JFK Assassination System . Identi?cation Form Date: 4/27/20] Agency Inform ati on AGENCY I HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 130-1014740191 RECORD SERIES CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 61-10?05 Document Information ORIGINATOR HSCA FROM TO TITLE STAFF REPORT ON THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIA-SPONSORED ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO DATE 2 03/ 12/1 979 PAGES 2 101 SUBJECTS Eleased under: the John . ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES Selle-:Eiin Act of 199211 :44 a -US DEE . ESE ORGANIZED CRIME 338313;: DEB-mini CIA, FILES CIA, CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS DOCUMENT TYPE 2 REPORT CLASSIFICATION Unclassi?ed RESTRICTIONS: 18 CURRENT STATUS Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW I 09/07/1995 OPENING CRITERIA 2 COMMENTS Box 34 32273546 Page 1 7) .HH 53333- 32223546 ..-.- 1? A. 1" 011 11:11.? . 11,11,113 1111*?111311 A 11;; 1:.11-: . .31 141.1?- 1 2111..- .11 34? i .?701111.11 com-12 1 155gm": i? rad-,1-1151 i I 91:: as 1. 11:. Introduction .The attempt of the United States government to assassinate Cuban premier.Fidel Castro as well "as other Iforei.gn leaders during the turbule?nt deCade of the 19608 shocked and disgusted the American citizen.41When sources disclosed that the Central Intelligence Agency intentionally . solicited and received the assistance of various .members of organized crime, La Cosa Nostra, in thefurtherance of such plots, more outrage prevailed. 1 Civilized society simply did. not an does not condone.1ld such acts as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy.m There is no excuse; no rationalization. - The effect and influence of these actions did not stop, howeVer, with invoking the di sdain of the American public and world. These assa_3sinati0n- attempts gave birth to the haunting theory th at Fidel Castro orchestrated the aSsassination_of President John F. Kennedy in defensive retaliation 'for_the plots on his life.: 2/qu Page ?.1119?I'Vconclusions. HHIEBDEDI Dunfd:322?354? In-its Final Report_pUblished in April, I976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmen-tal - Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (hereinafter responded to this theory. In this Report, the SSC focused On two operations . of the CIA which may have provoked Cas tro into retaliation.' First, the SSC documented the joint effort of the CIA and Organized Crime to eliminate Castro. Second, the SSC examined the nature and eXtent of the CIA AMLASH operation._ _The SSC concluded its analysis with the statement that "/t/he Committee _believes the investigation_should continue in certain-' areas, and for that reason does not reach any final This_analeis is_an attempt to make such ?.conc1usions. It is not the purpose of the remainder.- as: of this material to g?faf" review detail$ of the CIA?Mafia'plotsgor of the AMLASH operation, to resolve all.of the conflicting viewpoints of the .SSC and the CIA in regard to the importance of the- various operations, or to subject anyone to moral. .tongue?l?ashing.2 Instead, this material first seeks' Page .3 -7- sausu 1m .4 1.. .. 'to present a comprehensive reView of_the CIA ?Jfoperation AMLASH and Of the inyolvement or potential 32253546 certain Tags 4 1 . .6 ,1 inVolvement of organized crime in the CIA operations against Castro during l960? 1963 From this review A and conclusions are then drawn Concerning the nature, scope, and ramifications of these operations..% BACKGROUND MATERIAL SUMMARY A. CIA?Mafia Plots The genesis of the utilisation of the United States criminal syndicate by the CIA to-attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Report of the? Inspector General as occurring dur-ing a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard BiSsell, '3 and .the1 Director of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards. \vte These plots extended fromAl960 until early 1963 and can be divided into two stages.4 The first stage occurred from August, 1960 until April, 1961, and can best be termed as Phase I or theNpre? Bay of Pigs 5- - . period. From April, l961 until late 1961 ,_the CIA takes the position that the plots were dOrmant. 19/ In late 1961 the CIA decided to renew. the CIAnMafia plots, theIn' creating Phase II, and kept them active until late l9_62 or early 1963.7 IDuring the initial stages of Phase I, Edwards? assigned the specific task of locating the proper LA 'persons to assassinate Castro to - I Chief of the Operational Support 8- Division of the Office of Secu-rity. Both men padrfw. agreed that shouPld contact Robert A Maheu, whom the CIA had previously used in several Covert Operations, to recruit the necessary personnel. 9 . 10 Maheu subsequently contacted Roselli, who in turn reersate??two persons 1nitiall?*5nowg to- mLAICVuvixan?akism?Pg?i Ctueaf ll . a "Sam Gold" and "Joe." IG?Cea?Eil.says: he, along with Maheu, later discovered the true identities} of these persons to Ibe Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante, I 2 . 1 "er: respectively. . . 1 A a. After meeting several times in Miami and deciding_ upon poison pills as the method of assassination, the 1967 IG Report cgj?ends that Trafficante made the arrangements for the assaSSination of Castro with one of his contacts inside Cuba on one of the trips. 2194' 721- . - 7., .. HH Dncl? 322T354?m .w-m Page 5 13 he allegedly made to Havana, Cuba. This contact' was Cuban official who held a position close to Castro.l4 The 1967 IG Report then states that Rose11i -passed the pills to Trafficante.15 Roselli subsequently 'b?p told Connell th th? pills were delivered te-ee?me 5? 16 in Cuba Q?Ee-apparently retained the pills for -a few weeks and then returned them since he was unable 11 .to fulfill any no longer in aT position to k111 Castro because he had lost his Cuban t. - ?\41 - . a With Gabe unable to perfo1mmthe4 dicate . val-$2 LWQ looked 'elsewhere. Roselli next tolda 6? sometime during early 1961, that_ Trafficante knew a man prominent in the Cuban exile movement who could accomplish the job, 19 - 11., - After receiving approval, Tra?ficante mu: CLEDH 911W - approached veEe?a about assassinating Castro and . ?9111??, A 20 'reported that rece tive2.6 The 1967 IG ?wr?aw 1n distributed pills awe. Report states that which eventually reachedV . IThis activity concluded the pre?Bay of Pigs phase of the plots.' The does not I - I I I document an ymattempt to Uri: f;g administethhe pills to Castro. The 1967 IGR relates that after a period 22 - of apparent dormancy, Bissell directed William Harvey in approximatel November of 1961 to 2 3W0 Hf?? reactivate the CIA?Mafia plots. -therefore 24 ?Iintroduced Harvey to Roselli. so During this phase} the CIA decided against using Giancanaior'Trafficante; inStead, a person referred to as W??*?owlentered the ,plot as the person who would help provide CastroI_' 25 contacts. In addition, the plots still utilized. Em av}? - the services of . Even though the plots no longer i neluded \qu sf' -Trafficante and Giancana, the CIA admi tedI that 9 unlik?ly that Castro izm?gs?? Onigoing .gi?k?hmnw, ., 3., 1. I .f I ?62tvi -affiliated in any way?with the identified-the AMLASH'operation,, however, as being "clearly different" from the underu . (63.. world plots. The SSC stated that AMLASH was in progress at the time of the assassination, that it? Icould clearly be traced to the CIA, and that proposal for a.ad been endorsed by the CIA, n?~64_ the initial step being the assassination of Castro.: . The SSC cautioned, however, that.it saw "no-evidenced athat Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban government plotted President Ken nedy? assassination in retaliation 65179 for U. S. operations against Cuba." As related in the IntrOduction to this material, the SSC did not reach any conclusion because it 7"?66 - believed additiOnal investigation needed to occur. ?rent Foecsf J. The CIA 1977 Stung by the Senate criticism and the effect that Book caused in the media, the CIA . lq7/ . prepared a comprehensive report in to Ir, at least within the CIA, the critical questions postul_ated in the SSC Final Report. Page 13 . -. 53030 322T354E Gil . - The a principal theme of Book as the possibility that Castro retaliated- -against the United States for attempts on his life .and that the CIA operations may have specifiCally 71 caused any such actions by Castro. In responding to'this theory the CIA decided to perform?the? I followingconduct a ftilg review of information - and operations the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate -to the assassination of President Kennedy, and - to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassina- tion of President - 1g fare thoroughly '.The details of the "related in this material-because no source has previously publicly released them. 1.1 Syndicate operations I s??_ff . Before analyzing the AMLASH operations, the CIA first related new Considerations- -pertaining to they TFK syndicate operations. The BERLIefers to a series of articles written by Paul Meskill and appearing in the New York Daily News in April, 1975. In these articles Meskill described how Frank Fiorini,_ was known as Sturgis, allegedly ?121: 11?. Wm?? i?i?s 9119,43 9515" "filial" T1 ?5 3' HH.EBDBD 25' :1 I . 1W2-- . recruited Marie Lorenz to spy on Castro. and and planned to use him 7{ 193? . II Ia how Sturgis knew . in a bombing assassination of Castro. Mesk ill ass-erted that Sturgis claimed he had been a hired operatffi>for the CIA for at least a decade and that Sturgis was in touch with all the casino operators in Havana during the period of the Castro takeoyer.194*iz' In another article on June 13,1976, Meskill. related the claim of Marie Lorenz 'that_ in the fail of 1960 Frank Sturgis, acting for the CIA, gave her ton capsules of poison powder which she was to sprinkle. 19- in- some food or drink Iof Castro-1 :1 TFEL The writersof the quite conCerned +hmn, with thee: assertions because Smea?s name Ihad publicly surfaced/in connection with a Castro assassina? rc'xc?tt?ruvx Iss F93 tion plot before the SSC aaevtw' I organized crime plots; 6,111?" ??nrdi?HHX?E?ftasewtr?tasfro- iwho inter -Igstew?:iThe possibility that-Beta was involved ',in assassination plots other than the CIA operation" 5 -also attracted the attention oIf the Page ED I . I 1 i NH 5303!] 