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The attempt of the United States government to assassinate Cuban premier Fidel Castro as well as other foreign leaders during the turbulent decade of the 1960s shocked and disgusted the American citizen. When sources disclosed that the Central Intelligence Agency (hereinafter "CIA") intentionally solicited and received the assistance of various members of organized crime, La Cosa Nostra, in the furtherance of such plots, more outrage prevailed. Civilized society simply did not and does not condone such acts as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. There is no excuse; no rationalization.

The effect and influence of these actions did not stop, however, with invoking the disdain of the American public and world. These assassination attempts gave birth to the haunting theory that Fidel Castro orchestrated the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in defensive retaliation for the plots on his life.
In its Final Report published in April, 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (hereinafter "SSC") responded to this theory.

In this Report, the SSC focused on two operations of the CIA which may have provoked Castro into retaliation. First, the SSC documented the joint effort of the CIA and Organized Crime to eliminate Castro. Second, the SSC examined the nature and extent of the CIA AMLASH operation. The SSC concluded its analysis with the statement that "/\the Committee believes the investigation should continue in certain areas, and for that reason does not reach any final conclusions."¹

This analysis is an attempt to make such conclusions. It is not the purpose of the remainder of this material to review every detail of the CIA-Mafia plots or of the AMLASH operation, to resolve all of the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and the CIA in regard to the importance of the various operations, or to subject anyone to moral tongue-lashing.² Instead, this material first seeks
to present a comprehensive review of the CIA
operation AMLASH and of the involvement or potential
involvement of organized crime in the CIA operations
against Castro during 1960-1963. From this review
certain inferences and conclusions are then drawn
concerning the nature, scope, and ramifications of
these operations.

II. BACKGROUND MATERIAL - RELEVANT SUMMARY

A. CIA-Mafia Plots

The genesis of the utilization of the United
States criminal syndicate by the CIA to attempt to
assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Report of the
Inspector General as occurring during a conversation
between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell,
and the Director of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards.  
These plots extended from 1960 until early 1963 and
can be divided into two stages. The first stage
occurred from August, 1960 until April, 1961, and
can best be termed as Phase I or the pre-Bay of Pigs
period. From April, 1961 until late 1961, the CIA
takes the position that the plots were dormant. 

[Handwritten notes:]
- From 60A
- 1960
- 1962
- 1966
In late 1961 the CIA decided to renew the CIA-Mafia plots, then creating Phase II, and kept them active until late 1962 or early 1963. 7

During the initial stages of Phase I, Edwards assigned the specific task of locating the proper persons to assassinate Castro to J. Renstrom, who was Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. 8 Both men agreed that Renstrom should contact Robert A. Maheu, whom the CIA had previously used in several covert operations, to recruit the necessary personnel. 9

Maheu subsequently contacted Roselli, who in turn recommended two persons initially known to him as "Sam Gold" and "Joe." 10 He says he, along with Maheu, later discovered the true identities of these persons to be Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante, respectively.

After meeting several times in Miami and deciding upon poison pills as the method of assassination, the 1967 IG Report contends that Trafficante made the arrangements for the assassination of Castro with one of his contacts inside Cuba on one of the trips.
he allegedly made to Havana, Cuba. This contact was a Cuban official who held a position close to Castro.

The 1967 IG Report then states that Roselli passed the pills to Trafficante. Roselli subsequently told O'Connell that the pills were delivered in Cuba apparently retained the pills for a few weeks and then returned them since he was unable to fulfill any plan. was no longer in a position to kill Castro because he had lost his Cuban post.

With unable to perform, the syndicate looked elsewhere. Roselli next told sometime during early 1961, that Trafficante knew a man prominent in the Cuban exile movement who could accomplish the job, Manuel Antonio de

After receiving approval, Trafficante approached Velez about assassinating Castro and reported that Velez was receptive. The 1967 IG Report states that again distributed pills which eventually reached Velez.
This activity concluded the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the plots. The 1967 IGR does not document any attempt to administer the pills to Castro.

The 1967 IGR relates that after a period of apparent dormancy, Bissell directed William Harvey in approximately November of 1961 to reactivate the CIA-Mafia plots. Therefore introduced Harvey to Roselli. During this phase, the CIA decided against using Giancana or Trafficante; instead, a person referred to as "Mafia" entered the plot as the person who would help provide Castro contacts. In addition, the plots still utilized the services of Trafficante and Giancana, the CIA admitted that Roselli most likely kept them informed. The 1967 IGR noted that "it would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing higher-ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private
domain of someone else in the syndicate.  

In June of 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey that \textit{Vice City Leader} dispatched a three-man team into Cuba with the general assignment of recruiting others to kill Castro, and, if the opportunity arose, to kill him themselves, maybe through the use of pills. In September of 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey in Miami that the "medicine" was reported in place, that the three-man team was safe, and that he was prepared to dispatch another three-man team to infiltrate Castro's bodyguard. In December, 1962, Roselli and Harvey agreed that not much seemed to be occurring and by February, 1963, Harvey terminated the plot.

B. The Las Vegas Wiretap Incident

The 1967 IGR also mentioned an event that occurred during Phase I of the CIA-Mafia plots which resulted in the first dissemination of the details of the plot to persons other than the ones involved in the operation. On October 31, 1960, Las Vegas police arrested Arthur J. Balletti, an employee of a Florida investigator named Edward DuBois, for placing
an electronic bug in a hotel room in Las Vegas. Subsequent investigation determined that Robert A. Maheu authorized the surveillance and possibly the wiretap of the subject involved and that Maheu probably acted on behalf of Giancana and the CIA.

The violation of the wiretap statute placed the case under federal jurisdiction and the FBI soon began an investigation. In the course of this investigation, Maheu informed the FBI that he instituted the surveillance on behalf of CIA efforts to obtain Cuban intelligence through the hoodlum element, including Giancana. In its efforts to prevent the prosecution of Balletti, Maheu, and an unidentified individual known as J. W. Harrison, the CIA eventually told the Justice Department the details of Phase I of the CIA-Mafia plots to kill Castro.

This most accurately can be related through the following
memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Ramsey Clark:

Blank letterhead memorandum

TO: Attorney General
FROM: Director, FBI

TOP SECRET

Attorney General Robert Kennedy indicated that a few days prior to 5-9-62 he had been advised by the CIA that Robert Maheu had been hired by the CIA to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition of paying $150,000 to hire gunmen to go into Cuba and kill Castro. He further stated CIA admitted having assisted Maheu in making the "bugging" installation in Las Vegas which uncovered this clandestine operation and for this reason CIA could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana or Maheu. Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA had not cleared its action in hiring Maheu and Giancana with the Department of Justice, he issued orders that the CIA should never again take such steps without first checking with the Department of Justice.

Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this matter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosecution against Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring out the fact the United States Government had approached him to arrange for the assassination of Castro. He stated the same was true concerning any action we might take against Maheu for any violation in which he might become involved.

In summary, the Las Vegas wiretap forced the CIA to acknowledge the existence of the CIA-Mafia plots to non-CIA government officials.

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 14 Sep 64

RELEASE IN FULL □ RELEASE IN PART □ TOTAL DENIAL
and provided the first occasion for participants to manipulate the operation to prevent prosecution.

C. Robert Maheu and the Long Committee

The next major event related to the CIA-Mafia plots occurred in 1966 when Maheu used his involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before Senator Edward Long's Committee which was investigating 35 invasions of privacy. The attorney for Mahue, Edward Pierpont Morgan, informed the House Select Committee on Assassinations (hereinafter the "Committee") that Maheu contacted him during the fall of 1966 and said he was going to be called before the Long Committee in conjunction with the Morgenthau investigation. Maheu then informed Morgan of the plots and suggested that any testimony might necessarily reveal his previous covert activities with the CIA. Morgan then contacted Senator Long and Lawrence Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, to reiterate Maheu's concerns in an apparently successful effort to block any testimony.
D. Roselli Efforts to Avoid Prosecution

The SSC related that in May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport Roselli "for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia." The SSC then states that Roselli contacted Edwards who subsequently spoke to the FBI in regard to Roselli.

The SSC reports that Roselli again contacted CIA sources in an effort to thwart prosecution when Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills in 1967. Roselli contacted Harvey, who was no longer a CIA employee, to represent him. Harvey subsequently attempted to influence the CIA into preventing the prosecution. The Justice Department, however, subsequently convicted Roselli for a violation of the interstate gambling laws.
E. Debut of the Retaliation Theory

The genesis of this theory can be attributed to an interview that Premier Castro held on September 7, 1963 with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker. In that interview, Castro warned against the United States "aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders." He stated, according to Harker, that United States leaders would be in danger if they promoted any attempt to eliminate the leaders of Cuba. In early January, Edward Morgan approached Drew Pearson, related the background of the plots, posed the possibility that the plots could have provoked a Castro retaliation, and asked Pearson to inform Chief Justice Earl Warren of the operation.

Warren subsequently informed Secret Service Director James J. Rawley who in turn notified the FBI. Morgan informed the Committee that Roselli initially approached him complaining of excessive FBI surveillance ever since he had been involved in this patriotic venture. Roselli also informed Morgan that Castro had retaliated for these plots by assassinating President Kennedy.
After receiving this information the FBI decided not to further investigate the allegation. Following the publication of the Jack Anderson and Drew Pearson articles of March 3 and 7, 1967, however, where the theory of retaliation first gained public notoriety, President Johnson ordered the FBI to investigate the matter. The FBI consequently interviewed Edward Morgan on March 20, 1967. Morgan informed the FBI that he represented clients that were reasonable individuals who entered into a project that they understood to have high governmental backing and which involved the assassination of Fidel Castro. Morgan then stated that his clients had reason to suspect that Castro learned of these plots and killed President Kennedy in retaliation.

