IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
________________________________
IN RE: CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC,
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PATENT LITIGATION
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________________________________)
TAYLOR PUBLISHING COMPANY v.
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC

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CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
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EBSCO INDUSTRIES INC.
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CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
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WORLDWIDE TICKETS AND LABELS,
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INC.
)
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CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
)
WALTON PRESS, INC.
)
)
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
)
GEO GRAPHICS INC.
)
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CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
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INDEXX INC.
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CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
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AMERICAN PRINTING
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COMPANY
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CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
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JET PRINTING, LLC
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CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
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PUBLICATION PRINTERS
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CORPORATION
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CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
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COMMAND WEB OFFSET COMPANY, INC.)
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CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
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SANDY ALEXANDER, INC.
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CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
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F.C.L. GRAPHICS, INC.
)

MDL No. 14-MD-2581

14-cv-3894-MJG

14-cv-3884-MJG
14-cv-3886-MJG

14-cv-3887-MJG

14-cv-3888-MJG

14-cv-3889-MJG
14-cv-3890-MJG

14-cv-3893-MJG
15-cv-1469-MJG

15-cv-1470-MJG

15-cv-1471-MJG
15-cv-1550-MJG

 CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
WORZALLA PUBLISHING COMPANY
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
SPECIALTY PROMOTIONS, INC.
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
ARANDELL CORPORATION
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
VALASSIS COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
SCHUMANN PRINTERS, INC.
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
DIRECTMAIL.COM
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
MIDLAND INFORMATION RESOURCES
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
TIMES PRINTING CO., INC.
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
TREND OFFSET PRINTING SERVICES
INC.
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
ENNIS, INC.
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
VERSA PRESS, INC.
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
JOURNAL GRAPHICS INC.
CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC v.
CENVEO CORPORATION
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15-cv-1646-MJG

15-cv-1692-MJG
15-cv-1693-MJG

15-cv-1807-MJG

15-cv-1813-MJG

15-cv-1975-MJG

15-cv-2016-MJG

15-cv-2052-MJG

15-cv-2389-MJG

15-cv-2391-MJG

15-cv-2682-MJG

15-cv-3123-MJG

15-cv-3124-MJG
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER RESOLVING MOTIONS
The Court has before it the following motions:

2

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 Defendants’ Consolidated Motion to Dismiss Under 35
U.S.C. Section 101 [ECF No. 343];
Defendants’ Consolidated Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss or,
Alternatively, for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No.
345];
Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Willful
Infringement Claims [ECF No. 346]1; and
Defendants’ Joint Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s
Lack of Standing [ECF No. 354],
together with the materials submitted relating thereto.
The Court has held a hearing and has had the benefit of the
arguments of counsel.

I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, CTP Innovations, LLC (“CTP”) is a non-practicing

patent assertion entity.

In March 2013, CTP obtained a

purported assignment of United States Patent Nos. 6,611,349
(“the ‘349 Patent”) and 6,738,155 (“the ‘155 Patent”)
(collectively, “the Patents in Suit”) from Media Innovations,
LLC (“Media”).

The Patents in Suit pertain to systems and

methods relating to the printing industry.
Thereafter, CTP contacted many printing companies stating
that they may have infringed the Patents in Suit and offering a
“fully paid-up, one-time license” including “past, present, and

1

Not all Defendants joined this motion.

3

 future uses of the technology.”
in MJG-14-3894.

Compl. Ex. C at 3, ECF No. 1-3

In the one letter of this type on the record,

CTP offered a license for $75,000 if agreement was reached in
two weeks and $95,000 if agreement was reached in three weeks.
Id.
Not all recipients of CTP’s letter accepted the offer.
Beginning in 2013, CTP has sued more than 75 printing companies
for infringement of the Patents in Suit.

In addition, one

printing company filed suit against CTP seeking a declaratory
judgment of non-infringement, and CTP counterclaimed for
infringement.

