July 2, 2017 BY ELECTRONIC MAIL The Honorable Kris Kobach Vice-Chair Presidential Commission on Election Integrity C/o Office of the Kansas Secretary of State Memorial Hall, 1st Floor 120 SW 10th Avenue Topeka, KS 66612-1594 Dear Vice-Chair Kobach: In support of the Presidential Commission on Election Integrity, I am writing to present you with evidence which may significantly contribute to your study of relevant facts within the Commission’s defined parameters. A good deal of national attention has thus far focused1 on section (c) of your Commission’s Mission, namely vulnerabilities and practices used for Federal elections that could lead to, “improper voter registrations and improper voting, including fraudulent voter registrations and fraudulent voting”. The purpose of this letter is to provide you with additional information regarding activities by the Obama Administration, the Clinton campaign and their transnational criminal associates which attempted to undermine the fairness and honesty of the 2016 Federal election in the United States; this information speaks directly to the policies, activities, strategies, and practices covered in the preceding sections of the Commission’s Mission: (a)! those laws, rules, policies, activities, strategies, and practices that enhance the American people's confidence in the integrity of the voting processes used in Federal elections; and (b)! those laws, rules, policies, activities, strategies, and practices that undermine the American people's confidence in the integrity of the voting processes used in Federal elections.2 In describing the Presidential Election Process, the official USA.gov website of the United States government summarizes the General Election as follows: “The presidential candidates campaign throughout the country in an attempt to win the support of the general population… General 1 Brandon Carter, “Trump election panel asks all 50 states for voter roll data,” The Hill, June 29, 2017. [http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/340117-trump-election-integritycommission-requests-years-of-voter-data-from] 2 Donald J. Trump, “Presidential Executive Order on the Establishment of Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity,” White House, May 11, 2017. [https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/11/presidential-executive-orderestablishment-presidential-advisory] election campaigning begins after a single nominee is chosen from each political party, via primaries, caucuses, and national conventions. These candidates travel the country, explaining their views and plans to the general population and trying to win the support of potential voters.”3 Unfortunately, President Trump’s campaign was illicitly hindered by U.S. government officials given the Obama Administration’s misuse of federal resources of the Intelligence Community in their unjustified attacks on myself and other volunteers who peacefully supported his campaign as private citizens. Although I was unable to play any material role in the campaign given these intolerable personal attacks, these illegitimate efforts by the U.S. Government left an unnecessary dark cloud over the Trump campaign based on nothing more than complete lies. These unpardonable actions represented an inexcusable effort to undermine election integrity, both before the November 2016 election and in the months since. As you may be aware, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights led a 2016 observation mission in the United States which had a mission to, “Assess these elections for their compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation.” I have included as an attachment my letter to the OSCE dated October 28, 2016 which summarizes some of the cornerstone violations of democratic norms that were damaged during the Obama Administration. Given the fact that the illicit attempts by the Obama Administration and their associates to rig the 2016 election in favor of their appointed heir fell short and the risks to American democracy were relieved over the immediate term, the OSCE did not directly address these matters further.4 However, the work of your Commission offers an essential opportunity to take further steps toward helping to further restore the integrity of American democracy following their abuses of last year. During the past eight months since I submitted my original letter to the OSCE, a steady drip of additional evidence has been disclosed to the public about the illegitimate Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants that were allegedly filed by the Obama Administration against me in 2016. As reported in an unfortunate front-page Washington Post article about the civil rights abuses committed: “Applications for FISA warrants, Comey said, are often thicker than his wrists, and that thickness represents all the work Justice Department attorneys and FBI agents have to do to convince a judge that such surveillance is appropriate in an investigation.”5 If this thickness is indeed the case for last year’s FISA warrant, it will inevitably be filled with a potpourri of falsehoods from the Clinton/Obama regime which fabricated this travesty and undermined election integrity from the outset. 3 “Presidential Election Process,” USA.gov. [https://www.usa.gov/election#item-212586] “United States of America, Election Observation Mission press conference,” 9 November 2016. [http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/usa/246356] 5 Ellen Nakashima, Devlin Barrett and Adam Entous, "FBI obtained FISA warrant to monitor Trump adviser Carter Page" Washington Post, April 12, 2017. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-obtained-fisa-warrant-to-monitorformer-trump-adviser-carter-page/2017/04/11/620192ea-1e0e-11e7-ad743a742a6e93a7_story.html] 4 2 I have been in contact with the relevant U.S. Department of Justice offices regarding outstanding requests for the immediate release of this information. These personal appeals for public disclosure have echoed recent loud cries across America’s political spectrum from left to right, including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)6 and Judicial Watch (JW).7 As a major affront to our democracy, the complete mockery that the Obama Administration allegedly attempted to make of the 2016 election underscores the importance of these essential steps today. I will plan to make these documents available to your Commission following their eventual disclosure. By all accounts, the issuance of the Obama Administration’s fake FISA warrants for exercising basic First Amendment rights may be among the most unwarranted abuses of power that I and most Americans have ever witnessed in any election throughout our lifetimes. We must get to the bottom of this as quickly and efficiently as possible. I hope that details regarding my case partially fill that gap in keeping with this relevant Section of your Commission’s Mission statement: Section (b), Presidential Commission on Election Integrity, regarding “those laws, rules, policies, activities, strategies, and practices that undermine the American people's confidence in the integrity of the voting processes used in Federal elections”. During the opening remarks of Senator Sheldon Whitehouse at a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism meeting in May 2017, he presented a helpful table for thinking about government active measures that might have undermined the confidence of many Americans in the integrity of the 2016 Federal elections.8 6 “With just the stroke of a pen, President Trump could provide the public with the information necessary to assess his claims that the Obama administration improperly surveilled him and his associates.” Neema Singh Guliani, “How Trump Can Show Us Whether He Was Spied On,” ACLU Washington Markup Blog, April 13, 2017. [https://www.aclu.org/blog/washingtonmarkup/how-trump-can-show-us-whether-he-was-spied] 7 Press Room, “Judicial Watch Sues for FBI Records on UK ‘Trump Dossier’,” Judicial Watch, May 16, 2017. [http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/judicial-watch-sues-fbirecords-uk-trump-dossier/] “Hillary Clinton’s national security crimes included running the most highly classified material the U.S. possesses across her outlaw server without legal consequence. If Communications Intelligence is used as a partisan political weapon without people going to jail, we will have crossed the point of no return for institutional corruption in our government, our intelligence services and law enforcement.” Chris Farrell, “On Watch: Episode 11 – ‘Corrupt Weaponizing of Intelligence Collection’,” Judicial Watch, March 28, 2017. [http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/watch-episode-11-corruptweaponizing-intelligence-collection/] 8 “Opening Remarks of Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, May 8, 2017,” Senator Whitehouse website. [https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-0508%20SJCCT%20hearing%20opening%20remarks%20as%20delivered.pdf] 3 Based on his same analytic framework, below is a summary of the Clinton/Obama Regime Toolbox used in meddling in the 2016 election as per my direct personal experiences: Clinton/Obama Regime Toolbox in the 2016 Election Yes No ? Examples Propaganda, Fake 2016 Dodgy Dossier saturated private media News since August 2016; RFE/RL repeats. √ Hacking and theft of political information Timed leaks of damaging material √ √ Assassination and political violence Investment control in key economic sectors √ Shady business / financial ties √ Yes, if unjustified FISA warrant news proves to be correct Felony #1: Illegal leaking of “Male-1” identity Felony #2: Illegal leaking of unjustified FISA warrant identity Yes, threats to my life following Clinton campaign fake news & commentary Coercion related to miniscule Gazprom ADR investment following gangster tactics by Harry Reid Cash payoffs related to 2016 Dodgy Dossier (Clinton associates <-> Steele) Corrupting / compromising politicians √ Cash payoffs related to 2016 Dodgy Dossier (U.S. Government <-> Steele) √ Although I still do not have all complete information at this stage while I await the aforementioned disclosure regarding the Obama Administration’s actions, Senator Grassley, Senator Graham and others members of the Senate Judiciary Committee have taken positive steps to help address these genuinely problematic active measures by the Obama Administration which unsuccessfully sought to influence last year’s election.9 In an opening statement by Congressman Adam Schiff before a House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on March 20, 2017, he spoke to alleged abuses by foreign entities during the 2016 U.S. election. This information represented a highly relevant instance of external interference given the transnational actor Steele’s connection to Obama Administration 9 Catherine Herridge, Pamela K. Browne and Cyd Upson, “Comey pressed for anti-Trump dossier in classified Russia report, sources say,” Fox News, May 05, 