Magic Weapons:
China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping
Professor Anne-Marie Brady
Global Fellow, Wilson Center, Washington, DC;
Department of Political Science and International Relations
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

In September 2014 Xi Jinping gave a speech on the importance of united front work—
political influence activities—calling it one of the CCP’s “magic weapons”. The Chinese
government’s foreign influence activities have accelerated under Xi. China’s foreign
influence activities have the potential to undermine the sovereignty and integrity of the
political system of targeted states.
Conference paper presented at the conference on “The corrosion of democracy under
China’s global influence,” supported by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, and
hosted in Arlington, Virginia, USA, September 16-17, 2017.
Key points:
• CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping is leading an accelerated expansion of
political influence activities worldwide.
• The expansion of these activities is connected to both the CCP government’s
domestic pressures and foreign agenda.
• The paper creates a template of the policies and modes of China’s expanded
foreign influence activities in the Xi era.
• The paper uses this template to examine the extent to which one
representative small state, New Zealand, is being targeted by China’s new
influence agenda.
Executive Summary
In June 2017 the New York Times and The Economist featured stories on China's
political influence in Australia. The New York Times headline asked "Are Australia's
Politics too Easy to Corrupt?," 1 while The Economist sarcastically referred to China as
the "Meddle Country." 2 The two articles were reacting to an investigation by Fairfax
Media and ABC into the extent of China's political interference in Australia, 3 that
built on internal enquiries into the same issue by ASIO and Australia's Department
of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 2015 and 2016. The media and official reports
concluded that Australia was the target of a foreign interference campaign by China
“on a larger scale than that being carried out by any other nation” and that the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was working to infiltrate Australian political and
foreign affairs circles, as well to acquire influence over Australia's Chinese
1

 population. 4 The story is continuing to play out in the Australian media, with more
and more revelations of China’s political interference appearing almost daily. 5
The focus of media attention has been on Australia, but the People's Republic of
China's (PRC) attempts to guide, buy, or coerce political influence abroad are
widespread. China's foreign influence activities are part of a global strategy with
almost identical, longstanding approaches, adapted to fit current government
policies. They are a core task of China’s united front work; one of the CCP’s famed
“magic weapons” (法宝) that helped bring it to power.
This policy paper examines China's foreign political influence activities under Xi
Jinping, using one very representative state, New Zealand, as a case study. New
Zealand’s relationship with China is of interest, because the Chinese government
regards New Zealand as an exemplar of how it would like its relations to be with
other states. In 2013, China’s New Zealand ambassador described the two countries’
relationship as “a model to other Western countries”. 6 And after Premier Li Keqiang
visited New Zealand in 2017, a Chinese diplomat favourably compared New
Zealand-China relations to the level of closeness China had with Albania in the early
1960s. 7 The paper considers the potential impact of China’s expanded political
influence activities in New Zealand and how any effects could be mitigated and
countered.
The role of the CCP in Chinese foreign policy
The People's Republic of China is a party-state that since its founding in 1949, has
always relied on non-traditional means for its diplomacy and economic relations.
Agencies of the CCP such as the United Front Work Department, the Central
Propaganda Department, the International Liaison Department, the All-China
Federation of Overseas Chinese, and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship
with Foreign Countries, all play an important part in Chinese foreign affairs and
defence. These agencies supplement and extend, and sometimes override, the work
of the PRC's state sector organizations involved in China’s external relations as well
as increasingly, SOEs and private firms.
The key concept in Chinese foreign policy which links party and state organisations
is the “united front” (统一战线). 8 The united front is originally a Leninist tactic of
strategic alliances. Lenin wrote in “Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder,
The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and
without fail, most thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skilfully using every, even
the smallest, ‘rift’ among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among the
bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of
bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of every,
even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be
temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who fail to
2

 understand this, fail to understand even a particle of Marxism, or of scientific,
modern Socialism in general. 9 (Italics in the original)
From the mid-1930s, CCP strategists adapted Lenin’s tactics to Chinese
circumstances and culture. The CCP’s united front can be used in both domestic and
foreign policy. United front activities incorporates working with groups and
prominent individuals in society; information management and propaganda; and it
has also frequently been a means of facilitating espionage.
The PRC was forged out of the civil war from 1927 to 1949 between the CCP and the
Chinese Nationalist Party government. The new regime was excluded from the
international governance system until 1971, the date when the PRC took over the
China seat in the United Nations from the Republic of China (ROC). During the Cold
War years, patriotic overseas Chinese (爱国华侨) helped the PRC economy with
technical assistance and investments. Over the same period, the CCP government
worked to break its diplomatic isolation by making use of an informal diplomatic
corps of ‘foreign friends’ of China (外国朋友) who pushed for the recognition of the
PRC in their respective nations. In those years, reaching out to the overseas Chinese
population (侨务工作) and managing relations with foreigners (外事工作) were
essential tasks of CCP foreign affairs. 10 PRC agencies such as the International
Liaison Department, the United Front Work Department, and PLA Second
Department supported and nurtured revolutionary overseas Chinese in Southeast
Asia to undermine governments, foment revolution, and help gather intelligence.
The PRC government also supported revolutionary and nationalist movements
throughout the world, and nurtured pro-PRC united front organizations. In the Mao
years and up to the present day, under the policy known as “using civil actors to
promote political ends” (以民促政), CCP united front officials and their agents try to
develop relationships with foreign and overseas Chinese personages (the more
influential the better) to influence, subvert, and if necessary, bypass the policies of
their governments and promote the interests of the CCP globally. 11
The year 1989 was a turning point in the Cold War, the year when the governments
of the Eastern Bloc fell in a series of peaceful revolutions. It was also a turning point
for the PRC and its efforts to influence foreign publics and governments. Following
the violent crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in Beijing on June 4, 1989,
the CCP government faced international sanctions and opprobrium. The Party
responded by increasing foreign influence efforts and reaching out even more to
overseas Chinese. Members of these communities had supported the student
democracy movement, providing funds and safe havens. Yet in speeches in 1989 and
1993, senior Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping spoke of the "unique opportunity" the
overseas Chinese offered the PRC, saying that by drawing on their help, China could
break out of international isolation and improve its international political standing. 12
Gaining influence over overseas Chinese groups in order to “turn them into
3

 propaganda bases for China” became an important task of overseas Chinese united
front work. 13
The State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (国务院侨务办公室) was
significantly expanded after 1989. 14 There are currently around 60 million Chinese
people living outside China, some of whose forebears left China hundreds of years
ago. However the CCP’s main focus since 1989, and the main area of success for its
overseas Chinese policies, is towards more recent migrants (新桥), those who have
migrated from the PRC in the last 30 years. In 2015 10 million PRC citizens were
living abroad. 15
The CCP’s efforts to influence the overseas Chinese population has helped to extend
China's global influence and to expand its economic agendas. Post-1989 the CCP’s
policies were designed to discourage the Chinese diaspora from supporting Chinese
dissidents and Falungong, to reduce the impact of the Taiwan democratic model, as
well as to draw on the patriotic sentiments of the overseas Chinese to get them to
assist in China's economic development.
United Front Work Department personnel often operate under diplomatic cover as
members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 using this role to guide united front
activities outside China, working with politicians and other high profile individuals,
Chinese community associations, and student associations, and sponsoring Chinese
language, media, and cultural activities. The Party has a long tradition of party and
government personnel “double-hatting”; holding roles within multiple agencies. 17
Chinese consulates and embassies relay instructions to Chinese community groups
and the Chinese language media and they host visits of high-level CCP delegations
coming to meet with local overseas Chinese groups. The leaders of the various
China-connected overseas Chinese associations in each country are regularly invited
to China to update them on current government policies.
The CCP wants to avoid being seen to “lead” [领导] the overseas Chinese
community, but rather prefers to be seen to “guide” [引导] them. 18 Overseas Chinese
leaders who cooperate in this guidance are encouraged to see their participation as a
form of service, serving the Chinese Motherland, the Chinese race, and the ethnic
Chinese population within the countries where they live. Their cooperation with
China is meant to be a “win-win” situation, whereby they and their community will
achieve gains at the same time as China achieving its own agenda. 19 The goal of
successful overseas Chinese work is to get the community to proactively and even
better, spontaneously, engage in activities which enhance China’s foreign policy
agenda.
After more than 30 years of this work, there are few overseas Chinese associations
able to completely evade “guidance”—other than those affiliated with the religious
4

 group Falungong, Taiwan independence, pro-independence Tibetans and Uighurs,
independent Chinese religious groups outside party-state controlled religions, and
the democracy movement—and even these are subject to being infiltrated by
informers and a target for united front work. 20
As in the Cold War years, united front work not only serves foreign policy goals, but
can sometimes be used as a cover for intelligence activities. 21 The Ministry of State
Security, Ministry of Public Security, PLA Joint Staff Headquarters’ Third
Department, Xinhua News Service, the United Front Work Department,
International Liaison Department, are the main, but not the only, PRC party-state
agencies who recruit foreign, especially ethnic Chinese, agents for the purpose of
collecting intelligence. 22 In 2014, one former spy said that the Third Department had
at least 200,000 agents abroad. 23 Some Chinese community associations act as fronts
for Chinese mafia who engage in illegal gambling; human trafficking; extortion; and
money laundering. As a leaked 1997 report by Canada’s RCMP-SIS noted, these
organizations also frequently have connections with China’s party-state intelligence
organizations. 24
The crisis of 1989 resulted in the CCP government stepping up foreign persuasion
efforts (外宣) aimed at the non-ethnic-Chinese public too. As they had done in the
past, in this the Chinese government drew on the help of high level “friends of
China”—foreign political figures such as the USA’s Henry Kissinger, to repair
China's relations with the USA and other Western democracies. In 1991 the State
Council Information Office was set up to better promote China's policies to the
outside world. Reflecting the fact that it is both a party and a state body, its other
Chinese-only nameplate is the Office of Foreign Propaganda, 外宣办. Soon after,
China Central Television (CCTV) launched its first English language channel. China
gradually expanded its external influence activities under CCP General Secretary
Jiang Zemin (1989-2002). While these activities failed to ameliorate negative global
public opinion towards the Chinese government and its policies, efforts to promote a
positive image of China’s economic policies had much more success. 25
In the era of CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao (2002-2012) China made an even
bigger investment to expand its foreign influence activities (大外宣). The aim was to
get China's perspectives on global affairs heard and understood.26 CCTV set up a
global, multi-platform network, CCTV International; while China Radio
International (CRI), and Xinhua News Service also expanded their global presence.
From 2007 the Hu government officially embraced Joseph Nye's theory of soft
power, using it both as a justification and as a new euphemism, for the Chinese
government's expanded and revised overseas Chinese and foreigner management
techniques and propaganda offensive. 27

5

 Joseph Nye is critical of the Chinese (and Russian) interpretation of his theory.28 But
read from the perspective of a rising (or resurgent) revisionist power, it is easy to
understand the interpretation—and its attraction. Nye wrote in his 1990 book Bound
to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power that the steady erosion of the
Westphalian system, the growing importance of non-state actors in global affairs, the
economic interdependence of states, and the development of new information
communication technologies had all led to a reduction in the effectiveness of
traditional sources of power, so-called “hard power”. 29 In Nye's understanding, hard
power implies the use of threats, bribes, or direct military action in order to coerce
another state to change its behaviour. However, what he called “soft power” can
offer an alternative means to influence the decision-making of a foreign government
or society. According to Nye, states that possess strong soft power resources can
become role models, making people across the world want to follow their policies. 30
Nye further argues that armed conflicts will not occur if the hegemon’s cultural
influence eliminates differences and prevents new ones from arising. In contrast, it is
far more difficult, for a state to achieve its goals—if past actions have led to a
negative international image. 31
The PRC is a rising, revisionist power. The CCP believes that the outside world has a
distorted and negative picture of contemporary China. The government has also
long been determined to change the security environment it faces and since the
1990s, has been able to steadily build up its hard power capacity. Double digit
economic growth since the early 1990s has turned China into a global economic
power. Since the Hu era, China has invested in soft power activities in order to
strengthen the nation’s comprehensive national power. Yet according to Nye, China
(and Russia) "don't get" what soft power means and are weak in how he measures
soft power: attractive culture, political values, and foreign policies. 32 Nye’s emphasis
is on the role of civil society to promote a nation's soft power. But based on the
concept of the united front, China uses party-state agencies and their affiliates to
develop both soft and hard power, and has consequently adopted a much broader
approach in its means to enhance soft power.
China’s political influence agenda and methods in the Xi era
Even more than his predecessors, Xi Jinping has led a massive expansion of efforts to
shape foreign public opinion in order to influence the decision-making of foreign
governments and societies—Nye's definition of what strong soft power can achieve.
Political influence activities in the Xi era draw heavily on the approaches set in the
Mao years and the policies of Deng, Jiang, and Hu, but take them to a new level of
ambition. This reflects both the growing confidence of the Xi government in China’s
international influence, as well as the high stakes strategy he is pursuing to maintain
his regime through boosting economic growth and tightening control of information.

