Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17
Page 1 of 129
r

usnc ~DNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DOC#:

----------------------------------------------------------)(

DATE FILED:

_........,.~~----#--

THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY and
CHARLIE SAVAGE,

DECISION & ORDER

Plaintiffs,
- against -

16 Civ. 6120 (RMB)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Defendant.

----------------------------------------------------------)(
I.

Background
This Decision & Order resolves the summary judgment motion, dated March 27, 2017, of

the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ''), and the summary judgment motion, dated
April 24, 2017, of The New York Times Company ("N.Y. Times") and Charlie Savage, a New
York Times Reporter ("Savage," and collectively, "Plaintiffs"). The cross-motions concern
Plaintiffs' request under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, for the
written threat assessments of Guantanamo Bay detainees ("threat assessments"). The threat
assessments were prepared by a task force appointed in 2009 ("Task Force") "to review each
remaining [Guantanamo Bay] prisoner" (Complaint, filed Aug. 2, 2016, ii 10). 1

1

DOJ has submitted a memorandum, filed March 27, 2017, in support of its motion ("DOJ Br."),
and a reply memorandum, filed May 1, 2017, in further support of DOJ' s motion and in
opposition to Plaintiffs' motion ("DOJ Reply").
DOJ has also submitted a total of eight written Declarations from the following individuals:
Courtney J. O'Keefe, Attorney-Advisor in the Office oflnformation Policy, United States
Department of Justice, dated March 27, 2017 ("O'Keefe Deel."); David M. Hardy, Section
Chief, Record/Information Dissemination Section, Records Management Division, Federal
Bureau oflnvestigation, dated March 27, 2017 ("Hardy Deel."); Michael G. Seidel, Assistant
Section Chief, Record/Information Dissemination Section, Records Management Division,
Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, dated May 1, 2017 ("Seidel Deel."); Mark W. Ewing, Chief
Management Officer, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, dated March 24, 2017
1

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 2 of 129

On January 27, 2009, then-President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13492
("Executive Order") which directed "the executive branch [to] undertake a prompt and thorough
review of the factual and legal bases for the continued detention of all individuals currently held
at Guantanamo, and of whether their continued detention is in the national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States and in the interests of justice." Exec. Order 13492, 74 Fed.
Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 27, 2009). The Executive Order called for a "comprehensive interagency
review" and appointed as Review Participants the U.S. Attorney General, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ("Review Participants"). Id.
"To implement the Order, the Attorney General established the Guantanamo Review
Task Force and a senior-level Review Panel. The Task Force was responsible for assembling and
examining relevant information pertaining to the Guantanamo detainees and making

("Ewing Deel."); Eric F. Stein, Director of the Office oflnformation Programs and Services,
United States Department of State, dated March 27, 2017 ("Stein Deel."); Department of
Defense, with the declarant's name and biographic information redacted pursuant to 10 U.S.C.
§ 424(a)(2), dated March 27, 2017 ("DOD Declaration"); and Robert C. Moscati, Deputy Chief
Prosecutor, Office of the Chief Prosecutor, Office of Military Commissions, dated March 27,
2017 ("Moscati Deel."). DOJ has also submitted ex parte and in camera a (second) Declaration
from Hardy, dated March 27, 2017, and an unredacted version of the DOD Declaration.
DOJ has also submitted a Vaughn Index, attached hereto as Attachment A. "A Vaughn index
typically lists the titles and descriptions of the responsive documents that the Government
contends are exempt from disclosure .... The titles and descriptions of documents listed ...
usually facilitate the task of asserting and adjudicating the requester's challenges to the
Government's claims of exemption." N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 758 F.3d 436,
438-39 (2d Cir. 2014).
Plaintiffs has submitted a memorandum, filed April 24, 2017, in opposition to DOJ's motion and
in support of Plaintiffs motion ("Opp."); and a reply memorandum, filed May 8, 2017, in
opposition to DOJ's motion and in support of Plaintiffs motion ("Pis.' Reply"). Plaintiffs have
also submitted the Declaration of David E. McCraw, Vice President and Deputy General
Counsel, The New York Times Company, dated April 24, 2017 ("McCraw Deel.").
2

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 3 of 129

recommendations on their proper dispositions. The Review Panel, consisting of officials with
delegated authority from their respective agencies to decide the disposition of each detainee,
reviewed the Task Force's recommendations and made disposition decisions on a rolling basis.
Where the Review Panel did not reach consensus, or where higher-level review was appropriate,
the Review Participants enumerated in the Executive Order determined the proper disposition of
the detainee." (O'Keefe Deel., dated Mar. 27, 2017, if 12.)
As part of its work, "the Task Force prepared recommendation memoranda assessing a
variety of factors for evaluation by the Review Panel." (Id.

if 14.) The recommendation

memoranda created by the Task Force contained "evaluation[s] of the threat to the national
security of the United States posed by an individual detainee. These threat assessments were
based upon specific pieces of evidence that Task Force members selected from the larger pool of
information that had been compiled for each detainee. This evidence frequently consisted of
intelligence reporting or law enforcement information related to a particular detainee. The
[threat] assessments included candid evaluations of the reliability and credibility of each
particular piece of evidence .... " (Id. if 15.)

"[NJ either the Review Panel nor the Review Participants ever adopted the findings
or the recommendations of the Task Force as the final disposition determination; indeed, in
some instances, the final disposition determination for a particular detainee differed from
the recommendation contained in the Task Force's memorandum." (Id. if 16 (emphasis
added).) "The final disposition determinations of the interagency review were memorialized in
the Guantanamo Review Dispositions chart [("GRD")], which is dated January 22, 2010." (Id.

if 17; id., Ex. G.) The GRD was publicly released in redacted form by the Office of the Director
ofNational Intelligence ("ODNI") on March 31, 2016 and is attached hereto as Attachment B.

3

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 4 of 129

(Isl) The GRD indicates whether the 240 Guantanamo detainees were to be "released,
transferred, prosecuted, or detained." (Id.) The GRD did not make specific reference to the threat
assessments. (See O'Keefe Deel., Ex. G.)
On June 13, 2016, Savage, on behalf of The New York Times, submitted to DOJ and to
ODNI, Freedom of Information Act requests to obtain and review the threat assessments.
(O'Keefe Deel., Ex. A.) Savage's FOIA requests sought to obtain "the threat assessments of
Guantanamo detainees produced by the six-agency executive order task force appointed in 2009
to review each remaining prisoner." (Id.) The FOIA deadlines passed with no response from DOJ
or ODNI (Opp. at 9.) On August 2, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint requesting that
this Court order DOJ and ODNI to produce the threat assessments.2
On October 25, 2016, the Court directed DOJ to "complete [its] 'classification review"'
of the threat assessments by February 27, 2017. 3 And, on February 27, 2017, DOJ wrote to
Plaintiffs' counsel advising that DOJ had determined "that all of th[e] material should be
withheld in full pursuant [to] Exemption 5 of the FOIA," and that portions of the material should
be withheld pursuant to Exemptions 1, 7(B), 7(D), and 7(E) of the FOIA. (O'Keefe Deel., Ex. C
at 1.)4
As noted at footnote 1 supra, DOJ has submitted eight Declarations in support of its
invocation of the Exemptions, as follows:

2

On February 27, 2017, the Court "so-ordered" the parties' stipulation dismissing ODNI as a
defendant, leaving DOJ as the sole defendant.

3

According to DOJ, a "classification review" occurs when the relevant agency or agencies
"[r]eview[] and process[] ... records to determine ... the extent to which FOIA Exemption [l]
applies to them." (Letter to Judge Richard M. Berman from AUSA Christopher Connolly, dated
Oct. 18, 2017, at 1.)

4

For a description of these Exemptions, see Attachment C hereto.

4

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 5 of 129

•

The 0 'Keefe Declaration states that "the threat assessments are protected in full by
the deliberative process privilege encompassed by Exemption 5 of the FOIA."
(O'Keefe Deel. if 28.) "DOJ has determined that the threat assessments are protected
by the deliberative process privilege because they consist of the Task Force's internal
recommendations to the Review Panel of senior-level officials who comprised the
ultimate decision-makers for the Task Force's disposition determinations regarding
each detainee. The Task Force prepared the threat assessments to succinctly
summarize significant issues and present key background information regarding the
potential national security threat of individual detainees in a concise format for ease
of presentation and review for the Review Panel." (Id. if 26.) O'Keefe also states, "I
am not aware of any ... public statement by the Review Panel, nor the Review
Participants, adopting the conclusions or rationale of any of the threat assessments."
(Id. if 28.) Assuming, arguendo, that the Court were to reject DOJ's invocation of
Exemption 5, O'Keefe also states that "pmtions of the threat assessments ... are ...
protected under Exemption l." (Id. if 30.) In particular, Exemption 1 applies to
"[c]ertain threat assessments [that] contain ... information that is currently and
properly classified." (Id.)

•

The Hardy Declaration was submitted "to provide the Court and [P]laintiffs with the
FBI's justification for withholding its equities within the records pursuant to FOIA
Exemptions 1, ... 7(B), ... (7)(D), and (7)(E)." (Hardy Deel. if 4.) As to Exemption
1, Hardy states that "[t]he unauthorized disclosure of information concerning foreign
relations or foreign activities of the United States can reasonably be expected to ...
identify the target, scope, or time frame of intelligence activities of the United States
in or about a foreign country, which may result in the curtailment or cessation of
these activities; enable hostile entities to assess United States intelligence gathering
activities in or about a foreign country and devise countermeasures against these
activities; or compromise cooperative foreign sources, which may jeopardize their
safety and curtail the flow of information from these sources." (Id. if 27.) As to
Exemption 7(B), Hardy states that "[p]remature release of the recommendations
provided in the threat assessments through the FOIA, could unfairly impact ongoing
or prospective proceedings and jeopardize the detainee's ability to receive a fair and
impartial adjudication." M if 38.) As to Exemption 7(D), Hardy states that the threat
assessments contain "information regarding individual sources who are ...
informants under an express grant of confidentiality." (Id. if 54.) As to Exemption
7(E), Hardy states that "database search results" are protected from disclosure
because "[d]isclosure of the printouts or information compiled from these search
results, or even the selection of a certain database over another for a particular type of
information and its relative usefulness, could enable criminals to employ
countermeasures to avoid detection, thus jeopardizing the FBI's investigative
mission." (Id. if 64.) 5

•

The Stein Declaration explains why Exemption 1 applies to portions of one of the
threat assessments. (Stein Deel. if 8.) Stein states that the portions in question

5

The Court has also reviewed carefully in camera Hardy's second Declaration which was
submitted ex parte in further support of the FBI's invocation of Exemptions 1 and 7(E).

5

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 6 of 129

"require[] classification at the SECRET level because [their] unauthorized disclosure
reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security." (Id.
if 14.) In particular, these "[p]ortions ... are being withheld pursuant to Exemption 1
because they contain information relating to foreign govermnent information." (Id.
if 17 .) "[P]rotecting foreign govermnent info1mation, and in some cases even the fact
that information has been provided, is important to our relationship and conduct of
foreign relations." (Id.)
•

The DOD Declaration asserts that Exemption 1 applies to portions of the threat
assessments because these portions contain DOD information that is properly
classified. (DOD Deel. if 5.) DOD "withheld certain inf01mation in the threat
assessments under Exemption 1 because it consists of information that is related to
foreign relations or the foreign activities of the United States, and may include
confidential sources." (Id. if 20.) "The United States govermnent goes to great lengths
to maintain effective foreign relations and even greater lengths to protect and
maintain its sources' confidentiality because it is an integral part of successful foreign
relations policy." (Id. if 21.) "If [DOD] were to disclose this information [in the
portions protected by Exemption l], it would have a chilling effect on current U.S.
foreign relations, and any future relations, inasmuch as potential associations might
be precluded for fear of exposure, especially with confidential sources." (Id.)

•

The Seidel Declaration was submitted "to further explain and, where necessary,
clarify the FBI's application ofFOIA Exemptions 7(B), 7(D), and 7(E), to portions of
certain records responsive to plaintiffs' FOIA request." (Seidel Deel. if 3.) As to
Exemption 7(B), Seidel states that "it is more probable than not that disclosure of the
information withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(B) would seriously interfere with the
impartiality of those ongoing proceedings." (Id. if 6.) As to Exemption 7(D), Seidel
states that "the protection of these types of confidential source inf01mation is
necessary both to protect the sources themselves from potential reprisal, and to ensure
that the FBI may continue to access vital information through the continued use of
confidential sources." (Id. if 7.) Seidel also states that "[t]he FBI maintains 'source
files' for informants who are granted express confidentiality. Each source file
memorializes the FBI's confidentiality agreement with the source .... "(Id. if 9.) As
to Exemption 7(E), Seidel states that "specific details concerning the databases
queried in connection with ... FBI counterterrorism activities discussed in the
responsive records, the number of databases searched, the combinations of databases
searched for certain individuals, the information retrieved from those searches, and
the ways in which the FBI utilizes th[ e] information it obtains from such searches
would all reveal unknown law enforcement techniques." (Isl if 15.)

•

The Ewing Declaration explains why Exemption 1 applies to portions of the threat
assessments. (Ewing Deel. if 11.) "[P]ublic[ly] revealing whether responsive records
concerning a particular detainee contain or do not contain information ...
implicat[ing] the foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, could
itself be reasonably expected to cause serious damage to the national security." (Isl
if 21.) "The public disclosure that particular intelligence information relating to a
particular detainee was gathered (or not gathered) by certain members of the
6

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 7 of 129

Intelligence Community through certain means ... would indicate to the public and
to foreign intelligence agencies how the Intelligence Community is allocating its
resources and would provide targets of intelligence collection and foreign intelligence
agencies with information on how best to anay their counterintelligence resources."
(Id.~ 21.) "[T]his information remains currently and properly classified .... "(Id.
~ 22.)
•

The Moscati Declaration advises that the threat assessments "were compiled, in part,
for a law enforcement purpose and readily meet the threshold requirement of
Exemption 7." (Moscati Deel.~ 5.) "Law enforcement proceedings for several
detainees are ongoing." (Id.~ 6.) "[S)ome detainees, regardless of whether they might
be prosecuted in either an Article III court or a military commission, potentially have
value as witnesses in other cases. Release of the information contained in the threat
assessments, which may include candid assessments of potential evidentiary
weaknesses or other concerns with the viability or feasibility of the potential
prosecution of a particular detainee, could either impair the prosecution's case against
certain detainees, or might adversely affect the fairness of ongoing or future criminal
proceedings. Accordingly, certain information in some of the threat assessments has
been withheld ... to prevent this type of harm." (Id.)

On August 1, 2017, the Court directed DOJ to produce the threat assessments for ex parte
in camera review. (Order, filed Aug. 1, 2017, at 1.) On August 9, 2017, DOJ submitted 209
threat assessments for Court review. (See Letter to Judge Richard M. Berman from AUSA
Christopher Connolly, dated Aug. 9, 2017, at 1.) On August 14, 2017, DOJ submitted 8
additional threat assessments for Court review. And, on September 6, 2017, DOJ submitted the
remaining (22) threat assessments. (See Letter to Judge Richard M. Berman from AUSA
Christopher Connolly, dated Sept. 6, 2017, at 1.)

The Court has carefully reviewed all 239 threat assessments in camera in the course
of preparing this Decision & Order. 6
On March 27, 2017, DOJ filed its motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other
things, that: (1) all of the threat assessments "fall squarely within the deliberative process

6

One additional detainee (i.e. the 2401h detainee) appears to have been approved for transfer
prior to the issuance of Executive Order 13492 and was, in fact, transfened to the United
Kingdom. (See GRD at 3.) There was no threat assessment for this individual presented to the
Court.
7

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 8 of 129

privilege" codified in Exemption 5 in that "they are predecisional, deliberative documents that
reflect the opinions and recommendations of the Task Force, and were created in order to assist
the Review Panel and Review Participants in making final disposition decisions" (DOJ Br. at 8);
(2) portions of the threat assessments should be withheld also because they contain "matters that
... are specifically authorized ... to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy" as codified in Exemption 1 (ill, at 14, 17-18); (3) portions of the threat assessments
should be withheld also under Exemption 7(B) because "disclosure ... would deprive a person
of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication." (Id. at 23.) "[D]etainees for whom law
enforcement proceedings are ongoing" would have knowledge of types of information that may
not already be available through the court proceedings (Seidel Deel. if 5); (4) portions of the
threat assessments should be withheld also under Exemption 7(D) because they contain
information which "could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential
source, including a ... foreign agency or authority ... which furnished information on a
confidential basis" (DOJ Br. at 24); and (5) portions of the threat assessments should be withheld
also under Exemption 7 (E) because they contain "techniques and procedures for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions" (DOJ Br. at 25).
Plaintiffs counter that: (1) with respect to Exemption 5, "even if a document is
predecisional and deliberative, the deliberative-process privilege gives way where the agency has
'expressly adopted' the document's conclusions and reasoning or incorporated them by
reference" (Opp. at 12); (2) with respect to Exemption 1, some "infonnation within the scope of
foreign relations and foreign activities information" can no longer be classified because
government press releases announcing particular detainee transfers "have ... described some of
the communications between the two countries in order to facilitate the transfer" (id. at 21 );

8

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 9 of 129

(3) with respect to Exemption 7(B), DOJ's submissions do not show that it is "more probable

than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of ...
proceedings" (id. at 22); (4) with respect to Exemption 7(D), DOJ "fails to make the appropriate
showing for the names and identifying data for informants that [the FBI] claims to have offered
... express ... assurances of confidentiality" (Opp. at 23-24); and (5) with respect to Exemption
7(E), DOJ's submissions "fall[] far short of showing how disclosure of the responsive records in
this case plausibly would reveal something new about [a law enforcement] technique" (id. at 2425).
Helpful oral argument on the parties' cross-motions was held on September 18, 2017.
(See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017.)
For the reasons stated below, DOJ's motion for summary judgment [#23) is granted.
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment [#32) is denied. 7
II.

Legal Standard

The Supreme Court has recognized that "the statutory exemptions [to FOIA disclosure]
are intended to have meaningful reach and application." John Doe Agency v. John Doe Coro.,
493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989). "[T]he burden [is] on the agency to justify the withholding of any
requested documents." Associated Press v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 554 F.3d 274, 283 (2d Cir. 2009).

7

Where the "[p]laintiffs have opted not to challenge [the] defendants' claimed assertions of
[other] Exemptions" to FOIA disclosure, the plaintiffs have waived any argument that the
exemptions were improperly asserted, and the Court grants surmnary judgment to DOJ as to
those Exemptions. Nat'! Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. l.C.E., 811 F. Supp. 2d 713, 738
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). Specifically, Plaintiffs do not oppose the Government's invocations of
Exemptions 3, 6, 7(A), and 7(C) (see Opp. at 20 n.7, 25 n.10), and the Court hereby grants
summary judgment to DOJ as to those Exemptions. See id.; N.Y. Legal Assistance Grp., Inc. v.
United States Dep't of Educ., 2017 WL 2973976, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017) ("Surmnary
judgment is granted to [the agency] without further discussion on the portions of documents that
[the plaintiff! does not challenge.").

9

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 10 of 129

The applicability of a FOIA Exemption must be "prove[n] by a preponderance of the evidence."
Nadler v. F.D.I.C., 899 F. Supp. 158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 92 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1996).
"Affidavits or declarations ... giving reasonably detailed explanations why any withheld
documents fall within an exemption are sufficient to sustain the agency's burden. The affidavits
submitted by an agency are accorded a presumption of good faith." Wilner v. Nat'l Sec. Agency,
592 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).
The deliberative process privilege (Exemption 5) "covers documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated." Tigue v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 312 F.3d
70, 81 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[I]ts object is to enhance the quality of
agency decisions, by protecting open and frank discussion among those who make them within
the Government." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
"[P]roduction of ostensibly predecisional material may be compelled where an agency
chooses expressly to adopt or incorporate by reference an intra-agency memorandum previously
covered by Exemption 5 .... "Id. at 80-81 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Mere reliance on
a document's conclusions does not necessarily involve reliance on a document's analysis; both
will ordinarily be needed before a court may properly find adoption or incorporation by
reference." Wood v. F.B.I., 432 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). Where "[t]here is no evidence in the
record from which it could be inferred that [the agency] adopted the reasoning of the
[predecisional document], ... this failure is fatal." Id. "[M]inor references to [a privileged
document] cannot be said to be an express adoption or incorporation." Tigue, 312 F.3d at 81.

10

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 11 of 129

Where a letter or statement "was not written [or spoken] by a decisionmaker ... [it] could
not have served as a basis for express adoption or incorporation by reference." Brennan Ctr. for
Justice at N.Y. Univ. School of Law v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 697 F.3d 184, 206 (2d Cir. 2012).
FOIA requires disclosure of "purely factual material appearing in [privileged] documents
in a form that is severable without compromising the private remainder of the documents." EPA
v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 (1973). But, "[i]fthe factual materials are inextricably inte1twined with
policy making recommendations so that their disclosure would compromise the confidentiality of
deliberative information that is entitled to protection under Exemption 5, the factual materials
themselves fall within the exemption." Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Admin., 610 F.2d 70, 85 (2d Cir. 1979) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Exemption 1 ofFOIA "is specifically designed to allow government agencies to withhold
information that might jeopardize our national security." Milner v. Dep't of Navy, 562 U.S. 562,
580 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Information is properly classified ... if
unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in ... harm to
the national defense or foreign relations of the United States." Intellectual Prop. Watch v. United
States Trade Representative, 205 F. Supp. 3d 334, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To establish "official disclosure" of classified information, the "plaintiff bears
the burden of showing specific information in the public domain that duplicates [or matches] the
information withheld." Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep't ofNayy, 891F.2d414,
421 (2d Cir. 1989).
To withstand a challenge to the applicability of Exemption (7)(B), "the government bears
the burden of showing: (1) that a trial or adjudication is pending or truly imminent; and (2) that it
is more probable than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere with

11

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 12 of 129

the fairness of those proceedings." Wash. Post Co. v. Dep't of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 102 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
"FOIA Exemption 7(D) protects information compiled for law enforcement purposes
where disclosure could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source."
Adamowicz v. I.RS., 402 F. App'x 648, 653 (2d Cir. 2010).
"Exemption 7(E) provides categorical protection for [law enforcement] techniques and
procedures without need for demonstration of harm .... "Allard K. Lowenstein Int'! Human
Rights Project v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 626 F.3d 678, 681 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

III.

Analysis 8
Exemption 5
DOJ argues persuasively (and shows by a preponderance of the evidence) that all of the

threat assessments "fall squarely within the deliberative process privilege." (DOJ Br. at 8.) That
is, the threat assessments are clearly "predecisional, deliberative documents that reflect the
opinions and recommendations of the Task Force, and were created in order to assist the Review
Panel and Review Participants in making final disposition decisions." (Id.) Plaintiffs cannot,
according to DOJ, demonstrate "express adoption" or "incorporation by reference" through the
various government public statements they cite because "the vast majority of the statements
[P]laintiffs cite were not made by decision-makers, but rather by advisors." And, even ifthe
statement(s) were made by decision-makers, a "statement by a decision-maker that explicitly

8

The Court addresses Exemption 5 first because the parties' briefs address Exemption 5 first
(see DOJ Br.. at 8; Opp. at 11), and also because DOJ has invoked Exemption 5 with regard to all
of the threat assessments (in their entirety) (see O'Keefe Deel., Ex.Cat 1). DOJ has invoked
other Exemptions to defend against disclosure of portions of some of the threat assessments. (See
id.)
12

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 13 of 129

approve[ s] the recommendation of a subordinate, without any reference to the reasoning of that
recommendation, d[oes] not qualify as express adoption." (DOJ Reply at 3-4.) DOJ also argues
that any factual material the threat assessments may contain is "inextricably intertwined with
deliberative material such that it cannot reasonably be segregated." (Id. at 15.)
Plaintiffs counter (unpersuasively) that government officials' "references to the reasoning
and conclusions of the [t]hreat [a]ssessments [we]re no vaguer or more perfunctory than those
the Second Circuit has found sufficient to demonstrate express adoption." (Pis.' Reply at 5
(citing Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 204.) The deliberative-process privilege gives way where "the
agency has 'expressly adopted' the document's conclusions and reasoning" (Opp. at 12) in
public statements issued by officials who were "tasked with articulating and defending the
[Obama] Administration's detainee policy" (Pis.' Reply at 3). Plaintiffs cite to letters, press
releases, and Congressional testimony of government officials, who, they aver, "were exactly the
officials tasked with articulating and defending the Administration's detainee policy." (Id. at 3,
5-8.) 9 Plaintiffs also argue that "DOJ has not demonstrated that the [t]hreat [a]ssessments consist
entirely of 'deliberative' material and must segregate and release the factual portions." (Opp. at
12.)
Predecisional and Deliberative
The Court finds that the threat assessments are "predecisional and deliberative." See
Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 194. "An inter- or intra-agency document may be withheld pursuant to
the deliberative process privilege ... if it is: (1) predecisional, i.e., prepared in order to assist an

9

The parties disagree regarding who is a decisionmaker. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at
2-13.) Plaintiffs argue that a speaker is a decisionmaker if the speaker "ha[s] the hallmarks of
being authorized ... to make the statement that he or she makes." (Id. at 11:15-24.) DOJ argues
that a decisionmaker is "either [a] review participant[] or [a] review panel member[.]" (Id. at
5:23-24.)
13

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 14 of 129

agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision, and (2) deliberative, i.e., actually related to the
process by which policies are formulated." Id. (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted).
The applicability of the deliberative process privilege has been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Nadler, 899 F. Supp. at 160.
The threat assessments were created for the express purpose of advising and assisting the
Review Panel "in carrying out their responsibilities under the [Executive] Order, and were
drafted antecedent to any final decisions being made." (O'Keefe Deel.

if 23; see also Brennan

Ctr., 697 F.3d at 202 (where document "was generated before the adoption of an agency policy"
and "the preparer was not the final decisionmaker"); Tigue, 312 F.3d at 80 (document was
predecisional where it "was specifically prepared for use ... in advising the [agency] on its
future policy"); Grand Cent. P'ship. Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1999) (document
"was predecisional in that it was prepared in order to assist an agency decision maker in arriving
at his or her decision").)
The threat assessments are "deliberative" because they are related to the formulation of
policy, i.e. they "includ[e] express advice and recommendations regarding the proper disposition
determination for each detainee." (O'Keefe Deel.

if 25.) They also include "the Task Force's

determination of which evidence related to a particular detainee was germane to that detainee's
potential threat to the United States, and the Task Force's qualitative assessment of the
credibility and reliability of those selected pieces of evidence." (Id.)
The Court's careful in camera review of all of the threat assessments confirmed the
description in O'Keefe's Declaration, namely that each threat assessment "includ[es] express
advice and recommendations." (Id.) "[T]he Task Force's determination of which evidence
related to a particular detainee was ge1mane to that detainee's potential threat to the United

14

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 15 of 129

States, and the Task Force's qualitative assessment of the credibility and reliability of those
selected pieces of evidence." (Id.; see also Grand Cent., 166 F.3d at 483 ("Through its in camera
review of Document 4, the district court .... concluded that Document 4 was deliberative in that
it actually related to [the agency's] policy formulation processes."); Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at
202 (memorandum was deliberative where "[agency] officials asked the OLC [the Office of
Legal Counsel] for advice on the ... propriety of [a proposed agency course of action]"); Robert
v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 217 F. App'x 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2007) (document was
deliberative where it contained "recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental policies [we]re formulated").)

Express Adoption and Incorporation by Reference 10
Plaintiffs' principal argument is that "senior government officials have relied repeatedly
and publicly on the strength of the reasoning and conclusions of the [t]hreat [a]ssessments to
defend the Obama Administration's detainee policy." (Opp. at 13.) Therefore, "the government
expressly adopted the [t]hreat [a]ssessments." (Id. at 14.) DOJ counters that "the vast majority of

Although DOJ and Plaintiffs each focus their arguments on "adoption" (as opposed to
"incorporation by reference") (see DOJ Reply at 2-3; Opp. at 13-14), the parties agreed at oral
argument that there is no "meaningful difference" between those terms in the context of
Exemption 5 (see H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 28:20-29:5 ("THE COURT: [I]s there any
meaningful difference between 'adoption' and 'incorporation by reference'? The cases seems to
use them sort of interchangeably .... [PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL]: I agree they mean the same
thing. THE COURT: You as well[?] [DOJ'S COUNSEL]: Yes .... ")). Second Circuit case law
often analyzes the two phrases as if they were interchangeable. See, e.g., Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d
at 204 ("We conclude that these references taken together establish express adoption or
incorporation by reference."); Robert v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 217 F. App'x 50, 52
(2d Cir. 2007) ("There is ... no evidence in the record that [the agencyJ expressly adopted or
incorporated by reference either of the two undisclosed documents."); Nat'! Council of La Raza
v. Dep't of Justice, 411F.3d350, 358 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Mere reliance on a document's
conclusions does not necessarily involve reliance on a document's analysis; both will
ordinarily be needed before a court may properly find adoption or incorporation by
reference." (emphasis added)).
IO

15

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 16 of 129

the statements [P]laintiffs cite were not made by decision-makers, but rather by advisors," and
that a statement (even by a decision-maker) "that explicitly approve[ s] the recommendation of a
subordinate, without any reference to the reasoning of that recommendation, d[oes] not qualify
as express adoption." (DOJ Reply at 3-4.)
The Court finds that the following nine statements cited by Plaintiffs (taken together or
taken individually) do not adopt or incorporate by reference one or more of the threat
assessments, see Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 206; Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Dep't of Justice,
411 F.3d 350, 359 (2d Cir. 2005); Tigue v. U.S. Dep 't of Justice, 312 F .3d 70, 81 (2d Cir.
2002).11 Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof. See supra at pp. 13-14.
1.

The February 1, 2010 letter from John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of
Representatives. (McCraw Deel., dated Apr. 24, 2017, Ex. 9.) This Letter was written on
White House letterhead @), and stated in relevant part,
Every decision to transfer a detainee to a foreign country during this
Administration has been made unanimously by all agencies [i.e. the Review
Panel or Review Participants] involved with the review process after a full
assessment of intelligence and threat information. This includes the
Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, as well as the Departments of State,
Justice, and Homeland Security. . . . During [a] briefing on January 13,
[2010,] [United States] Representative [Frank] Wolf [(of Virginia's 101h
congressional district)] made allegations that one detainee repatriated to
Yemen had been involved in weapons of mass destruction. As it has done
in every case, the task force thoroughly reviewed all information available
to the government about this individual and concluded that there is no basis
for the assertions Representative Wolf made ....