The FBI investigation resulted in President Johnson acquiring a personal interest in the retaliation theory which prompted CIA Director Richard Helms to prepare a report on the assassination plots.
On March 23, 1967 Director Helms ordered the CIA Inspector General to prepare a report on the CIA assassination plots. This report detailed the accounts of various CIA operations against including an analysis of the CIA-Organized Crime plots and the AMLASH operation. The IGR also examined the 1960 Las Vegas wiretap incident.

In reference to the AMLASH operation, the IGR related AMLASH's activities in Madrid, Spain in late 1964 and early 1965, where AMLASH was meeting with Manuel Artime. The IGR further noted that Rafael Garcia-Bongo, a former lawyer for Santo Trafficante, was in Madrid, Spain in March, 1965. Bongo claimed to be in contact with dissident Cuban military leaders, including AMLASH.

G. Anderson Articles

In 1971, Anderson once again published information promoting the retaliation theory in two articles dated January 18 and 19. These articles exhibited more detail, relating that several assassins made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before being apprehended, that this event
occurred in late February or early March, 1963, that Robert Kennedy at least condoned the CIA-Mafia plots, and that Roselli delivered poison pills to be used in killing Castro to a contact at the Miami Beach Fountainbleu Hotel on March 13, 1961.

H. Roselli deportation

In 1971, the same year that Anderson released additional information on the plots, the CIA contacted the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, in an attempt to prevent information on CIA operations from being disclosed in the event INS brought deportation proceedings against Roselli. The SSC stated in its Interim Report, released in November, 1975, that the deportation order was still in the process of being litigated. In August, 1976, authorities discovered Roselli's butchered body stuffed in an oil drum and floating in Miami's Biscayne Bay. His colleague in the plots to kill Castro, Sam Giancana, had been shot to death in his home in June, 1975.
I. The Senate Select Committee To Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities

In connection with its mandate to investigate
the full range of governmental intelligence activities,
the SSC "examined the performance of the intelligence
agencies in conducting their investigation of the
assassination and their relationship to the Warren
Commission." In April, 1976, the SSC published
its Final Report (Book V) which in essence faulted
the CIA for its errors of omission in not informing
the Warren Commission of the CIA's [on-going] plots
against the revolutionary government in Cuba and
its attempts on the life of the premier, Fidel Castro.

After reviewing the details of the CIA-Mafia
plots, the SSC stated that "Castro probably would
not have been certain that the CIA was behind the
underworld attempts" and that it would have been
unlikely that Castro would have distinguished the
the CIA plots with the underworld from any plots
sponsored by the Cuban exile community and not
affiliated in any way with the CIA. (")?

The SSC identified the AMLASH operation, however, as being "clearly different" from the underworld plots. The SSC stated that AMLASH was in progress at the time of the assassination, that it could clearly be traced to the CIA, and that AMLASH's proposal for a coup had been endorsed by the CIA, the initial step being the assassination of Castro. The SSC cautioned, however, that it saw "no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban government plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S. operations against Cuba."

As related in the Introduction to this material, the SSC did not reach any conclusion because it believed additional investigation needed to occur. **J. The CIA 1977 Task Force Report**

Stung by the Senate criticism and the rippling effect that Book V caused in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer, at least within the CIA, the critical questions postulated in the SSC Final Report.
The identifies a principal theme of Book V as the possibility that Castro retaliated against the United States for attempts on his life and that the CIA operations may have specifically caused any such actions by Castro. In responding to this theory the CIA decided to perform the following:

1) to conduct a full review of information and operations in the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy,

2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy.

The details of the are thoroughly related in this material because no source has previously publicly released them.

1. Syndicate Operations

Before analyzing the AMLASH operations, the CIA first related new considerations pertaining to the syndicate operations. The refers to a series of articles written by Paul Meskill and appearing in the New York Daily News in April, 1975.

In these articles Meskill described how Frank Fiorini, known as Sturgis, allegedly
recruited Marie Lorenz to spy on Castro, and how Sturgis knew him and planned to use him in a bombing assassination of Castro. Meskill asserted that Sturgis claimed he had been a hired operation for the CIA for at least a decade and that Sturgis was in touch with all the casino operators in Havana during the period of the Castro takeover. In another article on June 13, 1976, Meskill related the claim of Marie Lorenz that in the fall of 1960 Frank Sturgis, acting for the CIA, gave her two capsules of poison powder which she was to sprinkle in some food or drink of Castro.

The writers of the 1977 book were quite concerned with these assertions because of the name had

- publicly surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot before the SSC revelation of the CIA-organized crime plots, and thus the assignment to poison Castro gave to the "official case to Castro who may have received kickbacks from the gambling interests." The possibility that was involved in assassination plots other than the CIA operation also attracted the attention of the CIA.
In reference to Sturgis' allegation that he
had been a hired operator for the CIA for a decade
the report asserted that "he was in contact with
some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area,
but had no direct relationships with the Agency."
The report recognizes that Sturgis, through his gambling
activities and relationships with various casino owners,
may quite possibly have known Castro, and also raises
the question of whether Sturgis may have been a source
of information to Castro regarding his participation
in any assassination plot.

In reference to the Lorenz-Sturgis poison pill
plot, the report noted the similarity of this plot
to the details in the 18 October 1960 FBI report.
The CIA concluded that this October date is too early
for the CIA syndicate operations and that therefore
the syndicate may have been acting independently.

The CIA also concluded that Antonio de Mera,
the Cuban exile leader active in the CIA syndicate
operations, may have already been active in plots
with the Mafia when the CIA approached him.
The CIA cited two FBI memorandums as support. First, a 21 December 1960 memorandum pertaining to underworld support for some Cubans, and second, a 18 January 1961 memorandum relating an unconfirmed report that was one of the Cubans receiving support.

The CIA further acknowledged that although the operation with the Mafia was suspended after the Bay of Pigs, it appeared to still be in progress when re-activated in April, 1962.

The summarized its position concerning non-CIA sponsored syndicate operations in the following passage:

It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had underway.../1/: a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction.

2. AMLASH

The states the SSC suggests that AMLASH was possibly a Castro agent assigned a provocation
mission which would then justify retaliation, or, in the alternative, that AMLASH was a security risk through which details of the plotting may have surfaced to Castro thus providing the impetus for provocation. Additionally, the cites the SSC as holding that in either case, AMLASH should have been reported to the Warren Commission. 

The contends neither theory is correct stating that the relationship between the CIA and AMLASH before the death of President Kennedy was so "unsubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for AMLASH/1 to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against Castro. 

In support the proceeds to narrate the Agency's understanding of the operation. On August 17, 1962, the case officer for AMLASH reported that he "has no intention of giving AMLASH/1 physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiation." Headquarters replied
the next day, "Strongly concur that no physical elimination mission be given AMLASH/1." From August 29, 1962 until September, 1963 the CIA states it did not have any contact with AMLASH.

On September 7, 1963 the CIA received the following cable:

AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for U. S. reveal plan of action. 92 65

The notes that the SSC interpreted "inside job" as referring to an operation against Castro; the CIA, however, says it refers to a general commitment concerning how to effect change. 77 The also states that at this point Book V says "characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation is disputed." The CIA contends that any dispute only existed in the eyes of the SSC.

The next comments on an interview of Castro by AP reporter Daniel Harker in which Castro said that anti-Castro terrorists had the support of
The HSCA draft report is somewhat off target in its comment on what the CIA 1977 Task Force report said about AMLA/S/H's idea of what was involved in sustaining the Castro regime.

The Task Force report was not commenting on the report of AMLA/S/H's views, per se. It was commenting on the misquotations of those views in the SSC Final Report. The distinction is worth reviewing.

The 1977 Task Force report treated the AM/LA/S/H matter in two sections. The first was a summary of the AM/LA/S/H argument through the time of President Kennedy's death, with a recitation of the specific limitations envisioned in the relation of AM/LA/S/H to how he was treated (a), and how he clearly understood and was upset over it. The second section addressed a series of detailed separate representations on the AM/LA/S/H opera tor in Book D of the SSC Final Report. The summary of AM/LA/S/H's views on this point was of relative unimportance.
in itself, but for the misquotations of it by the SSC Final Report. It was that misquotations and was being addressed in the CIA 1977 Task Force report and the statement of AMPS and its views. Otherwise it was of relative unimportance that is omitted in the MSNA draft report, and to the extent it is worth note or all it is merely distorted.
U. S. leaders. The report states that the Book V implies that AMLASH/1 may have reported to Castro what the SSC characterized as assassination plots. The CIA response is that "Castro's remarks at that time could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing." On October 11, 1963 the case officer called headquarters and said that AMLASH/1 claimed to have the necessary people and equipment to overthrow Castro without U. S. assistance. On October 29, 1963 Desmond Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in Paris. At this meeting the CIA maintains that Fitzgerald rejected AMLASH's request for an assassination weapon specifically, a high powered rifle with a telescopic lens. The report contends that at this point it was clear that AMLASH was informed that there would be no U. S. assistance until after the fact, which is contrary to the SSC statement in Book V to the effect that it was uncertain how AMLASH interpreted the put-off by Fitzgerald. Rather detailed recitation of what AMLASH/1 was told, as basic fare view. The "put-off" was a general notice that certain actions were being considered, directed at specific statements, but it was clear how AMLASH had reacted in the past.
On November 19, 1963, Fitzgerald approved informing AMLASH/1 that he would be given a cache inside Cuba and that a high-powered rifle with a scope would be included upon request. On November 20 the case officer informed AMLASH that he would be receiving the meeting he requested. This meeting occurred on November 22.

