Increasingly, what we'll have is many variables with  
24 respect to the origins, the policies that pertain to data and  
25 many variables with respect to the authorities and privileges of

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1 individuals, and as that M meets N, the prospect of coming up  
2 with M times N, different instantiations of data sets that are  
3 physically separate, that's infeasible for us. So our strategy  
4 is to go towards the marking and to allow commingling to happen,  
5 not sloppily, but there's no real other tenable design.

6 THE COURT: I have a couple more questions on  
7 minimize, but go ahead.

8 [REDACTED]: If I could just follow up on that.  
9 I guess what we're trying to get at here is whether it was  
10 technologically feasible to separate this data out given that  
11 there are concerns about what's in it -- wholly domestic  
12 communications, lots of U.S.-person information, nontarget U.S.  
13 person information -- whether you physically separate it or  
14 separate it via marking rules, access rules.

15 Is it possible to segregate that, such that you could then  
16 limit access to it? I guess one of our concerns is, as I  
17 understand it, it comes in to your database and pretty much  
18 immediately is made available to analysts running queries. So  
19 if something is responsive to a query, it will come up and they  
20 will see it.

21 We were curious as to whether it would be technologically  
22 possible to sort of either segregate it and sort of immediately  
23 or soon thereafter pull out the stuff that you know is okay and  
24 make that available, or, alternatively, or perhaps in addition,  
25 limit the access of the stuff that's problematic to people who

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1       are specially trained or subject to certain additional access.

2                   MR. INGLIS: If I may, I think I hear two questions,  
3       but correct me if I got that wrong. The first is can there be,  
4       upon the collection and the immediate presentation of that  
5       collection to either machine or a person, some distinguishing  
6       characteristic, either some physical segregation or some mark  
7       that goes along with that, atomically bound to that, such that  
8       there's no doubt where this came from. It's either upstream, or  
9       it's all other. I think the answer to that question is yes.

10                  THE COURT: If you can mark it, presumably you can  
11       segregate it.

12                  MR. INGLIS: Yes. But I think the further implied  
13       question is, is there then some meaningful processing that might  
14       occur so that you can then winnow and filter that material  
15       before presentation, before some manual application procedures,  
16       and we don't yet know of those. We have thought hard about  
17       that, and we don't yet know what further processing might occur  
18       absent introducing the human into the loop and having that human  
19       follow a rule set that would help determine what the further  
20       provenance or not of that data might be.

21                  [REDACTED] But you have the capability to put the  
22       human in the loop. You have this specially trained cadre of  
23       analysts who are working with your manual database.  
24       Theoretically, you could have a specially trained cadre --

25                  MR. INGLIS: So given the answer to the first

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1 question, is it possible to alert the human beings that come  
2 into contact with that data that there are certain rules that  
3 pertain that you must handle this data, ask questions of this  
4 data in a certain way.

5 MS. MONACO: As the Court sees from the August 30  
6 submission, that's exactly what the proposal is to do going  
7 forward, to apply a banner to this collection so that would  
8 effectuate the alert Deputy Director Inglis talked about, and  
9 also that coupled with the training and guidance for the analyst  
10 working in concert would apply the protections to that  
11 potentially problematic material.

12 THE COURT: Let's go on to another minimization area.  
13 Under section 3(b) (1) of the NSA minimization procedures, "NSA  
14 personnel will destroy inadvertently acquired communications of  
15 or concerning a United States person at the earliest practical  
16 point in the processing cycle at which the communication can be  
17 identified either as clearly not relevant to the authorized  
18 purpose of the acquisition or as not containing evidence of a  
19 crime," and that's all in quotation marks.

20 But in the June 1 submission, I think at page 22, it's  
21 indicated that NSA cannot destroy a discrete communication  
22 within an MCT without destabilizing and potentially rendering  
23 unusable some or all of the collected transaction including the  
24 single discrete communication which is to, from, or about the  
25 task selector.

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1           So, assuming the communication of or concerning a U.S.  
2        person is not a wholly domestic communication, would NSA retain  
3        the entire MCT for five years regardless of that destruction  
4        requirement in section 3(b) (1)?

5           [REDACTED] : That's correct, yes.

6           THE COURT: And would the communication of or  
7        concerning a U.S. person be available to NSA analysts during the  
8        entire five-year period?

9           [REDACTED] : So again, Your Honor, I think this goes  
10      back to an earlier question you asked, which is would we mark it  
11      once we discover that's true. I think that's a valuable thing  
12      to do and to look into. For reasons already described by  
13      [REDACTED] we couldn't eliminate that piece of the  
14      communication without eliminating the whole communication.

15           So the line we're proposing here is, if we find a domestic  
16      communication within the series of communications, we'll destroy  
17      the whole transaction. If we find untargeted person  
18      information, we won't destroy, but we won't use that either.

19           THE COURT: Now, these communications will start  
20      unminimized and eventually be minimized. Does NSA share  
21      unminimized MCTs acquired through the upstream collection with  
22      any other agencies? CIA? FBI?

23           [REDACTED] : No. At this time the only collection  
24      that's shared with the CIA or FBI is from the PRISM side,

25      [REDACTED]

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1                   THE COURT: So the upstream collection is not shared  
2 at all.

3                   [REDACTED] : Correct.

4                   THE COURT: Except on an individual basis once an  
5 analyst has focused in on a particular --

6                   [REDACTED] : Not shared wholesale. That's correct.

7                   THE COURT: How about with foreign governments for  
8 translation purposes or analytical purposes under section 7(b)  
9 of your minimization procedures?

10                  [REDACTED] :

11                  [REDACTED]

12                  THE COURT: So just to close out the minimization,  
13 unless any of the legal advisors have questions, the manual  
14 review process is not going to be continued prospectively.  
15 Correct? In other words, NSA proposes to rely on analysts who  
16 recognize wholly domestic communications within transactions  
17 when they're confronted with them.

18                  MR. INGLIS: Sir, by the manual of due process, you  
19 mean the process by which we examined the slice of 50,000?

20                  THE COURT: Yes.

21                  MR. INGLIS: We don't intend to carry that forward.  
22 We intend to carry the training standard forward for the  
23 analysts who encounter the data.

24                  THE COURT: So wholly domestic communications that are  
25 never viewed by analysts will remain in the repositories for

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1       five years.

2                    : That's correct.

3                  THE COURT: And with transactions that are reviewed,  
4        should the Court be confident that NSA analysts would be able to  
5        recognize wholly domestic communications when confronted with  
6        them in their daily work? There's been -- even in this sampling  
7        process, there's been some difficulty in recognizing wholly  
8        domestic communications.

9                  Should we be confident that analysts will be able to do  
10      that? Presumably, they're going to have less in the nature of  
11      tools, time, and resources than were employed during this  
12      analytical exercise.

13                 : Your Honor, I think the Court should be  
14      confident, and really for a couple of reasons. First off, the  
15      10 domestic communications that were confirmed during the review  
16      of the sample were all communications that when you actually  
17      looked at them they were not responsive to any foreign  
18      intelligence requirement whatsoever, so it was unlikely that in  
19      the normal course of business our analyst would have pulled them  
20      up in the first instance. Therefore, by operation of NSA's  
21      minimization procedures just sort of by standard, they would  
22      have aged off in five years.

23                 But secondly, the amount of training, the notices to the  
24      workforce, the related efforts to be sure that the workforce is  
25      aware of the problem I think will sensitize our analysts to be

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1       on the lookout for the possibility that an MCT that was  
2       responsive to a query they made of a database might be a wholly  
3       domestic communication and therefore they should go through the  
4       steps that we've outlined in the filings to make sure that  
5       they've properly accounted for it and made sure that it is not  
6       in fact a wholly domestic communication.

7                   MR. INGLIS: Your Honor, if I might add, they're not  
8       advised to go through those checks; they're compelled to go  
9       through those checks. What we found as a practical matter in  
10      this particular activity where we manually examined the 50,000-  
11      plus transactions is part of the difficulty in having analysts  
12      identify wholly domestic communications is that they were not in  
13      practice in terms of finding any meaning or use in them.

14                  So we actually had to have them pursue matters that more  
15      often than not they would say that is of no interest to me; I  
16      wouldn't pursue that naturally. And so then becoming  
17      comfortable with the artifacts that are associated with wholly  
18      domestic communications that are otherwise uninteresting and  
19      otherwise not things that they would daily work with was in fact  
20      in my view an opportunity to understand why they then would  
21      necessarily go after those things that are directly responsive  
22      to their queries, as opposed to those things that were  
23      incidentally collected.

24                  THE COURT: Now, I have one more of area of  
25      questioning that's really under the umbrella of the Fourth

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1 Amendment and probably 15 minutes maybe at most, but there may  
2 be other things that we'll need to discuss and other things that  
3 you may want to say.

4 In asking this question I'm concerned about all of you, but  
5 I'm most concerned about [REDACTED] the court reporter, and that  
6 is whether we should take a short break now and resume in five  
7 to 10 minutes, probably for another -- it depends how much you  
8 would say after I finish with the questions.

9 The questions themselves probably won't take more than 15,  
10 at most 20 minutes, but I don't know what further we might need  
11 to discuss from your perspective. Anyone think it would be  
12 advantageous to take a short break?