2017. [http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/05/05/comey-pressed-for-anti-trump-dossier-inclassified-russia-report-sources-say.html] 4 officials and U.S. Government agents under their command which originally assisted in misleading him: “According to Christopher Steele, a British — a former British intelligence officer, who is reportedly held in high regard by U.S. intelligence, Russian sources tell him that Page has also had a secret meeting with Igor Sechin, CEO of the Russian gas giant, Rosneft. Sechin is reported to be a former KGB agent and close friend of Putin's…. Is it a coincidence that the Russian gas company, Rosneft, sold a 19 percent share after former British intelligence officer Steele was told by Russian sources that Carter Page was offered fees on a deal of just that size?”10 The fact that Steele was “held in high regard by U.S. intelligence” seems to provide further supporting evidence of the extensive collusion between this transnational Clinton associate and the Obama Administration, as U.S. Government agencies allegedly supported their domestic political intelligence operation. Amongst many other complete lies that originated from that foreign entity in his 2016 Dodgy Dossier, this above-mentioned excerpt regarding the Rosneft sale from the highly inaccurate document concocted by the political consultant associated with the Clinton campaign Mr. Steele remained one of the primary false allegations against me throughout much of last year. Yet a month after the election, Switzerland-based Glencore plc was revealed as the actual buyer of that stake in December 2016 – a company founded by Marc Rich. With respect to potential coincidences as Representative Schiff alluded to on March 20, I have never met with any member of Glencore's executive management. But there is someone who coincidentally has had an exceptionally close relationship with Glencore’s top management via its founder. This was described in the 2001 proceedings before the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform regarding “The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich”. As then-Representative Bernie Sanders said during those hearings: “I think it is important that we have this hearing, that we learn about what Mr. Clinton did and his terrible lapse in judgment, but if we are going to talk about money in politics, let’s talk about money in politics, the influence that money had on Mr. Clinton…”11 To help further illustrate how disgraceful this process of the U.S. Government’s active measures with foreign entities was by the Obama Administration during the 2016 election, it is also worth recalling some of last year’s final misdeeds by former Gang of Eight member Harry Reid. Characteristic of some of the ongoing investigations which he helped instigate with Comey and typical of his personal level of integrity, Mr. Reid has previously stated that making prior false claims without any evidence during the preceding U.S. Presidential election in 2012 was “one of 10 Rowan Scarborough, “Desperate Dems cling to discredited spy dossier to link Trump to Russians,” The Washington Times, March 21, 2017. [http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/21/discredited-dossier-detailing-trumprussian-collus/] 11 https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/12/2001_The_Controversial_Pardon_of_International_Fu gitive_Marc_Rich.pdf 5 the best things I’ve ever done.”12 Although this is obviously almost the exact same thing which again happened against me and the Trump campaign last year, it is my hope that your Commission might help restore the integrity of U.S. elections by calling for higher standards as compared to such gangster tactics and the transnational veritable organized crime network that Reid leveraged during the 2016 election.13 Lehoucq’s Annual Review of Political Science article entitled, “Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences,” noted that: “Electoral systems that dampen turnout may simultaneously encourage fraud.”14 Clearly the alleged active measures by the U.S. Intelligence Community under the orders of the Obama Administration would indeed dampen voter turnout if such civil rights abuses were ever allowed to be repeated in future elections. Demonstrating the extreme loyalty which James Comey maintained for the Clinton campaign and Obama Administration including his surreptitious steps toward voter intimidation, it is worth noting that neither he nor any other member of the U.S. intelligence community ever responded in 2016 to my letter which clarified the facts surrounding these false allegations (below). 12 Chris Cillizza, “Harry Reid lied about Mitt Romney’s taxes. He’s still not sorry,” Washington Post, September 15, 2016. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/15/harryreid-lied-about-mitt-romneys-taxes-hes-still-not-sorry/] Ben Terris, “‘I hate palm trees’: The sentimental journey of Harry Reid,” Washington Post, September 14, 2016. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/i-hate-palm-trees-the-sentimental-journey-ofharry-reid/2016/09/14/afcfc6bc-7301-11e6-be4f-3f42f2e5a49e_story.html] 13 Particularly in light of the alleged collusion with the 2016 Dodgy Dossier author in the U.K., they precisely match the definition of Transnational Organized Crime: “Those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, and monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption…” “Transnational Organized Crime: Glossary of Terms,” FBI website. [https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/organized-crime] 14 Fabrice Lehoucq, “Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences,” Annual Review of Political Science, 6, 2003, p. 253. [https://ucdenver.instructure.com/courses/3034/files/377939] 6 September 25, 2016 The Honorable James Comey Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20535 Dear Director Comey: I am writing to request the FBI’s prompt end of the reported inquiry regarding my personal trip to Russia in July 2016 – an investigation which has been widely mentioned in the media. In this regard, I wanted to provide you with a few basic facts which should help underscore what a complete waste of time this witch-hunt directed at me is. As you may be aware, the source of these accusations is nothing more than completely false media reports. Yet for the record, I have not met this year with any sanctioned individual in Russia or any other country despite the fact that there are no restrictions on U.S. persons speaking with such individuals. I understand that my stake in PJSC Gazprom has also been brought to your attention. For your information, last month I sold my American Depository Receipts in Gazprom. At this time, I maintain no holding in the company within any of my investment entities or personal accounts. My prior stake in Gazprom which I divested last month represented a de minimis equity investment that I sold at a loss. It is hard to imagine why this might have been deemed relevant, but I wanted to mention it since you were asked to look into this matter. In bothering the Bureau with such repeated appeals, the parties who have requested my investigation clearly fail to appreciate the risks they create for America with these shenanigans. Instead of allowing the staff of the FBI to focus the nation’s limited resources on real threats, these desperate and unfounded calls for my investigation as a private citizen to advance political interests based on nothing more than preposterous mainstream media reports is a true disgrace. Having interacted with members of the U.S. intelligence community including the FBI and CIA for many decades, I appreciate the limitations on your staff’s time and resources. Although I have not been contacted by any member of your team in recent months, I would eagerly await their call to discuss any final questions they might have in the interest of helping them put these outrageous allegations to rest while allowing each of us to shift our attention to useful matters. Thank you in advance for your consideration. Sincerely, Carter Page Although I was never subsequently contacted last year by any official from the FBI as requested in the above correspondence, I did eventually learn that an intensive domestic political surveillance operation was instead initiated on behalf of the Clinton campaign. This represented 7 a critical step which might have undermined the integrity of the 2016 election if the Obama Administration had succeeded in these efforts. It has been reported that the U.S. Government offered $50,000 to the transnational political research operatives of the Clinton campaign – apparently a special treat from the Obama Administration to supplement whatever undisclosed, presumably larger amount was already paid by Clinton associates for Steele’s 2016 Dodgy Dossier.15 The widespread lies hastily collected in the Dodgy Dossier might have carried potentially disastrous results for the integrity of the 2016 election had voters fallen for their dishonesty. Based on extensive reporting related to these completely unjustified civil rights abuses committed in 2016, there is a widespread need to protect ourselves in the future from similar illegal violations of our democracy by dishonest, corrupt politicians in the homeland seeking to advance their personal and partisan interests. While a September 23, 2016 news article stated that, “U.S. intelligence agencies have also received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide while in Moscow,” 16 it wasn’t until several months later in January 2017 that the source of this false evidence became fully known17: the Dodgy Dossier prepared on behalf of the "Hillary for America” campaign. As a potential severe case of election fraud, any FISA warrant would help ascertain whether criminal obstruction of justice in the form of false evidence may be the case. After the report by Yahoo News, the Clinton campaign put out an equally false press release just minutes after the article was released that afternoon.18 Compounding this transnational disinformation initiative, U.S. Government-funded propaganda outlets further undermined election integrity by echoing the lies advanced by the Clinton campaign’s Dodgy Dossier (again, in contrast to what Steele himself said was "never supposed to be made public"19). As dutifully recited by the Obama Administration-sponsored Radio Free 15 Chuck Ross, “Here’s How Much The FBI Planned To Pay Trump Dossier Author,” Chuck Ross, Daily Caller, April 22, 2017. [http://dailycaller.com/2017/04/22/heres-how-much-the-fbiplanned-to-pay-trump-dossier-author/] 16 Michael Isikoff, “U.S. intel officials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin,” Yahoo News, September 23, 2016. [https://www.yahoo.com/news/u-s-intel-officials-probe-tiesbetween-trump-adviser-and-kremlin-175046002.html] 17 Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder and Mark Schoofs, “These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia,” BuzzFeed News, January 10, 