Nunavunmi Maligaliuqtiit
NUNAVUT COURT OF JUSTICE
Cour de justice du Nunavut
Citation:

Adlair Aviation (1983) Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Nunavut, Government of Nunavut and Mark
McCulloch, 2017 NUCJ 19

Date:
Docket:
Registry:

20171013
21-12-709
Iqaluit

Applicant (Defendant):

Commissioner of Nunavut, Government of Nunavut and
Mark McCulloch
-and-

Respondent (Plaintiff):

Adlair Aviation (1983) Ltd

________________________________________________________________________
Before:

The Honourable Mr. Justice Paul Bychok

Applicant (Defendant):
Respondent (Plaintiff):

Vincent DeRose
Ed Brogden

Location Heard:
Date Heard:
Matters:

Iqaluit, Nunavut
April 26-27, 2017
Application for summary judgment – decision

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(NOTE: This document may have been edited for publication)

 2

I. OVERVIEW
[1]
The plaintiff started an action in December 2012 seeking damages and
various remedies following the award of a Government of Nunavut (GN)
medevac contract to a competitor, Aqsaqniq Airways Ltd. (Aqsaqniq). The
plaintiff filed its Statement of Claim on December 17, 2012. The plaintiff later
filed supporting affidavits. The defendants filed their Statement of Defence on
February 13, 2013. The plaintiff is represented by Ed Brogden of Toronto. The
defendants are represented by Vincent DeRose of Ottawa.
[2]
On April 13, 2016, after a hearing, I struck the plaintiff’s affidavits from the
record because they were based almost entirely on improper argument,
inadmissible hearsay and speculation. I ordered Mr. Brogden and the plaintiff
to share solicitor-client costs (the highest of the two available tariffs) to be paid
to the defendants. 1 Counsel for the plaintiff later filed replacement affidavits.
[3]
On April 27, 2017, I heard argument on an application, also called a
motion, by the defendants for summary judgment. Summary judgment is a
process designed to provide relief to a party without having to hold a trial. A
court may grant summary judgment if the plaintiff’s claim is one for which “no
legal relief is available”. 2 I reserved my decision to review the evidence.

II. BACKGROUND
[4]

Some background is necessary to put this civil action into context.

[5]
The Department of Health operates medical facilities in all 25 of Nunavut’s
remote communities. Except for the Qikiqtani Regional Hospital in Iqaluit,
these facilities are not equipped to handle cases involving life-threatening
trauma. (Even then, the Iqaluit hospital does not have the same capacities as
most southern hospitals.) Nunavummiut depend on reliable air ambulance
services as a literal life-line.

A. Request for Proposals for Kitikmeot Region air ambulance services
[6]
In February 2011, the GN issued a “Request for Proposals” (RFP)
respecting the provision of air ambulance services for the Kitikmeot Region.
The responsible agency was the GN’s Department of Community and
1

Adlair v Nunavut, 2016 NUCJ 23, 2016 NUCJ 23 (CanLII).
Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, Civil Procedure 2017, 1st (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, Canada, 2017) at 572. I
will comment further on summary judgment later in my decision.
2

 3

Government Services (CGS). The Honourable Lorne Kusugak was then its
Minister. The closing date for receipt of proposals was April 8, 2011. The
plaintiff submitted a proposal for consideration on April 8, 2011.
[7]
The RFP contained detailed instructions to prospective proponents (or
applicants), terms of reference, evaluation criteria, and terms and conditions.
In the “Instructions to Proponents”, the RFP stated among other things:
1.5 This is not a Request for Tenders or otherwise an offer. The GN is not
bound to accept the proposal that provides for the lowest cost or price to the
GN nor any proposal of those submitted.
1.6 If a contract is to be awarded as a result of this RFP, it shall be awarded to
the Proponent who is responsible and whose proposal provides the best
potential value to the GN.
1.7 Notice in writing to a Proponent and the subsequent execution of a written
agreement shall constitute the making of the contract. No Proponent shall
acquire any legal or equitable rights or privileges whatsoever until the contract
is signed.
1.8 The contract will contain the relevant provisions of this RFP, the accepted
proposal as well as such other terms as may be mutually agreed upon, whether
arising from the accepted proposal or as a result of any negotiations prior or
subsequent thereto. The GN reserves the right to negotiate modifications with
any Proponent who has submitted a proposal.
…
1.14 Proponents may amend their proposal up to the closing date and time by
facsimile. But after the closing date and time a proposal may not be amended,
but may be withdrawn by the Proponent at any time prior to acceptance. 3

[8]
Central to this application are the provisions respecting application of the
Nunavummi Nangminiqaqtunik Ikajuuti (NNI) policy outlined in sections 2.7 and
2.8 of the RFP:
2.7.1. One of the priorities of the GN is to ensure that Inuit, Local, and
Nunavut businesses supply materials, equipment and services, and that Inuit,
Local and Nunavut labour are used to the fullest extent practical on any GN
contract. Therefore, NNI Policy applies to this Request for Proposals. To
receive the benefits of this Policy, Proponents are required to identify cost
components for Inuit, Nunavut and Local content including the names of any
3

Government of Nunavut, Department of Community and Government Services, Procurement and Logistics,
Request for Proposals, RFP # 2011-21, Air Ambulance Services Kitikmeot Region (18 February 2011),
included as Exhibit “D” of the Affidavit of Mark McCulloch, sworn September 1, 2015, volume 1, at 4 [RFP #
2011-21].