The summarized the significance of these contacts with AMLASH as related to the contentions in Book V in the following passage:

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro.

Finally, in reply to the SSC allegation that the CIA inadequately responded to the Warren Commission's request for all possible relevant information, the observed:
While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to re-inform the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms - the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination (JFK) because of tensions of the time... The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well."

K. Recent Anderson Articles

In September 1976 and October, 1978, Anderson again published articles which propounded the retaliation theory. In addition, for the first time Anderson publicly revealed that John Roselli served as his source for the retaliation theory in all of the articles published through the years.

The September 7, 1976 article appearing in the Washington Post contains all components of the retaliation theory. This states:

Mafia mobster John Roselli may have taken the secret of the John F. Kennedy assassination with him to his death. He was brutally murdered a few weeks ago, his hacked up body stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami's Biscayne Bay.

Before he died, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators he suggested, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld
contacts in Havana who had been trying to knock him off. He believed, not altogether without basis, that President Kennedy was behind the plot.

The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's assassination according to Roselli's scenario. To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger.

Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. It was also difficult to assess whether he knew what he was talking about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there is no real evidence to support Roselli's story. But there are enough curious circumstances to justify telling it. Here are the fascinating highlights.

The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant mobster with underworld contacts in Havana, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no authority, however, over the underworld elements in Havana.

They were under the loose control of Florida's Mafia chieftain, Santos Trafficante. His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a Cuban jail, an indignity that didn't endear Castro to him.

After Trafficante made it back to his Florida haunts, he left part of his organization behind in Havana. Some of his henchmen even managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner circle. These were the people Roselli wanted to use to knock off Castro.
But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Sam "Momo" Giancana, to deal with Trafficante.

As Roselli's associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arrangements.

Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro's food. The pills would have made it appear that he died of natural causes. When this failed, snipers were dispatched to a Havana rooftop. They were caught.

The word reached Roselli that some of the plotters had been tortured and that Castro had learned about the whole operation.

The CIA called off the Roselli operation in March, 1963, but recruited a Castro associate, Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro.

In an impromptu, three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he knew about the attempts on his life and warned that U. S. leaders also
might not be safe. That was Sept. 7, 1963.

According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly were Cubans from the old Trafficante organization. Working with Cuban intelligence, they allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro-Castro movement.

According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have shot Kennedy or may have acted as a decoy while others ambushed him from closer range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would have brought a massive U.S. crackdown on the Mafia.

So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against the President's killer. At least this is how Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas.

Several key CIA officials believed that Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination.

It has also been established that Jack Ruby, indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections in the Havana underworld. One CIA cable, dated Nov. 28, 1963, reported that "an American gangster type named Ruby" had visited Trafficante in his Cuban prison.
III. ISSUE ANALYSIS

A. Preface

The Committee investigated this material to determine what conclusions can be ascertained concerning the nature, scope, and ramifications of these operations. In this regard, various issues are presented in the following sections, subjected to analysis, and then resolved according to available evidence, probable motivations and the most logical inferences.

To fulfill this process, the Committee reviewed material from numerous governmental sources that pertained to the persons and operations relevant to the investigation. These persons included:

1. John Roselli - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
2. Santo Trafficante - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
3. Antonio de Verona - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
4. Sam Giancana - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
5. Robert Maheu - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
6. Michael McLaney
   - Involved in Havana Casino Business
   - Involved in Havana Casino Business
   - Havana Casino Operator

7. Samuel Benton
   - Anti-Castro Activist

8. Norman Rothman
   - Washington, D.C. attorney
   - Involved in Havana Public Relations
   - Involved in Havana Public Relations
   - Associate of Sam Giancana

9. John Martino
   - Havana Casino operator
   - Havana Casino operator
   - Havana Casino operator
   - Associate of Sam Giancana
   - Havana Casino operator

10. Edward P. Morgan
    - Havana Casino business
    - Havana Casino business

11. Edward K. Moss
    - Havana Casino operator

12. Dino Cellini
    - Havana Casino operator

13. Richard Cain
    - Havana Casino operator

14. Charles Tourine
    - Havana Casino business
    - Havana Casino business
    - Havana Casino business
    - Havana Casino business

15. Rafael "Macho" Gener
    - Havana Casino operator

16. Evelio Duque Miyar
    - Havana Casino operator

17. Jorge Alonso Pujol
    - Havana Casino operator

18. Joseph Shimon
    - Havana Casino operator

19. Angelo Bruno
    - Spotted Organized Crime Leader Of Philadelphia

20. Sam Mannarino
    - Havana Casino operator
21. Kelly Mannarino
22. Edward Browder
23. Joseph Merola
24. Arthur Balletti
25. Dominick Bartone
26. Richard Helms
27. James O'Connell
28. Luis Balbuena Calzadilla
29. AMLASH
30. William Alexander Morgan
31. Jesus Orta
32. Jack Anderson
33. Frank Sturgis
34. Fidel Castro

(Roselli attorneys)
Wherever applicable and desirable, the Committee either interviewed or deposed these persons or subpoenaed them to give testimony before Committee members.

The government sources where the Committee requested and reviewed material were:

1. Central Intelligence Agency
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation
3. Drug Enforcement Agency
4. Department of Defense
5. Department of State
6. Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
7. United States Customs Service
8. Immigration and Naturalization Service
9. United States Senate Committee on Intelligence
10. United States Secret Service
11. Chicago Crime Commission
12. Chicago Police Department
13. New York Police Department
14. Public Safety Department, Organized Crime Bureau, Dade County, Florida
15. Cuban Government
In the majority of instances, review of any material at these sources and any statements from individuals were not pertinent to any assassination plots against Castro, particularly the CIA-Organized Crime and the AMLASH operations. Further, almost all relevant information acquired was already known through the SSC investigation and the CIA Inspector General Report. For this reason the following analysis represents conclusions principally derived from information substantively the same as that which the SSC and CIA previously considered. Consequently, the investigation resulted in additional corroborations of this information from a diversity of sources. What remained to be drawn were the conclusions.

B. Issues Pertaining to the AMLASH Operation

The Committee found no evidence that the AMLASH operation provoked Premier Castro to assassinate President Kennedy in retaliation.
The Committee has received equally persuasive evidence and therefore cannot state whether the AMLASH operation prior to the death of President Kennedy can be characterized as an assassination plot.

Richard Helms, the former Director of the CIA, in his testimony before this Committee stated that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot.112 As already indicated, the 1977 IC concluded that AMLASH had "no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro" during President Kennedy's life.112

Joseph Langosch, the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff in 1963, the component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services, offered a contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms and the assertions of the 1977 IC. Desmond Fitzgerald headed the Special Affairs Staff which was responsible for the AMLASH operation.

In an affidavit to the Committee, Longosch recalled that:

Langosch's testimony to HSCA seems to have experienced some evolution since he testified to the Church Committee (SCC) in 1975. Then he was quite vague, but now he is to some extent, and partly including here, to characterize the AMLASH operation per se (see page 75, Book II, SCC Final Report).
The AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA.

Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the AMLASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA officials, including Desmond Fitzgerald.

In response to Langosch's sworn statements, this Committee received the affidavit of Kent (CIA pseudonym) L. Pollock from the CIA. Pollock "served as Executive Officer for Desmond Fitzgerald during the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs Staff... and discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it progressed." Pollock specifically contested the assertions of Langosch stating:

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Fitzgerald considered the AMLASH operation to be a political action
activity with the objection of organizing a group under 

to overthrow Castro and the Castro regime by means of a coup d'etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as an assassination operation. Mr. FitzGerald stated within my hearing on several occasions his awareness that coup d'etat often involves loss of life.108g

He also stated:

Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH operation as an 'assassination operation'; the case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer did not, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the other branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially filled with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy's death. AMLASH rejected the pen with disdain.108h
2) Assuming that AMLASH was not an assassination plot during the life of President Kennedy and that Castro uncovered its existence and scope, the Committee believes that Castro would have been provoked in a manner sufficient to induce assassinating President Kennedy in retaliation.

Assuming that AMLASH was an assassination plot during the life of President Kennedy and that Castro uncovered its existence and scope, the Committee still believes that Castro would have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States in retaliation.

In his interview with the Committee, Premier Castro set forth some reasons supporting this contention. The Committee agrees with the reasoning in his statements. Castro said in part:

That was insane. From the ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane... absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of
organizing the death of the President of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here.

Castro also added:

I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the system. It has never done that.

In this interview Castro also commented on the speech of September 7, 1963 which has been cited throughout the years as an indication that Castro may have assassinated President Kennedy in retaliation.

Premier Castro asserted:

So, I said something like those plots start to set a very bad precedent. A very serious one - that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions...but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that...not in the least...but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting of other countries would be a very bad precedent...something very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under
the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I didn't mean a threat by that. I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures - similar measures - like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life. 

Some reasoning, which Committee cautions is speculative, may be of some assistance. It does not seem likely that Castro would make a veiled reference to assassinating American leaders in retaliation for plots on his life if he was actually planning or contemplating such acts: he would want to call as little attention as possible to himself. Rather, it seems Castro was attempting to display his public dismay and knowledge of such attempts in an effort to prevent their continuance. Consequently, together with an absence of any evidence implicating Castro in the assassination, the Committee believes
that this incident, while displaying Castro's displeasure at American activities, does not implicate Castro in the assassination.

