Review

The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change:
from 25 years of inaction to a global transformation for
public health
Nick Watts, Markus Amann, Sonja Ayeb-Karlsson, Kristine Belesova, Timothy Bouley, Maxwell Boykoff, Peter Byass, Wenjia Cai,
Diarmid Campbell-Lendrum, Jonathan Chambers, Peter M Cox, Meaghan Daly, Niheer Dasandi, Michael Davies, Michael Depledge,
Anneliese Depoux, Paula Dominguez-Salas, Paul Drummond, Paul Ekins, Antoine Flahault, Howard Frumkin, Lucien Georgeson, Mostafa Ghanei,
Delia Grace, Hilary Graham, Rébecca Grojsman, Andy Haines, Ian Hamilton, Stella Hartinger, Anne Johnson, Ilan Kelman, Gregor Kiesewetter,
Dominic Kniveton, Lu Liang, Melissa Lott, Robert Lowe, Georgina Mace, Maquins Odhiambo Sewe, Mark Maslin, Slava Mikhaylov, James Milner,
Ali Mohammad Latifi, Maziar Moradi-Lakeh, Karyn Morrissey, Kris Murray, Tara Neville, Maria Nilsson, Tadj Oreszczyn, Fereidoon Owfi,
David Pencheon, Steve Pye, Mahnaz Rabbaniha, Elizabeth Robinson, Joacim Rocklöv, Stefanie Schütte, Joy Shumake-Guillemot,
Rebecca Steinbach, Meisam Tabatabaei, Nicola Wheeler, Paul Wilkinson, Peng Gong*, Hugh Montgomery*, Anthony Costello*

Executive summary
The Lancet Countdown tracks progress on health and
climate change and provides an independent assess­
ment of the health effects of climate change, the
implementation of the Paris Agreement,1 and the health
implications of these actions. It follows on from the work
of the 2015 Lancet Commission on Health and Climate
Change,2 which concluded that anthropogenic climate
change threatens to undermine the past 50 years of gains
in public health, and conversely, that a comprehensive
response to climate change could be “the greatest global
health opportunity of the 21st century”.
The Lancet Countdown is a collaboration between
24 academic institutions and intergovernmental
organ­
isations based in every continent and with
representation from a wide range of disciplines. The
collaboration includes climate scientists, ecologists,
economists, engineers, experts in energy, food, and
transport systems, geographers, mathematicians, social
and political scientists, public health professionals, and
doctors. It reports annual indicators across five sections:
climate change impacts, exposures, and vulnerability;
adaptation planning and resilience for health;
mitigation actions and health co-benefits; economics
and finance; and public and political engagement.
The key messages from the 40 indicators in the Lancet
Countdown’s 2017 report are summarised below.

The human symptoms of climate change are
unequivocal and potentially irreversible—affecting the
health of populations around the world today
The impacts of climate change are disproportionately
affecting the health of vulnerable populations and people
in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs). By
undermining the social and environmental determinants
that underpin good health, climate change exacerbates
social, economic, and demographic inequalities, with the
impacts eventually felt by all populations.
The evidence is clear that exposure to more frequent
and intense heatwaves is increasing, with an estimated
125 million additional vulnerable adults exposed to
heatwaves between 2000 and 2016 (Indicator 1.2).

During this time, increasing ambient temperatures
have resulted in an estimated reduction of 5·3%
in outdoor manual labour productivity worldwide
(Indicator 1.3). As a whole, the frequency of weatherrelated disasters has increased by 46% since 2000, with
no clear upward or downward trend in the lethality
of these extreme events (Indicator 1.4), potentially
suggesting the beginning of an adaptive response to
climate change. Yet the impacts of climate change are
projected to worsen with time, and current levels of
adaptation will become insufficient in the future. The
total value of economic losses resulting from climaterelated events has been increasing since 1990, totalling
US$129 billion in 2016. 99% of these economic losses in
low-income countries were uninsured (Indicator 4.4).
Additionally, in the longer term, altered climatic
conditions are contributing to growing vectorial capacity
for the transmission of dengue fever by Aedes aegypti,
reflecting an estimated 9·4% increase since 1950
(Indicator 1.6).
If governments and the global health community do
not learn from the past experiences of HIV/AIDS and the
recent outbreaks of Ebola and Zika viruses, another slow
response will result in an irreversible and unacceptable
cost to human health.

The delayed response to climate change over the past
25 years has jeopardised human life and livelihoods
Since the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) commenced global efforts to tackle climate
change in 1992, most of the indicators tracked by the
Lancet Countdown have either shown limited progress,
particularly with regards to adaptation, or moved in the
wrong direction, particularly in relation to mitigation.
Most fundamentally, carbon emissions and global
temperatures have continued to increase.
An increasing number of countries are assessing
their vulnerabilities to climate change, developing
adaptation and emergency preparedness plans, and
providing climate information to health services
(Indicators 2.1, 2.3–2.6). The same is seen at the city
level, with more than 449 cities around the world

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9 

Published Online
October 30, 2017
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
S0140-6736(17)32464-9
See Online for infographic
*Co-chairs
Institute of Global Health
(N Watts MBBS, N Wheeler MSc),
ULC Energy Institute
(J Chambers PhD,
I Hamilton PhD,
Prof R Lowe PhD, S Pye MSc),
UCL Institute for
Environmental Design and
Engineering
(Prof M Davies PhD), UCL
Institute of Sustainable
Resources (P Drummond MSc,
M Lott MSEng, Prof P Ekins PhD),
Bartlett School of
Environment, Energy and
Resources, Bartlett Faculty of
the Built Environment
(Prof T Oreszczyn PhD),
Department of Geography
(L Georgeson MSc,
Prof M Maslin PhD), UCL
Institute of Epidemiology and
Health Care
(Prof A Johnson MD), UCL
Institute for Risk and Disaster
Reduction (I Kelman PhD),
Department of Genetics,
Evolution and Environment
(Prof G Mace DPhil), Centre for
Human Health and
Performance, Division of
Medicine
(Prof H Montgomery MD),
University College London,
London, UK; Air Quality and
Greenhouse Gases Program and
Greenhouse Gas Initiative,
International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis,
Vienna, Austria (M Amann PhD,
G Kiesewetter PhD);
Environmental Migration,
Social Vulnerability and
daptation section (EMSVA),
Institute for Environment and

1

 Review

Security, United Nations
University, Bonn, Germany
(S Ayeb-Karlsson MA);
Department of Geography,
University of Sussex, Brighton,
UK (Prof D Kniveton PhD);
Department of Social and
Environmental Health
Research, London School of
Hygiene & Tropical Medicine,
London, UK (K Belesova MA,
Prof A Haines FMedSci,
J Milner PhD, R Steinbach PhD,
Prof P Wilkinson FRCP); Climate
Change Department, World
Bank, Washington, DC, USA
(T Bouley MD); Center for
Science and Technology Policy,
University of ColoradoBoulder, Boulder, CO, USA
(M Boykoff PhD, M Daly MA);
Epidemiology & Global Health,
Department of Public Health
and Clinical Medicine, Umeå
University, Umeå, Sweden
(Prof P Byass PhD,
M Odhiambo Sewe PhD,
M Nilsson PhD, J Rocklöv PhD);
School of Environment,
Tsinghua University, Beijing,
China (W Cai PhD); Department
of Public Health,
Environmental and Social
Determinants of Health
(D Campbell-Lendreum DPhil,
T Neville MSc), Department of
Maternal, Newborn, Child and
Adolescent Health
(Prof A Costello FMedSci), World
Health Organization, Geneva,
Switzerland; College of
Engineering, Mathematics, and
Physical Sciences
(Prof P M Cox PhD), Medical
School (Prof M Depledge PhD),
European Centre for
Environment & Human Health
(K Morrissey PhD), University of
Exeter, Exeter, UK;
International Development
Department, University of
Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
(N Dasandi PhD); Centre
Virchow-Villermé for Public
Health Paris-Berlin, Paris,
France (A Depoux PhD,
Prof A Flahault PhD,
R Grojsman MSc, S Schütte PhD);
Department of Production and
Population Health, Royal
Veterinary College, London, UK
(P Dominguez-Salas PhD); Food
Safety and Zoonoses Program,
International Livestock
Research Institute, Nairobi,
Kenya (D Grace PhD);
Department of Environmental
and Occupational Health
Sciences, University of
Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
(Prof H Frumkin MD); Chemical

2 

reporting having undertaken a climate change risk
assessment (Indicator 2.2). However, the coverage and
adequacy of such measures in protecting against the
growing risks of climate change to health remain
uncertain. Indeed, health and health-related adaptation
funding accounts for only 4·6% and 13·3% of total
global adaptation spending, respectively (Indicator 4.9).
Although there has been some recent progress in
strengthening health resilience to climate impacts, it is
clear that adaptation to new climatic conditions can only
protect up to a point; an analogy to human physiology is
useful here. The human body can adapt to insults
caused by a self-limiting minor illness with relative
ease. However, when disease steadily worsens, positive
feedback cycles and limits to adaptation are quickly
reached. This is particularly true when many systems
are affected and when the failure of one system affects
the function of another, as is the case for multiorgan
system failure or when the body has already been
weakened through repeated diseases or exposures. The
same is true for the health consequences of climate
change. It acts as a threat multiplier, compounding
many of the issues communities already face and
strengthening the correlation between multiple health
risks, making them more likely to occur simultaneously.
Indeed, climate change is not a single-system disease
but instead often compounds existing pressures on
housing, food and water security, poverty, and many
determinants of good health. Adaptation has limits, and
prevention is better than cure to avert potentially
irreversible effects of climate change.
Progress in mitigating climate change since the signing
of the UNFCCC has been limited across all sectors, with
only modest improvements in carbon emission reduction
from electricity generation. Although sustainable travel
has increased in Europe and some evidence suggests a
decrease in dependence on private motor vehicles in cities
in the USA and Australia, the situation is generally less
favourable in cities within emerging economies (Indicator
3.7). In addition to a slow transition away from highly
polluting forms of electricity generation, this change has
yielded a modest improvement in air pollution in some
urban centres. However, global population-weighted fine
particular matter (PM2·5) exposure has increased by 11·2%
since 1990, and about 71% of the 2971 cities in the WHO
air pollution database exceed guideline annual PM2·5
exposure (Indicator 3.5). The strength and coverage of
carbon pricing covers only 13·1% of global anthropogenic
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, with the weighted average
carbon price of these instruments at $8·81 per tonne of
emitted CO2 in 2017 (Indicator 4.7). Furthermore,
responses to climate change have yet to fully take
advantage of the health co-benefits of mitigation and
adaptation interventions, with action taken to date only
yielding modest improvements in human wellbeing. In
part, this reflects a need for further evidence and research
on these ancillary effects and the available cost savings.

However, it also reflects a need for more joined-up policy
making by health and non-health ministries of national
governments.
This delayed mitigation response puts the world on
a high-end emissions trajectory that will result in
global warming of 2·6–4·8°C by the end of the century.

The voice of the health profession is essential in driving
forward progress on climate change and realising the
health benefits of this response
Following in the footsteps of previous Lancet
Commissions, we argue that the health profession not
only has the ability but the responsibility to act as public
health advocates by communicating the threats and
opportunities to the public and policy makers and
ensuring climate change is understood as being central
to human wellbeing.
Attention to health and climate change is growing in
the media and in academic reports, with global
newspaper coverage of the issue increasing 78% and the
number of scientific reports more than tripling since
2007 (Indicator 5.1.1 and 5.2). However, despite these
positive examples, the 2017 indicators make it clear that
further progress is urgently needed.

Although progress has been historically slow, the past
5 years have seen an accelerated response, and in 2017,
momentum is building across a number of sectors; the
direction of travel is set, with clear and unprecedented
opportunities for public health
In 2015, the Lancet Commission2 made ten recom­
mendations to governments to accelerate action in the
following 5 years. The Lancet Countdown’s 2017
indicators track against these 2015 recommendations,
with results suggesting that discernible progress has
been made in many of these areas (panel 1), breathing
life into previously stagnant mitigation and adaptation
efforts. Indeed, the transition to low-carbon electricity
generation now appears inevitable. Alongside the Paris
Agreement, this progress provides reason to believe
that a broader transformation is underway.
Following the US Goverment’s announced intention to
withdraw from the Paris Agreement, the global
community has demonstrated overwhelming support for
enhanced action on climate change, affirming clear
political will and ambition to reach the treaty’s targets.
The mitigation and adaptation interventions committed
to under the Paris Agreement have very positive shortterm and long-term health benefits, but greater ambition
is now essential. Although progress has been historically
slow, there is evidence of a recent turning point, with
transitions in sectors that are crucial to public health
reorienting towards a low-carbon world. These efforts
must be greatly accelerated and sustained in the coming
decades to meet the commitments, but recent policy
changes and the indicators presented here suggest that
the direction of travel is set.

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9

 Review

Panel 1: Progress towards the recommendations of the 2015 Lancet Commission on Health and Climate Change2
In 2015, we made ten policy recommendations. Of these, good
progress has been made against the following recommendations.
Recommendation 1: invest in climate change and public
health research
Since 2007, the number of scientific papers on health and
climate change has more than tripled (Indicator 5.2).
Recommendation 2: scale-up financing for climate-resilient
health systems
Spending on health adaptation is 4·63% of global adaptation
spend (US$16·46 billion); in 2017, health adaptation from
global development and climate financing mechanisms is at an
all-time high although absolute spending remains low
(Indicators 4.9 and 4.10).
Recommendation 3: phase-out coal-fired power
In 2015, more renewable energy capacity (150 gigawatts) than
fossil fuel capacity was added to the global energy mix. Overall,
annual installed renewable generation capacity (almost
2000 gigawatt) exceeds that for coal, with about 80% of this
recently added renewable capacity located in China
(Indicator 3.2). Although investment in coal capacity has
increased since 2006, this investment turned and decreased
substantially in 2016, and several countries have now
committed to phasing out coal (Indicator 4.1).
Recommendation 4: encourage a city-level low-carbon
transition to reduce urban pollution
Despite historically modest progress in the past two decades,
the transport sector is approaching a new threshold, with
electric vehicles expected to reach cost parity with their
non-electric counterparts by 2018—a phenomenon that was
not expected to occur until 2030 (Indicator 3.6).

global employment in the renewable energy sector reached
9·8 million people, more than 1 million more people than are
employed in fossil fuel extraction sector. The transition has
become inevitable. However, in the same year, 1·2 billion people
still did not have access to electricity, and 2·7 billion people
were relying on the burning of unsafe and unsustainable solid
fuels (Indicators 3.3, 4.6, and 3.4).
Recommendation 9: agree and implement an international
treaty that facilitates the transition to a low-carbon
economy
In December, 2015, 195 countries signed the Paris Agreement,
which provides a framework for enhanced mitigation and
adaptation and pledges to keep the global mean temperature
rise to well below 2°C. Going forward, an enhanced
programme of work dedicated to health within the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change would provide a
clear and essential entry point for health professionals at the
national level, ensuring that the implementation of the Paris
Agreement maximises the health opportunities for
populations around the world.
Recommendation 10: Develop a new, independent
collaboration to provide expertise in implementing policies
that mitigate climate change and promote public health,
and to monitor progress over the next 15 years
The Lancet Countdown is a collaboration between 24 academic
institutions and intergovernmental organisations based in
every continent and with representation from a wide range of
disciplines. It monitors and reports on indicators across
five sections and will continue to do so up to 2030.

Recommendation 6: rapidly expand access to renewable
energy, unlocking the substantial economic gains available
from this transition
Every year since 2015, more renewable energy has been added
to the global energy mix than all other sources, and in 2016,

Between 2017 and 2030, the Lancet Countdown will
continue to report annually on progress in implementing
the commitments of the Paris Agreement, future
commitments that build on them, and the health benefits
that result.

