!aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      111      ooofff      333444 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, et al., Plaintiffs, No. 17-cv-5205 (NRB) v. DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT CHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General JOON H. KIM Acting United States Attorney BRETT A. SHUMATE Deputy Assistant Attorney General ERIC R. WOMACK Assistant Branch Director /s/ Michael H. Baer MICHAEL H. BAER DANIEL HALAINEN Trial Attorneys U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 Telephone: (202) 305-8573 Facsimile: (202) 616-8460 E-mail: Michael.H.Baer@usdoj.gov Counsel for Defendants !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      222      ooofff      333444 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2 LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 4 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 4 I. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction TR 'HFLGH 3ODLQWLIIV¶ &ODLPV .............................................. 4 A. The Knight Institute Does Not Have A Cognizable Injury........................................... 5 B. The Individual Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Sue Ms. Hicks, Ms. Sanders, And Mr. Scavino. ......................................................................................................................... 7 C. Plaintiffs Cannot Obtain Equitable Relief Against The President. ............................... 7 II. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish State Action. ........................................................................... 10 III. 3ODLQWLIIV¶ )LUVW $PHQGPHQW &ODLP )DLOV %HFDXVH %ORFNLQJ 7KH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV 'RHV Not Implicate, Much Less Violate, The Public Forum Doctrine. ...................................... 13 A. If the 3UHVLGHQW¶V 8VH 2I 7ZLWWHU ,V 6WDWH $FWLRQ 7KHQ ,W ,V *RYHUQPHQW 6SHHFK ... 14 B. The Public Forum Doctrine Is Inapplicable Here. ...................................................... 18 IV. 3ODLQWLIIV¶ 5HPDLQLQJ )LUVW $PHQGPHQW &ODLPV $UH 0HULWOHVV ........................................ 23 A. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A First Amendment Right To Follow The @realDonaldTrump Account On Twitter. .................................................................. 23 B. 7KH .QLJKW ,QVWLWXWH¶V 5LJKW 7R +HDU &ODLP )DLOV 2Q 7KH 6DPH 7HUPV DV 7KH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV¶ &ODLPV ...................................................................................... 24 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 25 i !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      333      ooofff      333444 Table of Authorities Cases   $UN (GXF 7HOHYLVLRQ &RPP¶Q Y )RUEHV, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) ................................................................................................ 19, 20, 21, 22 Barnett v. Obama, No. 09-cv-82, 2009 WL 3861788 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009) ................................................... 10 Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 2003)........................................................................................................ 4 Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) .................................................................................................................. 25 Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379 (2011) .................................................................................................................. 23 Brentwood $FDG Y 7HQQ 6HFRQGDU\ 6FK $WKOHWLF $VV¶Q, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) .................................................................................................................. 11 Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2010).................................................................................................. 18, 19 Carlos v. Santos, 123 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1997)........................................................................................................ 12 Carlson v. Bush, No. 07-cv-1129, 2007 WL 3047138 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2007) ................................................. 9 Charley v. Total Office Planning Servs. Inc., 202 F. Supp. 3d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)......................................................................................... 4 &ODSSHU Y $PQHVW\ ,QW¶O 86$, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) ................................................................................................................ 5, 6 Colombo Y 2¶&RQQHOO, 310 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2002)...................................................................................................... 12 &ROXPELD %URDG 6\V ,QF Y 'HPRFUDWLF 1DW¶O &RPP , 412 U.S. 94 (1973) .................................................................................................................... 22 Comm. to Establish the Gold Standard v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ............................................................................................. 9 Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 2009)...................................................................................................... 10 ii !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      444      ooofff      333444 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) ............................................................................................................ 20, 21 Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-cv-574, 2017 WL 1459081 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) ................................................... 9 &RYHQWU\ (QWHUV //& Y 6DQRPHGLFV ,QW¶O +ROGLQJV ,QF , 191 F. Supp. 3d 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)......................................................................................... 4 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) .................................................................................................................. 19 F.D.I.C. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288 (2d Cir. 2010)........................................................................................................ 