The Committee believes there are additional reasons to discount any involvement of Castro in the assassination which are also compelling. The Committee cautions that these reasons, while persuasive, are still necessarily speculative.

First, William Atwood, Special Advisor to the United States Delegation to the United Nations, was involved in diplomatic efforts to establish a framework for detente during the fall of 1963. Atwood told the SCC that McGeorge Bundy, an advisor to President Kennedy, told him that President Kennedy was in favor of "pushing towards an opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back to normal." Atwood also arranged for a French journalist, Jean Daniel to meet with Kennedy prior to a scheduled trip by Daniel to see Castro. Daniel and Kennedy
discussed the prospects for reestablishing United States-Cuba relations and Kennedy asked Daniel to see him after visiting Castro.  

The Committee believes that such efforts to establish a peaceful coexistence between the United States and Cuba would have hampered any desire by Castro to assassinate Kennedy. In comparing the attitudes of the two [leaders of the United States, President Kennedy supported a less hostile attitude and position toward Cuba. Even if Castro felt the relations between Cuba and the United States were bad under the Kennedy Presidency, there were legitimate reasons to suspect they would have been worse under any other administration.]

Thus, with the prospects of renewed diplomatic relations in the air and the knowledge that Kennedy possessed a more favorable attitude toward Cuba than other military or political leaders, Castro would have
had every reason to hope that Kennedy maintained the Presidency. Further, the Committee does not believe that eliminating Kennedy would necessarily have favorably altered the United States' operations and ties toward Cuba. In addition, the Committee does not believe Castro would have assassinated President Kennedy because such an act, if discovered, would have afforded the United States the excuse to destroy Cuba. The risk would not have been worth it.

C. Issues Pertaining to the CIA-Organized Crime Plots

1. Scope and Nature of Plots - Analysis
   a) Roselli Knowledge of CIA Sponsorship

   James O'Connell informed the Committee that Maheu told Roselli he represented an international group of clients who had vested interest in Cuba.

   Roselli, however, testified to the SSC that Maheu told him from the beginning that the CIA was with him. Maheu confirmed this account to the SSC.

   Maheu also stated in a deposition to the Committee that Giancana knew at the time that was with the CIA. Further, Trafficante testified to the
Committee that Roselli informed him that he, Roselli, was operating as an agent of the CIA.

The weight of the evidence indicates that Roselli, and thus Giancana and Trafficante, knew the CIA was behind the assassination plots at an early stage. This recognition of CIA initiation is important because it shows that Giancana and Trafficante and thus organized crime knowingly became involved with the CIA.

b) Discovery of True Identities

Roselli arranged for the entrance of Giancana and Trafficante into the plots and introduced them to Connell as "Sam Gold" and "Joe." Connell contends he learned the true identities of these persons a few months after the operation was in progress when he and Maheu saw an article in one of the Sunday sections of the Miami newspaper. This article supposedly pertained to organized crime in the United States and contained pictures of top hoodlums, including Same Giancana and Santo Trafficante. In the
1967 IGR Council stated that the article came from the Parade magazine in the Miami Times. Maheu also contends that he did not know the true identities of Sam Gold and Joe until this article appeared. He also stated that this incident occurred after the "we were up to our ears" in the operations and consequently the CIA decided to progress forward.

The SSC conducted a search of supplements to all Miami newspapers for the requisite time period and could not locate any such article. The Committee consequently searched Parade magazine for the fall of 1960, all of 1961, and all of 1962, the years which spanned the entire operation. The Committee learned that on January 21, 1962, Parade published an article entitled, "Our government's crackdown on organized crime," written by Jack Anderson, which contains a listing of the top ten hoodlums in the country as well as several photographs of mobsters, including Santo Trafficante. The article focuses on the efforts of Attorney General
Robert Kennedy's campaign against organized crime and mentions both Giancana and Trafficante.

Although this Parade article appears to correspond with Connell and Maheu's description, it is over one year past the beginning months of the operation. Indeed, it occurs nine months after the completion of Phase I of the plots. Additionally, neither the SSC nor the Committee has discovered any other article pertaining to organized crime in Parade magazine or the supplements of any Miami newspaper for the alleged time period.

It appears Connell and Maheu are lying in an attempt to look for an ex post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top organized crime figures in the United States. Implicit in their contention is that while the CIA wished to solicit criminal sources to assassinate Castro, it would not knowingly have recruited any figures from the top-echelon of organized crime. Additionally,
statement that "we were up to our ears in it" is even more difficult to fathom since according to the 1967 IGR, the operation was in its embryonic stage in the fall of 1960 and no pills were even delivered until approximately February or March of 1961. Without additional support, the Committee does not believe the contentions of Maheu and O'Connell.

Further, the CIA plot to assassinate Castro was necessarily a highly volatile and secret operation. Once Roselli introduced additional contacts into the scene it is not logical that the CIA would have neglected to verify the identities of such principals. On the contrary, it is more believable and more probable that the CIA ascertained the true identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe" at an early stage and, consciously progressed forward in the operation, confident that these two persons, in the words attributed to Colonel Sheffield Edwards, were individuals "tough enough" to handle the job.
c) Roles of Principals

1) Phase One

Colonel Sheffield Edwards assigned the task of finding someone to assassinate Castro. O'Connell both decided to utilize Maheu as someone to recruit persons to effectuate the operation. O'Connell also described his role as the liaison to the CIA and confirmed that all reports or information would proceed through him to the Agency. In addition, O'Connell said he acted as a "babysitter" to Roselli; that is, remaining with him to occupy his time to insure that Roselli was fulfilling his role.

There is a discrepancy over who suggested Roselli for the operation, but in any event, he was recruited because he had connections with persons who could handle the assignment.

Conflict arises over the role of Giancana. Roselli informed the SSC that Giancana was only a "back-up" man. It should be noted that Giancana was murdered four days before Roselli made this statement. Mahue, however, described Giancana
as having a key role and characterized his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination." Joseph Shimon, a close friend of Roselli who had knowledge of the plots at the time, stated that Roselli contacted Giancana to provide Cuban contacts. Shimon further characterized Giancana as only providing contacts, specifically Santo Trafficante, and not as an active participant.

The most sound analysis is that Giancana served as a person Roselli could approach who could then make the necessary contact into the Cuban domain, specifically Santo Trafficante. Roselli, who FBI files indicate represented Giancana's interest in Las Vegas and was subordinate to him, would not directly contact the organized crime boss of the Cuban and Southern Florida area without first contacting his superior, Giancana, who would then make any necessary arrangements. Both Giancana and Trafficante, being bosses of two organized crime domains, would have the means, power, and stature to arrange for the assassination. After contacting Trafficante,
who had the influence to recruit the necessary personnel to perform the assassination, Giancana probably was not an active participant in the process of poisoning pills or actually arranging the assassination.

The role of Trafficante, the only living major organized crime figure involved in the plots, is a major source of conflict. The 1967 IGR contains several references to Trafficante which characterize his function. In discussing how poison pills could be given to Castro, it states that "Trafficante ('Joe, the courier') was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a wort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castr." Later the report states that "Roselli passed the pills to Trafficante." and that "Roselli reported to Connell that the pills had been delivered to Cuba in Cuba." After Havana lost his position in the Cuban government and could no longer pass any pills, the IGR says "Roselli told Connell that Trafficante knew of a man high up in the Cuban exile movement who might do the job." Roselli identified
him as Antonio de Verona. The following passage further confirms Trafficante's role:

Trafficante approached * and told him that he had clients who wanted to do away with Castro and that they would pay big money for the job. * is reported to have been very receptive, since it would mean that he would be able to buy his own ships, arms and communications equipment. 158 159

Trafficante testified in public to the Committee that Roselli asked him to solely act as an interpreter to between the American operations and the Cuban contacts. Trafficante denied handling or carrying any poison pills used in the operation, denied recruiting and denied recruiting * In his Senate testimony, Roselli confirmed Trafficante's role as that of a translator.

The Support Chief, however, informed the Committee that Trafficante was the person in contact with Cubans in Havana. Giancana partially confirmed this in the IGR by identifying Joe as a man "who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there. The Support Chief also confirmed that he was the only CIA conduit and that if the IGR states Trafficante
contacted or procured the assassin then it accurately reflects the information the CIA received.

It is interesting that the 1975 and 1978 Congressional testimony of Roselli and Trafficante corroborate each other but remain contrary to how the principals reported the facts in 1967. The evidence strongly indicates that Trafficante was not merely an interpreter but an active participant in passing the poison pills and in recruiting the potential assassins. This is important in dramatizing the deep involvement of organized crime with the CIA in these plots. One can understand why Trafficante today wishes to downplay his role; the facts, however, simply do not support his assertions. The Committee believes the CIA IGR.

The Committee also heard testimony from whom stated that he is not aware of any CIA assassination plots to kill Castro and denied involvement in their operations. is obviously lying. The Committee does not feel, however, that a further prosecution for perjury, if possible, would assist the investigation's goals.
Phase Two

In Phase Two William Harvey assumed no longer involved in the operation. The IGR states that Roselli remained as a prominent figure and worked "directly with the Cuban exile community and directly on behalf of the CIA." Although the IGR does request that Trafficante was not involved in Phase II, it contains this caution:

Trafficante was one of the principals in Shef Edwards Phase One of the operation. He presumably was not involved in Phase Two under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. After all, Trafficante was the man who brought Verona into the operation late in Phase One, and Verona was one of the main players during Phase Two.