11

The Court assumes, arguendo, but without deciding, that the nine statements were issued by
"decisionmakers" who had the authority to adopt or incorporate by reference the threat
assessments. As discussed at footnote 9 supra and at pp. 32-33 infra, the parties in this case
disagree about which speakers were decisionmakers and which speakers had the requisite
authority to adopt or incorporate by reference the threat assessments.
16

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 17 of 129

(IQ, at 2.) Representative Wolfs concern appears to have been whether the detainee in
question "had been involved in weapons of mass destruction" presumably because "the
DOD believed [the detainee] to be closely connected to al Qaeda's anthrax program."
(McCraw Deel., dated Apr. 24, 2017, Ex. 8 at E1332.)
DOJ argues that Brennan's letter did not adopt the detainee's threat assessment
because "Brennan did not identify any of the other facts or analysis that might well have
been discussed in the Task Force's threat assessment, nor did he [Brennan] explain the
final decision-makers' rationale for transferring the detainee to Yemen." (DOJ Reply at
10.)12
Plaintiffs say that Brennan's "whole letter" (see H'rg. Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at
22: 18) adopted the threat assessment because it was made "in direct response to criticism
of the Obama Administration's detainee policy in order to justify and defend it," and
Brennan's "references to the reasoning and conclusion[] of the [t]hreat [a]ssessment[]
[was] no vaguer or more perfunctory than those the Second Circuit has found sufficient to
demonstrate express adoption." (Pis.' Reply at 4-5 (citing Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at
204).) Plaintiffs were unable at oral argument to point to any specific portion of the
Brennan Letter which adopted the threat assessments or incorporated them by reference.
(See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 18-20.)

12 DOJ contends that Brennan was not a decisionmaker in this matter because he was not a
member of the Review Panel nor was he a Review Participant. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18,
2017, at 4:22-24 ("THE COURT: [Y]ou're saying John Brennan is not a decision maker?
[DOJ'S COUNSEL]: He was not a decision maker for purposes of the interagency review.").)
Plaintiffs counter that Brennan's "statements serve as evidence of the government's position on
the matter." (Id. at 9:4-5.) As noted, the Court assumes, without deciding, that Brennan was a
decisionmaker for purposes of discussing his letter.
17

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 18 of 129

The Comt finds that Brennan's letter did no more than confirm and describe the
processes laid out in Executive Order 13492. See 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898-99. The Executive
Order stated that "the executive branch [would] conduct a prompt and thorough review of
the circmnstances of the individuals currently detained at Guantanamo," and "determine
... whether it [wa]s possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States." Id. Moreover,
Brennan's letter makes no mention of the Task Force reasoning or analysis. See Wood,
432 F.3d at 84. The Letter's reference to "the task force" or to "threat information"
cannot be said to be an express adoption or incorporation of the threat assessments. See
Tigue, 312 F.3d at 81. And, Brennan's description of the process makes clear that the
Review Panel-not the Task Force-made the decision to transfer detainees. (See
McCraw Deel., dated Apr. 24, 2017, Ex. 9 at 2.) Brennan confirms that the decision to
transfer was consistent with the Task Force work-which does not amount to adoption.
See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 206 ("Nor does the fact that the agencies acted in
conformity with the [privileged documents] establish that the agencies adopted their
reasoning.").
The Court, following its in camera review, confirms that the threat assessment in
question contains no reference to antlu·ax, an anthrax program, or to weapons of mass
destruction.

2.

The June 11, 2009, DOJ press release ("June 11, 2009, Press Release")

announcing the resettlement of four Uighur Guantanamo detainees to Bermuda. (Mccraw
Deel., Ex. 10.) This press release stated in relevant part,
The detainees were . . . cleared for release this year after review by the
interagency Guantanamo Review Task Force. As directed by the President's
18

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 19 of 129

Januaiy 22, 2009, Executive Order, the interagency Guantanaino Review
Task Force conducted a comprehensive review of the four, including a
threat evaluation, and approved them for resettlement.
(Id.)
DOJ argues that the June 11, 2009, Press Release "simply provide[s] a thumbnail
sketch of the process by which the transfer decisions were made." (DOJ Reply at 10-11.)
DOJ also argues that the press release "do[ es] not establish that the final decision-makers
adopted the analysis and conclusions contained in each detainee's threat assessment." (Id.
at 11.)
Plaintiffs respond that the June 11, 2009, Press Release states that "the Justice
Department relied on the [t]hreat [a]ssessments as justification" for the decision to release
the detainees. (Opp. at 6.)
The Court finds that the June 11, 2009, Press Release did no more than confirm
and describe the process laid out in Executive Order 13492 which stated that "the
executive branch [would] conduct a prompt and thorough review of the circumstances of
the individuals currently detained at Guantanamo," and "determine ... whether it [wa]s
possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States." 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898-99, The press release
makes no mention of the Task Force reasoning or analysis, refe1Ting only to its
"comprehensive review of the four [detainees], including a threat evaluation." See Wood,
432 F.3d at 84. "Mere reliance on a document's conclusions does not necessarily involve
reliance on a document's analysis; both will ordinarily be needed before a court may
properly find adoption or incorporation by reference." Id. The press release's passing
reference to "threat evaluation" does not adopt or incorporate by reference the threat

19

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 20 of 129

assessments because "minor references to [a privileged document] cannot be said to be an
express adoption or incorporation." Tigue, 312 F.3d at 81.
3.

The December 20, 2009, DOJ press release ("December 20, 2009, Press Release")

announcing the transfer of 12 detainees. This press release advised that 4 detainees were
transferred to Afghanistan; 2 detainees were transferred to Somaliland; and 6 detainees
were transferred to Yemen. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 11.) It also stated in relevant part,
As directed by the President's Jan. 22, 2009 Executive Order, the
interagency Guantanamo Review Task Force conducted a comprehensive
review of each of these cases. As a result of that review, which examined a
number of factors, including potential threat, mitigation measures and the
likelihood of success in habeas litigation, the detainees were approved [by
the Review Panel] for transfer.

DOJ argues that the December 20, 2009, Press Release "simply provide[s] a
thumbnail sketch of the process by which the transfer decisions were made." (DOJ Reply
at 10-11.) DOJ also argues that the press release "do[es] not establish that the final
decision-makers adopted the analysis and conclusions contained in each detainee's threat
assessment." (Id. at 11.)
Plaintiffs respond that in the December 20, 2009, Press Release "the Justice
Departruent relied on the [t]hreat [a]ssessments as justification" for the decision to
transfer the detainees. (Opp. at 6.)
The Court finds that the December 20, 2009, Press Release confirmed and
described the process outlined in Executive Order 13492, i.e. that "the executive branch
[would] conduct a prompt and thorough review of the circumstances of the individuals
currently detained at Guantanamo," and "determine ... whether it [wa]s possible to
transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national security and foreign policy
20

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 21 of 129

interests of the United States." 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898-99. This press release does not
describe or mention the reasoning and analysis upon which the Review Panel relied. See
Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. While the press release indicates that the decision to transfer is
consistent with the Task Force work, this does not amount to adoption. See Brennan Ctr.,
697 F .3d at 206 ("Nor does the fact that the agencies acted in conformity with the
[privileged documents] establish that the agencies adopted their reasoning."). Although
the press release refers to the Task Force's "comprehensive review" of each detainee's
"potential threat," such a "minor reference[] ... cannot be said to be an express adoption
or incorporation." See Tigue, 312 F.3d at 81.
4.

The January 21, 2010, DOJ press release ("January 21, 2010, Press Release")

announcing the transfer to Algeria of2 detainees. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 12.) This press
release stated in relevant part,
As directed by the President's Jan. 22, 2009 Executive Order, the
interagency Guantanamo Review Task Force conducted a comprehensive
review of these cases. As a result of that review, which examined a number
of factors, including the potential threat posed by each individual and the
receiving country's demonstrated capabilities to mitigate potential threats
posed by the individuals in their home country, each detainee was approved
[by the Review Panel] for transfer. The transfers were approved by
unanimous consent among all the agencies involved in the review -including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Departments of Defense, State, Justice and
Homeland Security [i.e. the Review Panel].

DOJ argues that the January 21, 2010, Press Release "simply provide[s] a
thumbnail sketch of the process by which the transfer decisions were made." (DOJ Reply
at 10-11.) DOJ also argues that the press release "do[es] not establish that the final
decision-makers adopted the analysis and conclusions contained in each detainee's threat
assessment." (!_ch at 11.)
21

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 22 of 129

Plaintiffs respond that in the January 21, 2010, Press Release "the Justice
Department relied on the [t]hreat [a]ssessments as justification" for the decision to
transfer the detainees. (Opp. at 6.)
The Court finds that the January 21, 2010, Press Release confirmed and described
the process of review as set fmih in Executive Order 13492, namely that "the executive
branch [would] conduct a prompt and thorough review of the circumstances of the
individuals currently detained at Guantanamo," and "determine ... whether it [wa]s
possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States." 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898-99. The press release
does not describe or mention any analysis or reasoning in the threat assessments upon
which the Review Panel relied. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. And, the press release's
description of the process makes clear that the Review Panel-not the Task Force-made
the decisions to transfer detainees. (See McCraw Deel., Ex. 12.) The press release
indicates that the decision to transfer is consistent with the Task Force work but this does
not amount to adoption. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 206 ("Nor does the fact that the
agencies acted in conformity with the [privileged documents] establish that the agencies
adopted their reasoning."). And, although the press release refers to the Task Force's
"comprehensive review" of each detainee's "potential threat," "minor references to
[privileged documents] cannot be said to be an express adoption or incorporation." See
Tigue, 312 F.3d at 81.
5.

The testimony of Lee Wolosky, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure at the

State Department, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 23, 2016 and

22

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 23 of 129

July 7, 2016. (McCraw Deel., Exs. 1, 2.) On March 23, 2016, Wolosky testified as
follows:
In 2009-2010, more than 60 career professionals, including intelligence
analysts, law enforcement agents, and attorneys, drawn from the
Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of State,
Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and other agencies within the U.S. government assembled all
reasonably available information from across the government relevant to
determining the proper disposition of each detainee. The review task force
examined this information critically, giving careful consideration to the
threat posed by the detainee, the reliability of the underlying information,
and the interests of national security. Then, based on the review task force's
recommendations, the Departments of Defense, State, Justice and
Homeland Security; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously determined the appropriate
disposition for each detainee: transfer, referral for prosecution, or continued
law-of-war detention.
(McCraw Deel., Ex. 1 at 2-3.) 13

13

On July 7, 2016, Wolosky gave the following (nearly identical) testimony:
In 2009-2010, the Guantanamo Review Task Force ... , which was
composed of more than 60 national security professionals, including
intelligence analysts, law enforcement officials, and attorneys, drawn from
the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of State,
Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and other agencies within the U.S. government, assembled all
reasonably available information from across the government relevant to
determining an appropriate disposition of each detainee. The review task
force examined this information critically, giving careful consideration to
the threat posed by the detainee, the reliability of the underlying
information, and the interests of national security. Then, based on the
review task force's recommendations, the Departments of Defense, State,
Justice and Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously determined the
appropriate disposition for each detainee: transfer, referral for prosecution,
or continued law-of-war detention.

(McCraw Deel., Ex. 2 at 1-2.)
23

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 24 of 129

DOJ argues that Wolosky's testimony describes "precisely how the review
process worked: the Task Force made recommendations, which the Review Panel or
Review Participants considered when making their final disposition determinations.
Wolosky' s statements do not demonstrate that the final decision-makers adopted the
analyses or the conclusions in the Task Force's threat assessments-indeed, Wolosky
never even mentioned the threat assessments" but mentioned only the Task Force's
"recommendations." (DOJ Reply at 5.)
Plaintiffs argue that Wolosky was "defend[ing] [President] Obama's detainee
transfer policy by emphasizing the strong reasoning behind the [t]hreat [a]ssessments'
conclusions." (Opp. at 15.)
The Court finds that Wolosky' s testimony confirmed and described the process
set forth in Executive Order 13492. See 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898-99. Wolosky clearly stated
that the Review Panel (not the Task Force) determined the appropriate disposition for
each detainee. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 1 at 2-3.) While his testimony did refer to the Task
Force's "recommendations," i.e. its conclusions, Wolosky made no mention of the
reasoning or analysis of the Task Force. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. "Mere reliance on a
document's conclusions does not necessarily involve reliance on a document's analysis;
both will ordinarily be needed before a court may properly find adoption or incorporation
by reference." Id. Although Wolosky said that the Task Force "examined" and
"consider[ed] ... the threat posed by the detainee" and made "recommendations," he
does not specifically refer to the "threat assessments"-in fact, he did not refer to any
particular document. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 90 F. Supp.
3d 201, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (where "there [we]re no statements ... specifically

24

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 25 of 129

referencing particular [privileged] documents," the plaintiff had adduced no "evidence
that [the] agency ha[ d] actually adopted or incorporated by reference the [privileged]
document at issue"). Even ifthe term "recommendations" were meant to refer to the
threat assessments, "minor references to [a privileged document] cannot be said to be an
express adoption or incorporation." Tigue, 312 F.3d at 81.
6.

The prepared statement of Paul Lewis, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Detention

Closure at the Department of Defense, before the House Committee on Armed Services
on Feb 12, 2015. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 3.) Lewis stated:
The determinations made by the 2009 Guantanamo Review Task Force
process ... , an exhaustive interagency effort that fully examined the impact
of transferring individuals from Guantanamo Bay, should be used as the
foundational analysis when determining a detainee's current threat. This ...
process took account of the [Bush Administration's] assessments in the
course of a more comprehensive review of U.S. intelligence and other
information with respect to each detainee. The [Task Force] determinations,
in conjunction with regularly updated information from the intelligence
community, provide the most accurate assessment of a specific detainee's
current threat level. We believe that any decisions regarding transfers
should be based on all current information and individual assessments of
detainees.
(McCraw Deel., Ex. 3 at 28-29.)
DOJ argues that "Lewis did not state or suggest that the threat assessments were
the 'foundational analysis' of the decisions of the Review Panel and the Review
Participants, or any other disposition decision or agency policy. Instead, he was
recommending that the threat assessments (in addition to the [Bush Administration's]
assessments) be utilized prospectively to help inform future transfer decisions." (DOJ
Reply at 8 (emphasis added).)

25

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 26 of 129

Plaintiffs counter that Lewis "pointed to the [t]hreat [a]ssessments-not the
Review Panel's disposition-as the 'foundational analysis,' in Lewis's words, for all
subsequent transfer decisions." (Opp. at 16.)
The Court finds that the Lewis statement described the Executive processes
during the Obama and Bush Administrations regarding the then-current threat level(s) of
detainees and suggested that any information developed should be regularly updated.
(See McCraw Deel., Ex. 3 at 29.) Executive Order 13492 stated that "the executive
branch [would] conduct a prompt and thorough review of the circumstances of the
individuals currently detained at Guantanamo," and "determine ... whether it [wa]s
possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States." 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898-99. Lewis's statement
does not indicate that any particular review panel action or decision was--or would bebased (solely) upon the threat assessments. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 205 n.17. Lewis
did not say that a Review Panel or Review Participants had relied on any particular
reasoning or analysis in the threat assessments. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. He suggested
that the Task Force work was the "foundational analysis" and would be used
prospectively "in conjunction with regularly updated information from the intelligence

community[] [to] provide the most accurate assessment of a specific detainee 's current
threat level." (See McCraw Deel., Ex. 3 at 28-29; see also id. at 29 ("We believe that any
decisions regarding transfers should be based on all current information and individual
assessments of detainees.").)
7.

The testimony of Brian McKean, Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Policy at

Department of Defense, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 5,

26

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 27 of 129

2015. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 4.) McKeon's testimony described the work of the Periodic
Review Board ("PRB"), created in March of2011 by Executive Order 13567, to "review
the status of those [Guantanamo] detainees not currently eligible for transfer." (Id. at 4.)
His testimony included the following:
Key features of the [PRB] process that leads to a decision to transfer
include: a comprehensive interagency review and rigorous examination of
information regarding the detainee; the security situation in the potential
host country; and the willingness and capability of the potential country to
implement and maintain appropriate compliance with security measures.
Those initial reviews were conducted by career professionals from across
the government [i.e. the Task Force] ....
[E]ach decision [of the PRB] to transfer has been subject to unanimous
agreement of six principals: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney
General, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and, finally, the Secretary of
Defense ....
If somebody has already been cleared by the 2009 task force, and we find a
place to which we can transfer them, and a package is brought to the
Secretary [of Defense] to make the determination, we have an updated
assessment on the individual. We're not relying solely on the 2009 task
force work.

(Id. at 7-8, 41-42.)
DOJ argues that "McKean merely characterized the Task Force recommendation
memoranda (not just the threat assessments) as one of several '[k]ey features of the
process' leading to [detainee] decisions, and he also identified non-threat factors-such
as 'the security situation in the potential host country' -on which those decisions were
based. Thus, McKean never directly mentioned the threat assessments, much less
asserted that the final decision-makers agreed with their reasoning and conclusions."
(DOJ Reply at 5 (citation omitted).) McKean described the Task Force work as "initial
reviews" (McCraw Deel., Ex. 4 at 42), and stated: "We're not relying solely on the 2009
task force work" to determine "whether [the United States] should continue to hold
27

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 28 of 129

[detaineesJ under Law of War detention or they can be approved for transfer." (McCraw
Deel., Ex. 4 at 42.)
Plaintiffs counter that McKeon's testimony adopted or incorporated by reference
the threat assessments because he "called the [t]hreat [a]ssessments a '[k]ey feature'
justifying the Administration's detainee transfer process." (Opp. at 16.) Plaintiffs appear
to refer to McKeon's statement that "[k]ey features of the [PRB] process that leads to a
decision to transfer include[] a comprehensive interagency review and rigorous
examination of information regarding the detainee." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 4 at 7 .)
The Court finds that McKeon 's testimony describes the Periodic Review Board
process after a detainee has been "cleared by the 2009 task force." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 4
at 41.) McKeon specifically states, "We're not relying solely on the 2009 task force
work." (Id. at 42.) Instead, McKeon said, the Secretary of Defense obtains "an updated
assessment on the individual," and then "each decision to transfer has been subject to
unanimous agreement of six principals." (Id. at 8, 41.) This testimony does not describe
or mention the reasoning and analysis of any threat assessments upon which the Review
Panel or Review Participants relied. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. While McKeon does refer
to the "task force work," such a "minor reference[] ... cannot be said to be an express
adoption or incorporation." Tigue, 312 F.3d at 81.

8.

The joint statement, dated April 24, 2011, of Geoff Morrell, Pentagon Press

Secretary, and Ambassador Dan Fried, Special Envoy for Closure of the Guantanamo
Detention Facility. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 5.) Morrell and Fried appear to have issued the
statement in response to Wikileaks' announced intent to publicize on April 25, 2011
so-called Detainee Assessment Briefs ("DABs") which had been "written by the

28

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 29 of 129

Department of Defense between 2002 and early 2009," and which "contain[ed] classified
information about current and former GTMO detainees." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 5 at!.) The
joint statement included the following:
The Guantanamo Review Task Force, established in January 2009,
considered the DABs during its review of detainee information. In some
cases, the Task Force came to the same conclusions as the DABs. In other
instances the Review Task Force came to different conclusions, based on
updated or other available information. The assessments of the Guantanamo
Review Task Force have not been compromised to Wikileaks. Thus, any
given DAB illegally obtained and released by Wikileaks may or may not
represent the current view of a given detainee.

@J
DOJ argues that this statement "merely explained that the Task Force's threat
assessments[] ... agreed with the [DABs] at times and disagreed with them at others."
(DOJ Reply at 8.) "Contrary to [P]laintiffs' claim, the joint statement did not emphasize
the strength of the reasoning and conclusions of the [t]hreat [a]ssessments to defend the
Obama Administration's detainee transfer policy."

M

(brackets and internal quotation

marks omitted).)
Plaintiffs argue that the joint statement "highlight[s] the careful reasoning and
comprehensive review behind the [t]hreat [a]ssessments." (Opp. at 15.) Plaintiffs also
argue that the ''.joint statement [was] issued ... to defend the Obama Administration's
detainee transfer policy in the wake of the unauthorized disclosure ... of the [DABs]."
(Id. at5.)
The purpose of the joint statement was, by its terms, to advise that the work of the
Task Force had not been compromised by Wikileaks' intended disclosure of the DABs. It
does little more than (very) briefly refer to the work of the Task Force and the 2002-09
DABs. See 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898-99. The joint statement does not reveal the analysis or
29

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 30 of 129

reasoning of any threat assessment. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84; Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at
206. Indeed, Morrell and Fried made no mention of the Task Force's reasoning or
analysis. "[R]eliance on a document's analysis ... will ordinarily be needed before a
court may properly find adoption or incorporation by reference." See Wood, 432 F.3d at
84. The joint statement's mention of the Task Force's "assessments" a "minor reference"
to a privileged document and "cannot be said to be an express adoption or incorporation."
Tigue, 312 F.3d at 81.
9.

The prepared statement and testimony of U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder

before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciaiy on April 14, 2010. (McCraw Deel.,
Exs. 6, 7.) Attorney General Holder's prepared statement included the following:
The Guantanamo Review Task Force rigorously reviewed pertinent
information regarding 240 Guantanamo detainees, determining their
suitability for prosecution or for transfer to another country - or, if neither
of those options is available, continued detention under the Authorization
for the Use of Military Force, consistent with the rule oflaw. Each of these
decisions was reached by the unanimous agreement of the agencies
responsible for the review - the Departments of Justice, Defense, State,
Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(Mccraw Deel., Ex. 6 at 5.) Attorney General Holder testified as follows:
[T]here certainly needs to be a process by which an initial determination is
made, and that has already occurred with regard to the task force and in the
principals' committee that voted on making the decision to detain ... these
48 people .... [W]e've now gotten to the point where we have made the
determination. That very able task force made its recommendations,
unanimously agreed to by the principals, that 48 people should be held in
this way .... We've identified who those people are.
(McCraw Deel., Ex. 7 at 28.)
DOJ argues that Attorney General Holder's statement and testimony describe the
Executive Order process. (See DOJ Reply at 5.) And, they "do[] not reference the threat
assessment portions of the Task Force's recommendation memoranda, let alone indicate
30

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 31 of 129

that the unanimous decisions reached by the final decision-makers [the Review Panel and
Review Participants] adopted the analyses[, reasoning,] and conclusions contained in
those assessments." (Id.; see also id. at 9.)
Plaintiffs respond that Attorney General Holder's statement and testimony
"defend[ed] the ... decision to imprison 48 detainees indefinitely without change[] ...
on the basis of the Task Force's 'very able' work." (Opp. at 16.) Moreover, Attorney
General Holder's statement and testimony "refer to the [t]hreat assessments," "even if
[they do J not ... use the magic words 'threat assessment."' (Pis.' Reply at 4-5.)
The Court finds that Attorney General Holder's statement and testimony
confirmed and described the process as delineated in Executive Order 13492, namely that
"the executive branch [would] conduct a prompt and thorough review of the
circumstances of the individuals currently detained at Guantanamo," and "determine ...
whether it [wa]s possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States." 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898-99.
Attorney General Holder never identified analysis or reasoning of the threat assessments
that was relied upon by the Review Panel. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. He did say that the
Review Panel agreed with the Task Force's recommendation that the 48 detainees in
question should continue to be detained. (See McCraw Deel., Ex. 7 at 28.) That the
ultimate decisions by "the agencies responsible for the review - the Departments of
Justice, Defense, State, Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff' -were consistent with the Task Force
recommendations, does not establish adoption. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 206 ("Nor
does the fact that the agencies acted in conformity with the [privileged documents]

31

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 32 of 129

establish that the agencies adopted their reasoning."). Holder indicates that the Task
Force's role was to make an "initial determination," but he makes clear that the Review
Panel-not the Task Force-made the decision(s) to continue detention under the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub L. No. 107-40, 15 Stat. 224. (See
McCraw Deel., Ex. 6 at 5.) While Holder referred to the Task Force "recommendations,"
he made no specific references to "threat assessments" (see McCraw Deel., Exs. 6-7). See
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 217-18 (where "there [we]re no statements .
. . specifically referencing particular [privileged] documents," the plaintiff had adduced
no "evidence that [the] agency ha[d] actually adopted or incorporated by reference the
[privileged] document at issue").

Absence of a Decisionmaker
As noted at footnote 9 supra, at oral argument on September 18, 2017, the parties
presented differing views as to who is a decisionmaker for purposes of adopting or incorporating
by reference predecisional documents. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 2-13.) Plaintiffs
argue that a speaker is a decisionmaker if the speaker "ha[s] the hallmarks of being authorized
... to make the statement that he or she makes." Mat 11: 15-24.) DOJ argues that a
decisionmaker is "either [the] [R]eview [P]articipants or [R]eview [P]anel members," who
actually decided whether detainees would be transferred, detained, or prosecuted, under the
Executive Order. (Id. at 5:23-24.) Only "the relevant decisionmaker ... [can] expressly adopt[]
or incorporate[] by reference" a privileged document. See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 2013 WL 174222, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013).
Under either definition of decisionmaker, the following five statements and letters, upon
which Plaintiffs rely to establish adoption or incorporation by reference of the threat

32

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 33 of 129

assessments, cannot be determined to have been made by decisiomnakers, see Brennan Ctr., 697
· F.3d at 204 n.15, as follows:

1.

The testimony of Matthew Olsen, Director of the Task Force, regarding the work

of the Task Force before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on July 26,
2011 and January 31, 2012. (McCraw Deel., Exs. 13, 14.) 14 Olsen was not a member of
the Review Panel, and he was not a Review Participant. (See DOJ Reply at 6.) In
Brennan Center, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that, because the letter there
relied upon by the plaintiffs to show adoption was from Daniel Levin, an Office of Legal
Counsel official (i.e. the agency that drafted the predecisional memorandum) to Renee
Lettow Lerner (the general counsel of HHS), "th[e] letter was neither written by a
decisiomnaker nor released publicly by the decisiomnaking agency." See 697 F.3d at 204
n.15. For the same reason, Olsen, the Task Force Director, is not a decisiomnaker and his
statements do not aid in establishing express adoption or incorporation by reference. See
id. And, Plaintiffs have not shown that Olsen had the "hallmarks" of one authorized to
adopt or incorporate by reference the threat assessments. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18,
2017, at 11:15-24.)
2.

The letter, dated May 7, 2010, of U.S. Representative Frank Wolf (of Virginia's

10 1h congressional district) and other members of Congress to James L. Jones, National
Security Advisor General, requesting that General Jones recommend to the President "an
immediate prohibition on the transfer of any detainee out of Guantanamo Bay." (McCraw

14

Olsen described the Task Force's process, including the Task Force's use of the Bush
Administrntion's DABs. (See McCraw Deel., Ex. 13 at 74, 89.) He testified that "the results of
the review, the recommendations and the analysis [the Task Force] did, resulting in unanimous
decisions on 240 detainees, speak for themselves." iliL at 91.)
33

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 34 of 129

Deel., Ex. 15 at 1.) The Wolfletter requested the "findings and recommendations for the
disposition of each detainee case, since such information is being used as the basis for all
decisions being made with respect to each detainee." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 15.) 15 Members
of the U.S. House of Representatives were not Review Participants and did not serve on
the Review Panel, (see O'Keefe Deel. if 12), and their statements do not aid in
establishing express adoption or incorporation by reference. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d
at 204 n.15. And, Plaintiffs have not shown that Representative Wolf-or anyone from
the Legislative Branch-had the "hallmarks" of one authorized to adopt or incorporate by
reference the threat assessments on behalf of the Executive Branch. (See H'rg Tr., dated
Sept. 18, 2017, at 11:15-24.)
3.

The letter, dated June 4, 2014, of U.S. Senator Saxby Chambliss (Georgia) to

President Obama "calling for the declassification of intelligence related to the five
Afghan nationals who were transferred from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to Qatar." (McCraw
Deel., Ex. 16 at 1.) The Chambliss letter stated that President Obama "should
immediately declassify each of the[] 2009 assessments" for "five Afghan nationals who
were transferred from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to Qatar" in order "to explain the risks
associated with transferring these individuals and why they will never face justice for
their past actions." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 16 at 1.) 16 U.S. Senators were not Review
Participants and did not serve on the Review Panel, (see O'Keefe Deel.

if 12), and

15

Where, as here, "the record contains no evidence that [predecisional] documents were publicly
referenced or adopted by agency decisionmakers," Exemption 5 protects the documents from
disclosure. See N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, 2016 WL 5946711, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2016).
16

Where, as here, "the record contains no evidence that [predecisional] documents were publicly
referenced or adopted by agency decisionmakers," Exemption 5 protects the documents from
disclosure. See N.Y. Times, 2016 WL 5946711, at *15.
34

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 35 of 129

Senator Chambliss's statements do not aid in establishing express adoption or
incorporation by reference. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 204 n.15. And, Plaintiffs have
not shown that Senator Chambliss-or anyone from the Legislative Branch-had the
"hallmarks" of one authorized to adopt or incorporate by reference the threat assessments
on behalf of the Executive Branch. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 11: 15-24.)
4.

The letter, dated June 10, 2014, of U.S. Representative Jackie Walorski (of

Indiana's 2nd congressional district) to President Obama "urg[ing] [the President] to
declassify as much intelligence as possible related to the five Afghan nationals
transferred from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) to Qatar on May 31, 2014." (McCraw
Deel., Ex. 17 at I.) The Walorski letter requested that President Obama "declassify, to the
greatest extent possible, the 2009 Guantanamo Review Task Force assessments and any
other relevant intelligence surrounding the five transferred GTMO detainees" because
"the American people need more information to be able to evaluate fully the risk
involved in their release." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 17 at 1.) 17 Members of the U.S. House of
Representatives were not Review Participants and did not serve on the Review Panel,
(see O'Keefe Deel. if 12), and Representative Walorski's statements do not aid in
establishing express adoption or incorporation by reference. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d
at 204 n.15. And, Plaintiffs have not shown that Representative Walorski-or anyone
from the Legislative Branch-had the "hallmarks" of one authorized to adopt or
incorporate by reference the threat assessments on behalf of the Executive Branch. (See
H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 11 :15-24.)

17

Where, as here, "the record contains no evidence that [predecisional] documents were publicly
referenced or adopted by agency decisionmakers," Exemption 5 protects the documents from
disclosure. See N.Y. Times, 2016 WL 5946711, at *15; see also O'Keefe Deel. if 12.
35

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 36 of 129

5.