Introduction
Climate change has serious implications for our health,
wellbeing, livelihoods, and the structure of organised
society. Its direct effects result from rising temperatures
and changes in the frequency and strength of storms,
floods, droughts, and heatwaves—with physical and
mental health consequences. The impacts of climate
change will also be mediated through less direct pathways,
including changes in crop yields, the burden and

distribution of infectious disease, and in climate-induced
population displacement and violent conflict.3–5 Although
many of these effects are already seen, their progression
in the absence of climate change mitigation will greatly
amplify existing global health challenges and inequalities.2
The effects also threaten to undermine many of the social,
economic, and environmental drivers of health that have
contributed greatly to human progress.
Urgent and substantial climate change mitigation will
help protect human health from the worst of these effects,
and a comprehensive and ambitious response to climate
change could transform the health of the world’s
populations.2 The potential benefits and opportunities are
enormous, including cleaning the air of polluted cities,
delivering more nutritious diets, ensuring energy, food,

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9 

Injuries Research Center,
University of Medical Sciences,
Tehran, Iran (M Ghanei MD);
Department of Health Sciences,
University of York, York, UK
(Prof H Graham PhD); Centre for
Earth System Science, Tsinghua
University, Beijing, China
(Prof P Gong PhD); Unidad de
Desarrollo Integral, Ambiente y
Salud, Universidad Peruana
Cayetano Heredia, Lima, Peru
(S Hartinger PhD); School of
Forestry and Natural
Resources, University of
Arkansas at Monticello,
Monticello, AR, USA
(L Liang PhD); Institute for
Analytics and Data Science,
University of Essex, Colchester,
UK (Prof S Mikhaylov PhD);
Applied Biotechnology
Research Center, Baqiyatallah
Medical Sciences University,
Tehran, Iran (A M Latifi PhD);
Iran University of Medical
Sciences, Tehran, Iran
(M Moradi-Lakeh MPH);
Grantham Institute—Climate
Change and the Environment,
Imperial College London,
London, UK (K Murray PhD);
Iranian Fisheries Research
Organization, Tehran, Iran
(F Owfi PhD, M Rabbaniha PhD);
Sustainable Development Unit,
Cambridge, UK
(D Pencheon MA); School of
Agriculture, Policy and
Development, University of
Reading, Reading, UK
(Prof E Robinson PhD);
WHO/WMO Joint Climate and
Health Office, World
Meteorological Organization,
Geneva, Switzerland
(J Shumake-Guillemot DrPH);
and Biofuel Research Team,
Agricultural Technology
Research Institute of Iran,
Tehran, Iran (M Tabatabaei PhD)
Correspondence to:
Dr Nick Watts, Institute for
Global Health, University College
London, WC1E 6BT, UK
nicholas.watts@ucl.ac.uk

3

 Review

Panel 2: Developing Lancet Countdown’s indicators: an
iterative and open process
In developing the Lancet Countdown’s indicators, we took a
pragmatic approach, taking into account the considerable
limitations in data availability, resources, and time.
Consequently, the indicators presented here represent what
is feasible for 2017 and will evolve over time in response to
feedback and data improvements.
The purpose of this collaboration is to track progress on the
links between public health and climate change, and yet much
of the data analysed here were originally collected for
purposes not directly relevant to health. Initial analysis
therefore principally captures changes in exposure, states, or
processes as proxies for health outcomes—the ultimate goal.
Employing new methodologies to improve attribution to
climate change is a particular priority. Subsequent reports will
see the Lancet Countdown set 2030 targets for its indicators
that align more directly with the Paris Agreement, allowing an
assessment of its implementation during the next 13 years.

See Online for appendix

For the registry of nationally
determined contributions see
http://unfccc.int/focus/ndc_
registry/items/9433.php

4 

The indicators presented thus far are the beginning of an
ongoing, iterative, and open process, which will work to
continuously improve as capacity, data quality, and methods
evolve. The objectives of the Lancet Countdown are both
ambitious and essential, relying on support from a broad
range of actors. To this end, the collaboration welcomes
support from academic institutions and technical experts that
are able to provide new analytical methods and novel datasets
with appropriate geographical coverage. A short overview of
several parallel and complementary processes currently
underway is provided in the appendix (pp 1–10).

and water security, and alleviating poverty and social and
economic inequalities.
Monitoring this transition, from threat to opportunity,
is the central role of the Lancet Countdown: Tracking
Progress on Health and Climate Change.6 The
collaboration is a partnership of 24 academic institutions
from every continent and brings together individuals
with a broad range of expertise across disciplines
(including climate scientists, ecologists, mathematicians,
geographers, engineers, energy, food, and transport
experts, economists, social and political scientists, public
health professionals, and doctors). Until 2030, the
Lancet Countdown will track a series of indicators of
progress and to report annually on the state of the
climate, the implementation of the Paris Agreement,
and efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change
(panel 2). The initiative was formed after the 2015
Lancet Commission on Health and Climate Change,2
which concluded that “tackling climate change could be
the greatest global health opportunity of the 21st century”.
It builds on and reinforces the work of the expanding
group of researchers, health practitioners, national
governments, and WHO, who are working to ensure
that this opportunity becomes a reality.

Indicators of progress on health and climate
change
In 2016, the Lancet Countdown proposed a set of
potential indicators to be monitored and launched a
global consultation to define a conclusive set of
indicators for 2017.6 A number of factors determined
the selection of indicators, including: (1) their relevance
to public health, both in terms of the impacts of climate
change on health and the health effects of the response
to climate change; (2) their relevance to the main
anthropogenic drivers of climate change; (3) their
geographical coverage and relevance to a broad range of
countries and income groups; (4) data availability; and
(5) resource and timing constraints. These indicators
are divided into five broad sections: climate change
impacts, exposures, and vulnerabilities; adaptation
planning and resilience for health; mitigation actions
and health co-benefits; economics and finance; and
public and political engagement (panel 3). These
sections are aligned with the global action agenda on
climate change and health that was agreed to at the
Second WHO Global Conference on Health and
Climate in July, 2016.
The results and analysis of each indicator are
presented alongside a brief description of the data
sources and methods. A more complete account of each
indicator can be found in the appendix. For a number
of areas, such as the impacts of climate change on
mental health or hydrological mapping of flood
exposure, a robust methodology for an annual indicator
has not been reported, reflecting the complexity of the
topic and the paucity of data rather than its lack of
importance. The thematic groups and indicator titles
provide an overview of the domain being tracked,
allowing for the growth and development of these
metrics (eg, to more directly capture health outcomes)
in subsequent years.

Delivering the Paris Agreement for better health
The Paris Agreement1 has been ratified at the national
level by 153 of 197 parties to the UNFCCC, and covers
84·7% of greenhouse gas emissions at present. The
agreement set out an ambitious commitment to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and to limit climate change to
well below a global average temperature rise of 2°C above
pre-industrial levels, with an aim to limit temperature
increases to 1·5 °C.
187 countries have committed to near-term (up to 2030)
actions to reduce greenhouse gas emission through
their nationally determined contributions. Article 4
paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement1 states that each
signatory “shall prepare, communicate and maintain
successive nationally determined contributions that it
intends to achieve”. However, the nationally determined
contributions of the 153 parties that have ratified the
agreement now fall short of the necessary reductions by
2030 to meet the 2°C pathway.11

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9

 Review

The Lancet Countdown’s indicators place national
decisions within a broader context. The indicators
highlight that: (1) worldwide, total power capacity of preconstruction coal (commitments for new coal power
plants) has halved from 2016 to 2017 alone; (2) every year
since 2015, more renewable energy has been added to the
global energy mix than all other sources combined;
(3) the installed costs of renewable energy continue to
decrease (solar photovoltaic electricity generation is now
cheaper than conventional fossil fuels in an ever-growing
number of countries); (4) electric vehicles are poised to
reach cost-parity with their petrol-based counterparts;
and (5) in 2016, global employment in renewable energy
reached 9·8 million people, over 1 million more than that
in fossil fuel extraction.
These positive examples in recent years must not mask
the dangerous consequences of failing to meet the Paris
Agreement, the past two decades of relative inaction, the
economies and sectors lagging behind, and the enormity
of the task ahead, which leave achieving the aims of the
Paris Agreement in a precarious position. Much of the
data presented should serve as a wake-up call to national
governments, businesses, civil society, and the health
profession.
However, the world has already embarked on a path
to a low-carbon and healthier future. Although the pace
of action must greatly accelerate, the direction of travel
is set.

Section 1: Climate change impacts, exposures,
and vulnerability
In this section, we provide a set of indicators that track
health impacts related to anthropogenic climate change.
Such impacts depend on the nature and scale of the
hazard, the extent and nature of human exposure to
them, and the underlying vulnerability of the exposed
population.12 The purpose of these indicators is there­
fore to measure exposure to climatic hazards and
vulnerabilities of people exposed to them, and, over time,
to quantify the health impacts of climate change. These
impacts, in turn, inform protective adaptation and
mitigation interventions (Section 2, Section 3), the
economic and financial tools available to enable such
responses (Section 4), and the public and political
engagement that facilitates them (Section 5).
Climate change affects human health primarily
through three pathways: direct, ecosystem-mediated,
and human institution-mediated pathways.13 Direct
effects are diverse, being mediated, for instance, by
increases in the frequency, intensity, and duration of
extreme heat and by increases in average annual
temperature (leading to, for example, greater heatrelated mortality). Rising incidence of other extremes of
weather, such as floods and storms, increase the risk of
drowning and injury, damage to human settlements,
spread of water-borne disease, and mental health
sequelae.13 Ecosystem-mediated impacts include changes

Panel 3: Sections and indicators for the Lancet Countdown’s 2017 report
Section 1: Climate change impacts, exposures, and vulnerability
1.1. Health effects of temperature change
1.2. Health effects of heatwaves
1.3. Change in labour capacity
1.4. Lethality of weather-related disasters
1.5. Global health trends in climate-sensitive diseases
1.6. Climate-sensitive infectious diseases
1.7. Food security and undernutrition
  1.7.1. Vulnerability to undernutrition
  1.7.2. Marine primary productivity
1.8. Migration and population displacement
Section 2: Adaptation planning and resilience for health
2.1. National adaptation plans for health
2.2. City-level climate change risk assessments
2.3. Detection and early warning of, preparedness for, and response to health emergencies
2.4. Climate information services for health
2.5. National assessment of vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation for health
2.6. Climate-resilient health infrastructure
Section 3: Mitigation actions and health co-benefits
3.1. Carbon intensity of the energy system
3.2. Coal phase-out
3.3. Zero-carbon emission electricity
3.4. Access to clean energy
3.5. Exposure to ambient air pollution
  3.5.1. Exposure to air pollution in cities
  3.5.2. Sectoral contributions to air pollution
  3.5.3. Premature mortality from ambient air pollution by sector
3.6. Clean fuel use for transport
3.7. Sustainable travel infrastructure and uptake
3.8. Ruminant meat for human consumption
3.9. Health-care sector emissions
Section 4: Economics and finance
4.1. Investments in zero-carbon energy and energy efficiency
4.2. Investment in coal capacity
4.3. Funds divested from fossil fuels
4.4. Economic losses due to climate-related extreme events
4.5. Employment in low-carbon and high-carbon industries
4.6. Fossil fuel subsidies
4.7. Coverage and strength of carbon pricing
4.8. Use of carbon pricing revenues
4.9. Spending on adaptation for health and health-related activities
4.10. Health adaptation funding from global climate financing mechanisms
Section 5: Public and political engagement
5.1. Media coverage of health and climate change
  5.1.1. Global newspaper reporting on health and climate change
  5.1.2. In-depth analysis of newspaper coverage on health and climate change
5.2. Health and climate change in scientific journals
5.3. Health and climate change in the United Nations General Assembly

in the distribution and burden of vector-borne diseases
(such as malaria and dengue) and water-borne infectious
disease. Human undernutrition from crop failure,

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5

 Review

0·8

Mean warming (ºC)

limitations and challenges encountered in the selection
of each indicator) are provided in the appendix (p 16).
The indirect indicators (Indicators 1.5–1.8) each provide
a proof of concept rather than being fully comprehensive,
focusing variably on a specific diseases, populations, or
locations. Additionally, in future reports by the
Lancet Countdown, we will seek to capture indicators of
the links between climate change and air pollution, and
with mental illness.

Exposure weighted
Area weighted
Exposure trend
Global trend

0·6

0·4

Indicator 1.1: Health effects of temperature change

0·2

0
2000

2002

2004

2006

2008
Year

2010

2012

2014

2016

Figure 1: Mean summer warming relative to the 1986–2008 average
The time series are global mean temperatures calculated from the gridded data, weighted by area (to avoid bias
from measurements near the poles) and by exposure (to show the number of people exposed).

Change in exposure of people to heatwaves
(millions per year)

175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
–25
2000

2002

2004

2006

2008
Year

2010

2012

2014

2016

Figure 2: The change in heatwave exposure (in people older than 65 years), relative to the 1986–2008 average
For European Centre for
Medium-Range Weather
Forecasts see
https://www.ecmwf.int/
For the European Centre for
Medium-Range Weather
Forecasts’ climate reanalysis
see https://www.ecmwf.int/en/
research/climate-reanalysis
For Socioeconomic Data and
Applications Center’s Gridded
Population of the World v4 see
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.
edu/data/collection/gpw-v4

6 

population displacement from sea-level rise, and
occupational health risks are examples of human
institution-mediated impacts.
Although reported data, and indeed some of the data
presented here, have traditionally focused on impacts
such as the spread of infectious diseases and mortality
from extreme weather, the health effects from noncommunicable diseases are just as important. Mediated
through a variety of pathways, they take the form of
cardiovascular disease, acute and chronic respiratory
disease from worsening air pollution and aero-allergens,
or the often-unseen mental health effects of extreme
weather events or of population displacement.14,15 Indeed,
emerging evidence is suggesting links between a rising
incidence of chronic kidney disease, dehydration, and
climate change.16,17
Eight indicators were selected and developed for this
section. Headline findings for all indicators are provided
at the beginning of each indicator; additional detailed
disussion on the data and methods used (as well as the

This indicator reports that people experience far more than
the global mean temperature rise. This indicator reports
that between 2000 and 2016, human exposure to warming
was about 0·9 oC, more than double the global area average
temperature rise during the same period.
Increasing temperatures can exacerbate existing health
problems in populations and introduce new health
threats (including cardiovascular disease and chronic
kidney disease). The extent to which human populations
are exposed to this temperature change, and thus the
health implications of temperature change, depends on
the detailed spatiotemporal trends of population and
temperature over time.
Temperature anomalies were calculated relative to
1986–2008 from the European Research Area, produced
by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather
Forecasts (ECMWF). This dataset uses ECMWF climate
reanalysis to give a description of recent climate, produced
by combining models with observations.
Changes in each country population were obtained
from NASA’s Socioeconomic Data and Applications
Center and the data were projected onto the gridded
population. Exposure-weighted warming from 2000 to
2016 (0·9 °C) is much higher than the area-weighted
warming (0·4 °C) during the same period (figure 1).
Hence, mean exposure to warming is more than double
the global warming since 2000.
The increase in exposure relative to the global average
is driven partly by growing population densities in India,
parts of China, and sub-Saharan Africa. Accounting for
population when assessing temperature change provides
a vital insight into how human wellbeing is likely to be
affected by temperature change, with the analysis here
showing that temperature change where people are
living is much higher than average global warming.
Details of the global distribution of this warming can be
found in the appendix (p 16).

Indicator 1.2: Health effects of heatwaves
This indicator reports that between 2000 and 2016, the
number of vulnerable people exposed to heatwave
events increased by about 125 million, with a record
175 million more people exposed to heatwaves in 2015.
The health impacts of extreme heat range from direct
heat stress and heat stroke, to exacerbations of preexisting heart failure, and even an increased incidence of

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9

 Indicator 1.3: Change in labour capacity
This indicator reports that global labour capacity in rural
populations exposed to temperature change is estimated
to have decreased by 5·3% from 2000 to 2016.
Higher temperatures pose profound threats to
occupational health and labour productivity, particularly
for people undertaking manual, outdoor labour in hot
areas. This indicator shows the change in labour
capacity (and thus productivity) worldwide and for rural
regions specifically, weighted by population (appendix
p 18). Loss of labour capacity has important implications
for the livelihoods of individuals, families, and
communities, especially those relying on subsistence
farming.
Estimation of labour capacity is based on wet bulb
globe temperatures, as described by Watts and
colleagues.2 We estimated change in outdoor labour
productivity as a percentage relative to the reference
period (1986–2008) (figure 4). Labour capacity is
estimated to have decreased by 5·3% between 2000 and
2016, with a dramatic decrease of more than 2%
between 2015 and 2016. Although there are some peaks
of increased labour capacity (notably in 2000, 2004, and
2008), the overwhelming trend is one of reduced
capacity. These effects are most notable in some of the
most vulnerable countries in the world (figure 5).
This indicator only captures the effects of heat on
rural labour capacity. The Lancet Countdown will work
to expand this metric to capture impacts on labour
capacity in other sectors, including manufacturing,

1·50
1·25

Exposure weighted
Area weighted
Exposure trend
Global trend

1·00
0·75
0·50
0·25
0
–0·25
2000

2002

2004

2006

2008
Year

2010

2012

2014

2016

Figure 3: Change in mean heatwave lengths worldwide, relative to the 1986–2008 average

Exposure weighted
Exposure trend

1
0
Labour capacity change (%)

acute kidney injury from dehydration in vulnerable
populations. Elderly people, children younger than
12 months, and people with chronic cardiovascular and
renal disease are particularly sensitive to these changes.13
Our definition of a heatwave is a period of more than
3 days during which the minimum temperature is greater
than the 99th percentile of the historical minima
(1986–2008 average).18 This metric therefore focuses on
periods of high night-time temperatures, which are crucial
in denying vulnerable people vital recuperation between
hot days. Heatwave data were calculated against the
historical period 1986–2008. The population for the
exposure calculations was limited to people older than
65 years (as this age group is most vulnerable to the health
impacts of heatwaves), and data were obtained on a percountry basis from the UN World Population Prospects
archives for each year considered.
The highest number of exposure events was recorded
in 2015, with about 175 million additional people exposed
to heatwaves (figure 2). Over time, the mean number of
heatwave days experienced by people during any one
heatwave (exposure-weighted) increases at a much faster
rate than the global mean (area-weighted) number of
heatwave days per heatwave (figure 3) because of high
population densities in areas where heatwaves have
occurred.