6

 Notably, Xi has revived and revitalized many Mao era practices and institutions,
blending them with modern concerns and terminology. Like Mao, Xi stresses the
importance of information control. In the modernized information environment, this
now means not only China’s public sphere, but also how the international media and
international academia comments on China and China-related issues. Thus the
revitalized CCTV International, re-branded in 2016 as CGTV (China Global
Television), provides the CCP line to the outside world (emphasizing business, not
politics) via 24-hour satellite broadcasts and social media. At the same time, China
Radio International (CRI) and the Xinhua News Service have cornered niche foreign
radio, television, and online platforms via mergers and partnership agreements.
China Daily, the CCP’s English language newspaper, has arrangements to publish
supplements in major newspapers around the world. China has also announced
media cooperation partnerships with nations it calls “strategic partners” such as
Russia, Turkey, and the 16-plus-1 (central and East European, plus China) states.
Chinese universities and university presses have set up partnerships with their
foreign counterparts and we are steadily seeing the creep of Chinese censorship into
these domains as a result.
In the mid-1960s, Mao’s China was promoted as the center of world revolution;
under Xi, China is attempting to lead Globalization 2.0, via a China-centered
economic order. Under Xi (as under Mao), united front work has taken on a level of
significance not seen in China since the years before 1949, when the CCP was in
opposition. In September 2014, Xi gave a speech on the importance of united front
work, using Mao’s term to describe it as one of the CCP’s “magic weapons”. 33 The
other two “magic weapons” are Party building and military activities, both of which
feature prominently in China under Xi. In May 2015, Xi presided over a national
united front work conference, the first in nine years, and in July 2015 he set up a
Leading Small Group on United Front Work.34
Xi-era political influence activities can be summarized into four key categories:
1.
A strengthening of efforts to manage and guide overseas Chinese
communities and utilize them as agents of Chinese foreign policy.
2.
A re-emphasis on people-to-people, party-to-party, plus PRC enterprise-toforeign enterprise relations with the aim of coopting foreigners to support and
promote CCP’s foreign policy goals.
3.
The roll-out of a global, multi-platform, strategic communication strategy.
4.
The formation of a China-centred economic and strategic bloc.
I will outline the methods of these four categories in the sections that follow, and
explore the impact they have had on one representative small state, the Oceanic
democracy famed for its agriculture, rich natural resources, and small population:
New Zealand.
7

 1.
“Bring together the hearts and the power of the overseas Chinese” 35
Xi Jinping’s ambitious strategy to harness the overseas Chinese population for the
CCP’s current economic and political agenda, builds on existing practices and then
takes it to a new level of ambition.
Agencies: State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, CCP United Front Work
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of State Security, PLA Joint Staff
Headquarters’ Third Department, and other relevant organs.
Policies:
•
Monitor the local long term Chinese community via community organizations
(侨务社团工作); 36 establish Overseas Chinese Service Centres (海外华侨华人互助中
心) to coordinate this work, cherry pick which groups to work with.
•
Sponsor and support the emergence of new united front organizations to
represent the overseas Chinese, recognizing that they are a diverse group and
flexibility is required to establish a positive working relationship with them. Avoid
directly interfering in overseas Chinese community affairs unless there is a situation
that directly affects China’s political interests, such as the whistleblower Red
Capitalist Guo Wengui 37 (Miles Kwok) 38, whose international campaign to expose
corruption and espionage activities of the Chinese government at the highest level
has provoked a massive counter-attack.
•
Unite the ethnic Chinese communities through nurturing and subsidizing
authorized Chinese cultural activities. 39
•
Supervise Chinese students and visiting scholars through the united front
organization the Chinese Student and Scholars Association (中国学生学者联合会). 40
•
Encourage influential figures within the overseas Chinese community who
are acceptable to the PRC government to become proactive in helping shape ethnic
Chinese public opinion on political matters.
•
Encourage wealthy overseas Chinese who are politically acceptable to the
PRC government to subsidize activities which support China’s political agenda.
•
Draw on China’s agents and informers abroad to enhance China’s political
influence. 41
•
Encourage political engagement of the overseas Chinese community (华人参
政). This policy encourages overseas Chinese who are acceptable to the PRC
government to become involved in politics in their host countries as candidates who,
if elected, will be able to act to promote China’s interests abroad; and encourages
China’s allies to build relations with non-Chinese pro-CCP government foreign
political figures, to offer donations to foreign political parties, and to mobilize public
opinion via Chinese language social media; so as to promote the PRC's economic
and political agenda abroad. 42 Of course it is completely normal and to be
encouraged that the ethnic Chinese communities in each country seek political
representation; however this initiative is separate from that spontaneous and natural
development.
2.

Make the foreign serve China
8

 In 2013, at the national conference on CCP Propaganda and Thought Work Xi
Jinping utilized a well-known saying of Mao Zedong “make the past serve the
present, make the foreign serve China” (古为今用， 洋为中用) to sum up his
administration’s back-to-the-future approach to governance. 43 In foreign affairs, the
Xi administration has revived traditional CCP policies of utilizing people-to-people,
party-to-party, and now PRC enterprise-to-foreign enterprise relations in order to
coopt foreigners to support and promote China’s foreign policy goals.
Agencies: CCP International Liaison Department, Ministry of State Security, CCP
national, provincial and city government leaders, Chinese State-Owned Enterprises
and Red Capitalists, the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign
Countries and other such CCP Front organizations.
Policies:
•
Strengthen party-to-party links.
•
Building a global network of strategic partners—a classic united front
approach. 44
•
Appoint foreigners with access to political power to high profile roles in
Chinese companies or Chinese-funded entities in the host country. 45
•
Use sister city relations to expand China’s economic agenda separate to a
given nation’s foreign policy. The CCP front organization, the Chinese People’s
Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries is in charge of this activity.
•
Coopt foreign academics, entrepreneurs, and politicians to promote China’s
perspective in the media and academia. Build up positive relations with susceptible
individuals via shows of generous political hospitality in China. The explosion in
numbers of all-expenses-paid quasi-scholarly and quasi-official conferences in China
(and some which are held overseas) is a notable feature of the Xi era, on an
unprecedented scale.
•
The use of mergers, acquisitions, and partnerships with foreign companies,
universities, and research centres in order to acquire local identities that enhance
influence activities; and potentially, access to military technology, commercial
secrets, and other strategic information. 46
3.
“Make the CCP’s message the loudest of our times” 47
The Xi government’s go-global, multi-platform, national and international strategic
communication strategy aims to influence international perceptions about China,
shape international debates about the Chinese government and strengthen
management over the Chinese-language public sphere in China, as well as globally.
Agencies: Xinhua News Service, CGTV, CRI, State Council Information Office/Office
for Foreign Propaganda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant state organs.
Policies:
•
The approach is multi-platform and multi-media. The Xi era media strategy
creates new platforms which merge China’s traditional and new media such as
Wechat, and takes it to new global audiences in the developing world, the former
Eastern Bloc, as well as to developed countries. 4849
9

 •
Under the policy known as to “borrow a boat to go out on the ocean” (借船出
海) China has set up strategic partnerships with foreign newspapers, TV, and radio
stations, to provide them with free content in the CCP-authorized line for Chinarelated news. The formerly independent Chinese language media outside China is a
key target for this activity.
•
Integrate and “harmonize” the overseas Chinese media with the Chinese
media (海外华文媒体融合). 50
•
Under the policy to “buy a boat to go out on the ocean” (买船出海) China’s
party-state media companies are engaging in strategic mergers and acquisitions of
foreign media and cultural enterprises. 51
•
Under the “localizing” (本土化) policy, China’s foreign media outlets such as
CGTV are employing more foreigners so as to have foreign faces explaining CCP
policies.
•
A new focus on the importance of think tanks in shaping policy and public
opinion. China is making a massive investment in setting up scores of China, as well
as foreign-based, think tanks and research centres to help shape global public
opinion, increase China’s soft power, improve international visibility and help shape
new global norms. 52
•
Setting up academic partnerships with foreign universities and academic
publishers; then imposing China’s censorship rules as part of the deal.
•
Offering strings-attached academic funding through the Confucius Institutes
and other China-connected funding bodies, and investment in foreign research
centres.
•
Under the slogan "tell a good Chinese story," (讲好中国故事) restoring to
prominence China’s cultural and public diplomacy. Central and local governments
are once again providing massive subsidies for cultural activities aimed at the
outside world; from scholarly publishing, to acrobatics, to Chinese medicine. This
policy builds on and extends efforts established in the Hu era. China promotes
Chinese culture and language internationally through Confucius Institutes, cultural
centres, and festivals. The revised strategy particularly focuses on youth; and in
countries with a significant indigenous population, attempts to develop close
relations with indigenous communities.
4.
One Belt, One Road
This is the Xi government’s initiative to create a China-centered economic bloc, one
that is “beyond ideology” and will reshape the global order. 5354 One Belt, One Road,
also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), builds on, and greatly extends, the
“going out” (走出去) policy launched in 1999 in the Jiang era and continued into the
Hu era, which encouraged public-private partnerships between Chinese SOEs and
Chinese Red Capitalists in China and overseas to acquire global natural resource
assets and seek international infrastructure projects. 55
Agencies: National Development and Reform Commission (lead agency), Stateowned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council,
10

 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other relevant state agencies, Chinese SOEs and Red
Capitalists, Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries or
such CCP united front organizations.
Policies:
•
Use OBOR to stimulate China’s economic development via external projects;
secure access to strategic natural resources.
•
Set up trade zones, ports, and communications infrastructure that connects
back to China.
•
Provide China-based “China-model” training programs and exchanges for
foreign government officials.
•
Get foreign governments to do the work of promoting China’s OBOR to their
own citizens and neighboring states (another version of “borrowing a boat”).
•
Work closely with both national and local government leaders on OBOR
projects. Local governments control considerable assets and can make planning
decisions at the local level.
•
Invest in both China-based and foreign-based OBOR think tanks to help
shape global public opinion, strengthen China’s soft power, improve China’s
international visibility, and ability to help shape new global norms. 56
•
Offer governments who sign up to OBOR privileged access to the Chinese
market.
•
Draw on the resources and assistance of overseas Chinese entrepreneurs to
extend the objectives of OBOR.
•
Promote the view that that OBOR is a win-win strategy both for China and
the countries who accept OBOR projects. 57
•
Use united front work to increase support for OBOR.

Tweet from Auckland Confucius Institute commenting on the New Zealand election.

11

 Why New Zealand is of interest to China
Unlike Australia, New Zealand does not have many of the strategic mineral
resources that China needs for its industrial development. But New Zealand is of
interest to China for a number of significant reasons. First of all, the New Zealand
government is responsible for the defence and foreign affairs of three other
territories in the South Pacific: the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau—which
potentially means four votes for China at international organisations. New Zealand
is a claimant state in Antarctica and one of the closest access points there; China has
a long-term strategic agenda in Antarctica that will require the cooperation of
established Antarctic states such as New Zealand. 58 New Zealand has cheap arable
land and a sparse population and China is seeking to access foreign arable land to
improve its food safety. 59 New Zealand now supplies 24 percent of China's foreign
milk, and China is the biggest foreign investor in New Zealand’s dairy sector.60 New
Zealand is useful for near-space research; which is an important new area of
research for the PLA as it expands its long range precision missiles, as well as having
civilian applications. Chinese companies Shanghai Pengxin and KuangChi Science
have used Shanghai Pengxin's New Zealand dairy farms for near-space launches. 61
New Zealand also has unexplored oil and gas resources. In 2016, New Zealand was
described as being “at the heart” of global money laundering. 62 The Cook Islands,
Niue, and Tokelau are well-known as tax havens and money laundering nations.
New Zealand is also a member of the UKUSA intelligence agreement, the Five
Power Defense Arrangement, and the unofficial ABCA grouping of militaries, as
well as a NATO partner state. Breaking New Zealand out of these military
groupings and away from its traditional partners, or at the very least, getting New
Zealand to agree to stop spying on China for the Five Eyes, would be a major coup
for China's strategic goal of becoming a global great power. New Zealand’s evercloser economic, political, and military relationship with China, is seen by Beijing as
an exemplar to Australia, the small island nations in the South Pacific, as well as
more broadly, other Western states. New Zealand is valuable to China, as well to
other states such as Russia, as a soft underbelly to access Five Eyes intelligence. New
Zealand is also a potential strategic site for the PLA-Navy’s Southern Hemisphere
future naval facilities and a future Beidou-2 ground station—there are already
several of these in Antarctica. 63
All of these aspects make New Zealand of interest to China’s Party-State-MilitaryMarket nexus. Unlike the Cold War years when the CCP’s agents and spies were
united by a common faith in Maoism-Marxism-Leninism, in the present day,
modern-day agents of influence may be working to extend political and strategic
interests at one moment, while lining their own pockets in the next. Current policy
encourages the blurring of political and economic interests in the pursuit of
extending China’s soft power. 64
12

 China hasn't had to pressure New Zealand to accept China's soft power activities
and political influence. The New Zealand government has actively courted it. Ever
since New Zealand-PRC diplomatic relations were established in 1972, successive
New Zealand governments have followed policies of attracting Beijing's attention
and favor through high profile support for China's new economic agendas. 65 New
Zealand has strived to always be the first Western country to sign up to China’s new
external economic policies, whether it is China's entry into the WTO, a Free Trade
Agreement with China, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment
Bank (AIIB), and most recently the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI/OBOR). New
Zealand governments have also encouraged China to be active in New Zealand's
region—from the South Pacific to Antarctica; initially as a balance to Soviet
influence, 66 as an aid donor and scientific partner, and lately, as part of
“diversification” of New Zealand's military links away from Five Eyes
partnerships. 67
As a small state which relies on international trade for economic prosperity and the
protection of great powers for its security, New Zealand is very vulnerable to shifts
in the global balance of economic and political power. New Zealand has had an
extended transition from being a colony of the United Kingdom (UK) to full
independence. Like most small states, New Zealand looks to larger powers for its
security. In the early 1970s the New Zealand economy was rocked by the UK's entry
into the Common Market and the global oil crisis. Formerly known as the UK’s
"farm" in the South Pacific, New Zealand's economic prosperity was founded on
access to the British market, and until the fall of Singapore in 1942, New Zealand's
security was also protected by the UK. With the post-WWII decline of British power,
New Zealand benefited from the Atlantic Alliance to become an ally of the USA,
united by the UKUSA Agreement and (the now defunct) ANZUS Agreement.
Since the mid-1980s, successive New Zealand governments have looked to China as
the solution to the loss of access to the UK market. New Zealand retains strong
military relations with the UK and US and other traditional partners. However, these
days forty-four percent of New Zealand's trade is with the Asia-Pacific, and China is
New Zealand's second largest overall trading partner and largest market for tourism
and milk products—New Zealand's top two economic sectors. 68 New Zealand signed
a Comprehensive Cooperative Relationship Agreement with China in 2003 and a
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with China in 2014. 69 New Zealand
is now expanding relations with China beyond trade, to finance,
telecommunications, forestry, food safety and security, education, science and
technology, tourism, climate change and Antarctic cooperation, and also into
military cooperation. In contrast, the Trump presidency has not ratified the TPPA,
which New Zealand helped to set up, and successive US presidencies have refused
to sign an FTA with New Zealand—many believe in punishment for New Zealand's
1987 anti-nuclear legislation. In 2013, New Zealand’s Minister of Defence, Dr
13

 Jonathan Coleman, admitted that New Zealand was currently “walking this path
between the US and China.” 70

Tweet by National MP Nikki Kaye, interviewed on NCTV with National MP Yang Jian

There were signs of a shift in New Zealand-China relations under the Clark Labour
government (1999-2008), 71 but the current prominence afforded the China relationship
has accelerated dramatically under the government that won the election in 2008, the
New Zealand National Party. The National Party government (2008-), follows two
main principles on China: 1. The “no surprises” policy, 72 which appears to mean
avoiding the New Zealand government or its officials or anyone affiliated with
government activities saying or doing anything that might offend the PRC
government; and 2. a long-standing emphasis on “getting the political relationship
right”, which under this National government has come to mean developing extensive
and intimate political links with CCP local and national leaders and their
representatives and affiliated actors in New Zealand. 73 According to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs from 2008-2017, Murray McCully, getting the China relationship right
was the “top priority” of his government because the expansion in New ZealandChina trade after the 2008 FTA was signed enabled New Zealand to weather the 2008
Global Financial Crisis. 74
This cautiousness to not rock the boat over New Zealand-China relations lay behind
New Zealand's reluctance to join the USA and Australia to criticize China's militarybase building activities in the South China Sea. Following massive pressure from
Australia and the US, New Zealand Prime Minister John Key (2008-2016) and other
ministers made a series of muted remarks in 2015 and 2016, but it was far from what
14