The published statement, dated June 11, 2014, of U.S. Representative Tulsi

Gabbard (of Hawaii's 2nd congressional district) criticizing a "prisoner swap to recover
Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl" because the five alleged "Taliban terrorists" who were released in
exchange for Sgt. Bergdahl "present[ed] a threat to the United States." (McCraw Deel.,
Ex. 18 at 1.) The Gabbard letter stated, "The recent statements by the administration that
these terrorists do not pose a significant threat are preposterous. The President's
Guantanamo Review Task Force in 2010 determined that these five were too dangerous
to transfer. The task force concluded that each of these five individuals possess a high
level of threat that cannot be mitigated sufficiently except through continued detention."
(McCraw Deel., Ex. 18 at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).) 18 Members of the U.S.
House of Representatives were not Review Participants and did not serve on the Review
Panel, (see O'Keefe Deel.

ii 12), and Representative Gabbard's statements do not aid in

establishing express adoption or incorporation by reference. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d
at 204 n.15. And, Plaintiffs have not shown that Representative Gabbard-or anyone
from the Legislative Branch-had the "hallmarks" of one authorized to adopt or
incorporate by reference the threat assessments on behalf of the Executive Branch. (See
H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 11 :15-24.)

Segregation of Factual Material
DOJ argues that "[t]he threat assessments are protected in full by the deliberative process
privilege and do not contain any purely factual material that could be segregated for release."
(DOJ Br. at 12.) DOJ contends that "any purely factual material ... is inextricably linked to the

18

Where, as here, ''the record contains no evidence that [predecisional] documents were publicly
referenced or adopted by agency decisionmakers," Exemption 5 protects the documents from
disclosure. See N.Y. Times, 2016 WL 5946711, at *15; see also O'Keefe Deel. ii 12.
36

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 37 of 129

explicitly evaluative nature of the records as a whole." Mat 13.) "The threat assessments
contain a careful selection of specific infonnation drawn from large quantities of evidence
compiled from across the govenunent ... and often 'included candid evaluations of the
reliability and credibility of each particular piece of evidence."' (Id. (quoting O'Keefe Deel.

if 15).) DOJ also argues that "the policy-oriented judgment involved in the selection of factual
material for evaluation is plain from the nature of the records themselves. The threat assessments
are wholly evaluative: they filter the factual material they contain through the prism of the Task
Force's appraisal of the potential threat to the national security." (DOJ Reply at 17.)
Plaintiffs contend that "DOJ provides only a conclusory explanation for why it is not
possible to segregate the fact from the analysis of that fact." (Opp. at 18.) Plaintiffs argue that
"the Second Circuit has rejected precisely this kind of ipse dixit declaration and required in
camera review to evaluate segregability." (Id. (citation omitted).) Plaintiffs also argue that "it is
not correct, as DOJ would have it, that anytime a fact is selected it becomes deliberative
material. If that were so, it would nullify the factual-material exception .... " (Id. at 19.) "FOIA
provides that any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt." N.Y. Times, 756 FJd at
117.
Case law in this Circuit includes the following rule: factual segments of a predecisional
document are exempt from disclosure under Exemption 5 if: (1) the predecisional document is
"submitted to the agency ... to assist it in rendering an informed decision upon the ... record,"
and (2) disclosing the factual segments "would reveal the deliberative process ... itself by
demonstrating which facts in the ... record were considered significant." See Lead Indus., 610
F.2d at 83, 85; see also Tigue, 312 F.3d at 74, 82 (where a predecisional report "express[ed] the

37

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 38 of 129

views of the [United States Attorney' Office for theJ Southern District [of New York] ... about
tax investigations" and "recommend[ed] procedures for the Internal Revenue Service," factual
information could not be segregated because that "information ... provided insight into
privileged material"); Local 3, Int'l Bhd. ofElec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 845 F.2d
1177, 1180 (2d Cir. 1988) (where "stripping [predecisional documents] down to their bare-bone
facts would render them ... too illuminating of the agency's deliberative process").
The Court has conducted a thorough in camera review of the 239 threat assessments,
including their segregability, and concludes, for the reasons that follow that all of the threat
assessments meet the two requirements of Lead Industries, Tigue, and Local 3. First, all of the
threat assessments were, according to the Executive Order, "submitted to the agency [i.e. the
Review Panel] ... to assist it in rendering an informed decision upon the ... record." See Lead
Indus., 610 F.2d at 83. O'Keefe states that, "[a]fter completing a thorough review of all pertinent
information about each detainee, the Task Force prepared recommendation memoranda [which
included the threat assessmentsJ assessing a variety of factors for evaluation by the Review
Panel." (O'Keefe Deel.~ 14.) The "threat assessments were based upon specific pieces of
evidence that Task Force members selected from the larger pool of information." (.hl, ~ 15.)
According to O'Keefe, "the Task Force assessed the universe of information compiled about
each detainee, and selected the most prescient issues about which to brief the Review Panel."
(Id.) The Task Force's work and its responsibility were to select and present facts to aid the
Review Panel in making its decisions. See Lead Indus., 610 F.2d at 83; see also Mapother v.
Dep't of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1536, 1538-39 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (no segregation of facts required
where a report was prepared "to provide the Attorney General with the information ... to decide
whether [an individual] should be excluded from the United States," and "[t]he staff was to cull

38

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 39 of 129

the relevant documents, extract pertinent facts, organize them to suit a specific purpose, and to
identify the significant issues they encountered along the way"); Montrose Chem. Corp. of
California v. Train, 491F.2d63, 64 n.3, 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (no segregation of facts required
where two reports were prepared to assist the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") in his review of the record of a hearing held to determine whether
Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane ("DDT") was "injurious to man and his environment." "The
EPA assistants ... were exercising their judgment as to what record evidence would be
important to the Administrator in making his decision").
Second, the threat assessments are predominantly deliberative and evaluative. (See supra
at pp. 13-15.) Disclosing factual material within the threat assessments would "reveal the
deliberative process of selection" by demonstrating which facts in the record were "considered
significant." See Lead Indus., 610 F.2d at 85; see also Tigue, 312 F.3d at 82 ("After de novo in
camera review of the original and redacted memoranda, we conclude that the district court
properly found that the document is predominantly evaluative .... [The] factual material ... is
too inte1twined with evaluative and policy discussions to require disclosure."). O'Keefe's
Declaration supports this conclusion. (See O'Keefe Deel.

if 15.) "[T]he Task Force considered

the totality of the circumstances related to each detainee, but attempted to focus on certain
factors when possible." (Id.) "[It] prepared the threat assessments to succinctly SUillillarize
significant issues and present key background information regarding the potential national
security threat of individual detainees .... " (Id.

if 26.) If the factual portions of the threat

assessments were disclosed, those portions would indicate which facts the Task Force found
"significant," "key," and worth "focusing" on. See Lead Indus., 610 F.2d at 83, 85; see also
Tigue, 312 F .3d at 74, 82 (factual information could not be segregated because that "information

39

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 40 of 129

... provided insight into privileged material"); Local 3, 845 F.2d at 1180 (no segregation of facts
of predecisional documents where "stripping them down to their bare-bone facts would render
them ... too illuminating of the agency's deliberative process"); Assadi v. U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., 2013 WL 230126, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013) (no segregation where
the Fraud Detection and National Security Unit ("FDNS") of the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services ("CIS") sought to determine whether an immigration application was
fraudulent and to recommend a course of action, and where the reports "contain[ed] factual
information specifically chosen by extracting pertinent factual material from a larger body of
factual material"); Shinnecock Indian Nation v. Kempthome, 652 F. Supp. 2d 345, 372
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (where a report was prepared by attorneys in the Office of the Solicitor for the
United States Department of the Interior to assist the Solicitor with his decision regarding
whether the United States would assist the Shinnecock Indian Nation. The facts in the report
were not segregable because "the selection of and presentation of the facts reveal[ed] the
judgment of the author and la[id] the foundation for his recommendation").
The 1982 decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Dep't of Justice, cited in Plaintiffs' opposing brief (Opp. at 19), is distinguishable, and it does
not persuade the Court that segregation of factual material in the threat assessments is
appropriate. 677 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Playboy, the Circuit Court affirmed the
District Court's order that the Department of Justice redact "conclusions, recommendations,
opinions, or advice" from a report concerning whether FBI personnel acted improperly, and "that
remaining portions of the [report] be disclosed." Id. at 934. Plaintiffs seek to rely upon the
following Circuit Court statement:
Anyone making a report must of necessity select the facts to be mentioned
in it; but a report does not become a part of the deliberative process merely
40

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 41 of 129

because it contains only those facts which the person making the report
thinks material. If this were not so, every factual repo1i would be protected
as a part of the deliberative process.
677 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
The report in Playboy "was prepared only to inform the [U.S.] Attorney General of facts
which he in tum would make available to members of Congress." Id. at 936. The report in
Playboy was not "submitted to the agency ... to assist it in rendering an informed decision upon
the ... record." See Lead Indus., 610 F.2d at 83. The Court in Playboy distinguished Montrose
Chemical, 491 F.2d 63, where segregation was not required, because, in Montrose, "summaries
were prepared for the sole purpose of assisting the Administrator [of the Enviromnental
Protection Agency] to make a complex decision .... " Playboy, 677 F.2d at 936.

***
Having determined that the threat assessments are properly exempt from disclosure
(in full) under Exemption 5, lli supra at pp. 12-41, it is not necessary to analyze other
exemptions. The Court nevertheless includes the following analysis of Exemptions 1, 7(B),
7(D), and 7(E) to assist the parties-and the public-in understanding the Court's
reasoning as to all of the issues which have been presented in the briefs in this case.
Exemption 1
DOJ invokes Exemption 1 to protect against disclosure of portions of the threat
assessments containing classified infonnation "pertaining to the foreign relations or foreign
activities of the United States." (DOJ Br. at 17-18.) DOJ argues that "far from disclosing
classified information, the press releases on which [P]laintiffs rely [(see infra at pp. 43-48)]
merely provide general assurances that the United States aod the receiving country worked
together to facilitate the transfer." (DOJ Reply at 18.) According to the Hardy Declaration, the
information withheld under Exemption 1 "concern[s] sensitive intelligence information gathered
41

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 42 of 129

by the United States either abont or from a foreign country." (Hardy Deel.
Deel. 'if 21; Stein Deel.

'if 27; see also Ewing

'if 14; DOD Deel. 'if 21.) "The unauthorized disclosure of information

concerning foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States can reasonably be expected
to ... identify the target, scope, or time frame of intelligence activities of the United States in or
about a foreign country, which may result in the curtailment or cessation of these activities;
enable hostile entities to assess United States intelligence gathering activities in or about a
foreign country and devise countermeasures against these activities; or compromise cooperative
foreign sources, which may jeopardize their safety and curtail the flow of information from these
sources." (Hardy Deel.

'if 27.)

Plaintiffs argue that the Government's invocation of Exemption 1 is "too broadly stated."
(Opp. at 20.) Plaintiffs cite to three press releases which they contend "raise concerns about ...
official disclosure." (ML) In these three press releases, according to Plaintiffs, "both the United
States and the receiving country have ... described some of the communications between the
two countries in order to facilitate the transfer." (Opp. at 20.) Plaintiffs do not challenge DOJ's
use of Exemption 1 to justify the redaction of three other categories of information:
"(l) intelligence sources and methods; (2) foreign government information provided to the
United States in confidence; (3) information relating to military and counterterrorism operations,
including certain operational details about Guantanamo Bay." (Id.)
The term "official disclosure" refers to the "limited exception" under Exemption 1
"where the government has officially disclosed the specific information the requester seeks."
Halpern v. F.B.I., 181 F.3d 279, 294 (2d Cir. 1999). "Classified information that a party seeks to
obtain or publish is deemed to have been officially disclosed only if it (1) is as specific as the
information previously released, (2) matches the information previously disclosed, and (3) was

42

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 43 of 129

made public through an official and documented disclosure." Wilson v. C.I.A., 586 F.3d 171,
186 (2d Cir. 2009) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court, having thoroughly reviewed the threat assessments in camera, finds that
Plaintiffs have not met their "burden of showing specific information in the public domain that
duplicates [or matches] the information withheld" by DOJ under Exemption 1. See Hudson
River, 891 F.2d at 421. None of the three press releases cited by Plaintiffs constitutes "official
disclosure" of classified information "pertaining to the foreign relations or foreign activities of
the United States" (DOJ Br. at 17-18), as follows:

1.

The October 31, 2009, DOJ Press Release announcing the transfer of six Uighur

Guantanamo detainees to the Republic of Palau. Dept. of Justice, United States Transfers
Six Uighur Detainees from Guantanamo Bay to Palau, No. 09-1179 (Oct. 31, 2009). This
press release stated in relevant part,
Six detainees who are Chinese nationals of Uighur ethnicity have been
transferred from the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay to the control of the
Republic of Palau....
These transfers were carried out under an arrangement between the United
States and the Republic of Palau. The United States has coordinated with the
Republic of Palau to ensure the transfers take place under appropriate security
measures and will continue to consult with the Republic of Palau regarding the
individuals .
. . . "[W]e are grateful to the Republic of Palau for its assistance in the
resettlement of these individuals," said Matthew Olsen, Executive Director of
the Guantanamo Review Task Force.

DOJ argues persuasively that this press release "merely provide[s] general
assurances that the United States and the receiving country worked together to facilitate
the transfer." (DOJ Reply at 18.) DOJ also contends that, "in connection with the
government's application of Exemption 1 to foreign relations and foreign activities
43

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 44 of 129

information," the Hardy Declaration "demonstrate[s] that [Exemption 1] was not applied
to the type of information [P]laintiffs describe." (Id. at 19.) "The unauthorized disclosure
of information concerning foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States can
reasonably be expected to lead to diplomatic or economic retaliation against the United
States; identify the target, scope, or time frame of intelligence activities of the United
States in or about a foreign country, which may result in the curtailment or cessation of
these activities; enable hostile entities to assess United States intelligence gathering
activities in or about a foreign country and devise countermeasures against these
activities; or compromise cooperative foreign sources, which may jeopardize their safety
and curtail the flow of information from these sources." (Hardy Deel.

if 27.)

Plaintiffs argue that the press release constitutes an "official disclosure" because it
"describe[s] some of the communications between the two countries in order to facilitate
the transfer." (Opp. at 21.) Plaintiffs also argue that the Hardy Declaration "refer[s]
broadly to foreign relations information" and does not "carry [DOJ's] burden." (Pls.'
Reply at 8.)
The Court finds that the October 31, 2009, DOJ Press Release does not constitute
an official disclosure. See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 421. The press release does not
contain, as pointed out in the Hardy Declaration, "sensitive intelligence information
gathered by the United States either about or from a foreign country." (Hardy Deel.

if 26.)

It cannot be said to "duplicate" or "match" any of the information withheld under
Exemption I. See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 421. The press release also does not include
information about "United States intelligence gathering activities in or about a foreign

44

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 45 of 129

country" which could enable others to "devise countermeasures against these activities."
(Hardy Deel.~ 27.)
2.

The June 22, 2016, Government of Montenegro Press Release annonncing the

transfer of one Guantanamo detainee to Montenegro. Gov'! of Montenegro, Montenegro
Receives Another Person Within Humanitarian Programme of Re-Socialisation of
Prisoners from Guantanamo, Press Release (June 22, 2010). This press release stated in
relevant part,
As part of a humanitarian programme launched by the Government of the
United States with the aim of closing the base in Guantanamo, Cuba,
Montenegro took on the responsibility of re-socialisation of another prisoner
and his return to his family.
·
It is ... a citizen of Yemen who stayed for many years in Guantanamo, and
who ... does not constitute, according to the assessment of the competent US
and Montenegrin security services, a security or any other threat to the country
and citizens of Montenegro. Prior to the persons' transfer to third countries,
their behaviour and criminal liability are subjects of security assessment and
detailed evaluation, according to which the decision on the transfer is made.

Re-socialisation of these persons implies control by the relevant institutions of
the receiving countries, while ensuring full respect for legality and the policy
of humane treatment.

DOI argues that this press release "merely provide[ s] general assurances that the
United States and the receiving country worked together to facilitate the transfer." (DOJ
Reply at 18.) DOJ also contends that the Hardy Declaration "submitted in connection
with the government's application of Exemption 1 to foreign relations and foreign
activities information demonstrate[ s] that [Exemption l] was not applied to the type of
information [P]laintiffs describe." (Id. at 19.) "The unauthorized disclosure of
information concerning foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States can
reasonably be expected to lead to diplomatic or economic retaliation against the United
45

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 46 of 129

States; identify the target, scope, or time frame of intelligence activities of the United
States in or about a foreign country, which may result in the curtailment or cessation of
these activities; enable hostile entities to assess United States intelligence gathering
activities in or about a foreign country and devise countermeasures against these
activities; or compromise cooperative foreign sources, which may jeopardize their safety
and curtail the flow of information from these sources." (Hardy Deel.

ii 27.)

Plaintiffs argue that the press release constitutes an "official disclosure" because it
"describe[s] some of the communications between the two countries in order to facilitate
the transfer." (Opp. at 21.) Plaintiffs also argue that the Hardy Declaration "refer[s]
broadly to foreign relations info1mation" and does not "carry [DOI' s] burden." (Pis.'
Reply at 8.)
The June 22, 2016, Government of Montenegro Press Release carmot constitute
an "official disclosure" because it was not issued by an agency or official of the United
States Government. See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 422 ("Officials no[t] ... serving with
an executive branch department cannot ... disclose official agency policy .... ").Also,
the press release does not include "sensitive intelligence information gathered by the
United States either about or from a foreign country." (Hardy Deel. ii 26.) The June 22,
2016, Government of Montenegro Press Release does not "duplicate" or "match" the
inf01mation withheld under Exemption 1 (as described in the Hardy Declaration). See id.
at 421. The press release also does not include information about "United States
intelligence gathering activities in or about a foreign country" which could enable others
to "devise countermeasures against these activities." (Hardy Deel.

46

ii 27.)

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 47 of 129

3.

The January 19, 2017, DOD Press Release announcing the transfer of one

Guantanamo detainee to Saudi Arabia. Dept. of Defense, Detainee Transfers Announced,
Release No. NR-017-17 (Jan. 19, 2017). This press release stated in relevant part,
The Department of Defense announced today the transfer of [one detainee] from
the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay to the government of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia....
The United States is grateful to the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
for its willingness to support ongoing U.S. efforts to close the Guantanamo Bay
detention facility. The United States coordinated with the government of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to ensure this transfer took place consistent with
appropriate security and humane treatment measures.

DOJ argues that this press release "merely provide[ s] general assurances that the
United States and the receiving country worked together to facilitate the transfer." (DOJ
Reply at 18.) DOJ also contends that the Hardy Declaration "submitted in connection
with the government's application of Exemption 1 to foreign relations and foreign
activities information demonstrate[ s] that [Exemption 1] was not applied to the type of
information [P]laintiffs describe." (Id. at 19.) "The unauthorized disclosure of
information concerning foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States can
reasonably be expected to lead to diplomatic or economic retaliation against the United
States; identify the target, scope, or time frame of intelligence activities of the United
States in or about a foreign country, which may result in the curtailment or cessation of
these activities; enable hostile entities to assess United States intelligence gathering
activities in or about a foreign country and devise countermeasures against these
activities; or compromise cooperative foreign sources, which may jeopardize their safety
and curtail the flow of information from these sources." (Hardy Deel.

47

if 27.)

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 48 of 129

Plaintiffs argue that the press release constitutes an "official disclosure" because it
"describe[s] some of the communications between the two countries in order to facilitate
the transfer." (Opp. at 21.) Plaintiffs also argue that the Hardy Declaration "refer[s]
broadly to foreign relations information" and does not "carry [DOJ's] burden." (Pis.'
Reply at 8.)
The Court finds that the January 19, 2017, DOJ Press Release does not constitute
an official disclosure. See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 421. As noted, the Hardy
Declaration states that the government withheld "sensitive intelligence information
gathered by the United States either about or from a foreign country." (Hardy Deel.

ii 26.)

The press release contains no such information and does not "duplicate" or "match" the
information withheld. See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 421. The press release also does not
include information about "United States intelligence gathering activities in or about a
foreign country" which could enable others to "devise countermeasures against these
activities." (Hardy Deel. ii 27.)
Exemption 7(B)

DOJ (on behalf of the FBI) invokes Exemption 7(B) to protect against disclosing
citations to FBI files found in footnotes of six threat assessments (as indicated in the DOJ' s
Vaughn Index, see Attachment A hereto at pp. 47, 49-52) because "disclosure ... 'would deprive
a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication."' (DOJ Br. at 23 (quoting 5 U.S. C.
§ 552(b)(7)(B)).) DOJ contends that "[t]he responsive records include [six] threat assessments of
certain detainees for whom law enforcement proceedings are ongoing or are reasonably
anticipate[ d]. Premature release of the recommendations provided in the threat assessments
through the FOIA, could unfairly impact ongoing or prospective proceedings and jeopardize the
detainee's ability to receive a fair and impartial adjudication." (Hardy Deel. ii 38.) "Each threat
48

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 49 of 129

assessment contains footnotes identifying specific source documents," some of which are FBI
files that "capture[] interviews of third parties providing information." (Id.

if 39.) Unless the FBI

redacts the file numbers (for these FBI interviews of third parties), "the detainee would have
knowledge of types of information that may not already be available through the court
proceedings," including the "targets of investigative activities or a close association with another
target of investigation." (Id.) This "could indicate that the government has additional testimony
or information available." (Id.) DOI also relies upon the Seidel Declaration which states that "the
prior use of the term 'law enforcement proceedings' referred only to trials and adjudications."
(Seidel Deel. if 6.) "[A]ll of the infonnation that the FBI withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(B)
relates to ongoing trials or adjudications" (id.). And, "it is more probable than not that disclosure
of the information ... would seriously interfere with the impartiality of those ongoing
proceedings" (id.).
Plaintiffs argue that DOI has not carried its burden because "a trial or adjudication must
be 'pending or truly imminent'" and "it must be 'more probable than not that disclosure of the
material sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of those proceedings."' (Opp. at 22
(quoting Wash. Post, 863 F.2d at 102).) Plaintiffs also argue that the Court should "require
DOI-at the very least through an in camera, ex parte declaration-to describe the specific
proceedings at issue and explain the particular harms disclosure would cause." (Pis.' Reply at 9.)
The Government has met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
Exemption 7(B) protects against the disclosure of citations to FBI files concerning interviews of
third parties (Seidel Deel. ifif 5-6). See Chiquita Brands Int'! Inc. v. S.E.C., 805 F.3d 289, 294,
298-99 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Washington Post, 863 F.2d at 102. "[T]o withstand a challenge to the
applicability of (7)(B) the government bears the burden of showing: (1) that a trial or

49

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 50 of 129

adjudication is pending or truly imminent; and (2) that it is more probable than not that
disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of those
proceedings." Id. This burden can be met by affidavit or otherwise. Id.
Both Hardy and Seidel confirm in their Declarations that trials or adjudications are
ongoing for the six detainees at issue. (See Hardy Deel.

if 38; Seidel Deel. if 6.) Ongoing

litigation "satisfies the 'pending or truly imminent' judicial proceeding prong ofth[e] test."
Chiguita Brands, 805 F.3d at 294. Seidel confirmed that "all of the information that the FBI
withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(B) relates to ongoing trials or adjudications." (Id.; see also
Moscati Deel.

if 6; Chiquita Brands, 805 F.3d at 294; Washington Post,

863 F.2d at 102.)

The Hardy and Seidel Declarations also satisfy the second prong of DOJ' s burden of
proof. See id.; Chiguita Brands, 805 F.3d at 298-99. That is, where, as here, "disclosure through
FOIA would [also] furnish access to a document not available under the discovery rules and thus
would confer an unfair advantage on one of the parties," the document need not be disclosed.
Washington Post, 863 F.2d at 102; see also Chiguita Brands, 805 F.3d at 298-99 (where "one
party obtains valuable information from witnesses and other third parties outside the formal
discovery process while under no obligation to produce similar information to its adversaries").
Plaintiffs do not dispute that such disclosure "would furnish access to a document not available
under the discovery rules," see Washington Post, 863 F.2d at 102; Hardy Deel. if 38; Seidel Deel.

ir 5.
Exemption 7(D)

DOJ (on behalf of the FBI) invokes Exemption 7(D) to protect against disclosure of
portions of the threat assessments which are "law enforcement records that 'could reasonably be
expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a ... foreign agency or
authority ... which furnished information on a confidential basis."' (DOJ Br. at 24 (quoting 5
50

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 51 of 129

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D)). DOJ is concerned about "portions of the responsive documents
[containing] information regarding individual sources who are ... informants under an express
grant of confidentiality." (Hardy Deel., 54.) The file for each confidential source "memorializes
the FBI's confidentiality agreement with the source, as well [as] other information about the
particular source (i.e., suitability, reliability, scope of reporting, payments, etc.). To the extent the
FBI applied Exemption 7(D) to information pe1iaining to a source who has received express
confidentiality, FBI procedures require that evidence of that grant of confidentiality would reside
in the appropriate source file." (Seidel Deel.,, 9-10.)
Plaintiffs argue that "DO J's invocation of Exemption 7(D) is plainly insufficient." (See
Opp. at 23-24.) Plaintiffs contend that "the FBI ... fails to make the appropriate showing for the
names and identifying data for informants," and "provides only ... 'bare assertions' of
confidentiality .... '" QQ,) Plaintiffs also argue that Seidel's "[D]eclaration says only that some
unnamed 'FBI procedures' suggest that evidence of express grants of confidentiality 'would
reside'-hypothetically-in the source's file." (Pls.' Reply at 9 (citation omitted).)
The Court finds that DOJ has met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that Exemption 7(D) applies to portions of the threat assessments. It has done so by relying upon
the Hardy and Seidel Declarations. When invoking Exemption 7(D), an "agency['s] burden of
proof [is] satisfied by [an] affidavit declaring that ... assurances of confidentiality are set forth
... in the source's informant file .... " Halpern v. FBI, 181F.3d279, 298-99 (2d Cir. 1999)
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The Hardy and Seidel Declarations clearly meet
this requirement. (See Hardy Deel. , 54; Seidel Deel. ,, 9-10; see also Halpern, 181 F.3d at 29899; Ferguson v. FBI, 83 F.3d 41, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1996) (where "the affidavit explain[ed] ... that .
. . express assurances of confidentiality were given by the FBI to the sources providing the

51

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 52 of 129

information, and that these assurances [we]re set forth ... in the source's info1mant file");
Williams v. FBI, 69 F.3d 1155, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (where "the Government submitted an
affidavit from [an] FBI Special Agent ... explaining that the FBI withheld ... information on
the ground that this information was obtained pursuant to express grants of confidentiality").)
Exemption 7(E)

DOJ (on behalf of the FBI) invokes Exemption 7(E) to protect against disclosure of
portions of the threat assessments containing "database identities and database search results"
(Hardy Deel.~ 64) because that "info1mation ... 'would disclose techniques and procedures for
law enforcement investigations or prosecutions'" (DOJ Br. at 25 (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7)(E)). "Such techniques and procedures are categorically exempt from disclosure,
without any need for inquiry into the harm that would result from their disclosure." (Id.) DOJ
relies upon the Seidel and Hardy Declarations. Seidel states:
[T]he specific selection of a single database among many that could be used,
based on the unique factors of a specific investigation, would reveal the
specific methodology that the FBI employs in the course of
counterterrorism investigations. Disclosure of this information, including
which database is searched and the unique search parameters used, would
provide individuals with insight into how to avoid detection by knowing
what factors would trigger discovery. Knowledge of what actions and what
characteristics the FBI detects through its querying of non-public databases
would allow individuals to alter their behavior to avoid detection.
Accordingly, the specific details concerning the databases queried in
connection with the FBI counterterrorism activities discussed in the
responsive records, the number of databases searched, the combinations of
databases searched for certain individuals, the information retrieved from
those searches, and the ways in which the FBI utilizes that info1mation it
obtains from such searches would all reveal unknown law enforcement
techniques.
(Seidel~

15.) The Hardy Declaration states:
Disclosure of the printouts or information compiled from these search
results, or even the selection of a certain database over another for a
particular type of information and its relative usefulness, could enable
52

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 53 of 129

criminals to employ countermeasures to avoid detection, thus jeopardizing
the FBI's investigative mission.
(Hardy Deel.

if 64.)

Plaintiffs "call into question the withholding of database search results" by DOJ. (Opp. at
24.) According to Plaintiffs, the FBI "does no more than assert, in entirely general terms, that
printouts, info1mation from search results, and information about what database the FBI searched
might reveal a secret. That falls far short of showing how disclosure of the responsive records in
this case plausibly would reveal something new about the technique-the search of a databaseitself" (Opp. at 24-25 (citation omitted).) "What the FBI has failed to explain ... is whether the
withheld infmmation reveals, for example, types of searches---databases queried, search
parameters used, and the like-that are regularly used in counterterrorism cases or whether the
information is merely a search that a particular analyst in a particular case decided to make on
his or her own." (Pis.' Reply at 9-10.)
The Government has met its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence
the applicability of Exemption 7(E). It has done so by relying on the Hardy and Seidel
Declarations. See Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2017 WL
1155898, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017); Bishop v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 45 F. Supp.
3d 380, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). "Affidavits or declarations ... giving reasonably detailed
explanations why any withheld documents fall within an exemption are sufficient to sustain the
agency's burden." Wilner, 592 F.3d at 69.
"The phrase 'techniques and procedures['] ... refers to how law enforcement officials go
about investigating a crime." Allard K. Lowenstein, 626 F.3d at 682. Exemption 7(E) applies
where, as here, the government's Declarations show that disclosure will reveal "which databases
[law enforcement] considers in its ... process and how such information can lead to the
53

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 54 of 129

triggering of additional" investigation. See Bishop, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 391; see also Iraqi Refugee,
2017 WL 1155898, at * 11 (where the plaintiffs challenged the redaction of a document
discussing search results from "a law enforcement database").
The Hardy and Seidel Declarations explain that disclosure of database identities and
search results would reveal how the FBI investigates suspected terrorists, including "the number
of databases searched, the combinations of databases searched for certain individuals, the
information retrieved from those searches, and the ways in which the FBI utilizes that
information it obtains from such searches." (See Hardy Deel. if 64; Seidel Deel.

if 15.)

"Disclosure of this information ... would provide individuals with insight into how to avoid
detection by knowing what factors would trigger discovery." (Id.)

IV.

Conclusion & Order
For the reasons stated herein above, DOJ's motion for summary judgment [#23] is

granted. Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment [#32] is denied.

Dated: New York, New York
September 29, 2017

RICHARD M. BERMAN, U.S.D.J.

54

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 55 of 129

ATTACHMENT A 19

19

The attached Vaughn Index is a declassified, redacted and public document, which was
originally attached as Exhibit H to the O'Keefe Declaration. It was made public by DOJ on
March 27, 2017. The original, classified version was submitted to the Court in camera.

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 56 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 2of18
+oP StCRe+//Sl//QRCQl'olf/NQPQRN

Ahmed Hassain !Task Force Evaruation Worksheet;
ISN:YM-690
Subse·ction of EVilluation Worksheet
contalning the Tilsk Force's candid
a.sse-ssment of identJflab!e threat(s)
potentially pos.ed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.
Mohammed

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Ahmed Salam

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

ISN:YM· 689

Subsection of E"v<iluation Worksheet

(WlP)

u.s.c..