Taylor Publishing Company (“Taylor”) v. CTP

Innovations, LLC, MJG-14-3894.
While many of these cases settled, by December 12, 2014,
nine remained pending.

On that date, the United States Judicial

Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) issued its Transfer
Order [ECF No. 1] consolidating the then-pending actions and
transferring them for pretrial purposes to this Court.

In 2015,

more than 20 additional tag-a-long cases were filed and
subsequently transferred to this Court under the MDL.
At present, the instant MDL proceeding consists of 26 cases
filed in 18 districts.

In addition, CTP has stated an intention

to file as many as 200 additional tag-a-long cases.2

2

Tr. 33:23-24, Dec. 15, 2015, ECF No. 290 in MJG-14-2581.

4

 II.

SUMMARY
As discussed herein, the Court shall grant Defendants’

Joint Rule3 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s Lack of Standing [ECF No. 354].
CTP did not, prior to filing any of the pending cases,
obtain ownership of a right to sue for infringement of the
Patents in Suit.

Accordingly, CTP lacked the necessary

constitutional standing to sue for patent infringement of the
Patents in Suit.

“A court may exercise jurisdiction only if a

plaintiff has standing to sue on the date it files suit.”
Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 625 F.3d 1359, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2010).

“Standing is a constitutional requirement

pursuant to Article III and it is a threshold jurisdictional
issue.”

Id. at 1363.

The Court’s holding that it lacks jurisdiction over CTP’s
infringement claims, moots Defendant’s motions other than the
Joint Motion seeking dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) as well
as Taylor’s claim for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement.4

3

All “Rule” references herein are to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
4
If the matter were not moot, the Court would have held the
Patents in Suit invalid as not claiming patentable subject
matter.

5

 III. LEGAL STANDARD
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction to
survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

Generally,

whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a patent
case is determined by the law of the regional circuit5 because it
is a “procedural question[] not unique to patent law.”

Univ. of

Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften
E.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
However, standing to sue for patent infringement flows from
the patent statutes.

Israel Bio-Eng’g Project v. Amgen Inc.,

475 F.3d 1256, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 281,
which provides that “[a] patentee shall have remedy by civil
action for infringement of his patent.”).

Therefore, subject

matter jurisdiction in the instant case implicates Federal
Circuit law on standing.

See, e.g., Paradise Creations, Inc. v.

UV Sales, Inc., 315 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(“Whether a
party has standing to sue in federal court is a question of
federal law.”); Bushnell, Inc. v. Brunton Co., 659 F. Supp. 2d
1150, 1163 n. 15 (D. Kan. 2009)(citing Madey v. Duke Univ., 307
F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

5

The cases in the instant MDL were filed in nine different
geographical circuits.

6

 The standing requirement imposes both constitutional and
prudential limitations on federal court jurisdiction. Morrow v.
Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The
constitutional component of standing arises from the “case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III.”

Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Constitutional standing is
jurisdictional and must be present on the date a suit is filed.
WiAV Solutions LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1263–64
(Fed. Cir. 2010).

“[T]he touchstone of constitutional standing

in a patent infringement suit is whether a party can establish
that it has an exclusionary right in a patent that, if violated
by another, would cause the party holding the exclusionary right
to suffer legal injury.” Id. at 1265.
If a plaintiff does not own valid legal title to the patent
at the time of filing suit, it does not have standing to bring
the lawsuit, and the Court is without subject matter
jurisdiction over the case.

See Gaia Techs., Inc. v.

Reconversion Techs., Inc., 93 F.3d 774, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1996),
amended on reh’g in part, 104 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

IV.

DISCUSSION
As discussed herein, the Court holds that CTP did not have

legal title or the necessary “substantial rights” in either of

7

 the Patents in Suit at the time the lawsuits were filed (between
June 14, 2013 and July 13, 2015).

From May 24, 2013 to the

present, the Patents in Suit have been owned by R.R. Donnelley &
Sons Company (“R.R. Donnelley”).