It is reasonable to assume that Roselli at least kept both Giancana and Trafficante informed of the operation's progress.

d) Delivery of the Pills

Neither the IGR nor the SSC pinpoint the date on which someone delivered the pills to Roselli during Phase One of the plots. The chain of custody, as already mentioned, was for Roselli to deliver the pills to Trafficante. The subsequent
steps remain a mystery but Roselli reported to 

Joseph Shimon informed the Committee that he and Maheu travelled together to Miami to the 
Fontainbleu in March, 1961, to witness the Patterson-Johansson fight. Once there Maheu informed him of the plot to assassinate Castro. Shimon also says that during this trip he attended a meeting where a poisonous liquid to be used in the assassination was passed.

Shimon is probably the source for Jack Anderson’s column of January 19, 1971, which fixes the date of the passage of the poison at the Fontainbleu as March 13, 1961.

In any event, it appears certain that the CIA did not pass any pills, poison, or assassination weapons before February of 1961. The fall segment of the plots only constituted a planning stage; no one undertook any operational activities.
e) Location of Trafficante

To support the description of Trafficante as a courier, the 1967 IGR states that "At that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba, and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana on syndicate business."

The Committee has obtained some evidence which indicates that Trafficante was not travelling to Cuba during this period. No records available to the Committee from INS, State Department, or the FBI reflect any travels after February, 1960. During this time, the FBI maintained physical surveillance on Trafficante. Trafficante testified before the Committee that he only made two trips to Cuba after his release from the Trescornia prison in August, 1959, and that these trips occurred within two to three months of this release. Additionally, considering Trafficante's reputed top position in the La Cosa Nostra, it seems more reasonable that Trafficante would send a representative to Cuba to conduct any business rather than risk being detained by Castro again.
If Trafficante was actually travelling between Miami and Havana, the implications are interesting. He was either willing to risk being detained again or had acquired assurances from the Cuban government regarding his safety. In any event the presence of Trafficante during the fall of 1960 in Cuba raises the possibility of a more cooperative relationship between himself and the Cuban government than previously believed. Such a relationship during the period when Trafficante was scheming to assassinate Castro invites the theory that Trafficante was possibly informing the Cuban government of activities in the Miami area in general and of the plots in particular. In return for such information, Trafficante could have acquired lost gambling operations as well as support and a Cuban sanctuary for the smuggling of contraband into the United States.

The Committee realizes the enormous ramifications of such a theory and cautions that it has not received
any information or evidence in this regard. In addition, the available evidence indicates Trafficante was not travelling between Miami and Havana although the Committee recognizes that Trafficante could make such trips and not disrupt his normal routine in Miami and Tampa, thus possibly undermining the effect of any surveillance.

f) Trafficante's Other Contacts

As previously related, the FBI forwarded to the CIA a memorandum on 21 December 1960 revealing that U. S. racketeers were making efforts to finance anti-Castro activities and subsequently forwarded another memorandum on 18 January 1961 which associated Verona with those schemes.

Other sources were also providing assistance to conduct anti-Castro operations. At the time of his introduction into the CIA-Organized crime plots, the CIA was funding through the Revolutionary Democratic Front and the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Verona informed the Committee that the purpose of the council stemmed from an agreement with
the American government to invade Cuba and establish democratic control of the island.

Adding to the support for the promotional efforts of Dino and Eddie Cellini who reportedly were working through a Washington, D.C. public relations firm, Edward K. Moss and Associates, was supposedly acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini brothers with the understanding that this group would receive privileged treatment in the Cuba of the future.

In his testimony before the Committee Verona also described a meeting with Jorge Alonzo Pajol and Meyer Lansky in Lansky's home in Miami in the summer of 1960. Lansky said he had business interests in Cuba and wanted to help the Cubans fight Castro, destroy Castro, and try and establish a democratic government.

The logical inference to be drawn from this is that the CIA, Organized Crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime all settled
upon Giacca, probably independently, as a person who had the potential of uniting the multitude of exile groups to overthrow Castro. Additionally, "Joe" reported contacts with Organized crime raises the possibility that he was involved with them in a plot to kill Castro before the evolution of the CIA-organized crime plots. If this was the case, then Trafficante's recruitment of into the CIA operation would result in providing official U.S. sanction to an already existing independent operation.

The CIA recognized this in stating "it is possible that already was involved in independent operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro Assassination." (see yellow page 96)

g) Introduction of "Joe" and "Gold" and Related Events

The timing of the introduction of Giancana ("Gold") and Trafficante ("Joe") is important to the analysis of the true role of organized crime in the Castro assassination plots. This introduction,
together with other related events, further suggests the thesis that the CIA found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operation that the syndicate already had commenced.

According to the 1967 IGR, the entrance of Giancana and Roselli occurred during the week of September 25, 1960. In contrast, the SSC did not assign a precise date for their entrance because of conflicting evidence between the 1967 IGR and Maheu's Senate testimony which set the date after November, 1960. The SSC did conclude, however, that Giancana was involved in the operation during October because of the Las Vegas wiretap incident which occurred on October 30, and because of the October 18, 1960 FBI memorandum which revealed Giancana had told several people of his involvement in a plot to assassinate Castro.

Although these two events which the SCC cites may support the involvement of Giancana during October, they also invite speculation of independent organized crime operations. The October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum is particularly applicable. This states:

During a recent conversation with several friends, Giancana stated that Fidel Castro
was to be done away with shortly, said it
would occur in November. Moreover, Giancana
said he had already met with the would-be
assassin on three occasions, the last meeting
taking place on a boat docked at the Fontainbleu
Hotel, Miami Beach. Giancana stated everything
had been perfected for killing Castro and that
the assassin had arranged with a girl, not
further described, to drop a 'pill' in some
drink or food of Castro.  

Since, according to the 1967 for the poison pills,
which the CIA prepared at Giancana's request, were not
ready for delivery until late February or early
March, 1961, it is extremely doubtful that Giancana's
November, 1960, assassination plot was part of the
CIA operation. Rather it appears that organized
crime already had its poison plan in progress, using
a mistress of Castro to accomplish the deed, when the
CIA fortuitously entered the scene. Organized
crime then occupied a perfect position. If their
private plot succeeded, they then would possess
far-reaching blackmail potential against the CIA
which they could exercise at an opportune moment;
If their intrigue failed, however, they could then
assume the position that they were only executing
the directives of the government and could possibly
still use their involvement as blackmail
potential.
h) "Government"

Richard Cain

assassination attempt

The "matter" that Giancana refers to in the October 18 memo may have involved Richard Scallzetti Cain. Cain, in connection with the top Echelon Criminal Enforcement Program, informed the FBI of his criminal activities and close association with Giancana. 166 Cain admitted that he had covertly worked for Giancana and been on his payroll while he was a member of the Chicago Police Department from 1956-1960, director of a private detective agency from 1960-62, and Chief Investigator (see yellow pg. 109) for the Cook County Sheriff's Office from 1962-1964.

Several of Cain's activities during the fall of 1960, together with his past experience, support the proposition that if Giancana was involved in any Cuban affairs, specifically an assassination of Castro independent of the CIA plot, he would have recruited Cain to assist him.
First, Cain maintained a record of voluntarily providing information to the CIA concerning his foreign ventures, a practice Giancana may have promoted in an effort to gain possible leverage with the CIA. In a CIA memorandum to the FBI dated 4 November 1960 Cain supplied the following information in his first contact with the CIA:

1) that in 1950-52 while in Miami, Florida, he initiated several telephone taps on various Cuban revolutionary figures under the supervision of William Buenz, a private detective who had contact with the Batista government. (See yellow 104)

2) that on October 2, 1960, William Buenz, then operating out of New York City, met with Cain at O'Hare Airport and offered him $25,000 to travel to Cuba at the request of former President Piro to install telephone taps on various Cubans, and

3) that in 1959, Constantine Kangles, a former attorney for the Cuban 26th of July movement, inquired whether Cain would instruct Castro Army officers in the use of polygraphs.173 191

It seems more than coincidental that Cain's approach to the CIA to supply this information occurred simultaneously with Giancana's meeting with Roselli and Maheu. Cain subsequently volunteered information to the CIA during 1961-63.
Second, on November 2, 1960, a confidential informant told the Bureau that on October 20, 1960, Serapio Montijo, the former head of the July 26 Movement in Chicago, met Richard S. Cain in the office of Constantine Kangles, the former attorney in Chicago for the Cuban 26th of July Movement and former counsel in the United States for the Cuban Government headed by Fidel Castro. Cain indicated to Kangles that he had clients who wished to get news stories and photographs out of Cuba concerning rebel activity in the Cuban foothills. Cain further indicated that he wanted to cover this story and was soon going to Miami in an attempt to enter Cuba, and that Jack Mobley, a Chicago columnist, and Bob Ajamian of Life magazine, had knowledge of this venture.

Third, on November 2, 1960, the FBI interviewed Cain in Miami at the Sands Hotel, Miami Beach. Cain said he was a representative of Accurate Detective Laboratories, Life magazine, and sixty-four other newspapers. After providing information on the military armaments in Cuba, Cain said that the
Resistance movement had eight hundred men fighting in the Escambray Mountains and that he was awaiting the opportunity to parachute into the Escambrays to take photos for Life. Cain said that Antonio de Verona gave him the information on the Cuban armaments.

