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# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275

KOLAN L. DAVIS, *Chief Counsel and Staff Director*  
JENNIFER DUCK, *Democratic Staff Director*

October 27, 2017

Jack Dorsey  
Chief Executive Officer  
Twitter, Inc.  
1355 Market Street  
Suite 900  
San Francisco, CA 94103

Dear Mr. Dorsey:

On September 25, 2017, the Committee sent a request to Facebook as part of its active investigation into Russian attempts to meddle in our democratic processes. While we did not send a formal request to your company, we have engaged in several discussions and we fully appreciate the briefings and materials that you have already provided to Committee staff. We also understand that your internal investigation into use of your social media platform as part of Russian interference in the 2016 election is continuing and we look forward to receiving updates and information as this progresses.

In the meantime, please also produce the following documents, some of which relate to specific Twitter user accounts identified. While I recognize that this type of information is not routinely shared with Congress, we have sought to limit the requests to communications only with those entities identified as responsible for distribution of material that was unlawfully obtained through Russian cyberattacks on US computer systems.

In the course of the briefings that you have provided to date, there have been some additional questions raised. I am therefore asking that you also produce the following documents and information by November 6, 2017:

1. All documents produced by Twitter to other Congressional Committees concerning Russia-linked accounts, misinformation networks, or malicious "bots" (i.e., software applications that run automated scripts over the internet) spreading misinformation during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign that have not yet been produced to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (the "Committee").
2. Documents sufficient to show how Twitter identified the accounts for which it previously produced ads and the accounts for which it produces additional ads or posts in response to the requests set forth below.

3. Documents sufficient to show whether and how Twitter is undertaking efforts to identify other accounts that had a connection to Russia's influence campaign in the 2016 election. For any accounts that have or are identified, please also provide those ads and account information to the Committee.
4. All documents concerning Twitter advertisements placed or funded by RT (formerly known as Russia Today) television network, anyone associated with the Internet Research Agency ("IRA"), or Teka during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign.
5. All documents concerning possible interference in the 2016 presidential election using Twitter by Russian government officials, associates, representatives, or other Russia-connected users. ("Russia-connected user" means any user of Twitter, whether a person or entity, that may be connected in some way to Russia, including by user language setting, user currency or other payment method, IP address used (including proxy servers used to buy the ads previously produced to the Committee), the criteria you used to identify the ads previously produced to the Committee, and the user's connections to those previously identified users.
6. All ads and organic content posted by Russia-connected users and targeted to any part of the United States, regardless of whether the individual or entity violated any Twitter policy.
7. All ads and organic content that Twitter has determined was attempting to suppress voter turnout or otherwise interfere with the right to vote, including but not limited to by circulating misleading information ("Voter Suppression Tweets").
8. Documents sufficient to identify how and when Twitter became aware of, addressed, and responded to Voter Suppression Tweets.
9. For all ads and organic content described above, provide all subscriber information; IP address information; the number of shares and the number of interactions per ad and tweet; and the dates and times of each share and interaction; whether the account is a managed account; and identification of any third-party intermediary used to place ads.
10. All communications between Twitter and individuals or entities associated with Russia-connected users that posted ads or organic content targeted to any part of the United States for the time period from January 1, 2015 to the date of production.
11. Documents sufficient to identify any overlap between (i) ads that may be from Russia regardless of topic and (ii) election-related ads regardless of a Russian relationship.
12. Documents sufficient to describe Twitter's analysis of political hashtags and their "trending" status to generate more views for ads and non-purchased tweets.
13. Communications with the Tennessee Republican Party regarding their complaint(s) about an account falsely purporting to be that group that was eventually taken down by Twitter.


14. All content of each Direct Message greater than 180 days old between each Requested Account contained in Attachment A and any of the following accounts:

- a. @wikileaks (<https://twitter.com/wikileaks>, 16589206);
- b. @WLTaskForce (<https://twitter.com/WLTaskForce>, 783041834599780352);
- c. @GUCCIFER\_2 ([https://twitter.com/GUCCIFER\\_2](https://twitter.com/GUCCIFER_2), 744912907515854848);
- d. @JulianAssange\_ (<https://twitter.com/JulianAssange>, 181199293);
- e. @JulianAssange (<https://twitter.com/JulianAssange>, 388983706); or
- f. @granmarga (<https://twitter.com/granmarga>, 262873196).

15. For each Direct Message identified in response to the preceding requests, documents sufficient to identify the sender, receiver, date, and time each message was sent.

We appreciate your prompt attention to this important matter. If you have any questions, please contact Heather Sawyer of my staff at (202) 224-7703.

Sincerely,



Dianne Feinstein  
United States Senator

Enclosure  
CC: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley