D.C. SHOP Exchange online eligibility-certification form. US. House of Representatives (Members) Filed November 3, 2013. For calendar year 2014. Close a Print Emelex er ,lnferrn9!!99__ Employer name 8: address Employer name US House of Representatives Doing business ailname} us Hausa ofRepresenlatives federal Employer ldenll?cullon Numberl?l?) Employer Type Slalellocal government Average Number 0! - - Full-lime Employees (in Prior Calendar Year) Average Number of - Parmime Employees {in F?orCulendurYear} Average Weekly Hours - Worked By Purl-Time Employees Number of FullJime 45 Equlvdenls in Pilot Calendar Year Primary business address address 3 US House of Representatives Business address ?ne 2 Members 8v: Room 139A Cannon Hoe CW Washington Siale DC ZIP Code 20515 10! 3 811512014 1:17 PM Contact name a email address Check here if you are the mntact? Mame Frrzi! Name lnlral Iaal Name Su?! Title Email address Contact mailing address Check here if the contact address is the same as the prlmary business address? Address Um 1 Wing add-ass Line 2 ?in Slate ZIP cm United States Senate Disbursing O??oe Washington DC 20510 Contact preferences Phone W99 Muf?er Plane number F.1d. Preferred phone number Secondary phone numbe; Phone ?anther Hone number Ext -- .. Fax number Prelened spoken language - - . Preferred wrlilen language 1 First Name Last Name Den: of Blah ZIP Code 62 Class 2 o! 3 8/15/2014 1:20 PM 3ot3 First Name Last Name Date of Birth ZIP Code EE Class Twenty Congress 01m1r1994 20002 All Employees Employee Dependents None Confirmation i attest that lemptoy 50 or fewer full time eQuivatent employees. I attest that wit offer coverage to an tulLtime employees working an average of 30 hours perweek through DC Health Link (or. for muIIi-state employers. any other exchange serving those work locations outside 0! DC). Electronic Signature I've provided true and correct answers to all the questions on this form to the best of my knowledge I know that i? I?m notlruttrful there may he a penalty I know that I must tell {Dc Health Link) it anything changes about what I wrote on this application I agree Job Titte ham ltl?cmr Company Signatufe: Fifi! Name Wle "mild Last Name Su?: Dale 1110312013 Close Print 8/15/2014 1:20 PM D.C. SHOP Exchange online eligibility-certification form. US. House of Representatives (STAFF) Filed November 25, 2013. For calendar year 2014. Close 1 Print 1 Employer name address name US House of Represenlaliues Doing business aSlnume) STAFF us House or Representatives federal Employer. Identi?cation NumberIEm} Employer 1y pe slaleilocal government Average Number of . . Full-Time Employees (in Prior Calendar Year) Average Number oi . . Part-lime Employees (In Prior Calendar Year} Average Weekly Hours . . Worked By fad-Tlme Employees umber 07 full-time 45 Eqwlvalenls (HEs) in Prior Calendar Year Primary business address Business address Line I 3-215 Longworth HOB Business address Line 2 -. Clly Washington Stale DC Code 20515 1 ore. 3/15/2014 1:18 PM Contact name email address .1 Check here ify0u are the contact? Name Mladla lnllial Last Name Suf?x Nome - . E-mall addres? Contact mailing address Check here if 1he contact address is the some as the primary business address? Adda? Malina address Llne Mallng address Llne 2 US House of Representatives Members Room 139A Cannon HOB City stale Zip Code Washinglorl DC 20515 Contact preferences one number ?we ?Mm? ?mwa as. - Phone type Phone number Phone number Era. Preferred ph Secondary phone number fax number .. I Preferred spoken language - Prelerred language . - Finalize Employee; 1 Zof3 Vii 8/15/2014 1:17 PM Brut Name Last Nun} Due of Shah ZIP Code 55 Class Twenty Congress 01331! (994 20:02 NI Employees Employ? 03de None Con?rmajion I attest the! I employ 50 Or fewer full time eqUivalem employees. a I attest ma! I wuk OUBI coverage to ail full-time working an EVEIEQB of 30 hours per week mush BC Health Link (04. for mid-5:516 empbye?. any sane: Exchange serving these work locz?ms We of 0C). Electronic Signature I?ve provided true and canact answeus to an lhe questions on this {mm the best ofmy knowledge I know man! I?m no! truthful theta may be a penaxy I know that! must tell (Dc Health Link) it anything changes about what I wmta on this application I agree Job fnom ?fom - - Company Signafure. Fl?? Nama Last Name Sum! Duh 12I25r201a Choc mi 3 of3 8115/2014 D.C. SHOP Exchange online eligibiIity-certification form. US. Senate Filed February 19, 2014. For calendar year 2014. Close Print Employer lafger?QL Employer name address Employer name untted sures Senate Doing business aslname} United glazes Senale Mb?? W99 Federal Employer Identi?cation Numberml?l) Average Number or - - Full-Ilme Employees (In Prlor Calendar Year} Average Numberof Pad?Tlme Employees (in Prior Calendar Year) Average Weekly Hours - Worked By Park?me Emploirear Number 0! fell-Tm: Equivalenls (HES) in Friar Calendar Year Primary business address Buslness address line 1 Uni?ed sgata Senate auslness address ?me 2 Disbursing Mae CW Washington Side no NP Code 2051;] 10:3 8/15/2014 1:20 PM Contact name email address Check here if you are the contact? First Name Middie Initial LastName Su?ix Hume Tllie -- E- mail address . Contact mailing address Check here lithe contact address is the same as the piimary business address? Address Malling Line 1 Mailing address Line 2 City State ZIP Code 8.215 HOB - - Washington DC 20515 Contact preferences Phone type Phone nurnber Phase number Ext. Work Preferred phone number ambit In- vu fax number - . Prelerxed spoken language . . . language .- Finalize Employees 1 Finn Name Last Maine Data of Slim ZIP Code EE Class 2013 3/15/2014 1:18 PM ?rst Hnmo Lasr Name Oct: earth 219 Code EE crass rm last orromeao 20002 All Employee Con?rmation attest trial I employ 50 or fewer full time equivalent employees. I attest that I will offer coverage to all fulldime employees working an average 01 30 hours per week lhmugh EX: Health Link (or, [or mul?etara analogue. any other exchange seam?; those wont [Idiom (3115812 of DC) Electronic Signature I?ve provided true and correct answers to all the Questions on this form to the heel of my knowledge I know lha: if I'm no: lrulhlul there may be a penalty know thal I must tell Health Link) If anything changes about wha't I wrote on lhis applicalion I agree Job we: from four . - Coupony 5191169033: First Name Middle lni?a Lust Suf?x Dale 02/1 9:2014 Close Print I 3 013 8/15/2014 1:18 PM D.C. SHOP Exchange online eligibility-certification form. US. House of Representatives (Members) Filed November 9, 2014. For calendar year 2015. 7124:2015 Customer Detail Employer Information Employer name address Employer name US House of Representatives 00mg buslness Gimme} Member-US House of Rep. Federal Employer - ldenll?collon Number(ElN) Employer TYPE State/local government Primary business address Buslness address 1 US House of Representatives address Line 2 Members Svo Room 139A Cannon HOB Washington Stole DC ZIP Code 20515 Finalize Employees 1 Employee Dependents Spouse {27 ?242015 Customer Deta'l Confirmation I attest that I will offer coverage to all full-time employees working an average of 30 hours per week through DC Health Link (or, for multi-state employers. any other exchange serving those work locations outside of DC). Electronic Signature I've provided true and correct answers to all the questions on this form to the best of my knowledge. I know that if i?m not truthful there may be a penalty. I know that I must tell (DC Health Link) if anything changes about what i wrote on this application. I agree Signature; First Name Middle initial LastName Suf?x 0098 1110912014 Close D.C. SHOP Exchange online eligibility-certification form. U.S. House of Representatives (STAFF) Filed November 10, 2014. For calendar year 2015. ?2412015 Cuslomer Detail Employer Information Employer name address Employer name US House of Representatives Doing business as(name] STAFF US House of Representatives Federal Employer - ldenl?lca?on Number(ElN) Employer Type Statellocal govemmenl Primary business address Buslness address Llne 1 3-215 Longworth HOB Bu?slness address llne 2 CRY Washington State DC ZIP Code 20515 Finalize Employees 1 Employee Dependents None 1f2 71240015 Customer Detail Confirmation attest that I will offer coverage to all full-time employees working an average of 30 hours per week through DC Health Link (or, for multi-state employers. any other exchange serving those work locations outside of 00). Electronic Signature I've provided true and correct answers to all the questions on this form to the best of my knowledge. I know that if I'm not truthful there may be a penalty. I know that I must tell (DC Health Link) if anything changes about what wrote on this application. I agree SIElnolure: Fm Name M'ddle Initial Last Name Suf?x Dale 1111012014 Close I - D.C. SHOP Exchange online eligibility-certification form. U.S. Senate Filed November 10, 2014. For calendar year 2015. 7/24201 5 usluner Dela! Close on er Information Employer name address Employer name Uniled States Senale Doing business ?(name-l United States Senate Federal Employer - ldenli?co?on Number(ElN) Type State/local government Primary business address Business address Llne i United Stales Senate Busmess address Line 2 Disbursing Of?ce CHY Washington State DC ZIP Code 20510 Finalize Employees 1 Employee Dependents None b5181533-c4b3-487d-b7a58W1a 1/2 73412015 Customer Detail Confirmation attest that I will offer coverage to all full-time employees working an average of 30 hours per week through DC Health Link (or. for multi-state employers. any other exchange serving those work locations outside of DC). Electronic Signature I've provided true and correct answers to all the questions on this form to the best of my knowledge. I know that if t'm not truthful there may be a penalty. I know that I must tell (DC Health Link) if anything changes about what I wrote on this application. I agree Signature- First Name Middle lnitlal Last Name Suf?x Dale 11I1012014 Close D.C. Health Benefits Exchange Authority FOIA response indicating DC. has denied no employers participation in the SHOP Exchange. September 15, 2015 DC Health Benefii" Exchange Authority September 15, 2015 Tom Capone Cato Institute 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001?5403 Via email Re: FOIA 2015?12 Dear Mr. Capone, This letter is the response to your email dated August 25, 2015 containing a Freedom of Information Act request. Your request is for ?all documents and communications from the DC Health Bene?t Exchange Authority regarding the number of employers who have requested and been denied participation in the DC Small Business Health Options Program, in addition to the reason given for each denial.? Your request is granted. Response: The agency has no documents responsive to this request. No employer has been denied participation in the DC Small Business Health Options Program. Under D.C. Of?cial Code 2-537 and 1 DCMR 412, you have the right to appeal this letter to the Mayor or to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. If you elect to appeal to the Mayor, your appeal must be in writing and contain ?Freedom of Information Act Appeal? or OIA Appeal? in the subject line of the letter as well on the outside of the envelope. The appeal must include (1) a copy of the original request; (2) a copy of any written denial; (3) a statement of the circumstances, reasons, and/ or arguments advanced in support of disclosure; and (4) a daytime telephone number, and e?mail and/or US. Mail address at which you can be reached. The appeal must be mailed to: The Mayor?s Correspondence Unit, FOIA Appeal, 1350 Avenue, N.W., Suite 316, Washington, DC. 20004. Electronic versions of the same information can instead be e?mailed to The Mayor?s Correspondence Unit at foia.mavor@dc. gov. Further, a copy of all appeal materials must be forwarded to me as the Freedom of Information Of?cer of the involved agency. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. The ?le is now closed. Sincerely, WW Mary Beth Senkewicz Associate General Counsel and Policy Advisor FOIA Of?cer Text of 18 U.S.C. ?1001 prohibiting falsifying, concealing, or covering up material facts within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, orjudicial branch. away Page 275 1990?Pub. L. 101?647, title XXV, ?2501(b), title ?3532, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4860, 4925, inserted a period after ?1031? and added item 1032. 1989?Pub. L. 101?73, title IX, 961(g)(2), 962(a)(4), Aug. 9, 1989, 103 Stat. 500, 502, struck out item 1008 ?Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation transactions? and item 1009 ?Rumors regarding Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation?. 1988?Pub. L. 100?700, Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4632, added item 1031. 1984?Pub. L. 98?473, title II, 2102(b), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2184, 2192, added items 1029 and 1030. 1982?Pub. L. 97?398, Dec. 31, 1982, 96 Stat. 2010, added item 1028. 1974?Pub. L. 93?406, title I, Sept. 2, 1974, 88 Stat. 852, substituted ?Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974? for ?Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act? in item 1027. 1967?Pub. L. 90?19, May 25, 1967, 81 Stat. 28, in- cluded ?Department of Housing and Urban Develop- ment? in item 1010, and substituted the same for ?Pub- lic Housing Administration? in item 1012. 1962?Pub. L. 87?420, Mar. 20, 1962, 76 Stat. 42, added item 1027. 1951?Act Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, ?25, 65 Stat. 720, sub- stituted ?Public Housing Administration? for ?United States Housing Authority? in item 1012. l949?Act May 24, 1949, ch. 139, 19, 63 Stat. 92, corrected spelling in item 1012 and substituted ?offi- cers? for ?offices" in item 1019. 1001. Statements or entries generally Except as otherwise provided in this sec- tion, Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdic- tion of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully?? (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or docu- ment knowing the same to contain any mate- rially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If the matter relates to an of- fense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, or section 1591, then the term of imprisonment im- posed under this section shall be not more than 8 years. Subsection does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party?s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or doc- . uments submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding. (0) With respect to any matter within the ju- risdiction of the legislative branch, subsection shall apply only to? (1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a document required by law, rule, or regula- tion to be submitted to the Congress or any of? fice or officer Within the legislative branch; or (2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate. TITLE AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ?1001 (June 25, 1948, Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 749; Pub. L. 103?322, title Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147; Pub. L. 109292, Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3459; Pub. L. 108?458, title VI, ?6703(a), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3766; Pub. L. 109?248, title I, ?141(0), July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 603.) HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., ?80 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, ?35, 35 Stat. 1095; Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015: June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996; Apr. 4, 1938, ch. 69, 52 Stat. 197). Section 80 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., was divided into two parts. The provision relating to false claims was incor- porated in section 287 of this title. Reference to persons causing or procuring was omit- ted as unnecessary in view of definition of ?principal? in section 2 of this title. Words ?or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder? in said section 80 were omitted as unnecessary in view of definition of ?agency? in section 6 of this title. In addition to minor changes of phraseology, the maximum term of imprisonment was changed from 10 to 5 years to be consistent with comparable sections. (See reviser?s note under section 287 of this title.) AMENDMENTS 2006?Subsec. Pub. L. 109~248 inserted last sen? tence in concluding provisions. 2004?Subsec. Pub. L. 108?458 substituted ?be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic terror- ism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both? for ?be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both" in conclud- ing provisions. 1996?Pub. L. 104?292 reenacted section catchline without change and amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: ?Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.? 1994?Pub. L. 103?322 substituted ?fined under this title? for ?fined not more than $10,000?. CHANGE OF NAME Reference to United States magistrate or to mac- istrate deemed to refer to United States magistrate judge pursuant to section 321 of Pub. L. 101?650, set out as a note under section 631 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure. SHORT TITLE OF 2004 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 108?275, July 15, 2004, 118 Stat. 831, pro~ vided that: ?This Act [enacting section 1028A of this title, amending sections 641 and 1028 of this title, and enacting provisions listed in a table relating to sen? tencing guidelines set out as a note under section 994 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure] may be cited as the ?Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act?.? SHORT TITLE OF 2003 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 108?21, title VI, ?607(a), Apr. 30, 2003, 117 Stat. 689, provided that: ?This section [amending section 1028 of this title] may be cited as the ?Secure Authentica- tion Feature and Enhanced Identification Defense Act of 2003? or ID Act?.? SHORT TITLE OF 2000 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 106?578, Dec. 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 3075, pro- vided that: ?This Act [amending section 1028 of this ?1002 title, repealing section 1738 of this title, and enacting provisions set out as notes under section 1028 of this title] may be cited as the ?Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 2000?.? SHORT TITLE OF 1998 AMENDMENTS Pub. L. 105?818, Oct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 3007, pro- vided that: ?This Act [amending sections 982, 1028, and 2516 of this title and section 105 of the Ethics in Gov- ernment Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95?521, set out in the Ap- pendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Em- ployees, and enacting provisions set out as notes under section 1028 of this title and section 994 of Title 28, Ju- diciary and Judicial Procedure] may be cited as the ?Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998?.? Pub. L. 105?172, Apr. 24, 1998, 112 Stat. 53, provided that: ?This Act [amending section 1029 of this title and enacting provisions set out as a note under section 994 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure] may be cited as the ?Wireless Telephone Protection Act?.? SHORT TITLE OF 1996 AMENDMENT Section 1 of Pub. L. 104?292 provided that: ?This Act [amending this section, sections 1515 and 6005 of this title, and section 1365 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judi- cial Procedure] may be cited as the ?False Statements Accountability Act of 1996?.? SHORT TITLE OF 1994 AMENDMENT Section 290001(a) of Pub. L. 103?322, as amended by Pub. L. 104?294, title VI, ?604(b)(34), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3508, provided that: ?This section [amending sec? tion 1030 of this title] may be cited as the ?Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994?.? SHORT TITLE OF 1990 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 101?647, title XXV, ?2500, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4859, provided that: ?This title [see Tables for classification] may be cited as the ?Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Re? covery Act of 1990?.? SHORT TITLE OF 1989 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 101?123, Oct. 23, 1989, 103 Stat. 759, provided that: ?This Act [amending section 1031 of this title, re- pealing section 293 of this title, enacting provisions set out as notes under sections 293 and 1031 of this title, and repealing provisions set out as a note under section 293 of this title] may be cited as the ?Major Fraud Act Amendments of 1989?.? SHORT TITLE OF 1988 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 100?700, Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4631, pro- vided that: ?This Act [enacting sections 293 and 1031 of this title and section 256 of Title 41, Public Contracts, amending section 2324 of Title 10, Armed Forces, and section 3730 of Title 31, Money and Finance, enacting provisions set out as notes under sections 293 and 1031 of this title, section 2324 of Title 10, and section 522 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, and repeal- ing provisions set out as a note under section 2324 of Title 10] may be cited as the ?Major Fraud Act of 1988?.? SHORT TITLE OF 1986 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 99?474, Oct. 16, 1986, 100 Stat. 1213, provided that: ?This Act [amending section 1030 of this title] may be cited as the ?Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986?.? SHORT TITLE OF 1984 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 98?473, title II, ?1601, Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2183, provided that: ?This chapter [chapter XVI 1601?1603) of title II of Pub. L. 98?473, enacting sec- tion 1029 of this title and provisions set out as a note under section 1029 of this title] may be cited as the ?Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984?.? Pub. L. 98?473, title II, ?2101, Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2190, provided that: ?This chapter [chapter XXI TITLE AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Page 276 (??2101?2103) of title II of Pub. L. 98?473. enacting sec- tion 1030 of this title and provisions set out as a note under section 1030 of this title] may be cited as the ?Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984?.? SHORT TITLE OF 1982 AMENDMENT Section 1 of Pub. L. 97?398 provided: ?That this Act [enacting sections 1028 and 1738 of this title and amend? ing section 3001 of Title 39, Postal Service] may be cited as the ?False Identification Crime Control Act of 1982?.? ?1002. Possession of false papers to defraud United States Whoever, knowingly and with intent to de? fraud the United States, or any agency thereof, possesses any false, altered, forged, or counter? feited writing or document for the purpose of en- abling another to obtain from the United States, or from any agency, officer or agent thereof, any sum of money, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 749; Pub. L. 103?322, title Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.) HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., ?74 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, ?30, 35 Stat. 1094). Words ?or any agency thereof? after ?United States? and word "agency? after ?any? and before ?officer,? were inserted to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definition of ?agency? in section 6 of this title.) The maximum fine of ?$10,000" was substituted for ?$500? in order to conform punishment provisions to those of comparable sections. (See section 1001 of this title.) Minor verbal change was made. AMENDMENTS 1994?Pub. L. 103?322 substituted ?fined under this title? for ?fined not more than $10,000?. 1003. Demands against the United States Whoever knowingly and fraudulently demands or endeavors to obtain any share or sum in the public stocks of the United States, or to have any part thereof transferred, assigned, sold, or conveyed, or to have any annuity, dividend, pen- sion, wages, gratuity, or other debtdue from the United States, or any part thereof, received, or paid by virtue of any false, forged, or counter~ feited power of attorney, authority, or instru- ment, shall be fined under this title or impris- oned not more than five years, or both; but if the sum or value so obtained or attempted to be obtained does not exceed $1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 749; Pub. L. 103?322, title (L), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147; Pub. L. 104?294, title VI, ?606(a), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3511.) HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., ?79 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, ?34, 35 Stat. 1095). Words ?prize money? were deleted on the ground that they are an anachronism and were so before 1909. (See reviser?s note under section 915 of this title.) Mandatory punishment provision was rephrased in the alternative. US. Attorney?s Manual guidance on enforcement of 18 U.S.C. ?1001. 35 United States nfjustic UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS U.S. Attornevs U.S. Attornevs' Manual Criminal Resource Manual CRM 500-999 Criminal Resource Manual 901-999 902. 1996 Amendments to 18 U.S.C. 1001 The False Statements Accountability Act of 1996 (FSAA), Pub. L. No. 104-292, HR. 3166 (October 11, 1996), made several changes that affect the work of United States Attorneys? Offices, including revisions to 18 U.S.C. 1001, 1505, 6005, and 28 U.S.C. 1365. This section describes the changes to section 1001. Section 2 of the FSAA revises section 1001 of title 18, United States Code. The new 18 U.S.C. 1001, effective October 11, 1996, reads as follows: a. Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully -- 1. falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; 2. makes any materially false, ?ctitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or 3. makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be ?ned under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. b. Subsection does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party?s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding. c. With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, subsection shall apply only in 1. administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a document required by law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office or officer within the legislative branch; or 2. any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate. The new section 1001 contains several important features. First, section 2 of the FSAA restores nuns-v awar- nr?m1.m .ymua-uxu .m 7.. q?m-Up?. .u .u the Department's ability to prosecute false statements made to the judicial and legislative branches. In 1995, the Supreme Court reversed long-settled precedent in Hubbard v. United States, 115 1754 (1995), and held that a court is neither a "department" nor an ?agency" under 1001. Although the Court's Opinion left open the possibility that a judicial or legislative entity might still be considered an "agency" under section 1001, several courts interpreted Hubbard broadly to mean that section 1001 applies only to false statements made to the executive branch. See, 9.9., United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 1288 (1996); United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1995). As of March 1997, there was pending in the District of Columbia Circuit an interlocutory appeal concerning whether the old version of section 1001, even after Hubbard, still applies to financial disclosure statements that Members of Congress filed, pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act, with the Clerk of the House of Representatives before October 11, 1996. See United States v. Oakar, No. 96-3084 (D.C. Cir.). Prosecutors therefore should not concede, in any pleadings or arguments presented in federal courts, that the old section 1001 does not apply to such statements, at least until the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decides this case. The new statute effectively overrules Hubbard, and expressly provides that section 1001 covers false statements that are made to all three branches of the federal government, without regard to whether the entity may be categorized as a "department" or "agency." By including certain statutory terms "jurisdiction" and "statement?) from the former section 1001 without change, Congress intended that those terms, as reenacted, continue to carry with them the body of existing judicial constructions of those terms. For example, with respect to statements made within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, prosecutors should continue to consider all statements -- whether oral or written, and whether sworn or unsworn -- as being within the scope of the new section 1001. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-680 (July 16, 1996) at 8 ("Other than establishing materiality as an element of all three offenses, the Committee does not view the offenses defined in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) as changing already existing case law as it relates to the elements of the was no Senate report concerning the Act, and the House report covers only the changes that the Act made to section 1001). Section 2 of the FSAA, however, contains certain limitations concerning statements within the jurisdiction of the judicial and legislative branches. Subsection 2(b) of the FSAA provides that statements made to a judge or magistrate by parties or their counsel in a judicial proceeding will not be. subject to prosecution under section 1001. Section 2 of the FSAA thus codifies a limited version of the "judicial function exception," which was created by the courts under the old section 1001 to avoid the chilling of advocacy that might occur if attorneys and parties were subject to prosecution for concealing facts from a court or jury. Under the codified version of the judicial function exception, parties or their counsel may be prosecuted for false submissions to other entities within the judicial branch, such as the probation office. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-680 at 9. Non-parties may be prosecuted for any false submission within the jurisdiction of the judicial branch. In subsection of amended 1001, Congress created a "legislative function exception." Under the new provision, false statements within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch are subject to prosecution only if they relate to administrative matters or congressional investigations conducted consistent with the applicable congressional rules. Amended 1001 will thus reach those documents that have most often been the subject of congressional false statement prosecutions, such as vouchers, payroll documents, and Ethics in Government Act (EIGA) financial disclosure forms. The exception was intended to protect, among other things, the free flow of constituent submissions to Congress. See HR. Rep. No. 104-680 at 4-5. Amended 1001 also expressly includes materiality as an element under each of the three clauses in subsection This resolves a conflict among the courts on that issue. See, United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1984) [cited in Criminal Resource Manual 1743; USAM 9-42.001] 901. Scope of the General Statutes up; 903. False Statements. Concealment?18 Prohibitinq Fraud Against the Government U.S.C. 1001 a$ United States Department ofjustic UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS U.S. Attornevs U.S. Attornevs' Manual Criminal Resource Manual CRM 500-999 Criminal Resource Manual 901-999 905. Items Not Required to be Proved The courts have concluded that 18 U.S.C. 1001 does not require any proof of the following: 1. any financial or property loss to the Federal government (though one often exists), United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1188 (8th Cir.1983); 2. that the false statement be made or submitted directly to the federal government, United States v. Uni Oil Co., 646 F.2d 946, 954-55 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982); 3. any favorable agency action based upon the statement, Brandow v. United States, 268 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Quirk, 167 F. Supp. 462 (ED. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 266 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1959); 4. reliance by the government, United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1980? 5. the defendant's actual knowledge of Federal agency jurisdiction, United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984); on remand, 741 F.2d 267 (1984) or 6. that the false statement be written, signed or sworn, United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43, 46 (1952). [Cited in USAM 9?42.001 904. Purpose of Statute 906. Jurisdictional Requirements Satisfied UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS U.S. Attornevs U.S. Attornevs' Manual Criminal Resource Manual CRM 500-999 Criminal Resource Manual 901-999 906. Jurisdictional Requirements Satis?ed Section 1001's jurisdictional requirements are satis?ed if: 1. the agency had the power to act on the statement, United States v. DiFonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied 444 U.S. 1018 (1980); 2. there was an "intended" relationship between the act and the Federal government, United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 297 (7th Cir. 1978) cert. denied 440 U.S. 983 (1979); or 3. the act was calculated to induce government action, United States v. Barbato, 471 F.2d 918, 922 (1st Cir. 1973). Courts have frequently held that the phrase "matter within the jurisdiction," as used in Section 1001, means a matter regarding which the department or agency in question has the authority to take action. See Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 743 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 376 US. 973 (1964); United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525 (7th Cir. 1996)(false statements within the jurisdiction of the Department of Education). In United States v. Gibson, 881 F.2d 318, 322?23 (6th Cir. 1989), the following examples were cited as false statements that could be prosecuted under Section 1001 although indirectly made to the Federal government (so-called indirect submissions): Courts have . . . af?rmed 1001 convictions for false statements made to private entities receiving federal funds or subject to federal regulation or supervision. See, United States v. Kirby, 587 F.2d 876, 881 (7th Cir. 1978) (false inspection and weight certificates submitted in transaction subject to regulation by Department of Agriculture); United States v. Dick, 744 F.2d 546, 554 (7th Cir. 1984)(false statements to surety insured by Small Business Administration); United States v. Brack, 747 F.2d 1142, 1150-52 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 US. 1216 (1985)(false statements to surety insured by Small Business Administration); United States v. Green, 745 F.2d 1205, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 US 925 (1985)(false statements to private firm constructing nuclear power plant regulated by Nuclear Regulatory Commission); United States v. Wolf, 645 F.2d 23, 25-26 (10th Cir. 1981)(false statements to oil company subject to federal regulation); United States v. Matanky, 482 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 US 1039 (1973); (false statements to insurance company acting as payment agent for Medicare); United States v. Mouton, 657 F.2d 736, 739 (5th Cir. 1981)(false time sheet submitted to accounting office of community organization receiving CETA funds); United States v. Cartwright, 632 F.2d 1290, 1292-93 (5th Cir. 1980)(false statements to savings and loan association insured by FSLIC). ?rm-v.UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS U.S. Attornevs U.S. Attornevs' Manual Criminal Resource Manual CRM 500-999 Criminal Resource Manual 901-999 907. Statements Warranting Prosecution Whether the relationship between the fraudulent statement and the Federal government is sufficient to warrant prosecution, and possible conviction by a jury at trial, will depend on the context of the false statement. Not