IDOD: 10
424 {WJP)

IFBI (WIP)

I

FBI: 1.4 {b),(c),(d)
:{WIP)

9

so u.s.c.

IFBI:
§
3024\i)[l) {WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (b),

000: so u.s.c. § IDOi: OPP (WIF)

(c),Jd), Jg) {WIP)

3024[i)[l); 10

assessment of identifiable threat{s)
pat-entlalty posed by detainee to the

IFBI: (7l!C).IO),(E)
{WIP)

FBl(WIP)

U.S.C. § 424 (WIP)
FSI: 1.4 (c),(d)
(\VIP)

containing the Task Force's candid

IDOD(WIPJ

FBI: 5-0 U.S.C. §
3024(;)(1) (WIP)

national secudty of the United States.
Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
!SN: Subsect1on of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the TaS-k Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the Unlte-d States.

Fahrni Abdu![ah

Ahmed alTawlaqi

YM·683

I

Abd u1 Aziz Karim Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
ISN: SA*687
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evilluation Worksheet
containing- the Task force's carndid
assessme·nt of ldentifi:able lhrcat(s.}
potcntialfy posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

14

ooo: 1.4 (cJ,(g)

DOD: 50 U.S.C, §

(WIP)

3024(;]{1) (WIP)

001: OPP (WIF)

OOD(WIP)

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

fBl(WJP)

FB1' 1.4 (c) (WIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

6

DOD: L4(o), (g)

DOD: 10 U.S.C, §

(WIP)

424 (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 {b),(c)

FBI: 50 U.S.C §

(WIP)

3024(1)(1) (WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

OQO(WIP)

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBI (WIP)

WP SliCRfi+//Sl//ORCON//PJOFORN

001

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 57 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 3 of 18
l'QP S~RiT,l:fS.1/-,'QRbQNf/NQFQR~I

Abdel Ghaib
Ahmild Hakim

ISN': YM·686

Said bin Brahim
bin Umran

Bakush

ISN:

AG-685

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluatlon Worksheet;
Subsectlon of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's cnndid
assessment of identlflablethreat{s)
potentially posed by.detafnee to the
national security of the United States.

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force EYaluatton. Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation: Worksheet

9

DOD:
l.4(c),(g)(WIP)

DDJ: OPP (WIF)

!DOD (WIP)

FBI: (7){C),(E)
(WIP)

FBJ (WIP)
ODS: 1.4 (c ). (di

(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 {c)(WIP)

I

s

IOOD: 1.4{c) (WIP) I

IDOJ: OPP (WIF)

containing the Task Force's candid

assessment of identifiable tlireat{s)
potentially·posed by detainee-to the
national security of the United States.
Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of EvaluJtlon Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment ·of id-entlflabl.e threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

11

Muhammad Ali Cove( Page of Guantanamo Review
Salem Al Zarnuki Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
ISN: YM·6Sl
Subsection of EVi!l·u;nton Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiabl.e threat(s)
porent!alty posed by detainee to, the
national security of the United States.

13

O.mar Khalif

s

Mohammed

Tahanmatan
ISN:

WE~6S4

Mohammed Abu
Baker Mahjour
Umar
ISN: LY
69S

Cover Page of Guantanamo Rcviev.1
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

000: 1.4 (a), [b), DOD: so u.s.c. § IDOJ: OPP (WIF)
(c), (d), (g) (WIP) 3024(i){l) (WIP)

!°OD {WIPJ

rl: {7J[CJ,{E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 {c) {WIP) fBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i)!l) (WIP)

000: 1.4 (c), (g)
(\VIP)

DOD: SO U.S.C. § IDDJ: OPP (WIF)
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

IOOD(WIP)

IFSI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBI ()NIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP) FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
l024(i)(l) (WIP)

000; L4 (c), (g)
(WI?)

ODD: so u.s.c. §
3024{i)(1) (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

rn1: so u.s.c. §
3024(i)(l)(WI P)

100!: OPP \W!F)

1'.0P SllCRQ"h'Sl,'/QRCON//MOj;QRN

IFBl(WIP)

'FBI: (7J(C),(E)
(WIP)

002

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 58 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 4of18
:J'.QP SliGRIH,l/Sf.ifQR(;QN,l/PJQFQRfll

FawadYahya

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Ahmed al Rami

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

ISN:YM-683

Stibsection of Evaluation w.orksheet
containing the Task Force's candid

16

DOD: 1.4 (a), {c), 000: 50 u.s.c. §
(g)(WIP)
3D24{i){l); 10
use § 424 (WI?)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

potentiafly posed by detainee to the
national security .of the United States.
Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Hassan

Task Force Evaluation Wor"sheet;

ISN:YM·630

13

Subsection of Evatuation Worksheet

DOO: 1.4 {c)(WIP) FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024{!)[1) (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 jc){WIP)

containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable thrcat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United :States.
Khafrullah Said

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

W.ali Khairkhwa

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evatuation w.orksheet

ISN: AF·57:9

8

DOD: 1.4 (c)
(WIP)

IDOJ: OPP (WIFJ

DOD: 50 U.S.C. § jDOJ: OPP (WIF)
3024(1)11) (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) [WIP) FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(1)(1] (WIP)

assessment of identifiable threot(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Sal.am Al·
Ghi:zzawi
ISN: lv.654

rl: (7)(Q.(D),(E)
(WIP)

FBl{WJP)

I

containing the Task N:rrce's candid

Abdul Hamid

DOO(WIP)

IFBI: 50 u.s.c. §
3024(i)il) (WIP)

assessment of identifiable threat(s}

Emad Abdallah

DOl: OPP {WIF)

Cover Pa.ge of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Works.heet;

9

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing d"~e Task Force's-c:an-dld
<tS$essment of ldentlfiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the

DOD: l.4(c)
(WIP)

I

DOD: 10 U.5.C. § IOOJ: OPP {WIF)
424

1001 (WI?)

ID01: (7JICJ(WIPJ

IOODjWIP)

IFBI: (7){C],(EJ
(WIP)

FBI (WIP)

IDOD(WIP)

IFBI: {7)(C) {WIP)

jFBI {WJP)

IDOO(WIP)

IFBI: (7)1C),{E)
(WIP)

FBI (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WW) FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3D24(i)(I) (WIP)

national security nf the United States.
Abdul al~Azii

Cover Pa.ge of Guantanamo Review

Abduh Abdullah Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Ali Al Suwaydi
ISN: YM·578

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
contain.Ing the Task Force's-candid
assessment of Identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the

I

10

1000: 1.4 (c)
(WIP)

IDOJ: OPP (Wlf)
I

IFBl{WlP)

IFBI: (7JIC),(E)
(WIP)

national securlty of the United States.

TOP SECRE:f,l/Sll/ORCONl}~IOFORN

oro

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 59 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 5of18
+oP 5bGRi+#S~t,!QRa)PJ.} 1!NG~O~PI
Jam<il
Muhamma:d
Alwai
ISN:YM-577

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

12

Task Force Evaluat1on Worksheet;

Subsection of Evaloatio·n Worksheet
containing the: Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiabte threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the

DOD: 1.4 la), lb),
lcJ, lrl), (g) {WIP)

DOI: OPP (WIF)

FBI (WIP)

FBI: 17JIC).(E)
(WlP)

DOJ: DPP {WIF)

DODIWIP)

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
IWIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP) 302411)11) (WIPJ

national security of the Un'ited States.
Z;;iharOm;;ir

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Hamb; bin

Task Force Evalu~tion Worksheet;
Subsection of Ev:alu<Jtion Work-she-et

Hamdoun

ISN: YM-576

containing the Task Force1s.candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Saa'd Na$.Ser
Moqbll af·Azani
ISN:YM-575

Cover Page: of Guantanamo Review

9

OOD: 1.4 la); (c), DOD: 50 U.S.C. §
lg] (WIP)
3024(;)(1} (WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (cj (WIP) FBI: 50 U.5.C. §
3024li)(1J {WIP)

8

Task Force Ev<iluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containlng the Task Force's candid
,assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentially pos.erl by detainee to thenational .security of the United States.

DOD: 1.4 la), (b), DOD: 10 U.S.C. §
424(WIP)
lcJ, (rl) (WIP)

DOJ: DPP (WIF)

DOD (WIP)

FBI: l7}{C),(EJ
(WJP)

FBllWIP}
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

1

F81: 50 U.5.C. §
3024li}{l) (WIP)

1

H•mood Abdulla \Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Hamood
T11sk Force Evaluation Worksheet;
1SN: YM·S74
Subsection of Evaluation W<lrksheet

13

DOD: 1.4 (a), {c) FBI: 50 U.5.C. §
(WIP)
3024(i)(lj !WIP}

DOJ: OPP (WIFj

DOD (WIP)

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
IWIP)

FB1(WIP)

containing the Task Force's candid

FBI: 1.4 (<) (WIP)

assessment cf identifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States,
Safah
Mohammad
S;alih al·Ohabi
ISNcYM-572

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection. of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s)
po-tent1a11y po-sed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

9

DOD: 1.4 lb), lcJ,
ld)(WIP)

DOD: 10 U.5.C.
424(WIP)

DOJ: OPP IWIF)

DOD{WIPj

FBJ: {7)(C),IE)
(WlP)

FBI (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) {WIP) FBlc 50 U5.C. §
3024(1){1) {WIPI

TOP

SECR:E+J/.Sl,l{O'f~CO~l//~JOFOR~J

004

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 60 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 6of18
'+OP SGGRe::i;t,!Sl/fQ'ROON#l!IQ~QRfll

Sabrl

Cover Page of Gu<intanamo ReView

Muhammad

Task Force Eva[uation Workshi;!et;

Ibrahim al·

Subsection of Evaluation Work$heet
containing the Task Force's-candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Qurashi
ISN:YM-570

Mohammad

Sulayman Barre
ISN:S0·567

Cover Page of Guantanamo lleview
Task Force- Evaluation- Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

9

11

Ja!al Salam Awad Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Awad
Task Force Ev<iluation Worksheet:
lSN: YM·564
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifi.;ible threat(s)
potentially pos.ed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

8

I

I(WIP)
FBI: {7){C),[E)

DOD: l.4 (a], [cl
{WIP)

DOD: 10 U.S.C. §
424 (WIP)

l°OJ: OPP {WIF)

IOOO(WIP)

IFBI: (7){C),{E)
{WIP)

FBI{WIPJ

6

Hoji Wali
Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Muhammed !SN: Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
AF-S-60
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment ofldentifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

DOD[WIP)

FBI: 1.4 {c) {WIP) FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024[1)[1) (WIPJ

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluat~on Worksheet
containing the Task force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s}
potentially-posed by detainee .to the
national -security of the United States.

MutayaAli
ISN: YM-566

DOJ: OPP [WIF)

FBfiWIP)

assessment of identifiable thrc.at(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
m:itional security of the United States.

Mohamed

DOD: 10 U,S.C, §
424[WIP)

FBI: L4 (c) [WIP) FBk 50 U.S.C. §
3024[i)[l) (WIP)

containing the Task Force's·candid

Mansour

DOD: 1.4 [c), [g]
[WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (a). [b), fBI: 50 U.S.C. §
(c), (d) (WIP)
3024(;}(1) (WIP)

OOJ: OPP (W!F)

I

DOD(WIP)

FBI: (7)(C) {WIP)

!FBI (WIP)

fBl: 1.4 (c} (WIP)

DOD: L4 [c), (g)
(WIP)

OOD: 10 U.S.C. §
424

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 [c)
[WIP)

FBI: 50 U.5.C. §
3024{i){l) [WIP)

OOJ: OPP (WIF)

DOD{WIP)

FBI: (7)(C).(E)
[WIP)

FBI (WIP)

11

DOJ: OPP (Wlf)

DOD(WIP)

FBI: [7)(C),[E)
{WIP)

FBl[WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) [WIP)

TOPS i.CR'fl//Sl//ORCON//NQFORN

005

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 61 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 7 of 18
+oP: S t;c;;RS:S:,','Sl/,lOR(;QPl,f/filQ~Q;RN

Abdel Al Saleh
ISN:YM·91

I

Cover Pag:e of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid

7

DOD: 1.4 (b), [c). FBI: 50 U.S.C, §
(d){WJP)
3024(;){1) (WIP)

OOJ: OPP (Wlfj

DOO(WIP)

FBI: (7){C).[D),{Ej
(WJPj

FBl(WJP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

assessment of identifiabte thrcat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to-the'
national security of the United States.

Polad Sabir Oglu Cover P:agc of Guantanamo Review
,Sirajov
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
1
!SN: AJ-89
Subsection oft:vatuation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's.- candid
a:sse-ssment of identifiable thrcat(s)

7

DOD: 1.4 (c)
[WIP)

I
DOD: so u.s.c. § IOOJ:. OPP {WIF)
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

I
IFBJ (WIP)

I
IFBI: (7)(C) (WJPj

FBI: 1.4 {c){WIP) FBI: SQ U.S.C. §
3024(11(1) (WJP)

potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Aasmi Matruq

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Mohammnd

Task force Evaluation Worksheet;

Assa mi
ISN: SA·49

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the: Task Forte's candid
assessment of identifiabte threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to· the
national security of the United States,

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Rajah Sadiq Abu Task Force Evaluation Worksheet:
Ghanlm
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task force's candid
ISN:YM·44
Muhammed

8

DOD: 1.4 (c}
(WlP)

!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

11

OOD:L4(c)
(WIP)

000: so u.s.c. § OOJ: OPP (Wlf)
3024(1)(1), ID
U.S.C. § 424 (WJP)

FBI: (7l{C),(E)
(WIP)

OOD(WIP)

FBI: (7j[C),(E)
(WJP)

FBl(WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)
FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3D24(1)il) {WIP)

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

DOD; 1.4 (a), (c), DOD: SO U.S.C. §
lg) (WIP)
3024!1){1) (WIP)

Subsecticn of Ewluation Worksheet
containing the T:ask Force's candid

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

a'Ssessment of identifiable threat{s)

DDD(WIP)
FBJ(WJP)

potentially posed by detainee to the
natiorial security of the United States.

Hasan Moqbil
ISN: YM-43

DOJ: DPP (WIF)

FBI: 1.4 (c) !WJP) FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

as!>essment of identifiable :rhreat{s}

Sami:r N<iji Al

DOD: 50 U.S.C. §
3024fo)(l) {WJP)

8

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

DOD(WJP)

FBI: (7)(CJ,(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024[1)(1) {WIP)

potentially posed by dctalnee to the
national security -0f the United States.

TOP SECR"if/#Jlh'QR,·QPlf/NOFORN

006

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 62 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 8 of 18
TOP SliCRErf/Slh'QRGQPJh1 PIOJ:QRPI

Abd Al Rahman

Shalbl Isa
Uwaydah
ISN:SA-42

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

10

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force-'s candid

DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), 000: 50 u.s.c. §
Id), (g) (WIP)
3024(i)il) (WIP}

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

DOD(WIPI

'FBI: {7)(CJ,(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP) fBI: 50 U.$ . C. §
3024(i)(1) (WIP)

assessment of identifiable threat(s)

potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Abdel Qadir Al-

Mudafari
ISN:YM-40

Majid Mahrnud

Abdu Ahmed
ISN:YM41

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluatlon Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task force's candid
asse:s$-ment of identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

7

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task For~e's candid
assessment cf identifiable threot(s}
potentially posed by detainee ro the
national security of the United States.

10

Abd AJ·Satam Al· Cover Page.of Guantanamo Review
Hilah
Task Force Evaluation. ~'ark.sheet;
ISN:YM-1463
Subsectlon o! Evnluation Worksheet
contain frig the Task Force's candid
assessment ofidentifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by deta·inee to the
national security of the United States.

Abdul Rahman
Abmed

ISN: YM-441

DOD: 1.4 (c), (g)
(WIP)

OOD: 50 U.S.C. § !°OJ: OPP (WIF)
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

I

FBI: 17l(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP) FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024[i){1) (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (c)
(WIP)

DOD: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(;)(1) [WIP)

I

001: OPP (WIF)

IDOD{WIP)

'FBI: (7)(C),(EJ
(WJP)

FBl{WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP) FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP]

9

DOD: 1.4 (a), le),
(g) (WIP)

I

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(Q(1} (WIPJ

IDOJ: OPP (Wlfj

IDOD(WIP)

'FBI: (7)((),{Di.(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP]

I
Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evafuatiori Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Tas_k Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
pot~ntially posed by detainee to the
notional security of the United States.

IDOD(WIP)

11

DOD: 1.4(a).{c), IFBl: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

1001: OPP (WtF)

IDOD(WIP)

(g) (WIP)

I

FBI: (7](C),{E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

TOP SECR~/}Slf/ORCONHAIOI=ORN

007

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 63 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 9 of 18
:f-OP St;,Rr;r.f./Sl1l/.OROON//.NOFQRfll
Ahmed Yaslam
Said Kuman

Cover Pag.e of Guantanamo Revte·w
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

ISN: YM·321

Subsection: of Evaluation Worksheet

11

DOD: 1.4 (b), (c),

DOD: SO U.$.C § IOOJ: OPP (WIF)

(d), fg) {WI?)

3044{1)11). 10
U.$.C. § 424(WIP)j

containing the Task Force's candid
assessment ,of tdentifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

JDOD (WIP)

[FBI: (7)(C) {WIP)

JFBl{WIP)

lfBI:

SO U.S.C §
3024(1)tl) (WIP)

national security of the United States.

Khalid Ahmed

Qasim
ISN: YM-242

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Eva Iuation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

9

DOD: 1.4 {a), (c),

so u.s.c.

{g),(WIP)

DOD:
§ IDOi: OPP (WIF}
3024{;1(1) (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c} (WIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C §

\°OD!WIP}

IFBI: {7)!C).[E)
(WIP)

FBI (WIP)

containing the Task Farce's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the

3024(1)!1) {WIP)

n;:itional security of the United States.

Abd nl·Rahman
Sulayman
ISN:YM·223

Abu Bakr ibn Ali
Mtthilmmadal
Ahdal

ISN: YM-171

Sharaf Ahmad
Muhammad
Mas'ud
ISN:YM·170

9

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Task Force··Evaluatlon Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluatiori Worksheet
containjngthe Task Force's-candid
assessment of identifiable thrcat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to then<ltional -secUrlty of the United States.

DOD: 1.4 (c), (g)
(WIP)

IOOD(WIP)

r l : (7j(C),(O),{E)
(WIP)

Fal(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (b),{c),(d) FBI: SD U.S.C. §

10

Cover Page of Guantariamo R!!Vle\V
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Sllbsection of Evatuation Worksheet
containing the Task '.Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s.j
p·otential!y posed by detainee to the
national :security of the Unlted States.

(WIP)

3024(i)(l) (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (a). (c],

FBI: SO U.5.C §

{gl(WIPJ

3024{i){l) {WIP)

8

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

000: 1.4 (b), (c).

I
IDOJ: DPP {WIF)

I

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

Cover-Page of Guantanamo Review-

(d){WIP)

DOD: 50 U.S.C §
3024(1){1), 10

FBI' 1.4 {c) (WIP)

{WI?)

1001: OPP {WIF)

u.s.c. §424

Subsection of Evatuation Worksheet

containing the Task fotc:e's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentf;:illy posed by detain~e to the
national security of the United States.

u.s.c.

000,50
§ IOOJ: OPP (Wlf)
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

I

I

DOD{WIP)

FBI: (7)(C) (WIP}

jFBl{WIP)

l°OD{WIP)

IFBto l7)(C),{EJ
[WIP}

FBl{WIP)

I FBI: 50 u.s.c §
3024(1)(1) IWIPJ

TOP SiatET/{Sl//QRCON}/NOFfdR N

008

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 64 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 10of18
+GP 51!;~R&:fl 1lSfh!QR,QNff~IQFQRN
Khalid Abrl Al

Jab bar
Muhammad
UthmanA1

Qadasl
!SN:YM·163

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet~

Subsection of Ev<:iluation Worksheet
containing the Task force's candid
assessment of identlfiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the

I

6

I

jDOJ: DPP (WIF)

jDOD {WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), DOD: 50 USC.§ !°OJ: OPP {WIF)
3024(i)il) {WIP)

/°OD(WIP)

j,DOD: 1.4 {aJ, (c)
{WIP)

national security of the United States.

Adham

Cover Page ·of GtJantanamo Review

Mohamed Ali

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

Awad
ISN:YM-llB

Subsection of Ev.:iluation Worksheet
containin.g the Task Forte's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potentfally-posed by detainee to the
national :Security-of the United States.

9

{dj {WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP) FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024{i)i1) (WIP)

Abdel Malik
Ahmed Abdel

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Wahab Al Rahabi Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
ISN:YM~37
contalning th·e· Task Force's candid
ass.essment of identifiable thre<Jt(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national Sf!CUrfty of the United States.

B

Ibrahim Othman Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Ibrahim Idris
Task Force Evaluation Worksh-eet;
ISN:SU-36
Subs.ectl'on of Evalu11tion Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of idetitifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States_

11

Ahmed Umar

Abdullah alHik.iml
ISN:YM·30

IFBI: (7)(C).1£)
{WIP)

DOD: 1.4 {a), (cj, /'Bl: 50 USC.§
{g) {WlP)
3024{0(1) {WIP)

IDOJ: OPP (WIF]

IDOO{WIP)

I

IFBl{WIPJ

IFB1: (7)(CI (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c) rl= so u.s.c. § IDOJ: OPP {WIF)
(WIP)
302<1(l)(1) (WIP)

l°OD {WIP)

IFBI: (7){C),(D),(E)
IWIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)
(WIP)

Cover Pa.ge of Guanranamo Review
Task Forc-c Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
contalning the Task Force's candid
I
assessm.ent of ideotiflable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national .security of the Unlted States..

)

12

IDOD: 1.4 {a), (c), IFBI: SO u.s.e, § IDOJ: OPP (WIF)
(g) (WIP)
302401(1) (WIP)

IFBl(WIP)

IFBI: (7)1C),{E)
(WIP)

IFBI: 1.4 (c)IWIP)

TQP SECRli:rJ/lil,t,'ORl:Glll/#IOl'QRlll

009

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 65 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 11of18
:;gp SEGRe+,~!Sl//ORGQPl/J.~PIOFQRN

Mohammed al·
Ansi

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
T.ask force Evaluation Worksheet;

15N:YM·29

Subsection of Evatuation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid

9

DOD: l.4 {a). {cl. fBt 50 U.S.C. §
(g)(WIP)
3024(i](1) (WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WIFI

OOO(WIP)

FBI: (7/IC),(D),(E)
{WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: lA (cl {WIP)

assessm·ent of identifiable threat{s)

potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Moath Hamza

Cover Page of Goantanamo Review

Ahmed Al~Alwi

Task forc:e Evaluation Worksheet;

000: 1.4 (a). (cl rBJ: 50 U.S.C. § )°OJ: OPP (WIF)
(WI?)
3024(iJll) {WIP)

ISN:YM-2&

Subsection of Cvaluatlon Worksheet
containing the Task Force's c;indid

FBI: l.4 (c) (WIPJ

10

IOOD(WIP)

IFBI: (7J(C),(El
(WIP)

FBI (WIP)

.assessment .of ldentifiablethreat(s}
potentiaUy posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Ulhman Abd a!M
Rahim
Muhammad
Uthm<in

ISN: YM·27

Al Khadr
Abdallah
Muhammad Al

Yafi
ISN:YM-34

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

,g

Tusk Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Eva!uatlon Works.heet
containing the. Task Forr:e's candid
assessment of identlfiable rhreat(s)
potent1ally posed by deta'inee to the
national security of the United States.

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subs.cction of Evaluation Worksheet
containing th~ Task Forte's Cilndid
assessment of id~ntifiable threat{s)

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c) IFBI: 50 u.s.c. §
(WIP)
3024(i)(1) (WIP)

IOOJ: OPP (WJF]

IDOD(WIP)

IFS!: (7)(CJ,(D).!E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: l.4 (c) (WIP)

9

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c],
(g) (WIP)

rl:

50 U'.S.C. §
3D24(i)(1) (WIP)

l°OJ: OPP (WIF)

l°OD(WJP)

IFBI: (7)(C),(D).IE)
(WIP)

FBl(Wl,P)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.
Mohammed Al·
Adahi
ISN: YM-33

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's cand!id
assessment of identifiable thr.eat{5)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of-the United States.

9

000: 1.4 (c), (g)
(WIP)

DOD: 10U.S.C. § IOOJ: OPP IWJFJ
424(WlP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(11(1) (WIP)

IOOD(WJP)

IFS!: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)

TOP SECRE:r,l/Sl//.QRbGN//PJOFORPl

010

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 66 of 129

Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 12of18
+QP SEGRr;f./.1l!;,l//.Oat:::.QN 1~l~IQPORN

Faruq AH Ahmed Cover Pag_e of Guantanamo Revi:ew·
JSN:YM~32
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Eval.uation Worksheet
containing the Task force's candid

&

DOD: L4ic]
(WIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(1){1) (WIP)

IDOJ: OPP [WIF)

IDOD(WIP)

I

FBI: [7)(C),(E)
{WIP)

FBI {WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

assessment of Identifiable threat(s)
potent!ally p:os.ed by detainee tc the
national securhy of the Un~ted States.

Abdul Haq Wasiq Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

ISN: AF-04

15

Task Forte Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
asses'sment of identifiabfe threat(s}

DOD: 1.4 (c)
[WIP)

IFBI: 50 u.s.c. §
3024(i){1) (WIP)

IDDJ: OPP {WIF)

1000 (WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C).(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

potentially posed by detainee to the

national security of the Unlted States.

MuLlah Norullah Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Noori
Task Force Elr.lluafion Worksheet;
ISN: AF·06
Subsecti-on of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's cnndid
assessment of identifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee tO· the
national security of the United States.

11

Mullah

12

Cover Page of Guanta·namo Review
Mohammed Fazl Task torte Evaluation Worksheet;
lSN:AF-07
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
co'ntainlng the Task For:ee's candid
assessment -0f identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the Unlted States.

Fahed Abdullah
Ahmad Ghazl
1SN:YM~26

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
I
containing the: Task Force's ca11did
assessment of 1dendfrable threat(s.)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

DOD: 1.41<)
(WIP)

DOD: SO U.S.C. ~ l°OJ: OPP (WIF)
3024(i)il) (WIP)

IDOD (WIP)

IFB1: {7](C),(D),(E)
(W1P)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) IWIP) FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (a), (cl
(WIP)

DOD: SO u.s.c. § IDOJ: OPP (WIF)
3024(1)11) (WIP)

IOOD(WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C],(D),(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 jc) (WIP) FBl: SO U.S.C. §
3024{i)(l) (WIP)

6

IDOD: 1.4 (c)(WIP) IFBI: SO U.S.C. 9
3024{iH 1) (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c )!WJP)

I

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

TOP SiC:R'1'}/.Sl//ORCOPJ//NOmR.N

IDOD(WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WlP)

FBl(WIP)

011

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 67 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 13of18
lQP SECRE+/1fSl//OR,Or..l//NOFORr>J

Mahmud Abd Al Cover Page· of Guantanamo Revie-\o,i
Aziz Al Mujahid Task Force Evaluatlon Worksheet;
ISN:YM-31
Subsection of Ev<iiuation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s')
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

6

Tawfiq Nas;ir
Awad Al-Bihanl
ISN;YM-893

ll

Abdu'JQawi
!SN: AF·l030

Mohammed
Kamin
ISN: Af·1045

Mohammed
Zahir
l'SN: AF· 1103

jFBI: {7)(C) (WIP)

IFBl(WIP)

FBI: SD U.S.C §
3024ji)(l) jWIP}

DOD: 1.4 (a). (c), FBI: SD U.S.C. §
(g)(WIP)
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

DOJ; DPP (WIF)

DOD{WIP)

FBl:(7JtC).(E)
{WIP)

, FBI (WIP)

8

Task Force Evalu;;ition Worksheet;
Subsection of'Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Task Foret? Eval.uation Worksheet;
Sub-"$ection of Ev~luation Worksheet
contaln Ing the Task Force's candid
as.se.ssment of identifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
nation.al :security of the- United States.

1000 (WIP)

FBI: l.4 (c) IWIP)

Cover Page of Guantanamo Re.view

rover Page of Guantanamo Review

DOD; 10 u.s.c. § IDOJ; DPP (WIF)
BOb(WIP)
I

FBI: l.4 {cl (WIP)

Cover !'age of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet:
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Farce's candid
assessment of Identifiable- thre-at(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United Stat-es.

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsectlon of Evaluation Wor!Gheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of ident1fiab1e threar(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

DOD: 1.4 {a), {c),

{&I (WIP)

DOD: l.4 (c)
IWIP]

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(1)(1) (WIP]

DOJ; OPP (WIF)

FBI (WIP)

FBI: (7JIC).(E)
(WIP)

DOD(WIP)

FBI: j7}(C),(EI
jWIP)

FBI: l.4 (c) (WIP)

I

5

IDOD: l.4 (a), (c), I

IDOJ: OPP (WIF)

(g)IWIP)

13

DOD: l.4 (c); jg)
(WIP)

DOD: SO U.5.C. §
3024(i)(1! IWIP)

DOJ; OPP (WIF)

FBI (WIP}
FBI; 50 U.S.C. §
FBI; 1.4 (c) (WIP) 3024(iJll}{WIP)

TOP SEGRF:r//-Sl/{.QRCQPJ//MOFORN

012

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 68 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 14of18
+GP SEGR~lSl,£,CQRc;QpJ 1f,lfl,Ql=QRN
A\'1ra)Gul

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review·

ISN:AF·782

Task Force Evaluation Worl::sheet;

H

DOD: L4(c)

000: 50 U.S.C. § 100J: OPP '{WlF)

[WIP)

3024(;)(1) {WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

fBl: 50 U.S.C. §

I

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

containing the, Tas:k Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s)

IOOO(WIP)

!FBI: (7J(C) (WIP)

IFBllWIP)

30240)(1) (WIP)

pOtentfatly posed by detainee to the

national security of the United States.

Mohammad

7

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Nabi-Omarl !SN: Task For-ce Evaluation Worksheet;

I

AF-832

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
contain'lng, the Task Force's candid
assessment or identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to· the
national security of the United States.

Mohammed

Gover Page of Guantan:amo Rcvi·ew
Task Force Evaluation Workshe.~t;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the: Task Force's <:andTd
assessment of identifiable thrcat{s}
potentially pos.ed' by detainee to the
n<itional security of'the United States.

&

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection_ of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Tas.k Force's candid
assessment of identiftabl'e threat(s}
potentlalfy posed by detainee to the
I: national security of the United States.