 4
subcontractors, suppliers, and the residency of project team members and
personnel and any other labour proposed to carry out the work. Consideration
will also be given for the proponent’s Inuit firm and/or Nunavut Business
status.
…
2.8.1. In compliance with Article 24 of the Nunavut Final Agreement, the GN
will provide consideration for the use of Inuit firm’s goods and services, and
for Inuit labour. Proponents should describe fully the proposed Inuit content.
This Inuit content will be the percentage of work completed by an Inuit firm
listed on the registry of Inuit firms available from Nunavut Tunngavik Inc.
(NTI) and the amount of Inuit employment created. 4

[9]
To this end, the RFP package included at page 31 two tables requiring
“RFP NNI Adjusted Price Calculation Information”. The tables were titled
“Value of Labour / Work to be completed by the Contractor or SubContractors”, and “Value of Supplies / Materials to be provided by NNI Named
Companies”. The party submitting a proposal (proponent) was required to
provide the following information in each category: the total dollar value of
work, with seven per cent adjustments made for Inuit, Nunavut and/or Local
businesses. Proponents were advised that this information was mandatory, if
bid adjustments were to be awarded:
The following information MUST be completed by proponents to receive any
NNI bid adjustments. If the information is not completed, bid adjustments will
NOT be granted. Values provided must be substantiated by the information
contained within the RFP response. It will be necessary to outline the names
of staff along with their location of residence and or the names of
subcontractors. 5 [Original emphasis]

[10] In response to this part of the RFP, the plaintiff provided in its proposal a
document which it described as “a partial list of Inuit firms used by Adlair
Aviation and describes the nature of that business”. The document did not
contain any of the required dollar values or calculations of available bid
adjustments. 6
[11] The plaintiff and Unaalik Aviation (2004) Inc. each filed a proposal to
secure the contract, as did the eventual winner, Aqsaqniq, which filed four
separate proposals.

4

Ibid at 28.
Ibid at 31.
6
Adlair Aviation (1983) Ltd, Air Ambulance Services, Kitikmeot Region, Territory of Nunavut, RFP 2011-21, (8
April 2011), included as Exhibit “E” in the Affidavit of Mark McCulloch, sworn September 1, 2015, volume 1, at
29.
5

 5

[12] According to the Statement of Claim, the plaintiff is owned and operated by
the Laserich family that lives in Cambridge Bay. According to its proposals,
Aqsaqniq listed the following persons as contacts: Dennis Lyall, President of
Aqsaqniq; Peter Arychuk, President of Air Tindi Ltd.; and Sean Ivens, President
of Medic North Nunavut.
[13] I understand from Mr. Brogden’s oral argument that Chuck Parker was
involved somehow in the Aqsaqniq group. The extent of his involvement was
never made clear. According to the evidence, Mr. Parker was Executive VicePresident for Discovery Air which was a business partner of both Air Tindi and
Medic North Nunavut. I mention his name as he will appear again as the story
unfolds.

B. Six proposals were evaluated and the contract was awarded to Aqsaqniq
[14] CGS struck a five-person Evaluation Committee which reviewed and
scored the six proposals on a line-by-line basis. The Committee was
composed of Mark McCulloch, Senior Manager of Procurement, Contracts and
Logistics at CGS, and four persons from the Department of Health. 7 The
Honourable Tagak Curley was Health Minister at the time.
[15] In the end, Aqsaqniq’s “Option C” finished first overall with a total score of
1,642 points. Aqsaqniq’s “Option A” received 1,630 points. “Option A” was
identical, for the most part, to “Option C”, but included a Learjet. Senior
management at the Department of Health decided that “Option A” offered a
“better service”, as it included use of a Learjet. The GN accepted “Option A”
and awarded the contract to Aqsaqniq.
[16] The plaintiff’s proposal came in fifth position with a total score of 1,544
points. 8 The 86-point difference between Aqsaqniq’s “Option A” and the
plaintiff’s proposal in part was due to the plaintiff’s failure to provide the
required information on Inuit, Nunavut and Local content. Aqsaqniq’s “Option
A” received 150 points in this category. The plaintiff’s proposal received none. 9
[17] The Court was told during the application that at some point after the six
competing proposals were filed and the competition closed, there was
communication between Mr. McCulloch and two of the proponents, Adlair and

7

The other members were Bill Neish, Dr. Melissa Allen, Clair Evalik and Kim Dunlop.
Pre-Hearing Brief of the Defendants, 14 March 2017, at paras 4, 5.
9
Fifty points were awarded for Inuit Firms and 100 points for Inuit Labour. Evaluation Notes – Evaluation
Committee, Exhibit “F” to the Affidavit of Mark McCulloch, sworn September 1, 2015, volume 1, at 5.
8

 6

Aqsaqniq. The legal implications of these communications are contested by
the parties. This is what Mr. Brogden said:
They – Aqsaqniq called them and said we need to look up some things, there’s
some things … we need clarified. That’s a discussion. That was not offered to
Tindi – to Adlair. There was one question, only one: What’s the serial
number of the aircraft you don’t own yet but you’re talking about buying? …
That’s the only question they were asked. 10