13 MS. MONACO: Well, Your Honor, I don't want to impose  
14 on [REDACTED] --

15 THE COURT: I'll ask him independently. He may answer  
16 that question yes, and that'll be the end of it?

17 [REDACTED] do we need to take a short break?

18 COURT REPORTER: Five minutes would be fine.

19 (Recess from 1:07 p.m. to 1:21 p.m.)

20 THE COURT: Let's continue. I want to move to the  
21 Fourth Amendment, but by moving to the Fourth Amendment, I'm not  
22 really totally moving away from a statutory assessment of  
23 targeting. Both of them have a reasonable component in the  
24 statutory targeting assessment that may be a reasonably designed  
25 component, but in the Fourth Amendment, there's also much more

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1 of a reasonable aspect.

2 We've assumed, in prior 702 dockets, that at least in some  
3 circumstances, account holders have a reasonable expectation of  
4 privacy in electronic communications and therefore that the  
5 acquisition of electronic communications can result in a search  
6 or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

7 Consistent with the position that it's taken in other matters  
8 before the FISC, the government does not assert otherwise in the  
9 multiple filings in this matter.

10 Can the Court infer, therefore, that the government does  
11 not disagree with the proposition that the acquisition of  
12 electronic communications can result in a search or seizure  
13 within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?

14 [REDACTED] I think so.

15 THE COURT: All right. I'll take "I think so" as a  
16 yes.

17 (Laughter)

18 [REDACTED] I'll clarify my remarks for the record.

19 Yes.

20 THE COURT: Let's talk about incidentals. The  
21 government's position is that the collection of wholly domestic  
22 communications as part of the Internet transactions that NSA  
23 acquires through this upstream collection is incidental for  
24 purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

25 Now, as the government acknowledges, the mere fact that an

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1       intrusion is incidental does not necessarily render it  
2       reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment, and  
3       I think you've acknowledged that in one of the June submissions,  
4       the June 28 submission probably.

5           And then in the August 16 submission, it's indicated that,  
6       as we've talked about, that NSA acquires at least 2,000 to  
7       10,000 transactions annually that contain one or more wholly  
8       domestic communications that are not to, from, or about a task  
9       selector, at least that's what this statistical analysis shows.

10          Now, do those numbers alone establish a fairly substantial  
11       intrusion on the protected Fourth Amendment interest,  
12       particularly when you consider that the actual number of wholly  
13       domestic communications may be higher depending upon how  
14       convincing you are in a further assessment of the unknown  
15       category of communications, also considering that each  
16       transaction may actually contain multiple communications, and  
17       also taking into account that many of the persons whose  
18       communications are being acquired have little or no connection  
19       to the user of the task selector?

20          Some persons outside the United States are protected under  
21       the Fourth Amendment, and also we don't know what this category  
22       of *about* communications in the four to 5,000 of the 50,000 that  
23       were set aside as being discrete communications will turn up.

24          Just in terms of the numbers, it looks like there's a  
25       fairly substantial intrusion on protected Fourth Amendment

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1 interest, doesn't it?

2 [REDACTED] I think that's right, Your Honor. I think  
3 there is clearly an intrusion upon Fourth Amendment protected  
4 interest, but in conducting the Fourth Amendment balance, we  
5 also have to consider the protections that are put into place to  
6 protect those Fourth Amendment interests.

7 And as we've asserted, we're committed to destroying any  
8 wholly domestic communications that, for whatever reason, have  
9 run through NSA filters and happen to land in an NSA repository  
10 and are recognized by NSA analysts as such.

11 So, yes, even though the Fourth Amendment intrusion may be  
12 greater, we are taking basically the ultimate step that we can  
13 in minimizing the effects of that intrusion by destroying any  
14 MCTs that have wholly domestic communications within them.

15 THE COURT: And part of the assessment, of course, is  
16 a balancing assessment under the Fourth Amendment that looks, as  
17 we're considering the certifications and the procedures and  
18 whether they satisfy the Fourth Amendment, the government would  
19 stress the importance of the upstream collection to national  
20 security.

21 I want to just assess that a little bit and get a little  
22 bit more of a sense of that. Just numerically, the collection  
23 of Internet transactions really is a pretty small part of the  
24 collection as a whole. We're not talking about telephonic  
25 communications, and according to the numbers, the upstream

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1 collection in the aggregate only constitutes about 9 percent of  
2 all Internet communications acquired pursuant to 702. We have  
3 the PRISM collections, etc.

4 And then based on the sample and the analysis applied, only  
5 10 percent of that 9 percent, which results in .9 percent, or  
6 .009 of the overall collection of Internet communications is  
7 Internet transactions containing multiple communications.

8 That would suggest that the collection of Internet  
9 transactions through the upstream collection, and particularly  
10 the MCTs that we're concerned about, isn't a particularly  
11 critical national security tool. It's a really small part of  
12 what NSA collects. Why should I conclude that it's so vital,  
13 looking at that side of the balance?

14 MR. INGLIS: Your Honor, I would offer and then pass  
15 to [REDACTED], perhaps [REDACTED] from the operational side of the house, two  
16 points. One is that it uniquely covers a scene [REDACTED]

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24 THE COURT: [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]

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1 MR. INGLIS: [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED].  
5 The second is that this collection [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED]  
12 [REDACTED].  
13 [REDACTED].  
14 So a significant percentage of our counterterrorism  
15 reporting is ultimately attributable to what we do in 702, and  
16 albeit the percentages would show that the upstream is a  
17 relatively small percentage of that, but it covers a unique  
18 scene [REDACTED] we can't get other ways.  
19 [REDACTED]: With respect to technology parsing out  
20 those MCTs, we don't have the technology to eliminate the MCTs  
21 without also eliminating the bulk of the discrete  
22 communications. We'd lose all of that except for [REDACTED]  
23 [REDACTED] that we fully understand.  
24 THE COURT: This is a unique Fourth Amendment context,  
25 as many legal settings will be unique, and therefore, the Court,

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I am having some difficulty in assessing just how the balancing under the Fourth Amendment is applied. But if the primary value of the upstream collection is the acquisition of a fairly small number of communications that have high value to national security, how does the Court balance the possibility of such acquisitions against the known acquisition of at least thousands of nontarget communications each year?

Another way of putting it would be, does the possibility that NSA is going to acquire a single piece of valuable intelligence outweigh the privacy interest of these thousands of U.S. persons and persons in the United States whose communications are being incidentally, if you will, acquired?

How do I make that assessment and reach that balance? Is the intelligence value always going to rule the day? Is one valuable piece of intelligence enough to justify the thousands of Fourth Amendment intrusions that are involved here?

[REDACTED] Your Honor, I think what was demonstrated in our sample, and I want to perhaps correct a statement there that we get relatively few communications through upstream collection that are of intelligence value. I think what our sample showed was that we get millions of Internet communications that are of potential intelligence value and a very small number of those which have the potential to be wholly domestic.

MS. MONACO: I think I would follow up on that, Your

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1 Honor, by saying that the Court has posed, I think -- put it in  
2 somewhat more of a starker context than I think the government  
3 has in its filings. In other words, the Court has already  
4 acknowledged that the FI, or the foreign intelligence  
5 information sought through the to, from, or about task selectors  
6 is of paramount importance to the government and is of the  
7 highest order of magnitude. I think that is the one side of the  
8 balance that the Court is faced with, and we would not suggest  
9 that it should be put in such stark terms.

10 In other words, on the other side of the balance, what  
11 we've tried to do in the study that NSA has done is indicate the  
12 relatively small portion, understanding the questions that the  
13 Court has raised at the beginning of the hearing about those  
14 numbers, but we've tried to put in place a series of measures  
15 that would enhance the ability of the Court to make its  
16 reasonableness finding in terms of the analysis that gets done  
17 as the information is seen by the analyst.

18 So I would suggest to the Court that, no, setting one  
19 potential piece of foreign intelligence information against the  
20 privacy interest of potentially thousands of domestic  
21 communications is, I respectfully suggest, not the appropriate  
22 analysis but rather the paramount interest of the foreign  
23 intelligence contained in those MCTs and our inability to get at  
24 that paramount important information other than by collecting  
25 the whole MCT.

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1           Balance that against the procedures and the number of steps  
2           that the government is proposing to be put in place to ensure  
3           that there is the maximum amount of privacy protection that can  
4           be applied to those potentially problematic pieces of  
5           communications.

6           THE COURT: Would we all agree that ultimately the  
7           assessment or application of this balancing under the Fourth  
8           Amendment might be different depending upon whether they're in  
9           this fairly substantial upstream collection that is still a  
10          limited percentage of the total collection but the outcome of  
11          the Fourth Amendment balancing might be different depending upon  
12          whether the collection of wholly domestic communications was  
13          1,000 a year, 10,000 a year, 100,000 a year, 10 million a year?

14          It would depend upon what those numbers show, if you will,  
15          that at some point the collection, even though unintended or  
16          incidental, at some point the acquisition of a large volume of  
17          Fourth Amendment protected communications would simply be too  
18          much under the Fourth Amendment? Would we all agree that there  
19          is some tipping point?

20          MR. INGLIS: Your Honor, I would agree from an NSA  
21          perspective that there is. In the extreme, there must be a  
22          line. It's probably not objectively determinable, but there  
23          would be a line. If the preponderance of material that we  
24          picked up was in fact wholly domestic or declared incidental but  
25          in fact it was the preponderance of what we picked up, clearly

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1       we'd be in the wrong place.