The Court rejects CTP’s

contention that it had received a valid assignment of rights in
the Patents before the time of the first lawsuit filing and,
therefore, had valid legal title and standing to pursue its
infringement claims.

A.

Standing to Sue for Infringement

“Only a patentee may bring an action for patent
infringement.” Abbott Point of Care Inc. v. Epocal, Inc., 666
F.3d 1299, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

The Patent Act defines the

term “patentee” to include “not only the patentee to whom the
patent was issued but also the successors in title to the
patentee.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(d).

Thus, the right to sue

infringers, normally the prerogative of the inventor(s), can be
transferred to another who has been given legal title to the
patent. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476,
489 (1926); Sicom Sys. Ltd. v. Agilent Techs. Inc., 427 F.3d
971, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

When a patentee has transferred all

substantial rights of the patent, the transferee will be deemed
the effective patentee under the statute and will have standing

8

 to bring suit. See Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst. Inc., 52
F.3d 1026, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

The court determines whether

the party alleging ownership has received “all substantial
rights.”

A123 Sys., Inc. v. Hydro–Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213, 1218

(Fed. Cir. 2010).
To determine the legal effect of an agreement to transfer
patent rights, a court “must ascertain the intention of the
parties and examine the substance of what was granted.” Id.
(quoting Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d
1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
“[S]tate law, not federal law, typically governs patent
ownership.”

Akazawa v. Link New Tech. Int’l, Inc., 520 F.3d

1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Diamond Coating Techs.,
LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 618 (Fed. Cir. 2016)(“We
treat an agreement granting patent rights as a contract and
interpret its terms consistent with the choice of law provision
in the agreement in question.”).

However, where there is a

conflict between federal law and state law, federal law preempts
state law.

See, e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70,

76 (2008).

For example, federal law preempts state law with

respect to the question “whether a patent assignment clause
creates an automatic assignment or merely [a future] obligation
to assign,” as that question “is intimately bound up with the

9

 question of standing in patent cases.” DDB Techs., LLC. v. MLB
Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Also, the Federal Circuit has made clear that 35 U.S.C. § 261
“requires that all assignments of patent interest[s] be in
writing.” Sky Techs. LLC v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).6

B.

Did CTP Have Standing To Sue?

The pertinent events are shown in the following chronology:
Date

Rights Owner

Event

9/21/1999 Inventors assign patent
rights to Banta Corporation
(“Banta”)
In 2007
R.R. Donnelley acquires
Banta (not its assets)
2007 Banta operates as a subsidiary of
2013
R.R. Donnelley
2/12/2013 R.R. Donnelley (not Banta)
executes assignment of rights to
Media Innovations, LLC
3/5/2013
Media executes assignment of
rights to CTP Innovations, LLC
5/24/2013 Banta executes assignment of
rights to R.R. Donnelley nunc pro
tunc to 1/3/2013
6/14/2013 CTP files first7 of suits at
issue
6

Banta Corporation

Banta Corporation
Banta Corporation
Banta Corporation

Banta Corporation
R.R. Donnelley &
Sons Company
R.R. Donnelley &
Sons Company

The Court notes that there are also methods to transfer
ownership other than by assignment, and such methods may not be
subject to the § 261 written requirement. See Sky Techs., 576
F.3d at 1380 (describing a transfer of ownership by operation of
law under intestacy).
7
On June 13, 2013, Taylor filed a declaratory judgment
complaint against CTP, who, on June 27, 2013, filed a
counterclaim for patent infringement.

10

 The essential question presented is whether the May 24,
2013 assignment of rights from Banta Corporation (“Banta”) (then
the owner of the patent rights) to R.R. Donnelley nunc pro tunc8
to January 2013, retroactively effected a February 2013
assignment from R.R. Donnelley to Media and a March 2013
assignment from Media to CTP.

The Court holds that it did not.

On September 21, 1999, the inventors of the Patents in Suit
assigned title and all substantive rights in the patents to
Banta. Assignments to Banta, Exs. A, B, ECF Nos. 354-2, 354-3;
Assignment Abstracts, Exs. A, B, ECF Nos. 347-1, 347-2.