[18] I found this part of Mr. Brogden’s oral argument to be completely
confusing. He started by saying Aqsaqniq had contacted Mr. McCulloch to get
information about its own proposal which, apart from not making sense, never
happened. He continued and garbled several different events and could not
keep the parties straight. [As an aside, I have concerns about Mr. Brogden’s
careless advocacy. I will say more about that in paragraph 69.]
[19] Mr. DeRose, the defendants’ lawyer promptly objected to this description
of what happened. Mr. DeRose stated there had never been any telephone
call. He said the evidence which emerged at discovery was that Mr.
McCulloch, for the GN, had contacted Aqsaqniq by email to maintain a paper
record. To this objection, Mr. Brogden replied: “… but there was a telephone
exchange, there was an email exchange”.
[20]

What actually happened can be found in the evidence.

[21] Mr. McCulloch was cross-examined by Mr. Brogden on his affidavit during
the discovery. The evidence shows that Mr. McCulloch tried to conduct all his
communications by email so there would be a record. At some point, Mr.
McCulloch may have had an actual verbal conversation with Mr. Parker,
although I found the transcript ambiguous on the circumstances. Mr.
McCulloch had sought clarification from Mr. Parker about certain pieces of
information included in Aqsaqniq’s proposals. These clarifications concerned
the numbers of staff and their staff schedules, as well as assurances that their
proposed aircraft would be able to service the Kitikmeot’s communities. As we
will see later, Mr. Parker helped prepare a proposal for a medevac contract for
the Kivalliq Region and this was the subject of another lawsuit against the
defendants.
[22] Mr. McCulloch also stated in that discovery cross-examination that he did
not seek any clarifications from the plaintiff concerning its Inuit, Nunavut and
Local content. He did not do so because the plaintiff had not submitted this
10

Transcript of Proceedings, 26 April 2017, at 102 [Transcript].

 7

information, so the Evaluation Committee “didn’t have any questions about
what was submitted, there was nothing.” 11
[23] The evidence also shows that at some point, Mr. McCulloch called Paul
Laserich, one of the plaintiff’s principals. Mr. McCulloch did so to ask for the
serial number of the aircraft that the plaintiff intended to purchase. 12
[24] The defendants advised the plaintiff by letter dated August 15, 2011 that
they had not been awarded the medevac contract. Mr. McCulloch signed the
letter. In the letter, Mr. McCulloch set out a summary of the evaluation results.
The results were contained in two broad sections, “Air Ambulance Equipment”
and “Air Medical Flight Crew” broken down into 19 categories. Of the 19
categories, the plaintiff’s proposal was rated “excellent” nine times, including its
proposed aircraft. Four categories received a “good” rating. Four categories
were rated “poor”. It was these four “poor” results which ultimately scuttled the
plaintiff’s proposal. The remaining two categories dealt with the reason why no
bid adjustments could be given to the plaintiff.
[25] The reasons given by Mr. McCulloch for the four “poor” ratings bear close
examination. “Poor” ratings were awarded for both “Inuit Labour” and “Inuit
Firm” in both “Air Ambulance Equipment” and “Air Medical Flight Crew”
sections as follows:
On page 31 of the RFP document, details of Inuit Labour and business with
Inuit Firms was requested. Your proposal did not include the completed table.
The required level of expenditures was not submitted in your proposal. 13

[26] Mr. McCulloch’s letter also stated that no bid adjustment 14 could be
awarded either to the plaintiff because it failed to provide the information
concerning Inuit labour and firms as required and noted on page 31 of the RFP.
I note a bid adjustment had been awarded to Aqsaqniq.
[27] However, it appears Aqsaqniq was not able immediately to provide the
contracted medevac services after it won the contract. CGS then contracted

11

Transcript of the Cross Examination of Mark McCulloch on Affidavits, October 27, 2016, at 21.
Ibid at 17.
13
Department of Community and Government Services, Letter to Adlair Aviation Ltd. 1983, GNE002033/1 (15
August 2011), included as Exhibit “G” to the Affidavit of Mark McCulloch, sworn September 1, 2015, volume 1.
14
Bid adjustments were (and are) designed to give preference to Inuit, Nunavut and local businesses. In 2011,
the NNI policy defined bid adjustments as “the amount by which the face value of a Bid is reduced in
accordance with the Policy. The Bid Adjustment is used for Bid evaluation purposes only. The Bid price minus
the Bid adjustment will be referred to as the adjusted price”. Government of Nunavut, Nunavummi
Nangminiqaqtunik Ikajuuti (NNI Policy) (20 April 2006), at Appendix “A”, online:
http://nni.nu.ca/sites/nni.gov.nu.ca/files/01nnPolicyEng.pdf.
12

 8

with the plaintiff to provide interim air ambulance services. The only sketchy
information Mr. Brogden provided about this development was:
They (Aqsaqniq) couldn’t do it at first and the contract had to be renewed with
Adlair. And in fact in the long run the only way they could do it is they had
lease Adlair’s own aircraft. [sic] They had to lease the King 150 from Adlair –
250 I believe. But anyway – or 200. 15

[28] I have referred earlier to Mr. Brogden’s careless advocacy. Here, he
described the aircraft leased by Aqsaqniq from the plaintiff in three different
ways in one sentence.