 New Zealand's allies had hoped for, who have frequently accused the National
government of being soft on China. The New Zealand National government's
reticence to speak out on this issue, despite the fact New Zealand has the fourth largest
maritime territory in the world and relies on respect for international norms for the
protection of its rights, is one telling example of the effectiveness of China's soft power
efforts in New Zealand in recent years. In contrast, after the Chinese government’s
crackdown on the student protest movement in 1989, New Zealand joined with other
Western governments in making strong statements criticizing China’s actions. At the
time, China was New Zealand’s fourth largest trading partner and China trade was a
major focus of the then Labour government, but this did not inhibit that government
from speaking out on China’s human rights abuses.
China’s Political Influence Activities in New Zealand
China's political influence activities in New Zealand and the agencies involved in
those efforts closely follow the template outlined above. The examples of this are
numerous, but I will highlight examples below as an illustration.
•
Unsheathing the magic weapon: Overseas Chinese work in New Zealand
There are currently around 200,000 ethnic Chinese resident in New Zealand, out of a
population of 4.5 million New Zealanders. The majority of Chinese in New Zealand
live in Auckland, where they make up around 10 percent of the population. Chinese
consular authorities keep a close eye on all Chinese community activities, but
especially in Auckland. They have achieved this through close links with core proBeijing Chinese community groups, and by maintaining oversight over other
Chinese community groups, ethnic Chinese political figures, and Chinese language
media and schools in New Zealand. Moreover, during the Xi era, the PRC embassy
has supported the setting up of new organizations that report back to united front
bodies in China, and, according to two former Australian-based Chinese diplomats,
by placing supporters and informers in New Zealand Chinese organizations that are
more independent minded and pose a potential threat to China’s interests. 75 This is
classic CCP party-building and organization work (组织工作); one of the three
“magic weapons” of the CCP. The current level of supervision over the ethnic
Chinese community in New Zealand is a remarkable achievement. All throughout
the Cold War years, with only a few exceptions, Chinese New Zealanders were
neither pro-CCP nor pro-PRC, even if they were not necessarily pro-Chinese
Nationalist Party or pro-ROC, 76 and New Zealand’s Chinese-language media,
community groups, and language schools were proudly independent.
It should be remembered that the ethnic Chinese permanent residents and citizens of
New Zealand are a very diverse group; not all are Han Chinese, not all are originally
from the PRC. Many come from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam,
Thailand, or elsewhere, their families may have emigrated to New Zealand before
1949, and many of those who did originally migrate from the PRC left there to
15

 escape the politics. But if they wish to be part of a Chinese-speaking environment in
New Zealand, then they now have to put up with China’s guiding of political
activities within the ethnic Chinese community and tightened censorship on political
issues in New Zealand.
The organization most closely connected with the PRC authorities in New Zealand is
the Peaceful Reunification of China Association of New Zealand (PRCANZ),
founded in 2000. 77 In Chinese the organization’s name is 新西兰中国和平统一促进会,
which translates as the “New Zealand China Council for the Promotion of the
Peaceful Reunification of China”. 78 It comes directly under the United Front Work
Department of the CCP Central Committee. The name of the organisation is a
reference to the “Peaceful Reunification” of mainland China and Taiwan. However,
the organization also engages in a range of activities which support Chinese foreign
policy goals, including block-voting and fund-raising for ethnic Chinese political
candidates who agree to support their organization’s agenda. When Chinese senior
leaders visit New Zealand, it is united front-affiliated organizations such as
PRCANZ who organize counter-protest groups to shout down pro-Falungong, proTibet, or any other group critical of China who come to protest when China’s senior
leaders visit New Zealand. 79 In 2014, PRCANZ hosted a meeting of the leaders of
over thirty New Zealand united front-affiliated groups to denounce Hong Kong’s
pro-democracy protests, the Occupy Movement. 80 In 2015, after the historic meeting
between PRC President Xi Jinping and ROC President Ma Ying-jeou, PRCANZ
organized a meeting of New Zealand politicians and Chinese community leaders to
discuss China's reunification with Taiwan. 81 National MP Jamie-Lee Ross spoke at
the meeting and pledged the New Zealand National Party's support for the One
China policy. 82

Meeting in Auckland in 2016 of New Zealand overseas Chinese leaders to support China’s official response to
the International Court ruling on the South China Sea territorial dispute, photo via
https://www.flickr.com/photos/88452641@N08/albums/with/72157671193301625

16

 The current head of PRCANZ is Steven Wai Cheung Wong, also known as Huang
Weizhang 黄玮璋. Mr Wong has senior leadership roles in many other united front
organisations in New Zealand, as well as in China. He is head of the United Chinese
Association, head of the New Zealand Chinese History and Culture Association,
Vice President of the China Chamber of Commerce in New Zealand, member of the
Guangdong Provincial Association of Overseas Exchanges, Shandong Province
Association overseas honorary president, member of the China Peaceful
Reunification Council, and an adviser to the Beijing Overseas Chinese Affairs
Council. Steven Wong was born in Guangdong, China and moved to New Zealand
in 1972. He is general manager of New Zealand Fresh Food Co. Ltd and made his
money as a manufacturer of potato chips. 83
The PRCANZ is one of a growing number of united front organizations in New
Zealand 84 and other countries which the Chinese government organises, supports,
and subsidises. The PRC also relies on “patriotic” business persons—Red
Capitalists—who are always prominent in such organizations, to provide further
funding. This is a longstanding practice of CCP united front work. The Red
Capitalists may be granted business opportunities and political cover, a win-win
situation.
Beijing-supported united front groups in New Zealand are too multitudinous to list
in full, but they are generally organizations that group people according to their
place of origin; along professional lines; or else interest groups such as the New
Zealand China Charity Association. 85 Some of the united front-related groups may
only have 5 or 6 members. From the participants’ point of view, the connection with
the PRC embassy can bring benefits such as prestige and business opportunities.
Because the numbers of groups are now so large, the PRC representatives prioritize a
few core organizations and encourage the formation of Chinese community centres
to link groups together.
In 2014, the first New Zealand Overseas Chinese Service Centre was set up in
Auckland. The organization aims to better coordinate relations between local
Chinese associations, the PRC embassy in New Zealand and the State Council
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. 86 The Service Centre has been built on a pre-existing
organization, founded in 1998, the Chinese New Settlers Services Trust. 87 In 2017 the
head of the Auckland Overseas Chinese Service Centre, Wang Lingjuan, was invited
by the State Council for Overseas Chinese Affairs to attend a conference on overseas
Chinese affairs, where she laid flowers at a memorial to Mao Zedong. She told
reporters, with presumably unintended irony, that the service centres were “like a
part of China and that now wherever overseas Chinese go in the world, the Overseas
Chinese Service Centre will give them a sense of being back home.” 88

17

 As in many other countries in the world, each university campus in New Zealand
now has a Chinese Student and Scholars Association, one of the main means the
Chinese authorities use to guide Chinese students and scholars on short-term study
abroad. The New Zealand organization was formed in 2012 and links all the Chinese
student groups on the various tertiary campuses in New Zealand. The New Zealand
Chinese Student and Scholars Association is "under the correct guidance" of the PRC
representatives in New Zealand. 89
An important Xi era policy on overseas Chinese work is the goal to encourage the
Chinese diaspora to become more active in the politics of their host countries. The
numbers of ethnic Chinese candidates at local and national elections in New Zealand
is growing 90 and this is a very natural and positive development for the New
Zealand Chinese community, some of whose members have been in the country for
over one hundred and fifty years. Chinese political leaders in New Zealand
inevitably come under pressure from PRC diplomats to conform to, and work for,
Chinese government policy. Reflecting the diversity of the ethnic Chinese
community in New Zealand, many are not attracted to being coopted by the PRC’s
representatives in New Zealand.
National’s ethnic Chinese MP Yang Jian, Labour’s Raymond Huo, and ACT’s
Kenneth Wang have had varying degrees of relations with united front
organizations in New Zealand and the PRC embassy. Kenneth Wang (王小选)
entered parliament from 2004-2005 as list MP for the ACT Party and was deputy
leader of the party until 2014. Wang is descended from a CCP revolutionary family,
he is the grandson of the first CCP governor of Shanxi Province, Wang Shiying. 91 In
2005, Wang was invited to China to meet with the Guangdong Overseas Chinese
Association. 92 Wang's pro-Chinese investment, pro-Chinese immigration policies
have been reported favorably in China. 93 In past years, PRCANZ organized many
fund-raising events for Wang and encouraged the ethnic Chinese community to
block vote for him. 9495 Since 2005 Wang has been honorary president of the New
Zealand Beijing Chamber of Commerce. 96 He also has leadership roles in a number
of other united front-linked organizations: Vice President of the Beijing
Association, 97 New Zealand President of the University Alumni Association, 98 and
New Zealand Bowo International President. 99
When Kenneth Wang first entered Parliament as a list MP, 47 percent of Chinese
voters voted Labour. 100 But in the 2014 election, 75 percent voted National. 101
National has worked hard to attract the ethnic Chinese vote, investing in saturation
media presence in all the Chinese language traditional and social media platforms in
New Zealand. National elected its first ethnic Chinese MP, Pansy Wong 黃徐毓芳, in
1996, but she was forced to resign from Parliament in 2011 over scandals related to
her misuse of travel perks. Wong had been in the media spotlight for a number of
18

 years, over allegations that her husband, Sammy Wong, had used his wife’s status to
boost his business deals in New Zealand and China.
After Pansy Wong was forced out of Parliament, former University of Auckland
political studies lecturer Dr Yang Jian 杨健 was shoulder-tapped by National Party
President Peter Goodfellow to become the second ethnic Chinese MP because, he
was told, “National needs the Chinese vote.” 102 At the time of entering parliament,
Dr Yang already had a profile in the ethnic Chinese community in New Zealand due
to his community activities as well as his academic status. From 2006 Dr Yang had
also been involved in New Zealand’s Track 2 diplomacy.
As widely reported in the New Zealand and international media in 2017, 103 Yang Jian
worked for fifteen years in China’s military intelligence sector. It was a history
which he has admitted he concealed on his New Zealand permanent residency
application and job applications in New Zealand, 104 as well as his public profile in
New Zealand—at least in English sources. 105
However in an article in the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao) magazine, Huanqiu renwu
(Global People) in 2013, which was republished in a number of websites, Yang Jian
gave an extensive interview detailing aspects of his earliest years, his career in
China, and subsequent activities in Australia and New Zealand. 106 Yang Jian entered
the PLA-Air Force Engineering College to study English in 1978; he taught at the
same college for five years after graduation, trained at the People’s Liberation Army
Luoyang Foreign Languages Institute for his first Masters degree, studied for a year
at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for US-China Studies at Nanjing University, and after
that, from 1990 to 1993 taught English to students at the Luoyang Foreign Languages
Institute who were studying to intercept and decipher English language
communications. 107
Yang Jian does not mention his 15 year career and studies with the PLA on his
National Party online cv, 108 and it also does not appear on the online cv provided for
his profile when he was a lecturer at the University of Auckland. 109 But he did
provide this information in a cv in English to be circulated to Chinese officials which
he gave to the New Zealand Embassy in China, preparatory to a visit to China in
2012, the year after he entered parliament. 110 And a Chinese language report
promoting the setting up of the National Party’s Blue Dragons organization (an
ethnic Chinese youth group within that party), highlights his studies at the Luoyang
Foreign Languages Institute, while not mentioning any other details about his
working life or other tertiary studies when he was living in China. 111 The Financial
Times speculated that these selective mentions of his past links with the Luoyang
Foreign Languages Institute were meant as a “dog whistle” to the Chinese
community in New Zealand. 112
19

 The PLA-Air Force Engineering College is the PLA-AF’s elite training institution,
one of the top ten military colleges in China. So if Dr Yang was allowed to stay on as
a teacher after teaching, he would most likely have had to be admitted to the CCP at
some point when he was a student, as a teaching position in a military academy
would require Party membership. Dr Yang admitted to journalists that he is a CCP
member—though insisted he had not been an active member since he left China in
1994. 113 However once someone is accepted into the CCP (which involves an
extremely rigorous two-year supervision process), regardless of how an individual
may feel, they are always regarded as a Party member; unless they are officially
expelled from the CCP. This happens very rarely—one would have to be a traitor or
commit a serious disciplinary offence for it to occur.
Yang’s second place of study in China, the PLA Foreign Language Institute at
Luoyang, is part of the Third Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters of the PLA,
one of the PLA’s two military intelligence agencies. The Third Department is the
equivalent of the USSR’s GRU or the USA’s National Security Agency. The Third
Department is in charge of China’s signals intelligence operations and provides
intelligence assessments. 114 Linguists assigned to the PLA Third Department are sent
to the Luoyang Foreign Languages School for language training, then assigned to a
Third Department bureau for technical training. 115 Yang Jian’s wife, who goes by the
English name “Jane” 116, was in the same graduate programme with him at the
Luoyang Foreign Languages Institute. 117 Jane is an IT specialist, who got a job in
information technology at the University of Auckland when Dr Yang took up a
lecturing position in international relations there. 118
The PLA would not have allowed anyone with Yang Jian’s military intelligence
background to go overseas to study—unless they had official permission. Even if he
had left the PLA, he would have had to wait at least two years before he would be
allowed to go abroad and he would have had to have official permission from his
former employer to obtain a Chinese passport. In 1994 Yang Jian moved to Australia
to study for his second Masters in International Relations and then a PhD at the
Australian National University. He quickly became heavily involved in united front
activities there. He was chairman of the Chinese Student and Scholars Association in
Canberra for many years; and after he moved to Auckland, he took on leadership
roles in overseas Chinese activities there too. 119
Since he entered parliament, Yang has been a central figure promoting and helping
to shape the New Zealand National government’s China strategy and been
responsible for their engagement with the New Zealand Chinese community. From
2014-2016, Yang Jian was a member of the Parliamentary Select Committee for
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Yang accompanied New Zealand PM John Key
and his successor PM Bill English on trips to China and in meetings with senior
Chinese leaders when they visited New Zealand. This role would have given him
20

 privileged access to New Zealand’s China policy briefing notes and positions. Under
normal circumstances someone with Dr Yang’s military intelligence background in
China would not have been given a New Zealand security clearance to work on
foreign affairs. Elected MPs are not required to apply for security clearance.