This

action gave Banta ownership of the rights to the Patents in
Suit.
In January 2007, R.R. Donnelley acquired Banta – but not
its assets.

Company Bio, Ex. C, ECF No. 354-4. Banta continued

to operate as a subsidiary corporation under the umbrella of
R.R. Donnelley management.

Id.; 2013 Form 10-K Annual Report

162, Ex. D, ECF No. 354-5.

R.R. Donnelley did not become an

owner of Banta’s patents in 2007 when it acquired Banta.

“A

corporate parent which owns the shares of a subsidiary does not,
for that reason alone, own or have legal title to the assets of
the subsidiary.” Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475

8

The Latin term “nunc pro tunc” meaning “now for then,”
refers to the court’s inherent power to give retroactive legal
effect. Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

11

 (2003).

“Common corporate structure does not overcome the

requirement that even between a parent and a subsidiary, an
appropriate written assignment is necessary to transfer legal
title from one to the other.”

Abraxis, 625 F.3d at 1366.

On February 12, 2013, R.R. Donnelley purported to assign
the rights in the Patents in Suit to Media and recorded that
transfer with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”). Assignment to Media, Ex. E, ECF No. 354-6.

However,

R.R. Donnelley did not own the rights it purported to transfer.
And “nemo dat quod non habet,” i.e., one cannot give what one
does not have.

See Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 550 (1872).

Hence, Banta continued to own the rights to the Patents in Suit.
On March 5, 2013, Media purported to assign the rights to
the Patents in Suit to CTP and recorded the purported assignment
with the USPTO.

Assignment to CTP, Ex. F, ECF No. 354-7.

However, since Media had not obtained the rights from R.R.
Donnelley, it could not transfer the rights to CTP.

Thus, Banta

continued to own all rights in the Patents in Suit.
On May 24, 2013, Banta executed a written assignment of the
Patents in Suit, nunc pro tunc as of January 3, 2013, to R.R.
Donnelley, not to CTP.
No. 354-8.

Assignment to R.R. Donnelley, Ex. G, ECF

Certainly, Banta had the ability to, and did,

transfer the rights to the Patents in Suit to R.R. Donnelley on

12

 May 24, 2013.

R.R. Donnelley then had the ability immediately

to transfer those rights to CTP.

Had R.R. Donnelley done so,

CTP would have owned the rights prior to filing the instant
lawsuits.

Alternatively, on May 24, 2013, Banta could have

transferred the patent rights to Media, and Media immediately
could have assigned those rights to CTP and provide CTP standing
to file the instant law suits.

And, most simply, on May 24,

2013, Banta (then owning the patent rights) could have assigned
the rights directly to CTP.
courses of action.

However, Banta took none of these

Rather, Banta sought to retroactively

provide CTP with the patent rights by means of a nunc pro tunc
assignment of the rights to R.R. Donnelley.
CTP contends that Banta’s May 24, 2013 execution of a nunc
pro tunc assignment of the rights to the Patents in Suit to R.R.
Donnelley was effective to retroactively close the gaps in the
chain of title between R.R. Donnelley and Media and between
Media and CTP.

Certainly, contracting parties may agree to give

retroactive effect to their agreements as between themselves.
American Cyanamid Co. v. Ring, 286 S.E. 2d 1, 3 (1982).
However, a nunc pro tunc agreement cannot be used to rewrite
history so as to retroactively provide standing to sue for
patent infringement. “[N]unc pro tunc assignments are not
sufficient to confer retroactive standing.” Enzo APA & Son, Inc.

13

 v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “As a
general matter, parties should possess rights before seeking to
have them vindicated in court.” Id. (quoting Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 305, 310 (D.
Del. 1995)). See also Gaia Techs., 93 F.3d at 780 (vacating
verdict that the asserted patents were infringed because the
nunc pro tunc agreement was insufficient to cure the lack of
standing existing when the complaint was filed).9
In Abraxis, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit was presented with a situation somewhat
analogous to the instant case.