2                  THE COURT: I think that's a good way to put it,  
3                  Mr. Inglis, that if you have a preponderance that's in the wrong  
4                  category, then maybe that would be too much.

5                  MR. INGLIS: So if I might, given the opportunity to  
6                  answer the question in a subjective manner, complement  
7                  Ms. Monaco's answer, I would offer three things as to whether  
8                  this achieves a reasonable balance between those competing  
9                  concerns.

10                 The first is that it does offer unique material that we  
11                 believe could provide valuable foreign intelligence. If it were  
12                 not unique, if we could in fact make up for this some other way  
13                 and given the problematic nature of this, I think that we would  
14                 quickly go to that corner, but we haven't found another way to  
15                 go after what we see as unique material.

16                 The second is that we've taken what we believe are all  
17                 reasonable measures in the technology and a set of then equally,  
18                 if not more so, reasonable procedures of how we then use the  
19                 fruits of what that technology provides to address the real and  
20                 material concerns about Fourth Amendment, statutory, or the  
21                 Court's authority, have we made reasonable use of that such that  
22                 we are focusing the majority, the preponderance of our efforts  
23                 after the greater purpose and at the same time an equal amount  
24                 of time and effort to make sure that we don't then incidentally  
25                 or intentionally collect the wholly domestic.

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1       The last thing I would say is that in equating whether one  
2 report is the equal of or is offsetting against incurring  
3 intruding upon the privacy of thousands of individuals, that's a  
4 hard call, but the one report could in fact protect millions of  
5 individuals, depending upon the density of the population it is  
6 under, is it at risk, and what that report might pertain to. So  
7 that's the great unknowable here is how valuable is that single  
8 piece of intelligence.

9           THE COURT: One could use that accurate observation to  
10 support the conclusion that one piece of intelligence does  
11 outweigh whatever the Fourth Amendment intrusion is, and I think  
12 if most reasonable people actually weighed that one piece of  
13 known intelligence that would save millions of lives against any  
14 number of Fourth Amendment intrusions, they'd say, yes, get that  
15 piece of intelligence.

16           MR. INGLIS: I would argue that, sir, but I would not  
17 be completely impartial in making that argument.

18           THE COURT: All right. Just one or two small  
19 questions, and that will be the end of this inquisition. Is NSA  
20 able to acquire [REDACTED] that are to, from, or  
21 about a task selector from a service provider?

22           [REDACTED]: Yes, we are.

23           THE COURT: So, what would NSA acquire in the upstream  
24 collection in those categories that could not be acquired from  
25 the provider, anything?

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1 [REDACTED] : What could we obtain from, for instance,  
2 [REDACTED] from the upstream world that we couldn't obtain from the  
3 provider?

4 THE COURT: Right. Do you get anything more through  
5 the upstream collection [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED] : Yes. [REDACTED]

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21 [REDACTED] : Your Honor, if I may, just to take this up  
22 another level of generality. In general, NSA cannot do *abouts*  
23 collection at the ISP, so that [REDACTED] that  
24 would be entirely off the table, [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED] I also need to add that we do not obtain

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1        abouts collection from [REDACTED]

2        [REDACTED].

3                 THE COURT: Okay. So back to the evolution and the  
4        dynamic nature of the Internet, and I'm curious as to how this  
5        phenomenon affects the Fourth Amendment balancing given that the  
6        upstream collection is going to be constantly changing because  
7        of the nature of the Internet.

8                 If the government can't predict just what the impact of any  
9        changes in the Internet will be on the collection, is it valid  
10      for the Court to presume in a Fourth Amendment analysis that the  
11      scope and intrusiveness of the upstream collection will expand  
12      or contract or stay the same?

13                What should the Court presume in applying a Fourth  
14      Amendment analysis? Just take it as it is frozen now, or is it  
15      valid to make some presumption or assumption with respect to the  
16      future given what the experts see with respect to the Internet  
17      and its evolution?

18                MR. INGLIS: I'll leave it to my Department of Justice  
19      colleagues to speak on the Fourth Amendment implications, but I  
20      would say that the Court can and should assume that it will  
21      change. I don't know whether to the greater or the lesser  
22      benefit of the interest between the government and the Court,  
23      but it will change. And I think the expectation of the Court  
24      upon the government is that the government will discern that  
25      change and faithfully either stay within the authorities granted

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1 by the Court or come back to the Court and argue that those  
2 authorities must be modified in some way, shape, or form based  
3 upon those changes.

4 THE COURT: So, in this setting, with the  
5 certifications and the Fourth Amendment, if the Court is  
6 comfortable, based on the record before it notwithstanding the  
7 fact that there will be changes, there will be evolutions, the  
8 Court should simply rely on the renewal process and the  
9 obligation of the government to come forward with any additional  
10 information, changes in the technology or what have you, in  
11 order to assess a future certification.

12 MS. MONACO: Your Honor, I would add to that that  
13 certainly the Court should rely on that, but I would add to that  
14 the Court should also hold the government, quite obviously, to  
15 the procedures that we've discussed would apply in this case  
16 precisely because we understand the evolving nature of the  
17 Internet, precisely because we understand the real, and I would  
18 say nontrivial, intrusion that we've all acknowledged and  
19 discussed here, given the nature and collection of MCTs.

20 And it's precisely because of that that I think the  
21 government would propose to put in place these series of steps  
22 in what I guess we've termed a multilayered approach to try to  
23 do the utmost in terms of being able to enhance the privacy  
24 protections that exist in the existing minimization procedures  
25 that can be applied to that potentially problematic collection.

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1                   THE COURT: All right. Any other questions legal  
2                   advisors have?

3                   ████████ Yes. Can I just ask one quick question?  
4                   Do you have a rough estimate as to the percent of Internet  
5                   transactions that are actually handled by ██████████

6                   ████████ just a rough? No? Lots? Few? Anything?

7                   THE COURT: Certainly you've said that because of the  
8                   place of the United States in the Internet, there's a very heavy  
9                   use of --

10                  MR. INGLIS: So two things remain true, which is the  
11                  majority of the world's reliable communications continue to flow  
12                  through the United States, largely because of the investments  
13                  made over the last 40, 50 years in the creation of the Internet  
14                  and also because of the inherent stability, resilience of the  
15                  infrastructures that then underpin that.

16                  There's also a degree of innovation that continues to  
17                  center on the United States, and despite its best efforts,  
18                  China, Russia, others, have not yet created the engine of  
19                  innovations that have taken those products and materials  
20                  offshore, but that has begun to occur.

21                  So you do see a flattening of the innovation, you see a  
22                  slight flattening in terms of the infrastructure. So today, and  
23                  I think for the foreseeable future, the preponderance of  
24                  communications are still centered in through the United States.  
25                  But I can see a world 50 years from now where that might be

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1 completely flat. I can't predict that far out. I just know  
2 over the next year or two we can depend upon the trends that  
3 extend from 10 years past.

4 [REDACTED] And another thing we can say which may  
5 be obvious, with respect to our targets, particularly [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]

8 MR. INGLIS: And I've been pleasantly surprised from  
9 an intelligence perspective [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]  
11 [REDACTED]. I would never  
12 have predicted that 10 years ago, and yet it's been  
13 extraordinarily lucrative for us.

14 THE COURT: All right. Any other questions?

15 So, let me make one or two observations, and we'll talk  
16 about what further you can provide. And I do note that I've  
17 kept you here for a long time, and I do know that some among you  
18 may have other places to get to.

19 It seems to me that to the extent that either the statutory  
20 or the Fourth Amendment analysis turns on the record and  
21 statistics, if you will, and numbers of potential or actual  
22 wholly domestic communications that are acquired, things of that  
23 sort, we have a situation where we have this -- I'll call it  
24 fairly low number, at least in terms of percentages, of between  
25 1 and 5,000 every six months having identified through your

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1       statistical analysis as containing wholly domestic  
2       communications that are to, from, or about a task selector.

3           We then have a larger category that I refer to as "unknown"  
4       that is identified as between 48,609 and 70,168 every six months  
5       that you've indicated you've made some assessment of that takes  
6       you out of the category of totally unknown and into a category  
7       of highly unlikely, at least, or whatever term you want to  
8       apply, or can under the facts apply, highly unlikely to contain  
9       wholly domestic communications.

10          I'm not yet convinced that the record before me supports  
11       the conclusions that have been articulated. So I will look for  
12       further information on that to bolster that assessment.

13          We also have this other category, in your random sampling  
14       again, that is 9/10ths of the random sampling that was set aside  
15       as being discrete communications -- 45,000 out of the 50,000 --  
16       as to which our questioning has indicated we have a concern that  
17       some of the *about* communications may actually have wholly  
18       domestic communications.

19          And I don't think that you've really assessed that, either  
20       theoretically or by any actual examination of those particular  
21       transactions or communications. And I'm not indicating to you  
22       what I expect you to do, but I do have this concern that there  
23       are a fair number of wholly domestic communications in that  
24       category, and there's nothing -- you really haven't had an  
25       opportunity to address that, but there's nothing that has been

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1       said to date that would dissuade me from that conclusion. So  
2       I'm looking there for some convincing, if you will, assessment  
3       of why there are not wholly domestic communications within that  
4       body which is 9/10ths of the random sample.