Yang Jian MP and the PRC Auckland Consul-General meet with visiting Chinese scientists in 2016, photo via
https://www.flickr.com/photos/88452641@N08/32408371584/in/album-72157679392669810/

Since entering parliament, Dr Yang has become the National Party’s main organizer
and fundraiser among the Chinese community. For example, in 2014 PM John Key
attended a fund raising dinner and auction organized by Dr Yang for unnamed
wealthy ethnic Chinese voters, which raised $200,000 for National's election
campaign. 120 In 2016 Dr Yang was involved in another major fund-raising event with
PM Key, related to the bid to change the New Zealand flag. Six unnamed Chinese
donors at an exclusive lunch for nine (the other attendees were Yang and National
MP Nikki Kaye) donated a total of $100,000 for the flag campaign. The Chinese
donors wanted the Union Jack removed from the New Zealand flag, because it
reminded them of the history of British imperialism in China. 121 Yang is seen at most
official events involving the PRC embassy and the ethnic Chinese community in
New Zealand. 122 The New Zealand media reported that Dr Yang has been
investigated by New Zealand’s SIS in the last three years. 123
Even more so than Yang Jian, who until the recent controversy, was not often quoted
in the New Zealand non-Chinese language media, the Labour Party’s ethnic Chinese
MP, Raymond Huo 霍建强 works very publicly with China’s united front
organizations in New Zealand and promotes their policies in English and Chinese.
Huo was a Member of Parliament from 2008 to 2014, then returned to Parliament
21

 again in 2017 when a list position became vacant. In 2009, at a meeting organized by
the Peaceful Reunification of China Association of New Zealand to celebrate Tibetan
Serf Liberation Day, Huo said that as a “person from China” (中国人) he would
promote China’s Tibet policies to the New Zealand Parliament. 124
Huo works very closely with the PRC representatives in New Zealand. 125 In 2014, at
a meeting to discuss promotion of New Zealand’s Chinese Language Week (led by
Huo and Johanna Coughlan) Huo said that "Advisors from Chinese communities
will be duly appointed with close consultation with the Chinese diplomats and
community leaders." 126 Huo also has close contacts with the Zhi Gong Party 致公党
(one of the eight minor parties under the control of the United Front Work
Department). The Zhi Gong Party is a united front link to liaise with overseas
Chinese communities, as demonstrated in a meeting between Zhi Gong Party
leaders and Huo to promote the New Zealand OBOR Foundation and Think Tank. 127
It was Huo who made the decision to translate Labour’s 2017 election campaign
slogan “Let’s do it” into a quote from Xi Jinping (撸起袖子加油干, which literally
means “roll up your sleeves and work hard”). Huo told journalists at the Labour
campaign launch that the Chinese translation “auspiciously equates to a New Year's
message from President Xi Jinping encouraging China to ‘roll its sleeves up’.” 128
However, inauspiciously, in colloquial Chinese, Xi’s phrase can also be read as “roll
up your sleeves and fuck hard” and the verb (撸) has connotations of
masturbation. 129 Xi’s catchphrase has been widely satirized in Chinese social
media. 130 Nonetheless, the phrase is now the politically correct slogan for promoting
OBOR, both in China and abroad. The use of Xi’s political catchphrase in the Labour
campaign, indicates how tone deaf Huo and those in the Chinese community he
works with are to how the phrase would be received in the New Zealand political
environment. In 2014, when asked about the issue of Chinese political influence in
New Zealand, Huo told RNZ National, "Generally the Chinese community is excited
about the prospect of China having more influence in New Zealand” and added,
“many Chinese community members told him a powerful China meant a backer,
either psychologically or in the real sense." 131

22

 Tweet from Raymond Huo announcing the use of Xi’s phrase to translate Jacinda Ardern’s
slogan. Chinese New Zealand Herald website editor Hao Peng comments below the tweet
that he should pay him a royalty fee for the idea.
Labour have selected another ethnic Chinese candidate in the 2017 elections, who
also has close United Front connections—Ms Chen Naisi (陈耐锶), a law student at
the University of Auckland. 132 Chen is President of the New Zealand Chinese
Students and Scholars Association, and co-president of the Auckland branch of this
organization. Chen said in an interview on New Zealand Chinese television that she
is “not in the least bit interested in politics” but that the job as an MP will give her
the platform to promote the interests of the student association she currently
represents. 133 So if Chen, Huo, and Yang are elected in the 2017 election, which is
quite likely given their high placing on party lists, there will be a leader of a united
front-related organization for managing the overseas Chinese students and scholars,
someone who has worked in Chinese military intelligence for 15 years, and someone
23

 who is an extremely active participant in China’s united front activities sitting in the
New Zealand Parliament. As one New Zealand Chinese wit drily pointed out on
Twitter, between them they will be enough members to form a New Zealand
parliamentary CCP party cell. 134
The Xi government is encouraging more overseas Chinese to become engaged in
politics and one important means to be active in politics is via political donations.
Since 2007 the New Zealand Electoral Commission has compiled an annual report on
political donations over $1,500 to political parties and candidates. However,
“charity” fundraising, such as dinners and auctions, are excluded from this scrutiny.
According to a 2007 Sunday Star Times report, eighty-three per cent ($8.7 million over
six years) of the political donations received by National are from anonymous
donors, while eighty per cent ($2.8 million) of those donated to Labour are also from
anonymous donations. 135 This means that the figures available are only partial at
best, but they do give an indication of trends when it comes to the large donations to
political parties in the period from 2007-2017.
The National Party has been in government since 2008, and this appears to be a
factor in why they have received the bulk of recorded funds from Chinese
entrepreneurs with close political connections to China in that time period, as when
they have not been in power or look to be unlikely to win an election such as the
Auckland mayoral race in 2016, donations have shifted to Labour. In this
preliminary study, following the model used in Australia to investigate this
matter, 136 I have focused only on those donors where I found evidence of
membership in united front-related organizations or close connections with the CCP.
In 2007, Steven Wong, Steven Wai Cheung Wong,黄玮璋, head of the Peaceful
Reunification of China Association of New Zealand made two donations to Labour
in one year, $19,000 and $23,000; but his name does not appear again on the list of
large donors from 2007-2017. Che Weixing (车卫星 also known as Christine Chee
Waxing and Che Weixing) donated $19,468 to National in 2016; 137 and $15,800 in
2015. 138 Ms Che holds senior honorary roles in the New Zealand Song Qingling
Foundation, the New Zealand Qingdao Association, the Shandong Association, the
New Zealand Teo Chew Nang Association, 139 and she is the deputy president of the
Auckland branch of the Peaceful Reunification of China Association of New
Zealand. 140 Ms Che is also the director of Qiushi Property and Acme Longhan
Building Company. In Australia, the Peaceful Reunification Association has been a
major donor to Australian politicians. As documented below, it appears the trend in
New Zealand is slightly different.
Zhao Wu Shen and his wife Susan Chou (also known as Shen Zhaowu 沈兆武 and
Zhou Suzhen 周素珍), who reside in Hong Kong, 141 are the owners of Contue Jinwan
Enterprise Group in New Zealand and Kangju Enterprise, 康居企业集团 in China.
24

 Shen and Zhou have sponsored many cultural and social activities in China and
New Zealand over the last ten years, working closely with the Chinese government
and funding Chinese government projects large and small. 142 The couple are also
major political donors in New Zealand. In 2007 Susan Chou donated $41,000 to
Labour. Then in 2010, Susan Chou donated $200,000 to National, 143 in 2011 she
donated a further $100,000, 144 and in 2014, her family company Contue Jinwan
Enterprise Limited donated $200,212.36. 145 The couple joined in the exclusive fundraising charity dinner for Chinese rich-listers hosted by National MP Yang Jian and
attended by John Key in 2014; 146 which raised $200,000 for National's election
campaign.

National Party President Peter Goodfellow and National MP Yang Jian visit one of Shen Zhaowu’s projects in
China in 2014, http://www.xacontue.com/a/xinwenzixun/pinpaixinwen/21.html

Shen is the main investor in Mega Upload,147 a data storage and encryption service
set up by the controversial Kim Dotcom, whom the US government is trying to
extradite from New Zealand to face a multitude of charges including money
laundering and copyright breaches. Further major share-holdings of Mega Upload
are held by Jesse Nguy, 148 chair of the New Zealand Chinese Business Association
(NZCBA), allegedly on behalf of the convicted money-launderer and so-called
“father of Viagra” in China, Liu Yang (aka Yan Yongming). 149 Shen is a close
associate of Liu Yang. 150 Nguy (Jesse Seang Ty Nguy), is also a director of Contue
Jinwan Enterprise Group along with another company of Shen’s. The board of the
NZCBA features a number of leading ethnic Chinese personages associated with
both the New Zealand National Party, such as Sammy Wong, husband of National
25

 MP Pansy Wong; and those closely associated with China’s united front work
activities in New Zealand, such as the head of Alpha Group Gao Wei. 151
Gao Wei (高炜) has been a major donor to the National Party in recent years, via his
company Alpha Group Holdings. 152 Alpha Group Holdings donated $112,000 to
National in 2017; and $50,000 in 2014. 153 Gao has very close links with senior New
Zealand and senior Chinese political figures. 154 Gao Wei is chair of the Fujian
Overseas Chinese Business Association, 155 Deputy-head of the New Zealand-China
Association for the Promotion of Economy and Science, 156 Deputy president of the
Standing Committee of the New Zealand Fujian Chamber of Commerce, 157 Deputy
president of the New Zealand Fujian Association, Executive president of the Third
World Assembly of Youth, Chairman of the Jilin Province Overseas Chinese
Businessmen Association, 158 Chair of the Guilin Overseas Chinese Business
Association, and a member of the China Returned Overseas Chinese Association, all
of which are united front-related organizations.

National Party President Peter Goodfellow, Gao Wei and Gao Yihuai at a commemorative meeting of the Fujian
Overseas Chinese Business Association in 2015, http://fcxlm.com/content/?1894.html

The chairman of the board of directors of Alpha Group Holdings, Dr Gao Yihuai, is
also a senior leader in China’s overseas Chinese activities. 159 The General Manager of
Alpha Group Holdings, Maggie Chen (陈丽华) who was for many years the chief
editor of the New Zealand Chinese Herald, is the Deputy-President of the Song
Qingling Foundation of New Zealand, which retains close links to the CCP in New
Zealand as well as China. 160 The foundation is a CCP united front organization that
among other activities, arranges camps for Overseas Chinese youth, to ensure they
maintain close links with China and Chinese culture. 161 Through the Chinese Herald
Ms Chen organized many charity campaigns for causes in New Zealand and China,
26

 which is both worthy, and brings overseas Chinese communities together as desired
by the United Front Work Department. 162
In 2011 Shi Deyi (also known as Stone Shi, 石德毅) donated $56,500 (via Oravida NZ)
to National 163 and secured a game of golf with John Key in return. 164 The photo of the
match is still used in Oravida publicity. 165 Shi donated a further $30,000 via Oravida
in 2013, 166 in 2016 he gave $50,000, and then a further $50,000 in 2017. 167 Shi, is CEO
of Shanghai Jiacheng Investment Management 上海嘉诚投资管理有限公司, but in
New Zealand he is most well known as the director of the milk products company
Oravida. Shi also bought Ardmore airport, Auckland’s second airport, in 2016. 168 In
2005 Shi was involved in a fraud case in China; his business partner got life in
prison, while he was sentenced to pay debts and compensation. 169 Stone Shi is now a
rotating chair 170 of a Red Capitalists organization, the Shanghai Entrepreneurs
Association (上海新沪商联合会). 171 This is a grouping of 2,000 of the most powerful
companies in China, and is under the supervision of the All-China Federation of
Industry and Commerce as well as the United Front Work Department. The
Shanghai Entrepreneurs Association is a channel for public-private partnerships in
China. 172 It currently has an MOU with the New Zealand China Trade Association. 173

“Oravida’s Chairman plays golf with NZ PM,” http://www.oravida.com/newsdeitails.aspx?id=137.

Shi bought Oravida in 2010 under its former name Kiwi Dairy, from Terry Lee; a
businessman associated with Shanghai Pengxin. 174 Former New Zealand National
PM Jenny Shipley is a director of Oravida, as, for almost five years until 2017, was
David Wong-Tung, the husband of National MP Judith Collins. 175 Collins’
relationship with Oravida attracted media scrutiny when she attended a private
dinner with a Chinese customs official and Shi when Oravida were having difficulty
exporting their products to China. 176 The National government later gave Oravida
$6000 to help it to overcome border issues. 177
27

 In 2013 Ms Fan Xiaomiao donated $62,132.18 to the National Party,178 and in 2011 she
and her husband Zhang Yaxun donated $43,526.41. 179 Zhang and his wife own
Henan Province Zhou Fan Investment Company 河南省卓凡事业投资公司 and have
seven companies in New Zealand, mostly involved in agriculture. Zhang Yaxun is
the chair of the Henan Chamber of Commerce in New Zealand 180 and is a member of
the Henan Provincial People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. 181
The Henan Chamber of Commerce in New Zealand is a united front organization. 182
GMP Dairy Ltd, run by Karl Ye, also known as Ye Qing 叶青, donated NZ$25,338 to
the New Zealand National Party in 2015. 183 GMP Dairy Ltd is 51 percent owned by
Sunlight Property Development (purchased from Evergrande in 2016) and 49
percent owned by Ye via his company GMP Pharmaceuticals. The directors of GMP
Pharmaceutical are Ye and another family member, and, since April 2017 Conor
English, brother of New Zealand Prime Minister Bill English. 184 Ye also owns GMP
Nutrition Ltd, and his company Australian Infinity Pacific Holdings owns several
other food and nutrition-related companies in New Zealand. 185
Karl Ye is founder of the Australia-New Zealand China Health Industry Forum, a
group that links PRC State sector organizations and the health sector in New
Zealand and Australia 186 and he was involved with united front groups such as the
Chinese Student and Scholars Association in Australia where he initially migrated to
in the early 1990s, and which he still uses as his home address in company listings.
In 2012, GMP Dairy subsidiary Cowala used a photo of PM John Key posing with its
products in advertising in China; Key had opened GMP Dairy’s Auckland factory
that year. Senior National MPs Steven Joyce and Bill English have attended product
launches for GMP, as has National Party President Peter Goodfellow. GMP paid for
two National MPs, Jamie-Lee Ross and Stuart Smith to visit China in 2016. 187,188

28

 New Zealand politicians from ACT and Labour parties speak at the founding of the Shandong Association in
Auckland in 2016, http://www.toutiaoabc.com/index.php?act=view&nid=176014

In 2017 Lang Lin, owner of Inner Mongolia Rider Horse Industry (NZ) Ltd donated
$150,000 to National. Lang’s company is backed by the Chinese government
investment firm CITIC (China International Trust and Investment Company), who
are sponsoring his bid to expand China’s racing industry through importing New
Zealand race horses. 189 CITIC was set up under United Front Work Department
auspices. 190

29

 Promotional materials from Rider Horse’s Chinese language website show Lang Lin and a staff member meeting
with Xi Jinping and John Key, http://www.riderhorse.com/cn/about

During his successful campaign for the Auckland mayoralty, in 2016, former Labour
leader and MP, Phil Goff received $366,115 from a charity auction and dinner for the
Chinese community. 191 The event was organized by Labour MP Raymond Huo.
Tables sold for $1680 each. Because it was a charity auction Goff was not required to
state who had given him donations, but one item hit the headlines. A signed copy of
the Selected Works of Xi Jinping was sold to a bidder from China for $150,000. 192 A
participant at the fundraiser said the reason why so many people attended and had
bid strongly for items was because they believed Goff would be the next mayor. 193 In
individual donations, Goff’s largest donor, giving $50,000, was Fuwah New Zealand
Ltd, a Chinese-owned company building a 5-star hotel on Auckland’s waterfront
and working closely with the New Zealand One Belt One Road Promotion
Council. 194
30

 Phil Goff meeting with Christine Chee/Che Weixing, deputy president of the Auckland branch of the New
Zealand Peaceful Unification of China Association at her home in Pakuranga in 2016, photo via
https://www.flickr.com/photos/88452641@N08/sets/72157677187513973