625 F.3d 1359.

On April 26,

2006, corporate affiliates of AstraZeneca owned the rights to
the patents at issue.

On that date, AstraZeneca entered into an

asset purchase agreement whereby it agreed to cause its
affiliates to transfer the patent rights to Abraxis.

On June

28, 2006, AstraZeneca – not then the owner of the patent rights
9

In circumstances other than those involving the retroactive
creation of standing to sue for patent infringement, nunc pro
tunc assignments can be valid. See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S.
Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1467 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(acknowledging that certain “retroactive licenses of patent
rights have been enforced” for patents with sole owners); High
Point SARL v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 640 F. App’x 917, 920 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)(upholding a sublicense executed after the patent had
expired); Canon Inc. v. Tesseron Ltd., 146 F. Supp. 3d 568, 57677 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that patent law did not bar
retroactive licenses); Gipson v. Mattox, 511 F. Supp. 2d 1182,
1190 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (allowing a plaintiff to cure a technical
defect in the assignment post-filing since one of the plaintiffs
clearly had standing when suit was filed).

14

 - executed an agreement purportedly assigning the asserted
patents to Abraxis.10

As noted by the Federal Circuit, “[t]here

was a break in the chain of title, however, because the asserted
patents were still owned by [the affiliates], neither of which
had assigned the rights in the asserted patents to
[AstraZeneca].”

Id. at 1361. Therefore, AstraZeneca “did not

have legal title when it executed the June 28, 2006 IP
Assignment Agreement and it did not obtain legal title to the
patents until March 15, 2007.”

Id. at 1365.

On March 15, 2007, Abraxis filed suit and, on the same day,
the affiliates executed assignments of the patents to
AstraZeneca – not to Abraxis.

AstraZeneca did not, however,

then assign the patents to Abraxis.
On November 12, 2007, some eight months after filing suit,
AstraZeneca executed an “Intellectual Property Assignment
Agreement,” confirming the assignment of all of AstraZeneca’s
rights in the patents.

The Agreement stated that AstraZeneca

and Abraxis considered Abraxis “to own all rights, title, and
interest to the asserted patents, including the right to sue for
patent infringement no later than June 28, 2006.”

Id. at 1362.

The Abraxis court did not give the March 15, 2007
assignments to AstraZeneca retroactive effect to June 28, 2006.
10

AstraZeneca also agreed to execute any further agreements
to vest the patent rights in Abraxis.

15

 Moreover, the court stated that “[e]ven if given retroactive
effect, the March 15, 2007 assignments do not automatically
assign the patents to Abraxis; a subsequent written agreement
was necessary. The only subsequent written agreement between
[AstraZeneca] and Abraxis is the November 12, 2007 Intellectual
Property Assignment Agreement.”

Id. at 1365.

The Abraxis court found the purportedly retroactive
November 12, 2007 assignment from AstraZeneca to be “a clear
recognition by Abraxis that [the assignee, AstraZeneca] did not
hold legal title and therefore could not have transferred the
patents without a properly executed assignment. It was a futile
attempt by the parties to correct a critical error by a nunc pro
tunc assignment.”

Id. at 1365-66.

By the same rationale, the

purportedly retroactive May 24, 2013 assignment from Banta can
be viewed as recognizing that the assignee, R.R. Donnelley, did
not have legal title to the Patents in Suit when it purportedly
assigned those rights to Media.
CTP seeks to avoid the holding in Abraxis by virtue of the
fact that the nunc pro tunc assignment in the instant case
occurred prior to the filing of the law suit, citing MasHamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1998).11

11

CTP also seeks to rely upon the district court decision in
Sunrise Med. HHG, Inc. v. AirSep Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 348, 437
(W.D. Pa. 2000). With all due respect, the Court finds the

16

 In Mas-Hamilton, however, standing was not deficient at the time
the lawsuit was filed.