6

Abdul Malik
Baja bu
ISN: KE·1002S

lnayatullilh
ISN: AF-10028

IDOD: L4(c)
(WlP)

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c),

1000:50 U.S.C. § jDOJ: DPP(WIF)

IDOD{WIP)

3024{1)(1) {WlP)

(g)(WIP)

DOD: 50 U.S.C. § l°OJ: OPP (Wlf)
3024(1)11) (WlP)

FBI: 1.4 (cj {WIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §

IDOD(WIP)

IFBl: (7){C).(E)
(WIP)

FBl (W!P)
3024(1)(1} (WlP)

!i

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c),

DOD: 50 U.S.C.

{g)(WIP)

3024(1)(1) (WlP)

DOJ: OPP (WlF)

DOO{WIP)

FBl: p)(C},(E)
(WlP)

FBI (WIP]
FBI: 1.4 (c} {WIP)

FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(1){1} (WlP)

TOP SiGR&T/}Sll/OROON//NOFORN

013

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 69 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 15of18
+GP SiQ!H,l,4il/,£QR~QN,tiNQFQRN

Sulaiman Awath Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Silaiman Bin
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Agell Al Nahdl
ISN:YM·Sll

Cover ?age of Guantanamo Review
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;

Rabei'i
ISN: YM·S08

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

IFBI: (7){C).{E)
(WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

7

DOD: 1.4 {a), (b), IDOD: 50 u.s.c. § IDOJ: OPP (WIF)
3024(i)(l), l0
U.S.C. § 424 (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)
FBI: so u.s.c. §
3024[i]{l) (WIP)

\°OD{WIP)

(c), {d), (g) (WIP)

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing-the Task force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potentlallyposed by detainee to the
national security o.f the United :States.

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

IOOO{WIP]
FBI {WIP)

containing the Task force.'st:andid
assessn1ent of identifiable threat{s)
potentiallyposed by detainee to the
national s-ecurity of the United States.

Nasir Yahl
KhussrofKai::a:z
ISN:YM·S09

Mohammad

DOD: l.4 (a], (c), FBI: SO U.S.C. §
(g)(WIP)
3024(1)(1) (\VIP)

Subsection of Evalu<itlon·worksheet

Mohammed

Salman Yahya
Hassan

9

IFBI: {7){C),(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)

I

9

Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Ev;iluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candld
assessment of identifiable threat{s)

DOD: l.4 (c). [g)
(WIP)

DOD: so U.5.C. § IDOJ: OPP (WIF)
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

!°OD{WIP)

IFBI: (7){C).(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 I<) (WIP) fBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024{i)(1) (WIP)

potentially posed by detainee to the

national security of the United States.

Mohammed

KhaJid Salih alDhuby
iSN;YM~'506

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force EvaltJation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task force's candid
as_sessment of identifiable threat{s}
potentfa!Jy posed by detainee to the
nation-al security of t·he United States.

6

DOD: 1.4 (c)
{WIP)

DOD: 10 u.s.c. § IDOJ: OPP {WIF)
424 {WIP)

1°00 (WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C),{E)
{WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP) FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

+Q.p..S.iCRET//Sl/,'GRCOM//PlOFQRN

014

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 70 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 16of18
+GP

Has<1n Zamlri

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

ISN: AG-533

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task force's candid
assessment of identifiable thrcat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to.the
nation-al security of the United States.

6

SGGREW~1.~£QR,QP,/ilNOa::QRP~

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c),
(g)(WIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(;)(1} (WIP)

DOJ: OPP (Wlfj

I

FBI: 1.4 (c) {WIP)

!DOD {WIP}

\FBI: (?){C)(WIP)

jFBl(WIP)

I

V:assim Qasim
Mohammed
lsmalJQasim
!SN: VM-522

8

Cover Page of Guanta name Review
Task Force Evaluatlon Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task force's candid
assessment of Identifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee t0- the
nat.iona! security of the United States.

Mahrar RafutAI· Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Quv;ari
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
!SN: WE·S19
Subsection of EvaJunUon Woi'ksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment ofidentrfiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national se·curfty cf the United States.

Said A!·Asani
ISN:YM~ 554

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Forte Evahmlion Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assess:ment ofid-ent~fiable threat{s}
potentia·uy posed by detainee to the
n:ationa! security of the United States.

DOD: SO U.S.C. §
3024(1)(1} {WIP)

FBl: 1.4 {c) {WIP}

FBI: 50 U.5.C.. §
3024{1)(1) (WIP)

DOJ: OPP {WIF)

OOD{WIP)

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
{WIP)

FBl(WIP)

I

4

I

5

I

I

1:ahml Salem

DOD: l.4(n), (c),
{g)(WIP)

I
I

DOD: 1.4 (a)
(WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (c}
(WIP)

I

u.s.c.

IFBI: SD
§
3024(1){1) {WIP)

jDOJ: OPP (WIF)

jDOO{WIP)

IDOJ: OPP {WIF)

!FBI (WIP}

IFBI: {7](C) {WIP}

IFBI: L4 (c) {WIP)

+oP SECR&+//S~'/ORCOPJ/{PJQFORN

015

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 71 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 17 of 18
+OP SEGRE+,l,41,t/ORGQll/,lNQ>QRPI
Abdul KhaJed Al· Cover Page of Guantanamo Reviev.,r
Baydani
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
lSN: SA- 5S3
Subsection of Evafuation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s}
potentfaJly posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

6

Faez Mohammed Co1J·er Page: of Guantanamo Review

10

Ahmed Al·

Task Force Evaluation Work!;heet;

Kandari

Subsection ofEvafuation Worksheet

flSN: KU·SS2

containing the T.c:isk 'Fon:e's candid

assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potenti.alryposed by detainee to-the
national security of the United States.

Fouad Mahmud

Hasan Al Rabia
!SN: KU·5Sl

Walid Said bin
Said Zald
ISN:YM-550

000: 1.4 {a), (c),
{g)(WIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(1)(1) {WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

DOO{WIP)

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
{WlP)

FBI (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (a), {c), DOD: SO U.S.C. §
(g)(WIP)
3024(i)[l) {WIP)

r·=

I

Cover Page of Guanta-namo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsectlon of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task fon:::e's candid
assessment of identifi;ible threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

16

Cover Page of Guantanamo Revi.ew
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsectlon of Evaluation Work>heet
containing the Task Force's cand.td
a:ssessment of identifiable thr<eat{s}
potentfal!y posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

7

DOJ: OPP {WIF)

FBl(WIP)

FBI: (7){C) (WIP)

DOJ; OPP {WIF)

DOO[WIP)

FBI: [7)(C),{E)
(WIP)

1.4 {c) {WIP) IFBI: so u.s.c. §
3024(1)(1) [WIP)

DOD: 1.4 {a), {c),
{g)(WIP)

DOD: 10 U.S.C. §
424(WIP)

FBI [WIP}
FBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP) FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (c)
(WIP)

DOD: SO U.S.C. § IDOJ: OPP (WIF)
3024(1)(1); 10
§ 424 (WIP)

u.s.c.

I

IDOO(WIP)

!FBI: {7){C) (WIP}

Jrn1 {WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)
FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(1)(1) {WIP]

~~

016

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 72 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 18 of 18
+GP 5E,FUi+f1lSl/fQRCGNHNOFGRN
Umar Said Sa'lim Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Al· Dini
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
ISN: YM-549
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
c:ont<1lningthe iask Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

6

DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), DOD: 10 U.S.C. li
{<), (d) (WIP)
424 {WIP)

Mohammed

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

6

Has.him

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of EWJluation Worksheet

DOD: 1.4 (al, {c) IFBI: 50 u.s.c. !i
(WIP}
3024(;){1) [WIP)

ISN:AF-850

DOt OPP (WIF)

!om

OPP (WIF)

IDOD(WIP)

IDOO(WIP)

rl: (7){C),(E)
•(WIP}

FBl(WIP)

containingth:e Tas.k Force's candid

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

asst?ssment of klentlfiab!e threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national securlty of the Unfte:d.Stat-e5.

HusaynSalim
Muhammad at-

Matarl Y:afui
lSN:YM-1015

Mohammad
Mustafa Sohail
Bahazada
lSN: AF-1008

I
Cover Page of Guantanamo Revtew
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Tnsk Force's candfd
asses~ment offdent1fiabie threat(s)
potentially poset:I by detain~e to the
national security of the United States.

6

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Fo-rce Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of f1Jaluatton Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
a.ssessment of Identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
nati;onal security of the Unitt"d States.

9

DOO: 1.4 (a), (c],
{g)(WIP)

FBI: SO U.5.C §
3024F)!1) (WIPJ

DOJ: OPP ,(WIF)

DOO(WIP)

FBI: (7)(C),{E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
(c), (d) (WIP)
3024(;){1) (WIPJ

OOJ: OPP (WIF)

OOO(WIP)

FBI: (7JIC),(O)
(WIP)

FBI (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

TGP >ECR6+NS1/{GRCGN/,tMGFGRM

017

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 73 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 1of18
+oP SEGRi;+/fSl,l,IQRGOPl/,£PIOFQRPI
Karim Bostan

ICover Page of Guantanamo Review

ISN: AF·975

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee too the
national security of the United States.

Sha:rifullah

\Cover Page: of Guantanamo Review

ISN: AF·944

Task force Evaluation Worksheet;

18

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c),
(&) (WIP)

DOD: 50 U.5.C. §
3024(1){1) {WIP)

DOJ: OPP {WIF)

DOD{WIP)

IFBI: (7JIC),(El
(WIP)

FBI (W!P)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WlP) FBI: 50 U.5.C. §
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

15

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c),
(g) (WIP)

SUbsection of Evaluation Worksheet

I

DOJ: OPP (WJF)

DOD(WlP)

I

IFBI (WIP)

FBI: (7)(CJ (WIP)

containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of·identffiabfe threat(s}
potentfally posed by detainee to the

nation.1l security of the United States.

1.Abdul Ghani
tsN: AF·934

6

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Task Force Evalu:ation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaruation Worksheet
containing. the Task Force's candid

DOD: 1.4 (a).(c),
(WIP)

:fBI: SI) U.S.C §
3024(1)11) (WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WJF)

DOO(WJP)

FBI: (7J(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBl{WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

assessment of idenrifiable threat(s}
potentl111ly posed by detainee to the
national secufity of the United .States.

Khi Ali Gui
ISN:AF-928

\Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Ev;i,!uati-on \Vorksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(sl
potentt;illy posed by detainee to the
national sect.irity of the United States.

9

DOJ
DOD: 1.4 (a), (c),
(g)(WIP)

I

FBI; SO U.5.C §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

DOJ; OPP (WlF)

DOO(WIP)

I

IFBl(WIP)

FBI: (7)(C) fWIP)

IFBI: l.4 (c) (WIP)

TOP SECRi+//Sl}{GRCOfrlf/NOfQRN

018

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 74 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27117 Page 2of18
TOP SibRgf.!Sl/-;lQR,QPlf/filQFQRPI

Shawali Khan
ISN:AF~899

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;

11

000: 1.4 (a), le),
lg) [WJP)

DOD: 50 U.S.C, § jDOJ: OPP (WIF)
3024(illl) (WIP)

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing_ the Task Force's candid

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP) FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

assessment ofidenlifrabte threat(s}

I

IDOO(WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C) (WlP)

jFBI (WIP)

potentlally posed by detainee to the

national security of the United States.

Ahmld Al Razak
ISN: AF·l119

Cover Page of Guant<inamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Eva!u.ation Worksheet
contail'ling the Task Force's candid

11

DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
(d) (WIP)
3024(il(l) (WIP)

001: OPP (WIF)

DOD(WJP)

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FB!(WIP)
FBI: 1.4{c) (WIP)

assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Mohammed

Rahim
ISN: AF-1104

Haroon al·

Afghani
ISN: AF-3148

I

Cover Page of Guontanamo Review
Task Force Eva!uatio-n Worksheet;

11

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
a-ssessment of1dentifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

tover Page of Guantanamo Reviev1
Task For<e Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Wor'ksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment-of 'identifiab!~ threat(s)
'potenttally posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

9

DOD: 1.4 (c)
(WIP)

DOD: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(;j{l) (WJP)

DOJ: OPP {WIF)

fBI: L4 (c) {WIP)

FBI: SO U.S,C. §
3024(1){1) (WIP)

DOD:lA(c)
(WIP)

DOD: 50 u.s.c. § I DOJ: OPP (Wlf)
3024(1){1) (WlP)

FBI: L4 (cj (WlP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(1)11) {WIP)

I

DOO{WIP)

FBI: {7j(C) (WlP)

IFBJ (WlP)

IDOD(WIP)

!FBI: (7){C),(E)
{WJP)

FBl(WIP)

1

WP S:£CR;e+h'Sl/1tQRCON// PIOF-ORPi

019

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 75 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 3of18
T-OP SE'-'R&T//Sl//.Q'RGQPl//PIQFQRN

Mjuayn A!·Din

I

Cover Page of Guanranamo Review

8

Jamal Al·Din Abd Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Al Fadhil Abd Al· Subsection of Evafuation Worksheet
Sattar
contalnlng the Task Force's candld
lSN: UAE- 309

I

DOD: 1 ..4 (a), (bl,
(<), (d). lg) [WIP) FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(1)11) (WIP]

jDOJ: OPP (WIF)

IDOD (WIP)

fBl: (7)(C),(E)
{WIP)

I

IFBI (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national .security of the United States.

Fadhel Hussein
Saleh Hentif
ISN:YM-259

Riyad Atiq Ali
Abdu A!·Haj
ISN:YM-256

Cover Page- of Guant<inamo Review

5

Task Force Evaluation Workshf!et;

Subsection of Evatu.atio:n Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment offdentifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by deta'inee to the
natfona.t s:ecurity of the United States.

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
;Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
5-ubsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing: the Task Force's candid

DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), DOD: 50 U.5.C, § [DOJ: OPP (WIF)
3024(i)(l); 10
U.S.C. § 424 (WIP)

DOD(WIP)

(d)[WIP)

FBI; (7}(C),{E)
{WIP)

FBl(WIP)

FSI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)
FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(i){l) (WIP)

7

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), IFBJ: 50 U.S.C.§

Isl 1w1P1

IOOJ: DPP (WIF)

IOOD (WIP)

3024111<111w1p1

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WJPI

FBl(WIP)

assessment offdentifiabte threat(s)

FBl:l.4 {<) (WIP)

potentially posed by detainee to the
n-ational seci.Jrity of the United States.

Said Muhammad !Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Sa11h Hatim
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
ISN: YMN255
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable·threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
nntiona! security of the United States.

7

ODD: 1.4 (a), (c), IFBI: 50 U.S.C. §
[g) (WIPJ
3024(1){1) {WIP)

)DOJ: OPP (Wlf)

IDOO (WIP)

FBI: (J)(C) (WIP)

FBI (WIP]
FBl:l.4 (c)(WIP)

020

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 76 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 4 of 18
TOP SEGRET/lSl/.JQRCGPl//PlQFQRPI
Muhammad Ali !Cover Pag€' of Guantanamo Review
Husayn
Task Force_ Evaluation Worksheet;
Khanayna

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

lSN:YM-254

containing the Task Force's candid
assessment o'f identifiable threat(sl
potentlally posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

ICove:r

Muhammad Said
Pag!;! of Guantanamo Review
Salim Bin Salman Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
ISN: YM·251
Subsection ofEvalua'tion Worksheet

6

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), IFB!: 50 V.S.C. §
3024\;1{1) (WIP)

IDOJ: OPP (WTF)

IFBI (WIP)

(g) (WIP)

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FSl:l.4 (c) (WIP)

5

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c)
(WIPJ

FBI: SD V,S,C. §
3024(i)[l) (WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

OOD(WIP)

FBI: (7J(C) (WJP)

FBl{W!P)

containing the Task For<:e's candid

FBI: 1.4 (c} {WIP}

assessment of identifiable threat(s.)
potentially posed by-detainee to the

national security .of the United States.

Mohammed

Cover Page: of Guantanamo Review

Ahm·enSaid

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
cont<iining the Task force's candid

Haider

IS!N: YM-498

9

DOD: L4(a), (b).1000: lD U.S.C.§ IDOJ: OPP (WIF)
(cj, Id), (gJ (WIP) 424 (WIP)

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBl{WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c}(WIP) IFBI: 50 u.s.c. §
3024(iJ11J (WIP)

a-s-se:ssment of identifiable threatlsl

IDOD {WIP)

potentially posed by d'erain1'!e ro the
ntjtJonal security of the United States.

Abd al Rahman al!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Qyati
Task Force Eva[uaHon Worksheet;
ISN: YM-461
Subsection of Evalu.at1on Worksheet
containing the Task Force's-candid
assessment ·ofidentlfiable threat('s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States-.

4

DOD: 1.4 {a), (c), IFBI: SO U.S.C. §
(g) (WIP)
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

IDOJ: OPP (WIF)

jDOD (WIP)

FBI: (7JIC) {WIPJ

FBl(WIPl
FBl:l.4 {c) (WTPJ

TOP SECRiTf/S:l/lORWNHNOl=ORN

021

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 77 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 5of18
+OP SiQUH'./1!Slh!QJU;;Qpa1t1t:;iigFQRPi

Muhammad Ali

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Abdalloh

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

Muh;immad

Subsection of £vafuation Worksheet

BwazJr

containing the TaSk :Force's candid

ISN: YM--440

assessment of identlfiable threat(s}
potentially po·sed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Mustafa Abd al·

Cover Pa;ge of Guantanamo Revie\'V

13

DOD; 10 U.5.C. § IDOJ: OPP (WIF)
424 (WJP)

!DOD(WIP)

IFBI; (7)[Q (WIP)

IFBl(WIP)

I
FBI; 1.4 (c) (WIP) FBI: SOU.SL§
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

6

Qawi Abd al-Aziz Task Fo.rce Evaluatlon Worksheet;
al-Shamlri
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
ISN: YM·434

DOD; 1.4 (a). (c)
(WIP)

containing the Task Force1s candid

..

~"·""'"''· I~'""'"· 1~ ~"

(d) (WIP)

024(i)ll) (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP) FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(!){1) (WIP)

assessment of ldentifiabl!'.! thr€!at(s)

l°OD(WIP)

IFBJ; (7)(C),(E)
{WI?)

FBl(WIP)

potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States,

Adel F.-.ttough All Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Algauar
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
ISN: EG-369
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid

&

DOD: 1.4 (a), {c), IFBI; 50 U-5.C. §
(g) (WIP)
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

I

DOJ; OPP (WIF)

IDOD(WIP)

IFBI: {7)(C),(E)
{WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBl:l.4 (c) (WIP)

assessment -of ldentifi:able threat(s)
potentkally posed ·by detainee to the
natfon;i.J security O·fthe United States.

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Ah_m ad A! Shur fa Subsectlon of Evaluation Worksheet
ISN:SA-331
containing the Task force's candid
Ayman

Muhammad

5

000; l.4 (a), (c), \FBI; 50 U.S.C. §
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

IDOJ; DPP (WIF)

IDOD(WIP)

1

IFBl(WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C) (WIPJ

(g) (WIP)

FBI; 1.4 (c) (WIP)

assessment of id-en~ifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national :security of the United States.

un> SECRB-r/-/Sl/.,JORCON//~JOFORN

022

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 78 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 6 of 18
TOP Si:(;Ri+J,lil{1'0RCQN/}PIOFQRN

Abdah

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task 'Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task force's e<1ndfd
assessment of ident1fiable threat(s)
porentlally pos.cd by de'fainee to the
national security of the United States.

7

Abd Al Hadi
Cover Pa_ge of Guantanamo Review
Omar Mahmoud Task force EV<lluation Works,hee.t;
Faraj
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
!SN: SY-329
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potentially·pos:ed by detainee to the
national ~ecurity of the Unlted Stares.

9

Ali Huss,eJn

11

Muhammad

Masom
ISN:SY-330

Muhammed

Shaban
tSN:SY-327

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
1
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

000: L4{o). lcJ, )000: 10 U.S.C. § jOOJ; OPP IWJF)
lg) IWtPJ
424 (WIP)

OOO(WIP)

FBI: (71(Cj {WJP)

FBJ(WIP)
FBt:l.4 (c) (WIP) JFBI: so U.S.C. §
3024ji)(1) {WtP)

ODD' 1.4 {a), (c) 1000: 10 U.S.C. § jDOJ: OPP (WIF)
IWtP)
424 (WIP)

DOD(WIP}

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WtP)

FBI: 1.4 fc) (WIP) JFBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024li)(1) (WIP)

DOD: L4 (•). {c). ,000: lOU.S.C. § jDOJ: OPP (WIF)
(g) {WtPJ

Subsection of Evafuation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid

1000 (WIP)

424 (WIP)

fBI: (71(C).IEI
{WtP)

FBl IWtP}
FBl:l.4 (c) {WIP) JFBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024[iJ(l) {WIP)

assessment of Identifiable threat{s}

potenti,al1yposed by detainee to the
national s·ecurlty of the Un ired States.

Ahmed Adnan

Ahjam
tSN:SY-326

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
1

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet:
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
a:ss~sment of Jdentiflabte threat{s}
potentially posed by dotainee to the
national security of the United Stares.

8

000; 1.4 fa). (c), 'FBI: SOU.S.C. §
(g) (WJP)
3024(i]{l) {WIP)

jDOJ: OPP (WlF)

jOOO (W!P)

FBI: (7)[C),(EJ
(WlP)

FBJ (WIP)
FB!:l.4 (c) (WIP)

TOP SEGRE+/#l#ORCQN//NQFORPI

023

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 79 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 7of18
:+OP: 6E'.<;R~fSl 1t/GRWPl 1l1lPlOi;;QRPI
Mashur Abdullah Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Muqbil Ahmed

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

A!-5abri

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's c<indid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the

!SN: -YM-32:4

9

DOD: 1.4 (a). (b). DOD: 10 U5.C. §

(c), (d)(WIP)

424(W1PJ

FBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP)

fBI: 50 U.S.C. §

OOJ: OPP {Wlf)

IDOD (WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIPJ

FBJ (WIP)
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

national :security of the United StateS-.

Muhammed

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Abdullah Al

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

liHamiri
ISN: YM-249

5

DOD: 1.4 (a]. (c).

u.s.c.

(g){WIPJ

DOD: 50
§
3024(1)(1] {WIP)

FBI: 1.4 jc) (WIP)

FBI: SQ U.S.C. §

I

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

1000 (WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)

.containing_ the T<ts·k Force's candid
assessmen't of identifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the

3024(1)(1) (WIP)

national security of the Unlted StatEs.

Abdul Latif Nasir ,Cover Pageof Guantanamo Review
Task for.ce E11aluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the-Task Foree's candid
assessment of identifrable: threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the

9

~ISN: M0-244

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c). ,FBI: 50 U.S,C. §
(g) (WIP)
3024{1)(1) (WIP)

IDOJ: OPP (W\F)

IDOO(WIP)

I

IFBl(WIP)

!FBI: (7)(() {WIP)

fBl:l.4 (c) (WIP)

natfon;:il security of the United States.

'Abdallah Yahya
Yusif At Shibll
ISN: YM-240

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid

assessment ofidcntlfiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
natronal security of the United States.

6

so u.s.c.

DOD: 1.4 (a]. (c), IDOO:
§ IDOJ: OPP {Wlf)
(g} (WIP)
3024(1)(1}: 10

U.S.C. § 424 (WIP)

l°OD{WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBI (WJP)

fBl:l.4 {c) (WIPJ

u.s.c.

IFBI: 50
§
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

TOP SECRE+//$1,l/-OR~ONl/NOFORM

024

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 80 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 8of18
WP SECRE:r//SIHQR(QPlf/PlQFQRN

Shaker A<lmer
ISN: SA-239

Cover Page of Go<i.ntanamo Review

Saeed Ahm-ed

ICoV13( Page of Guantanamo Review

Mohammed
Abdullah Sa rem
Jarabh
ISN:YM-235

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

Abd al·Raiaq
Muhammed
Safih
!SN:

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Evaluation \Vorksheet;
Subsection of EvahJation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid

YM-233

7

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task force's.candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
m~tional 'Security of the United States.

DOD: 1.4 (a), {c), lfBI: 50 U.S.C. §
{gl (WIPI
3024{i){ll {WIP)

IDOJ: OPP (WIFI

!DOD (WIP)

fBI: (7)(C),(EI
(WIPJ

FBI (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (cl (WIP)

9

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
poteotialfy posed by detainee to· the
national security of the Unlted States.
8

DOD: 1.4 (a), (cl, DOD: so u.s.c. § IDOJ: OPP (WIFI
(gl(WIP)
3024{i)(l); 10
U.S.C. § 424 (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIPI
FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024[i){1) {WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (al. (cl IFBI: SO U.S.C. §
[\VIP)
3024(11(11 [WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WIFI

IDOD(WIPI

IFBI: (7)1C).(E)
(WIPI

FBl{WIPI

DOD(WIP)

FBI: (71(CJ (WIP)

IFBl(WIP)

I
FBI: 1.4 (cl (WIP)

assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States,

Abd Al·Rahman
Abdullah Ati

Cover Page 0-f Guantanamo Review
Task Fon:e Evaluation Wonksheet;

Shabati

Subsection of Evnluation Worksheet

ISN:YM-224

containing t_he Task Force's candid

7

DOD: 1.4 (a),(<), IFBI: 50.U.S.C. §
3024(i)!ll (WIPI

(g) (WIP)

DOJ: OPP {Wlfl

FBI {WIP)

iiFBI: [7)(C),(EI
(WlP)

FBI: 1.4 (cl (WIP)

assessment of identifiable 1hreat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

025

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 81 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 9of18
TOP SEGRIH',t/Sl/lgRGgPlf/PlgfQRPI

Khalid Adullah
Mil~had al~

Mutayri
!SN: KU-213

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task farce Ev.iluation. Worksheet:
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States:.

Mahmoud Omar Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Muhammad Bin Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
At cf
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
JSN:YM-202

10

DOD: L4 {a), {b), DOD: so u.s.c. § IDOJ: OPP{WIF)
3024(il(l); 10
U.S.C. § 424 (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 fc) (WIP)
FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

OOD(WIP)

(c), (d) {WJP)

6

DOD: 1.4 (a), {b), IFBI: so u.s.c. §
(c), {d), (g) (WIP) 3024(il(l) (WIP)

IDOJ: OPP (WIF)

FBI' (7)(C},(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP}

IDOD(WIP)

IFBJ: (7){C),{E)
(WlP}

FBl(WlP)

containing the Task Force's candid

fSI: 1.4 {c) (WlP)

assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detalnee to the
national ·security of the Unlted States.
Sa<1d
Muhammad

Husayn Qahtan1
ISN:SA-200

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Ewluation Worksheet
containing the Task force's candid

8

'assessment ofidentifiabte threat{s)

potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United State-s.

Mohammed Abd Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
A1 Rahman Al
Task Force Evaluation. Worksheet;
Sub-section of Evaluation Worksheet
Shumrant
l!SN,SA-lSS
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment ·ofldentifiabfe threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

12

DOD: 1.4 {•), (c), IDOD: SO U.S.C. § I DOJ: OPP {WlF)
{g) (WIP)
3024(1){1); 10
U.S.C. § 424 {WlPj
FBl:l.4 ;(c) {WlP}
IFBI: so u.s.c. §
3024{i)[l) (WIP)

l°OO{WIP)

DOD: 1.4(a), (b), DOD: 50 U.S.C. § l°OJ: OPP {WIF)
(c), (d), (g) [WIP) 3024{i){1}; 10
U.S.C. 424 (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)
FBI: 50 U.5.C. §
3024(i)(l} (WIP)

l°OO{WIP)

TOP SE:GRiT/}Sl//OROON/-/NQFORPI

IFBl: {7)(C),{Ej
(WJP.)

FBl{WJP)

IFBI: (7){C),(E)
{WlP)

FBl(WIP)

026

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 82 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 10of18
+GP S''R~!ili1lGR~~/;lMO~ORPI
Shec;f Fai; AU Al

Mishad
ISN: EG-190

I

Cove~ Page oiGuantanamo Review
Task force Evaruation Worksheet;

5

SubsectJon of Evaluation Worksheet

Salam Ghereby
tsN: LY-189

Tariq All
AbduUah Ba
Odah

lSN: YM-178

!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Wo:rks.heet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
co-ntain1ng the Task Force's candid
assessment of identlflable threat(s}
poteritlally posed by deta:lne-e to the
national security of the Unlted States.

1l

Cover Page of Gu;Jntanamo Rcvtew
TasK Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Sub:sectlon of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of Identifiable threat(s)
~potentially po:sed by detainee to the
national :security of the United States.

8

I

Adel Al Hakeemy Cover Page of Gu3ntanamo Review
tSN: TS-168
Task Force Evaluation Work5heet;
Subsection of Evaluat1.on Worksheet
containing the T<Jsk Force's. candid
asscs.:srnent of identifiable threat{s.)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security ofihe United States.

DOI: OPP {WIF)

DOD (WIP)

I

IFBl(WIP)

'FBI: (7){C) (WlP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) {WIP)

contain:ing the Task Force's candid
assessment of id-entifi';:ible threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.
'Salem Abd.u

rOD: 1.4 (a), (c), FBI: SO U.S.C. §
(g) (WIP)
3024(;)11) (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), DOD: so u.s.c. § IDOJ: DPP (WIF)
3024(;)11) (WIP)

IDOD (WIPJ

)'Bl: (7)(CJ,(EJ
(WIP)

(c), (d), (g) (WIPJ

FBl(WlP)
FBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP) FBI: SD U.S.C. §
3024(;)11) (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (o}, (c), DOD: 10 U.S.C. §
(g}(WIP)
424{W!P}

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

DOD (WlP)

FBI: (7)(CJ,[E)
(WIP}

FBl (W!P)

&

FBl:l.4 (c) {WIP)

FBI: SD U.S.C. §
3024[i)(1)(WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c)
(WIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3D24(i}i1J (WIP)

DOJ: DPP (WJF)

DOD (WJP)

FBJ: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBI (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

TOP SEGRi+l/Sl//OROON,'/PlOFORN

D27

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 83 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 11of18

Ali Yahya Mahdi \Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
ISN: YM~167
Task Force Evaluation Works-heet;
Subsection of Evaiuation. Worksheet
.containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiablethrcat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

9

Adil Said Al Haj
Ubayd Al-

Cover Page of Guantanamo Reviev,r

5

Busayss
!SN: YM-165

Subs·ection of Evaluation. Worksheet

Adnan Farhan
Abd Al-Latif
JSN: YM· 156

Ahmed Abde!
Az.iz
ISN: MR·757

DOD: 1.4

(a), (b),

IDOD:

so u.s.c. §

JDOJ: OPP (WIF)

(c), {d), (g) (WJP) 3024{i){1); lD
u.s.c. § 424 (WI Pl I
FBI: 1.4 (c) {WIP)
FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(;1(1) {WIP)

Task.i=:orc:e Evaluation Worksheet;

DOD: 1.4 (a], (cj,
(g){WIP)

DOD: 50 u.s.c. § IOOJ: OPP (Wlf)
3024(;){1) (WIP)

JDOD{WJP)

FBI: {7)(C).{E)
{WIP)

IFBI (WIP)

IOOO(WIP)

lfBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)

containing the Task Force's candi:d
assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
:national security of the U'nJted States.

fSI: 1.4 (<) (WIP) FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3D24(i)(lj (WIP)

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Fon:e Evaluation \Vorksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the: Task Force's c<indid
assessment of identifiable threat{sj
potentially posed by detainee to the
nationa 1security of the United States.