Change in the mean length of heatwaves (days)

Review

–1
–2
–3
–4
–5
2000

2002

2004

2006

2008
Year

2010

2012

2014

2016

Figure 4: Labour capacity change worldwide, relative to the 1986–2008 average

construction, transportation, tourism, and agriculture.
Through collaboration with HEAT-SHIELD,19 the
Lancet Countdown will work to develop this process,
providing more detailed analysis of labour capacity loss
and the health implications of heat and heatwaves
worldwide.20

Indicator 1.4: Lethality of weather-related disasters
This indicator reports that the frequency of weatherrelated disasters has increased by 46% from 2007 to 2016
(compared with the 1990–99 average), with no clear
upward or downward trend in the lethality of these
extreme events.
Weather-related events have been associated with more
than 90% of all disasters worldwide in the past 20 years. As
expected, considering its population and area, Asia is the
continent most affected by weather-related disasters.
2843 events were recorded between 1990 and 2016,
affecting 4·8 billion people and killing 505 013 people.
Deaths from natural hazard-related disasters are largely
concentrated in poor countries.21 Crucially, this must be
understood in the context of potentially overwhelming

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9 

7

 Review

Change in labour capacity (%)
–30

–20

–10

0

10

20

30

Figure 5: Change in labour capacity loss, relative to the 1986–2008 average

For EM-DAT see
http://www.emdat.be/

8 

health impacts of future climate change, worsening
profoundly in the coming years. Indeed, the
2015 Lancet Commission estimated that an additional
1·4 billion drought exposure events and 2·3 billion flood
exposure events will occur by the end of the century,
showing clear public health limits to adaptation.2
Disaster impact is a function of hazard and
vulnerability, with vulnerability from a climate change
perspective sometimes defined as a function of
exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity.22 This
indicator measures the ratio of the number of deaths to
the number of people affected by weather-related
disasters. Weather-related disasters include droughts,
floods, extreme temperature events, storms, and
wildfires. The health impacts of weather-related
disasters expand beyond mortality alone, including
injuries, mental health impacts, spread of disease, and
food and water insecurity. Data for the calculations for
this indicator come from the Emergency Events
Database (EM-DAT). Here, in line with the EM-DAT
data used for analysis, a disaster is defined as either:
(1) ten or more people killed; (2) 100 or more people
affected; (3) a declaration of a state of emergency; or
(4) a call for international assistance.
Between 1994 and 2013, the frequency of reported
weather-related events (mainly floods and storms)
increased substantially. However, this trend might be
partially accounted for by information systems having
improved in the past 35 years, and statistical data are
now more available because of increased sociocultural
sensitivity to disaster consequences and occurrence.23
From 2007 to 2016, EM-DAT recorded an average of
306 weather-related disasters per year, an increase of

46% from the 1990–99 average.24 However, owing to
impressive poverty reduction and health adaptation
efforts, this increase in weather-related disasters has not
yet been accompanied by any discernible trend in
number of deaths or in number of people affected by
disasters (or in the ratio of these two; figure 6). Indeed,
separating out the disasters by the type of climate and
weather hazard associated with the disaster, we found a
significant decrease in the number of people affected by
floods worldwide, equating to a decrease of 3 million
people annually. Importantly, best available estimates
and projections expect a sharp reversal in these trends in
the coming decades, and it is notable that mortality
associated with weather-related disasters has increased
in many countries, many of which are high-income
countries, illustrating that no country is immune to the
impacts of climate change (appendix p 19).
The relative stability of the number of deaths in a
disaster as a proportion of those affected, despite an
increase in the number of disasters, could be interpreted
in a number of ways. One plausible conclusion is that
this represents an increase in health service provision
and risk reduction. However, although weather-related
disasters have become more frequent in the past three to
four decades, the data here do not capture the severity of
such events—a factor directly relevant to a country’s
vulnerability and ability to adapt.22 It is also important to
note the difficulties in discerning overall trends, owing
to the stochastic nature of the data and the relatively
short time series. This poses limitations on the
significance of findings that can be drawn from analysis
to date. Improving the validity of this indicator will be a
focus going forward.

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9

 Review

Indicator 1.5: Global health trends in climate-sensitive
diseases

Deaths and affected
Deaths
Affected
Occurrences
Trend (occurrences)

Change compared with 1990–2009

500
400

50
Y = 1·8902x –3783·4
R2 = 0·42

40
30
20

300

10
0

200

–10

100

–20

0

–30

–100

–40

Change in occurrences compared with 1990–2009

–50
–200
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

B
450

Drought
Extreme temperature
Flood
Storm
Wildfire
Trend (flood)

400
Number of people affected (millions)

This indicator reports that global health initiatives have
improved the health profile of populations around the
world—a trend that unmitigated climate change is
expected to undermine.
Disease occurrence is determined by a complex
composite of social and environmental conditions and
health service provision, all of which vary geographically.
Nonetheless, some diseases are particularly sensitive to
variations in climate and weather and might therefore be
expected to vary with both longer-term climate change
and shorter-term extreme weather events.13 This indicator
draws from Global Burden of Disease (GBD) 2015
mortality estimates to show trends in deaths associated
with seven climate-sensitive diseases since 1990
(figure 7).
These disease trends reveal worldwide increases in
dengue mortality, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, Latin
American, and Caribbean regions, with some peak
years (including 1998) known to be associated with
El Niño conditions.25 Beyond climate, likely drivers of
dengue mortality include trade, urbanisation, global
and local mobility, and climate variability. The
association between increased dengue mortality and
climate change is therefore complex.26 It naturally
follows that an increased spread of the disease resulting
from climate change will be an important contributing
factor in the increased likelihood of an associated
increase in mortality.
Malignant melanoma is a distinctive example of a noncommunicable disease with a clear link to ultraviolet
exposure. Mortality has been increasing steadily despite
advances in surveillance and treatment, although
increased exposures also occur as a result of changing
lifestyles (eg, an increase in sun tanning). Heat and cold
exposure is a potentially important aspect of climateinfluenced mortality, although the underlying attribution
of deaths to these causes in the estimates is uncertain.27–32
Deaths directly related to forces of nature have been
adjusted for the effects of the most severe seismic events.
Of the ten highest country-year mortality estimates due
to forces of nature, seven were directly due to specific
seismic activity, and these have been discounted by
replacing with the same countries’ force of nature
mortality for the following year. The remaining major
peaks relate to three extreme weather events (Bangladesh
cyclone of 1991, Venezuela floods and mudslides of 1999,
and Myanmar cyclone of 2008), which accounted for
more than 300 000 deaths.
Overall, the findings highlight the effectiveness and
success of global health initiatives in largely reducing
deaths associated with these diseases since 1990.
Furthermore, these trends provide a proxy for the global
health profile of climate-sensitive diseases and thus, to
some degree, indication of existing vulnerabilities and
exposures to them.

A
600

350
300
250

Y = –3E+06x + 2E + 08
R2 = 0·14

200
150
100
50
0
1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002 2004
Year

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Figure 6: Number of deaths and people affected by weather-related disasters
(A) Number of deaths, number of affected people, and the ratio of these (measured against the 1990–2009
average), worldwide. (B) Number of people affected by different weather-related disasters worldwide.

Indicator 1.6: Climate-sensitive infectious diseases
This indicator reports that climate trends have led to a
global increase in the vectorial capacity for the
transmission of dengue from A aegypti and Aedes
albopictus, of 3·0% and 5·9%, respectively, compared
with 1990 levels, and of 9·4% and 11·1%, respectively,
compared with 1950 levels.
Despite a decreasing overall trend, infectious diseases
still account for about 20% of the global burden of disease
and underpin more than 80% of international health
hazards, as classified by WHO.33,34 Climatic factors are
routinely implicated in the epidemiology of infectious
diseases, and they often interact with other factors,
including behavioural, demographic, socioeconomic,
topographic, and other environmental factors, to influence
infectious disease emergence, distribution, incidence, and
burden.4,35 Understanding the contribution of climate
change to infectious disease risk is thus complex but
necessary for advancing climate change mitigation and

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9 

For Global Burden of Disease
Study 2015 data resources see
http://ghdx.healthdata.org/
gbd-2015

9

 Review

Deaths per 100 000 population

All causes
1400

0·8

1200

0·6

Forces of nature

150

10

100
1000

0·4

800

0·2

600

0

5
50

Heat and cold exposure

Deaths per 100 000 population

Diarrhoeal disease

Dengue

3

0

0
Protein–energy malnutrition

Malignant melanoma

Malaria
150

3

60

2

100

2

40

1

50

1

20

0

0

1990

Year
Africa
Europe

2015
Americas
Southeast Asia

0

1990

Year

2015

1990

0
Year

2015

1990

Year

2015

Eastern Mediterranean
Western Pacific

Figure 7: Trends in mortality from selected causes of death, as estimated by the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015, by WHO region

adaptation policies.17 This indicator is divided into two
components: (1) a systematic literature review of the links
between climate change and infectious diseases; and (2) a
vectorial capacity model for the transmission of dengue
virus by the climate-sensitive vectors.
For the first component, we systematically reviewed the
scientific literature describing effects of climate change
and infectious diseases (appendix p 23), in which
evolutionary trends in knowledge and direction of the
impact of climate change disease risk associations were
measured (figure 8). The number of new reports fitting
the search criteria in 2016 (n=89) was the highest yet
reported, almost double the number of reports in 2015
(n=50) and more than triple the number of reports in
2014 (n=25). During this period, the complexity of
interactions between climate change and infectious
disease has been increasingly recognised and understood.
Trends in the global potential for dengue virus
transmission (as represented by vectorial capacity in the
mosquito vectors A aeqypti and A albopictus, the principal
vectors of dengue) are presented in figure 9. WHO
defines vectorial capacity as the rate (usually daily) at
which a bloodsucking insect population generates
new inoculations from a currently infectious case. We
10 

conducted a global, mechanistic investigation of changes
in annual transmission potential for dengue fever, a
model, high-burden, climate-sensitive vector-borne
disease. For both vectors, vectorial capacity in locations
where these vectors exist reached its highest or equal
highest average level in 2015 during the period considered
(figure 9). This consolidates a clear and significant
increase in vectorial capacity starting in the late 1970s
(3·0% and 6·0% increases in vectorial capacity compared
with 1990 levels for A aegypti and A albopictus, respectively).
Nearly all Aedes-positive countries showed relative
increases in vectorial capacity for both vectors during the
period considered (figure 9). Annual numbers of
cases of dengue fever have doubled every decade since
1990, with 58·4 million apparent cases (95% CI
23·6 million–121·9 million) in 2013, accounting for more
than 10 000 deaths and 1·14 million disability-adjusted lifeyears (95% CI 0·73 million–1·98 million).36 Climate
change has been suggested as one potential contributor to
this increase in burden.37 A aegypti and A albopictus
also carry other important emerging or re-emerging
arboviruses, including Yellow Fever, Chikungunya,
Mayaro, and Zika viruses, which are probably similarly
responsive to climate change.

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9

 Review

Indicator 1.7: Food security and undernutrition

Number of published reports

50

25

0

B

Impact

Decrease

Uncertain

Increase

1·00

0·75

0·50

0·25

0

00
0
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
0
20 7
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16

This indicator reports that the number of under­
nourished people in the 30 most vulnerable countries
(those that are geographically climate-vulnerable, have
very high levels of undernutriton, and have high
levels of regional dependency for food production)
has increased from 398 million people in 1990 to
422 million people in 2016.
The purpose of this indicator is to track the extent to
which health will be compromised by climate change
in countries where both dependence on domestic
production of food and levels of undernourishment
(which is strongly related to undernutrition) are already
high at present. Climate change could further compromise
health through changes in localised temperature and
precipitation, manifested in reduced yields.
Food markets are increasingly globalised, and food
security is increasingly driven by human systems. In
response to decreasing yields caused by temperature
increases, governments, communities, and organisations
can and will undertake adaptation activities that might
variously include breeding programmes, expansion
of farmland, increased irrigation, or switching crops.
However, the greater the loss of yield potential due to
temperature increases, the more difficult adaptation
becomes for populations dependent on domestic
food supply.
Increasing temperatures have been shown to reduce
global wheat production by 6% for each 1°C increase.43–45
Rice yields are sensitive to increases in night
temperatures, with each 1°C increase in growing-season
minimum temperature in the dry season resulting in a
10% decrease in rice grain yield.46 Higher temperatures
have been demonstrated rigorously to have a negative
impact on crop yields in countries in lower latitudes.47–49

75

<2

Indicator 1.7.1: Vulnerability to undernutrition

A
100

Proportion of responces

Isolating the impact of climate change on health through
the indirect impacts on food security is complicated
because policies, institutions, and the actions of
individuals, organisations, and countries strongly
influence the extent to which food systems are resilient to
climate hazards and adapt to climate change and whether
individual households are able to access and afford
sufficient nutritious food. For example, with respect
to undernourishment, vulnerability has been shown to
be more dependent on adaptive capacity (such as infra­
structure and markets) and sensitivity (such as forest cover
and rain-fed agriculture) than exposure (such as
temperature change, droughts, floods, storms).38 In view of
the role human systems have in mediating the links
between climate, food, and health, the chosen indicators
focus on abiotic and biotic indicators and population
vulnerabilities, considering both terrestrial and marine
ecosystems. Undernutrition has been identified as
the largest health impact of climate change in the
21st century.13,39–42

Year

Figure 8: Systematic review of scientific literature about climate-sensitive
infectious diseases
(A) Number of academic reports about climate-sensitive infectious diseases, by
year. (B) Proportion of responses reported in publications, by year and direction
of impact.

Moreover, agriculture in lower latitudes tends to be more
marginal, and more people are food insecure.
Using data from the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), this
indicator focuses on vulnerability to undernutrition.
Countries are selected for inclusion on the basis of
three criteria: (1) the presence of moderate or high
levels of undernourishment, reflecting vulnerability;
(2) their physical location, focusing on geographies
where a changing climate is predicted with high
confidence to have a negative impact on the yields to
staples produced; and (3) dependence on regional
production for at least half of the population’s cereal
consumption, reflecting high exposure to localised
climate hazards. 30 countries in Africa or southern
Asia are included. The aggregated indicators show the
total number of undernourished people in these
30 countries, multiplied by total dependence on
regional production of grains (figure 10). This gives a
measure of how exposed undernourished populations
that are already highly dependent on regionally
produced grains are to localised climate hazards.

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9 

For the FAO hunger map 2015
see http://www.fao.org/
hunger/en

11

 Review

A

Aedes aegypti

Aedes albopictus
USA
Turkey
South Korea
Japan
China
Lebanon
Israel
Pakistan
Nepal
Taiwan
Bangladesh
Mexico
Cuba
Cayman Islands
Haiti
Dominican Republic
Puerto Rico
Laos
Belize
Vietnam
Northern Mariana Islands
Guatemala
Thailand
Philippines
Nicaragua
Cambodia
Trinidad and Tobago
Nigeria
Marshall Islands
Panama
Venezuela
Côte d’Ivoire
Sri Lanka
Central African Republic
Cameroon
Colombia
Maldives
Malaysia
Singapore
Gabon
Congo (Brazzaville)
Indonesia
Papua New Guinea
Brazil
French Polynesia
Fiji
Tonga
Madagascar
Australia
South Africa
Argentina

B
5
VC %Δ (1990)

VC %Δ (1990)

2
0
−2
−4

0
−5

Year

19
50
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15

19
50
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15

−6

Year

Figure 9: Average annual vectorial capacity (VC) for dengue in Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus for selected Aedes-positive countries
(A) Matrix coloured relative to country mean in 1950–2015; red indicates relatively higher VC, and blue indicates relatively lower VC. Countries are ordered by centroid
latitude (north to south). (B) Average VC for both vectors calculated worldwide (relative to 1990 baseline).