322T354E "In reference to Sturgis' allegation that he' ?had been a hired operator for the CIA for a decade 0. Mthe asserted that "he was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency. The $38 recognizes that Sturgis, through his gambling activities and relationships with various casino owners, may quite possibly have known Sets, and alsoIraises the question of whether Sturgislmay have been a source- of information to Castro regarding participation ?198 - - .in any assassination plot. In reference to the Lorenz? Sturgis poison pill II guru?V? FRI: ?23" I plot, the Emir . noted the similarity of this plot chora-nMn-y 01. air 9: .199 to the details in the 18 October 1960 FBI ma?cb??3' The CIA concluded that this October date is too early for the CIA Syndicate operations and that therefore - 2:12. the syndicate may have been acting independently. ?.The CIA also concluded that the Cuban exile leader active in the CIA syndicate operations, may have already been active in plots? 89 with the Mafia when the CIA approached him Page 21 ?a .. . rm 1? Cited two FBI memorandum as support. 1 ,inirst,?a 21 December 1960 memorandum pertaining to underworld support for Some Cubans, and second, a 18 January 1961 memorandum relating an unconfirmed report at wg?oga was one of the Cubans receiving 94 . . Vsupport, The CIAfrurtheryacknowledgedfthat although the.operation with the-Mafia5Was suspended after the Bay of Pigs,-it appeared to still be in progress . - eff I when re~activated in April,.1962. 3 71:11 . summarized its position concerning_ -non?CIA sponsored Syndicate operations in/the?following?? passage: 'It is possible that CIA simply-found"jr ?itself involved.in providing additional resourCes for independent operations that the syndicate already had I/n" a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on i the syndicate and in addition to its material H. 'contribution was also supplying an-aura of; official sanction. - 2. AMLASH - .g The 3E3 states the SSC suggests that AMLASH ?was possibly a Castro.agent aSsigned a provecation~~w.nig' NH 530301 Page 22 NH 53930 We? 'Jn- Ch. amission'which would then justify retaliation,.or,' in the alternative, that AMLASH was a security. irisk'through which detaiIls of the 'surfaced to Castro thus providing the impetus for JVE6 Q?t? provocation. Additionally, the Cites the SSC as holding that in either case,- AMLASH should_ . have been reported_ to the Warren Commission. I- LI1. The _E??.contendsI neither theory is correct stating that the relationship between the CIA and IAMLASH before the death of President Kennedy .was so "unsubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no asis for to feel that he had. any tangible- 89v40 CIA Support -for plotting against Castro. I In support the ?g;-proceeds to narrate the j'Agency' 5 understanding of .the operation.I On August 17, '719-62,7 the case officer for AMLASH reported that he "/has/I no intention /of giving physical elimination mission as rquuirement but recognize this /as7 something he Could or might try to carry 5991 . out on his own initiation? .Headquarters replied DucId:322T354? Page 23 x2 the next day, ?Strongly concur that no physical 91PL elimination mission be given From Au_gust 29,1962 until September, 1963 the CIA states - 9-232' _2 it did not have any contact with AMLASH On September 7, 1963 _the CIA received the: following cabletn AMLASH still feels there onlv two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to realize . latter out of question. According AMWHIP, -AMLASH still awggting for S. reveal plan of aetion. Themgga notes that the SSC interpreted "inside job"_ as referring to an operation against Castro he concerning however, says it refers to a general 251 - how to.effect change.%5j The 15%: also States that at this point BOok saYS "characterizat ion of this pha se ?93, . - of the AMLASH operation is disputed? 'The CIA. Mal-M?? - - . contends that -any dispute only exasts in the eyes of the . ?967?17 1 - . .SSC. A .. . - ?f47*" '7 - The .163 next comments on an interview of. PP Castro by AP reporter Daniel Harker in which Castro said that Ianti? ?Castro terrorists had the support of . 1 .1- 1 ,1 s1? -.- 1wu-uw-c- .. ?w . 7 _na sauna Dueln?32213546 Page 24 TM CQ FE.- 0g kavgeie? ?my w'guL? [h Cit-14 TVS K: EVIL mn/l" SSH ?Elm; All; . WLHL an; '1 <6 'zC- 35w MSIM 71?4; A 35K p7) mm/?C? u/Lf 6.0. (i344 - (h 224? We?; 6?5? SA- 11 MM Lawn 014 MisquL (75K tea/L KW AVPWI VLL. Q?L?a?c ?m 7 chTil-?x?m 9633-5. TLQ \9'77 T155 1?4 va4g #1me brew/bk rm; (Aw LT Wig? 3 ?Ni (3 Mam Main) Wm( :hW-w. PMKM Icy-??g 1% ?9?th I 5L /1 \umj L?k NXQ vai 6/19 M7 3% A W35 l?ft? mam 3,4439% lz?c?re?r?cgg/ ?3 avg? Aa?s?d hawa?k?m Th: khaki? 43/ KM Qwal Mmk? 41(- AM-g/arm/m new: ?m max ?Mp/t7 any My \rdolQ/L . turme?pox/tMce? NH 5303i] Page 25 ?n "absellgci L01 5r Wu Mam udhl??a . . I (ac; LY ru 391' ?em hull?, was QLP EL- (?3&Ar??fgaa7? 013*? 197'? 73% ?Lam/Vi Mt?- - a; Ammlr/l?; ems?(Wm was 'Wkum ?Ll mg 5mg? Wt e? gf?(WP 7C (mod/K NFL 3(?4 NH 5303i] Page 26 7?What the.SSC.characterized as assassination plots. U. S. leaders. states that the Book VI 46: implies that may have.reported to Castro 35 - . - .. - ?98 The CIA response is that "Castro's remarks at that time could not have stemmed from anything said to by CIA officers as they propos-ed nothing and undertook nothing. {05" -I II CGuinI On October-ll, 1963 the case officer 0. headquarters and said that claimed to have . the neCessary people and equipment to overthrow 190 1~n? Castro without U. S. assistance. f. On October . ?10-1 1963 Desmond Fitzgerald met in Paris..w At this meeting the CIA maintains that Fitzgerald rejeCted 5 request for an assassination weapbng specifically, a high powered rifle with a telesCopic Area 11: lens.:3" vThe contends that at this point itI Vwas clear that AMLASH was informed that there would be no U. S. assistance until after the 'is contrary to the SSC Statement in Book to the effect that it was uncertain how AMLASH interpreted . ~403 the put-off by Fitzgerald. 134 Bi?ixov Aa? Mi - N?tLVl?wv? {at NM AWL-MWTM. 90+" - an: . a. Qwiwwis AW Wuimmw I Avatar-sci - air s?cr??g .1C?ba/l?fwm. W's/l" . Ni? dew. I I L0H ?in/L rad-v.4. wet A: Hail?16 A. m?ftuuavmmr-I1f?ka-mu??u mm.w-m.: . . - aim-ma: - ?1 1-. . .J 'd On November I9, 1963, Fitzgerald approved I 3' . informing that he would be given a cache inside Cuba and that a high? ?powered rifle with a . 10-4 scope' would be included upon request.11.1. 15.3,: 03,413? November 20 the case officer informed AMLASH that he would be receiving the meeting he requested. This meeting ocCurred on November 22.;0? The summarized the significance of these IcontaCts.with AMLASH as related to the Contentions .fin Book in the folloWing passage: -Whatever the relationship with following the death of President.Kennedy, there is every indication that during. . President Kennedy's life had no 'basis for believing that he had CIA support? for much of anything. -Were he-a provocateur greporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had nO' factual basis for leaking or reporting angs actual CIA plot directed against I rFinally, in reply to the SSC allegation that the CIA inadequately responded to the Warren Commissiodn s? request for all possible rele_v ant information, the observed: RH EBDBD _Dqud:322T354? Page 23 While one can understand day why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of inv stigationh it .would have served to re? nform the.credibility of its effort had it taken a broader View1 of the matter. CIA, too; could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms the possibility of Soviet or Cuban 5 involvement in the assassination (JFK) becausegQii of tensions of the The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then,_as well;" K. 'Recent Andersoanrti les September 197-6? and October, 1978,3Anaersen- again published articles which propounded the retaliation 1 - . -. - . theory.it0"In addition, for the first time Anderson_ publicly revealedjthat John Roselli served as his source 9 ?for the retaliation theory in all of the articles 7 ?publish ed through the years. The September 7, l976 article appearing'inr the Washington Post contains all components of the retaliation theory. This states: Mafia mobster John Reselli mayx have taken the secret of the-John F. LKennedy assassination with him to his . death. He was brutally murdered a . _few weeks ago, his hacked up body Stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami 5 Biscayne Bay. Before he died, Roselli hinted to' associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators he suggested, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier "?Fidel Castro. - . By Roselli' acCount, Castro learned the identity of the underworld NH 5303]] Page 29? .51.. W, . ?contacts in Havana who had been trying -to knoCk_him off. He believed, not . altogether Without basis, that President 'Kennedy.was behind the'plot.? The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and uSe the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's . assassination according to Roselliis scenario. To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger. Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. 'It was also difficult to-assess whether he knew what he was talking .about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there is no real evidence to support Roselli' - story. But there are enough curiOus circumstances to justify telling it. Here are the facinating highlights. . A The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant mobster with underWOrld Contacts in Havana, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no 'authority, however, over the_ underworld elements in Havana. 7They were under the lodse control of Florida's Mafia chieftan, Santos Trafficante. . His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. .In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a .?Cuban jail, an indignity that didn' endear -Castro to him. After Trafficante made it back to his 7 Florida haunts, he left part of his organization_' 'behind in Havana. Some of his.henchmen even [managed to deVelop contacts in Castro' 3 inner circle. These were the people Roselli wanted . g: '.to use to knock off Castro. .But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the neCessary_ arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Same (Momo) Giancana, to deal with Trafficante. As Roselli's associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arrangements. Once GianCana and Traffi cante set it up, --Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot . Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro?s food.. The pills_would have made it appear that he died of natural causes. When this failed, _snipers we_re dispatched to a_ Havana rooftop. They were caught. The word reached Roselli that some of the plotte-rs ?had been tortured and that -Castro had learned about -the whole operation. The CIA called off the Roselli operation in March, 1963, but recruited a Castro associate, Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro. -In an impromptu, three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he k_new about the attempts On hi 'life and warned that U. .S. leaders also Hw_?suah Page 31 might not be safe. 'That was Sept. 1963. According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly? ?Iwere Cubans from the old-Trafficante organiza~ .tion. Working with Cuban intelligence-, they allegedly lined up an ex Marine sharpshooter,_ Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro? Castro movement. . According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have Shot Kennedy or may have acted as a. decoy while Others ambushed him from closer_ range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would' have brought a massive U. S. crackdown on the mafia. - 7- So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate OSwald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against . the President' 3 killer. At least this is how Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas.7 Several key CIA officials believed that Castro _.was behind the Kennedy assassination.f - It has also been established that Jack Ruby, "indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections in the Havana underworld. One CIA_cable, - dated Nov. 28, 1963, reported that "an American gangster type named Ruby? had visited TraffiCante_ in his Cuban prison. I . Ii - HH Sansu .?unIae32213546 Page?s: ISSUE ANALYSIS rPreface I - 'Ther?:: investigated this material to determine what concluSions can be-aScertained concerning the naturer scope, and remifications of these operations. In this regard, various issues arepresented.in the following sections, subjected to analySis, and then resolved accOrdingp-I? to available euidence, probableynotiuations and the mOSt I 'u 7 To fulfill this process, the reviewed material from numerous goVernmental sources that pertained-to the persons and operations relevant I Ito the investigation. These persons indluded: John Rosellir 7 VII principal in CIA-?ficg - . . I operation vkv?{ 2.IISanto Trafficante I?-?Iprincipal in - - operation i Antonio de Verona ~7'principal I'operationf I 4. ?Sam Giancana --. Iin 5. Robert Maheu '1 principal operation. RH 32213545 Page'ss I 3:321'3? - . .3353Michael-McLaney - j? - . qu?t.- 5 2" c; . . 351? . . . A I ,Nin: . .7- Samuel Benton .57.: l, ?1 ?arm .65- vi: If: 1&4. kg. 8. Norman Rothman . .- John Martlno - Viv?"xx F. - - _10. Edward P. Morgan . 11. Edward K. Moss 12. Dino Cellini 13: Richard Cain . I. I 14. Charles Tourine .- . k. 15. Rafael "Macho" Gener16.. Evelio Duque Miyar - f? . o. .- ,ii?-ff; it ~?Ij-l Jorge Alonso Pnjol ?y 4' r7; pa?g?'vl ?1 .- .43. . .3 g" r~ shit?: _18. ?Joseph Shimon .19. AngelogBruno . - 1 . . . 51:31 .o . 1. 5? 5:4" . . a} I 20. Sam Mannarlno.~' re?ll {ahal?xl l? 21. Kelly Mannarino 22.. Edward Browder' ~3Pist-Qiiqmi 2 3 Joseph Merola 2 0-1; . anti. air" 3 - ?r 24. Arthur Balletti . - ngp(tgt La." 25. Dominick Bartone 52.;ggn f: ?aw: 1 _.inmt?WMW 26. Richard Helms ?27. ?413 . . . a-z . .. 28. Luis Balbuena Calzadilla 'f11's: 1. In.? - 2 9 I I ADELASH . . - A {1 I . - - 30- Alexandel Mergan i? tr?wi.w (41:5 CE. ll-L-?Iz31' J??fh?H?ia QLancu' bcar?tag *9 F?s? 32. Jack Anderson . . ?if 33. "Frank Sturgis 4mgg?g~Linanw LiSfa-J 34,- Fidel Castro - 9.. '31(Roselli attorneys). either interviewed or deposed these persons or A?subpoenaed?them to give testimony before Committee :members.'l- I _The government sources where the requested-and reviewed material were: Central Intelligence Agency. '2.l Federal Bureaa of InveStigation . 3. Drug Enforcement Agency?; - - '47 Deoartment of Defense 5. 'Department of State 6. ?Department of_nlcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 7.c United States Customs Service.' 8.. Immigrationand Naturalization Service United States Senate Committee on Intelligence C10. 'United States Secret Service I 11, ?Chicago Crime Commission '12. ,Chicago Police Department if l3.i,Nem YorE Police'Department' 14.' Public Safety Department; Organized_Crime. ?Bureau,?Dade County, Florida 15. Cuban Government In the majority of instances, review '1 of any material at these sources and any statements -from individuals were not pertinent to any assassination plots against Castro, particularly dyed the CrimeI en the AMLASH operations. Further, almost.all relevant information acquired was already known through the SSC investigation and the CIA Inspector General For this reason the following analeis represents conclusions I was principally derived from information substantively the same as that the SSC and CIA prev1ously Imn?w? 10:? Ce; 7 Consequently, the ?5EA'investigation - Hi,? resulted in additionalncorroboration of this informed . . tion from a diversity of sources. IWhat remained} - to be drawnI are the conclusions. ?ww- arm?- considered. B."Issues Pertaining to the AMLASH Operation - gw If? IThe Committee-found no evidence that the 3 AMLASH operation provoked Premier Castro to assassinate 1 1. . I L/President Kennedy in retaliation.. RH 5303p DunI?:322?3516' Page 3? O?fk'sg? if F1 - A 7? cw" The Committee has received equally persuasive _evidence and therefore cannot state whether thef? operation prior to the death of President MMKennedy can be characterized as an assass1nation 7 - .V 1 . 7 -Richard Helms, the former Director of the CIA, ?in his testimony before this Committee stated that the AMLASH operation was net designed to be i??kr ., an assassinatidn plot. ?4 As already indicated, 1?r3{< the i?ddrf?? concluded that AMLASH had "no factual -basis for leaking or VrepOrting? any ?actual CIA plot directed against Castro" during President Kennedy' 5 -- Joseph Langosch, the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff in 1963, the component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services, offered a contrasting View to the testimony of Mr. Helms and the assertions of the Q?H%Ldf?r- 'Desmond Fitzgerald headed the Special Affairs Staff which was responsible for the AMLASH operation. 'In an affidavit to the Committee, Longosch recalled that: scc. v? 53030 Page 33 '1 .13 is? p4 .gA-h ZE/he AMLASH operation prior to the assasSination of President Kennedy was _characterized by the Special Affairs 'staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination A operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA lOSe . . .efnih as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware 0f AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his Iconclusion that the AMLASH operation was insecure I was available to senior level CIA officials, including l0--8f 1- . ?Desmond FitzGer_ald. In response to Langosch's sworn statements, this Committee received the affidavit of Kent (CIA n? 1 at. pseudonym) L. Pollockl?su_ Polloc "servedft? as Executive Officer for?Desmond F_itz Gerald during - the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs and- discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it progressed." Pollock speci fical]y contested the assertions of Langosch stating: To the best of my knowledge, Mr.: FitzGerald considered the AMLASH, .operation to be a political action mi 53030 DucId:322T3?4? Page 35,; . {an 1251 51:35:: 2211' 111.15: 15-. gas: He also stated: 3V1. I activity with the objectign of organizing a group under to overthrow Castro and the uCastro regime by means of a coup d' etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as an assassination operation. -Mr. 'FitzGerald- stated within my hearing On several occasions his awareness that coup d' etat often involves loss of '1ife_108g if:- I-Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize' _the AMLASH operation as an 'assassination operation'; the case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer did not, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the other . branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially filled with.a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy' s: ?death. AMLASH rejected the pen with -disdain. -108h . i f" :f sun;rrw. 1%53221?3546 Page 4D 3 Kr. AsSuming that AMLASH was not an assassination. plot during the-life of President Kennedy and-that W,f?3? Castro uncovered its existence and scope, the Committee 5* -.., . . . z- - ?believes?that Castfotwould ?at have been prOVOked 1.0 in a manner sufficient to induce assassinating President Kennedy in retaliation. . . - - A Assuming that AMLASH was an assassination ?33 a, plot during the life of President Kennedy and that . Castro- uncovered its existenoe and scope, the Committee pl; {41 3 \v @3331? still believes? athat Castro would mw# have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States in . retaliation. In his interview with the Committee, Premier Castro set forth some reasons supporting this Contention._ The Committee agrees with the reasoning in his statements. .Castro said in part: That was insane. From the ideological ipoint of View it was insane; And from the politiCal point of View, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell? you here that nobody, nobody ever had the? 'idea of such things. What would it do? ?We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed_ to that idea would have been judged ?absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor --even speculate about a measure of that sort,- because who could think of the idea of "my. 51. -so- 1? ur- .1 JV, 221354?gypage 41 organizing the death of the ?resident of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for-the United States to invade?our country which is what I have.tried_to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States -would lose nothing. -The destruction would Castro ithe spe through have as Premier have been here.:20 A also added: I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the_ system. It has never done that.iz; .