When Cain's plans to visit Cuba, either to install wiretaps for former President Prio or to take photographs of rebel activity, or both, are considered simultaneously with Giancana's presence in Miami and his reference to the assassination of Fidel in November and with Cain's approach to the CIA, the true purpose and possible interrelation of these events become even more suspect. The wiretap assignment and the photographic story may have been covers; Giancana may have been attempting to send Cain to Cuba to supervise the poisoning attempt on Castro. Cain belonged to La Cosa Nostra, spoke Spanish, had extensive contacts in Latin America, was well-versed in sabotage and investigative procedures, had been on Giancana's payroll for four years, and apparently
was attempting to arrive in Cuba by approximately
November, 1960. Further, Cain's reference
in his FBI interview to "el hombre de Varona, the
person that the CIA concedes may have been active
in independent organized crime assassination plots
against Castro prior to his recruitment by Trafficante
in March, 1961, raises more suspicion.

These events can be interpreted to indicate
that Cain may have been the "assassin-to-be" whom
Giancana referred to in the 18 October 1960 FBI
memorandum, or he may have been the contact man
for the operation. The Committee cautions that this
analysis is obviously speculative.

Cain could also have provided another service
to Giancana. As already indicated, a second person,
called J.W. Harrison, allegedly accompanied and
assisted Balletti in the wiretap. Although the Justice
Department vigorously pursued this investigation and
prepared to indict the principals, no one could determine who Harrison was and no participant would admit to knowing his identity. There is no doubt he existed: he signed the hotel register and accompanied Balletti on the flight to Las Vegas. DuBois, the private investigator Maheu hired to conduct the surveillance, and Balletti maintained that Maheu arranged for J. W. Harrison to accompany Balletti from Miami to Las Vegas to assist in the operation. Maheu denied this. O'Connell, the CIA liaison man, informed the Committee that whoever Harrison was he was not a CIA employee.

Clearly someone arranged for Harrison's presence and knows his true identity. Since DuBois and Balletti acted only as the instruments of Maheu, it seems logical that they would have revealed Harrison's identity in the face of federal prosecution if Harrison were just an employee of DuBois with no connection to the CIA or to the associates of Maheu in the CIA operation against Castro. Thus, Balletti and DuBois either did
not know the identity of Harrison or felt that their client's interests prohibited them from revealing such information. The conclusion that clearly someone arranged for Harrison's presence and knew his identity. It seems most likely that Maheu provided Harrison at the request of a source that had a direct interest in the surveillance. It was most logical for Maheu to inform the Committee that he instituted the surveillance to pacify Giancana's concerns that Phyllis McQuire was having an affair with Dan Rowan and to uncover any possible leaks regarding the operation.

Roselli confirmed these two accounts in his Senate testimony. Shimon further informed the Committee that Giancana told him he paid $5,000 for the Las Vegas operation.

Assuming that Maheu did provide for Harrison, he did so at the request of someone else. Maheu did not have any reason to independently prefer one person over another; the CIA or Giancana, however, did have such a personal interest. Giancana's interest obviously stemmed from his relationship with McQuire; and it is probably correct that Giancana requested
Maheu to bug Rowan's room. This personal interest could have prompted Giancana to direct Maheu to use a person of Giancana's choice. Cain fits that role perfectly. He was a skilled electronic surveillance technician and was in Miami during late October and early November. Miami was the debarkation point for Harrison and Balliatti on their trip to Las Vegas. In his deposition, Maheu denied any knowledge of Cain. When shown several photographs of Cain from the late 1950's and early 1960's, Arthur Balliatti also could not identify Cain as Harrison. These denials do not detract from the theory that Cain was Harrison if no one would identify Harrison in 1960 there is no reason to expect any change in testimony.

The CIA had a personal interest in surveilling McQuire because of the 18 October 1960 memorandum where Giancana discussed an assassination plot against Castro. The SSC concludes that this memo caused the CIA to be concerned with determining if Giancana was leaking information on the CIA-organized crime plots. This may be partially correct, but as already
indicated, the FBI Memorandum depicts a plot substantially in progress and involving a girl which does not resemble the October status of the CIA operation. The CIA could have been more concerned that Giancana was involved in a separate assassination plot and consequently could have been concerned with its nature and extent. The reasons why Phyllis McQuire would have been the target for such surveillance were two-fold. First, her relationship with Giancana might have entailed her learning of certain clandestine activities. Second, she was one of the "several friends" in the conversation related in the 18 October memo. The CIA interest would also explain why a wiretap was installed. Maheu informed the Committee that he only ordered physical surveillance of the target, Rowan, and could not understand why anyone installed a wiretap since the primary intent was to check on McQuire's reported affair with Rowan. Physical surveillance and a room bug would, admittedly, be more than adequate to uncover any affair. If, however, Maheu also wished to investigate
the possibility of leaks in the operation as well as the possibility of Giancana's involvement in an independent plot, then the use of a wiretap would have been logical.

Assuming that investigating an affair was not the primary focus of the Las Vegas operation, it can be argued that direct surveillance of McQuire would have been the optimum method to investigate her for leaks and information that Giancana may have given her. This, however, would have run the risk of incurring the wrath of Giancana and his possible departure from the CIA assassination plots if anyone detected the surveillance. Through the cover of surveilling Rowan for a possible affair with McQuire, however, the CIA had the opportunity to indirectly surveil McQuire to obtain information on the assassination plots for a reason which met the approval of Giancana. Indeed, Giancana probably always believed that his directive to investigate a possible affair was the only issue involved in the surveillance.
In any event, the objectives of both Giancana and the CIA could have been achieved whether Harrison was a Giancana choice, specifically Cain, or an Agency operative.

After the Las Vegas operation backfired, the CIA obviously decided to continue the assassination plots. This indicates that O'Donnell et al. felt the security of the CIA organized crime plot had not been seriously breached. Additionally, it possibly indicates that the CIA determined that even if Giancana was involved in an independent operation, that it would not hamper their efforts, and that all interests could be reconciled. The CIA continued on the same track, blithely going "to bed" with organized crime.

1) The "girl" in the 18 October 1960 Memorandum

In this memo Giancana spoke of a girl who was going to drop a pill in some food or drink of Castro. This format is again in contradiction to the CIA operation which initially relied on a woman, an official in Castro's prime ministry, to administer the pills.
The identity of this "girl" referred to by Giancana has not been ascertain but it is reasonable to assume that Trafficante was in the prime position to recruit a mistress of Castro because of his numerous contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution circles.

American gamblers routinely maintained Cuban mistresses and Trafficante was a typical example. A witness also informed the Committee that Castro customarily arrived at the Nacional Hotel unescorted to visit one of his paramours. This indicates that it may have been relatively easy for Trafficante to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him. Consequently, the use of a girl is quite logical and further supports the involvement of organized crime in an independent plot to kill Castro.

j) Articles on Frank Sturgis

As indicated in Section II Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News wrote several articles in 1975 and 1976 concerning activities of Frank Sturgis. These articles reflect the theory that organized crime was involved in independent Castro assassination plots.
The Committee consequently agrees with the assertion that the Agency "may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction." The following considerations emanate from this theory and more thoroughly respond to the allegations in the Meskill articles.

First, organized crime probably initiated independent assassination plots against Castro prior to any CIA involvement in late 1960. Such plots may have been in progress when the CIA reactivated its plans to kill Castro in April, 1962.

Second, organized crime could quite possibly have been directing activities such as those described in the New York Daily News article.

Third, Frank Sturgis most probably established contacts with organized crime through his gambling associations and probably was used by them in some capacities. This does not imply that he was a member of organized crime.
Forth, Frank Sturgis probably knew and could have been involved with him in an assassination plot. Since Sturgis is not a reliable source, however, his allegations are suspect.

Fifth, according to the Committee's review of all available evidence, the CIA was not involved in any operations with the Cuban official prior to late 1960.

Sixth, Sturgis was not necessarily involved with Lorenz or in a plot to kill Castro. He may have learned of plots involving and possibly Lorenz in Miami after they arrived there in 1965.

Additionally, the April, 1975 Meskill articles did not relate the Sturgis-Lorenz plot to kill Castro with poison pills. It is only after the publication of the SSC Interim Report in November, 1975, and the Final Report in April, 1976, that Meskill describes this plot. Thus, Sturgis may have combined accurate information obtained from and other Miami sources with the facts the SSC presented and then fabricated the Lorenz story, together with other evidence such as the 18 October memo, unfortunately in appearing both logical and believable.
k) Implications Arising From Phase Two of the Operation

Significant differences are apparent between Phase One and Phase Two which reflect upon organized crime's motivation and seriousness in fulfilling its part of the bargain originally initiated in 1960.

First, in Phase One, Roselli and his colleagues demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, indeed, in a position close to Castro. In Phase Two the modus operandi and the ability of the assassin or assassins becomes quite vague. Harvey reported that had an asset in Cuba who had access to someone in a restaurant which Castro frequented who could administer the poison. In June, 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey that had dispatched a three man team to Cuba to recruit persons to kill Castro, or to kill themselves, maybe with poison pills, if the opportunity arose. Harvey said they had no specific plans.

Second, as already indicated, the cast of the organized figures involved changed. Maheu, Giancana, and Trafficante allegedly retired from the scene, with
a "Maceo" assuming the position of Trafficante. Roselli and Geroma remained. The Committee agrees with the CIA that these figures, at least Trafficante and Giancana, were kept informed of the progress of the plots.

What is puzzling is the introduction of a person simply referred to as "Maceo" into a highly sensitive and covert CIA operation without any apparent attempt by the CIA to check his background or ascertain his identity. It seems extraordinary that the CIA would propel the plots forward without performing any security check. Indeed, it seems more logical that at least Roselli and Harvey did ascertain the identity of Maceo and for whatever reason decided to withhold this information. Further, although the mobilization involved 13, whom Trafficante recruited in Phase One, it seems reasonable to assume that some of the individuals in Phase One were actively attempting to kill Castro after the Bay of Pigs and probably until the advent of Soviet solidification. These efforts, however, may well-over
have been conducted without CIA knowledge and again support the theory of independent organized crime plots. \( \rightarrow \) refer to p. 79.