The regions with the highest vulnerability to
undernutrition are also areas where yield losses due to
climate warming are predicted to be relatively high,
thus increasing the vulnerability of these populations
to the negative health consequences of undernutrition.
High dependence on one crop increases the
vulnerability of a country further. For example, Kenya,
with a domestic pro­
duction dependency for cereals
of almost 80%, is 69% dependent on maize, is
experiencing high levels of under­
nutrition, and
is particularly vulnerable to climate-related yield
losses. Going forward, these data will be refined
through country-level exploration, incorporation of the
predicted impact of warming on yield losses, and
incorporation of key temperature indicators such as
12 

growing degree days above critical crop-specific
thresholds.50,51

Indicator 1.7.2: Marine primary productivity
Decreasing fish consumption is an indication of food
insecurity, especially in local shoreline communities that
depend on marine sources for food. These communities
are especially vulnerable to any decreases in marine
primary productivity affecting fish stocks.52 This is
particularly concerning for the 1 billion people in the
world who rely on fish as their principal source of protein,
placing them at increased risk of stunting (prevented from
growing or developing properly) and malnutrition from
food insecurity.53 Fish are also important for providing
micronutrients such as zinc, iron, vitamin A, vitamin B12,

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9

 Western Africa (five countries)
Central Africa (three countries)

Eastern Africa (ten countries)
Southern Africa (seven countries)

100

Southern Asia (five countries)

350

300
80
250
60
200

40

150

100
20
50

0

6*

5*

–1

–1

13

14
20

20

20

12

–1

4*

3

2
20

11

–1

1

–1
10

20

0

–1

09

20

9

20

08

–1

8
20

07

–0

7

–0
06

20

6

–0

20

05

5

–0

20

04

4

–0

20

03

3

–0
02

20

2

20

01

–0

1

–0
00

20

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00

–2

99

9

00

–2
98

19

8

–9

19

97

19

7

–9
96

19

6

–9

19

95

5

–9
94

19

4

–9

19

93

3

–9

19

92

–9
91

19

19

90

–9

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0

Total number of undernourished people multiplied by regional dependency
(southern Asia)

Total number of undernourished people multiplied by regional dependency

Review

Year

Figure 10: Total number of undernourished people multiplied by regional dependency on grain production for countries

and omega-3 fatty acids. If fish stocks continue to decrease,
up to 1·4 billion people are estimated to become deficient
and at increased risk of certain diseases, particularly those
associated with the cardiovascular system.54,55
Marine primary productivity is determined by abiotic
and biotic factors; measuring these globally and
identifying relevant marine basins is complex. Factors
such as sea surface temperature, sea surface salinity, coral
bleaching, and phytoplankton numbers are key
determinants of marine primary productivity. Other local
determinants have particularly strong effects on marine
primary productivity. For example, harmful algal blooms
result from uncontrolled algal growth producing deadly
toxins. The consumption of seafood contaminated with
these toxins, such as those produced by Alexandrium
tamarense, is often very dangerous to human health and
potentially fatal.56
Changes in sea surface temperature and sea surface
salinity from 1985 to present are shown for 12 fishery
locations essential for aquatic food security. Data were
obtained from NASA’s Earth Observatory Databank, and
mapped across to the important basins outlined in the
appendix (p 34). From 1985 to 2016, a 1°C increase in sea
surface temperature (from an annual average of 22·74°C to
23·73°C) was recorded in these locations.57 This indicator
requires substantial further work to draw out the
attribution to climate change and the health outcomes that
might result. A case study on food security and fish stocks
in the Persian Gulf is presented in the appendix (p 39).

Indicator 1.8: Migration and population displacement
This indicator reports that climate change is the sole
contributing factor for at least 4400 people who are

already being forced to migrate, worldwide. The total
number of people vulnerable to migration might increase
to 1 billion by the end of the century without significant
further action on climate change.
Climate change-induced migration can occur through
a variety of different social and political pathways,
ranging from sea level rise and coastal erosion to
changes in extreme and average precipitation and
temperature that reduce the arability of land and
exacerbating food and water security issues. Estimates
of future so-called climate change migrants vary widely,
but range from 25 million people to 1 billion people by
2050.58 Such variation indicates the complexity of the
multifactorial nature of human migration, which
depends on an interaction of local environmental,
social, economic, and political factors. For example, in
Syria, many attribute the initial and continued conflict
to the rural-to-urban migration that resulted from a
climate change-induced drought.59,60 However, the
factors leading to the violence are wide-ranging and
complex, with clear quantifiable attribution particularly
challenging. Indeed, climate change, as a threat
multiplier and an accelerant of instability, is often
thought of as important in exacerbating the likelihood
of conflict. Nonetheless, migration driven by climate
change has potentially severe impacts on mental
and physical health, both directly and by disrupting
essential health and social services.61
Despite the methodological difficulties in proving a
direct causal relationship between climate change and
population displacement, this is possible in some areas.
This indicator focuses on these situations and makes
attempts at isolating instances where climate change is

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Population size

Notes on causes of migration

Carteret Islands, Papua New Guinea

1200 people

Migrating due to sea-level rise7,8

Alaska*

3512 people

Changing ice conditions leading to coastal erosion and due to permafrost melt, destabilising
infrastructure9,10

Isle de Jean Charles, LO, USA

25 homes

Coastal erosion, wetland loss, reduced accretion, barrier island erosion, subsidence, and saltwater
intrusion were caused by dredging, dikes, levees, controlling the Mississippi River, and agricultural
practices; climate change is now bringing sea-level rise

*Communities in Alaska that need to migrate as soon as possible include: Kivalina (398–400 people); Newtok (353 people); Shaktoolik (214 people); and Shismaref
(609 people). Communities in Alaska that need to migrate gradually include: Allakeket (95 people); Golovin (167 people); Hughes (76 people); Huslia (255 people); Koyuku
(89 people); Nulato (274 people); Teller (256 people); and Unalakleet (724 people). Village names and populations are sourced from the US Government Accountability
Office’s report.7–10

Table 1: Locations from which populations are migrating now only because of climate change

Panel 4: Mental health and climate change
Measuring changes in the effects of climate change on mental health and wellbeing is
difficult. Although this is partly because of problems of attribution, the main
measurement difficulty lies in the inherently complicated nature of mental health,
which embraces a diverse array of outcomes (eg, anxiety and mood disorders), many of
which co-occur and all of which vary with contexts and during lifetimes. They are
products of long and complex causal pathways, many of which can be traced back to
distal but potent root causes, such as famine, war, and poverty, of which climate
change is an accelerator.69
Mental health, with its inherent intricacy, is a field of study where systems thinking is
likely to be particularly valuable. A first step, therefore, in tracking progress on mental
health and climate change is to build a conceptual framework using systems thinking.
Initial work in partnership with the University of Sydney has begun to trace through the
many direct and indirect causal pathways to aid the identification of indicators. Many
challenges are immediately apparent (eg, how to gather and interpret highly subjective
measures across cultures and income settings). Although further work and engagement
with other partners will be necessary, potential indicators might focus on a range of
issues, including: national and local mental health emergency response capacity to
climate-related extreme events; the extent to which climate change is considered within
national mental health strategies; or the social and psychological effect of uninsured
economic losses that result from extreme weather events.

the sole contributory factor in migration decisions. Sea
level rise is the clearest example, although other examples
exist (table 1). Estimating the number of people who
have involuntarily migrated (both internally and inter­
nationally) as a result of climate change alone helps
overcome the complexity of accounting for other societal,
economic, and environmental factors that also influence
migration.
On the basis of data derived from peer-reviewed academic
reports (appendix p 40 for full details), the 4400 people who
have been forced to migrate solely because of climate
change (table 1) is an underestimate because it excludes
cases in which more than one factor could be contributing
to a migration decision, such as a combination of both
climate-related sea level rise and coastal erosion not
associated with climate change (possibly such as the village
of Vunidogola, relocated by the Fijian Government in
2014 for such reasons, and the planned relocation of the
Fijian village of Narikoso by 2018).62–64
14 

In the long term, human exposure and vulnerability to
ice sheet collapse is increasing as the number of people
living close to the coast and at elevations close to sea level
increases. In 1990, 450 million people lived within 20 km
of the coast and less than 20 m above sea level.65 In 2000,
634 million people (about 10% of the global population),
of whom 360 million live in urban centres, lived below
10 m above sea level (the highest vertical resolution
investigated).66 With 2000 as a baseline, the population
living below 10 m above sea level will increase from
634 million people to 1005–1091 million people by 2050
and to 830–1184 million people by 2100.67 From 2100 and
beyond, without mitigation and adaptation interventions,
more than 1 billion people might need to migrate because
of sea level rise caused by any ice sheet collapse.67,68
Although this indicator is not yet able to capture the true
number of people forced to migrate because of climate
change, that at least 4400 people are already forced to
migrate because of climate change only is concerning and
demonstrates that there are limits to adaptation. That this
is a significant underestimate further highlights the need
to mitigate climate change and improve the adaptive
capacity of populations to reduce future forced migration.
Importantly, only instances of migration where climate
change is isolated as the only factor are captured. New
approaches will be necessary to more accurately estimate
the number of people forced to migrate because of climate
change and to capture situations where climate change
has an important contributory role alongside other social
and economic considerations.

Conclusion
Climate change affects health through diverse direct and
indirect mechanisms. The indicators presented here
provide an overview of some of these effects and capture
exposure, impact, and underlying vulnerabilities. Going
forward, indicators will be developed to better measure
direct health outcome from climate change in addition to
exposure and vulnerabilities.
The indicators will be developed continuously to more
directly capture mortality and morbidity outcomes from
communicable and non-communicable diseases. Work
is already underway to produce new indicators to capture

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these concepts for future reports. One such ongoing
process is focusing on mental health and climate change
(panel 4).
Adaptation pathways can help to minimise some of the
negative health impacts of global warming, especially for
the lower range of projected average temperature rises.
However, there are powerful limits to adaptation, and we
have drawn attention to the non-linearity and the spatial
distribution of the health impacts of climate change. The
indicators demonstrate clearly that these impacts are
experienced in all parts of the world today and provide a
strong imperative for both adaptation and mitigation
interventions to protect and promote public health.

Section 2: Adaptation, planning, and resilience
for health
Climate change adaptation is defined by the Inter­
governmental Panel on Climate Change as the
“adjustment in natural or human systems in response to
actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities”.70
With respect to health, adaptation consists of efforts to
reduce injury, illness, disability, and suffering from
climate-related causes. Resilience has been defined by
the Rockefeller Foundation as “the capacity of individuals,
communities, and systems to survive, adapt, and grow in
the face of stress and shocks, and even transform when
conditions require it”.71 In the context of climate change
and health, resilience is an attribute of individuals,
communities, and health-care systems; resilience at all
levels can reduce adverse health outcomes of climate
change and should be a goal of adaptation planning.
Identifying indicators of resilience and adaptation is
challenging. Resilience is related to, but not synonymous
with, preparedness, response, resource management, and
coordination capacity. Understanding the resilience of a
population’s health and health systems at present provides
some indication of resilience to climate change, although
direct indicators measuring this have not yet been
developed by the Lancet Countdown. The indicators
presented here are predominantly process-based, focusing
on health adaptation planning, capacity, and response.
Although the underlying resilience of communities is
present to some extent in all indicators in this section, it is
currently only captured directly for health systems. Most
indicators that follow will therefore focus more specifically
on health adaptation.
We have identified six indicators. Headline findings for
all indicators are provided at the beginning of each
indicator; detailed discussion of the data and methods
used is available in the appendix (p 49).

Indicator 2.1: National adaptation plans for health
This indicator reports that 30 out of 40 countries
responding to the survey have a national health
adaptation plan or strategy approved by the relevant
national health authority.

Panel 5: WHO—United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Climate and Health Country Profile project
The WHO–UNFCCC Climate and Health Country Profile Project forms the foundation of
WHO’s national level provision of information and monitoring of progress in this field.
The profiles, developed in collaboration with ministries of health and other health
determining sectors, support evidence-based decision making to strengthen the climate
resilience of health systems and promote actions that improve health while reducing
carbon emissions. In part, the data used in the development of the climate and health
country profiles are collected through a biennial WHO Climate and Health Country Survey.
Data from this survey are reported on for Indicators 2.1, 2.5, and 2.6.
The 2015 baseline survey findings for 40 responding nations are presented in this report
(a complete list of country respondents is provided in the appendix, p 49). The findings
include countries from all WHO regions (high-income, middle-income, and low-income
groups) and with varying levels of risks and vulnerabilities to the health effects of climate
change. The 2015 survey data were validated as part of the national consultation process
seeking input on respective WHO–UNFCCC Climate and Health Country Profiles from key
in-country stakeholders, including representatives of the ministry of health, ministry of
environment, meteorological services, and WHO country and regional technical officers.
The validated data presented in this report tended to include many countries that are
actively working on climate and health with WHO; as such, the results here are indicative
and are not meant to be inferred as an exact indicator of global status. The number of
country respondents is expected to double in subsequent iterations of the survey. As such,
the results represent the beginning of the development of a more comprehensive survey
and offer insights to findings at the start of this process.

Effective national responses to climate risks require that
the health sector identify strategic goals in response to
anticipated and unanticipated threats. A crucial step in
achieving these strategic goals is developing national
health adaptation plans and outlining priority actions,
resource requirements, and a specific timeline and process
for implementation. This indicator tracks the policy
commitments of national governments for health and
climate change adaptation, and data are drawn from the
recent WHO Climate and Health Country Survey (panel 5).
Of the 40 countries responding to the survey, 30 reported
having a national adaptation strategy for health approved
by their Ministry of Health or relevant health authority
(figure 11). Among these 30 countries are countries with a
health component of their National Adaptation Plan,
which was established by the UNFCCC to help nations
identity medium-term and long-term adaptation needs
and develop and implement programmes to address those
needs.72 There is a need for caution in extrapolating the
results to global level because many of the respondent
countries have received support from WHO in developing
and implementing their plans.73,74 Nonetheless, with
75% of respondents in the survey having an approved
national health adaptation plan, there is evidence that the
need to adapt to climate change is recognised. Countries
with national health adaptation plans are found in all
regions and, perhaps most importantly, include some of
the most vulnerable countries in Africa, southeast Asia,
and South America. In future iterations of the survey, data

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For the UNFCCC’s National
Adaptation Plans see
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/
workstreams/national_
adaptation_plans/items/6057.
php

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National health adaptation
strategies or plans are in place
National health adaptation
strategies or plans are not in place
No data available

Figure 11: Countries with national heath climate adaptation strategies or plans

will be gathered on the content and quality of these
adaptation plans, their level of implementation, the main
priorities for health adaptation, internal monitoring, and
review processes, and the level of funding available to
support policy interventions.

Indicator 2.2: City-level climate change risk assessments

For the Compact of Mayors
see https://www.compact
ofmayors.org
For the Carbon Disclosure Project
see https://www.cdp.net/en

16 

This indicator reports that, of the 499 self-reporting
cities in the Carbon Disclosure Project 2016 information
request, 45% have climate change risk assessments
in place.
55% of the world’s population lives in cities, where key
health infrastructure is often concentrated.75 These urban
centres are increasingly at risk from climate change,
with negative impacts predicted for human health
and health services. To improve cities’ ability to adapt
to climate change, National Adaptation Plans must
be complemented with city-level responses. Indeed,
cities have a unique opportunity to provide adaptation
measures that help improve the resilience of urban
populations, while also helping to mitigate the impacts
of climate change on public health.76
Data for this indicator are from the 2016 global survey
of the Compact of Mayors and the Carbon Disclosure
Project. According to a Carbon Disclosure Project 2016
information request, 45% of the 449 cities with public
responses (533 cities responded overall) reported having
undertaken a climate change risk or vulnerability
assessment for their local government (figure 12).
Most cities with climate change risk assessments are
in high-income countries (118 cities), whereas only
42 cities are in low-income countries. This partly reflects
the fact that more cities in high-income countries were
surveyed and that these cities have a greater capacity to
develop such plans. Most respondents were cities in

high-income countries (236 cities in high-income
countries vs 61 cities in low-income countries).
European cities in this survey have the highest
number of climate change risk assessments (56 cities,
representing 83% of European cities surveyed).
Conversely, only 28% of surveyed African cities have
climate change risk assessments. This has serious
implications for the adaptive capacity of some of the most
vulnerable populations to climate change in low-income
countries. A concerted effort must be made to increase
the number of climate change risk assessments in cities
in low-income countries so as to better understand their
vulnerability to climate change impacts and implement
adaptation actions.

Indicator 2.3: Detection and early warning of,
preparedness for, and response to climate-related
health emergencies
This indicator reports that, because of focused investment
in the implementation of the International Health
Regulations (IHR) 2005, national capacities relevant to
climate adaptation and resilience, including disease
surveillance and early detection, multihazard public
health emergency preparedness and response, and the
associated human resources to perform these public
health functions, have increased markedly from 2010 to
2016 in all world regions.
Many initiatives at community, national, regional,
and global levels support strengthening country
capacities for health emergency and disaster risk
management, and they complement the implementation
of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction,
Sustainable Development Goal 3D, the Paris Agreement
on Climate Change, and the IHR 2005. Under
IHR 2005, all States Parties should report annually

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A

Risk assessment undertaken
Risk assessment not undertaken
Risk assessment in progress
Whether risk assessment has
been undertaken is unknown

140

Cities with climate change risk assessments (%)

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

High-income countries

Upper-middle-income countries

Lower-middle-income countries

Low-income countries

B

Cities with climate change risk assessments

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Africa

East Asia

Europe

Latin America

Middle East

North America

Region

South Asia and
Oceania

South and west Asia

Figure 12: Number of global cities undertaking climate change risk assessments, by income grouping and region

to the World Health Assembly on the implementation
of the regulations.77,78,79 To facilitate this process,
WHO developed an IHR Monitoring questionnaire,
interpreting the Core Capacity Requirements in
Annex 1 of IHR (2005) into 20 indicators for 13 capacities
(panel 6).80,81 These metrics can serve as important
proxies of health-system adaptive capacity and system
resilience because they measure the extent to which
health systems show a range of attributes necessary to
detect, prepare for, and respond to public health
emergencies, some of which are climate-sensitive.
Four capacities (human resources, surveillance,
preparedness, and response) reflecting seven indicators
from the IHR Monitoring questionnaire are reported
here. Additional details of all four IHR Capacities are
available in the appendix (p 51).