5       Those things, and anything else that we identified, really  
6       was right at the outset of our discussion today, it would be  
7       very helpful to receive any further information on those. We  
8       don't have much time, though.

9       So I think in fairness to the Court, which is very  
10      constrained in the time available now to resolve and write up  
11      any resolution, particularly if I conclude that I cannot totally  
12      approve the certifications, you need to get that to me as  
13      quickly as you can. I have to say even this week. It would be  
14      very difficult if we didn't have it this week to formulate and  
15      frame the resolution of these matters and get it committed to  
16      writing.

17       Anything else you want to say I would be happy to receive,  
18       and I don't want to give the impression that this is the last  
19       point of communication even in addition to the written response  
20       that you may have in the next couple of days. If there's more  
21       to be discussed, then the Court is, in the words of Ross Perot,  
22       all ears.

23       MR. INGLIS: Your Honor, if I might ask a question  
24       regarding your summary, you had said at the outset of the  
25       conversation expressed a possible concern that the purged data

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1        might constitute an unexplored piece of the territory, to the  
2        extent that it would be useful for us to describe the attributes  
3        of those things purged and for what reasons, we'd be happy to  
4        provide that as well.

5                 THE COURT: Anything you can provide on that, which  
6        really goes not to the -- well, it goes to sort of a generalized  
7        assessment of the validity of the representative sample.

8                 MS. MONACO: Your Honor, if I might suggest, we  
9        understand the constraints on the Court's time on this, and we  
10       very much appreciate all the opportunities the Court has  
11       afforded the government to provide it additional information.

12                I think what we will do is go back and confer and ensure  
13       that we can provide you whatever it is along these lines that we  
14       can by the end of the week and be in touch if the Court permits  
15       with the legal advisors on the precise timing on that.

16                THE COURT: They are always open to such  
17       communications.

18                MS. MONACO: And then what I would also say is I know  
19       we've had some of this contact I think at the staff level, but  
20       looking ahead I think we'll also be in touch on potential  
21       coordination of any transition should the Court be poised to  
22       issue an order.

23                THE COURT: We understand the significance of the  
24       collections and the significance of technological and other  
25       issues with respect to any modification in what is currently

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1 being done, and we'll try to be as open as reasonably possible.

2 MS. MONACO: We appreciate that.

3 [REDACTED] Your Honor, earlier in the hearing as well  
4 you had asked where a particular part related to the unknowns --

5 THE COURT: I'm sorry, what?

6 [REDACTED] I'm sorry. You had asked where some of  
7 the representations we had made here today with respect to the  
8 unknowns was in relation to the record indicated that some of  
9 those points were captured in the 30 August submission. I would  
10 point the Court to the final paragraph on page 6 of the 30  
11 August submission there for a few of those representations just  
12 for reference.

13 THE COURT: And certainly, I hope you don't think that  
14 we didn't look at and take fully into account the August 30  
15 submission, but I think you can also conclude that it wasn't  
16 fully convincing, so anything more you can do to convince would  
17 be appreciated.

18 All right. Thank you again for coming and putting up with  
19 these long proceedings. I'll let you get on your way. I'll  
20 look forward to receiving further information and to talking  
21 with you along the way in resolving this very important, unique,  
22 and in some ways difficult matter. I thank NSA and the  
23 Department of Justice for all their efforts in this regard.

24 Thank you all. (Proceedings adjourned at 1:52 p.m.)

25

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All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) unless otherwise noted.

Approved for public release.



U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

U.S. FOREIGN  
INTELLIGENCE  
SURVEILLANCE COURT

2011 SEP -9 PM 5:06

Washington, D.C. 20530

LEEANN FLYNN HALL  
CLERK OF COURT

September 9, 2011

The Honorable John D. Bates  
Presiding Judge  
United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court  
333 Constitution Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20001



Dear Judge Bates:

The Government is pleased to provide certain additional information related to questions raised by the Court and discussed during the September 7, 2011, hearing on the above captioned matters which are currently pending with the Court. ~~(S)~~

I. Total Items Collected Versus Total Items Purged Between January 1 and June 30, 2011 ~~(S)~~

In its August 16, 2011 Submission, the Government advised the Court that it had identified 140,974,921 Internet communications as having been acquired under section 702 -- i.e., both from NSA upstream collection and PRISM collection<sup>1</sup> -- between January 1 through June 30, [REDACTED] and present within the relevant NSA SIGINT Collection Source System of Record [REDACTED] as of July 14, 2011. Of these, 127,718,854 (or approximately 91%) were acquired from PRISM collection, and 13,256,067 (or approximately 9%) were acquired through NSA's upstream collection. The Court was also advised that the 140,974,921 did not include Internet communications that were acquired between January 1 and June 30, 2011, but purged prior to July 14, 2011, the date the sample was drawn. In drawing the sample in this fashion, it

<sup>1</sup> "PRISM collection" refers to the acquisition of communications from Internet service providers [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~

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Classified by:

Tashina Gauhar, Deputy Assistant  
Attorney General, NSD, DOJ

Reason:

1.4(c)

Declassify on:

9 September 2036

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was NSA's intent to capture for further manual review a truly representative sample of Internet communications acquired through NSA's upstream collection. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that the Government drew an appropriately representative sample of Internet communications with which to conduct its manual review, the Court requested to know the total number of Internet communications acquired by NSA during this six month period and the total number of Internet communications purged during this six month period. NSA reports that from January 1, 2011, to June 30, 2011, approximately 18,446 upstream transactions were acquired and thereafter purged from [REDACTED] during that same time period.<sup>2</sup> The 18,446 transactions were purged for various reasons, such as a target traveling to the United States and other matters more specifically reported pursuant to Rule 13(b) of the Rules of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, including the Quarterly Reports Concerning Compliance Matters under Section 702 of FISA. For example, many related to two over-collection incidents previously reported to the Court on February 9, 2011 and June 24, 2011. Aside from the possibility of a target traveling to the United States, as otherwise reported to the Court, none of the transactions which were purged related to NSA's discovery of a wholly domestic communication acquired through its upstream techniques. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

NSA further reports that this information does not alter the statistically high degree of confidence (i.e., a simultaneous confidence level of 95%) and statistical conclusions previously reported to the Court in the Government's August 16, 2011 Submission.<sup>3</sup> ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

II. NSA Assesses that There is no Basis to Believe Any of The 224 "Unknowable" Multi-Communication Transactions (MCTs) Include Wholly Domestic Communications ~~(S)~~

In its August 16th Submission, the Government advised the Court that NSA conducted a manual review of a statistically representative sample of Internet communications acquired through NSA's section 702 upstream collection. As explained in the August 16th Submission, NSA identified 5,081 transactions within the representative sample as being MCTs. NSA determined that of those 5,081 MCTs, 4,847 contained discrete communications believed to be to or from persons located outside the United States and thus not believed to contain any wholly domestic communications.<sup>4</sup> NSA further determined that 10 of the 5,081 MCTs appeared to contain at least one wholly domestic communication. However, NSA was unable to definitively determine whether the remaining 224 MCTs contained wholly domestic communications, because those MCTs lacked information sufficient to positively identify the active user or

<sup>2</sup> This number is over-inclusive because it includes all transactions purged during the period of January 1 to July 14, 2011, some of which were acquired before January 1, 2011. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

<sup>3</sup> As stated in Appendix B of the Government's August 16th Submission, "a simple random sample... serve[d] as the basis for conclusions...about the true proportions of the 13.25 million-transaction universe." That simple random sample of 50,440 transactions did not include any transactions purged prior to the date of the sample; thus, all of NSA's representations regarding the 13.25 million upstream transaction-universe are unaffected by the fact that the random sample similarly did not include transactions purged from [REDACTED] prior to July 14, 2011. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

<sup>4</sup> This figure 4,847 is the sum of 713 MCTs reviewed by NSA analysts as containing a tasked selector as the active user and 4,134 MCTs reviewed by NSA analysts as containing discrete communications believed to be to or from non-targeted persons located outside the United States. See August 16th Submission at 5 nn.15 & 16. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

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determine the active user's location. Nevertheless, NSA asserted that it had no basis to believe any of these 224 MCTs contained wholly domestic communications. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

Except as noted below, in analyzing each single, discrete communication within these 224 MCTs to determine whether any were wholly domestic, NSA's team of experienced analysts considered all technical data (such as [REDACTED]) present within the MCTs, performed the same sort of technical analysis NSA would perform before tasking an electronic communications account/address/identifier in accordance with its section 702 targeting procedures, and scrutinized the content of each discrete communication for any information which would be indicative of the location of the communicants (such as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]). Despite this exhaustive review, NSA was unable to positively determine whether any of the remaining 224 MCTs contained wholly domestic communications. However, based upon the totality of the information reviewed, NSA analysts had no analytical basis to believe that any of the 224 MCTs contained wholly domestic communications. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