8

Cover Page of Guant;inamo Review
Task Forc:e Evaluation Worksheet;
Sohsectlon: of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's ci:indid
assessment of identifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
nat!onar security of the United States.

14

000:1.4(a),(c), IFBl:SOU.S.C.§
(g) (WIPJ
3024(11(1) {WIP)

!°OJ, OPP (Wlf)

IDOO(WIP)

IFBt FJ(C],(E)
(WIP)

fBl(WIP)
FBl:l.4 (c) {WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), ,FBI: SD U.S.C. §
(c), •Id), (g} (WIP) 3024(1)11) (WIP)

IOOJ: OPP (WIF)

IDOD(WIP)

IFBl: (7JIC),(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

TGP SE,RE+//Sl,LfORCml//NOHlRPI

028

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 84 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 12of18
TQP SEGRli:rNSIH~Rc;oPWNQfQRN

Abdul

Muhammad

N:assir al·
Muhajari
ISN: YM·728

Jihad Deyab
ISN: LE-722

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Tas.k For:c:e Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assf:!ssment -efidentifiable threa.t(s)
porenti:aUy posed by detainee lo the
national security of the United States.

7

!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Eval.uation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
a-ssessment of identifiabfe threat{s}
potentially posed by detalnee to the
national security of the United States.

6

Mohammed AI

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Zahrani
tSN: SAw713

Task Force Eva!utition Worksheet;
Subsection of £\Tilfuation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Fayiz:Ahmad
Yahla-Suleiman
ISN: YM·153

I

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation: Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the· Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by det<:1inee to the
national security of the United States.

DOD: L4 {a). (b).1000:. 10 u.s.c. § !DOJ: OPP (WIF)
le}, (d), (g) (WIP)

Jooo (WJP)

FBI: {7)(C) (WIP)

424 (WlP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP) JFBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(ij[l) (WIP)

000: L4 (a), (c), [FBI: 50 u.s.c. §
(g) (WIP)
3024[1)(1) (WIP)

l°OJ: OPP (Wlf)

l°OD{WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

6

DOD: 1.4 {c)
{WIP)

DOD: 50 U.S.C. § JDOJ: OPP {WIF)

FBI: 1.4\c) (WIP) FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(1)11) (WIP)

10

IDOD(WIP)

JFBI: {7)(C) (WIP)

3024{1){1) {WIPj

DOD: 1.4 {a), (b), [FBI: SO U.S.C. §
(c), (d), (g) (WIP] 3024(1)(1) (WIP)

I

I

OOJ: OPP (WIF)

lrrn {WIP)

IDOO(WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C),(EI
(WIP)

FBl{WIP)
FBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP)

TQP SEa!li:r/lSll/ORCQN//NQFQRN

029

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 85 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 13of18
+Qp SE(:R'E+//ilif.fQROO~/;iPJQs;:QRPI

AsimThahit
Abdullah Al-

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of EvaJuatlon Worksheet
'Containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s}
I
potentially pt'lsed by detainee to the
national security of the United States .

7

Cover Page of Guantilnamo Review
Task For-ce Evaluation Worksheet;

11

Hadi Bin Kanad
ISN: YM-13.1

Subsection of Evalualio:n Worksheet

Khalaqi
ISN:YM·1S2

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), DOD: 50 U.S.C. §
(gi{WIP)
3024(i)(l) {WIP)
IFBI: 1.4 tel {WIP)

DOJ: DPP (WIF)

FSJ(WIP)

FSJ: {7)(C),(E)
{WJP)

DOJ: OPP {WIF)

DOD(WIP)

FBI: (7)(C),{E)
(WlP)

1'3024(i)il)
8' so u.s.c.
(WI?)
§

•

Salem Ahmad

FBl{WIP)

containing the Tas.k Force's candid

FBI: 1.4 (c} (WI?) FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

assessment of identff1able thrcat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national :security of the United States.

I

10

Ghaleb Nassa< Al Cover Pog<> of Guan!>namo Review
Bihani
LSN: YM~128

Mukhtar Anaje

ISN:YM·ll7

Task Force Evaluation Work.sheet;
Subsection of Evaluatton Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable thrcatls'j
potentially posed by detainee to the
nation<il security of (he tJnited States.

!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsectlon of Evatuation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's c<1ndld
assessment ·of1dentif1:able threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the Un'ited States.

DOD: 1.4 (a). (b), DOD: SO U.S.C. §
(c), {d), (g) {WIP) 3024(1){1) (WIP)

I

DOD: 1.4 (a}, {c.}.

FSI: SO U.S.C. §

(g) (WIP)

3024{i)(l) (WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

FBJ (WIP)

FBI: {7)(C),(D),(E)
(WJP)

DOI: OPP (W!F)

DOD(WIP)

FBI: (7)(C).(E)
(W!P)

!FBI: 1.4 (c) (WJP)

12

DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), ODD: SO U.S.C. §
3024(1)11) (WIP)

(rl) {WIP)

FBI (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP) FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i)il) (WI?)

:ro?-SECRET//Sl//ORGON//PJOl=ORN

030

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 86 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 14of18
+OP S&bR~;t,lSJhlQRbQNlf~IQ~gRN

Abdul Rahman

Cover Page of-Guantanamo Review

Mohammed
Saleh Nasir

Tosk Force Evaluation Worksheet;

8

FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i}{l) {WIP)

OOJ:. OPP (Wlf)

containlngthe Task force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potentially- po-sed by detainee to the
national security of the Unlted States.

Abdul Rauf Omar
Mohammad Abu
Al-Quisln
ISN: LY-709

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

7

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;

DOD: 1.4 (a), {c),
{g){WIP)

000: 50 U.S.C. § !°OJ: OPP (WIF)
3024(1){1) IWIP)

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Hamlduva

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation. Worksheet
containing: the Task Force's candid
assessr:nent of ldentffiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the

IFBI: (7}{C),(E)
{WIP)

FBl(WIP)

s

1000:
1.4 lo), (cl,
(g){WIP)

I

IDOJ: OPP (Wlfl

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
I
contairfrng, the- Task force's rnndid
assessment of identifiable threat{s}
potent!ally posed by detalnee to the
natlona1 security of the United States.

Shakhrukh

IDOD{WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) {WIP) FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Ali Bakush
lSN: lY-708

IFBI: (7JIC),(E)
{WIP)

FBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP)

Subsection of Evaluation. \rllorksheet
containing the Task Force's candid

Ismael Ali Faraj

l°OD(WIP)
FB1(WIP)

Subsection of Eval'uation Worksheet

ISN: YM-115

ISN: UZ-22

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c},
(g}IWIP)

l°OD(WIP)

IFB1: (7){C) (WlP)

fBl(WlP)

5

FBI' 1.4 (c) (WIP)

FBI' 50 U.S.C. §
3024(i){l) (WJP)

OOJ' OPP \WIF)

FBl(WIP)

FBJ: (7)!C) {WIP)

national security of the United States.

TQ'P S~RE+f/-Sl//ORGQPl/-jPHJFORN

031

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 87 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27 /17 Page 15of18
:J'.QP Si:bRE+,lfS~9'.QRbGN/JNQFQRPI

Ahmed Zayid
Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Salim Al Zuhayd Task Forte Evaluation Worksheet;
!SN:SA·669

Subsection of Evaluati:on Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potent/ally posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Nagid

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Mohammed
ISN: CH·102

Task Force Evalu<Jtion Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
I
containing the Task 'Force's candid
assessment ofidentlfiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Arkin Mahmud
!SN: CH~l03

Adel Noori
ISN:CH-584

12

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

JDDD(WIP)

JFBI: (7JIC) {WIP)

I

JFBl(WIP)

u.s.c.

IDOJ: OPP (WIF}

JFBI (WIP}

IFBI: (7)(C} {WIP)

IFBI:
§
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

so u.s.c.

IDOJ: OPP (WIF)

r!(W!P)

lfBI: (7}{C),1E)
(WIP)

I

lOOJ: OPP (Wlf)

IFBJ(WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C) {WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP} FBI: SO U.S,C. §
3D24(i}{l] (WIP}

3

IDOJ

IFSI: 50
§
3024(1)(1) {WIP}

FSk 1.4(<) (WIP)

5

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Forice's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
nattom:il security of the United States.

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
I
Subsection: of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
nssessment of identifiable rhreat{s]
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), DOD: SD U.S.C. § JDOJ: DPP {WIF)
(g) (WJP)
3024(1)(1] (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (c)
(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

3

IDOD: 1.4 (c)
(WIP)

032

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 88 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 16of18
+QP S£'CRE:r//Sl//ORCOPJil/P.IQFQRPI

Kamalludin

Cover Page of Guantanamo Revte\v

Kasimbekov

Task-Farce Evaluatipo Worksheet;:

JSN: UZ-67S

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

5

contairiing the Task Force's candid

DOD: 1.4 {b), (c), lfBI: 50 U.5.C. §
(d) {WIP)
3024(i){l) (WIP)

IDOJ: OPP !Wlf)

!FBI (WIP)

FBJ; (7}{CI {WIP)

FBl: 1.4 {cj (WIP)

a:sses-sment ofldentifiable threat{s}
potenrfally posed by detainee to the

national security of the United State-:s.

Aziz: Abdul Naji
\SN: AG-744

CO\ler Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force. Evaluation Worksheet;

4

{Wte)

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candld
assessment ·Of identifiable thre:at(sJ
potentially posed by detainee to the
linatlonal security of the United States.

Ahmad Tourson

!SN:

CH~201

I

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

DOD: 1.4 {c)

DOD: 50 u.s.c. § IDOJ: OPP {WJF)
3024(1){1); 10
U.5.C. § 424 (WIP)

DDO{WIP)

FBI: (71{C) (WIP)

FBI (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) {WIP)
FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024{i)il) (WIP)

3

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Work5heet
containi.ng:_the.Task Force's candid
a:ssessm:ent ofidentifiabfe threat(s)
potentfally posed by detaine-e to the

DOJ

IFBI: 50 U.5.C.(WIP)
§

IDOJ: OPP (WIFJ

IFBl{WIPJ

!FBI: (7\(C)(WIPJ

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

FBl(WIP)

FBI: (7]{Q (WIP)

3024{i){l)

DOD: 1.4 (a), l&l
(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 {c) (WlP)

natlona Isecurity of the United States.

Abdul Razak

Cover Page of Goant.anamo Revlew

ISN: CH·219

T.ask force Evaluation: Worksheet;

3

000: 1.4 (a), le),

{g){WIP)

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identlfiabl'e lhreat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national !>ecofity of the United States.

1'.QP SE,Rr.+/./Sl//QRCOPJ/-/PlQfORN

033

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 89 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 17of18
TQP' SE:CR'i.:r/-/Sl,l/QRc;;OPJ1l/IHQFQRfll

Huzaifa Parhat
!SN: CH-320

Cover Page: ofGuant.anamo Revlev1
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;

Subsection of Evaluutlon Worksheet
containing the T.ask Force's candid

I

3

I

DOD: 1.4 (b). (c], I
(dj (WIP)

IDOJ: OPP (WIF)

!FBI (WJP)

!FBI: [7J!C) {WJP)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

FBI (WIPJ

FBI: (7)(C) (WIP)

DOJ: OPP {WIF}

DOD (WIP)

FBI: (7)(Cl {WIP)

assessment of ident\fiabte threat(s)

potentially posed by detainee to the
n<i-ti'onal security of the United States.

Nabil Said

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

HJdjarab

Task .Force Ev;iluation WorJq;heet;

ISN: AG-233

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

4

containing the Task Fo-rce's candid

DOD: 1.4 (o). (c).
(g)(WIP)

FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) {WJP)

assessment of identifiable threat(s)

potentially posed by detainee to the
national :security of the United States.

Oibek
Jamalad1novkh

Cover Page of G·uantan:amo Revi:ew

Jabarov

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(S)
p-otentially posed by detainee ·to the
national security of the Unlted States.

ISN: UZ-4S2

Ahmed
\Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Mohamed Yaqub Task f_orre Evaluation Works.heat;
ISN: CH~.328
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing_ the Task Force's candid
assessment ofidentifiable.threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

AHsheer
Hammedulah

ISN: UZ·45S

s

Task Force EvaJuation Wor'ksheet;

ICover Page of Guantanamo

Review

Task force Evalu;:'ltion Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiabl'e threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
l:natio-nal secur1ty of the United S~ates.

DOD: 1.4 (a). (g)
(WIP)

fBJ: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: L4 (c) (WIPj

DOJ: OPP (WJf)

3

5

FBJ: 1.4 (c) [WIP) FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(1)11) {WJP)

I

!DOJ: DPP (WIF)

+GP SECRE::rff$1,t/QROOPl//PJQFORN

FBl(WIP)

FBI: (7){C) (WlP)

FBI (WIP)

FBI: (7)(C) (WIP)

034

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 90 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 18of18
TOP SECRE+//Slfµ)RCQN//NQFQRN

Mohammed El
Gharanl
lSN: C0-269

!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
:Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subse:ctioo of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
a5.s~s.sment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
natfona! security of the United States.

AbdAI Rahim

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Abdul R:a:raq
Janka
ISN: SY-489

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potentially pos:ed by detainee co the
national security of the United States.

Hass.an Anvar

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evalu<ition Worksheet;

ISN: CH-250

8

so u.s.c. §

DOD: 1.4 (c)

DOD:

(WIP)

3024(;)(1) (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 {<) (WIP) IFBI: 50

IDOJ: OPP (WIF)

IFBI (WIPJ

FBI: (7)(C) {WIP)

u.s.c §

3024(;)(1) (WIP)

4

DOD: 1.4 (c)

FBI: SO U.S.C. §

(WIP)

3024{;)(1) (WIP)

DO): DPP (WJF)

DOD(WIP)

FBI: (7JICJ (WIP)

fBI {WIPJ
fBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP)

3

DOJo OPP (WIF)

2

OOJ: OPP {WIF)

!FBI (WIP)

FBI: (7)(CJ !WIP)

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
cont<iiningthe Ti!sk Force's candid

assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the

national :security of the-Unlted States.

Yousef Abb.:is
ISN:CH-275

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

Subs.ection. of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the: Task Force's candid

assessment of lde:ntifiable threat{s}
potentfally posed by detainee to the
n:attona1 securfty of the United States..

+op SliCRETl/Sll/O~CON,9NOFQRPI

035

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 91 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 1of20
:f.Qp: Slil,';;RST-/,!SlffQRGQP'/IPJQFQRN:

Bahtiyar Mahnut Cover P<1ge of Guantanamo Revlew

ISN: CH-277

3

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

DOD: 1.4 (c)
{WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

I

Subsection of Evafuation Worksheet

containing the Task Force's candid

I

DOD(WIP)

FBI: (7)(C) (WIP)

!FBI [WIP)

assessment of identifiabl.e threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national-security of the Unlted States.

Abdul Helli

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Mamut
ISN: CH-278

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

Subsection: of Evaluation. Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid

4

IDOD: 1.4 (c)
(WIP)

l°OD;SD U.S.C, § [DOJ: OPP {WIF)
3024(1)(1) (WIP}

[DOD{WIP)

I

[FBl(W!Pl

[DOJo OPP !WIF)

[FBI (WIP)

I DOD: 1.4 (a). le) IFBI; so u.s.c § IDOJ: OPP (WIF)
(WIP)
3024(i){1) [WIP)

IFBI [WIP)

I

I

[FBI: 1.4 [c) (WIP)

I

[FBI: (7)(C) (WIP)

assessment ·of identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the

national security of the United States.

Abdul Rahman
!SN:: CH·281

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation: Worksheet;

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the. ~ask Force's candid
assessm.ent of identifiable threat{s)
potentlaUy posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

SaiduUah l<hallk

Cover Page of.Guantanamo Review

!SN: CH·2SO

Task force Evaluation Worksheet;

Subsection of' Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable thre-at{s}
potentiJJly posed by detainee to. the
national security of the United States.
Hajiakbar Abdul

Ghuper
ISN: CH-282

3

I

I OOOo 1.4 l•J. lc), IFBJ: 50 U.S.C. §
(g) IWIP)
3024(ill1J IWIP)

I

jFSI: 1.4 {c) (WIP)

3

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
I
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing-the Task Force's candid
I
assessment of lde-ntiflabl'e th-reat(s)
potent.k11!y posed by detainee to the
national S<:!curfty of the United States.

3

IOOD: 1.4 (c)
(WIP)

IFS!; so u.s.c §
302411)11) (WIP)

IDOJ; OPP (WIF)

IFBl(WIP)

[FBI: (7)(C) (WJP)

rl:

(7)1C).(E)
(WIP)

IFS!: 17J(C),(El
(WIP)

[FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

TOP SEt:RET//£1//GRCON.//PJOFORM

036

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 92 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 2 of 20
TQP SEC:Rii:r;l,!il//QRbQN//M QFQRfll

I

Ahmed Bin Sa!ell Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Bel Bacha
Task force-· Evaluation Worksheet;
1-SN: AGw290
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

5

containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(sl

DOD: 1.4 (c I
{WIP)

!FBI (WIPJ

FBI: (7)(C).{EJ
(WlP)

IFBl (WIPJ

IFBI: (7)(C) {WIPJ

DOJ: OPP jWIF)

FBl{WIP)

FBI: {7)(C) {WIP)

DOJ: OPP {WIF)

FBI (WlP]

FBI: (7)(C) (WIPJ

DOJ: OPP .{WIF)

FSl(WJP)

FBI: {7)(C],(EJ
{WIP)

000: 50 U.5.C. § IDOJ: OPP (WIF)
30240)(1); 10
U.5.C. § 424 {WIPJ

FBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP)
FBI: 50 U.S.C. §

potentially posed by detainee to the

3024(iJ11J {WIP)

national se:curity of the United States.

I

Jallal Adin Abd Al Cover Page of Guanianamo Review

Rahman
lSN: CH-285

3

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
:Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task force's candid

DOD: 1.4 (aJ, (cJ
(WIP)

1000: so u.s.c.. IDOJ: OPP (WIF)
3024(iJll) (WIPJ

FBI: 1.4 {cJ (WIPJ r l : 50 U.S.C. §
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

assessment of identlfia b!e threat(s)

potentially· posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.
Eman Abdulahat ICovef Pa:ge of Guantanamo Review
!SN: CH~295
T<1sk Force Evaluation Workshr::et;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat[s)
pot.entially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

3

Muti:a Sadiq
Ahmad Sayy.ab

6

ISN: AG-288

IC<lver Page of Guantanamo Review

Task Force EV<iluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Eva.tu.ation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
I
assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by deta.inee to the
national security of the United States.

Saiid Farhi

!Cover Page ofGuanta,namo Review

ISN: AG-311

Ta$k Force- Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Tas:k Force's candid
I
assessment of identifiable threat{s.)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of ttie United States.

DOD: 1.4 fb), (c), FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
(d)(WIP)
3024(11(1) {WIP)
IFBI: 1.4 {c) {WIPl

4

DOD: 1.4 (a], (b), FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
(c}, (d}, {g) (WIP) 3024{iJ(l) (WIP)
!FBI: 1.4 .(c) {WIP)

+Qp SEGRET/ti'l//ORC:ONJ/PJQFQRPJ

037

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 93 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 3 of 20
+Qf.l i'GRE+/,Qil/i!QR(;Qfllf,£PIQ~QRPI

Oawut
Abdurehim
lSN:CH-289

3

Cover Page of Guantanamo·Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

Subsectlon of Evaluation Worksheet
conta"iningthe Task Force's candid
I
assessment of1dentifiablethreat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Sabir lahmar

Cover Page Of Guantanamo Review

fSN: ,AG·10002

Tas-k Force Evafuation Worksheet;

DOD: 1.4 (c)
{WJP)

FBI; 50 U.S.C. §
3024(;)(1) (WJP)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

I

IDOJ,: OPP {W!F)

FBI (WIP)

FBI: (7)(C).(E)
(WJP)

FBI (WIP)

fBl: {7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

DOD(WlP)

FBI: (7)(C).{E)
(WI?)

IFBI: 1.4 (c) {WIP)

5

IDOD: 1.4 l<l
(WI?)

4

DOD: 1.4 (c)
(WlP}

I

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
cOntalningthe· T:tisk Force's candtd
assessment of ldentifiabte threat(s]
potentially posed by detainee to the
nat!onal security of the United States.

Djamel S.a-lld Ali
Ame:ziane
ISN: AG-310

Liikhdar
Boumedlene
ISN: AG·lOOOS

Cover Page of Guantanamo Revlew
Ta.sk force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
conti"lining the Task Force's candid
I
l:a:ssessrnent uf ide:ntifiabte. threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

FBI: SD U.S.C. §
3024[1]\1) {WIP)

DOJ: OPP {WIF)

IFBI: 1.4 {c){WJP)

,Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet:
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Tas.k Force's candid
assessment-nf identifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
natlonal security 'of the United States.

3

DOD: 1.4 (c)
(WlP)

fdris Ahmad Abd Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Al Qadir ld ris
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
lSN: YM·3-5
Subsection of Evaluation Wofksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of irlentifiab!e threat{s)
putentially posed by deta1nee to tne
national security of the United States.

10

DOD: 1.4 (a). (c).
{g}(WlP)

001: OPP (Wlf}

s

FBI: SO U.S.C.
3024(11(1) {WlP)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

FBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) {WIP)

WP SEGR ET//SINORGON,'/~IQFORN

038

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 94 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 4 of 20
+QP SE;tRi+,lfSIHORt;,QPl,ffPl0$=~N

Fawzi Khalid

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Abdultah Fahad
Al Odah
ISN: KU-232

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the

12

DOD: lA {a), (b), FBI: SO U,S;C. §
(<J, {d), {g)(WIP) 3024(i)(l) (WIP)

OOJ: OPP {WIF)

FBI (WIPJ

FBI: {7J(CJ,!El
(WIP)

IOOD: 1.4 (a), (c), IOOD: SO U-5,C. § 1001: DPP (WIF)
{g) (WIP]
3024(<)(1) (WIPJ

IFSI (WIP]

IFS!: {7J(CJ,(E)
{WIP)

IDOD[WIP)

!FBI: (7)(C) (WIP)

IFBI: 1-4 {c) (WIP)

I

national se-ct.:1rity ofttie United States.

All Ahmad alR;;ihiz-1
fSN:YM-45

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet.;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of Identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national :security of the United States.

12
I

IFBI: 1-4 [c) {WIP) JFBI: SO US.C§
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

I

Mohammed
M-ohammed
Hasan Al Odaini
ISN: YM-681

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
cont'<iinlng the Task Force's c;::mdid
assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentially pos-ed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

7

Omar
Mohammed Ali
Al-Ram mah
ISN: YM-1017

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation. Worksheet;
Subsection ofEv.aluatfon Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the Unlted States.

16

DOD:L4(c)
{W1P)

DOD:SOU.S.C.§ IDOJ:DPP (WIFJ
3024(i)\l) (WIP)
I

!FBI [WIP)

FBI: lA (c) [WIP) FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) {WIP)

DOD: 1.4(c)
(WIP)

DOD: SO US,C. § !°OJ: DPP {WIF)
3024(ij(IJ (WIP)

IDOD(WIP)

IFBI: j7)(C),(E)
(WIPJ

FBI [WJP)
FBI: IA (c)IWJP) FBI: SO U.S,C §
3024(i)(l) {WIP)

TOP SiCRiT/Jsl-//ORCOM//NOfORN

039

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 95 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27117 Page 5 of 20
WP SECRE:rffSl/}QROOM}/PlQFQRl>J

Younis

Abdutrabman
liChekkouri
ISN; M0-197

Cover Page of Guantanamo Rc:vie\'I'
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identffiab!e threat(s}

12

DOD: L4 (b), (c),
(d) (WIP)

ISN:1S-894

Cover Page of Gt.1:antanamo Reviev11
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluatton Worksheet
containing the Tas.k For.c:e's candid
assessment o'f identlfrnbfe threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the:
national security of the United States.

Barhumi Riyadh

DOD (WIP)

FBI: (7J{C),(EJ
(WlP)

FBl(WIP)

FBJ: 50 U.S.C §
3024(1)(1) {WIP)

6

DOD: 1.4 (b), {cJ, IFBI: 50 U.S.C. §
Id) {WIP)
3024(i){.1J {WIPJ

DOJ: OPP (WlF)

DOD(WIP)

FBI: (7){C) {WIPJ

fBt(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) {WIP)

s

leaver Page of Guantanamo Review

7

FS!: 1-4 (c) {WIP) IFBJ: SD u.s.c. §
3024(i)(l) {WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (b), (c),

Bin Muhammad Task force Evaluation \Vorksheet;

{rl) {WIP)

Tahir Bin l..akhdir Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
Nas.ri
containing the Task Force's candid
ISN:TS-510
assessment of identifiable threat{s)

FBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP)

potentially posed by detainee: to the
,natronal security of the United States.
1

IDOJ: OPP (WIF)

U.S.C. § 424 (WIP)

I

Rafiq: Bio Sashir Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Bin Jalud Al Hami Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
!SN: TS-892
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment ofldentlfiab!e threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national s<?:cucity of the Un ired States.

so u.s.c. §

3024(i](l); 10

FBI: 1-4 {c) {WIP)

potentlaliy posed by detainee to the
national security of the Unlted States.

Abdullah Bin Ali
Al Luft]

DOD;

IDOi: OPP (WIF)

u.s.c.

DOD: 50
§ IDOJ; OPP (Wtf)
3024(i){1); 10
U.S.C. § 424 {WIP)

(FBI {WIP)

DOD[WIP)

FBI; {7)(C) [WIP)

FBI: (7){C) (WJP)

FBI {WIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C §

3024{i)(l) {WIP)

TOPS E-CRSTl/Sl/./ORCON/JNOFORl>l

040

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 96 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27117 Page 6 of 20
l'QP S!;CRi+/,!$1,t/QROOPlf,'llQFQR!I

Abdul Bin
!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Mohammed Abls Task force Evaluation Worksheet;

Ourgy
ISNoTS·502

7

OOD: 1.4 {c)
{WIP)

OODo 10 U.S.C. § IDOJo OPP (WIF)

{DOD (WIP)

FBI: (7){C) (WIP)

424 (WIP)

Subsection of Evaluation Works.heet

FBI {WIP)

containing the Task Force's candid

FBlo l.4 (c) (WlP) IFBlo SO U.5.C. §
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

assessment ·of identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security oflhe United States.

Hall Aziz Ahmed

ICpver Page of Guantanamo Review

Al-Maythali
!SN: YM·840

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evafuation Worksheet

(WIP)

containing the Task Force's candid

FBJo 1.4 (c) {WIP) !FBI: 50 U.S.C. §

7

DODo 1.4 (c)

assessment ·of identifiable threat(sl
p-otentlalJy posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Mus ab Omar Ali

Al-Mud\\lani
ISN: YM-S39

I

Cover Pa_ge of Guantanamo Review

DOD:50U.S.C. § IDOJ: OPP (Wlf)
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

fBI (WJP)

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
'(WJP)

3024(1)(1) (WJP)

10

Task Force Ev;.i.!uation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Works.heet
containing the Tas.k Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s}

DODo 1.4 (b),
Id) (WIP)

(cJ. ,DODo 10 U.S.C. § IDDJo DPP {WIF) IDOO (WIP)

FBI: (7)(C),{E)

(WIP)

424 (WIP)
FBl(WIP)

FBlo 1.4 (c){WIP) IFBI: 50 U.S.C. §

3024(1)[1) (WIP)

pote.rnlally posed by detainee ·to the

national security of the UnJtQd Sta"te-s.

Ayub Murshid Ali

ICover Page of Guantanamo Review

Salih

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

ISN: YM-836

Subsection of Evatuation-Worksheet

9

DOD: 1.4 {c)
{WIP)

OOJ: OPP (WIF)

cont<1ining the Task Force's candid

assessment -of Identifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the·
national security of the United States.

l'QP SEGRi+h'Sl/fGRCGN,l/"QFQRPI

041

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 97 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 7 of 20
TQp SECRi+//Sl{jQRCON,'}tJOFQR~I

s

Sharqawi Abdu

Cover Page ofGu<intanamo Re11iew

Ali Al Hajj
ISN: VM-1457

Task force Evaluation Wor'kshe;;:t;

DOD: 1.4 (a). (c), IDOO: 50 US.C. § IDOJ: OPP {WIF)
(g) (WIP)
3024(i)[1) {WIPj

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Fort:e's candid
assessment of ide·ntlfiable threat(s)

FBI: 1.4 (cl {WIP) IFBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i)(I) (WJP)

DOD(WIP)

FBI: (71(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBl(WIP)

potentially posed by detainee'to the
natlonal security of the United States.

Bensayah

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Belkecem

Task: Force Evalu:ation Worksheet;

ISN: AG-10001

Subsection of Eva[uation Worksheet

10

JSN: TS.-38

I

Cover Page of Guantanamo Revje\v
Task Force· Evaluation Worksheet;

!O

DOD: l.4 (c)
(WIP)

I

Cover Page ofGuantanamo Review

Task force Evaluation. Worksheet;

ISN:TS-46

Subsection of Ev.alu.ation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment ·ofidentlfiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee 10 the
natlona! security of the United States.

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

DOD: 50 U.S.C. § !DOJ: DPP (WIF)
3D24(iill); 10
U.S.C. § 424 (WIPJI

!DOD (WIP)

FBI: (7){C),(E)
(WIP)

jFBI (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)
FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(i){l) (WIP)

po-tentiatly posed by detainee to the
nationill security of the United States.