C. Adlair’s appeal to the NNI Contracting Appeals Board
[29] On August 26, 2011, the plaintiff appealed the award of the contract to
Aqsaqniq. The appeal was heard by the Nunavummi Nangminiqaqtunik
Ikajuuti Contracting Appeals Board on September 12 and October 11, 2011.
[30] At the appeal hearing, the plaintiff presented evidence of the difficulties
Aqsaqniq had in fulfilling the contract. However, the Board said it did not have
the authority to receive new information concerning events which happened
after the contract to Aqsaqniq had been awarded. In its written decision, the
Board stated it had conducted “a thorough review of all the documents involved
in the awarding of the contract” after the closing of the RFP. The Board ruled
the Contracting Authority (the defendants) “properly awarded the bid
adjustments” to Aqsaqniq and not to Adlair. Additionally, the Board ruled it was
“the responsibility of each proponent to provide the information that they wish
the Contracting Authority to consider … and not the responsibility of the
Contracting Authority to request missing information.” 16
[31]

The Board dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal on October 29, 2011.

[32] The plaintiff did not apply to the Nunavut Court of Justice for judicial review
of the Board’s decision until Mr. Brogden filed a Notice on August 12, 2015,
almost four years after the decision. The plaintiff’s motion stated it sought
“judicial review and damages for a failure of procedural fairness by government
administrators and a government tribunal”. 17 Given my previous comments on
the quality of Mr. Brogden’s work, I note that this motion was not filed according
15

Transcript, supra note 10 at 145-146.
NNI Contracting Appeals Board decision, 29 October 2011, included as Exhibit “K” to the affidavit of Mark
McCulloch, sworn September 1, 2015, volume 1, at 4.
17
Motion Memorandum, filed 12 August 2015, at 1.
16

 9

to the rules of the Court; it was filed too late; and damages are not available
through judicial review.

D. The “Keewatin action”
[33] This case is haunted by the spectre of what the parties call the “Keewatin
action”. This “action” was a lawsuit filed on July 14, 2011, against the GN and
Mr. McCulloch respecting a parallel RFP for medevac services in the Kivalliq
(Keewatin) Region. Much was said about this lawsuit, but I was never provided
a concise explanation of exactly what happened.
[34] On December 3, 2010, the GN issued an RFP for air ambulance services
in the Kivalliq Region. The initial closing date for proposals was January 21,
2011. At some point, it appears the closing was extended to February 4, 2011.
On February 4, a proposal was submitted by Kivallingmiut Aviation Inc. / Medic
North Nunavut (KAI/MNN). The proposal listed the following contacts: Victor
Tootoo, President of KAI; Peter Arychuk, President of Air Tindi Ltd.; and Sean
Ives, President of MNN. Chuck Parker, Executive Vice President for Discovery
Air Inc. (DAI), assisted in preparing the proponent’s proposal; DAI was a
business partner of KAI/MNN.
[35] This is where Mr. Brogden finds the supposed link between the Keewatin
action and the present case: Air Tindi, Medic North Nunavut and Chuck Parker
were also behind the proposals filed by Aqsaqniq for the Kitikmeot contract.
[36] Several weeks later, on March 29, 2011 the GN issued a POST-RFP
addendum. This addendum included a requirement for the successful
proponent to be able to launch three simultaneous medevac flights. 18 On June
13, 2011, the GN advised KAI / MNN that they were not successful.
[37] On July 14, 2011, KAI / MNN started a civil action seeking damages
against the GN and Mr. McCulloch. On September 20, 2011, KAI/ MNN
discontinued their Keewatin action. 19 At some point, basically the same
parties—in the corporate form of Aqsaqniq—were awarded the Kitikmeot
contract.

18
19

Kivallingmiut Aviation Inc v Nunavut, NCJ court file 18-11-463, Statement of Claim, at para 11.
Ibid.

 10

III. PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. The plaintiff
[38] I found the written pleadings and oral arguments presented by the
plaintiff’s counsel to be rambling and without focus. Mr. Brogden’s written legal
brief failed to contain any references to the law. Mr. Brogden’s basic argument
appears to be that the defendants “contravened the principles of fairness and
justice” in administrative law and “violated the laws and principles of the
Regulations of Nunavut” in the award of the contract. 20
[39] Mr. Brogden submitted that the defendants breached their “duty to be fair
and just” by considering the Aqsaqniq proposals while “knowing” that Aqsaqniq
“had no equipment, aircraft, staff, infrastructure, aviation licenses, operating
certificates, facilities or presence in Cambridge Bay”. 21 Furthermore, he
submitted that Aqsaqniq proposed to use an “illegal Lear jet”. 22 He said the
defendants “must have some responsibility for checking who’s making the
tender”. 23 He asserted the plaintiff’s proposal was treated unfairly as a “bid”
while the Evaluation Committee treated Aqsaqniq’s proposal as a “proposal”. 24
He says the Evaluation Committee should have declared a conflict of interest
when the Keewatin action started. 25
[40] Mr. Brogden is troubled by the timing of the dismissal of the Keewatin
Action and the award of the Kitikmeot contract to several of the same
principals, saying: “the defendants have not produced one scrap of evidence to
say there was not a deal.” 26 He claimed the defendants were biased in favour
of Aqsaqniq and they acted unfairly and unjustly by denying the plaintiff NNI bid
adjustments based on Inuit and local content. 27 He says there is missing
evidence which has yet to come to light. The plaintiff claims various categories
of damages totalling more than $31,000,000.
[41] Mr. Brogden’s submissions and oral argument arrived eventually at the
actual reason for having the hearing: whether I ought to grant summary
judgment to the defendants. He stated: “Without meaning to be mundane,
20