The first of these capacities is human resources,
which reflects a single indicator: human resources
available to implement the IHR Core Capacities. This is
a useful proxy in lieu of an indicator that looks at
specific capacity for health adaptation to climate
change (figure 13A). In 2010, capacity scores ranged
from 25% in Africa to 57% in western Pacific. Human
resource capacity had improved markedly by 2016, when
average capacity was 67% (with the lowest score in the
African region reporting 51%, and the highest in the
western Pacific region reporting 89%).
Second, surveillance capacity summarises two
indicators in the IHR Monitoring questionnaire:
(1) indicator-based surveillance includes an early warning
function for early detection of a public health event;
and (2) event-based surveillance is established and

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17

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functioning. This capacity score is used as a proxy for a
health system’s ability to anticipate and identify outbreaks
and changing patterns of climate-sensitive infectious
Panel 6: The International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005)
The IHR (2005), which entered into force in 2007, is legally binding on 196 States Parties,
including all WHO member states. It requires States Parties to detect, assess, notify and
report, and respond promptly and effectively to public health risks and public health
emergencies of international concern (IHR Article 5, 13) and to develop, strengthen, and
maintain the capacity to perform these functions (IHR Article 5). Examples of required core
capacities include: national legislation, policy, and financing; public health surveillance;
preparedness and response; risk communication; human resources; and laboratory services.
Under the IHR (2005), all States Parties should report to the World Health Assembly
annually on the implementation of IHR (2005). To facilitate this process, WHO developed an
IHR Monitoring questionnaire.80 The method of estimation calculates the proportion of
attributes (a set of specific elements or functions that reflect the performance or
development of a specific indicator) reported to be implemented in a country. Since 2010,
195 States Parties have submitted self-reports at least once. Indicator 2.3 is drawn from the
results of these questionnaires,81 to which 129 of 196 States Parties responded in 2016.81
A

diseases, such as zoonosis and food-related outbreaks.
Globally, 129 reporting States Parties scored 88% for this
capacity in 2016 (figure 13B). This proportion has
increased steadily since 2010 (average score of 63%),
indicating that health systems have increasing capacity
for early detection of public health events.
Third, preparedness capacity reflects that a Multihazard National Public Health Emergency Preparedness
and Response Plan is developed and implemented.
This indicator looks at the presence of a plan, the
implementation of the plan, and the ability for this plan
to operate under unexpected stress. Of responding
countries, progress can be seen in all world regions,
from a global average of 49% in 2010 to 76% in 2016
(figure 13C).
Finally, response capacity reflects the availability and
functioning of public health emergency response
mechanisms and infection prevention and control at
national and hospital levels. This capacity is an important
proxy for the ability of the health system to mobilise
effective responses when shocks or stresses are detected.

B

100

Capacity score

80

60

40

WHO regions
Africa
Americas
Eastern Mediterranean
Europe
Southeast Asia
Western Pacific

20

0

C

D

100

Capacity score

80

60

40

20

0
2010

2011

2012

2013
Year

2014

2015

2016

2010

2011

2012

2013
Year

2014

2015

2016

Figure 13: International Health Regulations capacity scores by WHO regions
(A) Human resources capacity score. (B) Surveillance capacity score. (C) Preparedness capacity score. (D) Response capacity score.

18 

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All countries had 73–91% response capacity in 2016
(figure 13D), with notable progress in Africa between
2010 (47%) and 2016 (73%).
There are some limitations to considering these
capacities. Most importantly, IHR survey responses are
self-reported; although national-level external verification
has begun, it remains relatively limited. Additionally,
these findings capture potential capacity, not action.
Finally, the quality of surveillance for early detection and
warning, and the impact of that surveillance on public
health, are not shown. Response systems have been
inadequate in numerous public health emergencies, so
the presence of such plans is not a proxy for their
effectiveness.

Indicator 2.4: Climate information services for health
This indicator reports that, out of the 100 WHO member
states responding to a 2015 survey by the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO), 73% report providing
climate information to the health sector in their country.
This indicator measures the proportion of countries
whose meteorological and hydrological services selfreported to the WMO in 2015 about tailored climate
information, products, and services provided to their
national public health sector.82 73% of the
100 responding WHO member states reported providing
climate information to the health sector in their country.
Response rates for the 2015 WMO survey were 71% in
the African region, 67% in the eastern Mediterranean
region, 79% in the European region, 81% in the Americas,
67% in the southeast Asia region, and 44% in the western
Pacific region.
Taking into account the total number of WHO member
states (respondent and non-respondent) per WHO region,
only 14·8–51·4% are known to provide climate information
to the health sector (figure 14), and 18–55% did not
provide information.
However, it is important to note that with a 49% nonresponse rate, this sample is not representative of all
countries, and these results were self-reported. Crucially,
this indicator does not capture the type of climate
products made available, quality of the data provided,
the ways in which the health sector makes use of these
data (if at all), and whether the data are presented in a
format and timely fashion relevant to public health.
Future WMO surveys will aim to provide greater insight
to the specific applications of climate information.
Further information is available in the appendix (p 54).

Indicator 2.5: National assessments of climate change
impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation for health
This indicator reports that more than two thirds of
countries responding to the survey have conducted a
national assessment of climate change impacts,
vulnerability, and adaptation for health.
National assessments of climate change impacts, vul­
nerability, and adaptation for health allow govern­ments

Service provision
No response
No
Yes

Western Pacific region 14·8%
Southeast Asia region 18·2%
Region of the Americas 51·4%
European region 49·1%
Eastern Mediterranean region 27·3%
African region 37·0%
0

20
Number of countries

40

Figure 14: National Meteorological and Hydrological Services of WHO member states reporting to provide
targeted or tailored climate information, products, and services to the health sector

to understand more accurately the extent and magnitude
of potential threats to health from climate change, the
effectiveness of current adaptation and mitigation policies,
and future policy and programme requirements. Although
ments might vary in scope between
national assess­
countries, the number of countries that have done a
national assessment of climate change impacts,
vulnerability, and adaptation for health is a key indicator to
monitor the global availability of information required for
adequate management of health services, infrastructure,
and capacities to address climate change. This indicator
tracks the number of countries that have national
assessments and is based on responses to the 2015 WHO
Climate and Health Country Survey (panel 5).
More than two thirds of the countries sampled (27 of
40 countries) reported having done a national
assessment of impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation for
health (figure 15). These countries include all regions,
and some countries are particularly vulnerable; for
instance, of the nine responding countries in the
southeast Asia region, eight countries (Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Indonesia, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, and Timor-Leste) reported having national
assessments of impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation
for health. Increasing global coverage of countries with
national vulnerability and adaptation assessments for
health is the result of WHO’s support to countries
through projects and technical guidance.87

Indicator 2.6: Climate-resilient health infrastructure
This indicator reports that 16 of 40 responding countries
(40%) have implemented activities to increase the climate
resilience of their health infrastructure.
Functioning health infrastructure is essential during
emergencies. Climate-related events, such as severe
storms and flooding, might compromise electricity and
water supplies, interrupt supply chains, disable trans­
portation links, and disrupt communications and IT
networks, which reduces the capacity to provide medical
care. This indicator measures efforts by countries to
increase the climate resilience of health infrastructure.
The climate resiliency of health infrastructure reflects
the extent to which these systems can prepare for and

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National assessment of climate change
effects, vulnerability, and adaptation for
health has been done
National assessment of climate change
effects, vulnerability, and adaptation for
health has not been done
No data available

Figure 15: Countries with national assessment of climate change impact, vulnerability, and adaptation for health

Measures to increase the climate resilience
of health infrastructure have been taken
Measures to increase the climate resilience
of health infrastructure have not been taken
Measures to increase the climate resilience
of health infrastructure are unknown
No data available

Figure 16: Countries taking measures to increase the climate resilience of health infrastructure

adapt to changes in climate affecting the system. Data
are drawn from the WHO Climate and Health Country
Survey (panel 5). Only 16 of 40 countries (40%) reported
having taken measures to increase the climate resilience
of their health infrastructure (figure 16). These results
suggest widespread vulnerability of health-system
infrastructure to climate change. For example, only two
of nine responding countries in the African region
reported efforts to improve the climate resiliency of
health infrastructure. Similar trends were found in other
WHO regions.
This indicator does not capture the quality or
effectiveness of efforts to build climate-resilient health
20 

system infrastructure. Nonetheless, it highlights the
importance of ensuring that countries work to implement
climate-resilient health infrastructure, as these findings
suggest that implementation is generally lacking.

Conclusion
This section has presented indicators across a range of
areas relevant to health adaptation and resilience. The
public and the health systems they depend on are clearly
unprepared to manage the health impacts of climate
change.
In many cases, the available data and methods provide
only a starting point for an eventual suite of indicators

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that capture health-specific adaptation, and include both
process-based and outcome-based indicators. New
indicators will also be necessary to better capture
important indicators of resilience.

Section 3: Mitigation, actions, and health
co-benefits
In previous sections we have covered the health impacts
of climate change, the adaptation available and being
implemented at present, and the limits to this adaptation.13
In this section, we present a series of indicators relevant
to the near-term health co-benefits of climate mitigation
policies. Accounting for this enables a more complete
consideration of the total costs and benefits of such
policies and is essential in maximising the cumulative
health benefits of climate change mitigation.
The health co-benefits of meeting commitments under
the Paris Agreement are potentially immense, reducing
the burden of disease for many of the greatest health
challenges today and in the future.88 The indicators
presented in this section describe a clear and urgent need
to increase the scope of mitigation ambition if the world
is to keep global average temperatures well below 2°C.1
Countries are accelerating their response to climate
change, with Finland, the UK, and China making strong
commitments to phase-out or dramatically reduce their
dependence on coal.89–92 By 2017, electric vehicles are poised
to be cost-competitive with their petroleum equivalents, a
phenomenon that was not expected until 2030. Globally,
more renewable energy capacity is being built every year
than all other sources combined.92,93 Consequently,
renewable energy is now broadly cost-competitive with
fossil fuels, with electricity from low-latitude solar
photovoltaic energy being cheaper than natural gas.92–94

Tracking the health co-benefits of climate change
mitigation
Meeting the Paris Agreement will require global
greenhouse gas emissions to peak within the next few
years and undergo rapid reduction thereafter, implying
near-term actions and medium-term and long-term cuts
through country-level activities.11 Global CO2 emissions
from fossil fuels and industry were 36·3 gigatonnes
CO2 in 2015 (60% higher than in 1990), whereas
emission from land use change, which is intrinsically
difficult to estimate, was about 4·8 gigatonnes CO2. In
the same year, 41% of the total fossil fuel and industry
emissions were estimated to come from coal, 34% from
oil, 19% from gas, and 6% from cement.95 In 2015, the
largest emitters of CO2 were China (29%), the
USA (15%), the European Union’s 28 member states
(EU28; 10%), and India (6·3%). However, per capita
emissions of CO2 belie the disparity driven by
consumption, with global mean emissions at 4·8 tonnes
CO2 per person per year compared with 16·8 tonnes
CO2 in the USA, 7·7 tonnes CO2 in China, 7·0 tonnes
CO2 in EU28, and 1·8 tonnes CO2 in India.95

The actions needed to embark on rapid decarbonisation
include avoiding the lock-in of carbon-intensive infra­
structure and energy systems, reducing the cost of
scaling-up low-carbon systems, minimising reliance on
unproven technologies, and realising opportunities of
near-term co-benefits for health, security, and the
environment.11 These actions will need to also be costeffective and supported by non-state actors and industry.
Indicators in this section are broadly considered
within the framework of Driving Force-Pressure-StateExposure-Effect-Action, which is recognised as being
suitable for the development of environmental health
indicators and for the identification of entry points for
policy intervention.96 An adaptation of the framework to
examine the health co-benefits of climate change
mitigation is explained in the appendix (p 70).
Health co-benefit indicators are captured for four sectors:
energy, transport, food, and health care. Headline findings
for all indicators are provided at the beginning of each
indicator; more detailed discussion of the data and
methods used is available in the appendix (p 57).

Energy supply and demand sectors
Fossil fuel burning is the largest single source of
greenhouse gas emissions wordwide, producing an
estimated 72% of all greenhouse gas emissions resulting
from human activities.97,98 66% of these emissions arise
in the energy sector from the production of thermal
and electric power for consumption in a range of
sectors including industry, commercial, residential, and
transport sectors.
To meet the climate change mitigation ambitions of the
Paris Agreement, it is widely accepted that the energy
system will need to largely complete the transition
towards near zero-carbon emissions by, or soon after,
2050, and then to negative emissions in the latter part of
the century.99,100 The necessary action has been framed as
a halving of CO2 emissions every decade.101
The potential short-term health benefits of such
strategies are substantial, with profound improvements
from a reduction in indoor and outdoor air pollution;
more equitable access to reliable energy for health
facilities and communities; and reduced costs of basic
energy services for heating, cooking, and lighting to
support an improved quality of life.

Indicator 3.1: Carbon intensity of the energy system
This indicator reports that globally, the carbon
intensity of total primary energy supply (TPES) of
55–56 tonnes CO2/TJ has remained stable since 1990,
reflecting the huge global challenge of energy-system
decarbonisation. This has occurred because the
reduction in carbon intensity in the USA, UK, and
Germany has been offset by an increased carbon
intensity of energy supply in India and China.
To achieve the 2°C target (at a 66% probability), the
global energy sector must reduce CO2 emissions to more

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90

CO2
USA

China
Germany

India
Kenya

Brazil
Worldwide

35

80

30
25

60
50

20

40

15

30

10

20
5

10
0
1971

Total CO2 emission (gigatonnes)

TPES (tonnes of CO2 per TJ)

70

1976

1981

1986
1991
1996
2001
Carbon intensity of TPES (tonnes CO2/TJ)

2006

2011

0

Indicator 3.2: Coal phase-out

Figure 17: Carbon intensity of total primary energy supply (TPES) for selected countries and total carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions
Total CO2 emission is shown as the shaded area against the secondary Y axis.
Worldwide

China

India

USA

Europe

180

80

160

70

140

60

120

50

100

40

80

30

60

20

40

10

20

0
1990

1994

1998

2002
Year

2006

2010

2014

Global coal TPES (EJ)

Coal TPES for selected countries (EJ)

90

0

Figure 18: Total primary coal supply, by country, region, and globally
Global primary coal supply is shown as the shaded area against the secondary Y axis. TPES=total primary energy supply.

than 70% below current levels by 2050. This means a
large reduction in the carbon intensity of the global
energy system, which can be measured as the tonnes of
CO2 for each unit of TPES. TPES reflects the total amount
of primary energy used in a specific country, accounting
for the flow of energy imports and exports.102
Commitments under the Paris Agreement should begin
to lower the overall carbon intensity of TPES, with the
aim of reducing to near zero by 2050.
Drawing on data from the International Energy Agency
(IEA), this indicator shows that since the 1990s, the
global carbon intensity of TPES has remained
55–56 tonnes CO2/TJ.103 However, a 53% increase in
energy demand during the period has meant that global
CO2 emissions have increased substantially. Increased
22 

coal use in LMICs has driven a rapid increase in carbon
intensity since the 1970s (figure 17). For example, India’s
TPES has almost tripled since 1980, with the share of
coal in the energy mix doubling from 22% to 44%.
Between 1980 and 2014, a four-fold increase in China’s
TPES, combined with increasing carbon intensity due to
the coal share of TPES increasing from 52% to 66%, has
led to strong increase in emissions.
High-income countries such as the USA and
Germany have reduced carbon intensity since the 1970s
(figure 17) by transitioning away from coal in energy
production and use, reducing heavy industrial output,
and increasing use of lower carbon fuels, notably
moving from coal to natural gas in the power sector and
increasing the use of renewable energy.
This indicator reports that globally, total primary coal
supply has increased from 92 EJ in 1990 to 160 EJ in 2015.
However, this peaked in 2013 and is now rapidly
declining, with the amount of coal power capacity
planned for construction halving from 2016 to 2017.
The primary means of reducing carbon intensity of
the energy system within necessary timescales will be
the phase-out of coal. Worldwide, coal supplies 30% of
energy use and is the source of 44% of CO2 emissions
worldwide. The dirtiest form of coal produces almost
twice as much carbon per unit of primary energy than
the least carbon-intensive fossil fuel (natural gas).103
Given that a large share of coal is used for power
generation, it is an important sector of focus, both to
reduce CO2 emissions and to mitigate a major source of
air pollution.103
This indicator of coal phase-out is the total primary coal
supply in the energy system (figure 18), which makes use
of recent data from the IEA.103
Coal use worldwide has increased by just less than 60%
since 1990. This is due to strong increases in global
energy demand and an increasing share of TPES coming
from coal, having increased from 26% in 1990 to 29% in
2014.103 This worldwide increase in coal use has largely
been driven by China’s increasing use of coal in industry
and electricity production, particularly in the 2000s
(figure 18). Crucially, coal use in China has plateaued and
reduced since 2013, in large part because the health
effects of air pollution have been recognised, slower
growth and structural changes in China’s economy, and a
slowing in energy sector expansion.104 India has also seen
substantial growth in coal use, with the share of coal in
TPES increasing from 31% in 1990 to 46% in 2015. The
other large coal-consuming regions are the USA and
Europe. Consumption has been stable in the USA since
the 1990s, but use has recently decreased, particularly in
energy production and use, because of the costcompetitiveness of shale gas. Coal use in Europe has
been steadily decreasing since the 1990s, again through a
move to gas in economies such as the UK, although this