Saleh Bin Hadi

1000 {WIP)

FBI: 1.4 [c) (WIP)

Subsection of Evaluation \Vorksheet
contalnlng the Task Force's candid
ussessment ofldentlfrabte threat(s}

ruasi

IDOJ: OPP (WIFJ

FBI (WIP)

containing the Task force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.-

Rldah Bin Saleh
al Yazidi

1•s1:

DOD: L4(a). (c),
so u.s.c. §
(g) (WIP)
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

s

DOD: 1.4 (a), (b),
(c). (d), (g) (WIP)

I

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(i)!1) {WIP)

/ DOJ: OPP (WIF)

/FBl(WIP)

FBI: (7l(C),(E)
{WIP)

FBI: L4 {c) (WIP)

1-0P SECRE+.'/Sll!Ot:;COPl/lPI~

042

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 98 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 8 of 20
'f'QP SECRG+h!Sl//QRCQN//PIQFQRJ'J

Suhayl Abdul

I

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Anam al Shar<ibi

Task Forti?· Evatuation Worksheet;

ISN: YM,569

Subsection of Evaluatfon Worksiieet
containing the· Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to· the

6

DOD: 1.4 (aJ, (c),

OOJ: OPP (WIF)

(g] (WIP)

national security of the United Srates.

Ayrman Saeed
Cover Page of Guantanamo Re\flew
Abdullah 8atarf1 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
ISt<: YM·627
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment ofidentifiable threat{s}

5

OOJ: OPP IWIF)

potentially posed by detainee to the
natfo:nal security of the United St:ates.

,Yaslr Ahmad All
Muh;;unmad

Cover Page of Guantanamo Revie\'l

raher

Subsecti-on of Evaluation Worksheet

ISN: YM-679

containing the: Task Force's candid

1

13

Task ·Force Eva!uation Worksheet;

Cover Page: of Guantanamo-Review
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;

Subsection of Evaluatfon Worksheet
containlng the Task Force's candid
assessment ofidentifiab!e threat(s)
potentlally posed by detah'i.ee to the
national security of the United S.tates.

DDD{WIP)

FBI: (7J(C),(E)
{WIP)

FBI (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP) !FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(i)il) (WIP)

assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the Un1ted States.

Alla Ali Bin Ali
Ahmrd
ISN: YM-692

DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), 1000: 50 U.S.C. § IOOJ: OPP (WIF)
(c), Id), (g) IWIP) 3024Pllll {WIP}

7

DOD: 1.4 [a), (cj

FBI; SO U.$.C. §

IWIP)

3024(;}(1) (WIPJ

DOJ, OPP (WIF)

FBl(WIP)

FBI: (7)(C) (WJP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

TQP SEl:iRE:r//Slf/QRCQPll/PIQFQRN

043

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 99 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 9 of 20
l'QP SECRET/lSl1~'QRGQl>J/,<PIQ~QRN
Jabran al QahtanijCover Page of Gu<1ntanamo Review
ISN: SA-696

5

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

DOD: 1.4 (c)
{WIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C §
3024(1)(1) (W!P)

!DDJ: OPP (Wlf)

!FBI (WIP)

FBI: (7)(C) (WIP)

Subsection ofEva[u.ation \Vorksheet

containing the Task Force's candid
assessment ofidentlflablethreat{s}
potentiafly posed by detainee ro the
national security of the United States.

Ravil Mingazov
!SN: RS·702

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Eval~iatfon Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment ofidentifrabfe threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the

FBI: L4 [c) [WIP)

8

DOD: l,4 (b), (c),

(d)(WIP)

DOD: 50 us.c § IDDJ: OPP {Wlf)
'3024(1)(1); 10

DOD{WIP)

US.C §424 {WIP)

FBl(WIP)

FB1: (7)(C) (WIP)

f81: L4 (c) (WIP)
FBl:50USC§
3024(i)(l) (WIP}

national security of the Unlted St<ites.

Noor Utihman

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Muhammed

Task force Evaluation Work.sheet;

ISN: :SU·707

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

4

ODD: 1.4 (c)
(WIP)

g

DOD: L4 (b~ (c), IDOD:50U.5.C § !OOJ: OPP (WIF)
Id) (WIP)
302•(;)(1) {WIP)

DO~

OPP (Wlf)

jDOD (WIP)

con.ta-ini:n:gthe Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable tOreat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the

national security of the United States.

Adil Ma. bro:uk B!n,Cove.r Page ·of Guantanamo _Revbew·
H:amlda
Task For-c.e Evaluation Worksheet;
!SN: TS~148

fFB!(WIP)

fBl: (7j(C) (WJP)

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

containing the Task Force's <:and.id
assessment of identifiable threat(s}

FBI: !A {cl (WIP) IFBI: SO U.5.C 'i
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

potentially posed by detainee to the

national .security of the United State.s-.

TOP SECRET//.$1,'1lORCQPl//NQFQR:N

044

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 100 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 10 of 20
TOP 5 bCR~1l/Sl/1lQRCOPl//PJQFORN

u.s.c. §

Hedl Ben Hedili
Hammami
ISN:TS-717

[Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
:Task Force Evaluation Worksh-eet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Tusk Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

6

DOD: l.4(a), (c) JDOD: 10
{WIP}
424 {WJP}

Abdu!Sahir

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

6

lSN: AF-753

Tas.k Force Evafuation. Worksheet;

DOD: 1.4(c)
(WIP)

so u.s.c.

FBI:
§
3024(i)(l} (WiP)

looJ: DPP (WIF)

!DOD (WJP)

IDOJ: OPP fWIF)

1000 (WIP)

Subsection of Evaluntion Worksheet

FBl(WIP)

contiiiningthe-Task Force's candid
assessment of ldentifiablethreat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.
Hasham Sin .Ali

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Om·arSllti

~Task force

ISN:TS-174

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
a.sses:>m"Cnt of identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Kha\ld

ro•e< Page of Guanlanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threa:t(s)
potentially posed by detainee to· the
n:attonar security of the United States.

Muhammed
ISN:SA-335

Jawad Jabber

Cover Page of Guantanamo Reviev1

Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

!SN: lZ*433

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

7

Eva.!uation Worksheet;

Sadkhan

containing the Task Force's candid

FBI: {7)(C) (WIP)

3

u.s.c.

DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), 1000:.SO
§ IDOJ: DPP(WIF)
(c), (d), {g] (WIP} 3024[i){l); 10
U.S.C. § 424 (WIP)
FBI: 1A {c) (WIP}
FBI: SD U.5.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (c)
{WIP)

rBJ: SD U.S.C. §
3D24(i}(l) (WIP)

!°OJ: OPP (WIF)

DOD(WIP)

FBI: (7)(C) (WIP)

FBl(WIP)

l°OD{WIP)

'FBI: (7)(C),(E}
(WIP)

FBI (WIP)
FBI: l.4 (c}(WIP)

g

DOD: 1.4 (c)
(WIP)

I

u.s.c.

FBI; SD
§
3D24(i}(l) (WIP)

j°OJ: OPP {Wlf)

l°OD(WIP)

'FBI: (7)(C),(D)
(WIP)

FBI (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c)IWIP

assessment of identifiable: threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee: to the

national :security of tl'te United_ States,

WP SECRET,l/Sl//QRGOPJ/fNQFQRN

045

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 101 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 11of20
+OP SECRR'/ISJ,!/Ql'lOOPJ//NQFQRPl
Yasin
Mohammed

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

4

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
I
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
I
:assessment of idcntlfiable threat("s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
natlonal security of the United States-.

9

Ashraf Salim Abd Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
al¥Salam· Sultan Task Force Evaluation Work:shee-t;
I
/SN: lY-263
Subsection of Evatuation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(:sj
I
potentiaTiy posed by detainee to the
national security of the U_nitcd States.

6

Basardah
/SN: YM-iS2

Omaf

Hamzavavich
Abdu!ayev
ISN: Tl-257

Abd·al-Nlsr
Khantumani
/SN: SY-307

Muhammad

Khantuman1
!SN: SY-312

rBI:

000: 1.4 (b), (c),
50 U.5.C. § IDOJ: OPP {W/F)
Id) (WIP)
3024(1)[1) [WIP)
I

IDOD(WIP)

IFBI: [7)(CJ (WIPJ

IFBl IWIPJ

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

rover Page of Guantanamo Review

!FBI: (7J[CJ,[E)
(WJP)

1000: 1.4 {b), (c), IOOO:SO U.S.C. § IOOJ: OPP (WIF)
{d) {WIP)
3024(1)11) (WIPJ

IFBl{WIP)

IFBI: (?)IC) (WIPJ

l'Bl{WIP)

)'(WIP)
8' (7}(C),(E)

IFBI: L4 (c)(WIP) IFBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(1)(1) [WIP)

8

I

IFBJ(WIP)

IFBt 1.4 {c) {WIP)

T<isk Force Evaluation Worksheet;
I
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identlfiab!e threat{:sJ
I
porentlally posed by detainee to the:
national security of the United States.

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
,Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection. of Evaf uution Worksheet
containing the Tas.k Force's. candid
I
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to- the
national security of the United States.

1000: 1.4 lb). lc), IFBI: 50 U.S.C § IOOJ: OPP IWIF)
[d) (WIP]
3024(1}11) {W/P)

o IDOJ: OPP {WIF)

!DOD: l.4(b), (c), 1000: SO U.5.C.
(d) IWIP)
3024(1!11) (WIP)

I FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIPJ IFB/: SO U.S.C.;
3024[/1{1) {WlPJ

9

IDDD: 1.4 {a), (c), /FBI: so U.S.C. §
(g) (WIP)
. >024(i){1) {WIPJ

IDOJ: DPP(WJFJ

IFBl(WIPJ

IFBI: l7JIC),(EJ
{WIP)

IFBI: 1.4 (CJ {WIP)

TOP SEGllET//Sll/<:lRGONf/NOFOllll

046

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 102 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 12 of 20
+oP S"RE:rl-/.SIJ/QROON//PIQFQRN
Mo:ammar
Badawi Dokhan

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

ISN: SY-317

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
contalningthe Task Force's CJndid
assessment of identlfiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
natio·nal security of the United States,

Mustafa Faraj
Muhammad
Masud al~Jadid al
Uzaybi
ISN: LY-10017

s

Task Force Evaluation Worksheeti

ISN: 50-10023

Moharnedou
Ould Slahl
ISN: MR·760

3024(i)(l) {WIP)

FBI (WIP)

fBI: (7)(C) {WIP)

3024(i}(!) (WIP)

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

5

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
I
Subsection-of £valuation Worksheet
contvi-n1ng the Task Fort:e's candid
I
asses>ment :Of ldentlfiable thr~t(s/
potentially pose.d by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

1000: 1.4 (c)

IFBI: 50 U.5.C. §
3024j;)(1) (WlP)

jOOJ: OPP {WIF)

IFBl(WIP)

!FBI: (7){C) IWIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C §
3024[;)(1) (WIP)

jDOJ: OPP (WIF)

/DOD(WIP)

!DOD: 7(A) (WIP)

I

IF81[WIP)

IFBI (7){A),(8),(c)

IDOJ: OPP {WIF)

IFBI IWIP)

!FBI: l7)(CJ{WIP)

'DOD: 1.4(a), (b),
SO u.s.c. § IDOJ: OPP (WIF)
le), Id), lg) (WIP) 3024(;)(1) {WIP)

IFBl(WIP)

IFS!: (7)(C) (WIP)

IWIP)
!FBI: 1.4 lc) IWIPJ

4

Subsec:Hon of EvatLiatton: Works:heet
cornalnlng the Task Force's-candid
asse~sment ,of identifiable threat{s)
potentlal!y posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Guleed Hassan

DOD: 50 us.c.• IDOJ: OPP (WIF)

(WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c)(WIP) IFSI: 50 U.S.C. §

Ali abd a'! Aziz A!I :cover Page of Guantanamo Review
ISN: PK-1001&
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

Ahmed

DOD; L4(c)

DOD: 1.4 {c)
(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

I

Cover Page of Guantanamo Revlew
Tas;k force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Wo·rksheet
containlng the Task Force's candid
I
assessment -of identifiable thrcat(s)
potentlatty posed by detainee to the
national_security Qfthe United States.

9

Cover Page ofGuantan;;imo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsectlon of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identiftable threat(s)
I
potentia1typosed by detainee to the
national security-of the United States.

9

I

'DOD: 1.4 (c)
(WIP)

r l : 50 u.s.c §
3024(1){1) (WIP)

(WIPJ

IFBI: 1.4 (c) (\VIP)

10000

FBI: 1.4 (<) IWIP)

1

rl:

50 u.s.c. §

3024(i)(l) (WIP)

T-OP SE,Rt:T//-Sl//.QRGOPJHPlGFQRfiJ

047

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 103 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 13 of 20
WP SliCAiT/·}Sl{/ORCON//P~QFQRN
Muhammad

Cover Page of Gtiantanamo Review

Rahim

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

!SN: AF-10029

Subsection of Evatuation Worksheet

10

containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Abdullah! Sudi
Ara le

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksh-eet;

!SN: 50·10027

Subsection of Eval'uation Worksheet

DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), 1000:50 U.S.C. § \DOJ: DPP (WIF)
(d) (WIP)
3D24(1}(1) (WIP)

\FBI (WIP)

FBI: (7)(C) (WIP)

!FBI (WIP)

FBI: (7)(C),(D),(E) I
(WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP) \FBI: SD U.S.C. §
3024(i)il) (WIP)

19

DOD: 1.4 (b),

(cj,

(d) (WIP)

containing the Task Force's candid

1000, SO u.s.c. §

IDOJ: OPP (WIF)

3024(;)(1) (WIP)

FBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP) !FBI: 50 U.S.C. §

assessment of identifia'ble threat{.s)
potentially posed by detainee to the

3D24(i)(l) (WIP)

national security of the United States.

Adi Hadi alJazairil:Cover Pa.ge of Guantanamo Re11iew

Bin Hamlill
!SN: AG·l452

10

Task Force Evaluation· Worksheet;
Subsectlon of Evalu.ation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid

000: 1.4 (a), (cJ,

OOJ: DPP{WIF)

IOOD {WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c). IDOD: SO U.S.C. § \DOJ' OPP (WJFI
(g) (WJP)
3024(i)ll) (WIP)

!DOD (WIP)

(g)(WIP)

1

assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the Unlted States.

Mahud Salem Al~

ICover Page of Guantanamo Review

Mohammed

Task For<:e Evaluation Worksheet;

\SN: SV~S37

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Fon::e's candid
assessment of identifiable threat{s)

9

FBI: (7)(C),(E)
(WIP)

FBI (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c)(WIP) jFBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3D24(;)(1J (W!PJ

potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

TOP SECR ET/,41//QRt;;OPJ//NQ F'.ORPI

04B

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 104 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 14 of 20
'l'QP S"RE+Nol,t.fQRGQPINPIQFQRPI
ShawqiAwad
ISN:YM·B38

s

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task force· Evaluation Worksheet;

Bulzuhair

FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i)!l) (WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

FBI (WIPJ

FBI: (7J(C) (WIP)

DOD: 1.4 (a). (c). IFBI: SO U.S.C.§
(g) (WIP)
3024(il(!J (WIPJ

IDOJ: OPP (WIF)

IDOD(WIP)

!FBI: (7)(C) (WIPJ

Task Force Evatuati·on Worksheet;

Subsection of Evaluation Workshe:et
containing the Task Force's candid

I

IFBl(WIP)

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

Subsection of Evaluatlon Worksheet
,,containing the Task Force's candid
I
assessment o-fidentifiab!ethreat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
nationaJ·securlty of the United States.

Bashir Nasir A!i
Al·Mar.valah

Cover Page of Guant.inamQ Review

ISN: YM·S37

000: 1.4 (a), (c),
(&HWIP)
I FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

6

assl!ssment of identlfiable threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national secuiity of the United States.

Said S<i lih Said
Nas.hir
tSN~

YM-841

Cover Page of Guantanam"O Review
Task Force Evafuatlon Work.sheet;
Subsection of Evatuation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
'·assessment of identifiable threat{s.t
potentiaUy posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

''Ahmed Ghailani
ISN: TZ-10012

Cover Page of Guant<inamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Sub-section of Eval'.uation Work~heet
contalningthe Task Forte's candid
assessment ofldentifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national.security of the United States.

Mtistafu Ahmad

al Hawsawi
'!SN: SA· 10011

11

Covet Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation \.Vorksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of fdenttflab1e threat(s)
potentially posed by det<ilnee to the
national security of the United States.

I

8

IOOD: 1,4 {c)

I

IDOJ: DPP (WIF)

(WIP}

4

I
4

IFBI: 1.4 (cl (WIP) \FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(i)(l) (WIP]

DOD: l.4 (c]
(WIPJ
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

FBI: SO U.S.C. §
3024(1)(1) (WIPI

IDOJ: OPP (WIF)

IDOD{WIPJ

I

IFBl(WIPJ

IDOJ: OPP (Wlf]

IDOD(WIPJ

!DOD: ?IA) (WIP)

I

IFBl(WIP)

'FBI (7JIA),(BJ.(c]
(WIP)

TOP SiCRfl/}Sf}/ORCON/!NOFORN

IFBI: (7)(CJ {WIP)

049

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 105 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 15 of 20
+Oil S'-t;;,Rt+f../.SlffQROOP,/,lMQFQRN
Zayn aHbidin
Muhammed

Husayn
GZ-W016

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation ·worksheet;
!SN: Subsect10·n of Evaluatlori Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
a.~scssment of id·entifiable th reat(:s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Mohammed-al

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Nashir1

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;

ISN: SA-10015

Subsection of Evaluatfon Worksheet
cont<ilnlng the Task Forte's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the

5

ODD: 1-4 (t]
(WIP)

FBI: 50 U,S,C. §

1001: DPP (WIF)

Jooo (WIP)

I

IFBl(WIP)

IDOl: OPP (Wlf)

IDOD(WIP)

!DOD: 7(A) (WIP)

I

IFBl(WIP)

r l : (7)(A),(B),(c)
{WIP)

iDOl: OPP (WIF)

IDOO(WIP)

IFBI: (7)(CJ (WIP)

I

/FBl(WIP)

IODJ: OPP (Wlf)

IDOD(WIP)

IDDl: OPP {WIF)

I

!FBI: (7)(CJ (WJP)

3024(i)(1) (WIP)

FBI: L4 (<) (WIP)

8

DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), FBI: 50 U.S.C §
(<), {d), (g) (WIP) 3024{i)!1) (WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) {WIP)

national security of the United States,

Abdullah Al

,Sharbi

1

ISN.: SA-682

Sufyian
Barhoumi
ISN: AG-694

Abdul Rabbani
ISN: PK-1460

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Ev.lluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
contalning the T<isk Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentially post?d by detainee to the
national s&urity Of the United States.

4

Co-vet Page of Guantanamo Review
I
Task 'Force Eva!u:ation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksh~et
containing the Task Force's candid
assessme-nt of identifiable threat(s]
potentially posed by detainee to the
national securlty of the United States.

3

ICover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Workslieet;
I
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's c;indid
I
assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
natlo:nal security of the United States.

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), rBI: SD U,S,C. §
[g) (WIP)
3024(;)(1] (WIP}
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

6

I

I

I DOD: 1,4 (o), {b), IFBI: SO IJ,5,C. §
(c), (d), (g) (WIP) 3024(i)(1) (WIP)

!DOD: 7(A) (WIP)

jFBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

+oP SECRiTh!Sl//ORCOPl//N~

050

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 106 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27 /17 Page 16 of 20
+QP ~i.Cf/.f:+/-/.Sl/.JORGQ~ij}PIQPQRfll

I

Encep Nurjaman Cover Page of Guantanamo Rev;ew

(Hambali)

Task force Evaluation-worksheet;

!SN: JD-.10019

'5ubsection ofEvafuatio:n \Vorksheet

10

containlng the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)
pc>tenttally posed by detainee 10 the
natfon<il ·security of the United States.

M:ajid Khan
ISN: PK-10020

!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), FBI: SO U.S.C. §
(d)(WIP)
3024(;)[1) (WI?)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

B

Task Force: Evaluation Worksheet;

DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
(c), (d), {g) (WIP) 3024F){ l){WIP)

Subsection.of Evaluation Worksheet

FBI: L4 (c) IWIP)

containing the Tad; Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s}
potentiatlyposed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Mohammed

Rabhani
ISN: PK-1461

\Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

5

Tast Force Evafuatlon Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

DOD: 1.4 (a), {b), FBI: SO U.S.C. §
{c), (d), (g) {WIP) 3024(il(l) {WIP)
FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

containing the Task Force's candid

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

I

FBl{WlP)

IFBJ: (7}(C) (WIP)

I

DOJ: OPP {WIF)

I

OOJ: OPP '{Wlf)

I

DOD: 7(A) {WIP)

DOD: 7(A) (WIP)

DOO(WIP)
IFBt(WIP)

IFBI: (7)(C),{E)
(W!P)

DOD: 7(A) (WIP)

FBI {W<P)

I

JFBI: 7{C) {WIP)

assessment of identifiable threat(sl

potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the United States.
I

Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed

ISN: KU·10024

\Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task For.re Eva-fuation Worksheet;
Subsection ofEvofuation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identiflabfe threat{s}
potentia1!y posed by detainee-to thenational security of the United States·.

•

DOD: 1.4 la), (c), FBI: SO U.S.C. §
(g)(WIP)
3024(il(l) IWIP)
FBI: 1.4(c) (WIP)

DOJ; OPP {WIF)

I

l'OP SEG!lET/,'-S:lf/QROOPl//NOFQR~I

OOD(WIP)
IFB!(WIP)

!

DOD: 7(A) {WIP)

IFBI:
7(A),(B),(C)(W1P)

051

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 107 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27117 Page 17 of 20
WP SEGRe:;;~!Sl,l/QRGQN,l,!PIQl'QRPl

Hassan Bin
Attash
!SN: 5A'1456

4

rover Page of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task force's candid

DOD: 1.4 lb), (c). FBI: 50 US.C. §
(d) {WIP)
3024(')(1) (W!PJ

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

FBl(WlP)

DOD: 7(A) {WIP)

IFBt: (7)(C) (WJPJ

I

I

\DOJ: OPP (WIF)

\DOD (WJP)

DOD: L4 (b), (c), FBI: 50 U.S.C. 'i
(d)(WJP)
3D24(i){l} (W<PJ

DOJ: DPP (WIF}

OOO(WIP)

DOD: 7(A) (WlP)

IFBl(WIP)
FBI: 1.4 {c) (WIP)

I

IFBI: 7(A),(BJ.IC
)(WJP)

FBI: 1.4(c) (WJP)

assessment of identifiablethreat(s)
potentfa!ly posed by detain·ce to the
national security of the Uni·ted States.

Sanad Al Kazimi

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

!SN: YM-1453

Task Force Ev.iluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet

I

7

!DOD: 1.4(a), (c),
(g)(WtP)

I

containing the Task Force'.s candid
assessment of ident1fi3ble threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
natlona·l security of the United :States.

Ram:i:i Sin Al
Shibh
!SN: YM-10013

w.a!id
Mohammed Bin
Atta sh
!SN: YM-10014

!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

4

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Tusk Force's candid
as-s.essment of tdentifiabte threatfs]
potentially posed by detainee to the
national securitYof the United States.

Cover P'age· of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's carldid
assessment of identifiable thre.at(-s)
potentially posed by detainee to the
!lational security of the United States._

4

DODo 1.4 (b), (c),

ldl (WIPJ
FB!o 1.4(c) (WIP)

FBI: 50 U.S.C. §
3024(il{1J (W!P)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

I

TOP SiCRE+/tsl!lORCON 11NOJ:ORN

FBl(WlPJ

I

DOD: 7(A) (WIP)
IFBI:
7(A),(B),(C)(WIP)

052

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 108 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 18 of 20
TOP SECRi.+f./$,f//Q"RCOP'J./}P'JQFORN

St1shir bin Lap
ISN: MY~10022

ICover Page of Guantanamo Review

5

DOD: L4 (b), (c),
(d)(WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

IDDO (WIP)

DOD: 7(A) (WIP)

5

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

FBI (WIP)

DOD: 7(Ai {WlP)

Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid

assesSm€nt of1dent1fiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to the

national security of the United States.

Mohd Farlk bin

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

Amin
ISN: MY-10021

Task force Evaluation Worksheet;

DOD: 1.4(b), (c), IFB1: SO U.5.C. §
{d) (W1P)
3024(1)(1) (WIP)

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid

FBI: 1.4 (c) (WIP)

FBI: 7{C),(E)(WIPI

assessm-ent of identifiable threat{s}
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the Unlted States.

I

Mohamed Ja\vad Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
lSN: AF-900
Force Evaluation Worksheet;

4

DOD: 1.4 (b), (c),
(d)(WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WlF)

jOOD (WIP)

6

DOD: 1.4 (a), (c),
(g) (WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

!DOD (WIP)

1rask

000: 7(A) (WIP)

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
ass-es~ment of identifiable threat(s)
potentially posed by detainee to· the
113tfona! :security of-lhe United States,

I

Saifullah ?aracha Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
ISN: PK·10S4
Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Suhsection of Evaluation Worksheet

containing the Task 'Force's candid
~assessment of ident1ffable threat{s}
potentfally posed by dctnlnec to the
national security of the United States.

+Qil.S£-CRi:r1~i.Sl/./ORCOPJ//MOl=ORN

053

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 109 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 19 of 20
TQP SiCRe:l}/S11l.}QRCQPl//NQFQRP1

Ahmed Al-Darbi

ICover Page of Guantanamo Revie.w

rSN: SA·768

Task. force Evaluation Worksheet;

5

DOD: 1.4 (b}. (<),

OOJ: OPP {WIF)

IDOD {WI P)

DOD: 7(A) (WIP)

OOJ: OPP (\VIF)

IDOD (WIP)

DOD: 7(A) {WIP)

(d)

Subsection of Evatuation Worksheet
containing the T:ask Force's candid

assessment of ldentffiable threat(s}
potentially posed by-detainee to the
national security of the United States.

Omar l<hadr

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review

ISN: CA·766

Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessm-ent of identtflable :threat{s)
potentially posed by detainee to. the
national security of the United States.

1 ~Mohammed
Ahmed

ISN: SU-054

Cover Page of Guantanamo ReiJlew

Mohamed Mani

ICover ?age of Guantanamo Review
Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing: the Task force's: candid
asses-sment of ident1fiab!e thre:at{s)

Kahtanl

DOD: 1.4 (a), {b).

(c). (d), (g) {WIP)

4

Task force Evaluation Worksheet;
Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
"containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(,:.)
potentially posed by detainee to the
national security of the- Un ired States.

Ahmad al
ISN: SA·D63

6

DOD: L4 (a). (b),

DOD: 7(A) (WIP)

DOJ: OPP (WIF)

I<), (d), lg) (WIP)

4

DOD: 1.4 (a), (b).
(<), {d). (g) (WIP)

OOJ: OPP (WIF)

!DOD {WIP)

DOD: 7(AJ (WIP)

potentially posed by det<1lnee to- the

national security of the United States.

TOP SKRE+/}Si//ORCON//NOFOR~l

054

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 110 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-10 Filed 03/27/17 Page 20 of 20
+GP So,RE+//Sll/QRGOll/INOFORPI

Tariq Mahmoud

Cover Page of Guant<Jnamo Review

s

OOJ: OPP (WIF)

OOO(W1P)

4

OOJ: OPP (WIF)

IOOO (WIP}

4

OOJ: OPP (WIF)

DOO(WIP)

Ahmed AI Sawah Task Force Evafuation Worksheet;
ISN: EG-535

Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable thrcat{s)
potentiarty posed by detainee to the
national :security of the United States.

Obaidullah
ISN: AF-762

Cover Page of Guantanamo Review
T;:isk forte: Evaluation Worksheet;
SJJbsection of Evatuation Worksheet
11containing the Task force's ~1odid
assessment of identifiable threat{s')
potentially posed by detainee to the
n<ltional :s&urity of the United States.

Nash\van nbd al· Cover Page of Guantanamo Reviev-;

Ra-zzaq abd at·
Baqi 1(Hadi) lSN:
IZ-10025

Task Force: £valuation Worksheet;
Subsection of Eval'uation Worksheet
containing the Task Force's candid
assessment of identifiable threat(s)

potentially posed by detalne·e to the
natfonal securlity of the United States.

TGP S&CRiT,l/SJ//QRCON/./NQFORN

055

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 111 of 129

ATTACHMENT B 20

20

As discussed supra at pp. 3-4, the Guantanamo Review Dispositions chart was publicly
released in redacted form by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence ("ODNI") on
March 31, 2016. The GRD was submitted to the Court as Exhibit G to the O'Keefe Declaration.

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 112 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7

Filed 03/27/17 Page 2of16

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
....-SEG~ETJJ-t.:0P0RN--­
Guantanamo Review Dispositions

Country

Name

ISN

of Origin

Final Dispositions as of January 22, 2010

Decision

AF

4

Abdul Haq Wasiq

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization ror Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.

AF

6

Mullah Noru!lah Noori

AF

7

Mullah Mohammed Fazl

AF

560

Haji Wall Muhammed

AF

579

Khairullah Said Wali Khalrkhwa

AF
AF
AF

753
762
782

Abdul Sahir
Obaldullah
Awai Gui

AF

832

Mohammad Nabi Omari

AF

850

Mohammed Hashim

AF

899

Shawati Khan

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.
Continued detention pursuanl to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by princlples of the laws of war,
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war, subject to further
review by the Principals prior to the detafnee's transfer to a detention
facllity in the United States.
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of MIUlary Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.
Referred for prosecution.
Referred for prosecution,
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the Jaws of war.
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of MiHtary Force
(2001 ), as informed by p_rindples of the laws of war.
Transfer to a country outside the United State~ that will Implement
appropriate security measures.
subject to appropriate security measures.
Transfer to •

AF

900

Mohamed Jawad

AF

928

KhiAll Gui

AF

934

Abdul Ghani

Transfer to Afghanistan pursuant to a court order issued in the detainee's
habeas case.
Transfer to a country outside the United States that will Implement
appropriate security measures.
subject to appropriate securlty measures. The
Transfer !010
JR•vlew Panel unaerstands thatW

AF

944

Sharifullah

AF

975

Karim Bostan

AF

1008

AF

1030

Mohammad Mustafa Sohail
Bahazada
Abdul Qawi

AF

1045

Mohammed Kamin

AF

1103

Mohammed Zahir

AF

1104

Mohammed Rahim

AF

1119

Ahmid Al Razak

AF

3148

Haroon al-Afghani

Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures.
Continued detention pursuant lo the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war, subject to further
review by the Principals prior to the detalnee's transfer to a detention
facility in the United States.
Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures.
Transfer to a country outside the United States that will Implement
appropriate security measures.
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
{2001), as Informed by principles of the laws of war.
Transfer to a country outside !he United States that will imple_ment
appropriate security measures.
Transfer to a country outside !he United States that will implement
appropriale security measures.
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war, subject to further
review by the Principals prior to the detainee's transfer to a detention
facility In the United States.
Referr~_c;I for_p~E>secution.