2017. [https://www.buzzfeed.com/kenbensinger/these-reports-allege-trump-has-deep-ties-to-russia] 18 Hillary for America, “Hillary for America Statement on Bombshell Report About Trump Aide’s Chilling Ties To Kremlin,” September 23, 2016. [https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/statements/2016/09/23/hillary-for-america-statementon-bombshell-report-about-trump-aides-chilling-ties-to-kremlin/] 19 Rowan Scarborough, “Ex-spy admits anti-Trump dossier unverified, blames Buzzfeed for publishing,” Washington Times, April 25, 2017. [http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/25/christopher-steele-admits-dossier-chargeunverifie/] 8 Europe / Radio Liberty news network in September 2016: “Yahoo News cited the same Western intelligence source as saying that U.S. intelligence officials have received reports that Page has also met with Igor Diveikin, a right-hand man of Vyacheslav Volodin, Putin's first deputy chief of staff and a key architect of Russia's political landscape during Putin's third term.”20 Just days before the election, the same U.S. Government-funded sources repeated these fabrications: “Another adviser, Carter Page, reportedly met with top Kremlin officials including those under U.S. sanctions.”21 In a further failed attempt to undermine the integrity of the 2016 election, the propagation of these falsehoods was indeed truly state-sponsored by our taxpayer dollars given Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s FY 2016 budget of $108.4 million in direct federal subsidies. Your recent public suggestion that, “Why Not Look at The Data,” underscored the need for an analytic approach to considering the integrity of the 2016 election.22 I hope this information might help in your ongoing efforts. I would welcome any questions you may have as you complete the important work of your Commission. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can provide further assistance. Sincerely, Carter Page, Ph.D. Attachment: Letter to OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ Election Observation Mission to the U.S. Copy to: Connie Lawson, Secretary of State of Indiana Bill Gardner, Secretary of State of New Hampshire Matthew Dunlap, Secretary of State of Maine Ken Blackwell, Former Secretary of State of Ohio Christy McCormick, Commissioner, Election Assistance Commission 20 “Report: U.S. Intelligence Officials Examining Trump Adviser's Russia Ties,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 24, 2016. [http://www.rferl.org/a/report-us-intelligenceprobes-trump-advisers-russia-ties-kremlin/28010062.html] 21 Mike Eckel, “Reset To Overload: Russia-U.S. Ties Have Changed, No Matter Who Wins The Election,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, November 6, 2016. [http://www.rferl.org/a/us-election-trump-clinton-relations-russia/28100058.html] 22 “Kris Kobach on Voter-Fraud Panel: 'Why Not Look at The Data',” MSNBC, June 30, 2017. [http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc-news/watch/kris-kobach-on-voter-fraud-panel-why-not-look-atthe-data-980833347662] 9 October 28, 2016 Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier Chairman-in-Office Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Wallnerstrasse 6 1010 Vienna, Austria Dame Audrey Glover Head of OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM), United States of America Washington, DC [via email] Dear Chairman Steinmeier and Dame Glover: I am writing to provide you with relevant information regarding several recent irregularities of the 2016 U.S. election vis-à-vis the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) inventory of election-related norms, commitments, principles, and good practices. I believe this may significantly assist the ongoing work of your Election Observation Mission (EOM) in the United States. I am not currently affiliated with any political campaign, but the continued personal attacks by the “Hillary for America” campaign against me based on completely fabricated, inaccurate information help to clearly demonstrate these violations.1 Although many aspects of this year’s election are under question, I suspect you may find the facts in my case to be among the most egregious abuses of core democratic principles. Paragraph 7.1 of the 2003 Inventory of OSCE Commitments and Other Principles for Democratic Elections summarizes the cornerstone violation of democratic norms which have been damaged in this instance: “The participating States reaffirm that [1] everyone will have the right to freedom of expression including the right to communication. This right will include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”2 On July 7, 2016, I gave a university lecture before members of the academic community at the New Economic School in Moscow based on my past scholarly research. This visit to the 1 Among the most recent, see “Hillary for America” press release of October 19, 2016. https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factchecks/2016/10/19/15-facts-about-donaldtrumps-deeply-unsetting-russia-problem-and-wikileaks/ 2 OSCE/ODIHR, “Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Participating States, a Progress Report,” 6 October 2003, 17. [“Incorporates parts of Copenhagen Document Paragraph 9 concerning the rights of free expression (including communication), peaceful assembly and demonstration, and association.”] territory of the OSCE member state Russia was outside of my role with the Donald J. Trump for President campaign at the time and I made clear on multiple occasions that my speech did not necessarily reflect the views of anyone other than myself. Nonetheless, the new ideas in my presentation unexpectedly led to significant interest among Russian, European and American observers since it reflected a major departure from recent policy approaches which have in my opinion severely damaged security and cooperation in Europe throughout recent decades. As retribution for these new ideas, on August 27, 2016, the Democratic Leader of the U.S. Senate Harry Reid sent a letter to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations James Comey calling for a personal investigation of me based on the following incorrect statement: “Questions have been raised about whether a Trump advisor who has been highly critical of US. and European economic sanctions on Russia, and who has conflicts of interest due to investments in Russian energy conglomerate Gazprom, met with high-ranking sanctioned individuals while in Moscow in July of 2016, well after Trump became the presumptive Republican nominee. (The same individual recently broke precedent by giving a speech critical of US. policy while in Moscow.).”3 This clear instance of suppression of dissent stands as an obvious attempt to silence me on an important issue of national and international consequence. As noted in the 2003 Inventory of OSCE Commitments for Democratic Elections, paragraph 7.10, “States should provide an adequate opportunity, on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis, for election contestants to inform the public about their candidacies and political programmes, including through the state media.” In keeping with the longstanding Cold War-era paranoia about Russia and although my academic lecture had no connection to the U.S. election, the discriminatory press reports against me reached proportions not seen since the 1950’s based on baseless and defamatory assertions made by the Clinton campaign. In this regard, a particularly outrageous news article on September 23 was almost entirely attributable to the "Hillary for America” campaign: “But U.S. officials have since received intelligence reports that during that same three-day trip, Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former Russian deputy prime minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft, Russian’s leading oil company, a well-placed Western intelligence source tells Yahoo News. That meeting, if confirmed, is viewed as especially problematic by U.S. officials because the Treasury Department in August 2014 named Sechin to a list of Russian officials and businessmen sanctioned over Russia’s “illegitimate and unlawful actions in the Ukraine.” (The Treasury announcement described Sechin as ‘utterly loyal to Vladimir Putin — a key component to his current standing.’ At their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page, the Western intelligence source said. “U.S. intelligence agencies have also received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide while in Moscow — Igor Diveykin. A former Russian security official, Diveykin now serves as deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. 3 https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3035844/Reid-Letter-to-Comey.pdf officials to have responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election, the Western intelligence source said.”4 On countless occasions over the months prior, many other journalists from some of the leading news agencies in the U.S. had contacted me to ask about precisely these same two meeting allegations. A few of those whom I pressed to provide some basis or source for these outrageous lies disclosed that it was the “Hillary for America” campaign which originally suggested it to them. Although most of these reporters avoided the persuasion to take this false bait, at last the Clinton campaign achieved their goal by finding a compliant media ally and put out an equally false press release just minutes after the aforementioned article was released that afternoon.5 Since these lies by the “Hillary for America” organization related to a trip that was completely unrelated to my prior activities in support of the Trump campaign, I decided to take a break from this movement on September 25 so that I could more effectively fight these allegations independently and not create a further distraction for my colleagues. As per paragraph 7.5 of the 2003 Inventory of OSCE Commitments, “States shall provide, through the state media and other means, for effective programmes of voter information and education.” The opposite has been the case for information put forward by the “Hillary for America” organization against me and subsequently supported by the anonymous “U.S. officials” as quoted in the sample article of September 23, above. As noted by the OSCE: “With respect to freedom of expression during elections, the European Court of Human Rights has called for governments to ‘display restraint’ and to accept that even offensive, shocking, and disturbing speech can contribute to pluralism and must usually be tolerated in a democratic society. This is especially true during electoral campaigns and of speech that ‘targets’ government authorities, elected officials, and candidates for office.”6 Notwithstanding these basic human rights principles, I have included my July Moscow speech for reference as an Appendix. I am confident you will agree that it is not offensive, shocking, or disturbing in any way, except perhaps from the perspective of those hawkish parties which maintain a preference for what I have previously pointed out to be failed interventionist approaches. For example, the segment on “Redefining policies of unilateral disrespect, inequality and unsanctioned intervention: The foundations of outside influence in Central Asia” in my Moscow speech (in the Appendix, below). In summary, such partisan manoeuvres stand contrary to the previously cited OSCE Principles for Democratic Elections, namely: “Freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” 4 Michael Isikoff, “U.S. intel officials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin,” Yahoo News, September 23, 2016. 