More specifically, in addition to the content analysis described above for all 224 MCTs, NSA analysts performed the same sort of technical analysis NSA would perform before tasking an electronic communications account/address/identifier in accordance with its section 702 targeting procedures for all available accounts/addresses/identifiers included in the MCT [REDACTED] for each discrete communication within the MCT for 183 of the 224 MCTs referenced on pages 7-8 of the August 16th Submission (i.e., [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]<sup>5</sup>. In all instances where location information was available for such accounts/addresses/identifiers, NSA analysts assessed that at least one communicant of each discrete communication within these MCTs was located outside of the United States. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

Despite this intensive review, NSA was unable to conclusively determine whether any of the 224 MCTs contained wholly domestic communications. However, based upon the totality of the analysis described above and in the Government's August 16th and August 30th Submissions, NSA assesses that it is highly likely that each discrete communication included in these MCTs includes foreign communicants, although given the absence of certain technical identifying data NSA cannot state this conclusively. Nevertheless, NSA believes that its manual review of the content of each discrete communication contained within these MCTs, at a

<sup>5</sup> As previously explained to the Court, the same sort of technical analysis was not performed for 23 of the 224 MCTs because, although part of the sample drawn on July 14, 2011, these 23 MCTs had been purged and/or placed on NSA's Master Purge List subsequent to the date of the sample. As noted during the September 7 hearing, the majority of these 23 MCTs (19) had been purged subsequent to July 14 as part of the [REDACTED] overcollection incident previously addressed in the Government's June 1 Submission. See also Government's August 16th Submission at 8. The technical analysis was, however, performed on each selector available within the 18 of the 224 MCTs that could not be further characterized by NSA analysts. See id. However, for these MCTs not all communicant account/address/identifiers were available because each of these MCTs contained corrupted data to varying degrees. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

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minimum, support its assessment that there is no basis to believe any of these 224 MCTs include wholly domestic communications. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

III. Regarding the Possibility of Wholly Domestic "Abouts" Communications Among the Single, Discrete Communications not Further Analyzed During the NSA Manual Review (S)

In its August 16, 2011 Submission, the Government advised the Court that of the 50,440 transactions reviewed, 45,359 (approximately 90%) were determined to be single, discrete communications. Because NSA's focus during the manual review was the assessment of MCTs, the Court was further advised that after determining that a transaction was a single, discrete communication to, from, or about a tasked selector, no further analysis of those transactions was done by NSA. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

As in the case of MCTs, the possibility does exist that in certain limited circumstances single, discrete "abouts" communications acquired via NSA's section 702 upstream collection could be wholly domestic in nature. For this possibility to be realized, a communication's sender and all intended recipients must be located in the United States, the communication must contain a section 702 tasked selector, and it must [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Furthermore, as described in the Government's June 1, 2011 Submission in greater detail, given the way in which [REDACTED] the communication [REDACTED]

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

On the basis of the foregoing and NSA's experience collecting Internet communications, NSA had assessed that it would be extremely unlikely for its upstream collection of single, discrete communications to result in the acquisition of wholly domestic communications, and not at a rate higher than wholly domestic communications may be contained within MCTs acquired through upstream collection. To investigate this further in response to the Court's questions, between the close of the September 7, 2011 hearing and the submission of this correspondence an experienced team of NSA analysts rapidly worked through a 48-hour period to evaluate the 45,359 single, discrete communications described above. As a result, NSA was able to conclude based on technical analysis that 41,272 of these communications were not wholly domestic in nature. The findings of NSA's technical analysis revealed that 4,087 of these single discrete communications lacked information sufficient for NSA to immediately identify the active user through technical means as reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.<sup>6</sup>

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

NSA analysts manually reviewed each of these 4,087 transactions to attempt to determine the nature of the communication as either to, from, or about NSA's tasked selector. Only 25 of the 4,087 transactions reviewed appeared to be a communication not specifically to or from a

<sup>6</sup> More specifically, 10,628 featured a tasked selector as the active user who by operation of the NSA targeting procedures is a person reasonably believed to be located the United States, 2,239 featured an active user that was not a tasked selector but nonetheless an electronic account/address/identifier reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, 3,926 featured [REDACTED]

and 24,479 featured [REDACTED]

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tasked selector.<sup>7</sup> NSA analysts then subjected all available selectors within those 25 “abouts” communications to the same sort of technical analysis they would perform before tasking an electronic account/address/identifier in accordance with its FAA section 702 targeting procedures to attempt to determine the location of the communicants within those 25 communications (i.e. additional technical analysis was performed on all of the single, discrete communications that appeared to analysts be a communication “about” NSA’s target between two or more non-tasked accounts/addresses/identifiers).<sup>8</sup> Notably, none of the reviewed transactions featured an account/address/identifier that resolved to the United States. Further, each of the 25 communications contained location information for at least one account/address/identifier such that NSA’s analysts were able assess that at least one communicant for each of these 25 communications was located outside of the United States. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

Given the United States’ status as the “world’s premier electronic communications hub,” and further based on NSA’s knowledge of Internet routing patterns, the Government has already asserted that “the vast majority of communications between persons located in the United States are not routed through servers outside the United States.” See the Government’s June 1, 2011 Submission at 11. As a practical matter, it is a common business practice for Internet and web service providers alike to attempt to deliver their customers the best user experience possible by reducing latency and increasing capacity. Latency is determined in part by the geographical distance between the user and the server, thus, providers frequently host their services on servers close to their users, and users are frequently directed to the servers closest to them. While such practices are not absolute in any respect and are wholly contingent on potentially dynamic business practices of particular service providers and users,<sup>9</sup> if all parties to a communication are located in the United States and the required services are available in the United States, in most instances those communications will be routed by service providers through infrastructure wholly within the United States. [REDACTED]

<sup>7</sup> More specifically, 20 of these transactions featured a [REDACTED] to or from a tasked selector, and 5 of these transactions included a [REDACTED] (i.e., potentially alternate accounts/addresses/identifiers for current NSA targets). ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

<sup>8</sup> To determine the location of these communicants, NSA performed the same sort of technical analysis it would perform before tasking an electronic communications account/address/identifier in accordance with its FAA section 702 targeting procedures. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

<sup>9</sup> According to NSA, [REDACTED]

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

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[REDACTED] will be filtered out by NSA's IP filters, even if they contain a 702 tasked selector, and the wholly domestic communications therein will not be collected. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)

These additional clarifications support the Government's conclusion detailed in the 30 August Notice of Clarifications to the Court that NSA's acquisition of foreign intelligence information through upstream collection, including the acquisition of MCTs, is reasonable and consistent with the Act and the Fourth Amendment. (TS//SI//NF)

NSA has reviewed this letter and confirmed its accuracy. (U)

The Government would like to thank both you and your staff for your consideration of the Government's Certifications and the complex factual and legal questions related thereto. Should the Court have any additional questions, comments or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me. (U)

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]  
Office of Intelligence  
National Security Division

b(6) and b(7)(C)

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Approved for public release.



U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

2011 SEP 13 PM 3:08

Washington, D.C. 20530

LEAH FLYNN HALE  
CLERK OF COURT

September 13, 2011

The Honorable John D. Bates  
Presiding Judge  
United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court  
333 Constitution Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20001



Dear Judge Bates:

The Government is pleased to provide this supplement to its correspondence to the Court dated September 9, 2011 regarding the above-captioned matters which are currently pending with the Court. (S)

On page 6 of the Government's September 9 correspondence, with respect to the possibility of wholly domestic "abouts" communications being acquired among single, discrete communications, the Government stated "[t]hus, while there are limited situations in which wholly domestic "abouts" communications will be acquired by NSA's upstream techniques, NSA assesses it is highly unlikely that the maximum number of wholly domestic communications that might be acquired within transactions containing only a single, discrete communication would be higher than those contained within MCTs [Multi-Communication Transactions]." As described in the Government's prior filings, the interception of an MCT can result in the acquisition of several communications, some of which are not to, from, or about NSA's tasked selector. Such communications would not have been acquired had they been transmitted as single, discrete communications because they do not contain a tasked selector. In contrast, a single, discrete communication that is wholly domestic would be acquired only if it is "about" a tasked selector, is sent and received by non-targeted persons in the United States, and [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~

Classified by: Tashina Gauhar, Deputy Assistant  
Attorney General, NSD, DOJ

Reason: 1.4(c)

Declassify on: 13 September 2036

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[REDACTED]<sup>1</sup> It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the probability of encountering wholly domestic communications in transactions that feature only a single, discrete communication should be smaller -- and certainly no greater -- than potentially encountering wholly domestic communications within MCTs. Indeed, all of the wholly domestic communications discovered during NSA's manual review were single, discrete communications within MCTs that were neither to, from, nor about the tasked selector. The basis for NSA's analytical assessment is grounded in its experience, its collection and analysis of Internet communications, and the information gleaned from the manual review more particularly described in the Government's September 9, 2011 correspondence and the Government's prior submissions of August 16, 2011 and August 30, 2011. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

NSA has reviewed this letter and confirmed its accuracy. (U)

The Government would like to thank both you and your staff for your continued consideration of the Government's Certifications and the complex factual and legal questions related thereto. Should the Court have any additional questions, comments or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me. (U)

Sincerely,

[REDACTED] **b(6) and b(7)(C)**

[REDACTED]  
Office of Intelligence  
National Security Division

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
<sup>1</sup> To be sure, it is possible that NSA could also acquire single, discrete communications to or from a tasked selector that are wholly domestic if, unbeknownst to NSA, the user of the tasked selector has entered the United States and sends a communication to another person located in the United States and that communication is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This Court has previously found that the acquisition of such communications under a reasonable but mistaken belief that the target is located outside the United States does not run afoul of the limitations in section 702. See In re DNI/AG Certification [REDACTED] Docket No. 702(i)-08-01, Mem. Op. at 26. (USFISC Sept. 4, 2008). ~~(TS//SI//OC,NF)~~

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UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



**ORDER**

This matter is before this Court for review of DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED]  
and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED]. On  
[REDACTED] 2011, and again on [REDACTED] 2011, the Court, on the motion of the United States,  
extended the time limits established by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(1)(B) and (C) for this Court to  
complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, the  
above-referenced Certifications. The current deadline is September 20, 2011.