• Making the foreign serve China
The CCP has long had a policy of developing party-to-party links, but this has
expanded even more intensely under the Xi administration which is determined to
improve China’s international image and legitimacy and a New Zealand
government that appears to have interpreted getting the “political relationship
right” with China very literally. The New Zealand Prime Minister (from 2008-2016
John Key, then from 2016- Bill English), National Party President Peter Goodfellow,
and Yang Jian are the key point figures on this strategy, and their names feature
heavily in Chinese media reports on New Zealand-China relations. Interestingly,
Goodfellow and Yang (until the recent controversy) seldom feature in English
language reports on New Zealand China relations, whereas the Prime Minister,
Foreign Minister and Defence Minister are prominently featured discussing New
Zealand-China relations.
Former politicians with access to government are a valuable commodity. China’s
foreign affairs work has always aimed to coopt foreigners with access to political
power to support China’s foreign policy agenda. 195 But now the focus is on using
foreign political leaders to progress both economic and political relations. China’s
united front approach has always used civil actors to promote political ends. CCP
united front officials and their agents are tasked with developing relationships with
foreign and overseas Chinese personages to influence, subvert, and if necessary,
bypass the policies of their governments and promote the interests of the CCP
globally. 196 A 1997 report by Canada RCMP-SIS identified a pattern of foreigners
31

 with high-level political contacts being placed in high profile roles in Chinese
companies or Chinese-funded entities in Canada. 197 Examples of this can also be
found in New Zealand. Concerns have repeatedly been raised about these
relationships in the New Zealand media and in parliament. Below I will list some of
these connections.
Former National Party leader, Dr Don Brash, chairs the Industrial Bank of China in
New Zealand; former National MPs Ruth Richardson and Chris Tremain are on the
board of the Bank of China in New Zealand; while former Prime Minister Dame
Jenny Shipley chairs the China Construction Bank (New Zealand) and was on the
board of the China Construction Bank for six years. She is also chair of the Oravida
board. 198 Former National MP and Minister of Finance, Ruth Richardson was a
director of Synlait Farms and is now a director of Synlait Milk. Shanghai Pengxin—
noted for its interest in New Zealand’s farms as well as near space—owns 74% of
Synlait Farm. National MP Judith Collins’ husband David Wong-Tung was on the
Oravida board for 5 years. 199 Sammy Wong, husband of former National MP Pansy
Wong, assisted Pacific Power Development to get a contract for the Chinese
company China North Rail (CNR) to supply 20 locomotives to KiwiRail. CNR also
won a $29 million contract to supply 300 flat-deck wagons to KiwiRail. 200
More recently, former New Zealand PM John Key is now acting on behalf of US
media and entertainment company Comcast, to assist Comcast’s business projects in
China. In July 2017, Key met with Chinese premier Li Keqiang, the acting mayor of
Beijing, and head of China’s Department of Tourism; with the New Zealand
Ambassador to China in attendance. 201 In September 2017 the New Zealand media
raised pointed questions about the price and purchaser of a two-thirds portion of
Key’s Parnell property. The property was sold for NZ$20 million, well above market
rates for the area, to an undisclosed Chinese buyer. John Key refused to answer any
questions about the transaction. 202

32

 PRC Auckland Consulate Counsellor Zhang Fan, PRC Consul-General Xu Erwen, PM John Key, Gao Wei of
Alpha Group, former PM Jenny Shipley, Mayor Steve Chadwick open new facilities at Alpha Group in 2015,
http://cnz.chinesetown.co.nz/shopone.php

Sir Bob Harvey, former mayor of Waitakere, heads the New Zealand OBOR
Promotional Council which is acting as a matchmaker in infrastructure projects in
Auckland. The former mayor of Christchurch, Sir Bob Parker is chairman of Xindu
Group, a partnership with Huadu Construction for projects in Christchurch. 203
Parker negotiated investment deals with Huadu in 2013, while he was mayor of
Christchurch. 204 Huadu Construction is a Hebei-based former SOE. Eugene Feng,
former Head of International Partnerships with the Christchurch City Council’s
Christchurch Development Corporation is CEO of Huadu. Huadu’s New Zealand
subsidiary, Xindu is involved in multiple projects in Christchurch, including
apartment blocks, the Christchurch health precinct, and the Port Hills Adventure
Park.
The involvement of the two former mayors of Waitakere and Christchurch in
politically-connected Chinese investment projects fits the pattern of Xi-era united
front activities. Local governments are important because they are able to make
planning decisions on the kinds of infrastructure project China wants to establish in
the Belt Road Initiative. The Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with
33

 Foreign Countries (CPAFFC, Youxie, 友协)—a united front organization—is in
charge of sister city relations. Since 2015, CPAFFC have run an annual China-New
Zealand mayoral forum. 205 During the first meeting the mayors discussed exchanges
and cooperation in the fields of tourism, education and primary industry and issued
a public statement, the Xiamen Declaration. 206
CPAFFC had an important role in people’s diplomacy when China was
diplomatically isolated during the Cold War. However they were increasingly
marginalized from the 1980s on, as the PRC had developed diplomatic relations with
most of the countries of the world. The Xi administration’s strategy of working more
with local governments for economic projects has now revitalized the CPAFFC, as
well as the local equivalents they work with such as in New Zealand, the New
Zealand-China Friendship Society (NZCFS). NZCFS, like their parent organization,
went into decline from the 1980s on, and struggled to attract membership. Now
thanks to significant support from both the PRC and the New Zealand government,
a re-invigorated NZCFA is again promoting China’s interests, but this time it is an
economic agenda—One Belt, One Road.
In 2012, a wealthy Chinese property developer with close connections to the Chinese
government, Simon Deng Li, 207 donated 1 million yuan to the New Zealand China
Friendship Society to enable it to expand its activities. 208 In the same year CPAFFC
donated a further 1 million yuan. 209 These two donations have now been “localized”
by being linked in to the New Zealand government’s Winston Churchill Trust,
which provides research funding. Only those who are members of NZCFS 210 may
apply for the Winston Churchill Trust fund for projects on China. 211 The society has
also used the two donations to subsidize New Zealand journalist and youth visits to
China, as well as art exhibitions, book publications and other activities that promote
a non-critical view of China in New Zealand.
According to a leaked 1997 RCMP-CSIS report “Chinese Intelligence Services and
Triads Financial Links in Canada”, Chinese investors linked to political and criminal
interests may conceal their foreign identity by purchasing a foreign company in
order to buy a local identity, and then using it to invest in other companies, as a
local, rather than a foreign investor. This can be useful for influence activities, and in
some cases, it could be a means to potentially access strategic information and
technology. 212 The following New Zealand examples may be worthy of further
investigation. In 2015 Kuangchi Science signed an agreement with Airways New
Zealand and Shanghai Pengxin International to launch a near-space balloon on one
of their dairy farms in New Zealand for data transmission. 213 In 2016,
Kuangchi Science became the main shareholder of innovative New Zealand nearspace company Martin Jackpacks. 214 In 2017 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd signed a
partnership with Victoria University of Wellington and Lincoln University. Huawei
have received subsidies from the PRC Ministry of State Security,215 and the USA and
34

 Australia have banned the company from their telecom markets. 216 Huawei have
promised to spend NZ$400 million to build a cloud data center and innovation labs
in Christchurch and Wellington and are building data capacity well in excess of their
needs for the project.217 In 2013 Huawei were contracted by New Zealand’s Telecom
to build the country’s 4G network. Telecom dismissed security concerns raised about
Huawei, 218 which had already acquired a major stake in the New Zealand telco
market by becoming the main financial backer of start-up telco 2degrees in 2011,
who are majority owned by a Māori consortium. 219 In 2014 New Zealand aeronautics
company Pacific Aerospace signed a partnership with Beijing Automotive Group for
the sale of planes into the Chinese market. 220 However in 2017 Pacific Aerospace
were charged by the New Zealand Customs for illegal exports to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) via its Chinese partner. A UN report
documented that, contravening UN sanctions on the sale of such goods to the DPRK,
Pacific Aerospace knew about the sale and had offered parts and maintenance
training. 221
•
China’s global, multi-platform, strategic communication strategy
Following the pattern of many other nations, in the space of a few years, New
Zealand’s Chinese language mass media has gone from being an independent,
localized, ethnic language medium to an outlet of China’s official messaging. 222 New
Zealand’s local Chinese language media platforms (with the exception of the proFalungong paper 大纪元/The Epoch Times) now have content cooperation agreements
with Xinhua News Service, get their China-related news from Xinhua, and
participate in annual media training conferences in China. 223 Some media outlets
have also employed senior staff members who are closely connected to the CCP.224
As part of Xi era efforts to “integrate” the overseas Chinese media with the domestic
Chinese media, New Zealand Chinese media organizations are now also under the
‘guidance” of CCP propaganda officials. Below I list some examples of these policies.
The leading Auckland Chinese language paper, the Chinese Herald has close
personnel inks to the PRC consulate 225 and works with the All-China Federation of
Overseas Chinese. 226 The paper was originally totally independent, but like many
other papers, it has been steadily “harmonized” with Chinese media control
agencies. In another example of a once independent organization being
“harmonized”, in 2011, Auckland's only Chinese-language 24-hour radio station FM
90.6 was taken over by a subsidiary of China Radio International (CRI), Global
CAMG. 227 FM 90.6 now sources all its news from CRI and its Australian subsidiary.
Global CAMG also runs Panda TV, Channel 37, the Chinese Times and Kiwi Style. 228

35

 CAMG Director Stella Hu, China Radio International Director Wang Gengnian, National Party MP Yang
Jian, in an event in February, 2017 to launch an agreement to show Chinese dramas dubbed into English on NZ
screens. At the event Yang Jian described Chinese TV dramas as a “symbol of China’s soft power”
http://www.cri.com.cn/2017-02-17/b410b69f-81b3-3409-d9a2-bbbc346530e6.html

In 2014, Xinhua set up an extensive cooperation agreement with Skykiwi, 229 New
Zealand's leading Chinese language, multi-platform website which has since become
a two-way channel for PRC-New Zealand communication. In addition to publishing
Xinhua news content on its website, Skykiwi has organised New Zealand segments
of popular Chinese shows such as the dating programme "If You Are the One"/ 非成
无饶, which are then broadcast on Chinese television; and Skykiwi stories reporting
on Chinese people and PRC policies in New Zealand are used in the online
publications of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. 230 In June 2017, Dan Guizhi, a
Skykiwi editor, delivered a speech at an Overseas Chinese media forum organized
by the Propaganda Department of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State
Council. 231 In 2015, the Deputy Head of the CCP Central Propaganda Department,
Sun Zhijun visited Skykiwi, and instructed the media group to “tell China's story”. 232
This phrase is the key term used to symbolize the CCP’s external propaganda
message in the Xi era.

36

 Sun Zhijun pictured giving instructions to Skykiwi staff, Chinese Consul General Niu Qingbao stands
listening behind him. http://radio.skykiwi.com/report/2015-09-09/204419.shtml

In 2015, World TV, an Auckland-based Chinese language television network with
seven channels and two radio stations that was founded by Hong Kong and
Taiwanese New Zealanders in 1998, made a controversial decision to take its Taiwan
programming off air. 233 World TV has been in partnership with CRI since 2010. 234 In
2016, China Xinhua News Network TV launched its own television station in New
Zealand, TV33. 235 In 2017, two young Chinese entrepreneurs founded the television
channel NCTV, which also relays news from Xinhua and shows from Chinese state
broadcasting, and aims to make programmes that will be able to be shown in
China. 236
In June 2017, at the Langley Hotel in Auckland, the State Council Overseas Chinese
Affairs Office hosted an update meeting to discuss the integration of the overseas
Chinese media with the domestic Chinese media. In attendance was Li Guohong,
Vice Director of the Propaganda Department of the State Council Overseas Chinese
Affairs Office, and other senior CCP media management officials, representatives of
the ethnic Chinese media in New Zealand, representatives of ethnic Chinese
community groups, and Labour MP Raymond Huo. 237 Update meetings (通气会) are
one of the main ways the CCP relays instructions to the domestic Chinese media, in
order to avoid a paper trail. Party directives are accorded a higher status than
national law. 238

37

 Li Guohong, Vice Director of the Propaganda Department of the State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office
with Zheng Jianting President and Director of TV33, Langley Hotel June 21, 2017
https://www.aoweibang.com/view/30713728/

China’s approach to achieving media supervision in New Zealand is identical to that
followed in the PRC since the economic reforms of the early 1990s: while media
companies may be owned by a range of actors, including the CCP; the Party retains
overall political control. 239 Canadian mass communication scholar Zhao Yuezhi
famously described the Chinese media within China as being “between the Party
line and the bottom line”, 240 and essentially the same pattern has now been repeated
in New Zealand.
As it has in many other countries, the PRC has made considerable efforts to shape
how China is reported in the mainstream media in New Zealand. The National
government’s “no surprises” policy on China is a reaction to this work. As they do in
many other countries, PRC diplomats put considerable pressure on New Zealand
academics, journalists, politicians, and other thought leaders who speak up critically
on China-related issues. In 2005, New Zealand Greens MP and Co-leader, Rod
Donald, was blocked and surrounded by Chinese officials when he unfurled a
Tibetan flag on the steps of the New Zealand Parliament when CCP senior leader
Wu Bangguo visited New Zealand. 241 In 2007, New Zealand parliamentary press
journalist Nick Wang was evicted from a photo opportunity at a meeting between
Chinese Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan and Labour Deputy-Prime Minister Michael
Cullen on the instruction of a “Chinese intelligence official”. 242 In my own
experience, in 2015, Chinese polar officials put pressure on the University of
Canterbury, Antarctica New Zealand, the Christchurch City Council, and New
Zealand diplomats in China regarding my unpublished research on China and
38

 Antarctica and a strictly factual comment I’d made to TVNZ on China’s interests in
Antarctic mineral resources. 243 It took the support of the University of Canterbury
Vice Chancellor, Dr Rod Carr, who upheld the principle of academic freedom, to
finally put a stop to this interference.
Some New Zealand journalists have been paid by the PRC embassy to visit China for
reporting trips. Of course it is a very good thing that the New Zealand media
develop a better understanding of one of New Zealand’s top trading partners, but
when someone else is footing the bill, it risks eroding journalists’ independence and
credibility and creates a sense of obligation to the sponsor. New Zealand
government officials are also being sent to attend short-courses in China funded by
the PRC government. Because China is so important to the New Zealand economy,
becoming China-literate is essential for the New Zealand politicians and their
officials. But the curriculum should not be dictated by China, or by fear of offending
China.
In 2016, the CCP English language paper, China Daily, signed a deal with Fairfax
Newspapers to have Chinese supplements published in Fairfax Australian and New
Zealand newspapers. In 2016, Natural History New Zealand (NHNZ) signed a tenyear co-production agreement with China Central Television (CCTV) for joint film
making and so that NHNZ could help CCTV get its content out into the global
marketplace. 244 At the time of the signing of these two agreements, the Head of the
CCP Central Propaganda Department, Liu Qibao, travelled to New Zealand and met
with New Zealand PM John Key. 245 Liu told Key “the Communist Party of China is
willing to continue to strengthen governance exchanges and cooperation with the
New Zealand National Party in order to promote the healthy and stable
development of bilateral relations.” 246
•
The formation of a China-centred economic and strategic bloc.
As has been the pattern for many years, the New Zealand government was quick to
sign up to China’s new policy on One Belt One Road. The Council for the Promotion
of OBOR in New Zealand was launched in 2015. 247 New Zealand was the first
Western country to set up a body to promote OBOR. The New Zealand OBOR
Council is led by former Mayor of Waitakere City, Sir Bob Harvey. John Hong (also
known as Hong Chengchen 洪承琛) head of Investment and International
Relationships, Panuku Development Auckland, at the Auckland City Council, is the
chief executive officer of the OBOR Council. Hong is closely connected to Fuqing
City authorities and the Fujian Provincial government in China. 248 The other
members of the Council are national and local politicians of both main political
parties and government officials. 249 The Council has done much to develop links
between New Zealand Māori and China, through business initiatives and cultural
exchanges. 250
39