- In this interview Castro also commented on.? ech of September 7,1963 which has been cited out the years as an indication that Castro may sassinated President Kennedy in retaliation. Castro aeserted: So, I said something like those plots -if at present, the same would happen under Page? 4.2.: . I w. 1? . am;- - start to set a very bad precedent. A . very serious one that that could become a boomerang against the authors Of those I did not mean to _threaten by that.' I did not mean even that.. .not in the rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting :of other countries would be a very bad very negative. And, i h- the same circumstances, I would have no .doubt in saying the same as I said (theny because I didn' mean a threat by that. didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures similar measures'? like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known there were plots against us. So, the conversation - came about very casually, you know; but would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the.everyday life.;11 .Some reasdning, which Committee pcaution's is speculative, may be of some It does not seem likely that Castro would make a veiled ?reference to assa351nat1ng?Amer1can leaders in .retaliation for plots on his life if he was actually aF planning oevContemplati ng such acts. he would want to call as little attention as possible to himself. Rather, it seems Castro was attempting to display 1 his public dismay and knowledge of such attempts in an effort to prevent their continuance. . Consequently, together with an absence 0f any evidence implicating Castro in the assassination, the Committee bel_ieves I (If! t? . - j? v. 4.. ErrJ?ffaj" r" - .4- Lil-12?: 2* ?k - I 2/ \owr . - - .that this inCident, while displaying Castro's I _displeasure at American aetivities, does not implicate Castro in the assassinatiOn. The Comnittee believes there are additional reasons to discount anv involvement of Castro in- the assassination which are also compelling.' The Committee cautions that these reasons, whilepersuasive,_ .are necessarily speculative. First, William Atwood, Special Advisor to thei United States Delegation to the United Nations, was?i involved in diplomatic efforts t0 establish _a frame- . work for detente during the fall of l963i13AtWOod?I Itold the SCC that McGeorge Berndy, an advisor_ to Pres ident; Kennedy, told him that PreSident Kennedy was in fever: of "pushing towards an opening toward Cuba? to take Castro "out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back to normalr." 'AtWOod also arranged for a French jonrnalist, Jean Daniel to meet with Kennedy prior to a scheduled . 12> trip by Daniel to see Castro.' Daniel and Kennedy? NH 53030 -DunId:322?354?? Page 44_: NH 53030 unaid;32213515-_ . Daniel to see_him after visiting Castroe discussed the prospects for reestablishing United States- -Cuba relations and Kennedy asked lib The Committee believes that such efforts to establish a peaceful coexistence between the. United States and Cuba would have hampered any desire by Castro to assassinate Kennedy. IJ in Qwh~gzl$dvb? ?in; (Lt- indie.- Second, t+ Cam 'cI leaders ofI the United States ?President - dam?: Kennedy supported a less hestile attitude and position ?f Itoward CubaI; Even if Castro felt the relations between" Cuba Iand the United States were bad under the Kennedy Presidency, there were legitimate reasons to suspectI they would have been worse under any other administration ?Thus, with the prospects of renewed diplomatic- relations in- the air and Ithe knowledge that. Kennedy ?possessed a more favorable attitude toward ICuba than other military or political leaders, Castro would have- Rage 45 I HE 53530 had every reason to hope that- Kennedy maintained the Presidency. Further, the Committee does not ,'pbelieve that eliminating Kennedy would necessarily 322T354E {a have favorably altered the United States' operations and ties toward Cuba. rIn addition, the Committee .does not believe Castro would have'assassinated President.Kennedy because such an act, if discovered, would have afforded the United Stat?s_theIeXcuse to [destroy Cuba; The risk would-not have been Worth it, Issues Pertaining to the CIA~Organized Crime Plots :Scope and Nature of Plots Analysi.s a) Roselli Knowledge of CIA Spons rship cm 0 ?wn WM limes?Q.Ca?ggl4 info ed the Committee_i' ?that Maheu told Pcseldathe represented an international I??hlli? group of clients who had vested interest in Cuba Roselli, however, testified to the SSC that Maheu - ,1 to].d him from the beginning that.S?Geanel; was With 513 - We . - fail" the CIA. Van? Maheu confirmed this account to the SSC. 7Ma heu also Stated in a deposition to he Committee that \wap CW- 'Giancana knew at the time that QaCanaal; was with the. . i??z CIA..24 Further, Trafficante testified to the Page 46 A I 4 I 7.lit-g af?x"? :{mll' 1, "u'g NH 53030 Eagle . LI 3 Committee infOrmed him that he, 23? '?ll3~ operating as an agent of the The weight of the evidence indicates that' Roselli, and thus Giancana and_Trafficante, knew the CIA was behind the assassination_plots at an 'early stage. _This recOgnition of CIA initiation is shows that Giancana and Trafficante and thus organized crime knowingly becam involved With the CIA. Discovery of True Identitiesv. Roselli arranged for the entrance oI_ 'GianCana and Trafficante into the plots. and introduced ?Ms I "13% 7 them to "Sam Gold? and "Joe.' 33% contends he learned the true identities of these? persons a few months after the operation was in progress when he and Maheu saw an artiCle in one of the Sunday diff 1:12 Sections of the Miami newspaper. ?This article7 supposedly pertained to Organized crime in the United States and centained pictures of top hoodlums, including . _Same Giancana and Santo In the NH 5303i] .DunId:322?3?4?' .4: 7. I I. .1967 IGR eh??ggng 1-stated that the article 117 '~Came frOm the Parade magazine;3? in the Miami Times. Ma heu also Contends that he did not know the true id.entit1es of Sam Gold and Joe until this article mm? :1 a stated that this incident in? appeared.gi~ occurred after the "we were up to our ears" in the operations and consequently the CIA ecided to ?1-9 progress forward.:3n The SSC Conducted a search of supplements" to all Miami newspapers for the reque.s ite time ?tgd period and could not 1oCate any such art icle.?3/ The Committee Consequently se arched Parade magazine for the fall of 1960, all of 1961, and all of?i62 the years which spanned the_ entire operation. The Committee learned that on Januar 21,1962, Parade I . published an article entitled, *?ur~government? craCk60wn on organized crime," written.by Jacki, Anderson, which Contains a'listing of the top ten hoodlums in the country as well as several phot ographs' 4am, of mobsters, including Santo Trafficante.t5 Ther 1 article focuses on the efforts of Attorney General P-EFHE 43.. 1? Robert Kennedy's campaign against organized H'crime and mentions both Giancana and Trafficante.i 1' Although this Parade aaticleappears - .- . to correspond with and Maheu's description, it is'bver One year past the beginning months Of the operation. Indeed, it occurs nine months after the completion of Phase I of the plots. . Additionally;' neither the SSC nor the Committee has discovered any other article pertaining to organized crime in'A Parade magazine or the supplements of any ?iami newspaper for the alleged time period; I 9.91;; ll! Phi! MAI It appears and Maheu are lying in:- -an attempt to look-for-an ex post facto reason for -continuing the operation after the introduction o_f two of the- top organized crime figures in the Uni ted ?States.g Implicit in their contention is that while.5 --the CIA wished to solicit criminal sources to .7 assassinate Castro; it would not knowingly have recruited any figures from the topeechelon go:awk;a' "1'22'3' ?g organized Crime.?? Additionally, .Queom?% NH 5303i] Page 49 statement that "we were up to our ears in it" isI even more difficult to fathom since according to the, 7.1967 IGR the operation was in its embryonic stage -in the fall of 1960 and no pills were even delivered- until approximately February or March of L?4mwwWithout additional support, the Cow?ittee does not believe the contentions of Maheu and 2 I CIIA plot to assassinate Castro was Inecessarily thighly volatile and seeret operation. Once Roselli introduced additional contacts intoIthe - scene it is not logical that the CIA would have-V neglected to verify the identities of such principIals.? On- the contrary, it is more believable and moIre - I probable Ithat the CIA ascertained theI true identities of_"Sam Gold" apd"Joe" at an early stage and I consciously progressed forward in confident that theSe two persons; in the wordsh attributed toIColonel Shef?ield EdWards,IwereHii individuals "tough enough" to handle the job. c) 'Roles of Principals 1) Phase One yColonel Sheffield Edwards assigned .. 0L, ?l the taskn findilg someone to assassinate 1 "$23 tk?ma ?~11 Castro.l% Edwards?and bOth decided to utilize Maheu as someone to recruit persons to I24 effectuate the operation.e?% also ,described his role as the liaison to the CIA and confirmed that all reports or information would .475 procee through him to the Agency. In addition, a @?said0 he acted as a "babysitter" to Roselli;' that is, remaining with him to occupy his time to: A??k insure that Roselli was fulfilling his role. ?Tq' There is a discrepancy over who suggested . Roselli for the operation, ?35 but in any event, he was recruited because he had connections withs i%&K persons who could handle the assignment. Conflict arises over the role 0? Giancana. Roselli informed the SSC that Giancana was only a '"back? up" man. ?if It should be not ed that Giancana was murdered four days before Roselli made this_ statement. .Mahue, however,-described Giancana 451 as having a key.role and characterized his-job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who esc~ ~could ac_complish the assassination. Joseph Shimon, a clOSe?friend cf Roselli who had knowledge of the plots-at the time, stated that Roselli contactedGiancana to provide Cuban contacts.??J? Shimon further characterized Giancana as only providing contacts, specifically Santo Trafficante, and not as an active? +34} 1539 - participant. The most sound analysis is that Giancana Eglel;::. . served as a person Roselli could approach who cOuld .1. 