A related issue is whether "phases" actually existed or whether the operations to kill Castro encompassed a continuous time period. As previously indicated, the CIA precautions that the plot was dormant from the Bay of Pigs until Harvey assumed direction in the spring of 1962. Both Harvey and Connell stated, however, that Harvey "took over a going operation." Considering that Roselli was able to immediately mobilize his forces in 1962 in response to Harvey's request and that this 1967 IGR characterizes Macco as Roselli's man, it is more probable that Trafficante, who had recruited all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who maintained the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba, provided this individual. If this speculation is accurate, then it displays Trafficante again performing a direct role during Phase II, a function every source has denied.
During late 1962 and early 1963 Phase Two undramatically and slowly terminated. In retrospect, the ambiguous modus operandi, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the total reliance of Harvey on Roselli for any information, and the seemingly apathetic desire of the CIA to corroborate any information from Roselli all converge to posit the theory that organized crime was not seriously attempting to assassinate Castro after following the solidification of Soviet influence in the Castro regime. Trafficante, Lansky, and other Cuban casino owners must have realized by the mid-1962 that the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last egg, and that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. Certainly, history shows growing Lansky influence in the Bahamas and Las Vegas, Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic, and burgeoning bolita operations in Florida arising from the influx of Cuban exile. Further, organized crime may have determined that the new Justice Department crackdown would probably not have permitted the "wide open" Cuba of the pre-Kennedy era even if the United States had succeeded in ousting the Cuban regime. Consequently, while the United States
government, specifically the CIA, still possessed a viable interest in assassinating Castro, organized crime did not.

2. Motivation of Organized Crime to be involved in Plots

Despite the reasons just presented to discontinue attempts to kill Castro, organized crime still had strong incentive to string the CIA along. Specifically, this incentive was to establish a relationship with the CIA for subsequent use in thwarting prosecution for various unrelated offenses and thus blunting any Justice Department proceedings against organized crime.

The Committee believes that organized crime, while always recognizing the benefits of establishing a relationship with the CIA, was also seriously interested in assassinating Castro to regain lost territory. As already indicated, the Committee believes this desire ebbed with the solidification of Soviet influence and other factors just mentioned. After this occurrence it appears organized crime may only have put forth the "appearance" of involvement and good faith in the plots to further define a
relationship with the CIA. Indeed, the CIA prevention of prosecution in 1961 in the Las Vegas wiretap incident would have given Maheu, Roselli and Giancana confirmation of the value of such a relationship and impetus for continuing it in 1962 even though the assassination of Castro may no longer have been a viable alternative.

The actions of Maheu, Giancana, and particularly Roselli in the years following these plots support this theory. As related in Section II, these individuals actually did use their CIA affiliation and knowledge of the plots in attempts to hinder law enforcement prosecutions and objectives.

The success of some of their efforts verifies the tremendous blackmail potential they possessed. As Sam Papich, the FBI liaison to the CIA, commented in May, 1967, Giancana and Roselli had the CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation" and he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either Giancana or Roselli because of "their previous activities" with the CIA.

It is clear that at least one group benefited from the failure of the assassination plots.

3. Retaliation Theory

The Committee found no evidence that these
operations provoked Premier Castro to assassinate President Kennedy in retaliation.

The Committee also has found no evidence that Castro knew of CIA sponsorship of these activities or even knew of their existence prior to the death of President Kennedy. Even if Castro did discover their existence, however, the Committee does not

In an article in the Washington Post on September 9, 1976, Anderson revealed that ex-CIA agent William Harvey, attorney Edward P. Morgan, and reputed mobster John Roselli were his sources. The Committee has determined that John Roselli was the person who informed Harvey and Morgan about the plots and the retaliation theory; thus, only one source,
Accept the conclusion of the SSC that Castro would not have connected them with the CIA. The Committee recognizes that only a few persons actually knew of the CIA sponsorship and that the Cuban operations and others engaged in penetrating Cuba or directly participating in the assassination efforts were reportedly told that the United States businessmen and organized crime sponsored the operation. The Committee believes, however, that while not being able to be certain, Castro would have highly suspected the CIA in any assassination plot not uncovered, at least to the degree that he would have suspected the CIA was funding the persons or persons plotting his murder. The reason is that Castro suspected the CIA of constantly attempting to overthrow his government. Castro's meeting with Senator George McGovern before Castro gave McGovern a list of CIA-sponsored assassination plots. Consequently, there is no reason to assume that Castro would not have attributed the particular plot to the CIA.
Even assuming that Castro did ascertain the existence of the CIA-organized crime plots and that the CIA sponsored them and ignoring the Committee's belief that Roselli fabricated the retaliation theory, the Committee still believes it is unlikely that Castro would have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States in retaliation for the reasons indicated in the AMLASH portion of the Issue Analysis section. Specifically, these reasons are:

1) the prospect of exposing Cuba to invasion and destruction would not have been worth the risk;

2) the act of changing a leader does not necessarily change the system; it can be argued that

3) Castro may have recognized that among the leaders of the United States, Kennedy maintained the least hostile approach towards Cuba; and

4) the growing prospect of detente between Cuba and the United States would have refrained Castro from assassinating an American official.

4. Related Organized Crime Activities

The Committee reviewed evidence that raises the possibility that various organized crime figures involved in attempts to assassinate Castro were unrelated to the CIA.
To ascertain more information about organized crime's knowledge about Castro assassination plots, the Committee investigated Norman Rothman, who was active in operating various casinos in Cuba before the Castro takeover and who consequently maintained associations with organized crime and the Batista regime.

At various times, Rothman served as manager of the Sans Souci and Copacabana Clubs in Cuba representing the interests of the Mannarino brothers of Pittsburgh. FBI files on Rothman indicate that a proposal to kill Castro was made to Rothman as a "quid pro quo" in which Rothman expected to avoid imprisonment for a 1960 gun running conviction. During an FBI interview, Rothman stated that he had been in "personal contact with White House attorney Harry Hall Wilson, as well as Assistant Attorney General John Liegenthaler, both of Washington, D.C." and members of the Kennedy Administration.

In a deposition to the Committee taken in Miami on April 16, 1979, Rothman expanded on the theme to include a series of mysterious telegrams summoning him to the White House for a series of two or three meetings which began in Attorney General
Kennedy's office with members of his staff and continued in a conference room where Rothman's assistance in providing contacts inside Cuba was explored. At the last meeting Rothman says that:

"one of them happened to discuss [the assassination of Castro] with me, but not in a technical way. You know, just in a casual way. That is about it. I cannot for the moment remember it word for word because it is too far back."  

The evidence suggesting such an approach by Robert Kennedy is entirely uncorroborated and makes no sense when viewed in light of the Justice Department crack-down on organized crime. Further, it seems extremely doubtful that any meeting with Rothman on this topic would have occurred at the White House. Consequently, the Committee believes it highly unlikely that such an event occurred.

The Committee also reviewed evidence which indicates that organized crime may have been aware of the AMLASH operation during its existence.

The IGR identified three name links between the AMLASH operation and the organized crime operation. The IGR did not sufficiently analyze, however, that the common denominator in two of the links was Santo Trafficante.
a) Link One

In March, 1961, the CIA received information that a high-ranking military figure in the Castro regime and a former personal secretary of Castro both wished to defect. The military officer was Rolando Cuba Bracares (AMLASH) and the former secretary was Juan Ortiz, the operative used in Phase I of the CIA-organized crime plots. As already revealed or indicated, the IGC documents that Trafficante recruited indicated that other than the coincidence of both Cuba Bracares and AMLASH seeking infiltration at the same time there is nothing to suggest a relationship between the two men in attempting to assassinate Castro, not a common denominator with Trafficante, Roselli, Giancana or any other members of the American gambling syndicate. This link is therefore insignificant.

b) Link Two

In mid-March, 1965, Rafael Garcia Bongo, a noted Cuban lawyer whose brother occupied the prestigious position of Minister of Sports in Cuba, contacted CIA
station personnel in Madrid to inform the agency that "he was in contact with a group of military officers who were planning to kill Castro" (1967 I.G. Report, p. ). It quickly became clear to CIA employees that Bongo's reference was to and the group of military men who were allied with him in attempting to depose Castro. Although the and are silent attitude toward Bongo's information, it must be assumed that did not respond affirmatively since the AMASH operation was in progress at the time and Artine was in the process of delivering arms caches to people within Cuba.

Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency personnel as a lawyer, the Capri Hotel and Casino in Havana who had been jailed in July 1975 for a period of 75 days, allegedly as a reprisal for representing Santo Trafficante. Bongo's utilization of the short prison term to establish his "bona fides" is questionable as Trafficante was in jail during August, 1959. For the Cuban government to wait for years to exact retribution for that representation makes sense. Possibly, Bongo was involved in approaching
station personnel in Madrid to inform the agency that "he was in contact with a group of military officers who were planning to kill Castro" (1967 I.G. Report, p. ). It quickly became clear to CIA employees that Bongo's reference was to Cuba and the group of military men who were allied with him in attempting to depose Castro. Although the and regarding had not \footnote{Reports are silent regarding Bongo's attitude toward Bongo's information, it must be assumed that they did not respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time and Artime was in the process of delivering arms caches to people within Cuba.}\footnote{Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency personnel as a lawyer, the Capri Hotel and Casino in Havana, who had been jailed in July 1975 for a period of 75 days, allegedly as a reprisal for representing Santo Trafficante. Bongo's utilization of the short prison term to establish his "bona fides" is questionable as Trafficante was in jail during August, 1959. For the Cuban government to wait for years to exact retribution for that representation makes sense. Possibly, Bongo was involved in approaching }
the Castro government in 1962 on Trafficante's behalf for permission to reopen the Capri casino.