 In March 2017, when Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited New Zealand, the two
countries signed a memorandum of understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative.
New Zealand was the first Western developed country to sign such an agreement.
During Li Keqiang’s visit the Oceania Silk Road Network (OSRN), the New Zealand
OBOR Foundation, and the New Zealand OBOR Think Tank were launched. The
Oceania Silk Road Network, aimed at looking for opportunities for New Zealand
companies on Oceania OBOR projects and is led by William Zhao, director and CEO
of Yashili New Zealand Dairy Company. 251 The New Zealand OBOR Foundation
and New Zealand OBOR Think Tank are co-headed by PR specialist Johanna
Coughlan (sister-in-law of New Zealand PM Bill English, she is married to his
brother Conor English) 252 and Labour Party MP Raymond Huo. 253 As yet neither the
“think tank” nor the “foundation” have either a web or a physical presence.
Since the visit of Li Keqiang, the China New Zealand OBOR Foundation has
promoted OBOR to closed-door audiences around the country.254 The government
sent Peter Goodfellow, President of the New Zealand National Party and Yang Jian
MP, who are also members of the New Zealand OBOR Foundation, to represent it at
China’s Belt and Road Forum, held in Beijing in May 2017. 255 A score of pro-OBOR
op eds and news items have appeared in the New Zealand media. The China New
Zealand OBOR Foundation has established links 256 with China's National
Development and Reform Commission (lead agency on OBOR and the PRC super
ministry with a special focus on strategic resources), construction companies, private
equity firms, and importantly, with Māori tribes (iwi), 257 because iwi control a
significant section of primary industry, fisheries, forestry and the telco market in
New Zealand (Te Huarahi Tika Trust, 258 a consortium of iwi, is majority shareholder
in New Zealand’s third telco company, 2degrees 259). Māori also have rights to
cultural knowledge of interest to China, such as the use of traditional herbs that can
be turned into natural health products.
Chinese language reports have cited Labour MP Raymond Huo’s involvement to
claim that both major political parties endorse New Zealand’s involvement in
OBOR.260 The New Zealand Labour Party does not yet have an official policy on
OBOR. If Labour were to win the 2017 election it may need to go into coalition with
New Zealand First, an important minor party that has often held the balance of
power in New Zealand. The leader of New Zealand First, Mr Winston Peters, is
adamantly opposed to New Zealand participating in OBOR projects; 261 which means
that a Labour-New Zealand First coalition government would likely engage in a reevaluation of current New Zealand government strategies on cooperating with
OBOR. Meanwhile the Green Party, who have an agreement to partner with Labour,
and also the other minor parties, have not commented publicly. All however, are
likely to have concerns about the extent of New Zealand involvement in the OBOR
and the implications for economic independence, the control of strategic assets, and
the extent of exposure to China’s massive public debt. The September 23, 2017
40

 election could therefore be a turning point for New Zealand-China relations—
leading either to a continuation of the policies that are drawing New Zealand ever
closer politically, economically, and also militarily 262 to China, or else to some sort of
a re-adjustment.
Conclusion
In July 2017 Chinese media jubilantly reported that China was climbing up the
global soft power ratings—China is now on a par with Italy, ranked at 25th in the
world for soft power. 263 China’s strenuous united front efforts of the last few years
have posted a return and it is increasingly able to use its soft power magic weapons
to help influence the decision-making of foreign governments and societies. New
Zealand, like many other states in the world, is becoming saturated with the PRC’s
political influence activities, and due to its pattern of engagement with China and its
natural assets, it may even be experiencing more political influence activities than
most.
New Zealand’s closest ally, Australia, is taking the threat of China’s accelerated
foreign influence activities in their country extremely seriously. 264 Australia is
planning to introduce a law against foreign interference activities at the end of the
year and may ban all foreign political donations.
Each state resists political interference in its affairs by other nations. The PRC
frequently berates the USA and other states for perceived interference in China’s
domestic politics, 265 and promotes the non-interference in the domestic affairs of
other states as an important principle of its foreign policy (不干涉内政)—though as
shown, the united front strategy has always gone against that ideal. For a small state
like New Zealand, which is a former colony of one great power and has been under
the shelter of another for more than 60 years, it can often be a challenge as to how to
defend the nation against foreign political interference. It takes the political will of
the government of the day, as well as that of the people of the nation, to do so.
New Zealand has a range of legislation that could deal with some of the foreign
influence activities listed in this study. The New Zealand Security Intelligence (SIS)
Act (1969) states that the SIS is charged with "the protection of New Zealand from
acts of espionage, sabotage, and subversion, whether or not they are directed from or
intended to be committed within New Zealand; the identification of foreign
capabilities, intentions, or activities within or relating to New Zealand that impact
on New Zealand's international well-being or economic well-being...the protection of
New Zealand from activities within or relating to New Zealand that are influenced
by any foreign organisation or any foreign person..." The SIS Act defines subversion
as “attempting, inciting, counseling, advocating, or encouraging… the undermining
by unlawful means the authority of the State in New Zealand.” The Act empowers
the SIS to respond to cases of subversion and foreign interference in New Zealand
41

 politics, interaction with agents of a foreign country, cooperation to influence the
foreign and economic policy and public opinion of New Zealand, and acts which
deliberately and covertly advancing the agenda of a foreign country at New
Zealand's expense. However, only the Minister of SIS can issue requests to
investigate potential cases of subversion and espionage when it concerns political
parties. Without government permission, the SIS may not engage in any
investigations which will harm another political party, so its hands are tied without
political instruction to act.
The Electoral Act (1983) Article 51: B states members of parliament must step down
if they “take[s] an oath or make[s] a declaration or acknowledgement of allegiance,
obedience, or adherence to a foreign State, foreign Head of State, or foreign Power,
whether required on appointment to an office or otherwise from swearing loyalty to
another state.”
The Commerce Commission manages the issue of media monopolies in New
Zealand. Yet there is no law in New Zealand against the official information service
of one country controlling a sector of the media environment via cooperative
agreements, mergers, and key personnel. New Zealand’s regulation of media
competition has so far focused on ownership, although the public interest is also a
concern.
New Zealand has had reforms in how political donations are reported, but more
needs to be done. In 2017, Fairfax media website Stuff launched a campaign for
transparency in political donations. They argued that the identity of all donors
should be promptly disclosed to the Electoral Commission and that loopholes
allowing donors to be masked by trusts and other aggregators, such as fundraising
dinners and auctions, must be closed. 266 New Zealand may also wish to consider
passing legislation to ban all foreign donations.
New Zealand has relatively few public intellectuals, but the right to free speech and
intellectual freedom for New Zealand academics—the society’s critics and
conscience—is protected under legislation: the Education Act (1989), Part 14 which
requires all government institutions and agencies to protect academic freedom, and
the Human Rights Act 1993 Article J, which prevents discrimination on the basis of
political opinion.
Many of the political influence activities China directs at New Zealand, unless they
result in treason, the paying of bribes, or other forms of corruption (Crimes Act 1961)
are not illegal. They are instead matters of propriety and national security; which are
always subjective. The Cabinet Manual of the New Zealand Parliament advises that
Members of Parliament must behave in a way that maintains the confidence of the
public and be seen to maintain the confidence of the public—but that is all in the eye
42

 of the beholder. The Manual has nothing to say about ex-ministers of parliament or
their relatives.
The SIS Act was passed during the Cold War, when New Zealand politicians were
very conscious of PRC and USSR united front organizations and most kept well
away from them. Labour Prime Minister Norman Kirk (1972-1974) was so anxious
about united front activities that he kept file cards on members of the factions of the
New Zealand communist movement, so as to ensure that Labour MPs did not
unwittingly become associated with any of them or their united front activities. 267
But several decades have passed since the Cold War ended, and political elites in
New Zealand may not be prepared for the new global battle for influence. Small
states are particularly vulnerable to foreign influence activities: our traditional media
has limited resources and lacks competition; our tertiary education sectors are small,
and despite the laws on academic freedom, easily intimidated.
New Zealand’s needs to face up to some of the political differences and challenges in
the New Zealand-China relationship and to investigate the extent and impact of
Chinese political influence activities on our democracy. This study is a preliminary
one, highlighting representative concerns. New Zealand would be wise to follow
Australia’s example and take seriously the issue of China’s big push to increase its
political influence activities, whether it be through a Special Commission or a closeddoor investigation. It may be time to seek a re-adjustment in the relationship, one
which ensures New Zealand’s interests are foremost. Like Australia, we may also
need to pass new legislation which better reflects the heightened scale of foreign
influence attempts in our times. New Zealand can find a way to better manage its
economic and political relationship with China, and thereby, truly be an exemplar to
other Western states in their relations with China.
Democracies have magic weapons too: the right to choose our government; balances
and checks on power through the courts; our regularity bodies such as the
Commerce Commission and the Press Council; the legally-supported critic and
conscience role of the academic; freedom of speech and association; and the Fourth
Estate—both the traditional and new media. Now is the time to use them.
Grateful thanks to Ursula Cheer, Toby Dalley, Gerry Groot, Jichang Lulu, Lindsey Te Atu o
Tu MacDonald, Donald Matheson, Karen Scott, Alex Tan, James To, and Geoff Wade for
feedback on early drafts of this paper and other assistance.
Damien Cave, "Are Australia's Politics too Easy to Corrupt?," New York Times, June
7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/world/australia/china-foreigndonations-tim-winton-melbourne.html?_r=0.
2 "Australia Battles Chinese Political Influence," The Economist, June 15, 2017,
https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21723454-it-will-be-uphill-struggle-australia1

43

 battles-chinese-politicalinfluence?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/australiabattleschinesepoliticalinfluence.
3
ABC Four Corners, http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2017/06/05/4678871.htm
4
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-05/asio-china-spy-raid/8589094.
5
http://www.afr.com/opinion/columnists/our-universities-are-a-frontline-in-chinasideological-wars-20170830-gy74br.
6
“Xinxilan huaren yiyuan Yang Jian: “Zuo hao mei yi jian shi, jihui jiu lai zhao ni”
[New Zealand Chinese MP Yang Jian: If you do everything well, opportunity will
come to you], Gongren Ribao, August 29, 2013,
http://character.workercn.cn/c/2013/08/29/130829075919750972761.html.
7 Anonymous source.
8 Zhao Pitao, Waishi gaishuo [Summary of Foreign Affairs], Shanghai shehui kexue
chubanshe, 1995, 166.
9 V.I. Lenin, "Left-wing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder, Moscow: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1950, 91.
10 See Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the
People's Republic, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003; James Jiann Hua To,
Qiaowu: Extra-territorial Practices for the Overseas Chinese, Brill Press, 2015; and James
Jiann Hua To, “Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart: Qiaowu and the Overseas China,
PhD thesis, University of Canterbury, 2009; for more on the United Front, past and
present see Gerry Groot, Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United
Front Work, Corporatism and Hegemony, Abingdon: Routledge, 2004.
11 Zhao Pitao, Waishi gaishuo, 167.
12 Zhang Bin, "Deng Xiaoping “dute jiyu lun” zai xin shiqi Zhongguo qiaowu fazhan
zhanlüe zhong de jicheng yu fayang," Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu [Overseas Chinese
Work Research), No. 2, (2016), http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjytt/177/2449.shtml.
13 Wang Zhongshen, Duiwai xuanchuan chulun [Introduction to Foreign Propaganda],
Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2000, 172.
14 http://www.gqb.gov.cn/.
15 UN Migration Report, 2015,
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrati
onreport/docs/MigrationReport2015_Highlights.pdf.
16 “Intelligence Services, part 1: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics,” Stratfor
Global Intelligence, March 2010, 12.
17 Frederick T. C. Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China (London: Pall Mall Press,
1964), 70.
18 “Fu Xinxilan diaoyan hou de xin sikao [New Thinking after Research Trip to New
Zealand] Qiao qing, no. 11 (March 1, 2004), 2. Qiao qing is an internal publication of
the State Council Overseas Chinese Office.
19 “Fu Xinxilan diaoyan hou de xin sikao, “ 3.
20 See “Dazao pinpai huodong, zengjin shaoshu minzu qiaobao dui Zhongguo de
liaojie [Branding activities: Enhance the understanding of ethnic minority overseas
Chinese about China], Qiaoqing, no. 22, (August 14, 2007), 1-16; “Jinnian lai qiaowu 44

 dui Tai gongzuo qingkuang [This year’s situation on overseas Chinese work towards
Taiwanese], Qiaoqing, no. 31 (October 23, 2007), 1-13.
21
Mark Stokes, “The PLA General Staff Department, Third department Second
Bureau,” July 27, 2015,
http://www.project2049.net/documents/Stokes_PLA_General_Staff_Department_Uni
t_61398.pdf.
22
“Intelligence Services, part 1: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics”; Peter
Matthis, “The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services,”
Studies in Intelligence, vol. 56, no. 3 (September 2012), 47-57.
23
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/968736-chinese-student-spies-overwhelm-us/.
24 RCMP-CSIS Joint Review Committee, “Chinese Intelligence Services and Triads
Financial Links in Canada,” June 24, 1997,
http://www.jrnyquist.com/sidewinder.htm.
25 Anne-Marie Brady and He Yong, “Talking up the Market: China’s Economic
Propaganda,” China’s Thought Management, edited by Anne-Marie Brady, Abingdon:
Routledge Publishers, 2011.
26 See Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” Journal of
Democracy, October 2015.
27 Hu Jintao, ‘Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All’,
Report to the 17th Party Congress, 15 October 2007,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm.
28 Joseph Nye, "What China and Russia don't get about Soft Power," Foreign Policy,
April 29, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-getabout-soft-power/.
29 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York: Basic
Books, 1990, 160-166.
30 Joseph Nye, ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 166-171.
31 Joseph Nye, ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly,
vol. 119, no. 2 (2004): 256-259.
32 Joseph Nye, "What China and Russia don't get about Soft Power."
33 “Zhuan she tongzhan gongzuo lingdao xiaozu zhongyang “da tongzhan” siwei
shengji [United Front Leading Small Group: more emphasis on CCP Politburo’s “Big
United Front“], Renminwang, July 31, 2015,
http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0731/c385474-27391395.html.
34 See Gerry Groot, “The Expansion of United Front Work Under Xi Jinping,” China
Yearbook, CIW, 2015; and Marcel Angliviel de Beaumelle, “The United Front Work
Department: ‘Magic Weapon’ at Home and Abroad,“ China Brief, Volume 17, Issue
11, https://jamestown.org/program/united-front-work-department-magic-weaponhome-abroad/.
35 凝聚侨心侨力. “Xi Jinping dui qiaowu gongzuo zuochu chong yao zhishi
qiangdiao ningju qiao xin qiao li tong yuan gongxiang Zhongguo meng” [Xi
Jinping’s important instructions for the work of Overseas Chinese: Unite the
45