Rather, the retroactive assignment in

Mas-Hamilton was a supplemental assignment of the right to sue
for past infringement to an assignee that – prior to the filing
of the suit – had standing to sue for infringement.

As stated

by the Mas-Hamilton court:
While it is true that in Enzo, we held
that “nunc pro tunc assignments are not
sufficient to confer retroactive standing,”
that is not the scenario here. In the case
at bar, standing was not deficient at the
time the suit was filed, nor at the time
that the appeal was filed. Hence operation
of the supplemental assignment specifying
the grant of the right to sue for past
infringement is not being used to cure
deficient standing.
Id. at 1211 (quoting Enzo, 134 F.3d at 1093)(second emphasis
added).
Finally, CTP argues that the assignments from R.R.
Donnelley to Media and from Media to CTP were for an “expectant
interest” and, thereby, title was transferred automatically upon
the ultimate transfer of ownership from Banta to R.R. Donnelley.
CTP cites cases involving employees who assign rights to future
inventions. See, e.g., FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939
F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“If an assignment of rights in
an invention is made prior to the existence of the invention,
Sunrise court to have misunderstood the decision in MasHamilton.

17

 this may be viewed as an assignment of an expectant interest.”);
Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
However, the language of the assignments at issue is clear
present-tense language based on the assignor’s already owning
title – not based upon expecting to acquire title in the future.
For example, the assignments to Media and CTP both state:
“Assignor is the owner of all rights, title and interest in [the
Patents],” and “Assignor hereby sells, transfers, assigns and
sets over to Assignee all rights, title and interest . . . in
and to the Patents. . . .”

Assignment to Media, Ex. E, ECF No.

354-6; Assignment to CTP, Ex. F, ECF No. 354-7 (emphasis added).
In sum, the Court holds that CTP did not own the rights to
sue for infringement of the Patents in Suit at the time it
commenced filing the instant lawsuits.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1.

Defendants’
for Lack of
Plaintiff’s
md-2581] is

Joint Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Due to
Lack of Standing [ECF No. 354 in 14GRANTED.

Individual Case Nos.
14-cv-3894-MJG
14-cv-3884-MJG
14-cv-3886-MJG
14-cv-3887-MJG
14-cv-3888-MJG

18

ECF No.
136
88
129
104
124

 Individual Case Nos.
14-cv-3889-MJG
14-cv-3890-MJG
14-cv-3893-MJG
15-cv-1469-MJG
15-cv-1470-MJG
15-cv-1471-MJG
15-cv-1550-MJG
15-cv-1646-MJG
15-cv-1692-MJG
15-cv-1693-MJG
15-cv-1807-MJG
15-cv-1813-MJG
15-cv-1975-MJG
15-cv-2016-MJG
15-cv-2052-MJG
15-cv-2389-MJG
15-cv-2391-MJG
15-cv-2682-MJG
15-cv-3123-MJG
15-cv-3124-MJG
2.

ECF No.
122
128
103
64
63
67
67
61
68
58
54
58
50
42
46
67
55
38
38
52

All cases, with the exception of Taylor
Publishing Company’s Declaratory Judgment action,
shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
a.

In Taylor Publishing Company v. CTP
Innovations, LLC, MJG-14-3894, Taylor
Publishing Company’s claim for declaratory
judgment of non-infringement shall be
dismissed as moot.

b.

In Taylor Publishing Company v. CTP
Innovations, LLC, MJG-14-3894, the
counterclaim for patent infringement by CTP
Innovations, LLC [ECF No. 6] shall be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

3.

Judgments shall be issued by separate Order.

4.

Defendants’ Consolidated Motion to Dismiss Under
35 U.S.C. Section 101 [ECF No. 343] is DENIED AS
MOOT.

19

 5.

Defendants’ Consolidated Rule 12 Motion to
Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Judgment on the
Pleadings [ECF No. 345] is DENIED AS MOOT.

6.

Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Willful
Infringement Claims [ECF No. 346] is DENIED AS
MOOT.

SO ORDERED, on Tuesday, November 29, 2016.

/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge

20