'then make the necessary contact into the Cuban domain,- specifically Santo Trafficante. Roselli, who FBI I files indicate represented Giancana' 5 interest 1h? prawn): Las Vegas and was subordinate to him, woulddnot directly contact the organized crime boss of the Cuban and Southern Florida area without first. contacting his superior, Giancana, who would then make any I necessary arrangements. Both Giancana_and?Trafficante, 7 being bosses of two_organized crime domains, would: have the means, power, and stature to arrange fOr- the assassination?j After contacting Trafficante,_- -- 1 who have the influence to recruit the necessary perform.the assasSination, . -Giancana probably was not an?active participant in' the process of poisoning pills or actually arranging 1133145; the assassination. The role of Trafficante, the onlyiliuing major organized crime figure involved in the plot5{ 'is a major Source of conflict.' The 1967 IGR contains -_several references to Trafficante which characterise. his function.? In discussing how poison pills c0uld_ Ibe given to Castro} it-states that "TraffiCante i?Joe,T the courier?) was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a 'h wort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castr. Later the report states that "Ro selli: passed the pills to Tr fficante." and that WRosellip mJ .- Cuba. After-Q?ta lost his position averted Mwe?miijf that pills had been de?lii'rere'd" to in the Cuban gpvernment and could no longe 5Lpass any pills, the "Roselli told that Trafficante knew of a man high up in the Cuban exile - +36? -. movement who might do the job. Roselli identified NEE DDEI?5322?3?i?smE?g?s??1. '29 W. m1- ??531 ujmyf?z 7: 1537, ?wdg leaky i3; him as dchCIJna. The following Wm passage further confirms Trafficante' rol-e: Tra-fficante approached ?green and 'told him that he had clients who Wanted to do aWay with Castro and that they would pay big money for the job. _V??ena?is reported to have been very receptive, since it would mean that he would be able to buy his own shi?8_, arms and communications equipment.k155 Trafficante testified in public to the-Committee that Roselli asked him tof??igi?ragfvas an interpretorva' -?ih between the American Operations and the Cuban contacts.? Trafficante denied handling or carrying any poison pills . - I . I+1f5 used in the operation, denied recruiting Veaema? #559 +425 and denied recruiting Green 1 In his Senate testimony,? Roselli confirmed Trafficant' role as that of a trans- 'lCa/ - big? 6&1in e"m, however, informed the Committee that Trafficante was the person in contact with Cubahs in -l43~ Giancana partially confirmed this in the IGR by identifying Joe as a man "who would serve as a cofrierk to Cuba and make arrangements there. 4 z? ?w?mRmR"lF also confirmed that he was the only CIA . conduit and that if the-$33? IGR states Trafficante mi 53m . .PsHa-Esi. . contacted oriprocured-the?assassin then it' accurately reflects the information .the ?144 received. It is interesting that the 1915 and 1978 Congressional testimony of Roselli and Trafficante Corroborate each other but remain centrary to how the principals reported the facts in 1967. The m" Trafficante was not merely an interpreter but an active.participant in passing the poison pills and in recruiting the potential_assassins. This is important in dramatizing 'the deep inyolvement of organized crime with the CIA -iin these plots. One can understand why Trafficante Itoday wishes to_ downplay his role; the facts; however, dyeimply do not support his assertions.g The Committee" The Committee also heard testimony from CHM \Ezur '-wetated that he is not aware of any_ believes the CIA-IGR. CIA assassination plots to kill Castro and denied [Ga 7- .- involvement in their operati ons.? .is obviously lying.j The Committee does not feel, however, that a - 7 43wa xiv? prosecution for perjuryg?if possible, would aserst - Amy .. . the.1nvest1gatmon.Icimvlg NH. 5(3an 10:11:32213546?sausa?? 2) Phase Two . 3:145? ?s role. Mb Giancana and Trafficante were" 146 no longer involved in the 61 gm Phast Two William Harvey assumed a ?g IGR states that Roselli remained aS?a prominent figure and worked _"directly with the Cuban exile community and directly on behalf of the (if Although the IGR does reqeest that. Trafficante ~l39- was not involved in Phase II ,g?iit contains this caution:'7 _Trafficante was one of the principals Shef Edwards Phase One of the operation. ~He presumably was not involved in Phase Two ,under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that.?, After all, Trafficante was the man who brought Verona into the operation late in-Phase One, and Verona was one of the main players during~ Phase Two. :70 It is reasonable to assume that Roselli at least kept ;3 both Giancana and Trafficante informed of the ?-operation' 5 progress. Delivery of the Pills Neither the ?35; I or the SSC. pinpoints. . . the date on delpivered the pills to Roselli during Phase One of the plots. The chain of custody, as already mentioned, was for Roselli to deliver the pills to Trafficante. "The subsequent sings 'Dunld;322?ssgs_ Page 55__ steps ri?ain a mystery but Roselli reported to ?ag $3 1 that the pills had been delivered to l7; aiaw? Cuba in late February or early March, l96l. 1 Joseph Shimon informed the Committee that he and Maheu travelled together to Miami to the) Fontainbleu in March} 1961, to witness the Patterson- 'JOhansson there Maheu informed him L- ?of the plot to assassinate Castroi?iai Shimon also?{ 'says that during this tririlmaattended a meeting wh ere a poisonous liquid to be used in the assassination i5li . was passed. Shimon is probably the source for Jack Anderson' 5 ?column of January 19, 19-711' which fixes the date of they Ipassage of the poison at- the Fontainbleu as March 13, 196l1 I In any event, it appears certain that the EIA did not pass any pills, poison? orassassinationi' weapons before February of 1961.9 The fall segment of the plots only constituted a planning stage; no one undertook any Operational activities. NH 53039 ?nucia;322?3516 gage 'Location of Trafficante To support the description of Trafficante 'as a courier} the IGR states that that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba, and Trafficante was making regular trips between ~?f?bf73 Miami and Havana on syndicate busineSsr" The Committee has obtained some evidence which_indicates that Trafficante was not travelling: to Cuba during this period. No?records'available toi?'l the Committee from INS, -State Department, or the FBI reflect any travels after February, 1960. During this: time, the FBI maintained physicaI surveillance on Trafficante. Trafficante testifiegd' before the. Committee that he only made two trips to Cuba after 9 1" h;i' his release from the Trescornia prisogffg Augus t; 1959; and that these trips occurred within two to three I V'months of this release. f?fAdd1tionally, -considering Trafficante' reputed top position in the La Cosa Nostra, it seems more reasonable that Trafficante would? send a representative to Cuba to conduct any business rather than risk being detained by Castro aviarw?lmgz-y ?nin-Z-z-r?z?az wah war-1r: _Hw.?ausuy Dania:322?s?1s If Trafficante was actually travelling ?between Miami Iand Havana, the implications are _interesting. He was either willing to risk being detained again Or had acquired assurances from the Cuban government regarding his safety. -In any event the presenCe of Trafficante during the fall? of 1960 in Cuba raises the possibility of a hnoEC, augmea relationship between himself and the Cuban government Such-a .relationship during the period when Trafficante was scheming to. assassinate Castro invites the theory that Trafficante was possibly informing the Cuban government of activities in the Miami area in general and of the plots in particular return for such information, TraffiIcan.te could Ihavenaequired lost gambling operations as well as sup port and a Cuban sanctuary for the smuggling of contIraband into the United States. The Committee reali-zes the enormous ramifications of Isuch a theory and cautionIs Ithat it Ihas not IreceivedI 1 any information or evidence in this regard. In addition, the available evidence indicates Trafficante was not travelling between Miami and 'Havana although the Committee re cognizes that Trafficante-could make such trips and not disrupt his normal routine in-Miami and Tampa, thus possibly undermining the effect of any surveillance. f) W's Other Contacts CUM W?u @144? As previously related, the FBI _forwarded 1 to the CIA a memorandum an 21 December 1960 revealing that U. S. racketerrs were making efforts to finance antiHCastro activities and subsequently forwarded another memorandum en 18 January 1961 which associated Verona with those schemes. a _ther sources were alSo providing assistance to ma 2. ?ne-7 - to conduct aeti? Castro operations. At the time Iof his introduction into the CIA?Organized crimeii - <1;ch plots, the CIA Was funding through. the Revolutionarym Democ atic Front and the Cuban Revolutionary h?i. 13% Council111? veesna informed the Committee that the purpose of the council stemmed from-an agreement with?;' ?w A nonin:322135??, Rag; FD . VII: 511'; aid/um." the American government to invade Cuba.and "1?53 (festablish democratic control of the i?sland_ weir: this: Adding to the support for ?e?eaa were the promotional efforts of IDino and Eddie Cellini who reportedly were w.orking through a Washington, D. C. "public relations firm, Edward Moss ag? AssoCiates. Moss had previous CIA associations and?was supposedly. acting as a conduit for funds supplied hy the Cellini ibrothers with the understanding that this grOup would' i receive privileged treatment in theI Cuba of the ass? 4/ Ifuture. In his testimony before the Committee Verona LL also deScribed a meeting with Jorge Alonzo P1 jol and Meyer Lansky in Lansky' home-in Miami in the summer I960. m1 Lansky said he had business interests in.- V_Cuba and wanted to help the Cubans fight Castro,fi destroy Castro, and try and estahliSh a democratic 4:59? ?11" 35;. government. - The logical inference to be drawn from this is that the CIA, Organized Crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime all Settled' HE Espan' DhaId:322T3545 _ngg HE'Sa?au 3225'354?6 7 :Paue 52 who had the potential of uniIting the multitude of exile groups to overthrow Castro. Additionally, reported contacts with Organized cri?eI ?.391 "939?? 'raises the possibility that he was involved with them in a plot to kill Castro before the? evolution of the CIA?organized crime plots. If this was the _case, then Trafficante' recruitment of ??re?a into the CIA operation would result in.providing official . sanction to an already IeXisting independent operation. The CIA recognized this in Stating "it is possible We. \m . that Verena already was involved in independent operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 196l to Carry out the Castro Assa531nation/rgf. (see yellow page . . 