Statement of Claim, filed 17 December 2012, at para 43 [Statement of Claim].
Ibid at para 71.
22
Pre-Hearing Brief of the Plaintiffs, 6 April 2017, at 41 [Pre-hearing Brief of the Plaintiffs].
23
Transcript, supra note 10 at 98.
24
Ibid at 103-104.
25
Ibid at 91, 96.
26
Ibid at 116.
27
Statement of Claim, supra note 20 at paras 51-54, 72-73.
21

 11

there is no onus on the plaintiff (motion respondent) to prove anything in this
motion”. 28 I shall comment on that assertion later.
[42] In his Pre-Hearing Brief, he stated: “… these questions, and more, must be
resolved against citizens before the state can be granted immunity from being
tested by the underpinning basis of the Right of Law – the trial” [sic]. 29 This
passage is virtually incomprehensible. At the hearing, Mr. Brogden stated: “It’s
an issue that needs the witnesses to be checked and their credibility checked,
have corroboration, extensive corroboration”. He anticipates “tens of
thousands of pages of paper” to be tendered at trial. 30 In Mr. Brogden’s view, a
full blown trial is necessary.

B. The defendants
[43] Counsel for the defendants, Mr. DeRose, says the GN Evaluation
Committee acted in good faith and based its decision only on the information
provided by each proponent in its respective proposal. Mr. DeRose asserted
that the plaintiff’s proposal was “faulty” and incomplete, and “quite simply, they
didn’t win. Fair and square”. 31 He stated the Keewatin action was irrelevant.
Mr. DeRose also stated that Mr. McCulloch is not personally liable; every action
Mr. McCulloch took was within the scope of his employment with the GN. Mr.
DeRose says the Court should grant the defendants summary judgment
because there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. 32

IV. ISSUE
[44] The issue I must decide is the following: has the plaintiff established a
genuine issue which requires a trial to determine the case on its merits? In my
respectful view, the plaintiff has not done so.

28

Pre-Hearing Brief of the Plaintiffs, supra note 22. The brief is sloppy and appears to be a cut-and-paste
exercise given its disparate fonts and spacing. This part of the brief did not contain numbered references,
either for the page or paragraphs.
29
Ibid at 14.
30
Transcript, supra note 10 at 129.
31
Ibid at 30. “They lost because they put in a faulty proposal”. Ibid at 42.
32
Pre-Hearing Brief of the Defendants, 14 March 2017, at paras 43-53.

 12

V. LAW
A. Summary judgment
[45] Access to affordable and timely justice has been a pressing recent issue in
Canadian civil courts. The costs of litigation can be enormous; this makes
access to the courts simply out of reach for many people. Our common law
has evolved to address this challenge. Summary judgment is a remedy
available to a party where the lawsuit may fairly be resolved without a lengthy
and expensive trial. The leading Supreme Court of Canada case setting out
the guiding principles in this area is Hryniak v Mauldin. 33
[46] An application by a party for summary judgment may be made in Nunavut
pursuant to Part 12 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northwest
Territories as adopted for Nunavut. 34 If such an application is made, the
responding party — in this case the plaintiff — must present sworn affidavits or
other evidence showing that there “is a genuine issue for trial”. 35 To resist a
summary judgment application, a party cannot rest merely on its unsupported
allegations. That party has a positive “obligation to put their best foot forward
on the motion”. 36
[47] Recently, the meaning of section 176 (1) of the Rules of Court 37 has been
judicially considered by Justice Shaner in Leishman v Hoechsmann et al. 38
Justice Shaner stated that the party who resists the application for summary
judgment must, in fact, show there “is a genuine issue which requires a trial for
fair and just resolution”. 39 [Emphasis added] Nunavut inherited its civil rules at
division from the Northwest Territories. The wording of Part 12 remains
identical in each Territory. Justice Shaner’s Supreme Court of the Northwest
Territories decision in Leishman is persuasive; in my view, it reflects the state
of the law respecting summary judgment in Nunavut.
[48] I have already referenced the Sweda Farms case. In that case, the
Ontario Court of Appeal accepted the Superior Court’s view that Hryniak has
resulted in an entirely new approach to summary judgment. The Superior Court
said:
33

Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 SCR 87 [Hryniak].
Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories, NWT Reg (Nu) 010-96, ss 174-184 [Rules of
Court].
35
Ibid, s 176 (1).
36
Sweda Farms Ltd v Egg Farmers of Ontario, 2014 ONCA 878 at para 4, [2014] OJ No 5815 [Sweda Farms
II].
37
Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories, NWT Reg 010-96, s 176(1).
38
Leishman v Hoechsmann et al, 2016 NWTSC 27, [2016] NWTJ No 34.
39
Ibid at para 42.
34

 13

Hryniak also provides a basis for a sort of reverse engineering of this motion
… The Supreme Court of Canada is clear that the motions court should ask
itself why it should not grant summary judgment. …
... The plaintiffs must show that there is evidence to support their allegations.
A party may not rest on allegations in its pleadings on a motion for summary
judgment. The party must “put its best foot forward” or “lead trumps or risk
losing”. 40 [Emphasis added]

[49] Decisions of appeal courts in other jurisdictions are not binding on the
Nunavut Court of Justice. However, I find the reasoning of the judges in the
Sweda Farms case to be persuasive. In my respectful view, Sweda Farms
represents the law in Nunavut as well.