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B
China
USA

UK
India

Germany
Worldwide

35
30
25
20
15

1400
Electricity generation from low
carbon sources (TWh)

Share of electricity generation from low
carbon sources (%)

A
40

10

Denmark
India

Germany
Spain

Germany

China
USA

UK
India

Germany
Spain

1000
800
600
400
200

250

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1990

UK
India

D
UK
USA

Generation from renewables
(excluding hydro; TWh)

Share of electricity generation from
renewables (excluding hydro; %)

35

China
USA

0

C
40

1200

1994

1998

2002
Year

2006

2010

200
150
100
50
0
1990

1994

1998

2002
Year

2006

2010

Figure 19: Renewable and zero-carbon emission electricity generation
(A) Share of electricity generated from zero-carbon sources. (B) Electricity generated from zero carbon sources. (C) Share of electricity generated from renewable
sources (excluding hydro). (D) Electricity generated from renewable sources (excluding hydro).

overall downward trend has transitioned to a plateau in
recent years.
China and India have similar shares of electricity
generated by coal, at about 75% of total electricity
generation. The plateauing coal use in China has not
been observed in other parts of Asia, and the rapidly
emerging economies of Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia,
and the Philippines see strong growth from coal.103
Meeting the IEA’s 2°C pathway and the Paris
Agreement requires that no new coal-fired plants be
built (beyond those with construction already underway),
with a complete phase-out of unabated plants (not fitted
with carbon capture and storage) by 2040. Crucially,
such a transition might have started, with the amount
of coal power capacity in preconstruction planning
at 570 gigawatts in January, 2017, compared with
1090 gigawatts in January, 2016.105 A range of reasons for
this large reduction include decreasing planned capacity
expansion, a desire to tackle air pollution, and active
efforts to expand renewable investment.

Indicator 3.3: Zero-carbon emission electricity
This indicator reports that renewable electricity as a
share of total generation has increased worldwide by
more than 20% from 1990 to 2013. In 2015, renewable
energy capacity added exceeded that of new fossil fuel
capacity, with 80% of recently added global renewable
energy capacity currently located in China. Where
renewables displace fossil fuels (coal in particular), it

represents the beginning of reductions in morbidity and
mortality from air pollution, and a potentially remarkable
success for global health.
As coal is phased out of the energy system, particularly
from electricity production, the rapid scale up of zerocarbon energy production and use will be crucial. To
remain on a 2°C pathway, renewables-based capacity
additions will need to be sustained during the next
35 years, reaching 400 gigawatts per year by 2050, which
is 2·5 times the current level. Solar, wind, and
hydroelectric renewable technologies will be important
for achieving this goal.
Indicator 3.3 draws on IEA data and considers both
renewable and zero-carbon electricity.103 Conversely,
renewable energy refers to “all forms of energy produced
from renewable sources in a sustainable manner, which
include: bioenergy, geothermal, hydropower, ocean energy
(tidal, wave, thermal), solar energy and wind energy”.106 By
comparison, zero-carbon energy means no greenhouse gas
emissions (ie, zero-carbon and carbon equivalent) at the
point of energy production and use, which therefore also
includes nuclear-powered electricity but excludes biomass.
Both renewable and zero-carbon electricity displace the
use of fossil fuels, reducing air pollution and greenhouse
gas emissions, and so are important indicators for climate
change and for health. One caveat is that combustion of
solid biomass fuels such as wood, which is occassionally
promoted for climate change mitigation purposes, might
increase PM2·5 exposure and not be carbon-neutral.107

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Panel 7: Energy and household air pollution in Peru
Universal access to energy is a major challenge in most low-income and middle-income
countries, and access to clean energy or energy sources that do not adversely affect health
is a considerable problem. In Peru, low-income families spend a higher percentage (5–18%)
of average monthly income on energy services than families with higher incomes.83
Furthermore, more than 80% of Peru’s rural population use firewood, dung, or coal for
cooking, making indoor air pollution one of the main environmental risk factors.84
Since the 1990s, the Peruvian Government and various non-governmental organisations
have promoted programmes and policies oriented towards addressing the problem of
solid fuels for lighting, cooking, and heating and the inadequate access to energy sources
in low-income sectors. In 2009, legislative changes enabled subnational governments to
invest up to 2·5% of the national mining revenues in improved cook stove (ICS)
deployment, resulting in the installation of more than 280 000 ICSs nationwide
(52% public and 43% private) as part of the multisectorial campaign Half Million ICS For
A Smokeless Peru. This campaign aims to improve quality of life and health through the
instalment of certified ICSs. Studies show that a well kept and certified ICS can reduce
personal exposure to fine particulate matter (PM2·5).
Peru released its 2010–40 National Energy Policy in 2010. Of the nine goals, two discuss
access to energy services to low-income sectors. Special programmes have been
developed in rural, high-altitude, and Amazonian regions of Peru to address energy access
issues. In 2012, programmes were established to substitute kerosene and other
contaminating stoves with liquefied petroleum gas and ICS; and the Social Inclusion
Energy Fund was established, promoting access to liquefied petroleum gas for the most
vulnerable populations through subsidies. According to the Social Inclusion Energy Fund,
more than 1·3 million families had received a liquefied petroleum gas stove by 2015,
mitigating 91% of their carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and leading to a corresponding
reduction of 553 000 tonnes of CO2 by using cleaner sources of energy.85,86

Proportion of total population with clean fuel use (%)

UN regions

Africa

Americas

Asia

Europe

Oceania

80

60

40

20
2005

Year

2010

2012

2014

Figure 20: Proportion of population relying primarily on clean fuels and technology
For the World Energy Outlook’s
2016 energy access databases
see http://www.
worldenergyoutlook.org/
resources/energydevelopment/
energyaccessdatabase

24 

As a share of total generation, renewable energy has
increased by more than 20% between 1990 and 2013.
The renewable energy sector continues to grow rapidly,
mainly from increasing wind and solar photovoltaic
investment, most notably in the USA, China, and
Europe (figure 19). In 2015, more renewable energy
capacity (150 gigawatts) was added than fossil fuel
capacity globally. Overall, there is now more added

renewable generation capacity installed worldwide
(almost 2000 gigawatts) than coal. About 80% of this
newly installed capacity is in China.103

Indicator 3.4: Access to clean energy
This indicator reports that in 2016, 1·2 billion people did
not have access to electricity, and 2·7 billion people relied
on burning unsafe, unsustainable, and inefficient solid
fuels.
Increased access to clean fuels and clean energy
technologies will have the dual benefit of reducing indoor
air pollution exposure and reducing greenhouse gas
emissions by displacing fossil fuels.108 Use of clean
energy for heating, cooling, cooking, and lighting is
important for improving health and wellbeing, economic
productivity, and reducing the risk of harm from living in
energy poverty.109
An estimated 1·2 billion people worldwide do not
have access to electricity, and 2·7 billion people rely on
burning unsustainable and inefficient solid fuels
(panel 7). According to the World Energy Outlook
Biomass Database and Electricity Access Database, the
reduced indoor air quality from burning these fuels is
estimated to cause 4·3 million premature deaths related
to pneumonia, stroke, lung cancer, heart disease, and
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease each year.
Access to electricity, an energy source that emits no
direct airborne particles (although particles might be
emitted indirectly from the fuel used to generate the
electrical power), is currently 85·3% worldwide but
varies widely between countries and between urban
and rural settings.
This indicator draws on and aligns with the proposed
Sustainable Development Goal Indicator 7.1.2, which
defines clean energy in terms of the emission rate
targets and specific fuel recommendations (ie, against
unprocessed coal and kerosene) included in the WHO
normative guidance.110 The indicator also estimates the
proportion of the population that primarily relies on
clean fuels (including liquefied petroleum gas, a fossil
fuel that is cleaner than many solid fuels) and
technologies for cooking, heating, and lighting relative
to all people accessing those services. The estimates of
fuel use for this indicator come from WHO household
survey data (roughly 800 nationally representative
surveys and censuses) that are modelled to estimate
the proportion of households’ reliance on clean fuels
(figure 20).111

Indicator 3.5: Exposure to ambient air pollution
This indicator reports that 71% of the 2971 cities in
WHO’s database do not satisfy WHO annual fine
particulate matter exposure recommendations.
Air pollutants directly harmful to health are emitted by
combustion processes that also contribute to emissions
of greenhouse gas. As such, well designed actions to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions will improve ambient

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Africa
Europe
The Americas
Eastern Mediterranean
Western Pacific
Southeast Asia

150

Delhi

Dammam

Annual mean PM2·5 concentration (μg/m3)

Amritsar
100

Bhopal
Langfang
Dhaka

Baghdad

Kabul

Beijing

Wuhan
Nanjing
Changzhou
Changchun
Hangzhou
Taian

Baotou

50
Foshan
Istanbul

Shenzhen

Hong Kong

Bucharest

Moscow
Chicago

WHO recommended
guidance level of 10 μg/m3

London

Punta Arenas
0

0

20 000

40 000

60 000

80 000

100 000

GDP per capita

Figure 21: Annual mean fine particulate matter (PM2·5) concentration versus per capita gross domestic product (GDP) for 246 cities in the Sustainable Healthy
Urban Environments database

Sulfur
dioxide

Nitrogen
oxides

Particulate
matter (PM2·5)

Carbon
monoxide

Volatile organic
compounds

Ammonia

>99%
energy

>99%
energy

85%
energy

92%
energy

66%
energy

3%
energy

Industry
Fuel combustion,
process
emissions

Power
Exhaust, brake,
tyre, and road
wear, and fuel
evaporation

Buildings
Cooking, heating,
and lighting

Fuel supply
Extraction, storage,
transport, and
transformation
of fossil fuels

Non-energy
Agriculture,
solvents, and
waste

Power
Combustion of
coal, oil, gas,
bioenergy,
and waste

Figure 22: Selected primary air pollutants and their sources globally in 2015
Adapted from the World Energy Outlook Special Report: Energy and Air Pollution,103 by permission of OECD and International Energy Agency Publishing.

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A

Russia
(1 megatonne)

European Union
(1 megatonne)

54%
57%

USA
(1 megatonne)

31%

48%

Middle East
(1 megatonne)

China
(9 megatonnes)

45%
Southeast Asia
(3 megatonnes)

(2
64%

78%
38%

Latin America
(2 megatonnes)

Africa
(8 megatonnes)

59%

India
(6 megatonnes)

PM2·5 emissions
Buildings
Industry
Transport
Other

B
36

Increasing car ownership
2010

NOx emission per capita (kg) (%)

30

2000

24

1990*

Regulations on NOx
emissions from cars

North
America

18
European
Union

12
6

South America

Other
Asia

0 India
0

Russia

Japan

China
Africa

Southeast Asia
10 000

20 000

30 000
GDP per capita (US$2014, PPP)

40 000

50 000

Figure 23: Sources and trends in particulate pollution
(A) Energy-related emission of fine particulate matter (PM2·5) emissions in 2015. (B) Nitric oxide (NOx) emissions from transport, 1990–2010, by region. GDP=gross
domestic product. PPP=purchasing power parity. *For Russia, 1995 data have been taken into account as first series point. Adapted from the World Energy Outlook
Special Report: Energy and Air Pollution,103 by permission of OECD and International Energy Agency Publishing.

air quality and have associated benefits for human
wellbeing.112 Estimates suggest that global populationweighted PM2·5 exposure has increased by 11·2% since
1990.112,113 To represent levels of exposure to air pollution,
this indicator collects information on annual average
urban background concentrations of PM2.5 in urban
settings across the world.

Indicator 3.5.1: Exposure to air pollution in cities
The data for this indicator were extracted from WHO’s
Urban Ambient Air Pollution Database,114 which compiles
information from a range of public sources, including
national and subnational reports and websites, regional
26 

networks, intergovernmental agencies, and academic
articles. The air pollution measurements are taken from
monitoring stations in urban background, residential,
commercial, and mixed areas. The annual average
density of emission sources in urban areas and the
proximity of populations to those sources led us to focus
on exposure in cities.
For this indicator, we combined the WHO Urban
Ambient Air Pollution Database with the Sustainable
Healthy Urban Environments database,115 presenting
data on 246 randomly sampled cities across the world
(stratified by national wealth, population size, and
Bailey’s Ecoregion).

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Coal power
plants
Other high
stack
Transport
Households
Waste
International
shipping
Agriculture
Other
Natural

Bangladesh
Bhutan
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
China
India
Indonesia
Japan
Laos
Malaysia
Mongolia
Myanmar
Nepal
North Korea
Pakistan
Philippines
South Korea
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnam
0

100

200
300
400
500
600
Annual premature deaths from ambient air pollution per million inhabitants

700

800

Figure 24: Health impacts of exposure to ambient fine particulate matter (PM2·5) in south and east Asian countries in 2015, by key sources of pollution
The contributions of individual source sectors to ambient PM2·5 concentrations have been calculated using linearised relationships based on full atmospheric
chemistry transport model simulations, and premature deaths are calculated following the methodology used by WHO and the Global Burden of Disease 2013 study.

PM2·5 concentrations in most cities are well above the
WHO’s annual guideline of 10 µg/m³, with particularly
high concentrations in cities in central, south, and east
Asia (figure 21). PM2·5 concentrations exceed the
guideline concentration in 71·2% of the nearly
3000 cities in the WHO database. However, since
monitoring is more common in high-income settings,
this is probably an underestimate. 87·3% of randomly
selected cities in the Sustainable Healthy Urban
Environments database had PM2·5 concentrations that
exceeded recommended concentrations. The data
suggest that air pollution has generally decreased
in high-income settings in recent decades but has
marginally increased worldwide.116

transport sector was responsible for around half of all
energy-related NOx emissions.103 30% of PM2·5 emissions
in 2015 came from the manufacturing industry, and
10% of PM2·5 emissions came from the transport sector
(figure 23A).103 Within the transport sector, road vehicles
were by far the largest source of NOx and PM2·5
emissions (58% and 73%, respectively), whereas the
largest source of SO2 emissions was shipping.103 There
are marked regional differences in trends of NOx
emissions within the transport sector. As car ownership
has increased between 1990 and 2010, the USA, EU, and
Japan have decreased NOx emissions, whereas China
and southeast Asia have increased NOx emissions from
transport (figure 23B).