96) Introduction of "Joe"-and "Gold" and ?1 Related Events I The timing of _the introduction of Giancana ("Gold") and Trafficante is important to the .analysis of the true role oIf organized crime in the - Castro assassination plots.1 This introduction, together with other related events,.furthe? suggestsi 'Iethe thesis that the-CIA found itself involved in providing additional resoUrces for independent operation that the syndicate already had commenced According to the bg?? IGR, the entrance of Giancana. and Roselli occurred. during the week of ISeptember 25 1960. if? In contrast; the SSC did not .assign a precise date for their entrance because of conflicting evidence between the 2967 IGR and Maheu 7?5 Senate testimony which Set the date after November,_l960: The SSC did conclude, however, that Giancana was.involved' in the operation during October because of the Vegas wiretap incident which occurred on October 30, -and because of the October_ l?g-196O FBI memorandUm which revealed Giancana had told several people of . . . his involvement in a plot to assassinate Castro. Although these t?o events which the SCC cites may support the involvement of Giancana during 'October, they also invite speculation of independent organized?crime operations. TheOctober l?:l960; IFBI memorandum is particularly appliCableQ This states: _/uring a recent conversation with several friends, Giancana stated that Fidel Castro NH 53030 nhnid:322?3546 Page 53- was to be done away with shortly, said it would occur in November. Moreover, Giancana said he had already met with the?would? be assassin on three occasions, the last meeting taking place on a boat docked at the Fontainbleu Hotel, Miami Beach. Giancana stated everything had been perfected for killing Castro and that_ the assassin had_arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a in some drink or food_of - poison pills, which the CIA prepared at Giancanals request, were noth? Hiready for delivery until late February or early 'March, 1961, it is extremely doubtful that Giancana' November, 1960, of the_'? CIA operation. Rather it appears that organized crime already had its poison plan in progress, using_ 1a mistress of Castro to accomplish the deed, when the' CIA fartuitously entered the scene._ Organized w? crime then occupied a perfect position; If their "*private plot succeeded, they then would possess?? ?far?reaching blackmail potentiaI against the CIA which they could exercise at an Opportune moment, _If their intrigue failed, however, they could then assume the position that they were only executing 5 I the directiVes of the government/Ha} genie [05w A 7 31-11}? 1 ?an?i. :n Cue-mysi- \3 i" urn-KL; prqs??u DucId:32213516 Page h) Richard Cain 43114 - that Giancana refers to in INVOW id the October 18 memo may Richard Scallzetti Cain. Cain, in connection with the top_Echelon 'Criminal Enforcement Program, informed'the FBI of his criminal activities and close association 'with Giancana admitted that he had covertly worked for Giancana and been 'on his payroll while he was a member of the Chicago Police Department from 1956fl960, director 5? a private detective agency from l960~62, and Chief Investigator_ County Sheriff's Office from l962~l?64. 30 I I 'Seweral of Cain's activities during the fall of 1960, together With his- past experienCe, support': the proposition that if Giancana was involved inv:r any Cuban affairs, specifically an assassination of Castro. independent of the CIA plot, he would have recruited Cain to assist him. HE Dunl?:322?35i?_ Page (See yellow 104). NH 53030 ?DucId:322T354?_ pama??i . . ?duo?C. M-u?m a. .4-.- First, Cain maintained a record of voluntarily (- ?1 providing informatiotho the CIA concerning his foreign ventures, a practice Giancana may have promoted in an effort to gain possible leverage with the CIA. -In a CIA memorandum to the FBI dated '4 November 1960 Cain supplied the following informa? tion in his first contact with the 1) that in 1950?52 while in Miami, Florida, he initiated several telephone taps on various Cuban revolutionary figures under the supervision of William' ?Buenz, a private detective who had contact with the Batista government 2) 'that on October 2, 1960, William Buenz, '_then operating out of New York City, met with Cain_at O'Hare Airport and 'offered him $25,000 to travel to Cuba at the request of former President Piro pvto install telephone. taps on various iCubans, and that in 1959, Constantine Kangles, a - former attorney for the Cuban 26th of July . movement, inquired whether Cain would instruct Castro Army officers i.n the use of poly~ graphs. 433? - . -It seems more than coincidental that Cain' approach to the CIA to supply this information occurred Isimultaneously with Giancana' 5 meeting with Roselli_ and Maheu. 'Cain subsequently volunteered informationl to the CIA during 1961~63. Second, on November 2, 1960, a confidential informant told the Bureau that on October 20, 1960, Serapio Montijo,-the former head of the July 26 Movement in Chicago, met Richard S. Cain in the office of Constantine Kangles, the former attorney in Chicago for the Cuban 26th Of July Movement and former cOunsel in the United States lqax -. . ?1 .- for the Cuban Government headed by Fidel Castro. Cain indicated to Kangles that he had clients who ?wished to get news stores and photographs out of - yai?h Cuba concerning rebel activity in the Cuban foothills. Cain further indicated that he wanted to cover this story Hand was soon going to Miami in an attempt to enter Cuba, and that Jack Mobley, a Chica.go columnist, and? Bob Ajamian of Life magazine, had knowledge of this a .. 1 I. ?venture. 1a? Third, on November 2, '1960, the FBI interviewed - Cain in Miami at the Sands Hotel, Miami Beach. -Cain said he was a representative of Accurate Detective. *lJJa-iqb . Laboratories, - Life magazine, and sixty four - l98? 1 other newspapers. {9?After providing information on the? Amilitary armaments in Cuba, Cain said that the RH 5303n_ DucId:322T354? ,Paga y, i; )sHi-j c.1149 NH DunIa:322?354?. ,even more suspect. The wiretap assignment_ and the Resistence movement had eight hundred men-fighting in the Escambray Mountains and that he was awaiting the opportunity- to parachute into the. Escambrays '3 17916? 3. - 1 to take photos for Life. Cain said that Antonio de Verona gave him the information on.the Cuban A related issue is whether ?phases" actually If?; existed or whether the operations to_kill Castro encompassed a continuous time period. Rs previously 6 indicated, the CIA precautions that the plot was If, _dormant from the Bay of Pigs until Harvey assumedhf3 Leg: 5 direction in the spring of 1962- Both Harvey andfaf??zg?fx I Key Qu?enmedl stated, however, that Harvey "took oVerig? ?pri - a gOing operation." 1 Considering that Roselli was: :g '1 \rableltominmedi?g?lyImobilize his forces in lQ?liiaa I I response to Harvey 8 request and IGR characterizes Macco as Roselli' 5 man, it is more probable that Trafficante, who had recruited .all the Cuban personnel previously in the .attempts and who -maintained the most complete network individuaIl.' If this spec_ulation is accurate, then it displays Trafficante _again performing a direct role .0- 1\ U-iduring Phase II, a'function every source has denied?wince - . Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba, provided this digij'?tm?a/ - . .. rm 51m- he 31 During late 1962 and early 1963 Phase Two rf"v?ha3"?mewa undramatically and In retrospect, the ambiguous modus operandi, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the total reliance of Harvey on Roselli for any information, and the A a? seemingly apathetic desire of the CIA tocorrdborate'I pie any information from Roselli all converge to posit the theory that organized crime was not seriously attempting to aSSassinate Castro after following the solidification jof Soviet influence- in the Castro regime. Trafficante, and other Cuban casino owners must have realized by the mid-1962 that the "golden goose" of Havana I had laid its last egg,'and_ that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. Certainly, hiStory shows growing Lansky influence in the Bahamas and Las Vegas; Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic,;hd burgeoning bolita operations in Florida arising from _the influx of Cuban exile. Further, organized crime? may have determined that the new Justice Department crackdown would probably not have permitted the 7 "wide open" Cuba of the pre? Kennedy era even if the United States had succeeded in ousting the Cuban_ regime. Consequently, while the United States 53m. Dunne-32211546 Page government, specifically the CIA, still poSsessed a . viable interest in'assassinating Castro, organized ?crime did not; 2. Motivation of Organized Crime to be involved in Plots - Despite the reasons just presented to discontinueI. attempts to kill Castro, organized crime still had ?3 -11 'stroninncentive' to.string the CIA along.I Specifically, Ithis incentive was to establish a relationship with the ICIA for subsequent uSe in thwarting prosecution for I ffenses and thus blunting any Justice Department preceedings against organized crime. The Committee believes that Organized crime,: hwhile always recognizing the benefits of e-stablishing a relationship with the CIA, {seriously interested in assassinating Castro to re.gain lost territory. As already indicated, the Committee believes this desire ebbed with the solidification _of Sovier?influence and other factors just mentioned. After this occurrence it appears organized crime may only have put forth- the "appearance" of involvement 3iand good faith in the plots to further define a NH 53030 Dqud:322?3545' Page EEC: 11? IpI,w - 4 .