B. The law of government procurement
[50] All three levels of government play an increasingly active role in society.
To fulfill their constitutional responsibilities, governments spend enormous
sums of money each year procuring goods and services. The common-law
has evolved to provide a legal framework intended to promote fairness and the
integrity of the procurement process.
[51] In procurement law, the party seeking proposals is often referred to as the
‘owner’. The parties making proposals are variously called bidders,
contractors, proponents and tenderers. When I refer to “owner” in this section,
I am referring to the defendants. There are two ways an owner can put out a
call for goods or services, those being by a call for either tenders or proposals.
Different legal expectations and obligations arise depending on which route is
chosen. The present case deals with a request for proposals.
[52] In the context of this proposal case, the following legal principles are
relevant:
1. Owners have a duty to conduct a fair RFP process. 41
2. An RFP process does not necessarily create any contractual relationship
between the owner and successful proponent. This process is an
invitation for expressions of interest. An owner may, or may not, wish to
40

Sweda Farms v Egg Farmers of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 1200 at paras 15, 26, [2014] OJ No851 [Sweda Farms
I] affirmed by Sweda Farms II, supra note 36.
41
MJB Enterprises Ltd v Defence Construction (1951) Ltd, [1999] 1 SCR 619, 170 DLR (4th) 577; See
generally, Paul Emanuelli, Government Procurement, 3 ed, (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2017) at 630.

 14

negotiate with any given proponent with a view to potentially entering into
a contract. The key consideration is the intention of the parties. Here,
the wording contained in the RFP must be examined. 42
3. An owner does not have a duty to investigate competing proposals. 43
[53] These are the legal principles I must apply to the evidence in this
application.

VI. ANALYSIS
[54] In Canada, the parties to a civil lawsuit engage in pre-trial ‘discovery’.
Each party is required to disclose all relevant documents in their possession to
the other side. Lawyers question the principal witnesses. These proceedings
are recorded and become part of the record. In this process, evidence is
discovered and outstanding issues are clarified. By the end of this process,
each party should be able to make a hard and realistic assessment of the
strength of their position. Not surprisingly, many cases are resolved or
abandoned after the rigours of the civil discovery process.
[55] There was discovery in this case. Documents were exchanged.
Witnesses were questioned. Evidence was collected. The plaintiff filed with
the Court sworn affidavits, documents and transcripts of discovery questioning.
The question I must ask is: has the plaintiff established a genuine issue which
requires a trial to determine the case on its merits? In my respectful view, the
plaintiff has not.
[56] This is an application or motion by the defendants for summary judgment.
Mr. Brogden claimed there was no onus on the plaintiff to establish anything on
the motion. This assertion revealed a staggering ignorance of the law. I have
already explained the applicable law. There was a positive duty on the plaintiff
to put its best foot forward. The plaintiff was required to base its position on
evidence demonstrating the requirement of a full-blown trial. The plaintiff came
to court with no plan to meet its burden.
[57] Mr. Brogden had an ethical duty to familiarize himself with the law. It is
clear he did not, just as he failed earlier to follow the basic rules governing the
42

Mellco Developments Ltd v Portage La Prairie (City), 2002 MBCA 125 at paras 73-74, 222 DLR (4th) 67;
Tercon Contractors Ltd v British Columbia (Minister of Transportation & Highways), 2010 SCC 4, [2010] 1 SRC
69; Paul Sandori & William M Pigott, Bidding and Tendering: What is the Law?, fifth ed (Markham, ON:
LexisNexis Canada, 2015) at 67-68.
43
Double N Earthmovers Ltd v Edmonton (City), 2007 SCC 3 at para 54, [2007] 1 SCR 116 [Double N];
Penney v Eastern Region Integrated Health Authority, [2016] NJ No 270, 2015 CarswellNfld 99.

 15

proper content and use of affidavits, and by his lack of understanding of the law
of judicial review. A lawyer holds himself out to be knowledgeable and capable
in practising law. He has an ongoing ethical duty to keep abreast of changes in
the law in his practice areas. It is clear Mr. Brogden has failed to do so and
that he has failed the most basic ethical obligations of a lawyer.
[58] Mr. Brogden asserted several ways in which he says the Kitikmeot RFP
process was unjust. I will deal with each one of these assertions in turn.
[59] Mr. Brogden submitted the defendants “violated the laws and principles of
the Regulations of Nunavut”. 44 However, he made no specific reference to any
Nunavut law or regulation which he claims the defendants violated.
[60] Mr. Brogden said the defendants had known Aqsaqniq did not have a
physical presence in Nunavut and the defendants ought to have investigated
Aqsaqniq’s four bids. I specifically asked Mr. Brogden if he had any legal
authority to support his argument. He replied: “No”. 45 In fact, the law
established by the Supreme Court of Canada is clear: there is no legal duty on
a contracting authority to investigate bids or proposals. 46
[61] Mr. Brogden submitted Aqsaqniq’s proposed Learjet was “illegal”. He did
not provide any evidence of “illegality” in the proposed use of a Learjet. There
is no legal cause of action here.
[62] Mr. Brogden said the defendants should have contacted the plaintiff to give
it a chance to provide the NNI content information. His reason was that Mr.
McCulloch had contacted Aqsaqniq to get further information about their
proposals. Mr. Brogden said the defendants treated Adlair’s proposal as a
“bid” and Aqsaqniq’s proposal as a “proposal”. In my respectful view, there is
no merit to this submission.
[63] I will not elaborate on the law pertaining to tendering bids as this is not a
tendering bid case. The RFP plainly stated that the GN was not seeking bids
giving rise to a tendering contract. 47 The RFP clearly stated the GN was
seeking proposals. The RFP clearly stated that no equitable or legal rights
accrued to a proponent until a contract was signed. The RFP clearly stated
any ensuing contract would be the result of any negotiations between the
parties either before or after a proposal was selected for further examination. 48
44