4 )ODJJ Y LQJ@ WKRVH GLVSXWHV ZKLFK DUH DSSURSULDWHO\ UHVRlved WKURXJK WKH MXGLFLDO SURFHVV ¶´ Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) 4 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      111333      ooofff      333444 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) %HFDXVH VWDQGLQJ ³VHUYHV WR prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of thH SROLWLFDO EUDQFKHV ´ Clapper Y $PQHVW\ ,QW¶O 86$, 568 U.S. 398, 408 FRXUWV DUH ³HVSHFLDOO\ ULJRURXV´ LQ H[DPLQLQJ standing when, as KHUH D VXLW DVNV WKH FRXUW WR GHFLGH ³ZKHWKHU DQ DFWLRQ WDNHQ E\ RQH RI WKH RWKHU WZR EUDQFKHV RI WKH )HGHUDO *RYHUQPHQW ZDV XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO ´ Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997). Plaintiffs are the party invoking jurisdiction and bear the burden of satisfying this especially rigorous inquiry. Spokeo 6 &W DW 7R HVWDEOLVK ³WKH µLUUHGXFLEOH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO PLQLPXP¶ RI VWDQGLQJ ´ 3ODLQWLIIV PXVW VKRZ WKDW WKH\ KDYH ³ VXIIHUHG DQ LQMXU\ in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial GHFLVLRQ ´ Id. at 1547 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). Plaintiffs cannot meet this burden because the undisputed facts show that at least one element of standing is lacking for all of the Plaintiffs and the specific claims they seek to bring. A. The Knight Institute Does Not Have A Cognizable Injury. The Knight Institute lacks standing because its alleged injury²WKH LQDELOLW\ WR ³KHDU>@ WKH VSHHFK WKDW WKH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV ZRXOG KDYH HQJDJHG LQ KDG WKH\ QRW EHHQ EORFNHG ´ &RPSO ¶ 77²is not cognizable. At the outset, the Knight Institute has not identified an actual injury. Plaintiffs have put forward no evidence that the Knight Institute ever viewed one of the Individual 3ODLQWLIIV¶ WZHHWV SULRU WR ILOLQJ WKLV ODZVXLW QRU LV WKHUH DQ\ HYLGHQFH WKDW WKH .QLJKW ,QVWLWXWH KDV viewed replies to @realDonaldTrump tweets. Indeed, a month after filing this suit, the Knight Institute did not even follow six of the seven Individual Plaintiffs on Twitter. Stip. ¶¶ 61-62. In any event, a user blocked by the @realDonaldTrump account can still view the PreVLGHQW¶V WZHHWV and tweet about them, and the Knight Institute is free to view DQ\ VXFK XVHU¶V tweets. Stip. ¶¶ 57, 5 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      111444      ooofff      333444 61. A blocked user can still post in the @realDonaldTrump comment threads, as all but one of the Individual Plaintiffs have done after being blocked, and the Knight Institute is free to view those comment threads. Stip. ¶¶ 57-58. EYHQ DVVXPLQJ WKH H[LVWHQFH RI D ³ULJKW WR KHDU´ tweets, the actions at issue in this case would not give rise to an Article III injury. Moreover, the Knight InVWLWXWH¶V DOOHJHG LQMXU\ LV HQWLUHO\ VSHFXODWLYH Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493-96 (2009); see also Clapper, 568 U.S. at 413. Thousands of users post replies to each @realDonaldTrump tweet, and only a tiny fraction of these replies will reach the top of the comment threads. Stip. ¶¶ 23, 41, 43-44. Plaintiff assumes (1) that an Individual Plaintiff would have replied to an @realDonaldTrump tweet but for the blocking, (2) that other users would have liked the reply, (3) that 7ZLWWHU¶V DOJRULWKP would have elevated the reply to a prominent place in the comment thread, see id. ¶ 23, (4) that a Knight Institute staffer would log in to the @knightcolumbia account and see the relevant @realDonaldTrump tweet, (5) that the staffer would click on the tweet and scroll through the replies, and (6) that the staffer would have VHHQ WKH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLII¶V UHSO\ But the Knight Institute has neither a demonstrable history of clicking on @realDonaldTrump tweets to view the replies, nor any concrete plans to do so. Cf. Lujan 8 6 DW 7KLV ³KLJKO\ DWWHQXDWHG FKDLQ RI SRVVLELOLWLHV ´ ZKLFK UHVWV RQ VSHFXODWLYH action by hundreds (if not thousands) of third parties not before the court, does not give the Knight Institute standing to sue. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410. In any event WKH .QLJKW ,QVWLWXWH¶V DVVHUWLRQ RI DQ DOOHJHG LQMXU\ from the denial of D ³ULJKW WR KHDU´ LV QRWKLQJ PRUH WKDQ DQ ³XQGLIIHUHQWLDWHG JHQHUDOL]HG JULHYDQFH ´ QRW D SDUWLFXODUL]HG injury in fact. Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (per curiam); see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974). The Knight Institute¶V SXUSRUWHG LQMXU\ IURP the ³GLVWRUWLQJ´ HIIHFWV RI EHLQJ XQDEOH WR ³KHDU´ WKH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV¶ speech, Compl. ¶ 77, would 6 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      111555      ooofff      333444 be shared equally by any member of the public who views the @realDonaldTrump account. That LQFOXGHV QRW RQO\ WKH DFFRXQW¶V PLOOLRQV RI IROORZHUV on Twitter, Stip. ¶ 36, but also anyone who accesses WKH DFFRXQW¶V SXEOLF ZHESDJH ,Q VKRUW WKLV LQMXU\ LV WRR JHQHUDOL]HG WR VXVWDLQ WKH &RXUW¶V jurisdiction. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575. B. The Individual Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Sue Ms. Hicks, Ms. Sanders, And Mr. Scavino. The Individual Plaintiffs urge this Court to exercise jurisdiction based on their alleged denial of access to a public forum. See Compl. ¶¶ 46-47, 79-81. As discussed in Section III, infra, this novel claim of First Amendment injury rests on the unsupported and erroneous premise that WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V 7ZLWWHU DFFRXQW LV D public forum for First Amendment purposes. But even assuming these alleged injuries are cognizable, they cannot fairly be traced to Ms. Hicks, Ms. Sanders, and Mr. Scavino. See 6WHHO &R Y &LWL]HQV IRU D %HWWHU (QY¶W, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). %\ 3ODLQWLIIV¶ RZQ DFFRXQW WKH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV¶ DOOHJHG LQMXULHV ZHUH FDXVHG E\ WKH EORFNLQg of their accounts. Compl. ¶¶ 46, 51, 55, 59, 63, 67, 71, 75. And the facts show that the President himself blocked the Individual Plaintiffs. Stip. ¶¶ 46-52. Any suggestion that the Individual 3ODLQWLIIV¶ DOOHJHG LQMXULHV DUH WUDFHDEOH WR WKHVH RWKHU GHIHQGDQWV LV QRW MXVW ³SXUHO\ VSHFXODWLYH ´ Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976), it is foreclosed by the record. C. Plaintiffs Cannot Obtain Equitable Relief Against The President. The Individual Plaintiffs must trace their alleged injuries to the President alone, but those injuries are not redressable. The remedy Plaintiffs seek²an injunction requiring the President to take discretionary action with respect to the management of his Twitter account in his official capacity, see Compl. ¶ 16; Stip. ¶ 9²is not available. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867). As discussed in Section II, infra, Defendants contest the premise that the President acted in his official capacity, but even 7 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      111666      ooofff      333444 DFFHSWLQJ 3ODLQWLIIV¶ premise as true, this Court would lack jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. See, e.g., Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265, 282 (D.D.C. 2005). Thus, the Individual Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this challenge on the only theory of the case on which their claims can proceed, and judgment should be entered for Defendants on that basis. To maintain the constitutional separation of powers, courts are prohibited from enjoining the discretionary conduct of the President. In Mississippi v. Johnson, the State of Mississippi sought to enjoin President Andrew Johnson from executing the Reconstruction Acts, which Mississippi claimed were unconstitutional. 71 U.S. at 475-78. The Supreme Court held that it had ³no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties ´ Id. at 501. When SUHVLGHQWLDO DFWLRQ UHTXLUHV ³WKH H[HUFLVH RI MXGJPHQW ´ ³JHQHUDO SULQFLSOHV . . forbid judicial LQWHUIHUHQFH ZLWK WKH H[HUFLVH RI ([HFXWLYH GLVFUHWLRQ ´ Id. at 499. Just as courts cannot enjoin Congress in exercising its legislative function, they cannot enjoin the President in exercising the executive function. Id. DW ³1HLWKHU FDQ EH UHVWUDLQHG LQ LWV DFWLRQ E\ the judicial GHSDUWPHQW> @´ 7R GR VR WKH &RXUW REVHUYHG ZRXOG EH ³ZLWKRXW D SUHFHGHQW ´ Id.2 The Supreme Court reaffirmed these fundamental principles in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992). In Franklin, a district court issued an injunction requiring the President to WDNH FHUWDLQ DFWLRQV UHODWHG WR WKH FHQVXV :ULWLQJ IRU D SOXUDOLW\ -XVWLFH 2¶&RQQRU H[SODLQHG WKDW ³WKH 'LVWULFW &RXUW¶V JUDQW RI LQMXQFWLYH UHOLHI DJDLQVW WKH 3UHVLGHQW KLPVHOI >ZDV@ H[WUDRUGLQDU\ and should have raised judicial eyebrRZV ´ Id. at 802 (plurality) (citation omitted). The plurality 2 7KH &RXUW KDV FRQVLVWHQWO\ DFNQRZOHGJHG ERWK WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V XQLTXH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO UROH DQG WKH VHSDUDWLRQ-ofpowers concerns that attend that position. E.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald 8 6 ³7KH 3UHVLGHQW¶V unique status under the Constitution GLVWLQJXLVKHV KLP IURP RWKHU H[HFXWLYH RIILFLDOV ´ Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) ³7KH JHQHUDO UXOH LV WKDW QHLWKHU GHSDUWPHQW PD\ LQYDGH WKH SURYLQFH RI WKH RWKHU DQG QHLWKHU PD\ FRQWURO GLUHFW RU UHVWUDLQ WKH DFWLRQ RI WKH RWKHU ´ Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 ³7KH H[HFXWLYH SRZHU LV YHVWHG LQ D 3UHVLGHQW DQG DV IDU DV KLV SRZHUV DUH GHULYHG IURP WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ KH is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching SRZHU ´ 8 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      111777      ooofff      333444 reiterated that ³LQ JHQHUDO µ>WKH@ FRXUW KDV QR MXULVGLFWLRQ RI D ELOO WR HQMRLQ WKH 3UHVLGHQW LQ WKH SHUIRUPDQFH RI KLV RIILFLDO GXWLHV ´ Id. at 802-03 (quoting Mississippi, 71 U.S. at 501). And -XVWLFH 6FDOLD DJUHHG WKDW WKH 3UHVLGHQW ³PD\ QRW EH RUGHUHG WR SHUIRUP SDUWLFXODU H[HFXWLYH acWV DW WKH EHKHVW RI WKH -XGLFLDU\ ´ D FRQFOXVLRQ ³LPSOLFLW LQ WKH VHSDUDWLRQ RI SRZHUV.´ Id. at 827 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). In line with Mississippi and Franklin, courts routinely reject demands to enjoin the 3UHVLGHQW¶V GLVFUHWLRQDU\ FRQGXFW 3 regardless of the claim. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 788 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted VXE QRP 7UXPS Y ,QW¶O 5HIXJHH $VVLVWDQFH 3URMHFW, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 976-81 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-cv-574, 2017 WL 1459081, at *29 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017), appeal docketed No. 17-16886 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2017); Settle v. Obama, No. 15-cv-365, 2015 WL 7283105, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 17, 2015); :LOOLV Y 8 6 'HS¶W RI +HDOWK +XPDQ 6HUYV , 38 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1277 (W.D. Okla. 2014); McMeans v. Obama, No. 11-cv-891, 2011 WL 6046634, at *3 (D. Del. Dec. 1, 2011); Shreeve v. Obama, No. 10-cv-71, 2010 WL 4628177, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010); Carlson v. Bush, No. 07-cv-1129, 2007 WL 3047138, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2007); Comm. to Establish the Gold Standard v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); 1DW¶O $VV¶Q RI ,QWHUQDO 5HYHQXH (PSV Y 1L[RQ, 349 F. Supp. 18, 21-22 (D.D.C. 1972); Reese v. Nixon, 347 F. Supp. 314, 316-17 (C.D. Cal. 1972); S.F. Redevelopment Agency v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672, 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Suskin v. Nixon, 304 F. Supp. 71, 72 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 3 The Franklin plurality, like the Mississippi &RXUW ³left open the question whether the President might be subject to a judicial injunction requiring the performance of a purely µministerial¶ duty ¶´ Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802 (quoting Mississippi, 71 U.S. at 498- $ PLQLVWHULDO GXW\ LV ³a simple, definite duty´ WKDW LV ³LPSRVHG E\ ODZ´ ZKHUH ³QRWKLQJ LV OHIW WR GLVFUHWLRQ ´ Mississippi, 71 U.S. at 498; see also Napolitano v. Flynn, 949 F.2d 617, 622-23 (2d Cir. 1991). 7KHUH FDQ EH QR TXHVWLRQ KHUH WKDW WKH ODZ LPSRVHV QR PLQLVWHULDO GXWLHV ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V XVH RI 7ZLWWHU 9 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      111888      ooofff      333444 To avoid infringing on the separation of powers, courts often ask whether presidential actions may be reviewed through claims brought against a subordinate official charged with implementing a presidential order. See, e.g., Swan, 100 F.3d at 979-81. +HUH KRZHYHU 3ODLQWLIIV¶ claims are directed squarely at discretionary choices²who to interact with on Twitter, including who to block²made only by the President himself. Stip. ¶¶ 9, 36, 46-52. Even if the Court had jurisdiction over another official, an order of relief against that official would be insufficient to grant redress, as any injunction ultimately must run to the President, who oversees the operation of the @realDonaldTrump account. Id. ¶ 9. Thus, Plaintiffs may obtain relief only through an injunction running to the President, and granting that relief would open the door to wide-ranging juGLFLDO PDQDJHPHQW RI WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V conduct as Chief Executive. Cf. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 82425, 828 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Mississippi, 71 U.S. at 500-01. A district court in similar circumstances²confronted with a claim seeking to enjoin President George W. BuVK¶V conduct on First Amendment grounds²FRQFOXGHG WKDW LW ZDV ³ZLWKRXW WKH DXWKRULW\ WR JUDQW VXFK UHOLHI ´ Newdow v. Bush, 391 F. Supp. 2d 95, 106-07 (D.D.C. 2005); see also Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1012-13 (D.C. Cir. 2010). This Court should reach the same conclusion and reject 3ODLQWLIIV¶ H[WUDRUGLQDU\ UHTXHVW 4 II. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish State Action. Even if this Court were to conclude that jurisdiction exists to enjoin the actions of the President, Plaintiffs¶ First Amendment claim fails EHFDXVH WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V GHFLVLon to block the Individual Plaintiffs from the @realDonaldTrump account was not state action. It is axiomatic 4 )RU WKH VDPH UHDVRQV WKH &RXUW VKRXOG UHMHFW 3ODLQWLIIV¶ UHTXHVW IRU GHFODUDWRU\ UHOLHI $V -XVWLFH 6FDOLD H[SODLQHG in Franklin ZKHWKHU WKH UHOLHI VRXJKW LV LQMXQFWLYH RU GHFODUDWRU\ LW LV ³LQFRPSDWLEOH´ ZLWK WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V ³FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SRVLWLRQ WKDW KH EH FRPSHOOHG SHUVRQDOO\ WR GHIHQG KLV DFWLRQV EHIRUH D FRXUW ´ 505 U.S. at 827 (Scalia, J., concurring). If declaratory relief against the President were DYDLODEOH LW VLPLODUO\ ³ZRXOG SURGXFH QHHGOHVV KHDGon confrontations between district judges and the Chief ExHFXWLYH ´ Id.; see also, e.g., Newdow, 603 F.3d at 1013; Swan, 100 F.3d at 976 n.1; Barnett v. Obama, No. 09-cv-82, 2009 WL 3861788, at *12-13 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009), DII¶G VXE QRP 'UDNH Y 2EDPD, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011); Newdow, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 105-07. 10 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      111999      ooofff      333444 that Plaintiffs can maintain a First Amendment claim only by establishing that the challenged conduct is state action. Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 491 (2d Cir. 2009); Flagg v. WKDW@ DUH SODLQO\ H[FOXGHG´ IURP VWDWH DFWLRQ Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) (plurality)). 7KH TXHVWLRQ IRU WKH &RXUW LV ZKHWKHU WKH 3UHVLGHQW ³H[HUFLVHG SRZHU µSRVVessed by virtue RI >IHGHUDO@ ODZ¶´ ZKHQ KH EORFNHG WKH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV VXFK WKDW WKH EORFNLQJ ZDV ³PDGH SRVVLEOH RQO\ EHFDXVH >WKH 3UHVLGHQW@ LV FORWKHG ZLWK WKH DXWKRULW\ RI >IHGHUDO@ ODZ ´ West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) ³>7@KH GHSULYDWLRQ PXVW EH FDXVHG E\ WKH exercise of some right or privilege created by the State . . . ´ 7KLV GHWHUPLQDWLRQ LV ³QHFHVVDULO\ fact-ERXQG ´ Lugar 8 6 DW DQG ³D PDWWHU RI QRUPDWLYH MXGJPHQW ´ DV ³QR RQH IDFW FDQ function as a necessary condition across the board for finding state action,´ Brentwood Acad. v. 7HQQ 6HFRQGDU\ 6FK $WKOHWLF $VV¶Q, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).5 This inquiry must be applied carefully in relation to the President, whose uniquely prominent constitutional position could be misread to suggest that state power permeates his every 5 As relevant here, the state-action requirement for actions against state officials is not meaningfully different than the state-action requirement for actions against federal officials. Lugar 8 6 DW ³>,@W LV FOHDU WKDW LQ D † 1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of DFWLRQ µXQGHU FRORU RI VWDWH ODZ¶ DQG WKH µVWDWH DFWLRQ¶ UHTXLUHPHQW RI WKH )RXUWHHQWK $PHQGPHQW DUH LGHQWLFDO ´ ; see also Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295 (2001) (applying state-action standards to a First Amendment claim); Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps., 768 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 2014) (same). 11 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      222000      ooofff      333444 action. There can be no question, though, that even prominent public officials engage in personal conduct, whether in public or private, that involves no exercise of state power. Cf. Zherka v. DiFiore, 412 F. $SS¶[ G &LU GLVWULFW DWWRUQH\¶V WHOHSKRQH FDOO WR QHZVSDSHU complaining about an article not state action); &RORPER Y 2¶&RQnell, 310 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam VFKRRO VXSHULQWHQGHQW¶V OHWWHU ZULWWHQ E\ D SULYDWH ODZ\HU WKUHDWHQLQJ WR ILOH libel suit not state action); Monsky v. Moraghan ) G G &LU ³>6@RPH DFWLRQV E\ D MXGJH DUH WDNHQ ZLWKRXW DQ\ UHODWLRQVKLS WR WKH MXGJH¶V RIILFH RU DXWKRULW\ DQG WKHUHIRUH DUH QRW WDNHQ XQGHU FRORU RI ODZ ´ see also, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 723 (2005) 6WHYHQV - GLVVHQWLQJ ³[W]hen public officials deliver public speeches, we recognize that their words are not exclusively a transmission from the government because those oratories have embedded within them the inherently personal views of the speaker[.]´ (emphasis in original)). The President, like other public officials, routinely engages in conduct that is not state action, whether that might be giving a toast at a wedding or giving a speech at a fundraiser. Here, the President does not operate his personal Twitter account by virtue of federal law, nor is blocking made possible because the President is clothed in Article II powers. His use of the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account is not a right conferred by the presidency. Twitter is a private platform, run by a private company, and it structures the interactions of its users on its own terms. Stip. ¶¶ 13-31. The President established the @realDonaldTrump account in 2009, has used the account before and after his inauguration, and will be free to use it after he leaves office.6 See id. ¶ 32. Throughout, his use of the account has been governed by Twitter¶V RZQ VWUXFWXUDO OLPLWDWLRQV; any features he may or may not use are created by Twitter and shared by every other user. See Carlos v. Santos, 123 F.3d 61, 65- G &LU ILQGLQJ QR VWDWH DFWLRQ ZKHUH ³>D@Q\ FLWL]HQ 6 Unlike @POTUS and @WhiteHouse, the @realDonaldTrump account is associated with the President, not the presidency. Stip. ¶ 45. These official accounts will, however, retweet the @realDonaldTrump account. Id. ¶ 37. 12 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      222111      ooofff      333444 PD\ SHUIRUP >WKH FKDOOHQJHG@ DFWV´ The blocking feature, for example, is one several tools Twitter provides to allow users to customize their interaction with other users and to curate the information that they consume. Stip. ¶¶ 19, 24- 25, 27- $QG WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V GHFLVLRQV DERXW who to interact with and what information to consume (what newspapers to pick up, what news programs to watch, what accounts to follow or block) are not state action. 