Given the complexity of the issues presented in these matters coupled with the  
Court's need to fully analyze the supplemental information provided by the  
government in recent filings, the last of which was submitted to the Court on September  
13, 2011, the Court will not be able to complete its review of, and issue

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Derived From: ~~Submission to the USFISC~~  
~~in Docket Number captioned above~~

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orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] by September 20, 2011. On September 13, 2011, the Court orally informed the government that it intended to issue a one-week extension. The government informed the Court that, for technical reasons, such a brief extension would compromise the government's ability to ensure a seamless transition from one Certification to the next. Instead, the government requested that the Court issue an extension for a longer period of time.

Title 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) permits this Court, by order for reasons stated, to extend, as necessary for good cause in a manner consistent with national security, the time limit for this Court to issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED]

By operation of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(5)(B), the authorization in the certification to be reauthorized, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] continues beyond its stated expiration date until this Court issues an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED]<sup>1</sup>

This Court finds that there is good cause to extend the time limit for its review of DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g)

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<sup>1</sup> Nothing in this Order should be construed to expand the scope of collection authorized under the Act and previously approved by the Court.


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Certifications [REDACTED] beyond September 20, 2011, and that such extension is consistent with national security.

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), that the time limit for this Court to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) [REDACTED] is EXTENDED to October 10, 2011.

ENTERED this 14<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2011.

  
JOHN D. BATES  
Judge, United States Foreign  
Intelligence Surveillance Court

b(6) and b(7)(C)

[REDACTED]  
FISC, certify that this document  
is a true and correct copy of  
the original.  
[REDACTED]

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UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

**NOTICE OF EXTENSION**

This matter is before this Court under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended ("the Act"). This Court hereby extends the time limit established by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(B) for this Court to complete its review of, and issue an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] In issuing this extension, this Court has considered the following:

1. DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] reauthorizes DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] which had an expiration date of [REDACTED] 2011.
  2. The government submitted DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] to the Court on [REDACTED], 2011.
  3. The current deadline for the Court to complete its review of, and issue an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]
- September 20, 2011.

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
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4. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) permits this Court, by order for reasons stated, to extend, as necessary for good cause in a manner consistent with national security, the time limit for this Court to issue an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3).

5. By operation of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(5)(B), the authorization in the certification to be reauthorized, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] continues until this Court issues an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED].

This Court has found, for the reasons set forth in its separate order of this date in the above-captioned matter, that there is good cause to extend the time limit for its review of DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] beyond September 20, 2011, and that such extension is consistent with national security. Accordingly, the time limit for this Court to complete its review of, and issue an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] has been extended to October 10, 2011.


Signed this 14<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2011.


  
JOHN D. BATES  
Judge, United States Foreign  
Intelligence Surveillance Court


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
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FISC, certify that this document  
is a true and correct copy of  
the original [REDACTED]


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

























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UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



**BRIEFING ORDER**

On October 3, 2011, this Court granted in part and denied in part the government's requests for approval of the certifications in the above-captioned dockets. See Oct. 3, 2011 Order at 2. This Court's Order and Memorandum Opinion found that the National Security Agency's (NSA) minimization procedures do not meet the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e) with respect to retention, and that NSA's targeting and minimization procedures are inconsistent

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with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, as the government proposed to apply them to Multiple Communications Transactions (MCTs) for which the “active user” is not known to be the tasked selector. Furthermore, in the Memorandum Opinion issued simultaneously with its Order, this Court noted that “[t]he government’s revelations regarding the scope of NSA’s upstream collection implicate 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)” and advised that the Court would address this and related issues in a separate order. Oct. 3, 2011, Mem. Op. at 17 n.15.

It is now clear that NSA has been acquiring MCTs since [REDACTED] while at the same time assuring the Court until May 2, 2011, that its upstream collection acquired only communications to or from a targeted selector and specified categories of “about” communications (i.e., individual communications that referenced [REDACTED] that NSA tasked for collection). See [REDACTED]; see also Oct. 3, 2011, Mem. Op. at 17; [REDACTED] Submission at 2.

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<sup>1</sup> In the Government’s Response to the Court’s Briefing Order of [REDACTED] 2011 ([REDACTED] Submission), the government acknowledged that it has been acquiring MCTs “throughout the entire timeframe of all certifications authorized under Section 702,” the Protect America Act (PAA), and earlier Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Title I cases. *Id.* at 2 (citing In re [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Furthermore, it is worth noting that in Docket [REDACTED], the government represented that [REDACTED] would “ensure that all communications forwarded to NSA … are indeed communications that have been sent or received using, and that ‘refer to’ or are ‘about,’ e-mail [REDACTED] for which there is probable cause to believe are being used, or are about to be used, by [the targets].” Docket [REDACTED] Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 21. The Court relied on this representation when it issued its Order approving the collection. Docket No. [REDACTED] Order at 22. MCTs, however, have been shown to contain communications that do not meet this standard.

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Prior to this Court issuing its Order in the above-captioned dockets, the government argued that previous and ongoing collections of MCTs were in compliance with this Court's orders, did not violate 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, and were consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and that the use of such information did not violate Section 1809(a)(2), see June 1 Submission at 2-24 & 31-38, despite the fact that the government acknowledged that it did not fully inform the Court of this aspect of the collection prior to May 2, 2011, see id. at 2 & 31; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Submission) at 25. In fact, the government's May 2 Letter "disclosed to the Court for the first time that NSA's 'upstream collection' of Internet communications includes the acquisition of entire 'transaction[s]' [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Oct. 3, 2011 Mem. Op. at 5 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). As a result, none of this Court's prior authorizations considered the collection and use of MCTs.

In light of this Court's Order and Memorandum Opinion issued on October 3, 2011, and in view of what appears to be a significant overcollection dating back to [REDACTED] including the content of communications of non-target U.S. persons and persons in the U.S., the government is hereby ORDERED to file a memorandum with any necessary supporting documentation no later than 5 p.m. on November 10, 2011, which shall address but not necessarily be limited to the following issues related to MCTs:

1. An analysis of the application of Section 1809(a) to each of the three different statutory schemes under which Internet transactions were acquired without the Court's knowledge. See supra note 1.
2. The extent to which information acquired under Section 1881a, the PAA, and Docket

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[REDACTED] falls within the criminal prohibitions set forth in Section 1809(a).

3. Whether the collections under Section 1881a, the PAA, and Docket [REDACTED] include information that was not authorized for acquisition but is not subject to the criminal prohibitions of Section 1809(a).
4. Whether any of the over-collected material has "aged off" NSA systems such that it is no longer retained by NSA or accessible to its analysts.
5. If the government has determined that it has acquired information that is subject to Section 1809(a) or was otherwise unauthorized:
  - a. Describe how the government proposes to treat any portions of the prior unauthorized collection that are subject to the criminal prohibitions of Section 1809(a).
  - b. What steps is NSA taking to ensure that such information subject to 1809(a) is not used in proceedings before the Court?
  - c. What steps is the government taking to remediate any prior use of such information in proceedings before this Court?
  - d. How does the government propose to treat any portions of the collection that are unauthorized but not subject to Section 1809(a), and explain why such treatment is appropriate.
6. Whether there are any other matters that should be brought to the Court's attention with regard to these collections that implicate Section 1809(a) or that were unauthorized.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED this 13<sup>th</sup> day of October 2011.