5 Hillary for America, “Hillary for America Statement on Bombshell Report About Trump Aide’s Chilling Ties To Kremlin,” September 23, 2016. https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/statements/2016/09/23/hillary-for-americastatement-on-bombshell-report-about-trump-aides-chilling-ties-to-kremlin/ 6 OSCE/ODIHR, “Existing Commitments,” 2003, 69-70. All of the available evidence makes clear that I have been targeted for potential reprisal merely for vocalizing my thoughts in a free academic forum. I would echo the sentiment that several supporters of mine have noted when they express continued concern that one formidable party in an OSCE member country election has unjustly targeted me for this speech. As a further related form of their retaliation, I have learned from a reliable source that a law firm close to the Clinton campaign has hired a London-based private investigator to investigate my trip to Russia. This approach is closely consistent with past tactics that investigators affiliated with Mrs. Clinton have historically taken toward their targeted victims: “Impugn… character and veracity until… destroyed beyond all recognition.”7 I apologize for addressing this to you directly, but it may be one of few potential alternatives given the current activities of Senator Harry Reid and other “Hillary for America” partners that violate the Article 10 principles of the European Convention on Human Rights as they have unsuccessfully tried to intimidate me. Per the “Hillary for America” statement of October 19, “Carter Page is being probed by U.S. intelligence agencies for meeting with sanctioned Kremlin officials including Igor Diveykin.” Although I have never met this year with any sanctioned Kremlin official nor been contacted by any of the U.S. intelligence agencies following my July visit to Moscow, the evidence of certain connections between the “Hillary for America” campaign and some federal authorities makes me cautious to avoid seeking external support from government officials in the United States. Despite the fact that over three weeks had already passed following my formal, personal appeal to FBI Director Comey on September 25, 20168 and after these conspiracy theories had seemingly been put to rest in the media, many of the same false claims by the “Hillary for America” organization were still being pushed in their October 19, 2016 press release which I previously cited. By way of background, this ongoing series of vindictive personal attacks came at virtually the same time as the contents of Mrs. Clinton’s personal email server were being publicized and scrutinized – making these unwarranted vendetta tactics a convenient distraction technique at the time. Although I am not an expert in these email proceedings and have no information beyond what is available in the press, some of these revelations nonetheless seem to violate other elements of the 2003 Inventory of OSCE Commitments for Democratic Elections. As noted in the 1990 meeting of representatives of the participating states of OSCE’s predecessor organization, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE): “They recognize that pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, the development of human contacts and the resolution of other issues of a related humanitarian character. They therefore welcome the commitment expressed by all participating States to the ideals of democracy and political pluralism as well as their common determination to build democratic societies based 7 Megan Twohey, “How Hillary Clinton Grappled With Bill Clinton’s Infidelity, and His Accusers,” New York Times, October 2, 2016. 8 Carter Page, Letter to The Honorable James Comey, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 25, 2016. on free elections and the rule of law.”9 Thank you for your current and future planned activities which may potentially help to now revitalize such principles in the United States. Having previously served as an Arms Control Action Officer in the Pentagon during my service in the U.S. Navy, I have worked in the past on issues related to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and other initiatives of the OSCE’s predecessor, the CSCE. On more of a strategic level, the collateral damage of these personal human rights abuses against me could undoubtedly have a negative impact on the future trajectory of security and cooperation in Europe if not properly addressed. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you would like any further information on these violations. I will be in Europe and Africa until November 1st, but would be happy to meet with members of the EOM following my return to the United States. Sincerely, Carter Page, Ph.D. Appendix: Speech transcript, New Economic School, Moscow, July 7, 2016 9 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE,” 29 June 1990. The Evolution of the World Economy: Trends and Potential Carter Page Introductory speech transcript July 7, 2016 Before we get started, it’s worth highlighting a bit of background regarding some of the work that I will speak with you about today. For the last fifteen years, I have been researching, teaching, and writing about certain fundamental trends in the world economy which have continued to evolve throughout this period and the years immediately preceding it. Although this work has been separate from my day-job in the investment arena, it has given me many opportunities to present outside lectures across Russia, Europe, Asia and the United States. While I’ve always valued the constructive dialogue throughout my many lectures at several of the top universities in Russia including MGIMO, Moscow State University and HSE, I am particularly grateful for my relationship with the faculty and staff at New Economic School. So I would like to begin by thanking NES for this invitation. I also appreciate Rector Shlomo Weber giving me the opportunity to take a few minutes to have a substantive Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 2 discussion with NES students in this lecture prior to tomorrow’s commencement ceremony. I would also like to reiterate Shlomo's point that I am speaking with you today as a private citizen and business executive, so this lecture only reflects my own ideas which I have developed over years past. Therefore, the ideas discussed do not necessarily reflect other people or organizations that I may be working with at the present time. Consistent with most of my past experiences with academia, I have always found an interactive dialogue to be more mutually beneficial. Like the format tonight, most of my university lectures have been taught after working hours and have brought in participation from real-world professionals – either in the evening or on the weekends, including teaching many executive education classes. In this regard, I appreciate the many graduates of NES who have taken the time to join tonight’s conversation and bring their perspectives as practitioners. Since I see many friends and colleagues in the audience this evening, apologies in advance if my introductory lecture prior to this discussion may be repetitive as I know a number of you have heard these ideas before in several speeches I’ve given in this city over the past decade. For reference and in preparation for tonight’s conversation, here is a summary of the main topics I plan to cover: Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 3 As prevalent definitions of capitalism and related theories of political economy have been either discarded or fundamentally rewritten in recent decades, the trends and potential of the world economy has often followed suit. Offering useful case studies of these dynamics, Russia, the U.S., China and Central Asia have to varying extents each continued to adjust to new practical realities through subtle shifts in governance. Using alternative techniques and approaches, these countries and regions have each to varying degrees and in different formats balanced state control of economic development with free-market principles. These trends have variably been reflected in Central Asia’s relations with Russia, China and other neighboring states. Meanwhile, the United States and other developed powers have often criticized these regions for continuing methods prevalent during the Cold War. Yet ironically, Washington and other Western capitals have impeded potential progress through their often hypocritical focus on democratization, inequality, corruption and regime change. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 4 I’d like to start off with a story which helps to illustrate some of these dynamics. It’s great to be here at Moscow’s World Trade Center today, but a few years ago the senior management of a leading Russian company held their investor day near another World Trade Center – the one in lower Manhattan. Although this annual shareholder event had routinely been held in the same place for many years, the periphery of its location had recently emerged as a site of revolution in the changing shape of governance worldwide. In Zuccotti Park, Occupy Wall Street started a wave of protest action in 2011. Originally focused on exposing injustice, inequality, and corruption in the United States, it would spawn similar events in London, Moscow and across Europe in the period that followed. The investor day had become a major event in the annual emerging market investor calendar and the location near Zuccotti Park was particularly symbolic of relative changes seen over the past two decades. However, similar shareholder meetings are often held in New York by their peers including Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGas, Russia’s Rosneft, PetroChina and other statecontrolled energy companies during the course of the year. While the location of the company’s investor day and Occupy Wall Street meetings were physically adjacent, their substance and tactics reflected distinct differences. As the Occupy demonstrations had focused on exercising verbal instruments of power, the company’s meeting remained concentrated on actions that its employees had recently taken. The Russian company outlined its recent steps to expand in new production regions, introduce an array of innovations, improve energy efficiency and lower carbon emissions. There was relatively little evidence that many members of the