Statement of Claim, supra note 20 at para 43.
Transcript, supra note 10 at 110.
46
Double N, supra note 43, para 54.
47
RFP # 2011-21, supra note 3, s 1.5.
48
Ibid, ss 1.7 and 1.8.
45

 16

These clauses set the playing field for the process — one of potential
discussion and negotiation prior to the formation of any potential contract.
[64] As noted, the RFP stated in plain language that the defendants reserved
the right to speak to any proponent about a proposal if the defendants chose to
do so. In this case, the evidence is that Mr. McCulloch contacted Mr. Parker
for Aqsaqniq seeking clarification about parts of their proposal. Mr. McCulloch
did not seek similar information from the plaintiff, and the defendants were
under no legal obligation to do so.
[65] I reject Mr. Brogden’s assertion that the defendants ought to have alerted
the plaintiff about the missing NNI content document. There is a critical
distinction between seeking to clarify a point of information submitted in a
proposal, and seeking to invite the submission of information which was absent
in the proposal. The RFP specifically stated, again in plain language, that no
further information could be submitted after closing. 49 While the defendants
had a right to clarify the information provided by Aqsaqniq, it would have been
unjust to the other proponents to seek out missing information from the plaintiff
after the closing date. Again, the plaintiff has failed to establish a cause of
action. In everyday language, there is no legal remedy available to the plaintiff.
[66] I also do not find any merit in Mr. Brogden’s assertion that the Keewatin
action put the Evaluation Committee members in a conflict of interest. Owners
and proponents have a duty to avoid conflicts of interest as this factor goes to
the integrity of the procurement process. The case law is extensive in this area
and it focuses on proponents or bidders trying to take advantage of inside
knowledge. 50 Mr. Brogden did not provide or refer the Court to any case
involving a conflict of interest in government procurement due to an unrelated
litigation with one of the proponents.
[67] The evidence here revealed that Mr. McCulloch did ask the GN lawyers
whether he should be “worried” by the Keewatin action. GN Justice Counsel
advised him there was no need for him to worry. 51 In addition, Mr. McCulloch
was but one out of five members on the Evaluation Committee. The fact that
Mr. McCulloch was named as a party in both the Kivalliq and Kitikmeot actions
does not, on its own, meet the applicable legal standard of “probability of
mischief”. 52 Again, the plaintiff has presented no evidence to substantiate this
argument.
49

Ibid, s 1.14. This would have been what is called ‘bid repair’.
See Kaymar Rehabilitation Inc v Champlain Community Care Access Center, 2017 ONSC 1843 at paras 8994, 2017 CarswellOnt 4131.
51
Transcript, supra note 10 at 75.
52
Irving Shipbuilding Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 1102 at para 54, [2008] FCJ No 1500 at para
54, affirmed 2009 FCA 116, [2009] FCJ No 449.
50

 17

[68] I turn now to the question of the points that the Evaluation Committee did
not award the plaintiff respecting Inuit content. In his oral submission, Mr.
Brogden stated several times that the plaintiff had supplied the information,
only it was elsewhere in its proposal. I asked him to show me where in the
plaintiff’s proposal that information could be found. He replied: “I can’t”. 53 The
supposed information was not there. In fact, the evidence showed that the
plaintiff had made a “mistake” in not including Inuit content information. 54
[69] In Canada, lawyers are ‘officers of the court’. Lawyers have a duty to be
candid when they address the court. They have a duty to be accurate and
careful in their submissions when they refer to evidence. Mr. Brogden failed to
meet that high standard when he misconstrued the nature of the contact
between Mr. McCulloch and Aqsaqniq referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19. He
failed to meet that standard when he repeatedly referred the Court to nonexistent evidence concerning Inuit content in the plaintiff’s proposal.
[70] The fact is the plaintiff failed to provide mandatory information concerning
two important aspects of its proposal: Inuit, Nunavut and Local labour and the
use of Inuit, Nunavut and Local firms. The RFP required specific quantified
percentages and dollar amounts of the proponent’s NNI content to be stated in
the appropriate form. The plaintiff failed to provide that mandatory information
in the form required. Therefore, the plaintiff’s proposal was deficient. The
Evaluation Committee cannot be faulted for failing to award the plaintiff points
in those categories. Again, the plaintiff has failed to establish any legal cause
of action.
[71] Mr. Brogden argued there is missing evidence. The law says if that is
suspected, then the plaintiff has a duty to show he has taken reasonable steps
to secure that evidence, and that the evidence is material. 55 Again, the plaintiff
has not done so.
[72] In my respectful view, the plaintiff’s lawsuit is not grounded in any evidence
of any unjust actions by the defendants. The driving force behind this litigation
is the apparent indignation shared by Rene Laserich, a principal of the plaintiff,
and Mr. Brogden concerning the possible implications of the Keewatin action. 56
53