7R EH VXUH WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V DFFRXQW LGHQWLILHV KLV RIILFH DQG KLV WZHHWV PDNH official statements about the policies of his administration. See Stip. ¶¶ 32, 35, 37. But the fact that the President may DQQRXQFH WKH ³DFWLRQV RI WKH VWDWH´ through his Twitter account does not mean that all actions related to that account are attributable to the state. Public officials may make statements about public policy²and even announce a new policy initiative²in a variety of settings, such as on the campaign trail or in a meeting with leaders of a political party. The fact that an official chooses to make such an announcement in an unofficial setting does not retroactively convert into state action the decision about which members of the public to allow into the event. Similarly, the 3UHVLGHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ WR EORFN 7ZLWWHU XVHUV RQ KLV SHUVRQDO DFFRXQW is not properly considered state action.7 III. 3ODLQWLIIV¶ First Amendment Claim Fails Because Blocking The Individual Plaintiffs Does Not Implicate, Much Less Violate, The Public Forum Doctrine. Plaintiffs cannot establish a violation of their First Amendment rights. Their principal claim is WKDW WKH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV KDYH EHHQ GHQLHG DFFHVV WR D ³SXEOLF IRUXP´ on the basis of viewpoint. They have not. Even assuPLQJ WKDW WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ WR EORFN WKH ,QGLYLGXDO 7 ,QGHHG XQGHU 3ODLQWLIIV¶ DSSURDFK HYHU\ WZHHW IURP WKH #UHDO'RQDOG7UXPS DFFRXQW LQFOXGLQJ WKRVH WKDW KDYH nothing to do with government policy, would constitute state action. See, e.g. 6WLS ([ $ DW ³&RQJUDWXODWLRQV WR Eric & Lara RQ WKH ELUWK RI WKHLU VRQ (ULF µ/XNH¶ 7UXPS WKLV PRUQLQJ KWWSV W FR $Z $9 ;G(´ ³$ JUHDW ERRN E\ D JUHDW JX\ KLJKO\ UHFRPPHQGHG KWWSV W FR ME''1 O\@ . UHSUHVHQW>HG@ JRYHUQPHQW VSHHFK´ In light of these facts, and their view that the PresideQW¶V XVH RI 7ZLWWHU TXDOLILHV DV VWDWH action, 3ODLQWLIIV FDQQRW VHULRXVO\ FRQWHQG WKDW WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V WLPHOLQH LV DQ\WKLQJ RWKHU WKDQ JRYHUQPHQW VSHHFK 7KH 3UHVLGHQW¶V XVH RI 7ZLWWHU LV KLV PHDQV RI FRQWULEXWLQJ WR WKH GLYHUVH VHW of conversations that take place on the Twitter platform, and his engagement in those conversations is self-HYLGHQWO\ WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V VSHHFK MXVW DV KLV SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ DQ\ RWKHU FRQYHUVDWLRQ ZRXOG be. Thus, Plaintiffs are left to argue that other elements associated with the account²elements created and maintained by Twitter, not the government²transform the @realDonaldTrump 15 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      222444      ooofff      333444 DFFRXQW LQWR VRPHWKLQJ RWKHU WKDQ D FKDQQHO IRU WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V VSHHFK 7KDW DUJXPHQW UHVWV entirely on the fact that Twitter permits followers of the @realDonaldTrump account to respond WR WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V WZHHWV DQG WR UHVSRQG WR RWKHU XVHUV¶ UHVSRQVHV See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 46. However, 7ZLWWHU¶V GHFLVLRQ WR FUHDWH D UHSO\ IXQFWLRQ for its users does not change the QDWXUH RI WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V VSHHFK Responses to @realDonaldTrump tweets are independently generated speech that is located in two places: on the page of the users who post them (under a KHDGLQJ ODEHOHG ³7ZHHWV UHSOLHV´ DQG LI D XVHU VHOHFWV D SDUWLFXODU WZHHW IURP WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V timeline, beneath that tweet. Stip. ¶ 22. In essence, Twitter has constructed a system where each reply tweet has two distinct characteristics: (1) the speech of the user who posts it, and (2) an element of a conversation with the author of the original tweet. When a user is blocked, in this FDVH E\ WKH 3UHVLGHQW RQO\ WKH VHFRQG FKDUDFWHULVWLF LV LPSOLFDWHG EORFNLQJ VLPSO\ ³SUHYHQW>V@ DQRWKHU XVHU IURP LQWHUDFWLQJ´ ZLWK WKH 3UHVLGHQW RQ 7ZLWWHU Id. ¶ 28. The blocked individual remains free to continue posting tweets that criticize the President, to link the @realDonaldTrump DFFRXQW WR VXFK FULWLFLVP E\ ³PHQWLRQLQJ´ WKH DFFRXQW see id. ¶ 25), and even to reply to FRPPHQWV E\ RWKHU XVHUV UHJDUGLQJ WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V WZHHWV 8 See id. ¶ 30. The President cannot alter, pre-screen, or prevent other users from seeing any of this content. See id. ¶ 26. 7KLV GLVWLQFWLRQ LV LPSRUWDQW EHFDXVH WKH ³FRQYHUVDWLRQDO´ DVSHFW RI WKH SODWIRUP WKDW 7ZLWWHU KDV FUHDWHG GRHV QRW WUDQVIRUP WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V XVH RI WKH #UHDlDonaldTrump account into 8 3ODLQWLIIV FRQWHQG WKDW WKH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV KDYH EHHQ GHQLHG WKH DELOLW\ WR SDUWLFLSDWH IXOO\ LQ WKH ³FRPPHQW WKUHDGV´ WKDW DUH ³DVVRFLDWHG with tweets from @realDonaldTrump ´ &RPSO ˆˆ 7KH\ KDYH QRW ,Q IDFW ³>D@OO but one of the Individual Plaintiffs have posted replies in comment threads that originated with @realDonaldTrump WZHHWV DIWHU WKHLU DFFRXQWV ZHUH EORFNHG ´ 6WLS ˆ 58; see also id. ¶ 57 (providing a relevant image). They were able to do that because, as outlined above, when a user replies to a tweet, that reply LV YLVLEOH IURP WKH UHSO\LQJ XVHU¶V Twitter webpage. See id. ¶ 22. The Individual Plaintiffs can view those replies, respond to them, and choose to engage other users in the same comment thread, even when the tweet that prompted the initial reply was from the @realDonaldTrump account. See id. ¶ 57. To be sure, because the Individual Plaintiffs have been blocked from the @realDonaldTrump account, they cannot go to his Twitter webpage, or see his initial tweet, when signed in to their accounts. Id. ¶¶ 29, 58. But their ability to participate in the comment threads remains unrestricted. 16 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      222555      ooofff      333444 a forum intended for free expression by the public. See Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 282 (1984) VHHNLQJ D ³JRYHUQPHQW DXGLHQFH IRU >SODLQWLIIV¶@ YLHZV´ GLG QRW LPSOLFDWH IRUXP DQDO\VLV EHFDXVH LW ZDV QRW DQDORJRXV WR D VLWXDWLRQ ZKHUH ³government property ha[d] been closed to them for use in communicating with private individuals´ 5DWKHU Whe 3UHVLGHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ WR EORFN FHUWDLQ XVHUV LV SDUW DQG SDUFHO RI his speech on the Twitter platform, as it allows him to select the information he consumes and the users with whom he wants to interact. For instance, by blocking the Individual Plaintiffs, the President LV QR ORQJHU ³QRWLILHG LI WKH EORFNHG >3ODLQWLIIV@ PHQWLRQ>@´ KLP QRU GRHV KH VHH DQ\ WZHHWV WKH\ SRVW Stip. ¶ 28. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to speak implicates the interest of ³XQZLOOLQJ listener[s]´ LQ ³avoiding unwanted communication ´ Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000); see also Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep¶t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) ³>1@R RQH KDV D ULJKW WR SUHVV HYHQ µJRRG¶ LGHDV RQ DQ XQZLOOLQJ UHFLSLHQW ´ /LNH SULYDWH FLWL]HQV WKH JRYHUQPHQW also has an interest in controlling the information it receives. Knight 8 6 DW ³1othing in the First Amendment RU LQ WKLV &RXUW¶s case law interpreting it suggests that the rights to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen oU UHVSRQG WR LQGLYLGXDOV¶ communications on public issues.´ That interest is especially pronounced in the case of public officials, who make choices every day about the information they consume and the individuals with whom they interact. By necessity, the freedom to make such choices must extend to circumstances where a public official disagrees with the views of a speaker. Otherwise, a congressperson would risk suit every time he cut short²or refused to begin in the first place²a conversation at a public event with a constituent he knew to be an unpleasant critic. Cf. Summum 8 6 DW ³>,@W LV QRW HDV\ WR LPDJLQH KRZ 17 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      222666      ooofff      333444 goYHUQPHQW FRXOG IXQFWLRQ LI LW ODFNHG WKLV IUHHGRP ´ 7KH 3UHVLGHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ WR EORFN WKH Individual Plaintiffs is properly viewed as the digital analog of this daily choice. B. The Public Forum Doctrine Is Inapplicable Here. Instead of treating the @real'RQDOG7UXPS DFFRXQW DV D FKDQQHO IRU WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V VSHHFK 3ODLQWLIIV XUJH WKH &RXUW WR YLHZ WKH DFFRXQW DV LI LW ZHUH D ³SXEOLF IRUXP ´ But the ³µIRUXP-EDVHG¶ DSSURDFK´ that courts employ to evaluate speech restrictions on government property is inapplicable here for at least two reasons. See Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 2010). )LUVW 3ODLQWLIIV FDQQRW HVWDEOLVK WKDW WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V 7ZLWWHU DFFRXQW LV SURSHUO\ FRQVLGHUHG government property from which private individuals can speak. Second, the forum-based approach should not be extended when, as here, the President has not taken steps to convert the @realDonaldTrump account into a forum for the speech of other Twitter users. The forum-EDVHG DSSURDFK RQ ZKLFK 3ODLQWLIIV UHO\ ³GLYLGHV JRYHUQPHQW SURSHUW\ into three [main] categories²the traditional public forum, the designated public forum, and the QRQSXEOLF IRUXP ´ Byrne, 623 F.3d at 53. A traditional public forum is a place thaW ³E\ ORQJ WUDGLWLRQ RU E\ JRYHUQPHQW ILDW KD>V@ EHHQ GHYRWHG WR DVVHPEO\ DQG GHEDWH ´ like public streets and parks. Perr\ (GXF $VV¶Q Y 3HUU\ /RFDO (GXFDWRUV¶ $VV¶Q, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). The JRYHUQPHQW PD\ LPSRVH ³>U@HDVRQDEOH WLPH SODFH DQG PDQQHU UHVWULFWLRQV´ RQ VSHHFK LQ D WUDGLWLRQDO SXEOLF IRUXP EXW ³DQ\ UHVWULFWLRQ EDVHG RQ WKH FRQWHQW RI WKH VSHHFK PXVW VDWLsfy strict VFUXWLQ\ ´ DQG ³UHVWULFWLRQV EDVHG RQ YLHZSRLQW DUH SURKLELWHG ´ Summum, 555 U.S. at 469. A GHVLJQDWHG SXEOLF IRUXP LV ³SURperty that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all RI WKH SXEOLF ´ ,QW¶O 6RF IRU .ULVKQD &RQVFLRXVQHss, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). Speech UHVWULFWLRQV LQ D GHVLJQDWHG SXEOLF IRUXP DUH ³VXEMHFW WR WKH VDPH OLPLWDWLRQV DV >WKRVH@ JRYHUQLQJ D WUDGLWLRQDO SXEOLF IRUXP ´ Id. )LQDOO\ ³SXEOLF SURSHUW\ QRW WUDGLWLRQDOO\ RSHQ WR SXEOLF 18 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      222777      ooofff      333444 H[SUHVVLRQ RU LQWHQWLRQDOO\ GHVLJQDWHG E\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW DV D SODFH IRU VXFK H[SUHVVLRQ´ JHQHUDOO\ is considered a nonpublic forum.9 Make the Rd. by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d &LU 7KH JRYHUQPHQW PD\ UHVWULFW VSHHFK LQ D QRQSXEOLF IRUXP ³VR ORng as the restriction is reasonable and viewpoint-QHXWUDO ´ Byrne, 623 F.3d at 53. But before even reaching this framework for evaluating restrictions on speech in these forums, the Court must make a threshold determination whether forum analysis applies. The 6XSUHPH &RXUW UHSHDWHGO\ KDV FDXWLRQHG WKDW ³WKH SXEOLF IRUXP GRFWULQH VKRXOG QRW EH H[WHQGHG LQ D PHFKDQLFDO ZD\´ WR FRQWH[WV WKDW DUH ³YHU\ GLIIHUHQW´ IURP WKH ³VWUHHWV DQG SDUNV´ ZKHUH WKH doctrine first arose. Ark. (GXF 7HOHYLVLRQ &RPP¶Q Y )RUEHV, 523 U.S. 666, 672±73 (1998); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996) (plurality) ³>:@H DUH ZDU\ RI WKH QRWLRQ that a partial analogy in one context, for which [courts] have developed doctrines, can compel a full range of decisions in . . . new and changing area[s].´ . This Court should decline to extend the forum-based approach to this new context for two reasons. )LUVW 3ODLQWLIIV FDQQRW HVWDEOLVK WKDW WKH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV VHHN ³access to governmentowned property for purposes of expression.´ Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 691±92 (2d Cir. 1991); see also : )DUPV $VVRFV Y 6WDWH 7UDIILF &RPP¶Q RI 6WDWH RI &RQQ , 951 ) G G &LU ³>3@XEOLF IRUXP DQDO\VLV DSSOLHV RQO\ ZKHUH D SULYDWH SDUW\ VHHNV access to public property, such as a park, a street corner, or school auditorium, in order to FRPPXQLFDWH LGHDV WR RWKHUV ´ . Such ³pURSHUW\´ FDQ EH D GHILQHG SK\VLFDO VSDFH OLNH D SXEOLF park, or a more ³PHWDSK\VLFDO´ VSDFH OLNH WKH SODWIRUP D XQLYHUVLW\ SURvides through a student activities fund. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). 9 As the Second Circuit has noted, courts sometimes invoke a fourth category of forum²WKH ³OLPLWHG SXEOLF IRUXP´² WKRXJK WKDW WHUP KDV EHHQ XVHG WR PHDQ ³ERWK D µVXEVHW RI WKH GHVLJQDWHG SXEOLF IRUXP¶ DQG D µQRQSXEOLF IRUXP¶ RSHQHG WR µFHUWDLQ NLQGV RI VSHDNHUV RU WR WKH GLVFXVVLRQ RI FHUWDLQ VXEMHFWV ¶´ Byrne, 623 F.3d at 55 n.8 (quoting +RWHO (PSV 5HVW (PSV 8QLRQ Y &LW\ RI 1 < 'HS¶W RI 3DUNV 5HFUHDWLRQ, 311 F.3d 534, 545 (2d Cir. 2002)). 19 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      222888      ooofff      333444 To ³GHILQe the nature of the property at issue,´ =DODVNL Y &LW\ RI %ULGJHSRUW 3ROLFH 'HS¶W, 613 F.3d 336, 341 (2d Cir. 2010), the Court must focus on ³WKH DFFHVV VRXJKW E\ WKH VSHDNHU ´ Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985). 3ODLQWLIIV VXJJHVW WKDW WKH ³SXEOLF IRUXP´ WR ZKLFK WKH\ seek access is the @realDonaldTrump account itself. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3. But, as explained supra in Section III.A, the President uses the account for his own speech on his own timeline, not as a place for the private expression of others. When other individuals speak about the President on Twitter, they do so through their own accounts and posts on their own timelines. Stip. ¶ 22. To the extent that their speech extends to other places on Twitter, it does so according to terms set by the company, not the government. See id. ¶¶ 22-23; cf. Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972) ³[P]roperty [does not] lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.´ 7R FRQFOXGH WKDW WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V RZQ DFFRXQW LV D SXEOLF IRUXP for private speech merely because other users may post tweets replying to him would transform any public appearance by a government official into a public forum on government property, and WKHUHE\ VXEMHFW WKH RIILFLDO¶V FKRLFHV WR D SURKLELWLRQ RQ YLHZSRLQW-based distinctions. If that were the case, then a congressman would be prohibited from pre-screening questions at a symposium hosted by a non-profit. Similarly, a senator could not choose to be introduced by a member of the college Democrats, rather than a member of the college Republicans, at a campus-wide event at a private university. This Court should seek to avoid such incongruous results. 6HFRQG HYHQ LI WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V 7ZLWWHU DFFRXQW LV FRQVLGHUHG ³SURSHUW\´ IRU WKHVH SXUSRVHV WKH &RXUW VKRXOG GHFOLQH 3ODLQWLIIV¶ LQYLWDWLon to graft public-forum doctrine onto a social media account ill-suited to traditional forum principles. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673 (analyzing whether forum analysis is ³compatible with the intended purpose of the property´ (quoting Perry Ed. 20 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      222999      ooofff      333444 Ass¶n., 460 U.S. at 49). In Forbes, the Court explained that subjecting public broadcasters to forum DQDO\VLV ³ZRXOG EH DQWLWKHWLFDO DV D JHQHUDO UXOH WR WKH GLVFUHWLRQ WKDW VWDWLRQV DQG WKHLU HGLWRULDO VWDII PXVW H[HUFLVH ´ Id.; see also 1DW¶O Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998). And in United States v. American Library Association, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003), a PDMRULW\ RI WKH &RXUW IRXQG WKDW IRUXP DQDO\VLV ZDV ³LQFRPSDWLEOH ZLWK WKH GLVFUHWLRQ WKDW SXEOLF libraries must have to fulfill their traditional missions.´ Id. at 205 (plurality); see also id. at 215 %UH\HU - FRQFXUULQJ LQ WKH MXGJPHQW DJUHHLQJ ZLWK SOXUDOLW\¶V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WKDW ³WKH µSXEOLF IRUXP¶ GRFWULQH >ZDV@ LQDSSOLFDEOH´ 7KLV IRFXV RQ D SURSHUW\¶V LQWHQGHG SXUSRVH LV QHFHVVDU\ EHFDXVH ³>WKH@ JRYHUQPHQW µGRHV not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally RSHQLQJ D QRQWUDGLWLRQDO IRUXP IRU SXEOLF GLVFRXUVH ¶´ Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802) (emphasis added). Even for nonpublic forums, the government must take some steps WR ³UHVHUYH HOLJLELOLW\ IRU DFFHVV WR WKH IRUXP WR D SDUWLFXODU FODVV RI VSHDNHUV.´ Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679-80. For instance, in American Library Association, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a statute that required public libraries to install software that blocks obscene images and child pornography in order to receive federal funds. 539 U.S. at 199 (plurality). A plurality of the Court GHFOLQHG WR DSSO\ IRUXP DQDO\VLV EHFDXVH ³>D@ SXEOLF OLEUDU\ GRHV QRW DFTXLUH Internet terminals in order to create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves, any more than it collects books in order to provide a public forum for the authors RI ERRNV WR VSHDN ´ Id. DW ,QVWHDG D OLEUDU\ SURYLGHV LQWHUQHW DFFHVV WR IXUWKHU LWV PLVVLRQ ³QRW WR µHQFRurage a GLYHUVLW\ RI YLHZV IURP SULYDWH VSHDNHUV ¶´ Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834). In this case, there is no indication that the government has taken steps to make the @realDonaldTrump account a forum for private speakers. The President established the account 21 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      333000      ooofff      333444 as a private citizen in 2009²more than seven years before he was elected. See Stip. ¶ 32. He posted messages on Twitter frequently prior to his election, and his use of the @realDonaldTrump account as a means of communicating his views has been well documented. See, e.g., Amber Phillips, 7KH VXUSULVLQJ JHQLXV RI 'RQDOG 7UXPS¶V 7witter account, The Washington Post, Dec. 10, 2015, http://wapo.st/1lS7jIY. Even if the content of the tweets on the @realDonaldTrump account may have shifted over time, there is nothing in the record to suggest that, since the inauguration, the President has opened up his account or otherwise taken affirmative steps to provide a forum for private speech. Absent evidence of such intent, the Court should not treat the @realDonaldTrump account as a forum. *** At bottom, it is a mistake to analyze the PreVLGHQW¶V decision at issue in this case²to use the Twitter account he created as a private citizen to block individuals on a private social media platform²³LQ WHUPV RI D GRFWULQH URRWHG LQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V KLVWRULF UHJXODWLRQ RI VSHHFK E\ private citizens, on real, public property ´ Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 334 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674 (warning against giving the public forum doctrine ³VZHHSLQJ DSSOLFDWLRQ´ EHFDXVH ³FRXUWV µZRXOG EH UHTXLUHG WR RYHUVHH IDU PRre of the day-to-day RSHUDWLRQV RI EURDGFDVWHUV¶ FRQGXFW¶´ TXRWLQJ &ROXPELD %URDG 6\V ,QF Y 'HPRFUDWLF 1DW¶O Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973))). ,QVWHDG RI DSSO\LQJ WKH ³highly strained analogy´ RI WKH SXEOLF forum, Sutliffe, 584 F.3d at 334, the better course is to treat the @realDonaldTrump account for what it most plainly is: the speech of the President participating in a privately run forum, not the government managing the participation of others in a public one. 22 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      333111      ooofff      333444 IV. 3ODLQWLIIV¶ 5HPDLQLQJ )LUVt Amendment Claims Are Meritless. A. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A First Amendment Right To Follow The @realDonaldTrump Account On Twitter. Plaintiffs claim that they have a First Amendment right to follow the @realDonaldTrump account as a channel for petitioning the government and as a means of accessing official statements. Compl. ¶¶ 80-81. Neither claim has merit. First, blocking the Individual Plaintiffs IURP IROORZLQJ WKH #UHDO'RQDOG7UXPS DFFRXQW RQ 7ZLWWHU GRHV QRW DEULGJH ³the right of the people . . . WR SHWLWLRQ WKH *RYHUQPHQW IRU D UHGUHVV RI JULHYDQFHV ´ U.S. Const., amend. I. ³[T]he rights of speech and petition share substantial common ground.´ Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 (2011). As such, courts have often held that a Petition Clause claim FDQQRW H[FHHG WKH VFRSH RI D FODLP JURXQGHG LQ WKH )LUVW $PHQGPHQW¶V 6SHHFK &ODXVH See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) ³>7@here is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions.´ 1R ³VSHFLDO FRQFHUQV ´ Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 389, warrant a distinct Petition Clause DQDO\VLV LQ WKLV FDVH 7KH 3HWLWLRQ &ODXVH PRVW FOHDUO\ ³protects the right of individuals to appeal WR FRXUWV DQG RWKHU IRUXPV HVWDEOLVKHG E\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW IRU UHVROXWLRQ RI OHJDO GLVSXWHV ´ Id. at 387; see also W. Farms Assocs., 951 F.2d at 474 ³7KH First Amendment right to petition does include a right of access to the courts ´ 3ODLQO\ QR VXFK IRrums are at issue here. In any event, the Petition Clause, like the other clauses of the First Amendment, does not create an entitlement to use Twitter to communicate with the government.10 That is because ³the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond or . . . to recognize 10 Even if the First Amendment provided such a right, the Individual Plaintiffs retain myriad ways to petition the government, including through Twitter. See, e.g., Stip. ¶ H[SODLQLQJ WKDW ³>W@KH 3UHVLGHQW DQG WKH :KLWH +RXVH DOVR RSHUDWH WZR RWKHU 7ZLWWHU DFFRXQWV #32786 DQG #:KLWH+RXVH´). 23 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      333222      ooofff      333444 [an] association DQG EDUJDLQ ZLWK LW ´ Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emp., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979); see also Knight, 465 U.S. at 285 (explaining that the right to petition does not ³require government policymakers to lLVWHQ RU UHVSRQG WR LQGLYLGXDOV¶ communications on public issues ´ 3ODLQWLIIV therefore have no free-standing Petition Clause claim. Second, and for similar reasons, the First Amendment does not create a right to follow the @realDonaldTrump account as a means of accessing official information. See Smith, 441 U.S. at 465. In a previous filing, Plaintiffs suggested that such a right exists because information from the @realDonaldTrump account is a government-FRQIHUUHG ³EHQHILW ´ See Letter Mot. for Conf., Aug. 8, 2017, at 3 (quoting Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017)), ECF No. 13 %XW 3ODLQWLIIV¶ only support for that claim, Matal, was about federal trademark registration, and the Court H[SUHVVO\ FRQILQHG LWV DQDO\VLV WR LQVWDQFHV ZKHUH WKH ³EHQHILW´ DW LVVXH LQYROYHG WKH JRYHUQPHQW providing a particular service, like fire protection. 137 S. Ct. at 1761. Even if such a right did exist, it would not be at issue here because the Individual Plaintiffs have the same ability to see tweets from the @realDonaldTrump account as the average member of the general public. All WKDW LV UHTXLUHG WR VHH WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V WZHHWV LV WR YLVLW WKH #UHDO'RQDOG7UXPS SDJH YLD DQ LQWHUQHW browser that is not signed in to Twitter. Stip. ¶ 36; see also id. ¶ 55. No First Amendment violation can exist under these circumstances. B. The Knight ,QVWLWXWH¶V 5LJKW To Hear Claim Fails On The Same Terms as The ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV¶ &ODLPV The Knight Institute cannot establish that WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ WR EORFN WKH ,QGLYLGXDO Plaintiffs violates any purported right to hear their speech. The First Amendment protects ³WKH ULJKW WR UHFHLYH LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG LGHDV ´ Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), as an ³LQKHUHQW FRUROODU\ RI WKH ULJKW[] of free speech,´ Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982). 7KLV ULJKW LV ³UHFLSURFDO ´ Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 24 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      333333      ooofff      333444 Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976), because WKH ³ULJKW WR UHFHLYH LGHDV IROORZV LQHOXFWDEO\ IURP WKH VHQGHU¶V )LUVW $PHQGPHQW ULJKW WR VHQG WKHP,´ Pico, 457 U.S. at 867. 7KXV ³WKH ULJKWV RI WKH UHFLSLHQWV RI VSHHFK . . . derive in the first instance from the primary rights RI WKH VSHDNHU ´ DQG WKH UHFLSLHQW ³PD\ FODLP QR JUHDWHU )LUVW $PHQGPHQW SURWHFWLRQ´ WKDQ WKH speaker. 6SDUJR Y 1 < 6WDWH &RPP¶Q RQ -XGLFLDO &RQGXFW, 351 F.3d 65, 83 (2d Cir. 2003); see also, e.g., Price v. Saugerties Cent. Sch. Dist., ) $SS¶[ , 716 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 603, 607-08 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the alleged violation of the .QLJKW ,QVWLWXWH¶V ULJKW WR KHDU LV GHULYHG IURP WKH YLRODWLRQ RI WKH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV¶ DOOHJHG right to speak ³WKH OHJDO DQDO\VLV RI WKH SODLQWLIIV¶ FODLPV DUH XQDYRLGDEO\ LQWHUWZLQHG DQG LQVHSDUDEOH ´ Spargo, 351 F.3d at 84. TKH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV¶ )LUVW $PHQGPHQW ULJKWV KDYH not been violated; accordingly, the Knight Institute has no claim. Further, even if the Individual Plaintiffs could establish a violation, the Knight Institute still would not have a FODLP 1RWKLQJ LQ 3ODLQWLIIV¶ FRPSODLQW RU WKH UHFRUG HYHQ VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH Knight Institute has viewed @realDonaldTrump comment threads, much less the Individual 3ODLQWLIIV¶ UHSOLHV QRU GRHV WKH .QLJKW ,QVWLWXWH KDYH Dny evident practice or plan to view those comment threads. There can be no violation of the right to hear if the Knight Institute is not listening. The Knight Institute raises the righWV RI WKH ,QGLYLGXDO 3ODLQWLIIV EXW LW ³cannot rest [its] claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties ´ Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). CONCLUSION For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their motion and enter judgment for Defendants on all claims. 25 !aaassseee      111:::111777-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000555222000555-­-­-NNNRRRBBB                  DDDooocccuuummmeeennnttt      333555                  FFFiiillleeeddd      111000///111333///111777                  PPPaaagggeee      333444      ooofff      333444 Dated: October 13, 2017 Respectfully submitted, CHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General JOON H. KIM Acting United States Attorney BRETT A. SHUMATE Deputy Assistant Attorney General ERIC R. WOMACK Assistant Branch Director /s/ Michael H. Baer MICHAEL H. BAER DANIEL HALAINEN Trial Attorneys U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 Telephone: (202) 305-8573 Facsimile: (202) 616-8460 E-mail: Michael.H.Baer@usdoj.gov Counsel for Defendants 26