3.5.2: Sectoral contributions to air pollution

3.5.3: Premature mortality from ambient air pollution by
sector

The energy sector (both production and use) is the
single largest source of man-made air pollution
emissions, producing 85% of particulate matter and
almost all of the SO2 and NOx emitted worldwide
(figure 22).103
Coal power is responsible for three-quarters of the
energy sector’s sulpher dioxide (SO2) emissions, 70% of
nitric oxide (NOx) emissions, and more than 90% of
PM2.5 emissions.103 However, in the past decade, these
emissions have largely decoupled from increases in
coal-fired generation in several geographies because
emission standards have been introduced for coal
power plants.117,118
In 2015, manufacturing and other industries (eg,
refining and mining) were responsible for about half of
global energy-related SO2 emissions and 30% of energyrelated NOx emissions (28 megatonnes), whereas the

The extent to which emissions of different pollutants
from different sectors contribute to ambient PM2·5 con­
centrations depends on atmospheric processes such as
the dispersion of primary particles and the formation of
secondary aerosols from precursor emissions. Sources
with low stack heights that are located close to
populations (eg, household combustion for cooking and
heating, road vehicles) typically have a disproportionally
larger role for total population exposure in relation to
their absolute emissions.
Long-term exposure to ambient PM2·5 is associated with
increased mortality and morbidity from cardiovascular
and pulmonary diseases.119–121 WHO estimated that
ambient air pollution causes about 3 million premature
deaths worldwide every year.122 The sources of air pollution
and greenhouse gases are overlapping in many cases, so

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Electricity
Other liquid biofuels
Gas or diesel oil
(excluding biofuels)
Fuel oil
Other kerosene

0·0120

Per-capita fuel use (TJ/capita)

0·0100

Liquefied petroleum gases
Motor gasoline (excluding biofuels)
Natural gas

0·0080

0·0060

0·0040

0·0020

75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13

19

71
19

19

73

0
Year

Figure 25: Per-capita fuel use by type for transport sector with all fuels

2·5

Others
Sweden
Germany
France
UK
Netherlands
Norway
Japan
USA
China
Battery
electric
vehicles
Battery
electric
vehicles
and plug-in
hybrid
electric
vehicles

Electric car stock (millions)

2·0

1·5

1·0

0·5

0

2010

2011

2012

2013
Year

2014

2015

2016

Figure 26: Cumulative electric vehicle sales worldwide
Adapted from The Global EV Outloook 2017,125,126 by permission of OECD and International Energy Agency Publishing.

greenhouse gas mitigation measures can have large
co-benefits for human health.
We estimated premature mortality from ambient air
pollution, as calculated in the GAINS model and using
data from the IEA, for south and east Asian countries
in 2015 (figure 24).123 The contributions of individual
source sectors to ambient PM2·5 concentrations were
calculated using linearised relationships based on full
28 

atmospheric chemistry transport model simulations,
and premature deaths were calculated following the
methodology used by WHO and in the GBD 2013
study.121,122 In some countries such as China, North
Korea, and South Korea, agriculture is a large
contributor to premature deaths. Large direct benefits
for human health can therefore be expected if these
emission sources are addressed by climate policies. For
example, additional important benefits could also
become available if coal-fired power plants were
replaced by wind and solar. Replacement of household
combustion of coal in China would result in health
benefits not only from ambient (outdoor) but also
household (indoor) exposure to air pollution.
Transport sector
Transportation systems (including road
vehicles, rail, shipping, and aviation) are key sources of
greenhouse gas emissions, contributing to 14% of global
emissions in 2010.102,103 To meet the 2°C target, the
transport sector must reduce its total greenhouse gas
emissions more than 20% below current levels by 2050
and be on a trajectory to zero-carbon emissions in the
second half of the century.124 Compared with other
energy-demand sectors, key subsectors of transportation
(urban personal and freight transport, long-distance
road transport, shipping, short-haul aviation, and longhaul aviation) are difficult to decarbonise because of the
high-energy density of fossil fuels, so emission
reduction targets are lower for transport than for the
energy sector as a whole.
The transport sector is also a major source of air
pollutants, including particulate matter, NOx, SO2,
carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and,
indirectly, ozone. Furthermore, exposure to air pollution
from road transport is particularly challenging in cities
where vehicles emit street-level air pollution. In turn,
important opportunities for health exist through the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from transport
systems, both in the near term through cleaner air and
increased physical activity, and in the long-term through
the mitigation of climate change.

Indicator 3.6: Clean fuel for transport
This indicator reports that transport fuel use on a percapita basis has increased worldwide by almost 24%
since 1990. Although petrol and diesel continue to
dominate, use of non-conventional fuels has been rapidly
expanding, with more than 2 million electric vehicles
sold between 2010 and 2016.
Fuels for transport produce more than half the NOx
and a substantial proportion of particulate matter
emitted worldwide.102,103 Switching to low-emission
transport systems is an important component of
climate change mitigation and will help reduce
concentrations of most ambient air pollutants. How­
ever, the transport sector’s extremely high reliance on
petroleum-based fuels makes this transition particularly
challenging.

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 Review

Car

Public transport

Other

Walking

Cycling

Tokyo
Osaka
Paris
Vienna
Delhi
Shanghai
São Paulo
Berlin
Bogota
Singapore
Prague
London
Bangalore
New York
Stockholm
Taipei
Ahmedabad
Chicago
Melbourne
0

10

20

30

40

50
Model share (%)

60

70

80

90

100

Figure 27: Modal shares in world cities
Other typically includes paratransit (transport for people with disabilities), electric bikes, or both.

This indicator focuses on monitoring global trends
in fuel efficiency and on the transition away from the
most polluting and carbon-intensive transport fuels.
More specifically, this indicator follows the metric of
fuel use for transportation on a per-capita basis, by type
of fuel. To develop this indicator, we drew on transport
fuel data from the IEA and population data from the
World Bank.103
Although some transport types have transitioned away
from carbon-intensive fuel use and fuel efficiency has
improved in select countries, transport is still heavily
dominated by gasoline and diesel. Transport fuel use on
a per-capita basis has increased worldwide by almost
65% since 1970 (figure 25). However, non-conventional
fuels (eg, electricity, biofuels, and natural gas) have been
rapidly gaining traction since the 2000s, with more than
2 million electric vehicles sold since 2010, mostly in the
USA, China, Japan, and some European countries
(figure 26).125 These figures are modest compared with
the overall sales of cars per year (77 million in 2017) and
the total global fleet of 1·2 billion cars.

Indicator 3.7: Sustainable travel infrastructure and uptake
This indicator reports that levels of sustainable travel
appear to be increasing in many European cities, but
cities in emerging economies are facing sustainable
mobility challenges. Although levels of private transport
use remain high in many cities in the USA and Australia,
evidence suggests that they are beginning to decrease.
Global trends of population growth and increasing
urbanisation suggest that demand for mobility in urban
areas will increase. Moving from private motorised
transport to more sustainable modes of travel (public
transport, walking, and cycling) in urban areas not only

helps to reduce emissions from vehicles but also
has several health co-benefits. This indicator tracks
trends in sustainable travel infrastructure and uptake
in urban areas.
Although this indicator would ideally track the
proportion and distance of journeys undertaken by
different modes of transport over time, data for citylevel trends in modal share are particularly scarce. We
therefore present data for selected locations, across a
limited timescale. Modal shares (ie, estimates of the
proportion of trips by different modes of transport in
recent years) in world cities are shown in figure 27
(details in appendix, p 64). The data, collated by the
Land Transport Authority, come from travel surveys
of individual cities and national census data (appendix
p 64).127
We collated data on trends in modal share in select
cities, for which data from at least three timepoints
(including one pre-2000 timepoint) are available.
Although many cities have begun collecting this
information in the past decade, there is a paucity of data
on trends from before 2000, with particularly wide gaps
in data availability from cities in Asia, Africa, and South
America.138
In Berlin, London, and Tokyo, the proportion of trips
by privatised motor transport has slowly decreased
since the late 1990s, whereas levels have remained
high in Vancouver and Sydney and appear to be
increasing in Santiago (figure 28). Levels of cycling are
generally low but appear to be increasing in many
cities.
Public transport in emerging cities is often in­
sufficient, inefficient, and in poor condition, potentially
leading to further decreases in sustainable travel in

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9 

29

 Review

Private transport
Berlin

Public transport

Other

Walking

Cycling
London

100
90

Percentage of total travel

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1998

2008

2013

Santiago

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Sydney

100
90

Percentage of total travel

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1991

2001

2006

2012

Tokyo

1981

1991

2001

2006

2011

2014

Vancouver

100
90

Percentage of total travel

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1978

1998
Year

2008 1994

1999

2004
Year

2008

2011

Figure 28: Trends in modal share in selected cities
Data from Santiago in 1991 represents travel on a usual day.128 Data from Sydney represent weekdays only, and the cycling modal share in Sydney is less than 1%.129–132
Sources: Institute for Mobility Research (2016),133 Transport for London (2016),134 New South Wales Department of Transport (2003, 2009, 2017),129–132
MetroVancouver Translink (2012),135 and the SECTRA Road and Transport Program (1992),128 Rode et al (2015),136 and City of Berlin.137

many rapidly growing cities in the future.139 As this
transition occurs, ensuring the mistakes made in
countries within the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) are not repeated
will be essential. In particular, it is crucial to improve
30 

walking and cycling environments so these become
attractive modes of choice and protect road users from
injury. The UN recommends devoting 20% of transport
budgets to funding non-motorised transport at national
and local levels in LMICs.140

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 Review

Indicator 3.8: Ruminant meat for human consumption
This indicator reports that the amount of ruminant
meat available for human consumption worldwide has
decreased slightly from 12·09 kg/capita per year in
1990, to 11·23 kg/capita per year in 2013. The proportion
of energy (kcal/capita per day) available for human
consumption from ruminant meat, as opposed to other
sources, has decreased marginally from 1·86% in 1990
to 1·65% in 2013.
This indicator focuses on ruminants because the
production of ruminant meat, from cattle in particular,
dominates greenhouse gas emissions from the livestock
sector (estimated at 5·6–7·5 gigatonnes emitted CO2 per
year). Consumption of red meat also has known
associations with adverse health outcomes.147 This
indicator measures the total amount of ruminant meat
available for consumption and the ratio of ruminant meat
energy supply to total energy supply. Together, these data
reflect the relative amount of foods in the system that
have high greenhouse gas emissions (figure 29).148–150
Assuming correlation between ruminant meat supply
and consumption, the indicator therefore also provides
information about variations in certain diet-related health
outcomes (such as colorectal cancer and heart disease).151,152
This indicator should be viewed in the context of the
specific setting where this trend is examined (in some
populations, meat consumption is a main source of food

Africa

Americas

Eastern Mediterranean

Europe

Southeast Asia

Western Pacific

30

20

10

Ruminant meat available for human
consumption (kg/capita per year)

0

30

20

10

0

Ruminant meat available for human
consumption (kg/capita per year)

The availability of food is central to human health. Its
production, however, is also a major contributor to
climate change, with the agricultural sector alone
contributing 19–29% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions worldwide.13,141
Dietary choices determine food energy and nutrient
intake. Inadequate and unhealthy diets are associated
with malnutrition and adverse health outcomes
including diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and some
cancers. Dietary risk factors were estimated to account
for more than 10% of all disability-adjusted life-years
lost in 2013.142 A transition to healthier diets, with
reduced consumption of red meat and processed meat
and increased consumption of locally and seasonally
produced fruits and vegetables, could provide
substantial emissions savings.143
Tracking progress towards more sustainable diets
requires consistent and continuous data on food
consumption and related greenhouse gas emissions
throughout food product life cycles. This would require
annual nationally representative dietary survey data on
food consumption. However, due to the complexity and
cost of such data collection, dietary surveys are available
for a limited number of countries and years only.144
Efforts to compile data and ensure comparability are
underway, but their current format is not suitable for
global monitoring of progress towards optimal dietary
patterns.145,146

Ruminant meat available for human
consumption (kg/capita per year)

Food and agriculture

30

20

10

0
1990

1995

2000
Year

2005

2010

1990

1995

2000
Year

2005

2010

Figure 29: The total amount of ruminant meat available for human consumption, by WHO-defined regions

energy, provides essential micronutrients, and sustains
livelihoods). Data for this indicator were constructed
from the FAOSTAT food balance sheets, which comprise
national supply and utilisation accounts of primary foods
and processed commodities.
The amount of ruminant meat available for
consumption is high in the Americas and has
remained relatively stable between 1990 and 2013. In
Europe, the amount of ruminant meat was relatively
high in 1990 but decreased rapidly from 1990–2000
and has remained stable from 2000–13. By
comparison, amounts of ruminant meat available are
moderate in Africa and the eastern Mediterranean
and have remained reasonably constant over time.
Southeast Asia and the western Pacific have low
amounts of ruminant meat available, but availability

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9 

For the FAOSTAT food balance
sheets see http://www.fao.org/
faostat/en/#data/FBS

31

 Energy from ruminant meat as a proportion
of total energy from all foods

Energy from ruminant meat as a proportion
of total energy from all foods

Review

4

responsibility and an appreciable opportunity to lead by
example in reducing its carbon footprint. In 2013, the
estimated US health-care sector emissions were
655 megatonnes CO2, which exceeded CO2 emissions in
the UK.154 Greenhouse gas emission in the health-care
sector is an obvious externality that contributes to climate
change, contradicting the sector’s aim of improving
population health.
The World Bank estimates that a 25% reduction in CO2
emissions from health-care sectors in Argentina, Brazil,
China, India, Nepal, Philippines, and South Africa
would equate to 116–194 million tonne reduction in CO2
emission (the equivalent of decommissioning
34–56 coal-fired power plants or removing 24–41 million
passenger vehicles from the road).154

3

Indicator 3.9: Health-care sector emissions

Africa

Americas

Eastern Mediterranean

Europe

4

3

2

1

0

2

1

0
Western Pacific

Energy from ruminant meat as a proportion
of total energy from all foods

Southeast Asia
4

3

2

1

0
1990

1995

2000
Year

2005

2010

1990

1995

2000
Year

2005

2010

Figure 30: Energy available from human consumption of ruminant meat as a proportion of total energy from
all food sources, by WHO-defined regions

has been slowly increasing in the western Pacific
since 1990.
The proportion of energy supply from ruminant meat
has been markedly higher in the Americas than in other
regions since the 1990s, although the trend has been
decreasing over time (figure 30). In Europe, the
proportion of energy from ruminant meat rapidly
decreased from 1990 to 2000 and has continued to slowly
decrease. By contrast, the trend in energy supply from
ruminant meat has been increasing in the western
Pacific, possibly reflecting the increasing trend in beef
consumption in China (16% increase annually).153

Health-care sector
The health-care sector is a considerable contributor to
greenhouse gas emissions and therefore has both a
32 

No systematic global standard for measuring the
greenhouse gas emissions of the health-care sector exist,
but a number of health-care systems in the UK, the USA,
and around the world are working to reduce their
contribution to climate change.
Several reduction targets in the health-care sector can
be highlighted as positive examples. The UK’s National
Health Service (NHS) set an ambitious target of a 34%
reduction in health-system-wide greenhouse gas
emission by 2020. Kaiser Permanente in the USA has
set 2025 as a target to become net carbon positive. The
Western Cape Government health system in South
Africa has committed to a 10% emission reduction by
2020 and a 30% reduction by 2050 in government
hospitals. The Albert Einstein Hospital in São Paulo,
Brazil, has reduced its annual emissions by 41%.154
In the UK, comprehensive reporting of greenhouse
gas emissions was facilitated by the centralised
structure of the NHS. The Sustainable Development
Unit of the NHS has been monitoring greenhouse gas
emissions from a 1992 baseline, including major
contributions from procurement of pharmaceuticals
and other products. NHS greenhouse gas emissions
decreased by 11% between 2007 and 2015, despite an
18% increase in activity.155 Mitigation efforts from the
health-care sector provide remarkable examples of
hospitals and health-care systems leading by example,
yielding impressive financial savings and health
benefits for their patients. To this end, the efforts of the
hospitals, governments, and civil society organisations
driving this work forward must be supported and
redoubled to ensure a full transition to a healthier,
more sustainable model of climate-smart and
increasingly carbon-neutral health care.154
Monitoring health-care system emissions is an
essential step towards accounting for the externality of
these emissions. Comprehensive reporting of national
greenhouse gas emissions by the health-care system is
only routinely done in the UK. Elsewhere, select healthcare organisations, facilities, and companies provide

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 Review

self-reported estimates of emissions, but this reporting
is rarely standardised across sites. We will continue our
work on developing a standardised indicator on healthcare sector emissions for future reports.

2000
1800

Section 4: Finance and economics
Interventions to protect human health from climate
change have been presented above. In this section, we
focus on the economic and financial mechanisms
necessary for these interventions to be implemented and
their implications. Some of the indicators do not have
an explicit link to human health, and yet increasing
investment in renewable energy and decreasing
investment in coal capacity, for instance, are essential in
displacing fossil fuels and reducing their two principal
externalities: the social cost of climate change and the
health costs from air pollution. Other indicators, such as
economic and social losses from extreme weather events,
have more explicit links to human wellbeing.
In the 2006 Stern Review on the Economics of
Climate Change,156 the impacts of climate change were
estimated to cost the equivalent of reducing annual
global gross world product (GWP; the sum of global
economic output) by “5–20% now, and forever”,
compared with a world without climate change. In their
Fifth Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change estimates an aggregate loss of up to
2% of GWP even if the rise in global mean temperatures
is limited to 2·5°C above pre-industrial levels.22
However, such estimates depend on numerous
assumptions such as the rate at which future costs and
benefits are discounted. Furthermore, existing
analytical approaches are poorly suited to producing
estimates of the economic impact of climate change,
and hence their magnitude is probably greatly
underestimated.157,158 In view of such uncertainty, with
potentially catastrophic outcomes, risk minimisation
through stringent emission reduction seems the
sensible course of action.

984
825

1600

Conclusion

1400
US$ 2016 (billions)

The indicators presented in this section have provided an
overview of activities in energy, transport, food, and
health-care sectors that are relevant to mitigating the
effects of climate change on public health. They have
been selected for their relevance to both climate change
and human health and wellbeing.
A number of areas show remarkable promise, each of
which should yield impressive benefits for human
health. However, these positive examples must not
distract from the enormity of the task at hand. The
indicators presented in this section serve as a reminder
of the scale and scope of increased ambition required to
meet commitments under the Paris Agreement. They
demonstrate a world that is only just beginning to
respond to climate change and hence only just unlocking
the opportunities available for better health.