1
Sl'!CR:Efb'NOFOR:lq

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 113 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 3 of 16
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
--SEGRE-T//NeFGRNGuantanamo Review Dispositions

Country
of Origin

Name

ISN

Final Dispositions as of January 22, 2010

Decision

AF

10028 lnayatullah

AF

10029 Muhammad Rahim

AG

238

Nabil Said Hadjarab

AG

288

Mut!a Sadiq Ahmad Sayyab

Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
appropriate security measures, The Revlew Panel recommends transfer

AG

290

Ahmed Bin Saleh Bel Bacha

Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
appropriate securlty measures. The Review Panel recommends transfer

AG

310

Djame! Saiid Ali Ameziane

Transfer outside the United Stales to a country that wlll Implement
ap ropriate security measures. The Review Panel recommends transfer

AG

311

Saild Farhl

AG
AG

533
685

Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
appropriate security measures. The Review Panel recommends transfer
to Algeria.
Transfer to Algeria subject to appropriate security measures.

AG
AG

694
744

AG
AG

1452 Adi Hadi al Jazairi Bin Hamlili
10001 Bensayah Belkecem

AG

10002 Sabir Lahmar

AG

10005 Lakhdar Boumedlene

AJ

89

Polad Sabir Oglu Slrajov

CA
CD

766
269

Omar Khadr
Mohammed El Gharani

CH
CH
CH
CH
CH
CH

102
103
201
219
250
275

Nagid Mohammed
Arkin Mahmud
Ahmad Tourson
Abdul Razak
Hassan Anvar
Yousef Abbas

CH

277

Bahtiyar Mahnut

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.
Conllnued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war, subject to further
review by the Principals prior to the detainee's transfer to a detention
facility In the United States.
Transfer outside the United States to a country that will Implement
appropriate security measures. The Review Panel recommends transfer

to •

to· •
to •
to •

HasanZamiri
Said b!n Brahlm bin Umran
Baku sh
Sufyian Barhoumi

Referred for prosecution.
Referred for prosecution.
Transfer outside the United States to a country that will Implement
appropriate security measures. The Review Panel recommends transfer
to Algeria.

Aziz Abdul Naji

Transfer to Algeria s·ubject to appropriate security measures.
Transfer outside the United States to a country that wlll implement
were specifically
appropriate security measures. r~U
identified as the appropriale
optrons.
Transfer outside the United States wit-riate security assurances
(potential destination countries include •
•
Transfer outside the United Stales with appropriate security assurances
(potential destination countries include ~
Transfer outside the United Stales to a country that wlll Implement
appropriate security measures.
Referred for prosecution.

res~€ment

Transfer outside the United Slates with appropriate security assurances
(potential destinallon countries include Chad).
Transfer or release outside the United States.
Transfer or release outside the United States.
Transfer or release outside the Uriited Stales.
Transfer or release outside the United States.
Transfer or release outside the United States.
Transfer to the United Stales, or transfer or release outside the United
States.
Transfer or release outside the United States.

2

SEGRETHNOF9RN

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 114 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 4of16
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
-$-ECRE'fHNSFSRNGuantanamo Review Dispositions

Country

of Origin

Decision

Name

ISN

Final O!sposltlon.s as of January 22, 2010

CH

278

Abdul Helfl Mamut

Transfer to the United States, or transfer or release outside !he United

CH

280

Sa!dullah Khalik

Transfer to the Uniled States, or transfer or relep;se outside the United

CH

Abdul Rahman

Transfer or release outside the United States.

CH

281
282

Hajiakbar Abdul Ghuper

Transfer to the United Stales, or transfer or release outside the United
States.

CH

285

Ja!lal Adin Abd Al Rahman

Transfer lo the United States,
States.

CH

289

Dawut Abdurehim

CH

295

Eman Abdulahat

Transfer to the United States. or transfer or release outside- the United
States.
Transfer to the United States, or transfer or release outside the Unlled
Slates.

CH

320

Huza!fa Parhat

States.
Stales.

or transfer or release outside the United

Transfer to the United States, or transfer or release outside the United
States.
Transfer or release outside the United States.

CH

328

Ahmed Mohamed Yaqub

CH

584

Adel Noori

Transfer or release outside the United States.

EG

190

Sherif Fall Ali Al Mishad

Transfer outside the United States to
appropriate security measures.

EG

369

Adel Fattough Ali Algazzar

Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
appropriate security measures.

EG

535
1458

Tariq Mahmoud Ahmed Al Sawah Referred for prosecution.

ET
GZ

10016 Zayn al-lbldin Muhammed Husayn Referred for prosecution.

Blnyam Mohammed

a country that will implement

Transfer to the United Kingdom.

ID

10019 Encep Nurjaman (Hambali)

Referred for prosecution.

IZ

433

Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
app~opriate security measures. Possible destlnation countries Include
Iraq.

!Z

10026 Nashwan abd al-Razzaq abd al·
Baqi (Hadi)

Referred for prosecution.

KE

10025 Mohammed Abdul Mallk Bajabu

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Mltltary Force
(2001), as Informed by principles of the laws of war.

KU

213

Khalid Adullah Mijshad al-Mutayri Transfer lo a country outside the United States that will Implement
appropriate security measures. This decision is made in accordance with
a court order In this detalnee's habeas case. The Review Panel
recommends transfer to Kuwait fa (b) (5)

KU

232

Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad A!
Odah

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.

KU

551

Fouad Mahmud Hasan Al Rabia

Pursuant to a court order in this detafnee's habeas case and the
government's decision not lo appeal, transfer to a country outside the
United States that will implement appropriate security measures.

KU

552

Faez Mohammed Ahmed Al·
Kandari

Conlinued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as Informed by principles of the laws of war.

Jawad Jabber Sadkhan

KU

10024 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

Referred for prosecution.

LE

722

Transfer to a country outside the United States that will Implement
appropriate security measures.

Jlhad Deyab

3
SEGRETl1'l0FORN-

UNCLASSIFl ED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 115 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 5of16
UNCLASS/FIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
-sEeRE'f//N6F0m.iGuantanamo Review Dispositions

Country
of Origin

ISN

Final Dispositions as of January 22, 201 o

Decision

Name

LY

189

Sa fem Abdu Salam Ghereby

Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures.
Ashraf Salim Abd al-Salam Sultan Transfer outside the United Slates to a country that will Implement
appropriate security measures.
Abdul Hamid Salam A!-Ghlzzawi Transfer outside the United Slates to a country that will Implement
appropriate security measures.
Omar Khalif Mohammed Abu
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as Informed by principles of the laws of war.
Baker Mahjour Umar
Ismael Ali Faraj All Bakush
Continued detention pursuant to !he Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as Informed by principles of the laws of war.
Abdul Rauf Omar Mohammad
Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
Abu Al-Quisin
appropriate security measures (including any necessary«Dll!J

LY

263

LY

654

LY

695

LY

708

LY

709

LY
MO

10017 Mustafa Faraj Muhammad Masud
al-Jadid al-Uzaybi
197
Younis Abdurrahman Chekkour!

MO

244

Abdul Latif Nasir

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of MUltary Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.

MR
MR
MY
MY
PK
PK
PK
PK
PK
RS
SA

757
760
10021
10022
1094
1460
1461
10018
10020
702
42

Ahmed Abdel Aziz
Mohamedou Ould S!ahl
Mohd Farik bin Amin
Bashir bin Lap
Saiful!ah P;;iracha
Abdul Rabbanl
Mohammed Rabbani
Ali abd al Aziz All

Transfer to •
subject to appropriate security measures,
Referred for proSecut!on.
Referred for prosecution.
Referred for prosecution.
Referred for prosecution.
Referred for prosecution.
Referred for prosecution.
Referred for prosecution.
Referred for prosecution.
Referred for prosecution.

Majid Khan
Ravi! Mingazov
Abd Al Rahman Shalbl Isa
Uwaydah

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Miiitary Force
(2001), as informed by pr!ncfples of the laws of war.
Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
appropriale security measures (Including any necessaryl!Dl.W

SA

49

Aasmi Matruq Mohammad
Assami

SA
SA

63

Mohamed Mani Ahmad at Kahtani Referred for prosecution.

195

Mohammed Abd Al Rahman Al
Shumrant

SA

200

Saad Muhammad Husayn
Qahtani

SA

239

Shaker Aamer

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Mmtary Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.

4
SEGREl'llNOFORtl
UNCLASSIFIEDl/FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 116 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 6 of 16
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
---SEeRE'fl/NOFORN-·Guantanamo Review Dispositions

Country

SA

Name

!SN

of Origin

331

Final Dispositions as of January 22, 2010

Decision

Ayman Muhammad Ahmad Al
Shurfa

Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
appropriate security measures. The Review Panel recommends transfer

to

SA

335

Khalid Muhammed

SA

669

Ahmed Zayid Salim Al Zuhayri

SA
SA

682

Abdullah Al Sharbi

Referred for prosecution.

687

Abdul Aziz Karim

Transfer to Saudi Arabia (b)(5)

SA
SA

696
713

Jabran al Qahlanl

Referred for prosecution.

Mohammed Al Zahrani

SA
SA
SA
SA

768

Ahmed

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Miiitary Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.
Referred for prosecution.

1456

Hassan Bln Attash

so
so

(b) (5)

Al~Darbi

Transfer to Saudi Arabia subject to appropriate security measures and
further disposition in accordance with Saudi law.

Referred for prosecution.

10011 Mustafa Ahmad al Hawsawi

Referred for prosecution.

10015 Mohammed a! Nashiri
Mohammad Sulayman Barre
567

Transfer to Somali!and subject lo appropriate security measures.

10023 Guleed Hassan Ahmed

Referred for prosecution.
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war, subject to further
review by the Principals prior to lhe detainee's transfer to a detention
facility in the United S1ates.

10027 Abdullahi Sudi Arale
36

Ibrahim Othman Ibrahim Idris

SU

54

Mohammed Ahmed

Referred for prosecutlon.

SU

707
307

Noor Uthman Muhammed

Referred for prosecution.

SY

Transfer outside the United States to a country that will Implement

Abd-a!-Nlsr Khantumanl

appropriate security measures.

SY

312

Muhammad Khan1umani

SY

317

Moammar Badawi Dokhan

SY

326

Ahmed Adnan Ahjam

Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures.

SY

327

Ali Hussein Muhammed Shaban

Transfer outside the United States to a country that will Implement
appropriate security measures.

SY

329

SY

330

Transfer outside the United States to a country that will Implement
appropriate security measures.
Transfer outside the United States to a country lhal will implement
appropriate security measures. Possible destination countries Include

Abd Al Hadi Omar Mahmoud

Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement

Faraj

appropriate security measures.

Abdah Muhammad Masum

Transfer lo a country outside the United States tha! will implement
appropriate security measures.

SY

489

Abd Al Rahim Abdul Razaq Janka- Transfer outside the United States to a counlry that will implement
appropriate security measures (poss ble destination countrles include

and '

5
SEORETHNOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 117 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 7of16
UNCLASSIFIEDl/FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
--sECRE'fl/NeFeRNGuantanamo Review Dispositions

Country
SY

Name

!SN

of Origin

537

Final Dispositions as of January 22, 2010

Decision

Mahud Salem AJvMohammed

Transfer to a country outside the United States that wm implement
appropriate security measures.

TS

257
38

Omar Hamzayavich Abdulayev
Ridah Bin Saleh al Yazidi

TS

46

Saleh Bin Had! Asasl

TS

148

Adil Mabrouk Bin Hamlda

TS

168

Adel Al Hakeemy

TS

174

Hasham Bin AU Omar Sliti

TS

502

Abdul Bin Mohammed Abis Ourgy Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
appropriate securily measures.

TS

510

Barhuml Riyadh Bin Muhammad
Tahir Bin Lakhdir Nasri

Transfer outside the United Stales to a country that will implement
appropriate security measures. The Review Panel recommends that the
detainee be transferred to (b)(1 ), (b (5)

rs

717

Hedi Ben Hedil! Hammami

TS

892

Rafiq Bin Bashir Bin Ja!ud A!
Hami

Transfer outside the United States to a country that wHI Implement
appropriate securi1y measures.
Transfer outside the United States to a country that wilt imple1nent

TS

894

Abdullah Bin Ali Al Lufti

Tl

Transfer to Tajikistan subject to appropriate security measures,
Transfer outside the United States lo a country that will intplement
appropriate security measures.
Transfer outside the United Slates lo a country that will Implement
appropriate security measures.
Transfer outside the United States to a country that wlll Implement
appropriate security measures.
Transfer to a country outside the United States that wlll implement
appropriate security measures, including possible prosecution. The
Review Panel notes thatllllan<tmID: b) ( )
Transfer outside the United States to- a country that will implement
appropriate security measures.

appropriate security measures.

Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
appropriate security measures.

TZ

UAE

10012 Ahmed Ghailanl
Mjuayn At-Din Jamal Al-Din Abd
309

appropriate security measures, including (b

Al Fadhll Abd Al-Satlar

uz

22

Shakhrukh Hamiduva

uz

452

Olbek Jamaladinovich Jabarov

uz

455

A!isheer Hammedulah

uz

675

Kamalludin Kasimbekov

WE

519

Mahrar Rafa!

WE

684

Mohammed Tahanmatan

Al~Quwarl

Referred for prosecution,

Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement

(5)

Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
appropriate security measures.
Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
appropriate security measures.

6
SEGRETHNOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 118 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 8of16
UNCLASSIFIEDl/FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
--sf:eRC-T/fl'lSFSRNGuantanamo Review Dispositions

Country

ISN

of Origin

YM

26

Name

Final Dispositions as of January 22, 2010

Decision

Fahed Abdullah Ahmad Ghazi

At this time, given the current security situation In Yemen, condit!onal
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situalion in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or thlrd~country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closuTeO uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in !he United States.

YM

27

Uthman Abd al-Rahim
Muhammad Uthman

Continued detention pursuant to !he Authorization for Use of Military Force
{2001), as informed by prlncip!es of the laws of war, subject to further
review by the Prlncipals prior to the detainee's transfer to a detention
facility in the United States.

YM

28

Moath Hamza Ahmed Al-Alwi

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
{2001), as Informed by princlp!es of the laws of war.

YM

29

Mohammed al-Ansi

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Mililary Force
(2001), as Informed by principles of the laws of war. subject to further
review by the Principals prior to the detarnee's transfer to a detention
facility in lhe United States.

YM

30

Ahmed Umar Abdullah at-Hikimi

At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use Of Military Force (2001), as
Informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen Improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to[ti>~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the tline of
the closure
uantanamo, !he detainee wm be reconsidered for transfer
lo Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Militmy Force
(2001), as informed by principles of !he laws of war.

O~

YM

31

Mahmud Abd Al Aziz Al Mujahid

YM

32

Faruq Ali Ahmed

Transfer to a country outside the United States that wlll implement
appropriate security measures.

YM

33

Mohammed At-Adahl

YM

34

Al Khadr Abdallah Muhammad A!
Yafi

At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, condltional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred lf the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabllilaUon program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
abillty to@~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the lime of
the closure ::uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.
Transfer to a country outside the Unlted Slates that will implement
appropriate security measures.

YM

35

Idris Ahmad Abd Al Qadir Idris

YM

37

Abdel Malik Ahmed Abdel Wahab Continued detentlon pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.
A! Rahabi

Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures.

7
-----'SB3REffltleF6RN

UNCLASSIFIEDl/FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 119 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 9of16
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
-SECRE'ftlNOFORN-Guantanamo Review Dispositions

Country

Name

ISN

of Origin

Final Dispositions as of January 22, 2010

Decision

YM

40

Abdel Qadir Al-Mudafar!

At this time, given the current securily situation In Yemen, condltlona!
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to[t.Q~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closure :
uantanamo, the detainee wlll be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third counlry, or a detention facllily in the United States.

YM

41

Majid Mahmud Abdu Ahmed

YM

43

Samfr Naji Al Hasan Moqbil

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.
At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for u.se of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement optlon becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to[t!J~
or mitigate any lhreat they pose. At the time of
the c!osurec:uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsldered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility In the United States,

YM

44

Muhammed Rajab Sadiq Abu
Ghanim

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.

YM

45

Ali Ahmad al-Rahlzi

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by prfnciples of the laws of war, subject lo further
review by the Principals prior to the detainee's transfer to a detention
facility in the United States,

YM

88

Adham Mohamed Ali Awad

YM

91

Abdel Al Saleh

At this Uine, given the current securlty situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001}, as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, !he detainee may be transferred If the security situation Jn
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated Its
ability tottiJI~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the lime of
the closure or uantanamo, the detainee wm be reconsidered for transfer
lo Yemen, a third country, or a detention facil!ty In the United States.
At this lime, given the current security situation In Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by prlnclples of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitatlon program or thlrd-country
reselt1ement option becomes available, or.Yemen has demonstrated its
ability tofl!J~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closurC:;uantananlo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United Slates.

8

SESRElWNOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 120 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 10of16
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
--SCCRE'TliN6F6RN-Guantanamo Review Dispositions

Country

of Origin

ISN

YM

115

YM

117

Name

Final Dispositions as of January 221 2010

Decision

Abdul Rahman Mohammed Saleh At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, cond!Uonal
Nasir
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
Informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred If the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabllltation program or thlrd·country
resettlement option becomes avaUable, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to[@I~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closuiea: uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.
Mukhtar Anaje
At this time, given the current security situation rn Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant lo lhe Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilllaUon program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated Its
abJ/lty to{~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closure
uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United State$.
Ghaleb Nassar Al Bihani
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Mi!ltary Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws ofwac

0

YM

128

YM

131

Salem Ahmad Hadl Bfn Kanad

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as Informed by principles of the laws of war.

YM

152

Asim Thahit Abdullah Al-Kha!aqi

YM

153

Fayiz Ahmad Yahia Suleiman

Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriale security measures.
Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures.

YM

156

Adnan Farhan Abd Al-Latif

YM

163

YM

165

Adil Said Al Haj Ubayd AlBusayss

YM

167

Ali Yahya Mahdi

YM

170

Sharaf Ahmad Muhammad
Mas'ud

Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures, taking Into account any necessary mental
health treatment.
Khalid Abd A! Jabbar Muhammad Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
Uthman Al Qadasi
appropriate security measures.
At this lime, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by prlnciples of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or thlrd--country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to(UJ~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closu= uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.
At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Miiitary Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation !n
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resetuernent option becomes available, or Yemen has demonslrated its
ability to{(!)~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closu=uantanamq, the detainee wlll be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention fac!lity ln the United Slates.
Transfer to a country outside the United Stales that will implement
appropriate security measures.

9

SEORE'FNNOFORt;

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 121 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27117 Page 11of16
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

---SEeREll/NOi'ORN--

Final Dispositions as of January 22, 201 O

Guantanamo Review Dispositions

Country
of Origin

ISN

YM

171

YM

178

YM

202

YM

223

YM

224

YM

233

Decision

Name

Abu Bakr ibn All Muhammad al
Ahdal

At this tfme, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by prlnciples of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or thlrd~country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to[t:J~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closure: uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.
At this time, given the current security situation Jn Yemen, conditional
Tariq Ali Abdullah Ba Odah
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the Jaws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or thfrd~country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to(©J~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closure;: uantanamo, the detainee wm be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.
Mahmoud Omar Muh<,'lrnmad Bin At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant lo the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
Atef
informed by prlnclptes of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated Its
ability to[t!]~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closure 0 uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a t_hlrd country, or a detention facility in the United Stal€!SAt this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
Abd al-Rahman Sulayman
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to(@~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closureouantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facl!lty In the United States.
Abd Al-Rahman Abdullah All
Transfer to a country outside the United States that will lmp!ement
appropriate security measures.
Shabati
Abd

a!~Razaq

Muhammed Salih

At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, condltlona!
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or YCmen has demonstrated its
ability to[@~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
uantanamo, the detainee wlll be reconsidered for transfer
the closure
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facllity Jn the United States.
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Miiitary Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war, subject to further
review by the Principals prior to the detainee's lransfer to a detention
facility in the United Slates.

T

YM

235

Saeed Ahmed Mohammed
Abdullah Sarem Jarabh

10
SEGRETllNOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 122 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 12of16
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
-SEeRE'f~N6FORN---­

Final Dispositions as of January 22, 2010

Guantanamo Review Dispositions

Country
of Origin
YM

ISN

240

Decision

Name

Abdallah Yahya Yusil Al Shlbll

At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, condllional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by prtnciples of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen ha~ demonstrated !ts
ability t o ! n
- - or mitigate any threat lhey pose. At the time of

c!os~uantanamo,

the
the detainee wfll be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in !he United States,
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as Informed by principles of the laws of war.

YM

242

Khalid Ahmed Qaslm

YM

249

Muhammed Abdullah Al Hamiri

YM

251

Muhammad Said Salfm Bin
Salman

YM

252

Yasin Mohammed Basardah

YM

254

Muhammad AH Husayn Khanayna Transfer to a country outside the United States that wm implement
appropriate security measures.

YM

255

Said Muhammad Salih Halim

Transfer to a country outside the United States that will itnplement
appropriate security measures.

YM

256

Riyad Atiq Ali Abdu Al-Haj

YM

259

Fadhel Hussein Saleh Hentif

YM

321

Ahmed Yaslam Said Kuman

YM

324

YM

434

Mashur Abdullah Muqbif Ahmed
Al-Sabri
Mustafa Abd al-Qawi Abd al-Aziz
al-Shamiri

Transfer to a country outside the United Slates that will Implement
appropriate securily measures.
Transfer to a country outside the United States that wm Implement
appropriate security measures.
At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, cond!Uonal
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Militaiy Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws ofY1ar. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to[(!)~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closureo uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of M!lltary Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Miiitary Force
{2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.

Transfer to a country outside the United States that wlll lmp!ement
appropriate security measures.
At this lime, glven the current security situation In Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated Its
ability to[@~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the lime of
the closure O:uantanamo, the detainee w!ll be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a lhird country, or a detention facility in the United States.

11
SEGRET/iliOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 123 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 13of16
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
-SE!3REfl/N0FeRN-

Final Dispositions as of January 22, 2010

Guantanamo Review Dispositions

Countty

of Origin

ISN

YM

440

YM

441

YM

461

YM

498

Name

Decision

At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Miiitary Force (2001), as
informed by prlnc!ples of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen Improves, an appropriate rehabUftation program or lhird-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to[~
or mitigate any threat they pose. Al the time of
the closufeOuantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.
Abdul Rahman Ahmed
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as lnfonned by prlnciples of the raws of war.
Al this lime, given the current security siluat.ion In Yemen, conditional
Abd al Rahman a\-Qyati
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Miiitary Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred lf the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilita!ion program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to{(!}~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closu;ec; uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility In the United States.
Mohammed Ahmen Said Haider At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehab!fitat!on program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated Jts
abiUty tc{t:)~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the
Guantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.
Mohammed Khalid Salih al-Dhuby At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Milftary Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred If the security situation In
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or lhlrd-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to@~
or mltlgate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closure
uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.
Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Salman Yahya Hassan
(2001), as Informed by principles of the laws of war.
Mohammad Rabei'l
Muhammad Ali Abdallah
Muhammad Bwazir

closure~

YM

506

0

YM

508

YM

509

Mohammed Nasir Yahi Khussrof
Kazaz

YM

511

Su!alman Awath Silaiman Bln
Agell Al Nahdl

At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by prlnclples of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation In
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability toW)~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closure: uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility In the United States.
Transfer to a country outside the United States that will Implement
appropriate securlly measures.

12
SEGRET./ll'leFGRPI

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 124 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 14of16
UNCLASSIF/ED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
SECRE-TllN6FORNGuantanamo Review Dispositions

Country
of Origin

ISN

Final Dispositions as of January 22 1 2010

Decision

Name

YM

522

YM

549

YM

550

YM

553

YM

554

YM

564

YM

566

YM
YM

570

YM

572

YM

574

Hamood Abdulla Hamood

YM

575

Saa'd Nasser Moqbil aJ-Azani

YM

576

Zahar Omar Hamis bin Hamdoun Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Mllltary Force
{2001), as Informed by principles of the laws of war, subject to further
review by the Principals prior to the detainee's transfer to a detention
facility In the United States.

YM

577

Jamal Muhammad A!wai

569

Yassim Qasim Mohammed lsmall Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Oasim
(2001), as Informed by prfnclp!es of the laws of war, subject to further
review by the Principals prior to the detainee's transfer to a detention
facility in the United States.
Umar Said Salim Al-Dini
At this time, given !he current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuani to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen Improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to[©~
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closureo uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.
At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, condi!Jonal
Walid Said bin Said Zaid
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstraled its
abl!ity totmle1
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the lime of
the closure or Guantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility In the United States.
Transfer to a country outside the United States thai Wfn implement
Abdul Khafed Al-Baydal'll
appropriate security measures.
Fahrni Sa!em Said Al-Asani
Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures.
Jalal Salam Awad Awad
Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures.
Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
Mansour Mohamed Mutaya Ali
appropriate security measures.
Referred for prosecution.
Suhayl Abdul Anam al Sharabi
Transfer to~ subject to appropriate security measures.
Sabri Muhammad Ibrahim alQurashi
Salah Mohammad Saith al~Dhabi Transfer outside the United States to a country that will implement
appropriate security measures.
subject to appropriate security measures,
Transfer lo •
including part1c1pal1on in the •

•

Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures.

Transfer to a country outside the United Stales that wm implement
appropriate security measures.

13
SECReTl!MOFORN

UNCLASS/FIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 125 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 15of16
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
--SECRs://N-OFSRt~­

Final Dispositions as of January 22, 2010

Guantanamo Review Dispositions

Country
of Origin

ISN

Name

Decision

YM

578

Abdul al-Aziz Abduh Abdullah Ali
Al Suwaydi

YM
YM

627

Ayman Saeed Abdullah Batarfi

At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to lhe Authorization for Use of MH!tary Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred ff tho security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitatlon program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to(ij)~
or mitigate any threat they pose, At the lime of
the closure 0 uantanamo, the detainee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a delentlon facllity In the United States.
Transfer to Yemen subject to appropriate security measures.

679

Yaslr Ahmad Ali Muhammad
Taher

Transfer outside the United States to a country that wiU Implement
appropriate security measures. The Review Panel recommends transfer

YM

680

Emad Abdallah Hassan

Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures.

YM

681

YM

683

Mohammed Mohammed Hasan A! Transfer to a country outside the United States that will Implement
Odaini
appropriate security measures.
Transfer to a country outside the United States that wm Implement
Fayyad Yahya Ahmed al Ram!
appropriate security measures.

YM

686

YM

688

YM

- 689

YM

690

YM

691

YM

692

A!la All Btn Ali Ahmed

Transfer outside the United Slates to a country that will Implement
appropriate security measures. The Review Panel recommends the
detainee be transferred to (b)(1), (b)(5)

YM

728

Abdul Muhammad Nassir al~
Muhajari

At this time, given the current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of M!li!ary Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation In
Yemen improves. an appropriate rehabllltatfon program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to~
or mitigate any threat they pose. Al !he time of
the closuTe013uantanamo, the detainee wi!I be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.

to (b)(1), (b)(5

Transfer to a country outside the United Slates that will implement
appropriate security measures.
Fahrni Abdullah Ah1ned al-Tawlaqi At this time, given !he current security situation in Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Aulhorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by princlptes of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or lhird-country
reselt!ement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to~
or miligate any threat they pose, At !he time of
the closUf80Guantanamo, the detalnee will be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.
Mohammed Ahmed Salam
Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures.
Abdul Al Oader Ahmed Hassain
Transfer lo a country outside lhe United Slates that will Implement
appropriate security measures.
Muhammad Ali Salem Al Zarnuki Transfer to a country outside the United States that will implement
appropriate security measures.
Abdel Ghaib Ah1nad Hakim

14
SliiCREiTllNOFORN,.__.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 126 of 129
Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 26-7 Filed 03/27/17 Page 16of16
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
-SEeRETllN0F6RNGuantanamo Review Dispositions

Country
of Origin

ISN

Name

Flnal Dispositions as of January 22, 2010

Decision

YM

836

Ayub Murshid AU Sallh

Continued detentlon pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
{2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war,

YM

837

Bashir Nasir Ali Al-Marwalah

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as Informed by prlncfples of the laws of war.

YM

838

Shawqi Awad Balzuhair

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as Informed by prlnclptes of the laws of war.

YM

839

Musab Omar All Al-Mudwani

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Miiitary Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.

YM

840

Hail Aziz Ahmed Al-Maythali

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as Informed by prlnclples of the laws of war.

YM

841

Said Salih Said Nashir

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001), as informed by principles of the laws of war.

YM

893

Tawfiq Nasir Awad Af-Bihanl

At this time, given the current security situation Jn Yemen, conditional
detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001), as
informed by principles of the laws of war. Before the closure of
Guantanamo, the detainee may be transferred if the security situation in
Yemen improves, an appropriate rehabilitation program or third-country
resettlement option becomes available, or Yemen has demonstrated its
ability to[DJlfg
or mitigate any threat they pose. At the time of
the closure :;uantanamo, the detainee wm be reconsidered for transfer
to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.

YM

1015

Husayn Salim Muhammad alMatari Yafai

Transfer to a country outside the United Slates that will implement
appropriate security measures, ·taking into account any necessarymJ

YM

1017

Omar Mohammed AH A!-Rammah Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Miiitary Force
{2001). as informed by principles of the laws of war, subject to further
review by the Principals prior to the detainee's transfer to a detention
facility in the United States.

YM
YM
YM

1453
1457

Sanad Al Kazimi

Referred for prosecution.

Sharqawi Abdu Ali Al Hajj

Referred for prosecution.

1463

Abd Al-Salam AINHilah

Continued detention pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Miiitary Force
(2001), as Informed by principles of the laws of war, subject to further
review by the Principals prior to the detainee's t.ransfer to a detention
facility in the United Stales.

YM
YM

10013 Ramzi Bin Al Shlbh
10014 Walld Mohammed Bin A1tash

Referred for prosecution.
Referred for prosecution.

15

SE:CRETllNOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

 Case Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 127 of 129

ATTACHMENT 

 

Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 128 of 129

The Exemptions from disclosure discussed in this Decision & Order are:

•

Exemption 1-5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l), which exempts from disclosure "matters that are ...
(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified
pursuant to such Executive order."

•

Exemption 5-5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), which exempts from disclosure "inter-agency or intraagency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency." Courts have interpreted Exemption 5 to encompass
common-law privileges against disclosure such as the deliberative process privilege which
covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising pati of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated."
Nat'] Council of La Raza v. Den't of Justice, 411F.3d350, 356 (2d Cir. 2005).

•

Exemption 7(B)-5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(B), which exempts from disclosure "records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information ... would deprive a person of a
right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication."

•

Exemption 7(D)-5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D), which exempts from disclosure "records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information ... could reasonably be expected
to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or
authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and,
in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the

C-1

 Case 1:16-cv-06120-RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 129 of 129

course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source."
•

Exemption 7(E)-5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E), which exempts from disclosure "records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information ... would disclose techniques
and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose
guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could
reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law."

***

C-2