-- . r. cf ?'relationship with the CIA. Indeed, the CIA varevention of prosecution in 1961 in the Las Vegas wiretap incident WOuld have given Maheu, Roselli .and Giancana _confirmation of the value of 'such a relationship and impetus forcontinuing it in 1962 even though the assassination of Castro may no longer have been a viable alternative._ IiThe actions of Maheu, Giancana, and particularly id -Roselli Iin the years following these plots suppert A this theory. As related in Section II, these f' individuals actually did use their CIA affiliation.? and knowledge of the plots in attempts to hinder 'law enforcement prosecutions and objectives. The success of some of their efforts verifies the I tremendous blackmail potential they possessed. I As I - .Sam Papich, the liaison to the CIA, commented ins May, 1967, Giancana and Roselli had the CIA "over. la barrel" because of "that operation" and he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about eitherII Giancana or Roselli because of "their previous . ans} activities" with the CIA. :1?7 It is Clear that at- least one group benefited from the failure of the assassination plots. 1? 3., Retaliation Theory . The Committee-found no evidence that these. Hw-?auan unclaiizzi??a?i Page 34; .. operations provoked Premier Castro toassassinate :President Kennedy in retaliation. The ICommittee also has found no evidence that Castro knew of CIA sponsorship of these activities: or even knew of their existence prior to the death _of President Kennedy. Emma 11 Castro did discover their existence} however, the Committee does not In an article in the-WashingtOn Post on I September 9, 1976, Anderson revealed that ex? 'agent William Harvey, attorney Edward- Morgan,. ?and reputed mobster John Roselli were his sources. fThe Committee has determined that John Roselli was the. person who informed Harvey and Morgan about the plots and the retaliation theory; thus, only one source,? . may ana??e' . r._q A??muv EXT 95%" KNEW 0N5 .ECE WARN. Ar WC.) ENE ma??Qw. EENNANN E. ANANSENKN GAN. SF EFS ANFNN 38) ESNAANKMN OJ. REPS . NA) SAN. .stm . ..- PNE) 3.) SAN) SN ANN. . NO SNANS Qg. \?NxhboAK. EN QNEN ONN .ANNCN .KNRW .NNQ RANK . . ?Nygr AH PNXANN. .. RAN) AWN ES. NE. KNEW NW N): . .. Q9. NANNVN . ?rmww ANNA NO A.) . :1 Huang mm w_nm 1 Ewen'assuming that_Castro did ascertain the existence.0f the CIA?organized crime plots and ?.that the CIA sponsored them and ignoring the Committee?s -belief that Roselli fabricated the retaliation theory, the Committee still believes it is unlikely that, i ICastro would have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States in retaliation for the reasons indicated in the AMLASH portion of the issue AnalysissectionL? Specifically; these reasons are: A l) Ithe prospect of exposing Cuba to invasiOn and destruction would not have been worth the risk; 2) Vthe act of changing a leader does not -. necessarily change the system; zit-ow b? dengue Castro may have reCOgnized that 2mgn?5 - the leaders of the United States Kennedy 1 maintained the least hostile approach 'towards Cuba; and 4) the growing prospect of detente between . Cuba and the United States would have refrained Castro from assassinating an American official - Related Organized Crime Activities The Committee reviewedAevidence that raises the possibility that various organized crime0?L?y[} were - Egg 3.. figureSAinvolved in attempts to assassinate Castro4were unrelated to the CIA. NH 53930 un- To ascertain more information about organized Crime's knowledge about Castro assassination plots,? itthe Committee investigated Norman Rothmanjwho was active in operating various casinos in Cuba before the Castro takeover and who consequently maintained associations with organized crime and the Batista regime.v I h-At various times, Rothman served as manager of . the Sans Souci and Copacabana Clubs.in Cuba represehting. .See_yello p. l49h'. the interests of the Mannarino_brothers of Fittsburgh.9? :1 files on indiCate that a'proposal to kill Castro Was made to Rochman _as a "quid pro guo? Lin which Rothman expected to avoid imprisonment for a 2a 1960 gun running an FBI interview, ?Rothman stated that he had been in "personal Contact with White House attorney Harry Hall Wilson, as well as Assistant Attorney General John Liegenthaler, both 5 of and members of the Kennedy Rae Administration. In a deposition to the Committee taken in h'Miami on April l6, 1978, Rothman expanded on the- - theme to include a series of teriOus telegrams sommoning him to the White House for a Series of two_? or three meetings which_began in Attorney General RH sauna DucIdr32213?i?: Rage an Kennedy's office with members of his staff and [continued in a conference room where_Rothman's aSSistance in providing contacts inside Cuba was. g2? explored. At the last-meeting Rothman says that: "one of them happened to discuss /the' "assassination of Castro7with me, but not in a technical way. You know, just in a - casual way. That is about it. I cannot - - for the moment remember it word for word. See yellow p. .because it is too far i The evidence suggesting Such Robert Kennedy is entirely uncorroborated and makes no sense when viewed in lightI of the Justice Department crac k? down on organized crime. Further, it seems extremely .- doubtful that any meeting wi th RoIthman on this topic. would have occurred-at the White House. the Committee believes it highly unlikely that such av' eVent occurred. 1 I i The Committee also reviewed evidence which indicatesI that organized'crime may have been aware ofcv the AMLASH operation during its existence.. The identified three name links betweenI 'theI AMLASH operation and the organized crime operation. v+ne ??Mt7b The IGR did not sufficiently analsze, however,?that the common denominator in two of the links was-Santo? Trafficante. 1m 51min. .1 2:41 a? Link.0ne In March, 1961, the CIA received information _that a high?ranking military figure in the Castro . ?18? 13W Gliding? . "~regime,and a fermeeapersenar?seeseearywof Castro. both wished to defect. The'military Offippn?was. I: I Si As already -1 revealed . indicated, the documents/that Trafficanten re- akij o! cruited weir-straw The Committee has determined that other than - . (Jinx. the coincidence of both ?res and AMLASH _seeking ex infiltration at the same time there _is nothing to .sugges a relationship between the two men in attemptingi?- to assassinate Castro, not a common denominator withvf Trafficante, Roselli, Giancana or any other members of the American gambling syndicate. This link is ex? $3 i; .. thereforeminsignificant, b} Link Two- In mid? March, 1965, Rafael Garcia Bongoi a noted' Cuban lawyer whose brother occupied the prestigious ?position?of Minister of Sports_in Cuba, contacted CIA HH.5??aui 1.151;: station personnel in.Madrid.to inform the agency? ,that fhe was in contact with a group of military officers who were planning to kill Castro" (1967 7 I.G. Report, It quickly became clear to . . . remployees that Bongo's reference the group of military men who were allied with him in attempt~ - - :1:ij 41,. TF3 ing to depOse Castro. Although the Met,ng alt" . are silent _aeQ . - attitude toWard Bongo? 5 man" I information, it must be assumed that ?aw? did not respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operatiOn was in progress at the time and Artime was_in the process_f of.delivering arms caches to within Cuba. Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency rep *mm personnel as a lawyerrEm? the Capri Hotel and Casino, .- 3? in Havanaiwho had been jailed 1\_July l975 for a? period of 75 days, allegedly as a reprisal -for a 9 representing Santo Traff1cante%%.Bongo utilization-- of the short prison term to establish is "bona fides" ?is questionable as_ Trafficante was in jail during August)l959._ For the Cuban government to wait for Ejartkr years to exaCt retribution for that representation makes [rid?Ht mg sense. Possibly, Bongo was involved in approaching 1m Quin i NH 53030 'DunId:32213546 station personnel in Madrid to inform the agency Athat ?he was in contact with a group of military officers who were planning to kill Castro" (1967 I.G. Report, p. It quickly became clear to a . employees that Bongo's reference was to eubbrg'and the group of military men who were allied with him in attempt? 326m 44; TFK. ing to depose Castro. Although the ra??-and (teamiwa Repeats are silent a ?4 5 attitude toward Bongo' 5 ?came information, it must be assumed that may? did not respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time and Artime was in the process of delivering arms caches to me? 1 people within Cuba. Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency'- r6113 personnel as a lawyertfm? the Capri H_otel and Casino 2 in Havanaiwho had been jailed in July l975 for a? period of 75 days, allegedly as?a reprisal for representing Santo TraffiCant??b Bongo's utilization of the short prison term to establish his "bona fides" is questionable as Trafficante was in jail during August)l959. For the Cuban government to wait for giautk. years to exact retribution for that repreSentation makes. [[+Lt6 my sense. Possibly; Bongo was involved in approaching Page 92 11 :the Castro government in 1962 on frafficante's. 'behalf for permission to reopen the Capri casino. I IBongo's'trip-to-Madrid apparently involyed more 'than a contact with the CIA for he wasarrested for counterfeiting and held until his old client, Santo WJ Mtp?ymrh?m?k Trafficante, arrived with a v: . . 7 - _to obta1n h1s releasep?'Presumably, Bongo was paroled' back to Cuba, at an unspecified later date; where he died. I One aspect of the Bongo? ?Trafficante relationship in Madrid deserves fuller treatment although it is doubtful that anything more than supposition can result "from further exploration. :As_ already indicated, it ?ha been reported by Jack Anderson that _secret source until his death John Roselli; had reason to speculate that ecruited1-by Santo Trafficante to kill Castro were "turned around"sand sent back to the United States where they were directly rinvolved in the assassination of President Kennedy.- If this line of hypothecation is adapted, then the i trip to Madrid by Bongo could assume? some sinister. implications such as-the possibility that Bongo? 5 NH gagsu' ?nEIdr322T354?yr?agEh93 real purpose in contadting the'Madrid Station_was to act as a double agent for Castro in ascertaining a?fthe nature and scope of the AMLASH operation. - Castroly certainly became aware of the Artime meetings with Cube?apin the fall of I964 since the list of charges ?upon which Gub?T?lwent to trial in 1966 began with these Madrid meetings. If Castro had begun his suSpicions of role with the CIA during late 1964 or early it is likely that he would lhave begun cOunter?intelligence measures to confirm his - fears which could have led to Castro sending Bongo ?Ff?is 1-3-4 v1 a - fkfi) f" - .. to Spain to contact the Agency. Given Tra??aeante+sr .--. I . 7? if! "g gg?g; it can be postulated that - [0259!?