  
JOHN D. BATES  
Judge, United States Foreign  
Intelligence Surveillance Court

I, [REDACTED] Deputy Clerk,  
FISC, certify that this document  
is a true and correct copy of  
the original [REDACTED]

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Page 4



U.S. Department of Justice

National Security Division

U.S. FOREIGN  
INTELLIGENCE  
SURVEILLANCE COURT

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Washington, D.C. 20530

LEEANN FLYNN HALL  
CLERK OF COURT

April 19, 2011

The Honorable John D. Bates  
United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court  
333 Constitution Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20001

Re: Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incidents  
Regarding Collection Pursuant to Section 702 (S)

Dear Judge Bates:

Pursuant to Rule 13(b) of the Rules of Procedure for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, effective November 1, 2010, this letter provides preliminary notice of two compliance incidents. Specifically, on April 11, 2011, the National Security Agency (NSA) initially reported to the National Security Division (NSD) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) two incidents involving communications that were overcollected as a result of NSA's upstream collection [REDACTED] pursuant to Section 702.<sup>1</sup>

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

Although different in many respects, both incidents involve the acquisition of communications that in the course of transmission through the Internet have been [REDACTED]

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

<sup>1</sup> NSA's upstream collection of electronic communications accounts includes collection performed with the assistance of electronic communication service providers of communications that are either to or from the tasked account, or communications that contain a reference to the tasked account in the communication (e.g., the body of an e-mail that contains a reference to the tasked account). [REDACTED]

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

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Classified by: Tashina Gauhar, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, NSD, DOJ

Reason: 1.4(c)

Declassify on: 19 April 2036

OI Tracking Nos. 104675-76

NYT v DOJ, 16 CIV 7020\_000191

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Upstream Overcollection Incident [REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)

The first identified instance of overcollected [REDACTED] involved upstream collection [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] each [REDACTED] contained at least one communication to, from, or about a Section 702-tasked selector, but also [REDACTED] unrelated communications. [REDACTED]

(TS//SI//NF)

On [REDACTED], the day NSA became aware of the potential overcollection, NSA ceased Section 702 collection at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NSA has identified no reports based upon the overcollected data, [REDACTED]

(TS//SI//NF)

Overcollection Incident [REDACTED] (TS//SI//NF)

<sup>2</sup> SC-SSRs, as well as the terms "Collection Stores," "Master Purge List," and "discovery status" (all discussed below), refer to aspects of the process and taxonomy NSA developed in the course of improving its purge of Section 702-acquired data. This process and taxonomy are most fully described in the Government's Supplement to and Clarification of the Record, Docket Number [REDACTED] filed May 10, 2010. (TS//SI//NF)

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~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

NSA has taken steps to ensure that overcollected information is handled appropriately.

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

3

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

<sup>4</sup> As noted above, although all of these [REDACTED] include at least one communication that is to, from, or about a Section 702-tasked selector, such [REDACTED] may contain other communications unrelated to any Section 702-tasked selector. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

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[REDACTED] NSA advises that it has identified no reporting based upon overcollected communications.<sup>5</sup> [REDACTED]

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

The Department of Justice will provide further reports to the Court regarding these two overcollection incidents. These reports will include updates regarding the implementation of [REDACTED] designed to prevent future overcollection of [REDACTED], as well as the status of any required purges. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

Respectfully submitted,

[REDACTED]  
**b(6) and b(7)(C)**

Kevin J. O'Connor  
Chief, Oversight Section  
Office of Intelligence  
U.S. Department of Justice

<sup>5</sup> NSA has identified [REDACTED] serialized reports based upon objects that were initially added to the MPL for this incident. In each case, however, the object was found to be a properly acquired communication that was to, from, or about a Section 702-tasked selector. These objects had been added to the MPL as a result of the overinclusive approach to adding objects to the MPL discussed above. These [REDACTED] reports have not been recalled and the related objects have been removed from the MPL. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

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UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

IN RE DNI/AG 702(g) CERTIFICATION [REDACTED]

Docket No. [REDACTED]

ORDER

This matter is before this Court on the motion of the United States for an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended ("the Act"), further extending to September 20, 2011, the time limits established by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(B) and (C) and extended by the Court's order of [REDACTED] 2011, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), for this Court to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED]

In entertaining the government's motion, this Court has considered the following:

1. DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] reauthorizes DNI/AG 702(g) Certification

[REDACTED] which expires on [REDACTED] 2011.

2. Included within DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] are amendments to

DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED]. These amendments

authorize the use of the minimization procedures attached as Exhibits B and E to

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DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] in connection with foreign intelligence information acquired in accordance with DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED]

3. The government submitted DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] to the Court on [REDACTED] 2011.

4. By operation of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(B) and (C), this Court was required to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] 2011.

5. By operation of the Court's order of [REDACTED] 2011, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), this Court is required to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] 2011.

6. The government is continuing to work to address the Court's concerns about the scope of NSA's upstream collection pursuant to section 702. The government has asserted that it will be able to supplement the record concerning these matters in a manner that will aid the Court in reviewing DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] and in making the determinations necessary to issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3).

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However, the government has represented that a sixty-day extension is necessary because of the additional time needed to supplement the record.

7. Because the record presently before this Court concerning these matters remains incomplete, this Court will not be able to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] before [REDACTED] 2011.

8. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) permits this Court, by order for reasons stated, to extend, as necessary for good cause in a manner consistent with national security, the time limit for this Court to issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED]

9. By operation of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(5)(B), the authorization in the certification to be reauthorized, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] continues beyond its stated expiration date until this Court issues an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED]

Having given full consideration to these matters and the representations in the government's motion, this Court finds that there is good cause to extend the time limit for its review of DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG [REDACTED]

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
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702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] beyond [REDACTED] 2011, and that such extension is consistent with national security.

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the government's motion is GRANTED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), that the time limit for this Court to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] is EXTENDED to September 20, 2011.


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
  
JOHN D. BATES  
Judge, United States Foreign  
Intelligence Surveillance Court


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
FISC certifies that this [REDACTED]  
is a true and correct copy of  
the original [REDACTED]


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


















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UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

IN RE DNI/AG 702(g) CERTIFICATION [REDACTED]

Docket No. [REDACTED]

**NOTICE OF EXTENSION**

This matter is before this Court on the motion of the United States for an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended ("the Act"), further extending to September 20, 2011, the time limit established by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(B) of the Act and extended by the Court's order of [REDACTED] 2011, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), for this Court to complete its review of, and issue an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In entertaining the government's motion, this Court has considered the following:

1. DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] reauthorizes DNI/AG 702(g) Certification

[REDACTED] which expires on [REDACTED] 2011.

2. The government submitted DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] to the Court on [REDACTED] 2011.

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in Docket Number captioned above~~

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3. By operation of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)(B), this Court was required to complete its review of, and issue an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] 2011.

4. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), however, permits this Court, by order for reasons stated, to extend, as necessary for good cause in a manner consistent with national security, the time limit for this Court to issue an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3).

5. One such extension has already been granted by the Court. By operation of the Court's order of [REDACTED] 2011, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), this Court is required to complete its review of, and issue orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] and the amendments to DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] 2011.

6. By operation of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(5)(B), the authorization in the certification to be reauthorized, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] continues beyond its stated expiration date until this Court issues an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED]

Having given full consideration to these matters and the representations in government's motion, this Court has found, for the reasons set forth in its separate order of this date in the above-captioned matter, that there is good cause to again extend the time limit for its review of DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] (previously set at [REDACTED] 2011, by operation of the Court's order of [REDACTED] 2011), and that such

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extension is consistent with national security. Accordingly, the government's second motion has been granted, and the time limit for this Court to complete its review of, and issue an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3) concerning, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification [REDACTED] has been extended to September 20, 2011.


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Date Time Eastern Time


  
JOHN D. BATES  
Judge, United States Foreign  
Intelligence Surveillance Court


[b(6) and b(7)(C)]


[REDACTED]  
FISC, certify that this document  
is a true and correct copy of  
the original. [REDACTED]


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












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U.S. FOREIGN  
INTELLIGENCE  
SURVEILLANCE COURT

UNITED STATES

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT ~~2011 OCT -4 PM 3:46~~

WASHINGTON, D.C.

LEEANN FLYNN HALL  
CLERK OF COURT

**MOTION FOR SECONDARY ORDERS TO CERTAIN  
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS (S)**

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, through the undersigned Department of Justice attorney, respectfully moves this Court, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (the Act), to issue secondary orders to certain electronic communication service providers concerning DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications

~~(S//OC/NF)~~

1. On October 3, 2011, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order concerning the following matters: (1) the "Government's Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification and Related Procedures, Ex Parte Submission of Amended Certifications, and Request for an Order Approving Such Certification and Amended Certifications" for DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications ~~[redacted]~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Classified by:

Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant Attorney General, NSD, DOJ

Reason:

1.4(c)

Declassify on:

4 October 2036

which was filed on April 20, 2011; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S//OC/NF)

2. The Court's Order granted in part and denied in part the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Certification [REDACTED]

■ See Order at 2. In particular, the Court found that the certifications required all of the required elements. See id. at 2-3. The Court further found that with respect to the acquisition of discrete Internet communications from Internet service providers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] hereinafter "PRISM collection"), the targeting and minimization procedures were consistent with the requirements of the Act and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. See id. at 3. (S//OC/NF)

3. The Government respectfully requests that the Court issue secondary orders reflecting the Court's approval in part, as described in the Court's Memorandum

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Opinion and Order of October 3, 2011, to the electronic communications service providers who provide the Government with information, facilities, or assistance necessary to accomplish PRISM collection. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S//OC/NF)


Respectfully submitted,


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
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
National Security Division  
United States Department of Justice


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
















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UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2011 NOV 15 PM 3:11  
RECAHN FLYNN HALL  
COURT



NOTICE OF FILING OF GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSES TO  
FISC QUESTIONS RE: AMENDED 2011 SECTION 702 CERTIFICATIONS

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, through the undersigned Department of Justice attorney, respectfully submits the attached responses to the questions provided by this Court to the Government on November 7, 2011, concerning the above-referenced matters. The Government is prepared to provide any additional information the Court believes would aid it in reviewing these matters. The Government may also seek to

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Classified by:

Tashina Gauhar, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, NSD, DOJ

Reason:

1.4(c)

Declassify on:

15 November 2036

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

supplement and/or modify the attached responses as appropriate during any hearing  
that the Court may hold in the above-captioned matters. ~~(S//OC/NF)~~

Respectfully submitted,



National Security Division  
United States Department of Justice

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VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in the attached Government's Responses to FISC Questions re: Amended 2011 Section 702 Certifications are true and correct based upon my best information, knowledge, and belief. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, § 1746, on this 15th day of November, 2011. (S)

[Redacted]  
Signals Intelligence Directorate Compliance Architect  
National Security Agency

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~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN~~

## GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSES TO FISC QUESTIONS RE: AMENDED 2011 SECTION 702 CERTIFICATIONS

1. ~~(S)~~ The government previously indicated to the Court that it lacked the capacity to conduct some of the activities that are now required by the amended NSA minimization procedures. Please confirm that the NSA is fully complying with those procedures.