Transcript, supra note 10 at 136.
The plaintiff’s proposal was prepared by Brian Yeo. In cross-examination on his affidavit during the
discovery, Mr. Yeo was asked whether it was a conscious decision not to provide specifics on the Inuit content
in the proposal. He replied: “Hindsight, I am sure we would – well, we would have – I would say it is a mistake,
yeah”. Transcript of Cross-Examination on Affidavit of Brian Yeo, at Yellowknife on August 26, 2016, at 30.
55
Sweda Farms I, supra note 40 at paras 27- 28.
56
Mr. Brogden said: “Aqsaqniq is a front, a paper company…We feel, I can tell you that if I don’t say this my
client will be disturbed because this is what he feels from the day I was first called on this matter, in fact, from
54

 18

The plaintiff’s concern appears to be two-fold: firstly, that the defendants
awarded the medevac contract to “a paper company” unable to deliver on the
contract and, secondly, that the award of the Kitikmeot contract to Aqsaqniq
was a trade-off for the abandonment of the Keewatin action.
[73] I pointedly asked the defendants’ lawyer if there was any evidence on the
record which suggested there might have been a quid pro quo involved in the
award of the contract to Aqsaqniq. In other words, ‘you folks drop the Keewatin
action, and we will award you the Kitikmeot contract.’ Or possibly, ‘we will drop
the Keewatin action against you if you award us the Kitikmeot contract.’ Mr.
DeRose’s answer was: “No, no, no, no”. 57
[74] When it was his turn to speak, Mr. Brogden said the following about the
Keewatin action:
The plaintiff on the other hand, says this probably explains everything and it
explains what else, what happened. And we – as I’ve already said – we’re not
going to find the smoking gun, we’re not going to find a letter where they say
let’s make a deal. It’s not a television show. It’s not going to show up and
you’re not going to get that in any situation similar to this. But what we have
is a number of coincidences, it’s just – it would be very hard for somebody
looking at this material to state, to look at it and say wow, what a coincidence.
It is just too much to be pure coincidence. 58 [Emphasis added]

[75] Whatever the obvious coincidence, there is no evidence before this Court
of any such quid pro quo.
[76] One of our society’s most important pillars is the rule of law. Civil and
criminal cases must only be decided upon probative and relevant evidence,
either accepted by the parties or tested in court in the crucible of crossexamination. Justice cannot find anchor in the shifting waters of coincidence,
speculation or suspicion. Whatever may be said on policy grounds about
awarding a vital medevac contract to a “paper company”, the plaintiff has failed
to establish, or present any evidence suggesting, a conspiracy which would
require a trial of this issue. That said, the plaintiff surprisingly failed to plead a
conspiracy in tort law.

knowing his father for 40 years. They are concerned about the people of Kitikmeot. That’s where they live.
They’ve lived there for three generations in Cambridge Bay. They’re not outsiders. You notice the list of
companies, they’re local. Because that’s where they live, that’s who they hire, that’s who they use. Tindi,
Discovery, that money is going to Ontario and other places. It’s not staying in Kitikmeot”. Transcript, supra note
10 at 149
57
Ibid at 71.
58
Ibid at 89.

 19

VII. CONCLUSION
[77] In his oral submission, Mr. Brogden referred to “tens of thousands of
pages” of evidence waiting in the wings. Was any of that “evidence” probative
or relevant? If so, it was his duty to provide this evidence to the Court. Rule
176(1) of the Rules of Court says a plaintiff:
may not rest on the mere allegations … in his or her pleadings. 59

Yet, this is exactly what the plaintiff has done here. The plaintiff has not
presented evidence establishing any cause of action or legal issue requiring a
trial.
[78] In the words of Justice Karakatsanis of the Supreme Court of Canada, I
am able “to reach a fair and just determination on the merits” 60 based on this
summary judgment motion. The evidence has permitted me to ascertain the
facts and to apply the relevant law. This process “is a proportionate, more
expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result” than a trial. 61
[79] I grant the application for summary judgment, and I dismiss the plaintiff’s
claim.

VIII. COSTS
[80] In my respectful view, the plaintiff ought to have reassessed the merits of
its case after discovery was completed. Had the plaintiff done so realistically,
this application would not have been necessary. Finite, valuable court time and
resources would not have been squandered. I award costs against the plaintiff
on a solicitor-client basis (the higher of the two available tariffs). The
defendant shall file its bill of costs with the Court within 10 business days.
Dated at the City of Iqaluit this 13th day of October, 2017

_____________________
Justice Paul Bychok
Nunavut Court of Justice
59

Rules of Court, supra note 34, s 176(1).
Hryniak, supra note 33 at para 49.
61
Ibid; See also Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 NUCA 2 at para 98, 2014
CarswellNun 14.
60