all false statements violate 18 U.S.C. 1001. False statements warranting prosecution may be made in at least three ways: 1. directly to a Federal agency, such as an application form for employment or a required form; 2. to a private person or institution which implements federal programs; and 3. in business records that may be subject to Federal government inspection. These various acts have one common feature: they may affect either the operation or integrity of the government. All that is necessary for jurisdiction is that the false statement touch on a Federal interest, it affect or influence that interest. The only limitation on this rule is that the Federal interest must exist at the time the false statement is made; it cannot arise after the defendant has made a false statement. Once Federal jurisdiction has been determined issues of materiality, knowledge, and falsity arise. [cited in USAM 9?42.001 906. Jurisdictional Requirements Satisfied up; 908. Elements of 18 U.S.C. 1001 3 United States Department ofjustie IE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS US. Attorneys U.S. Attornevs' Manual Criminal Resource Manual CRM 500-999 Criminal Resource Manual 901-999 908. Elements of 18 U.S.C. 1001 Section 1001?s statutory terms are violated if someone: 1. "falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme or device a material fact," 2. "makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations," 3. "makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry" 4. and, for cases arising after the 1996 amendments, the item at issue was material. Whether the above acts are criminal depends on whether there is an affirmative response to each of the following questions: 1. Was the act or statement material? 2. Was the act within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States? and 3. Was the act done knowingly and willfully? [Cited in USAM 942.001] 907. Statements Warranting Prosecution up 909. False Statement) 5? United States Dcpartmc nt nfuiustic OFFICES UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS U.S. Attorneys U.S. Attornevs' Manual Criminal Resource Manual CRM 500?999 Criminal Resource Manual 901-999 910. Knowingly and Willfully The prohibition of 18 U.S.C. 1001 requires that the false statement, concealment or cover up be "knowingly and willfully" done, which means that "The statement must have been made with an intent to deceive, a design to induce belief in the falsity or to mislead, but 1001 does not require an intent to defraud -- that is, the intent to deprive someone of something by means of deceit." United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1276-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980). The government may prove that a false statement was made "knowingly and willfully" by offering evidence that defendants acted deliberately and with knowledge that the representation was false. See United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1990). Thejury may conclude from a plan of elaborate lies and half-truths that defendants deliberately conveyed information they knew to be false to the government. Id. at 214-15. As used in the statute, the term ?knowingly" requires only that the defendant acted with knowledge of the falsity. See United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1287-89 (5th Cir. 1976). As in other situations, to commit an act "knowingly? is to do so with knowledge or awareness of the facts or situation, and not because of mistake, accident or some other innocent reason. See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, 1.35 (1990). Knowledge of the criminal statute governing the conduct is not required. The false statement need not be made with an intent to defraud if there is an intent to mislead or to induce belief in its falsity. Reckless disregard of whether a statement is true, or a conscious effort to avoid learning the truth, can be construed as acting "knowingly." United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978). A defendant is not relieved of the consequences of a material misrepresentation by lack of knowledge when the means of ascertaining truthfulness are available. In appropriate circumstances, the government may establish the defendant's knowledge of falsity by proving that the defendant either knew the statement was false or acted with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth. See United States v. West, 666 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1981); Lange, 528 F.2d at 1288; United States v. Clearfield, 358 F. Supp. 564, 574 (ED. Pa. 1973). Proof that the defendant acted with reckless disregard or reckless indifference may therefore satisfy the knowledge requirement, when the defendant makes a false material statement and consciously avoids learning the facts or intends to deceive the government. See United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120, 1122 (5th Cir. 1979). The term "willfully" means no more than that the forbidden act was done deliberately and with knowledge, and does not require proof of evil intent. McC/anahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 US 824 (1956); McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 US 934 (1956). An act is done "willfully" if done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids. There is no requirement that the government show evil intent on the part of a defendant in order to prove that the act was done "willfully." See generally United States v. Gregg, 612 F.2d 43, 50~51 (2d Cir. 1979); American Surety Company v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1925)(Hand, United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970),cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971) (involving 15 U.S.C. 32(a). See also 1 E. Devitt, C. Blackmar, M. Wolff K. O'Malley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 17.05 (1992). [cited in USAM 9-42.001 909. False Statement g9 911. Materiality> (fitness/?THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS U.S. Attornevs U.S. Attornevs' Manual Criminal Resource Manual CRM 500-999 Criminal Resource Manual 901-999 911. Materiality Amended section 1001 (1996) expressly includes materiality as an element under each of the three clauses in subsection This resolves a conflict among the courts on that issue. See, 9.9., United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. E/kin, 731 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1984). After United States v. Gaudin, 115 2310 (1995), materiality is an issue to be determined by the jury. Gaudin, held that it was error for a trial court to refuse to submit the question of materiality to the jury in a prosecution under the first prong of 18 U.S.C. 1001, overturning lower court cases holding that materiality was a legal question for the court. The Supreme Court held that if materiality is an element of the offense, that element must be submitted to the jury, and the jury must find materiality beyond a reasonable doubt to convict. Gaudin is probably not limited to 18 U.S.C. 1001, but may apply to any other offenses in which the materiality of a false statement is an element of the offense, such as 18 U.S.C. 1005, 1006, 1014 (false statements to various ?nancial institutions); 1542 (false statement to obtain passport); 