 overseas Chinese and share in the Chinese dream], February 17, 2017,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-02/17/c_1120486778.htm
36
“Xin lao qiao tuan lianghao hezuo” [Improve cooperation between old and new
overseas Chinese groups], Qiao qing no. 34 (August 23, 2004), 1-7.
37
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/world/asia/guo-wengui-china-corruption-xijinping.html?mcubz=1.
38
https://twitter.com/kwokmiles/
39
“Jiaqiang qiaowu wenhua gongzuo” [Increase Overseas Chinese Cultural
Activities], Qiaoqing, no. 16, (May 24, 2005), 1-5.
40
See the Appendix of Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations,
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994, for primary source documents on the
founding of this organization after 1989.
41 See Yin Qian, “Beijing’s Fifth Column and the Transfer of Power in Hong Kong,”
in Robert Ash, Peter Ferdinand, Brian S. Hook, Robin Porter, eds. Hong Kong in
Transition: The Handover Years, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000;
http://www.heritage.org/commentary/legion-amateurs-how-china-spies.
42 “Meiguo daxun huaren canzheng liliangzhanlou [Chinese participatory strength in
American elections revealed], Qiaoqing, no. 51 (December 1, 2004): 1.
43 http://zt.ccln.gov.cn/xxxjp/yysw/25502.shtml.
44 See Feng Zhongping and Huang Ping, “China’s strategic partnership diplomacy:
engaging with a changing world,” European Strategic Partnerships Observatory
Working Paper 8, June 2014.
45 RCMP-CSIS, “Chinese Intelligence Services and Triads Financial Links in Canada,”
June 24, 1997, http://www.jrnyquist.com/sidewinder.htm.
46 RCMP-CSIS, “Chinese Intelligence Services and Triads Financial Links in Canada,”
June 24, 1997, http://www.jrnyquist.com/sidewinder.htm.
47 让党的主张成为时代最强音.
48 http://news.cctv.com/2017/02/19/ARTINW0o9KU0T6pVPKfV6ODv170219.shtml.
49 “Xi Jinping: Jianchi zhengque fangxiang chuangxin fangfa shouduan tigao xinwen
yulun chuanbo li yindao li” [Xi Jinping: Maintain the Correct Direction and
Innovative Methods to Improve the Guidance of News Public Opinion], Xinhua,
February 19, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-02/19/c_1118102868.htm;
and “Laoji zhize shiming chuangxin goujian xiandai chuanbo tixi——xinwen yulun
zhanxian guanche luoshi Xi Jinping zong shuji 2·19 jianghua yi zhounian [Uphold
the mission to build a modern communication system – the news media’s
implementation of Xi Jinping General Secretary February 19 speech]，CCTV,
February 19, 2017，
http://news.cctv.com/2017/02/19/ARTINW0o9KU0T6pVPKfV6ODv170219.shtml.
50 http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2017-08-30/doc-ifykpuuh9583106.shtml.
51 http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0120/c1001-26419175.html.
52 “Guanyu jiaqiang Zhongguo tese xinxing zhiku jianshe de yijian” [Suggestions on
the strengthening of the new think tank construction with Chinese characteristics]
46

 Xinhua, January 21, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/201501/21/c_133934292.htm. Accessed June 18, 2015.
53
Peng Guangqian “Yidai yilu” zhanlue gouxiang yu guoji zhixu zhong gou”
[China’s Silk Road strategic concept and the reconstruction of the international
order], Xinhua, January 9, 2015
http://www.taiwan.cn/xwzx/gj/201501/t20150109_8645599.htm.
54
See Nadège Rolland, “China’s New Silk Road,” National Bureau of Asia
Research,” 2017, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=531.
55
“Zhuanjia zixunweiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji ance [Special Advisory
Council: Suggestions and advice on overseas Chinese work], Qiaoqing, no. 8 (March
15, 2005), 11.
56 “Guanyu jiaqiang Zhongguo tese xinxing zhiku jianshe de yijian” [Suggestions on
the strengthening of the new think tank construction with Chinese characteristics]
Xinhua, January 21, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/201501/21/c_133934292.htm. Accessed June 18, 2015.
57 http://media.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0108/c401858-28030991.html.
58 See Anne-Marie Brady, China as a Polar Great Power, (Cambridge University
Press/Wilson Press, 2017).
59 http://www.ynstc.gov.cn/kjxc/200911060018.htm;
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11534966
60 http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/country/334643/lower-chinese-milk-productiongood-for-nz-analyst.
61 http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/63416295/space-balloon-for-broadband;
http://new-zealand-innovation-awards.idealog.co.nz/tech/2015/02/darling-techcompany-martin-jetpack-wins-chinese-heart.
62 http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/panama-papers/303356/nz-at-heart-of-panamamoney-go-round.
63 See Brady, China as a Polar Great Power.
64 http://www.gov.cn/english/2009-07/14/content_1365066.htm.
65 See Anne-Marie Brady, “New Zealand-China Relations: Common Points and
Differences,” New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, December 2008.
66 “Muldoon Visit to China,” 18 November 1980, 59/264/11, NZ Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade archives (MFAT); Anne-Marie Brady, “The War that Never Was,
Or, New Zealand, China and the Cold War,” Lenin's Legacy Down Under. New
Zealand and the New Cold War History, ed. Aaron Fox and Alex Trapeznik, Dunedin:
University of Otago Press, 2004.
67 See Paul Sinclair (former head of the NZ Defence Force’s International Defence
Relations), “New Zealand Expands Defence Ties with China,” CSS Strategic
Background Paper, 2014, http://www.victoria.ac.nz/hppi/centres/strategicstudies/documents/18_New-Zealand-Expands-Defence-Ties-with-China.pdf.
68 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/economy/mei/archive/pdfs/mei-jun17.pdf.
69 https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-between-new-zealand-andpeople%E2%80%99s-republic-china-establishment-comprehensive47

 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11163835
See Anne-Marie Brady, “New Zealand-China Relations: Common Points and
Differences,”
72
See “New Zealand’s China Policy: Building a Strategic Comprehensive
Partnership,” July 2015,
https://www.victoria.ac.nz/chinaresearchcentre/publications/china-papers/ACRINZCCRC-New-Zealands-China-Policy-Building-a-comprehensive-strategicpartnership-July-2015.pdf. This report was commissioned by the controversial
Australia-China Policy Institute, at the University of Technology Sydney, which is
funded by a figure associated with China’s United Front activities in Australia. See
"Australia Battles Chinese Political Influence," The Economist, June 15, 2017,
https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21723454-it-will-be-uphill-struggle-australiabattles-chinese-politicalinfluence?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/australiabattleschinesepoliticalinfluence.
73 See PM Bill English, “I’d like to achieve continued strength in the political
relationship because it provides a cover and background for the cultural and trade
relationship that is turning out to be so successful,” NZ China Council, August 2,
2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J5CcyCeFPgk.
74 Audrey Young, "Megaphone Diplomacy not the New Zealand way says outgoing
Foreign Minister," New Zealand Herald, April 4, 2017,
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11831755.
75 http://www.clearwisdom.net/html/articles/2005/7/14/62895.html;
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0707/S00256/dissident-slams-nz-govtsrelationship-with-china.htm?from-mobile=bottom-link-01
76 US-Communist China Relations, Department of Police to Department of External
Affairs, 6 November 1956, PM 264/2/2 part 7, National Archives of New Zealand.
77 http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/xw/t39207.htm.
78 http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnwtch/dyz/xxl/xxltch/
79 James To, Qiaowu, 35, describes one such “rent-a-crowd” of united-front-affiliated
groups he observed during the visit of Li Keqiang to New Zealand in 2009.
80 http://www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/chn/lsqz/lingshiqianzheng/t1198220.htm.
81 http://www.oceaniatv.co.nz/video/show.php?itemid=4348;
http://www.chinanews.co.nz/bencandy.php?fid=1&id=356444.
82 http://www.oceaniatv.co.nz/video/show.php?itemid=4348.
83 http://www.520zc.com/article-1850-1.html
84 See a list of some of the numerous Auckland united front–related groups here, at
an event held to celebrate the Lunar Year in 2016. The gathering was attended by a
number of Auckland-based MPs politicians including Labour’s David Cunliffe and
Phil Goff, National’s Jamie Lee-Ross, and ACT’s David Seymour.
http://m.ausnz.net/article_detail.asp?p=community&articleID=2445.
85 People's Daily refers to the China Charity Association and its affiliated parent body,
the Song Qingling Foundation, as important organizations for promoting China's
soft power. http://ccn.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0503/c366510-28320966.html
48
70
71

 http://www.936.nz/article/4186/1.html.
http://cnsst.org.nz/files/NZ-Link.pdf.
88
http://www.chinaqw.com/sp/2017/01-22/123384.shtml.
89
http://www.chinanews.com/lxsh/2012/03-30/3787099.shtml.
90
http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/voices/audio/201816606/dr-x-isin-the-house!-asian-newcomers-to-local-body-elections.
91
http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2005-02-25/10075200470s.shtml.
92
http://www.qb.gd.gov.cn/qwxw/200504270017.htm.
86
87

93

http://www.bjqb.gov.cn/web/static/articles/catalog_2c94968944a9a3100144a9e9c1140
014/article_ff80808145457c1a0145833969ce0062/ff80808145457c1a0145833969ce0062.ht
ml.
94 http://onechina.nz/index.php?page=newsphp&fn_mode=fullnews&fn_id=141.
New Zealand has a mixed-member proportional voting system in national politics,
which means small parties can end up “kingmakers” who can help shift the balance
of power one way or another in a general election. Each voter gets two votes: one for
their local representative, one for the party they support.
95 In 2017 Wang resigned from ACT, after he was given a low ranking in the party
list. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/94542326/act-party-list-promptsresignation-of-deputy-leader-kenneth-wang.
96 http://www.yeeyi.com/news/index.php?app=home&act=article&aid=177418.
97 http://www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/chn/xwdt/t1299385.htm
http://www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/chn/xwdt/t1299385.htm
http://www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/chn/xwdt/t1299385.htm.
98 http://www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/chn/xwdt/t777724.htm
99 http://www.zzql.org.cn/shown.asp?id=92.
100 http://www.noted.co.nz/archive/listener-nz-2005/asian-vote/.
101 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11851380.
102 “Xinxilan huaren yiyuan Yang Jian:“Zuo hao mei yi jian shi, jihui jiu lai zhao ni”
[New Zealand Chinese MP Yang Jian: If you do everything well, opportunity will
come to you], Gongren Ribao, August 29, 2013,
http://character.workercn.cn/c/2013/08/29/130829075919750972761.html
103 https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2017/09/13/46657/national-mp-trained-by-chinesespies; https://www.ft.com/content/64991ca6-9796-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b;
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41256914
104 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11922025.
105 https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2017/09/13/46657/national-mp-trained-by-chinesespies; https://www.ft.com/content/64991ca6-9796-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b;
https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2017/09/14/48025/questions-hang-over-national-mpsvetting.
106 “Xinxilan huaren yiyuan Yang Jian:“Zuo hao mei yi jian shi, jihui jiu lai zhao ni”
[New Zealand Chinese MP Yang Jian: If you do everything well, opportunity will
come to you], Huanqiu renwu, August 26, 2013,
49

 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CEC7SEZKFcJ:paper.people.com.cn/hqrw/html/201308/26/content_1300577.htm+&cd=1&hl=mi&ct=clnk&gl=us. The story is also easily
accessible here: Gongren Ribao, August 29, 2013,
http://character.workercn.cn/c/2013/08/29/130829075919750972761.html
107
“Xinxilan huaren yiyuan Yang Jian: “Zuo hao mei yi jian shi, jihui jiu lai zhao ni,”
http://character.workercn.cn/c/2013/08/29/130829075919750972761.html;
https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/96800358/national-mp-jian-yang-slamsdefamatory-claim-he-was-trained-by-chinese-spies.
108
https://jianyang.national.org.nz/about_jian.
109 http://www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/people/jyan024.
110 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11921843.
111 http://www.toutiaoabc.com/index.php?act=view&nid=333702.
112 https://www.ft.com/content/5bd0d0c6-97a7-11e7-b83c-9588e51488a0.
113 http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/339335/national-mp-confirms-he-taughtspies-denies-he-is-one.
114 “Third Department,” https://fas.org/irp/world/china/pla/dept_3.htm.
115 Mark Stokes, “The PLA General Staff Department, Third department Second
Bureau,” July 27, 2015,
https://project2049.net/documents/pla_third_department_sigint_cyber_stokes_lin_hs
iao.pdf.
116 http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1202/S00217/maiden-speech-dr-jian-yang.htm.
117 “Xinxilan huaren yiyuan Yang Jian:“Zuo hao mei yi jian shi, jihui jiu lai zhao ni,”
http://character.workercn.cn/c/2013/08/29/130829075919750972761.html.
118 “Xinxilan huaren yiyuan Yang Jian:“Zuo hao mei yi jian shi, jihui jiu lai zhao ni,”
http://character.workercn.cn/c/2013/08/29/130829075919750972761.html.
119 “Xinxilan huaren yiyuan Yang Jian: “Zuo hao mei yi jian shi, jihui jiu lai zhao ni,”
http://character.workercn.cn/c/2013/08/29/130829075919750972761.html.
120 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11619417;
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/10391818/Secret-donors-Buck-stops-here.
121 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11619417.
122 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11619417.
123 https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2017/09/13/46657/national-mp-trained-by-chinesespies.
124 "Xinxilan tong cu hui qingzhu xizang bai wan nongnu jiefang jinian ri" [NZ
Peaceful Reunification Council celebrates Tibetan Serf Liberation Day], Zhongguo
toingzuhui wang, April 1, 2009,
http://www.taiwan.cn/fd/asia_2/fdct/200904/t20090401_859898.htm.
125 Some representative links here:
http://wcm.fmprc.gov.cn/preview/chn/slglgk/t1000609.htm;
http://www.aqtz.gov.cn/index.php/News/show/id/2162.html;
http://www.ahql.org.cn/DocHtml/1/2016/3/1/00002207.html;
50

 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/ydyl_67504
9/zwbd_675055/t1447741.shtml.
126
http://nzchinasociety.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/CLW-launch-speechRaymond-Huo-update-27-May.pdf
127

http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/xw/201705/4b7524b909304f259f374dbe5e438c60.sht
ml.
128
https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2017/08/06/41393/a-rockstar-and-a-rock-wooaucklanders.
129
https://www.yabla.com/chinese-english-pinyindictionary.php?define=%E6%92%B8.
130 http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=33759.
131 http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/259686/chinese-president-xi-jinpingvisits-nz.
132 http://www.skykiwi.com/e/wap/show2.php?id=242615
133 http://toutiao.manqian.cn/wz_16MckBEui7b.html.
134 https://twitter.com/Arctosia/status/908261639316692993.
135 https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/95952896/green-campaign-donors-leadway-in-fronting-up-with-their-money-amid-calls-for-transparency.
136 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-05/asio-warns-political-parties-over-foreigndonations/8590162.
137 http://www.elections.org.nz/parties-and-candidates/registered-political-parties0/party-donations/immediate-return-donation-0-0
138 http://www.elections.org.nz/sites/default/files/bulkupload/documents/national_party_return_of_donations_and_loans_2015.pdf
139 https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/queens-birthday-honours-2015-citations-queensservice-medal
140

www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10771749+&cd=1&hl=nl&
ct=clnk&gl=uk
141 http://news.qq.com/a/20160531/016638.htm.
142

https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%BA%B7%E5%B1%85%E4%BC%81%E4%B8%9A
%E9%9B%86%E5%9B%A2;%20http:/ddh10.xmu.edu.cn/f8/00/c3460a63488/page.htm,
143 http://www.elections.org.nz/parties-and-candidates/registered-political-parties0/party-donations/immediate-return-donation-0-0.
144 http://www.elections.org.nz/parties-candidates/registered-political-parties/partydonations/donations-exceeding-30000/returns.
145 http://www.elections.org.nz/sites/default/files/bulkupload/documents/national_return_of_donations_and_loans_2014.pdf.
146 http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/10391841/The-donors-behind-the-closedgates.
51