(U) Confirmed. NSA is fully complying with the amended minimization procedures, but is working to implement all the capabilities more specifically described in section 3(b)(5).

2. ~~(TS//SI)~~ The Court's Memorandum Opinion defined "active user" to be "the individual using the electronic communications account/address/identifier to interact with his/her Internet service provider." See Oct. 3, 2011 Memorandum Opinion at 35 n. 34 (emphasis added). However, the amended minimization procedures state that NSA will identify and segregate through technical means MCTs where "the active user of the transaction (i.e., the electronic communications account/address/identifier used to send or receive the Internet transaction to or from a service provider) is reasonably believed to be located in the United States; or the location of the active user is unknown." See Section 3(b)(5)(a). Please confirm that NSA's "technical means" for identification and segregation will focus on the location of the individual using the account.

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Confirmed. NSA's technical means for identification and segregation will focus on [REDACTED] indicative of the location of the individual using the electronic communication account/address/identifier. This is true whether the individual is [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

3. ~~(TS//SI)~~ Section 3(b)(5)(a)(1)(a) prohibits NSA from using a segregated Internet transaction "for foreign intelligence purposes" unless it has been determined that the transaction does not contain any wholly domestic communications. It is the Court's understanding that segregated Internet transactions may be used only for the purpose of determining whether any communication within the transaction is wholly domestic. Is this understanding correct? If not, please fully describe any other uses.

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The Court's understanding is partly correct. The Court is correct that pursuant to section 3(b)(5)(a)(1)(a) any information contained in a segregated Internet transaction (including metadata) may not be moved or copied from the segregated repository or otherwise used for foreign intelligence purposes unless it has first been reviewed and determined by a specially trained analyst that the transaction does not contain any discrete communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients were reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time NSA acquired the communication (a wholly domestic communication). If upon review any segregated transaction is determined by a specially trained analyst to contain a discrete wholly domestic communication, such transaction shall be destroyed upon recognition. For those segregated transactions reviewed by a specially trained analyst and determined not to contain any discrete wholly domestic

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Dated: 20070108

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communications, such transactions may be moved or copied from the segregated repository (after having first been appropriately marked, tagged, or otherwise identified as having been previously segregated) into repositories more generally accessible to NSA analysts and will be processed in accordance with section 3(b)(5)b. Consistent with section 3(b)(5)a, NSA may also be required to process [REDACTED] the segregated Internet transactions in order to render them intelligible to the specially trained analysts. Additionally, the specially trained analysts may also access and use the segregated Internet transactions for purposes of ensuring data integrity, compliance, ensuring appropriate segregation, and improving the technical means employed by NSA to reasonably identify Internet transactions containing single, discrete communications.

4. ~~(TS//SI)~~ What circumstances will trigger review by a specially-trained NSA analyst to determine whether a particular Internet transaction contains a discrete wholly domestic communication? It is the Court's understanding that such review occurs only when a segregated Internet transaction is responsive to a query designed to elicit foreign intelligence information. Is this understanding correct?

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The Court's understanding is partly correct. In addition to those circumstances in which a segregated transaction is reviewed because it is responsive to a query designed to elicit foreign intelligence information, NSA analysts also might review transactions in an effort to move additional communications into repositories more generally accessible to other NSA analysts. In other words, in a variety of circumstances, the specially trained analysts may make efforts to move segregated transactions into other repositories regardless of whether those particular transactions have been singled out through a foreign intelligence query.

5. ~~(TS//SI)~~ Please confirm that any transactions reviewed under Section 3(b)(5)(b)(1) will be destroyed if the analyst determines that the transaction contains a wholly domestic communication.

Confirmed.

6. ~~(TS//SI)~~ Section 3(b)(5)(b)(2)(c) indicates that NSA analysts will document certain determinations "if technically possible or reasonably feasible." Please explain under what circumstances documentation would be considered technically possible but not reasonably feasible.

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Within the context of documenting a determination under section 3(b)(5)(b)(2)(c) in the relevant analytic repository or tool, the provision "if technically possible or reasonably feasible" is intended to require documentation only under circumstances where the analytic repository or tool enables analysts to record such information (in this instance, that the transaction contains one or more communications to or from an identifiable U.S. person or a person inside the United States) in circumstances where such documentation would be accessible and usable by other analysts. In addition, the Government does not intend to apply this provision to require NSA to reconstruct or reconfigure all tools currently used by NSA analysts to perform foreign intelligence analysis

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of section 702 collection, nor to limit analytic efforts to only such tools that could be designed or retrofitted with such capabilities in the future.

7. ~~(TS//SI)~~ Section 3(c)(2) states, in the context of destruction of raw data: "[t]he internet transactions that may be retained include those that were acquired because of limitations on NSA's ability to filter communications." Please explain the meaning of this statement[.]

~~(TS//SI)~~ This statement applies to Internet transactions containing wholly domestic communications that NSA acquires despite the operation of the technical means that NSA uses to prevent the acquisition of such communications. The amended minimization procedures require Internet transactions containing wholly domestic communications to be destroyed "upon recognition." See NSA amended 702 minimization procedures §§ 3(b)(5)(a)(1)(a), 5. However, Internet transactions containing wholly domestic communications may go "unrecognized" because, for example, the Internet transaction, in whole or in part, has not been relevant/responsive to a query and, therefore, not reviewed by any NSA analysts. This statement in section 3(c)(2) permits NSA to retain for two years Internet transactions containing wholly domestic communications that are never recognized as such.

8. ~~(S//SI//NF)~~ Please explain whether, and if so under what circumstances, NSA will share unminimized communications acquired through its upstream collection under Section 6(c) (sharing with CIA and FBI) or under Section 8 of the procedures.

~~(S//SI//NF)~~ NSA will not share, under section 6(c) or 8 of the procedures, unminimized communications acquired through NSA upstream collection.

9. ~~(TS//SI)~~ Section 3(b)(5)(b)(4) of the amended NSA minimization procedures allows NSA to use metadata extracted from Internet transactions without first determining whether the metadata was extracted from a wholly domestic communication or a non-target communication. Please fully describe what constitutes "metadata" within the meaning of this provision.

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Set forth below are descriptions of the categories and types of metadata<sup>1</sup> the Government extracts from Internet transactions, including single, discrete communications contained within a multi-communication Internet transaction (hereinafter, collectively, "Internet transactions"), acquired through NSA's Internet upstream collection techniques. As the precise metadata transmitted with each particular Internet transaction varies, each type or category of metadata listed below may not be available for extraction by NSA in every particular instance.

<sup>1</sup> ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ For the purposes of this response, the term "metadata," when used in reference to an Internet transaction, is information about [REDACTED]


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All withheld information exempt under b(1) and b(3) unless otherwise noted.

Approved for public release.

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Metadata Category	Metadata Category Description




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


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


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Approved for public release.

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10. ~~(TS//SI)~~ It is the Court's understanding that metadata extracted in accordance with Section 3(b)(5)(b)(4) may otherwise be retained, used, and disseminated in accordance with the other provisions of the amended NSA minimization procedures. Is this understanding correct?

(U) This understanding is correct.

a. ~~(TS//SI)~~ For example, is metadata that has been extracted from Internet transactions pursuant to Section 3(b)(5)(b)(4) subject to the two-year retention limit set forth in Section 3(c) of the amended NSA minimization procedures? If not, how long is such metadata retained? If such metadata (including metadata extracted from discrete, non-target communications) is retained for longer than two years, how is Section 3(b)(5)(b)(4) consistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1)?

~~(TS//SI)~~ Metadata that has been extracted from Internet transactions consistent with Section 3(b)(5)(b)(4) is subject to the two-year retention limit set forth in Section 3(c) of the amended NSA minimization procedures.

b. ~~(TS//SI)~~ Is metadata consisting of U.S. person information disseminated only if such information constitutes foreign intelligence information or is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance? If not, how is Section 3(b)(5)(b)(4) consistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1)-(2)?

~~(TS//SI)~~ Metadata consisting of U.S. person information is disseminated only if such information constitutes foreign intelligence information, or is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance.

11. ~~(TS//SI)~~ Under Section 3(b)(5)(b)(4), NSA will not extract or use metadata from segregated Internet transactions. Will this limitation impair NSA's ability to determine when the users of targeted facilities have entered the United States?

~~(TS//SI)~~ It is not expected that this limitation will impair NSA's ability to determine when the users of targeted facilities have entered the United States because Internet transactions where the active user is the target (i.e., the user of the tasked selector) will not be sequestered. Therefore,



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