- 5:TrafficanteawaSvaware. of Bongo' 8 true mission prior Libarture or became knowled eable when he bailed him out of jail in Madrid. vt>d uu?zr A, 9-- ?raw z?du'w'r? - also could have receiVed. news of AAL. A ties _with the Agency through his close associate Jorge Nobreg?s who was described by Gorge Criie in his Washington Post article (circa 8/17/76) .- as "having worked with the CIA, was in ?a?eia?s Student revolutionary group in Cuba, and always close""? 'to Trafficante." 539??. -ACtually,'given the extent Of Trafficante's high-levelcontacts within the exile community and the low?level security in the CIA ekile operations, it is extremely logical that Trafficante and other members of the underworld knew, in some part or all of the AMLASH plot. .The question becomes: what? 'Short Of being ablefto blackmail .the government about the modus operendi of the l960? 62 events, the Significance of mob knowledge of AMLASHI is not readily apparent. I I kgufm?T . . y- I??Trafficante was a double age nt, working fOr .theHCIA.but actually Supplying information to Castro,7 1? then_another scenario emerges."It isthen'lOgical 'Ito assume that Castro knew of the AMLASIH and yorganizedI crime operatiOns from their inception. As mentioned earlier in this material, Traffic ante Ii could have received a sanctuary and assistance in I Ismuggling contraband for such information. As ?1501 discussed earlier, hoWever, the Committee believes? that even if Castro had knowIledge of CIA sponsorship of plots against his 1ife, that this would not haVe provoked him to IkilIl President Kennedy.' The banefit of contemporaneous knowledge of the ploIts .wOuld be HH Bags s5: rialitha; to neutralize their effect. Consequently, the Committee believes that any contacts between - do met 336 $ka 1' AMLASH and nouxeffect the un-tenability of the retaliation theory. C). Link three - The SSC noted that information contained in the . from A, raised-? the possibility that a link existed between the AMLASH operations and the 1960- 62 CIA plots to 3? aesassinate Castro using underworld contacts. :E?ae?i A review of the tE??hEmG. report does not sustain the Senate' 8 conjecture in that there is no available evidence cited in the Report to suggest that had knowledge of, or involvement with, any?of the syndicate or Cuban :exiles who participated in Phase I or II of theia CIA- -Mafia assassination plots during 1960? 62. I'What Book did was to seize upon the l967' tentative identification of name links? between the l960? 62 organized operation and AMLASH RH ?aqap Dunla:32213546 the amorphus nature of those "name links," which. included into a theory that was the conduit through which the Syndicate became knowledgeablei of both the AMLASH operation and the-initial CIA Iefforts to eliminate - The only solid factual basis for Book V's tie~ in between AMLASH and the 1960-62 CIA syndicate plots is based upon Victor Espenosa's exile activities in June?July 1963; which Book examined. 'MOreoveryj files contained at least some FBI reports-on 5the Cuban exile who was involved in transporting I explosives to New Orleans in 1963 These reports detail- his involvement with anti? Castro exiles and "underworld figures" who were operating the guerilla training _camp in New Orleans in July 1963. I ?The "underworld figures" reference relates to Michael and William McLaney who have been considered organized crime affiliates by some law enforcement and media personnelr?(See profile) 'Again, however, no evidence fron any source places Mohaney into the early-I? -- CIA plots to kill Castro or into the AMLASH operation." review of the June? July l963 activities of MCLaney .and Victor Espi nosa leads only to the inference that . .. \ne. (swat ?(3%de .. \ioww?m m. 5W:Auc&e ?their operation was-a private limited venture? with no agency or syndicate support and very little tilchance ot_success. - 9 Moreover, the link between McLaney; Espinosa and the organized crime principals connected to the initial CIA Castro plots must be dissected in order to make a judgment as to the likelihood of .the SSC speculation that _the syndiCate held "inside9 information on Agency opera-tions in l960? 65. . Since the Senate did not attempt to interview either of the McLaney brothers or Victor Espinosa in -l975 nor ask principals of the 1960? 62 plots of their 9 'knowledge or relationship to McLaney or Espinosa, the_h_ Senate's hypothetical question of underworld knowledge '?of the full range of CIA Castro plots is based upon a ?minimum of hard data and a maximum of free? ?wheeling Conjecture. - - A The evidence linking Espinosa to any known organized crime figures consists of his admission to being hfriends with "Cappy" Rothman, Normaanothman's son, Fand a casual knowledge of American gamblers gleaned- from his Student days of visiting the Havana casinos. nun1a11321354?; Page 93?. HH ?s?sn DucId:322T35?? As indicated earlier, Page 39 . ties to organized crime have' Mike Mg? Va: y/Zdy -within federal law enforcement agencies since the 1950's but no solid evidence has linked him to Trafficante,;RoselliIor Giancana, ASince McLaney has been most frequently mentioned as a "Lanskf man.? 'To place a witting I McLaney into the 1960-62 plots,' it requires a series 3 gaaispeculative hurdles which include: cam?. Meyer Lansky was a plotter with . Trafficante, McLaney was "action"_man; and ithe various underworld figures acted- in concert in promoting anti? ?Castro operations. . - Aareneasil supportable with facts and consequently does not place any- significance in the Victor_ sp inosa link 7 . a both Sam Giancana and John Roselli were murdered; .Sam Ciancana was shot in the basement- of his home in Chicago in June,' 1975, just prior to his scheduled testimony before?: the SSC regarding the CIA organized crime plots, . John Roselli's_butchered body was found inside _an oil drum which was floating in Key Biscayne- Bay, Florida in August, 1976 which was shortly I A after his testimony before the SSC regarding the organized crime plots.- I Various theories have surfaced concerning. why the? were killed and who was'responsible.: one Itheoryrelevant to this investigation is that Giancana- ??and Roselli were killed because of their part1c1pat1on';l in the Castro assa331nat1on plots and the SSC attempts_ 'to elicit_ information?on the plots. .In thier regard Trafficante has most often been the person _assigned responsibility for the deaths. On the other hand, the Justice Department informed the Committee 'that it believes that organized crime performed?theiil murderS?and that the reaSOns were unrelated to the organize crime plots.'in I i - I The Justice Department is still investigating- both murders. The Committee has_n0t uncovered evidenced: ;relevant to solving these murderer iThe Committee does believe, however, that a variety of_motiwations inspired the deaths; internal mob-conflict,especially in the case off ?Giancana, and participation and knowledge of the NH 53030 Dunld:322?354?? Page 1gp organized crime plots. The Committee considers it? probable that Trafficante approved of and liiassisted in the murderg ofi?tuie??taqohn Roselli. Trafficante's motivation-mggi? have been to maintain a low profile in connection with the plots and to prevent disclosure of other unknown persons involved in the plots as well as other operations? 'and activities which an investigation of the plots might Uncover. The Committee does not believe that such activities_were necessarily connected to the: .assasSination of President kennedy.? For instance, Trafficante may have had a covert relationship with Castro which may have entailed his running contraband through Cuba into the United States? . EBQBD Page 101 cmp' 1 i?ww**Consequently, although the deaths of Roselli?, GLR: ?rmf? and Gianoana related the CIAnorg?aniZed- crime operations, the Committee neCC?-n firth I . - does not believe that they are?related the assassination of President Kennedy. Iv. CONCLUSIONS . The Committee makes the following conclusions: A. AMLASH OPERATION I .THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE A AMLASH OPERATION PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO. TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION. 2. THE COMMITTEE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE AMLASH OPERATION. PRIOR TO THE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT..- 3. ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS NOT AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, .h COMMITTEE BELIEVES IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY - THAT CASTRO BEEN PROVOKED IN A MANNER SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE ASSASSINATING PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION. ?1 HAS SUMING THAT AMLASH WAS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND g] ;7 SCOPE, THE COMMITTEE STI BE LIEVES IT IS UNLIKELY THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RETALIATION. A 7 THE COMMITTEE THAT ANY KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE AMLASH OR ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME.FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS AND AMLASH WOULD.NOT ALTER THE -CONCLUSION THAT CASTRO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. NH EBIDBD .. NH 53030 DucId:322?354? ..- A CRIME PLOTS Edge 103 - THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE OPERATIONS PROVOKED CASTRO TO - ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT CASTRO KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY: IF CASTRO DID LEARN OF THEIR EXISTENCE THE COMMITTEE Te? ?a BELIEVESTHAT WOULD HAVE THE CIA - - 14%Hribu+c4 ASSUMING THAT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT THAT CASTRO DID LEARN OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS AND THAT THE CIA WAS SPONSORING THEM, THE COMMITTEE STILL BELIEVES IT IS THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT ORGANIZED CRIME . WAS INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO. INDEPENDENT OF ANY CIA OPERATIONS. THE COMMITTEE EELIEVES THAT THE PRINCIPAL REASON WHY ORGANIZED CRIME PARTICIPATED IN THE- PLOTS WAS TO STRING THE CIA ALONG AND THUS- FOSTER A GROWING RELATIONSHIP WHICH COULD . SUBSEQUENTLY BE EXPLOITED TO PREVENT PROSECUTIONE OF THE ORGANIZED FIGURES. INVOLVED IN THE THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT JOHN ROSELLI USED THE FACTS OF THE CRIME PLOTS TO FABRICATE THE RETALIATION THEORY IN EFFORTS PREVENT IN LEGAL MATTERS. a