U.S. Congress or the Presidential Administration chose to make the short trip in Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 5 order to participate in meetings with the Occupy protesters. Despite the 4,700 mile flight or over twenty times greater than the distance from Washington, the company’s management travelled to engage in a beneficial dialogue with U.S. investors.1 The diversity of alternative perspectives that produced and criticized the Occupy Movement also stand in sharp contrast to the pervasive disapproval amongst Western scholars and other experts regarding standards of governance in Russia, China, and Central Asia. Previewing the more adverse reviews that lie within recent books and reflecting a broad consensus amongst experts, some of the latest popular titles in the scholarly literature have referred to “Chaos, Violence, Dynasty” and “Predatory Regimes”.2 As once noted by Jack Fuller who recently passed away last month, these patterns follow broader trends in the mainstream Western discourse by which, “Nakedly emotional approaches to news, often involving expression of opinion and lacking verification of factual assertions, gained both audience and credibility…. The newest or most negative information, being most available to the mind, is often taken to be the most significant, when in fact it may be trivial or beside the point.”3 In his seminal Long Telegram of February 1946, a government bureaucrat named George Kennan famously argued that, “At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.”4 While the perspectives of leaders in Russia and the CIS countries have fundamentally advanced 1 Gene Marcial, “Obama, Congressional Leaders Must Meet With Occupy Wall Street Leaders,” Forbes, October 10, 2011. [http://www.forbes.com/sites/genemarcial/2011/10/10/obama-congressional-leaders-mustmeet-with-occupy-wall-street-leaders/] 2 Eric Max McGlinchey, Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011. Scott Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in Central Asia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010. 3 Jack Fuller, What Is Happening to News: The Information Explosion and the Crisis in Journalism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010, 2-80. 4 George Kennan's "Long Telegram", February 22, 1946. (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm) Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 6 in recent decades, the West’s combination of a nearly universal critical tone and continued proactive steps to encourage leadership change overseas may understandably advance a residual level of insecurity. Today, a broad Western consensus has defined these societies as largely state controlled, ridden with corruption or both. Although that may in some ways be partially true in any country including in the United States, recent history has exposed opportunities to build upon mutual interests in ways that are often hidden by this intolerance. Proactive steps toward mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit The same week as that company’s investor day in New York, China's then Vice President Xi Jinping gave a speech to senior U.S. Government officials and business leaders at the Marriott Wardman Park Hotel in Washington in February 2012. As heir apparent to President Hu Jintao whose term was drawing to an end, Xi’s visit was closely watched in the United States and around the world. During his speech, he suggested four steps that the U.S. and China could take to improve bilateral relations. In essence, each of his points highlighted not only philosophical differences with the U.S., but also the alternative tactics that China has taken in its approach to international affairs and investment policy in Central Asia and worldwide. First, Xi Jinping noted the central importance of steadily increasing mutual understanding and strategic trust. He quoted a Chinese saying, "Without trust, one can achieve nothing."5 This essential idea captures a key insight for U.S. analysts who have been confused by the reception that American leaders have received in Russia over recent decades. While Washington has historically taken proactive steps 5 More recently, these concepts have been similarly explored in Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York: Free Press, 1995. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 7 toward initiating regime change in the former Soviet Union, Beijing has displayed a high level of tolerance as particularly seen in this region. Second, Vice President Xi suggested that both parties should respect each other's core interests and major concerns. He quoted the first U.S. President George Washington who once noted that, "Actions, not words, are the true criterion of the attachment of friends". The dichotomy between China and the U.S.’s strategies for investment and foreign policy worldwide has largely centered on these two alternative approaches. The specific examples and related data in the research I have completed show how China has primarily focused on actions, most often in the form of hard investment. In contrast, the U.S. and other Western powers have sought to cure the perceived political shortcomings of Central Asian states. It has done so by attempting to remedy professed alternative tendencies toward chaos, violence, and dynasty in these countries. During recent U.S. Administrations, such objectives have been pursued as the strategy for waging war in Afghanistan remained a high foreign policy priority. Third, then Vice President Xi suggested that the two parties should work hard to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation. As similarly seen in China’s priorities in the former Soviet Union, he sharply focused his remarks in Washington on opportunities to increase trade which had remained extremely unbalanced for many years. Finally, he encouraged efforts to steadily enhance coordination and cooperation in international affairs and on global issues. At the conclusion of his remarks, he expressed hope that “the United States will respect the interests and concerns of China Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 8 and other countries in this region.” This final point closely related to his initial suggestion for mutual understanding and strategic trust.6 Similar principles were advocated by President Vladimir Putin in an Executive Order on foreign policy signed the day he began his third term on May 7, 2012. In beginning a section regarding the United States, his first point called for policies based on, “principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for mutual interests.”7 Mutual confidence, mutual benefit and equality would become explicitly engrained in Article 5 of the June 2001 Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).8 Acting with other member states, Russia and China have used this international forum as an instrument for re-balancing U.S. policies. In responding to a U.S. strategy that has been interpreted as hostile, the forum and its members have built upon value and broadly-held principles that may be deemed as reasonable. A failure of U.S. analysts and leaders to consider these principles has often allowed Washington to disregard proposed ideas that are actually not contrary to America’s interests. Previously, President Hu Jintao had similarly said that China hopes to work with Kazakhstan under, “The principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit and 6 Speech by Xi Jinping, “Work Together for a Bright Future of China-US Cooperative Partnership,” Washington DC, February 15, 2012. [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t910351.htm] 7 Vladimir Putin, “Executive Order on measures to implement foreign policy,” Kremlin website, May 7, 2012. [http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/3764] 8 William Cole and Erik G. Jensen, “Norms and Regional Architecture: Multilateral Institution Building in Asia and Its Impact on Governance and Democracy,” in Michael J. Green and Bates Gill, Editors, Asia's New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, 264-265. “Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, June 15, 2001. [http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/4255347F7E3D3DD643256A720052A1C8?OpenDocument] Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 9 as always, to increase good-neighbor relations, deepen mutual trust, and improve cooperation mechanism so as to deepen pragmatic cooperation in economy and trade, energy and non-resources sectors.”9 Echoing many of the same points and a similar tone, China's top legislator Wu Bangguo told Uzbek President Islam Karimov in September 2011 that future cooperation between the two countries should be based on these principles.10 The week after the Chinese Vice President’s speech, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi used equivalent words in an interview commemorating the twentieth anniversary of China-Kazakhstan relations in February 2012 and reiterating President Hu’s commitment to these ideals.11 Of course, the longevity of the Chinese economic miracle which began in the late 1990’s remains far from guaranteed.12 The significance of future growth trends for its domestic economy and partners worldwide especially Central Asia have remained high given the sheer scale of the country’s investments and trade. Among other recent accomplishments that have recently helped to reshape Eurasia, Russia emerged as the largest oil producer in the world in 2009. No potential peer seemed apparent with the potential exception of Saudi Arabia. Between 2000 and 2010, Russia and Kazakhstan grew production more than any other states. In addition to geographic proximity, China’s trade and investment growth rates have inherently given the 9 Xinhua, “Chinese President expects continued improvement of Sino-Kazakhstan relations to achieve new progress,” Global Times, June 11, 2011. [http://china.globaltimes.cn/diplomacy/201106/664154.html] 10 “China, Uzbekistan eye deeper energy cooperation,” China Daily, Source: Xinhua September 23, 2011. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-09/23/content_13774873.htm] 11 “Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Receives Written Interview by Kazaag News Agency Beijing Branch on the 20th Anniversary of China-Kazakhstan Diplomatic Relations,” February 20, 2012,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China website. [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t907826.htm] 12 For a discussion of some of the risk factors, see Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun Park and Kwanho Shin, “When Fast Growing Economies Slow Down: International Evidence and Implications for China,” NBER Working Paper No. 16919, March 2011. [www.nber.org/papers/w16919.pdf ] Ruchir Sharma, Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles, New York: Norton, 2012, 15-34. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 10 country a fundamental lead in Central Asia while broader market trends have followed suit. Redefining policies of unilateral disrespect, inequality and unsanctioned intervention: The foundations of outside influence in Central Asia Central Asia’s recent incremental trends toward developing links across Asia have not historically followed a direct or consistent path. In the years immediately preceding the dissolution of the Soviet Union and following the creation of independent nationstates in the region in 1991, new political and economic foundations were established.13 These changes allowed for the initiation of dramatic shifts in government policy toward alternative models of governance, marking a new phase in Central Asian history.14 The senior leadership of these five states redirected the future of their countries at a crucial juncture in their development. Amongst other fundamental choices during this dynamic period, national leaders were forced to consider the level of control that central state authority should maintain over the management of the political, social, and economic systems of the region. The balance between state and private governance offers a beneficial construct for addressing these trends, despite a vast negative consensus found in Western assessments of the region’s performance on these metrics.15 These assessments also illuminate the relative tendency of Central Asian leaders to gravitate toward Russia and China. Each 13 For the early trends following independence, see in particular Bremmer and Taras, New States, New Politics, 1997. For an overview of the external relations during the early post-Soviet period see Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1994, xv-xvii. 14 For an overview of the changes observed during the transition period, see Tom Everett-Heath, Editor, Central Asia: Aspects of Transition, Abingdon: Routledge, 2003. Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997. Arne Haugen, The Establishment of National Republics in Central Asia, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 15 Specific works surrounding this construct will be subsequently considered; for an overview, see Janos Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 11 of these partner states had managed similar challenges and transitions since 1991. In turn, these mutual experiences contributed to a higher level of common understanding. In part as a result of this personal and national sense of loyalty, Kazakhstan would stand as the last country that refrained from declaring its independence from the Soviet Union as of September 1991. In this and other examples from the transition period, Russia’s ties to the region continued to have a dramatic effect on the political careers of the first national leaders in the new states of Central Asia. Throughout the early transition period, a distinguishing characteristic of the leadership was the continuity of the legacy Communist elite. Despite shifts in his support of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Nazarbayev alluded to one justification of this continuity when he stated, “An important quality in every politician is predictability of his actions. I believe that M.S. Gorbachev has this quality. Therefore I am very much afraid of drastic changes in the top echelon of power, which today could lead to loss of even the rather small democratic gains that perestroika has given us.”16 Similar to trends seen in Russia, China and the U.S., each of the states in Central Asia has drawn from competing historical traditions in their search for a new paradigm for governance following independence.17 The Soviet period marked a higher level of central control and initially stood as the most recent precedent.18 At the collapse of 16 Mikhail Alexandrov, Uneasy Alliance: Relations between Russia and Kazakhstan in the PostSoviet Era, 1992-1997, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999, 34-39. 17 For an overview of historical traditions of Central Asia and their modern implications for the postSoviet states, see Samuel Adrian Miles Adshead, Central Asia in World History, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. Paksoy, Central Asia Reader, 1994. 18 For an assessment of the impact of these precedents following independence, see John Glenn, The Soviet legacy in Central Asia, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. Wallerstein has referred to this as the “Communist Interlude”. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The End of the World as We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-first Century, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, 7-18. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 12 the Soviet Union in 1991, the standards of Communism, socialism and a centrally planned economy remained in close sight.19 In the years that followed, the Soviet example shaped both internal developments and the external relations each country established with outside powers. As Russia faced its own transition and choices during this period, many of the Central Asian states continued the existing models of close ties with Moscow.20 While Western observers and scholars have often focused on the continuation of Soviet precedents, alternate trends have also arisen. These liberal tendencies were initially characterized by the rise of free trade and private property. Following independence from the Soviet Union, these tendencies developed to varying degrees amongst the five individual states. These included independent economic activities by corporations and individuals, privatization, and increased social and economic interconnectedness through globalization.21 Following independence, the balance between central state control and liberal structures of governance in Central Asia often aligned with elements of the region’s 19 As further discussed in Chapter 6, a discussion of the link between Soviet precedents and the subsequent economic policies of the newly independent states is found in Rawi Abdelal, National Purpose in the World Economy: Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. Additional perspectives also available in Neil Robinson, Editor, Reforging the Weakest Link: Global Political Economy and Post-Soviet Change in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, Aldershot: Ashgate: 2004. Graham Fuller, “The Emergence of Central Asia,” Foreign Policy, Number 78, Spring 1990, 49-67. For a discussion of interpretations of the distinction between Communism and socialism, see Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, New York: Ecco, 2009, 101-105. 20 Anthony Hyman, “Moving out of Moscow’s orbit: the outlook for Central Asia,” International Affairs, Volume 69, Number 2, April 1993, 289-304. Richard Pomfret, Asian Economies in Transition, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996, 98-99. 21 Christopher I. Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. For the evolution during the Soviet period, see Leon Goure, Foy D. Kihler, Richard Soll and Annette Stiedbold, Convergence of Communism and Capitalism: the Soviet View, Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1973. Scholars of political economy have pointed to the fall of the Soviet Union as “the proudest accomplishment of capitalist triumph.” See Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origins of Capitalism, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999, 1. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 13 prior independent experiences.22 Some of these traditions may be traced back to the Silk Road era, a period frequently cited by regional leaders as an example of modern development in Central Asia as well as a model to aspire toward.23 An early example of globalization, the Silk Road period was characterized by diverse trading relationships, both within Central Asia and across surrounding regions. Authors have pointed to this early precedent as an example of “thin” globalization – a limited number of traders with a primary set of customers consisting mainly of the elites.24 Hybrid corporate structures in Central Asia have often combined elements of both state-centric and market-centric behavior, similar to corporations in Russia and China.25 As an example, many state-owned enterprises, including KazMunaiGas, have listings on international bourses such as the London Stock Exchange.26 While definitions vary, state-owned enterprises are defined here to include businesses in which a government maintains a majority shareholding (greater than 50 percent).27 Despite ties to the free market in the ownership structure of these companies, they remain under a high level of government oversight and regulation. These companies display characteristics that in some ways parallel the modus operandi of mixed 22 A similar analysis of the early origins of governance structures in Russia may be found at Joseph T. Fuhrman, The Origins of Capitalism in Russia: Industry and Progress in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972, 6-11. 23 For a representative analysis of the early origins of modern governance trends as seen in Central Asia and more broadly around the world, see Parag Khanna, How to Run the World: Charting a Course to the Next Renaissance, New York: Random House, 2011. 24 See David Held and Anthony McGrew, Editors, The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, 77. Richard Foltz, Religions of the Silk Road: Premodern Patterns of Globalization, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Introduction,” in Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue , Governance in a Globalizing World, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, 7. 25 Alex Dupuy and Barry Truchil, “Problems in the Theory of State Capitalism,” Theory and Society, Volume 8, Number 1, July 1979: 1-38. 26 Brian C. Anderson, Democratic Capitalism and Its Discontents, Wilmington, Delaware: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2007. John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism, New York: New Press, 2000. Pertti Alasuutari, “Review: Globalization and the Nation-State, An Appraisal of the Discussion,” Acta Sociologica, Volume 43, Number 3, 2000, 260. [259-269] 27 Ravi Ramamurti and Raymond Vernon, Editors, Privatization and Control of State-Owned Enterprises, Washington: World Bank, 1991. Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 14 economies in mature social democracies. Some specialized studies of Central Asia have considered the link between these competing models and underlying philosophies, without systematic applying the framework to a strategic analysis of these societies.28 Across the population of post-Soviet Central Asian states, individuals have thus faced a range of alternatives that fall between the theoretical extremes of what may be characterized as “pure socialism” and “pure capitalism”. The resultant career and social decisions of citizens have similarly continued to pull them in alternative directions, both in keeping with proactive policy changes and implicitly through the variable market opportunities available in given countries.29 Traditions of the Soviet period that persisted or were reinitiated in the years since independence include a high level of state authority over businesses, across both strategic and non-strategic industries.30 Timothy Frye has characterized the struggle between respective “excommunist and anticommunist factions” as reflective of “a war of attrition over economic and political resources.” He has argued that this struggle had “a devastating effect on economic growth” after the fall of the Soviet Union.31 The research and writing that I have done on this topic has followed an alternative point of reference by often considering the methods by which states, private forces as well as associated 28 As an example, a consideration of the evolution of academic and scientific institutions in the region may be found in Sarah Amsler, The Politics of Knowledge in Central Asia: Science between Marx and the Market, Abingdon: Routledge, 2007. 29 Carter Page, “A historical review of capitalism and socialism in Central Asia,” Working Paper 2-1, January 2010. For a related example from another developing market, see Dan Senor and Saul Singer, Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle, New York: Twelve, 2009. In this analysis, Senor and Singer consider the relationship between Israeli cultures and traditions and national development trends toward entrepreneurial approaches. 30 James Rupert, “Dateline Tashkent: Post-Soviet Central Asia,” Foreign Policy, Number 87, Summer 1992, 175-195. Mick Moore, “Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries,” International Political Science Review, Volume 25, Number 3, July 2004, 297319. (JSTOR) 31 Timothy Frye, “The Perils of Polarization: Economic Performance in the Postcommunist World,” World Politics, Volume 54, Number 3, April 2002, 309. (JSTOR) Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 15 institutional structures have led to constructive symbiosis rather than destructive conflict. Recent efforts by Western scholars and leaders to denigrate public leaders from the region have unnecessarily perpetuated Cold War tendencies by deepening suspicisions from that era. Some of my related analysis has demonstrated a range of alternative perspectives and approaches that may help to illuminate future opportunities. In addition to tendencies toward centralized state control and liberal economic systems with diversified parties, some actors within Central Asia tended to follow an alternative path following independence. As the state remained dominant and new markets were simultaneously established following the breakup of the Soviet Union, members of these societies devised other methods and means of survival through corruption. While a comprehensive analysis of this third economic model is problematic due to the paucity of available data, these approaches mirror several corrupt tendencies at times found in Western societies.32 Some may be clear cut such as the Bernard Madoff scandal in financial markets and Enron in the energy sector, while others are more subtle such as the perceived societal injustices highlighted by the Occupy Wall Street movement. The rise of Russia and other external forces Among the diverse pressures that defined the balance of state and private forms of governance within the region, influences originating outside of Central Asia 32 James D. Smith, “Measuring the Informal Economy,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 493, September 1987, 83-99. (JSTOR) Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 16 eventually had a dramatic effect following independence.33 By most indications, the importance of these external influences is expected to remain high in the future, driven in part by the political and economic objectives of external states. In turn, the political, economic, and social pressure on the existing and emerging national leadership is expected to continue to shape the direction of new policies in the Central Asian states.34 Pressure from adjacent countries has remained especially relevant due to their proximity and the high level of emphasis that states such as Russia and China have placed on relations with Central Asia. In particular, Russia has often worked to maintain and revitalize many aspects of the relationship that existed during the Soviet era.35 After a rapid turn toward the capitalist model after the fall of the Soviet Union during the 1990s, Russia took some steps to again increase the role of the state in the second decade following independence.36 The country’s growing economic strength and increased leverage in commodity markets during the initial terms of Vladimir Putin’s presidency helped to further empower this new momentum.37 33 For an overview of this impact, with a particular focus on the impact of Russia, see Paul Kubicek, “Regionalism, Nationalism and Realpolitik in Central Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies, Volume 49, Number 4, June 1997, 637-655. 34 A useful review of these forces and actors may be found at Boris Z. Rumer, Editor, Central Asia: A Gathering Storm? Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002. 35 Graham Smith, “The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Volume 24, Number 4, 1999, 481-494. (JSTOR) 36 Displayed prominently in the literature surrounding the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Representative examples include Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, Abingdon: Routledge, 2008. Lilia Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. Peter Truscott, Putin’s Progress: A Biography of Russia’s Enigmatic President, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004. Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 37 The connection between Russia’s power and energy development is a central thesis of Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate, 2008. Steve LeVine, The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea, New York: Random House, 2007. Anita Orban, Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2008. Rudiger Ahrend, Sustaining Growth in a Resource-based Economy: The Main Issues and the Specific Case of Russia, Occasional Paper Number 6, Geneva: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2006. Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 121-180. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 17 Along with the direct influence that Russia exerted in Central Asia, the remnants of past Soviet policies shaped the region’s successor states during the years immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union.38 State policy decisions made by the Communist party leadership during the Soviet era also often mirrored many of the new initiatives implemented by Russia after 1991.39 While Central Asian states continued to establish their own political paths and new relationships over time, the remnants of historic linkages continued to represent a foundation on which these new states were established.40 Despite broad suspicions in the West regarding the intentions and influence of Russia, my related research has demonstrated evolving similarities between Russia and Central Asia that have positively impacted these states. The parallels between privatization trends and structures in the energy sector of Russia and Kazakshtan represents an important example that contrasts with most other producer regions that hold similar resources. Some competitive tensions between the neighboring powers of Russia, China, and other external states including the U.S. have remained particularly relevant in the energy arena as a result of the high level of focus.41 Viewed from both a contemporary and a historic perspective, the literature surrounding the Great Game 38 For an overview of the historic continuity between these periods, see Paul A. Goble, “Russia and Its Neighbors,” Foreign Policy, Number 90, Spring 1993, 79-88. 39 An overview of these consistencies is available at John M. Thompson, Russia and the Soviet Union: An Historical Introduction from the Kievan State to the Present, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2008. 40 Despite these deep historic precedents, Russia has taken its own steps toward liberalization and thus has in part moved counter to the paradigm of central state control seen during the Soviet period. For a related analysis including discussion of the characteristics of Russia’s interaction with neighbors, see Anders Aslund, Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001. Anders Aslund, “Russia's Road from Communism,” Daedalus, Volume 121, Number 2, Spring 1992, 77-95. 41 Lo, Axis of Convenience, 2008, 132-153. For a comparative review of the dynamics of competitive forces in the energy industry considered on a global level from a world-systems perspective, see Stephen G. Bunker and Paul S. Ciccantell, Globalization and the Race for Resources, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 18 has been frequently invoked as a precedent for this multi-tiered competition in modern Central Asia. This potential model refers to the history of conflict between the British Empire and the Russian Empire surrounding their efforts to achieve dominance in the region throughout much of the 19th century.42 In addition to influence from Russia and the U.S., Chinese government leaders and businesses have increasingly come to stand as alternative models for Central Asia. Beyond the contribution of capital investment, the approach of Chinese companies and smaller entrepreneurs consistently reflected the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit. Despite the high level of state control in China, Chinese merchants have added to this influence and have served as a fundamental example for capitalist trends in the region given their close proximity and the impact of these businesses within the society.43 Incremental steps toward liberalization have exposed alternative trends and future opportunities. Even if external relationships often center on government ties, the region’s establishment of diverse partnerships, technology transfer and capital flows including stock exchange listings help encourage trends toward market-based approaches. 42 In addition to the historic view offered by Hopkirk [Hopkirk, The Great Game, 1994], see for example Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Editor, From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game, Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995. Mentioned by Duke of York in meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Tatiana Gfoeller. “Candid discussion with Prince Andrew on the Kyrgyz economy and the “Great Game,” Embassy Bishkek, October 29, 2008, as cited on Wikileaks. [http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08BISHKEK1095.html#] 43 Carter Page, “A historical review of capitalism and socialism in Central Asia,” Working Paper 2-1, January 2010. Leo Paul Dana, When Economies Change Paths: Models of Transition in China, the Central Asian Republics, Myanmar & the Nations of Former Indochine Française, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2002. George Zhibin Gu and William Ratliff, China and the New World Order: How Entrepreneurship, Globalization, and Borderless Business Are Reshaping China and the World, Palo Alto, California: Fultus, 2006. Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Alan Smart and Josephine Smart, Petty Capitalists and Globalization: Flexibility, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Development, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005, 29-33. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 19 Contrary to popular perceptions, Central Asia’s partnerships with outside powers including Russia and China have leveraged the relative strengths of each party and may represent viable solutions to a range of current dilemmas. Despite the overwhelming focus on past failures and shortcomings, several areas of accomplishment expose the potential for effective future development through cooperative approaches. In contrast to the excitement many analysts and scholars have shown for the potential drama associated with a new “Great Game”, a range of successes from the initial decades point to alternative scenarios and opportunities. As advocated by China and Russia, policies and actions based on the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit have allowed for a diversity of participation that has benefited all parties. Concurrent with these trends, efforts by each major power to shift their focus toward development of their own domestic resources has offered additional advantages for each group. Technological breakthroughs in the energy sector since 2007 have enabled these new prospects and approaches. For an overview of these opportunities, I have a few slides which demonstrate these alternative views. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 20 Historic approaches to relations with post-Soviet Central Asia I umd \uln. lad-dug lump: Surly folio-?5 1-1 cl or [51?me - Fan? on Mary and panned Magda? (cm an - SW may run: haunt-m wood lulu) Dene-I: I equal mm 0 Foreign o! 'Mu-l m1. malty no mm! mar Idm . [Snot-us on men to :92:th II the - In?ux ?and mm Copyright 2002-2016 Carter Page 21 As suggested by the increasingly popular Great Game concept, the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit have indeed encountered obstacles. As an example of problems seen in the parallel activities of private businesses and centrallycontrolled state entities, officials have frequently been accused of corruption and arbitrary policies.44 Such challenges have drawn attention and interest away from external state-owned enterprises and independent local businesses in Central Asia following independence. Western disapproval of these perceived shortcomings has often served as the foundation for state-centric policies of unilateral disrespect as seen in the activities of the U.S. Government over recent decades. In sharp contrast, a market-based approach involving diversified investors establishes a subtler and effective means of incentivizing improvements. Words may highlight perceived 44 Nonna Barkhatova, “Russian Small Business, Authorities and the State,” Europe-Asia Studies, Volume 52, Number 4, June 2000, 657-659. In summary, Barkhatova describes the challenges faced in the former Soviet Union as follows: “The whole system of state regulation is like an endless ladder where every step is an obstacle provoking the small entrepreneur to abandon the business.” For a critical assessment of the interaction of state and private forces as it relates to the global energy industry see Robert Engler, The Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 22 inequalities on a conceptual level. In contrast, the financial impact of investor decisions often creates a more meaningful response. These frequently become personal given the often direct involvement of Central Asian leaders in negotiations and decisions. However, the effective allocation of capital through market structures can represent a more meaningful and effective approach. It also avoids the unpredictable outcomes potentially associated with intervention including military action. Recent examples have been seen in both U.S. and Soviet sequential wars in neighboring Afghanistan. As this lecture has tried to highlight, free market principles and entrepreneurial ventures often arose in the economies of the CIS states and beyond in a greater variety of forms than is frequently acknowledged. For instance, certain large state-run companies replicated comparable structures in adjacent countries, as seen in the similarities of corporate governance often observed between Kazakhstan and Russia. In addition to the impact of Russia and as a reference point for comparison, China grew as an important neighboring force that has increasingly affected the shape of economic relations in modern Central Asia through its commercial and investment activities in the region.45 Despite inevitable obstacles, competitive trends driven in part by the participation of major investors in the region have led to demonstrable improvements among local entities. In conclusion, I would make three primary arguments. First, states and individuals in Central Asia balanced alternative traditions of liberal economics with central government control and narrow relationships following independence. While 45 The implications of the trading relationships seen between China and the Central Asian states are considered in detail in Carter Page, “The influence of China in Central Asia,” Working Paper 3-1, January 2010. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 23 this balance has at times been acknowledged, the impact of market forces is significantly greater than perceptions of the prevalence of dictatorships have traditionally implied. Second, the balance between these alternative traditions was influenced by and correlated with characteristics observed in Central Asia’s external partners.46 Third, Russia has remained a primary external influence in the initial years of independence while the impact of China has grown more recently.47 In spite of this massive growth in investment and trade, Beijing’s overall impact and potential has remained constrained by a range of regional concerns. Contrary to the prevalent Great Game ideals advanced by many scholars and analysts, the relative impact of China and Russia has frequently offered positive and constructive benefits to both the region and other external states alike. The perspectives of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit both acknowledge the relative contributions of diverse parties while aligning closely with the respective competing economic models. Free market approaches have tended to incentivize positive relative performance by corporations through its inherent architecture of encouraging mutual benefits for shareholders and management. In both public institutions and private businesses alike, mutual respect stands as a vital prerequisite for effective commerce, especially when investors forge long-term agreements and allocate significant capital. Second, recent technology advances have further incentivized multi-party partnerships and cooperation. U.S.-China joint ventures in the shale arena represent important examples. While a few Russian companies have 46 Discussion of this correlation has been made in describing post Soviet societies in Central Asia, however limited supporting empirical evidence and analysis has been offered. See for example, Michael McFaul, “Circumstances versus Policy Choices: Why has the Economic Performance of the Soviet Successor States Been So Poor?” in Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Editors, After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transitions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 91. 47 “FACTBOX-China's investments in Central Asian energy,” Reuters, December 14, 2009. [http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/14/china-pipeline-idUSLDE5BD04Y20091214] Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 24 made similar steps forward in North America, although recent sanctions policy has to a large extent limited these possibilities. As the U.S., China and Russia have increasingly realigned their focus toward a new focus on developing domestic resources, it has incrementally helped to in some ways start to ease the detrimental characteristics of Great Game rivalries. In comparison to these alternative propositions, analyses of post-Soviet Central Asia have led to dire judgments built upon an incomplete understanding of the region.48 Condescending Western perpsectives that have been advanced regarding Central Asia stand in sharp contrast to the approaches taken by China and Russia as highlighted earlier in this chapter. As Harvie Wilkinson has noted in another field of study, legal scholars similarly have gone to great lengths in seeking to create cosmic theories that, “Purport to unlock the mysteries of [the U.S. Constitution] much as Freud proposed to lay bare all of human behavior and Einstein attempted to explain the universe.”49 While analyses of Central Asia have tended to be somewhat more modest in their scope and objectives on an individual basis, they have collectively helped to define the region in ways that lead to certain consistent policies and underlying philosophies within the Western world. Just as Wilkinson has noted the tendency of legal theories to foster activism in the American judiciary, a similar activism has long permeated the U.S. foreign policy establishment on the basis of perceived shortcomings in the 48 For a more comprehensive survey of the literature of Central Asia, a review of deficiencies in the existing literature, and proposed methods for improving theory-based research regarding the region, see Christoph H. Stefes and Amanda E. Wooden, “Tempting two fates: the theoretical foundations for understanding Central Asian Transitions,” in Amanda E. Wooden and Christoph H. Stefes, Editors, The Politics of Transition in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Enduring Legacies and Emerging Challenges, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, 3-29. Further analysis is provided by additional authors throughout this volume. See for example, Oksan Bayulgen, “Caspian energy wealth: social impacts and implications for regional stability,” in Wooden and Stefes, Editors, Politics of Transition, 2009, 163-185. 49 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Cosmic Constitutional Theory: Why Americans Are Losing Their Inalienable Right to Self-Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 3-4. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page 25 former Soviet Union. As recent decades have shown, this tendency has shown limited variance across liberal and conservative U.S. Administrations alike. Thanks again to the NES community for this invitation. I would look forward to engaging in a discussion and hearing your perspectives. Copyright © 2002-2016 Carter Page