 147

https://www.companiesoffice.govt.nz/companies/app/ui/pages/companies/4136598/
directors?backurl=%2Fcompanies%2Fapp%2Fui%2Fpages%2Findividual%2Fsearch
%3Fq%3Dnguy%26start%3D%26entitySearch%3D%26addressKeyword%3D%26post
alCode%3D%26country%3D%26addressType%3D%26advancedPanel%3D%26roleT
ype%3DDIR%26sf%3D%26sd%3D.
148

https://www.companiesoffice.govt.nz/companies/app/ui/pages/companies/4136598/
directors?backurl=%2Fcompanies%2Fapp%2Fui%2Fpages%2Findividual%2Fsearch
%3Fq%3Dnguy%26start%3D%26entitySearch%3D%26addressKeyword%3D%26post
alCode%3D%26country%3D%26addressType%3D%26advancedPanel%3D%26roleT
ype%3DDIR%26sf%3D%26sd%3D.
149 https://www.nbr.co.nz/article/chinese-national-party-donor-emerges-biggestshareholder-dotcom’s-mega-bd-155919.
150 http://finance.sina.com.cn/sf/news/2016-05-31/113731817.html.
151 http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU0312/S00097.htm.
152 http://cnz.chinesetown.co.nz/shopone.php
153 http://www.elections.org.nz/parties-candidates/registered-political-parties/partydonations/donations-exceeding-30000/returns
154 http://www.ganopoly.com/?p=1976; http://www.ganopoly.com/?p=1350;
http://www.skykiwi.com/e/wap/show.php?classid=49&id=227929
155 http://www.weixinnu.com/tag/article/1184967244
156 http://cnz.chinesetown.co.nz/shopone.php
157 http://www.fujian.org.nz/
158 http://www.dskuaiping.com/zhixun/6609.html
159 http://www.coea.org.cn/xhhy/ls/2017-07-20/detail-ifyihzry3089001.shtml
160 http://www.nzasianleaders.com/our-members/maggie-chen
161 http://www.sclf.org/
162 http://nzca.net/v3/a/bendixinwen/2015/0713/80373.html
163 http://www.elections.org.nz/sites/default/files/plain-page/attachments/
New%20Zealand%20National%20Party%20donations%202011.pdf.
164 http://www.newshub.co.nz/opinion/patrick-gower/opinion-oravidas-56600-golfphoto-with-john-key-2014032009
165 http://www.oravida.com/newsdeitails.aspx?id=137
166 http://www.elections.org.nz/sites/default/files/plainpage/attachments/national_party_donations_return_2013.pdf
167 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11820377
168 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11668372
169 http://old.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=178405
170 http://www.xinhushang.org/index.php?m=&c=Index&a=member_info&id=170
171 http://active.xhs98.com/index_qd.php/index/ddfg#shjj
172 http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_68_1023_0_7.html
52

 http://www.nzcta.co.nz/advice/1646/nzcta-and-shanghai-entrepreneursassociation-sign-strategic-cooperation-agreement/
174
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1...
175
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11820377
176
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/10002636/Oravidas-30-000-donation-toNational
177
http://www.pressreader.com/new-zealand/the-press/20140417/281590943552314
178
http://www.elections.org.nz/sites/default/files/plainpage/attachments/national_party_donations_return_2013.pdf
179
http://www.elections.org.nz/sites/default/files/plain-page/attachments/New
Zealand National Party donations 2011.pdf
180 http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/10185321/Thanks-very-much-for-thekind-donation
181 http://www.hnfo.gov.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&catid=102
182 http://www.chinanews.com/hr/2011/04-20/2984730.shtml
183 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11633335
173

184

https://www.companiesoffice.govt.nz/companies/app/ui/pages/companies/1151040/
directors
185

https://www.companiesoffice.govt.nz/companies/app/ui/pages/companies/6041588?
backurl=%2Fcompanies%2Fapp%2Fui%2Fpages%2Findividual%2Fsearch%3Fq%3D
ye+qing%26start%3D%26entitySearch%3D%26addressKeyword%3D%26postalCode
%3D%26country%3D%26addressType%3D
186 http://myaunew.weebly.com/20851201102510520204.html;
http://www.chc.org.cn/news/detail.php?id=46814.
187 http://www.newstalkzb.co.nz/news/politics/chinese-owned-milk-powdercompany-donates-25-000-to-national-party/
188 http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/303158/mps-were-'salespeople'-fordairy-co-labour.
189 http://www.shixunwang.net/article/921621228329/.
190 See Gerry Groot, “Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party’s United
Front Work, Minor Parties, and Groups, Hegemonies and Corporations,” PhD
Thesis, University of Adelaide, 1997.
191

http://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/EN/AboutCouncil/HowCouncilWorks/Election
s/Pages/candidateelectoraldonationsandexpensessearch.aspx
192 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11713471
193 http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/313906/goff-denies-hypocrisy-over$150k-donation;
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11712664
53

 194

http://www.fuwahgroup.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=217:
luxury-waterfront&catid=38&Itemid=292&lang=en
195
Zhao Pitao, Waishi gaishuo, Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe, 1995, 167.
196
Zhao Pitao, Waishi gaishuo, 167.
197
RCMP-CSIS, “Chinese Intelligence Services and Triads Financial Links in
Canada,” June 24, 1997, http://www.jrnyquist.com/sidewinder.htm.
198
http://www.oravida.com/newsdeitails.aspx?id=115.
199
http://cn.oravida.com/ourteam.aspx
200
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/4885018/Inquiry-into-Pansy-Wongshusband
201 http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-07/20/content_5212080.htm;
http://en.cnta.gov.cn/focus/travelnews/201707/t20170724_832937.shtml;
http://www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Government/Mayor_office/OfficialActivities/t1486610.ht
m.
202 http://www.newshub.co.nz/home/money/2017/09/john-key-sells-home-tooffshore-buyer.html;
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11919697.
203 http://www.huaduholdings.com/Chinese/news
focus/showcompanynews.asp?ID=784
204 http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/the-rebuild/8542525/Chinese-veryinterested-in-key-Christchurch-project
205

http://www.cpaffc.org.cn/Upload/File/201512/314c49815cf34dfaa94f37e72264c7a5.pdf
http://en.cpaffc.org.cn/content/details19-48206.html
207 https://www.nbr.co.nz/article/first-geothermal-power-now-luxury-resortwanying-he-ch-168079
208 http://nzchinasociety.org.nz/simon-deng-li-fund/
209 http://nzchinasociety.org.nz/rewi-alley-friendship-and-exchange-rafe-fund/
210 http://nzchinasociety.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Dunedin-BranchNZCFS-Newsletter-APRIL-2015.pdf
211 http://www.communitymatters.govt.nz/Funding-and-grants---Trust-andfellowship-grants---New-Zealand-Winston-Churchill-Memorial-Trust---2011-2017Fellows
212 RCMP-CSIS, “Chinese Intelligence Services and Triads Financial Links in
Canada,” June 24, 1997, http://www.jrnyquist.com/sidewinder.htm.
213 http://new-zealand-innovation-awards.idealog.co.nz/tech/2015/02/darling-techcompany-martin-jetpack-wins-chinese-heart
214 http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/93824452/Martin-Jetpacks-thirst-for-fundsdelivers-it-to-Chinese-shareholders
215 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/11/chinese-telecom-firm-tied-tospy-ministry/
206

54

 http://www.securityweek.com/pla-concerns-lead-huawei-being-blocked-australiaand-questioned-new-zealand
217
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-newzealand-huawei-tech-idUSKBN16S2NZ
218
https://www.nbr.co.nz/article/telecom-4g-launch-october-ck-138371
219
http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/business/8810165/2degrees-securesfunding-for-4G
220
http://www.aerospace.co.nz/news/minister-witnesses-120-million-deal-to-pacificaerospace
221
https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/95585657/customs-charges-pacific-aerospace-foralleged-unlawful-exports-to-north-korea
222 See Phoebe Li, A Virtual Chinatown: The Diasporic Mediasphere of Chinese Migrants in
New Zealand, Leiden: Brill, 2013; Manying Ip, “Chinese Media in New Zealand:
Transnational Outpost or Unchecked Floodtide” in W. Sun, Media and the Chinese
Diaspora: Community, Communications, and Commerce, London, New York: Routledge,
2006.
223 http://money.163.com/13/0902/10/97OS29M000254TI5.html
224 CAMG New Zealand director Stella Hu, 胡杨,infamous for smashing a colleague’s
desk after she was phoned while on holiday is one example
(http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/75860815/name-suppression-lapses-for-tv-bosswho-smashed-colleagues-desk-with-hammer);
http://chinese.cri.cn/media/video/mtdk/189/20170510/4357.html;
http://gold.hexun.com/2016-07-18/185007191.html;
http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2017/n1/2017/0306/c410899-29126634.html;
http://www.shxiandai.net/index.php?action=list_news&cid=112&pid=107
225 A typical meeting in 2015, had the PRC Auckland Consul General advising the
head of a New Zealand Chinese newspaper on how she should report on China
matters: http://www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/chn/gdxw/t1272585.htm.
226 http://www.chnet.co.nz/Html/2017-6-23/News_154198.html.
216

227

https://www.companiesoffice.govt.nz/companies/app/ui/pages/companies/4951539/
directors; http://www.bizdb.co.nz/company/9429041089002/;
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-radio/. The China
Australia Media group is run by Jiang Zhaoqing (Tommy Jiang 姜兆庆) of the
AIMG/Ostar/Austar Group (澳星国际传媒集团). The AIMG group runs 3CW and
other Chinese-language media in Australia and established a Beijing office in 2008.
In China the company cooperates with many state-owned broadcasters. In 2013,
Jiang Zhaoqing participated in the 9th conference of the All China Federation of
Returned Overseas Chinese, a party united front organisation, held in Beijing. He
also participated in the 7th Forum on the Global Chinese Language Media, sponsored
by the PRC’s Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs and held in Shandong. Recent
reports suggest that Mr Jiang is now linking up with Hong Kong First Pacific (under
the Indonesian Salim Group) and the PRC’s Orient International Group (东方国际集
55

 团), which comes under the Shanghai Municipality’s State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission (上海市国有资产监督管理委员会), to
pursue residential unit developments in Melbourne’s Southbank. Mr Jiang is also
now involved in an undertaking named China.com.mm which broadcasts Chinese
news to Myanmar in the Myanmar language. This was launched by the Chinese
ambassador to Myanmar in May 2015.
228
http://www.freeviewnz.tv/channel/63.
229
http://radio.skykiwi.com/report/2015-02-15/193476.shtml.
230

http://www.bjqb.gov.cn/web/static/articles/catalog_2c94968944a9a3100144a9e9c1140
014/article_ff80808145457c1a0145833969ce0062/ff80808145457c1a0145833969ce0062.ht
ml.
231 http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2017/0615/42798.shtml
232 http://radio.skykiwi.com/report/2015-09-09/204419.shtml.
233 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11889565.
234 http://gb.cri.cn/1321/2012/01/20/1427s3530044.htm.
235 http://www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/chn/gdxw/t1361136.htm;
http://www.oceaniatv.co.nz/.
236

http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/mediawatch/audio/201836854/newchinese-channel-with-bold-goals;
http://www.toutiaoabc.com/index.php?act=view&nid=271000.
237 http://www.skykiwi.com/e/wap/show2.php?id=242990;
http://politics.skykiwi.com/consulate/2014-09-15/185823.shtml;
http://www.toutiaoabc.com/index.php?act=view&nid=335062.
238 Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in
Contemporary China, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008 Anne-Marie Brady,
Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008, 19, 42, 95, 136, 168.
239 See Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in
Contemporary China, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.
240 Zhao Yuezhi, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the
Bottom Line, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1998.
241 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10127739.
242 https://home.greens.org.nz/speeches/urgent-debate-exclusion-chinese-journalistnick-wang.
243 Link to the interview here:
http://tvnz.co.nz/national-news/chinese-icebreaker-visit-prompts-hopes-nz-gains-inantarctic-exploration-6219663
244 http://chinafilminsider.com/new-zealand-pm-tv-companies-cozy-china-statebroadcaster/
56

 245

http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/mediawatch/audio/201802964/medi
a-deals-to-boost-china's-voice
246
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-05/26/c_1118937977.htm
247

http://www.fuwahgroup.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=195:
beijing-delegation-inspects-beijing-based-overseas-chinese-enterprise-fu-wah-sprojects-in-new-zealand&catid=38:news&Itemid=292&lang=en
248
http://www.chinaqw.com/zhwh/2017/03-10/130635.shtml
249
http://news.cctv.com/2017/04/15/ARTIV9vLaw14oERQqnng5uSu170415.shtml
250 chinahttp://news.cnhubei.com/xw/2017zt/hbysslydyl/201704/t3817252.shtml
251 http://www.chinaconsulate.org.nz/chn/xwdt/t1447740.htm
252 http://politik.co.nz/en/content/politics/873/English-breaks-with-National-Partyconvention-and-endorses-Mayoral-candidate-English-Coughlan-Wellington-YoungLeggat-Mayor.htm.
253 http://chinaplus.cri.cn/news/china/9/20170519/4895.html
254 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/26/c_136237559.htm
255 http://en.cccfna.org.cn/article/Newsroom/364.html
256 https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qwyw/rdxw/10244.htm
257 http://news.cctv.com/2017/04/15/ARTIV9vLaw14oERQqnng5uSu170415.shtml
258 http://thtt.co.nz/
259 http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1503/S00857/te-huarahi-tika-trust-celebrates-asuccessful-year.htm
260 http://www.chinesenzherald.co.nz/news/new-zealand/obor-national-vs-labour/
261 http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1703/S00464/nzs-economic-kowtow-to-chinabegins.htm
262 Paul Sinclair, "New Zealand Expands Military Links with China,” CSS Strategic
Background Paper, 18/2014, http://www.victoria.ac.nz/hppi/centres/strategicstudies/documents/18_New-Zealand-Expands-Defence-Ties-with-China.pdf.
263 https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d6b7a4e7967444e/share_p.html.
264 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-05/asio-china-spy-raid/8589094.
265 http://news.china.com.cn/world/2017-06/29/content_41122997.htm.
266 https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/96106426/fishing-company-talleysbankrolling-shane-jones-nz-first-campaign.
267 Margaret Haywood, Diary of the Kirk Years, Queen Charlotte Sound: Cape Catley
Ltd, 1981, p. v.

57