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WASHINGTON, DC 20510

October 25. 2017r

The Honorable Richard Burr
Chairman

Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate

The Honorable Mark R. Warner
Vice Chairman

Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate

Dear Chairman Burr and Ranking Member Warner,

As you are aware, on October 16. 2017, the Project on Government Oversight published an article
stating that Acting CIA Inspector General Christopher Sharpley has three open reprisal complaints against
him. Our of?ces are aware of certain of those investigations. We do not believe that the Senate should
con?rm individuals to Executive Branch leadership positions, particularly to head an inspector general?s
of?ce, while whistleblower reprisal complaints against them are pending.

We also want to bring to your attention questions that have arisen with respect to Mr. Sharpley?s
testimony before the Committee. During his Tuesday, October 17, 201?, con?rmation hearing, Members
asked Mr. Sharpley about the reported open reprisal investigations against him. Mr. Sharpley stated he
was not aware of any open investigations or the details of complaints against him.

On October 23, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security Of?ce of the Inspector General
(DHS OIG) informed Chairman Grassley?s statfof several facts related to one of their ongoing matters
that we believe may bear on Mr. Sharpley?s testimony.

Speci?cally, the DHS OIG currently is investigating a reprisa] complaint against Mr. Sharpley
and others pursuant to Presidential Policy Directive 19. The complaint originally was filed with CIA OIG
and IC 1G, and referred to the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE).
CIGIE declined the investigation on jurisdictional grounds. CIA OIG then did its own review of the
matter an action that poses signi?cant conflict of interests concerns and closed out the case. On
appeal, the IC IG was recused, and former Inspector General Charles McCullough referred the matter to
DHS OIG, where it remains an open case.

According to DHS OIG, on January 6, 201?, the DHS Inspector General John Roth sent a letter
addressed to Mr. Sharpley requesting Mr. Sharpley?s documents in connection with its open reprisal
investigation. The letter also was sent via e?mail to the CIA Of?ce of General Counsel on February
1. 2017. The DHS OIG sent requests to CIA 01G beginning in June 2017' to interview Mr. Sharpley and

other individuals regarding the same case. The DHS OIG reiterated its request to interview Mr. Sharpley
on October 12, 2017. In response, a representative from the CIA Of?ce of Investigations informed
DHS OIG that he had spoken with the ?front office" and. "based on Mr. Sharpley?s schedule and time on
the Hill, he would not be available until later in the week, after Tuesday." That Tuesday was October IT,
2017, the date of Mr. Sharpley?s nomination hearing. Additionally, DHS OIG advised that its
investigating attorney has frequently visited CIA OIG offices this year to review relevant documents on
site. In light of these facts, we believe Mr. Sharpley should explain in detail precisely how it is possible
that he could have been unaware of any open investigations against him at the time he testi?ed.

Finally, since the CIA Of?ce of the Inspector General is responsible for conducting investigations
of reprisal complaints ?led by CIA employees, it is of particular concern that the nominee is himself
accused of reprisal in more than one case and that those inquiries remain open. In addition, our offices
have received reports that the component 165 in the intelligence community, including and in some cases
particularly the CIA 016, have strongly resisted the oversight role of IC and the mandate to
investigate reprisal claims, and have caused substantial delays in reprisal investigations.

Strong whistleblower protections for individuals working in the intelligence community are vital
to protect national security and classi?ed information. The failure to provide proper channels to have
claims fairly and timely reviewed has been cited by leakers to try tojustify improper disclosures of
information that endangers national security. So. protections for legitimate whistleblowing should be
robust, consistent, well-communicated, and well-supported by intelligence community leadership and
their inspectors general. Without such protections, whistleblowers will not have a safe place to report
waste, fraud, and abuse in a manner that safeguards sensitive classi?ed information.

Sincerely.
Charles E. Grassley Ron Wyden
United States Senator United States Senator

cc: The Honorable Donald McGahn
White House Counsel