1621 and 1623 (perjury); and 26 U.S.C. 7206 (false statements on a tax return). This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. See United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)(collecting statutes possibly affected by the new ruling), aff?d, 115 2310 (1995). Although in Gaudin the Court did not explicitly hold that materiality was an element of each branch of 18 U.S.C. 1001, the majority View is that the element of materiality pervades the entire statute. See generally United States v. Adler, 633 F.2d 1287, 1291 (8th Cir. 1980)(the majority view is that the element of materiality pervades the entire statute). Nor did the Gaudin court define "materiality," under 18 U.S.C. 1001, noting that the parties had agreed to a definition. ln Gaudin the parties agreed to the definition from Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988), a denaturalization case under 8 U.S.C. 1451 in which the Supreme Court noted that the Federal courts have long displayed a quite uniform understanding of the materiality concept embodied in statutes criminalizing false statements to public officials, including 18 U.S.C. 1001. Specifically, the Court stated that "[t]he most common formulation of that understanding is that a concealment or misrepresentation is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed." 485 US. at 770 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish materiality as an element, it is suf?cient that the statement have the capacity or a natural tendency to influence the determination required to be made. See ld.; United States v. Lueben, 838 F.2d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Allen, 892 F.2d 66, 67 (10th Cir. 1989). One often cited test for materiality appears in United States v. Weinstock, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (DC. Cir. 1956): "Material" when used in respect to evidence is often confused with "relevant," but the two terms have wholly different meanings. To be "relevant" means to relate to the issue. To be "material" means to have probative weight, reasonably likely to in?uence the tribunal in making a determination required to be made. A statement may be relevant but not material. For example, a passport applicant's false statements as to name, identity, and citizenship were material to the State Department's decision as to whether to grant a passport. United States v. Ramos, 725 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir. 1984). Thus, the test for materiality under 18 U.S.C. 1001 is not whether the false statement actually influenced a government function, but whether it had the capacity to influence. Lueben, 838 F.2d at 754; United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1980). Weinstock held that "the issue to which the false statement is material need not be the main issue; it may be a collateral issue. And it need not bear directly upon the issue but may merely augment or diminish the evidence upon some point. But it must have some weight in the process of reaching a decision." 231 F.2d at 703. Materiality is best shown by the testimony of a witness, generally those who make the decisions on the application or statements in the particular case, concerning the influence that defendant's allegedly false statement might have had on the ultimate result of the transaction. Such a witness may be an expert witness or a fact witness, or both. [cited in USAM 9-42.001] 910. KnowinQIV and Willfully up 912. Falsity 59 United States Department ofuiustic UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS U.S. Attornevs U.S. Attornevs' Manual Criminal Resource Manual CRM 500-999 Criminal Resource Manual 901-999 912. Falsity Section 1001 of Title 18, United States Code, requires that the statement or representation actually be false, and the government has the burden of establishing the alleged falsity of the statement. Webster?s 3d International Dictionary defines the adjective "false" as "not corresponding to truth or reality." Although a statement may be misleading, unauthorized, or even fraudulent, a conviction under this section generally cannot be sustained unless the statement also is false. See United States v. Diego, 320 F.2d 898, 905-09 (2d Cir. true that defendant married). The statute also covers half-truths where there is a duty to speak the truth--as in a sworn deposition before an agency. See generally United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1948), affd, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); United States v. DeRosa, 783 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986). The question whether a literally true statement can also be a false representation is an open one. While the Diogo court held that a literally true statement cannot be said to be a false representation, a contrary holding was reached in United States v. Rodgers, 624 F.2d 1303, 1310- 11 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981). This problem often can be avoided by casting the indictment in terms of a "concealment of a material fact? rather than the making of a false statement or representation. Diego, 320 F.2d 902. A false or fictitious statement or representation is an assertion that is untrue when made or when used, and that is known by the person making it to be untrue. United States v. Worthington, 822 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944 (1987). A fraudulent statement or representation is an assertion that is known to be untrue and that is made or used with the intent to deceive. Id.; 2 E. Devitt, C. Blackmar 8 K. O'Malley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 37.08 (1990). The government need prove only that the statements were false "under a reasonable interpretation.? United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1980). But if a defendant's statement (or the government's question or form requiring an answer) is ambiguous, it is incumbent upon the government to negate any reasonable interpretation that could make the defendant's statement factually correct. See United States v. Anderson, 579 F.2d 455 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978); United States v. Race, 632 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Migliaccio, 34 F.3d 1517 (10th Cir. 1994)(involving 1341). Thus, the defendant may wish to offer evidence, including expert testimony, that a government form or document was vague and ambiguous. United States v. Barsanti, 943 F.2d 428, 432-33 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992); United States v. Hauck, 980 F.2d 611, 614 (10th Cir. 1992). In United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1991), the court found the airman's medical certificate (which included two of 23 questions about "convictions" on a form regarding medical history) was fundamentally vague. Finally, even if a question is arguably ambiguous, "the defendant's understanding of the question is a matter for the jury to decide." United States v. Bell, 623 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir. 1980). [Cited in USAM 9-42.001) 911. Materiality mg 913. Department or Aqencv United States Department nf?lustic . OFFICES TIIE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS U.S. Attornevs U.S. Attornevs' Manual Criminal Resource Manual CRM 500-999 Criminal Resource Manual 901-999 913. Department or Agency For cases before the 1996 amendments, in Hubbard v. United States, 115 1754 (1995), the United States Supreme Court concluded that a court is neither a "department" nor an "agency" under 1001. The court thereby overruled United States V. Brambiett, 348 US 503 (1955), a case broadly construing 18 U.S.C. 1001 in holding that the word "department" in Section 1001 was meant to extend the statute's reach to all three branches of government. Section 6 of Title 18, United States Code, defines the words department and agency. Although the Hubbard opinion left open the possibility that a judicial or legislative entity might still be considered an "agency" under section 1001, several courts have interpreted Hubbard broadly to mean that section 1001 applies only to false statements made to the executive branch. See, United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640 (DC. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 1288 (1996); United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1301 (DC. Cir. 1995). As of this writing, there is still pending in the District of Columbia Circuit an interlocutory appeal concerning whether the old version of section 1001, even after Hubbard, still applies to financial disclosure statements that Members of Congress ?led, pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act, with the Clerk of the House of Representatives before October 11, 1996. See United States v. Oakar, No. 96-3084 (DC. Cir.). Prosecutors therefore should not concede, in any pleadings or arguments presented in federal courts, that the old section 1001 does not apply to such statements, at least untilthe? Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decides this case. The 1996 statute effectively overrules Hubbard, and expressly provides that section 1001 covers false statements that are made to all three branches of the federal government, without regard to whether the entity may be categorized as a "department" or "agency." Under both the pre-1996 and post-1996 statutes, the government is not required to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge that the false statement in question was within the jurisdiction of a Federal department or agency. See United States v. Yermian, 468 US. 63, 68 (1984); on remand, 741 F.2d 267 (1984). Nor must the government prove that the defendant had the specific intent to deceive the Federal government. Yermian, 468 US. at 73. After United States v. Gaudin, 115 (1995), the element of agencyjurisdiction is probably a jury issue. But cf. United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984); United States v. Diaz, 690 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Goidstein, 695 F.2d 1228 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 462 US. 1132 (1983). The requirement that the statement must be "within the jurisdiction" of a federal agency is to be interpreted broadly. Rodgers; United States v. Notarantonio, 758 F.2d 777, 787 (1 st Cir. 1985). For liability under Section 1001 to attach, it is necessary only that the "false statements . . . result in the perversion of the authorized functions of a federal department or agency." United States v. Gilli/and, 312 US. 86, 93 (1941); Notarantonio, 758 F.2d at 787. In United States v. Candelia, 487 F.2d 1223 (2d Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 415 US. 977 (1974), for example, false affidavits submitted by movers were executed on forms prepared by the City of New York and not by the Department of Housing and Urban Development; but the false affidavits were within the purview of 18 U.S.C. 1001, because the city had entered into a contract with the United States prompting the move, the government was ultimately responsible for paying the moving expenses, and the movers were aware of the relationship between the government and the city. Candella makes clear that Section 1001 "does not require that the false statement must actually have been submitted to a department or agency of the United States, but rather that it was contemplated that the statement was to be utilized in a matter which was within the jurisdiction of such department or agency." Id. at 1227. in Candella, one of the purposes of the records was to provide an "audit trail" for Federal program auditors. See also United States v. Kraude, 467 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 US. 1076 (1972); United States v. Waters, 457 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1972). In United States v. Munoz, 392 F. Supp. 183 (ED. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 526 (6th Cir. 1975), the Department of Labor had authority to regulate the use of funds distributed through a national organization that was a contractor to the Department of Labor, to a state-chartered non- profit organization that was a subcontractor to the national organization. Any false statement submitted to the state-chartered organization under such circumstances was held to be a matter within the "jurisdiction of an agency or department of the United States." Munoz reaffirms not only the proposition that the fraud need not be perpetrated directly on or to the governmental agency involved but also that the term ?jurisdiction" in Section 1001 should not be given a narrow or technical meaning. See also Bryson v. United States, 396 US. 64 (1969). [cited in USAM 9-42.001 912. Falsity up 914. Concealment--Failure to Disclose United States Department of?iustic .nr?1?r?rr-l?r -- . .. .., .. vy. ..-. M. .- ., . . ., gum. :Alihxc nan-u.? e, . ?nu-c . Im'?a' . r?J UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS U.S. Attornevs U.S. Attornevs' Manual Criminal Resource Manual CRM 500-999 Criminal Resource Manual 901-999 914. Concealment--Failure to Disclose Although 18 U.S.C. 1001 is often referred to as a false statement statute, its scope extends beyond statements. The statute proscribes the acts of making false statements, falsifying, concealing or covering up. The statute also covers half-truths if there is a duty to Speak the truth. See generally United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd, 344 US. 604 (1953). Concealment and cover-up are essentially identical concepts and often result from falsification. These acts need not have any relation to a statement or representation. A concealment may involve a failure to disclose or partial disclosures of information required on an application form; however, when using such a theory, the government must prove that the defendant had a duty to disclose the facts in question at the time of the alleged concealment of them. United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 678-79 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 US. 1016 (1982). Concealment may also involve a merely physical act of concealment such as transferring inspection stamps, changing numbers on bottles to conceal rejection, conceal use of certain drugs, or using false stamps to conceal ownership of tobacco. Some courts have required that the government be prepared to prove that the ?concealment by trick" consisted of af?rmative acts. United States v. London, 550 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1977). [Cited in USAM 913. Department or Agency up 915. False Statements as to Future Actions