Bongo's trip to Madrid apparently involved more than a contact with the CIA for he was arrested for counterfeiting and held until his old client, Santo Trafficante, arrived with a ransom to obtain his release. Presumably, Bongo was paroled back to Cuba, at an unspecified later date, where he died.

One aspect of the Bongo-Trafficante relationship in Madrid deserves fuller treatment although it is doubtful that anything more than supposition can result from further exploration. As already indicated, it has been reported by Jack Anderson that the prize Cuban secret source until his death, John Roselli, had reason to speculate that Cubans originally recruited by Santo Trafficante to kill Castro were "turned around" and sent back to the United States where they were directly involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. If this line of hypothecation is adapted, then the trip to Madrid by Bongo could assume some sinister implications such as the possibility that Bongo's
real purpose in contacting the Madrid Station was to act as a double agent for Castro in ascertaining the nature and scope of the AMYASH operation. Castro certainly became aware of the Artme meetings with Cuba in the fall of 1964 since the list of charges upon which Cuba went to trial in 1966 began with these Madrid meetings. If Castro had begun his suspicions of Cuba's role with the CIA during late 1964 or early 1975, it is likely that he would have begun counter-intelligence measures to confirm his fears which could have led to Castro sending Bongo to Spain to contact the Agency. Given Trafficante's close ties to Bongo, it can be postulated that Trafficante was aware of Bongo's true mission prior to his departure or became knowledgeable when he bailed him out of jail in Madrid. Trafficante also could have received news of AMYASH's ties with the Agency through his close associate Jorge Nobregas who was described by Gorge Crie in his Washington Post article (circa 8/17/76) as "having worked with the CIA, was in student revolutionary group in Cuba, and always close to Trafficante."
Actually, given the extent of Trafficante's high-level contacts within the exile community and the low-level security in the CIA exile operations, it is extremely logical that Trafficante and other members of the underworld knew, in some fashion, part or all of the AMLASH plot. The question becomes: So what? Short of being able to blackmail the government about the modus operandi of the 1960-62 events, the significance of mob knowledge of AMLASH is not readily apparent.

If Trafficante was a double agent, working for the CIA but actually supplying information to Castro, then another scenario emerges. It is then logical to assume that Castro knew of the AMLASH and CIA-organized crime operations from their inception. As mentioned earlier in this material, Trafficante could have received a sanctuary and assistance in smuggling contraband for such information. As also discussed earlier, however, the Committee believes that even if Castro had knowledge of CIA sponsorship of plots against his life, that this would not have provoked him to kill President Kennedy. The benefit of contemporaneous knowledge of the plots would be
to neutralize their effect. Consequently, the Committee believes that any contacts between AMLASH and Bongo do not effect the untenability of the retaliation theory.

c) Link three

The SSC noted that information contained in the report from "A," Victor Spinosa Hernandez, raised the possibility that a link existed between the AMLASH operations and the 1960-62 CIA plots to assassinate Castro using underworld contacts.

A review of the G. report does not sustain the Senate's conjecture in that there is no available evidence cited in the Report to suggest that "A" (Victor Spinosa Hernandez) had knowledge of, or involvement with, any of the syndicate or Cuban exiles who participated in Phase I or II of the CIA-Mafia assassination plots during 1960-62. What Book V did was to seize upon the 1967's tentative identification of "name links" between the 1960-62 organized operation and AMLASH intrigue, and expand
the amorphus nature of those "name links," which included "A," into a theory that "A" was the conduit through which the Syndicate became knowledgeable of both the AMLASH operation and the initial CIA efforts to eliminate Castro. *

The only solid factual basis for Book V's tie-in between AMLASH and the 1960-62 CIA syndicate plots is based upon Victor Espenosa's exile activities in June-July 1963, which Book V examined. Moreover, CIA files contained at least some FBI reports on "A," the Cuban exile who was involved in transporting explosives to New Orleans in 1963. These reports detail his involvement with anti-Castro exiles and "underworld figures" who were operating the guerilla training camp in New Orleans in July 1963.

The "underworld figures" reference relates to Michael and William McLaney who have been considered organized crime affiliates by some law enforcement and media personnel. (See profile) Again, however, no evidence from any source places McLaney into the early CIA plots to kill Castro or into the AMLASH operation. A review of the June-July 1963 activities of McLaney and Victor Espinosa leads only to the inference that

* We cannot contribute positively to the "A"-syndicate link. However, it seems that what "A" knew about AMLASH/post dated the 1963 period. See pp 78, 79 of Book V, SSC Final Report.
their operation was a private limited venture
with no agency or syndicate support and very little
chance of success.

Moreover, the link between McLaney, Espinosa
and the organized crime principals connected to
the initial CIA Castro plots must be dissected in
order to make a judgment as to the likelihood of
the SSC speculation that the syndicate held "inside"
information on Agency operations in 1960-65.

Since the Senate did not attempt to interview
either of the McLaney brothers or Victor Espinosa in
1975 nor ask principals of the 1960-62 plots of their
knowledge or relationship to McLaney or Espinosa, the
Senate's hypothetical question of underworld knowledge
of the full range of CIA Castro plots is based upon a
minimum of hard data and a maximum of free-wheeling
conjecture.

The evidence linking Espinosa to any known organized
crime figures consists of his admission to being
friends with "Cappy" Rothman, Norman Rothman's son,
and a casual knowledge of American gamblers gleaned
from his student days of visiting the Havana casinos.
Mike McLaney's ties to organized crime have been seriously considered within federal law enforcement agencies since the 1950's but no solid evidence has linked him to Trafficante, Roselli or Giancana. Since McLaney has been most frequently mentioned as a "Lansky man." To place a witting McLaney into the 1960-62 plots, it requires a series of speculative hurdles which include:

1. Meyer Lansky was a plotter with Trafficante,

2. McLaney was Lansky's "action" man; and

3. the various underworld figures acted in concert in promoting anti-Castro operations.

The Committee believes that these premises are easily supportable with facts and consequently does not place any significance in the Victor Spinosa link.

As indicated earlier, both Sam Giancana and John Roselli were murdered. Sam Giancana was shot in the basement of his home in Chicago in June, 1975, just prior to his scheduled testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA organized crime plots.
John Roselli's butchered body was found inside an oil drum which was floating in Key Biscayne Bay, Florida in August, 1976 which was shortly after his testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA-organized crime plots.

Various theories have surfaced concerning why they were killed and who was responsible. One theory relevant to this investigation is that Giancana and Roselli were killed because of their participation in the Castro assassination plots and the SSC attempts to elicit information on the plots. In this regard, Trafficante has most often been the person assigned responsibility for the deaths. On the other hand, the Justice Department informed the Committee that it believes that organized crime performed the murders and that the reasons were unrelated to the CIA-organized crime plots.

The Justice Department is still investigating both murders. The Committee has not uncovered evidence relevant to solving these murders. The Committee does believe, however, that a variety of motivations inspired the deaths. These motivations included internal mob conflict, especially in the case of Giancana, and participation and knowledge of the CIA-
organized crime plots. The Committee considers it probable that Trafficante approved of and assisted in the murder of John Roselli. Trafficante's motivation have been to maintain a low profile in connection with the CIA plots and to prevent disclosure of other unknown persons involved in the plots as well as other operations and activities which an investigation of the plots might uncover. The Committee does not believe that such activities were necessarily connected to the assassination of President Kennedy. For instance, Trafficante may have had a covert relationship with Castro which may have entailed his running contraband through Cuba into the United States.
Consequently, although the deaths of Roselli and Giancana are somewhat related to the CIA-organized crime operations, the Committee does not believe that they are related to the assassination of President Kennedy.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The Committee makes the following conclusions:

A. AMLASH OPERATION

1. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE AMLASH OPERATION PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.

2. THE COMMITTEE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE AMLASH OPERATION PRIOR TO THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT.

3. ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS NOT AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVOKED IN A MANNER SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE ASSASSINATING PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.

4. ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, THE COMMITTEE STILL BELIEVES IT IS UNLIKELY THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN RETALIATION.

5. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT ANY KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE AMLASH OPERATION OR ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS AND AMLASH WOULD NOT ALTER THE CONCLUSION THAT CASTRO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY.
B. CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS

1. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE OPERATIONS PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.

2. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT CASTRO KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY; however, IF CASTRO DID LEARN OF THEIR EXISTENCE, THE COMMITTEE PROBABLY BELIEVES THAT CASTRO PROBABLY WOULD HAVE REPORTED THEM TO THE CIA.


4. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT ORGANIZED CRIME WAS INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO INDEPENDENT OF ANY CIA OPERATIONS.

5. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT THE PRINCIPAL REASON WHY ORGANIZED CRIME PARTICIPATED IN THE PLOTS WAS TO STRING THE CIA ALONG AND THUS FOSTER A GROWING RELATIONSHIP WHICH COULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE EXPLOITED TO PREVENT PROSECUTIONS OF THE ORGANIZED FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE PLOTS.

6. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT JOHN ROSELLI USED THE FACTS OF THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS TO FABRICATE THE RETALIATION THEORY IN EFFORTS TO PREVENT HIS PROSECUTION IN LEGAL MATTERS.