Energy efficiency
Renewables and nuclear
Electricity networks
Fossil fuels

1200
1000
800
600

266

277

223

231

353

342

400
200
0

2015

Year

2016

Figure 31: Annual investment in the global energy system

The ten indicators in this section seek to track flows
of finance and impacts on the economy and social
welfare resulting from action (and inaction) on climate
change. These indicators fall into four broad themes:
investing in a low-carbon economy; the economic
benefits of tackling climate change; pricing greenhouse
gas emissions from fossil fuels; and adaptation
financing. Headline findings for all indicators are
provided at the beginning of each indicator; additional
detailed disussion of the data and methods used is
available in the appendix (p 73).

Indicator 4.1: Investments in zero-carbon energy and
energy efficiency
This indicator reports that proportional investment in
renewable energy and energy efficiency increased in
2016, whereas absolute and proportional investment in
fossil fuels decreased and, crucially, ceased to account for
most annual investments in the global energy system.
This indicator tracks the level of global investment in
zero-carbon energy and energy efficiency in absolute
terms and as a proportion of total energy-system
investment. In 2015, total investment in the energy
system was around $1·83 trillion (in US$2016),
accounting for 2·4% of GWP (figure 31).159,160 19% of this
investment went to renewables and nuclear energy, and
12% of this investment was for energy efficiency. Most
investment (54%) was in fossil fuel infrastructure.
Electricity networks accounted for the remaining 15%.
In 2016, total investment in the energy system reduced
to around $1·68 trillion, accounting for 2·2% of GWP.
Although the absolute value of investment in renewables
and nuclear energy reduced slightly in absolute (real)
terms, its proportional contribution increased to 20% of
total investment. Investment in energy efficiency

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33

 Review

To hold a 66% probability of remaining within 2°C of
global warming, average annual investments in the
energy system must reach $3·5 trillion between 2016 and
2050, with renewable energy investments increasing by
more than 150% and energy efficiency increasing by
around a factor of ten.162

Index of global investment in coal-fired power capacity

150
140
130
120
110

Indicator 4.2: Investment in coal capacity

100
90
80
70
60

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011
Year

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Figure 32: Annual investment in coal-fired power capacity from 2006 to 2016
An index score of 100 corresponds to 2006 levels. Source: International Energy Agency.

increased in both absolute and proportional terms to
14% of total investment. Fossil fuel infrastructure
suffered a substantial reduction in investment, ceasing
to account for the majority of investment (at 49%). Such
trends broadly represent a continuation of the trends
seen between 2014 and 2015.161
Investment in renewables and nuclear energy is driven
by renewable electricity capacity (with more than 87% of
investment by value in this category in 2016). This, in
turn, is largely driven by investments in solar photovoltaic
power and onshore wind. Solar photovoltaic capacity
additions in 2016 were 50% higher than in 2015 (reaching
a record high of 73 gigawatts). This development was
driven by new capacity in China, the USA, and India, but
it was coupled with just a 20% increase in investment
that resulted from a 20% reduction in the cost of solar
photovoltaic units. By contrast, investments in onshore
wind decreased by around 20% between 2015 and 2016,
largely because of changes to incentive schemes and
increased wind power curtailment rates in China. The
increase in energy efficiency investment was driven by
policies that shifted markets towards more energyefficient goods (eg, appliances and lighting) and
buildings (along with the expansion of the construction
industry) and an increase in the sales of energy-efficient
(and low-carbon) vehicles. Europe accounted for the
largest proportion of spending on energy efficiency
(30%), followed by China (27%). This change in spending
was driven by efficiency investments in the buildings and
transport sectors.160
The substantially reduced investment in fossil fuel
infrastructure, both upstream (eg, mining, drilling, and
pipelines, which dominate fossil fuel investment) and
downstream (eg, fossil fuel power plants), is driven by a
combination of low (and decreasing) fossil fuel prices
and cost reductions (particularly upstream, which have
on average decreased by 30% since 2014).160
34 

This indicator reports that, although investment in coal
capacity has increased since 2006, in 2016 this trend
turned and investment has decreased substantially.
Coal combustion is the most CO2-intensive method of
generating of electricity.163 This indicator tracks annual
investment in coal-fired power capacity.
Global investment in coal-fired electricity capacity
generally increased from 2006 to 2012, before returning
to 2006 levels in 2013–14 and rebounding to more than
40% above this level in 2015 (figure 32). This rapid
growth was driven principally by China, which increased
investment in coal-fired power capacity by 60% from
2014, representing half of all new global coal capacity in
2015 (with investment in India and other Asian nonOECD countries also remaining high).161 The subsequent
reduction in investment in 2016 was similarly driven by
reduced investment in China because of overcapacity in
generation, concerns about local air pollution, and new
government measures to reduce new capacity additions
and halt the construction of some plants already in
progress.160

Indicator 4.3: Funds divested from fossil fuels
This indicator reports that the Global Value of Funds
Committing to Divestment in 2016 was $1·24 trillion, of
which Health Institutions was $2·4 billion; this
represents a cumulative sum of $5·45 trillion (with
health accounting for $30·3 billion).
The fossil fuel divestment movement seeks to
encourage institutions and investors to divest themselves
of assets involved in the extraction of fossil fuels. Some
organisations have made a binding commitment to
divest from coal companies, whereas others have fully
divested from any investments in fossil fuel companies
and have committed to avoiding such investments in the
future. Proponents cite divestment as embodying both a
moral purpose (eg, reducing the fossil fuel industry’s socalled social licence to operate) and an economic riskreduction strategy (eg, reducing the investor’s exposure
to the risk of stranded assets). However, others believe
active engagement between investors and fossil fuel
businesses is a more appropriate course of action (eg,
encouraging diversification into less carbon-intensive
assets through stakeholder resolutions).164
This indicator tracks the global total value of funds
committing to divestment in 2016 ($1·24 trillion) and
the value of funds committed to divestment by health
institutions in 2016 ($2·4 billion). The values presented
above are calculated from data collected and provided

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 Review

140

Insured losses
Uninsured losses

Economic losses (US$/$1000 GDP, US$ 2016)

120

100

80

60

40

2010

2011

2013

2014

2015

High income

Upper-middle

Lower-middle

Low income

High income

Upper-middle

Low income

Lower-middle

High income

Upper-middle

Lower-middle

Low income

High income

Upper-middle

Low income

2012

Lower-middle

High income

Upper-middle

Lower-middle

Low income

High income

Upper-middle

Lower-middle

Low income

High income

Upper-middle

Low income

0

Lower-middle

20

2016

Figure 33: Economic losses from climate-related events—absolute
Insured and uninsured economic losses resulting from all large meteorological, climatological, and hydrological events across the world, by country income group.
GDP=gross domestic product.

by 350.org. They represent the total assets (or assets
under management) for institutions that have
committed to divest in 2016 and thus do not directly
represent the sums divested from fossil fuel companies.
They also only include those institutions for which
such information is publicly available (or provided by
the institution itself ), with non-US$ values converted
using the market exchange rate when the commitment
was made.
By the end of 2016, 694 organisations with cumulative
assets worth at least $5·45 trillion, including 13 health
organisations with assets of at least $30·3 billion, had
committed to divestment. From the start of January, 2017,
to the end of March, 2017, a further 12 organisations
with assets worth $46·87 billion joined this total
(including Australia’s Hospitals Contribution Fund, with
assets of $1·45 billion).

Indicator 4.4: Economic losses due to extreme
climate-related events
This indicator reportst that in 2016, a total of 797 events
resulted in $129 billion in overall economic losses, with
99% of losses in low-income countries uninsured.
Climate change will continue to increase the
frequency and severity of meteorological (tropical
storms), climatological (droughts), and hydrological
(flooding) phenomena across the world. As
demonstrated by indicator 1·4, the number of weatherrelated disasters has increased in recent years. The
number of people affected and the economic costs

associated with this increase are expected to have risen.
This indicator tracks the number of events and the total
economic losses (insured and uninsured) resulting
from such events. In addition to the health impacts of
these events, economic losses (particularly uninsured
losses) have potentially devastating impacts on
wellbeing and mental health.165
The data upon which this indicator is based were
sourced from Munich Re’s NatCatSERVICE. Economic
losses (insured and uninsured) refer to the value of
physical assets and do not include the economic value
of loss of life or ill health, or of health and casualty
insurance. Values are first denominated in local
currency, converted to US$ using the market exchange
rate in the month the event occurred, and inflated to
US$2016 using country-specific Consumer Price
Indices. This indicator and underlying data do not seek
to attribute events and economic losses to climate
change per se but might plausibly be interpreted as
showing how climate change is changing the frequency
and severity of these events.
An annual average of 700 events resulted in an annual
average of $127 billion in overall economic losses per
year between 2010 and 2016 (figure 33). Around
two-thirds of the recorded events and around 90% of
economic losses were in upper-middle and high-income
countries, with less than 1% attributable to low-income
countries. The same ratios for the number of events and
economic losses between income groups are present in
the data for 1990–2016, despite an increasing trend in the

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For 350.org see https://350.org/

For the NatCatSERVICE see
https://www.munichre.com/en/
reinsurance/business/non-life/
natcatservice/index.html

35

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6

Insured losses
Uninsured losses

Economic losses (US$/$1000 GDP, US$ 2016)

5

4

3

2

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

High income

Upper-middle

Low income

Lower-middle

High income

Upper-middle

Lower-middle

Low income

High income

Upper-middle

Low income

Lower-middle

High income

Upper-middle

Lower-middle

Low income

High income

Upper-middle

Low income

Lower-middle

High income

Upper-middle

Lower-middle

Low income

High income

Upper-middle

Lower-middle

0

Low income

1

2016

Figure 34: Economic losses from climate-related events—intensity
GDP=gross domestic product.

total global number of events and associated total value
of economic losses during this period.
However, the data do not indicate the relative scale
of impacts across different income groups. For
example, although most economic losses have occurred
in upper-middle and high-income countries, these
countries are among the most populous, with more
economically valuable property and infrastructure (in
absolute terms). A rather different picture emerges
when data are analysed in terms of intensity (insured
and uninsured economic losses per $1000 gross
domestic product [GDP]; figure 34).
Between 2010 and 2016, high-income and uppermiddle-income countries had the lowest average annual
economic loss as a proportion of GDP ($1·45/$1000 GDP
and $1·95/$1000 GDP, respectively), with low-income
and lower-middle-income countries subject to somewhat
higher values ($2·65/$1000 GDP and $2·3/$1000 GDP,
respectively). Economic losses in low-income countries
were more than three times higher in 2016 than in 2010.
However, for the period 1990–2016, average annual values
vary substantially (full dataset included in the appendix p
77). Although high-income and upper-middle income
countries
maintain
relatively
similar
values
($1·60/$1000 GDP and $2·9/$1000 GDP, respectively),
average annual economic losses in low-income and lowermiddle income countries increase substantially (to
$10·95/$1000 GDP and $4·22/$1000 GDP, respectively).
On average, economic loss as a proportion of GDP is
greater in low-income countries than in high-income
countries. However, a more striking result is the
36 

difference in the proportion of economic losses that are
uninsured. In high-income countries, on average around
half of economic losses experienced are insured. This
share drops rapidly to less than 10% in upper-middle
income countries, and to much less than 1% in
low-income countries. From 1990 to 2016, uninsured
losses in low-income countries were on average
equivalent to more than 1·5% of their GDP. By contrast,
according to Global Health Observatory data, expenditure
on health care in low-income countries on average for
the period 1995–2015 was equivalent to 5·3% of GDP.

Indicator 4.5: Employment in low-carbon and
high-carbon industries
This indicator reports that in 2016, global employment in
renewable energy reached 9·8 million people, with
employment in fossil fuel extraction trending downwards
to 8·6 million people.
The generation and presence of employment oppor­
tunities in low-carbon and high-carbon industries have
important health implications, both in terms of the safety
of the work environment itself and financial security
for individuals and communities. As the low-carbon
transition gathers pace, high-carbon industries and jobs
will decline. A clear example is seen in fossil fuel
extraction. Some fossil fuel extraction activities, such as
coal mining, have substantial impacts on human health.
In 2008, coal mining accidents led to more than
1000 deaths in China alone (a rapid decrease from nearly
5000 deaths in 2003), with exposure to particulate matter
and harmful pollutants responsible for elevated incidence

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Indicator 4.6: Fossil fuel subsidies
This indicator reports that in 2015, fossil fuel consumption
subsidies followed a trend seen since 2012, decreasing
markedly to $327 billion principally as a result of
decreasing global oil prices.
The combustion of fossil fuels results in a variety of
harmful consequences for human health. Subsidies for
fossil fuels, either for its production (such as fossil fuel
extraction) or consumption (such as regulated gasoline
prices), artificially lowers prices and promotes over­
consumption. This indicator tracks the global value of
fossil fuel consumption subsidies (figure 36).161,173
Fossil fuel consumption subsidies, despite increasing
from $444 billion in 2010 to a peak of $571 billion in 2012,
have decreased markedly to $327 billion in 2015 (in
US$2016). The principal driver for this is the doubling in
oil price between 2010 and 2012, after which it plateaued,
before falling rapidly to below 2010 levels from mid-2014.
Fossil fuel consumption subsidies are typically applied to
moderate energy costs for low-income consumers
(although in practice, 65% of such subsidies in LMICs
benefit the wealthiest 40% of the population).174 As such,
increasing oil (and other fossil fuel) prices tend to
increase subsidy levels as the differences between
market and regulated consumer prices increase, and

12

Large hydropower
Solar heating or cooling
Wind energy

Bioenergy
Solar photovoltaic
Other technologies

Fossil fuel extraction

10

Jobs (millions)

8

6

4

2

0

2012

2014
Year

2013

2016

2015

Figure 35: Employment in renewable energy and fossil fuel extraction sectors

600

Fossil fuel consumption subsidies (US$ 2016)

of cardiovascular, respiratory, and kidney disease in coal
mining areas.166–169 The low-carbon transition is also likely
to stimulate the growth of new industries and
employment opportunities. With appropriate planning
and policy, the transition from employment in highcarbon to low-carbon industries will yield positive
consequences for human health.
This indicator tracks global employment levels in fossil
fuel extraction industries (coal mining and oil and gas
exploration and production) and in renewable energy
(figure 35). The data for this indicator are sourced from
International Renewable Energy Agency (renewables)
and IBIS World (fossil fuel extraction).170–172
The number of jobs in the global fossil fuel extraction
industry decreased from a peak of 9·1 million jobs in
2014 to 8·6 million in 2016. This change was largely
driven by reductions in the coal mining industry, which
were the result of a range of factors, including its
substitution by cheaper natural gas in the power sector in
many countries, reducing the demand for coal and
leading to overcapacity, industry consolidation, and the
rising automation of extractive activities.172
By contrast, employment in the renewable energy
industry increased rapidly from more than 7·1 million
jobs in 2012 to more than 9·3 million in 2014, reaching
9·8 million in 2016. This growth has largely been driven
by the solar photovoltaic industry, which opened more
than 1·7 million jobs between 2012 and 2016. Solar
photovoltaic energy is now the largest renewable energy
employer, overtaking the bioenergy sector, which has
seen a reduction of 250 000 jobs since 2012.

Oil
Natural gas
Coal

Electricity
Total

500

400

300

200

100

0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Year

Figure 36: Global fossil fuel consumption subsidies, 2010–15

governments take further action to mitigate the impact
on citizens. When fossil fuel prices are reduced, the gap
between market and regulated prices decreases, and
governments can reform fossil fuel subsidies while
keeping overall prices relatively constant.
Between 2014 and 2015, several countries took
advantage of this opportunity, particularly regarding
oil-based fuels, which accounted for more than 60% of
the reduction in total fossil fuel subsidies between 2012
and 2015 (followed by natural gas at around 25%). These
countries included India, which in deregulating diesel
prices accounted for a $19 billion subsidy reduction
between 2014 and 2015 (about 13% of the global total
reduction), and the largest oil-producing and natural
gas-producing countries (including Angola, Algeria,

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37

 Review

For the Carbon Pricing
Dashboard see http://
carbonpricingdashboard.
worldbank.org

Indonesia, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela), in
which reduced hydrocarbon revenue created pressure for
fiscal consolidation and, in turn, consumption subsidy
reform.161 To encourage the low-carbon transition, fossil
fuel subsidies should be phased out as soon as possible.
The commitment made by the G7 in 2016 to achieve this
goal by 2025 should be extended to all OECD counties
and to all countries worldwide by 2030.175

Indicator 4.7: Coverage and strength of carbon pricing
This indicator reports that so far in 2017, various
carbon pricing mechanisms covered 13·1% of global
anthropogenic CO2 emissions, up from 12·1% in 2016.
This reflects a doubling in the number of national
and subnational jurisdictions with a carbon pricing
mechanism over the past decade.

2016

2017

Global emissions coverage*

12·1%

13·1%

Weighted average carbon price of instruments
(current prices, US$)

$7·79

$8·81

Global weighted average prices (current prices, US$)

$0·94

$1·12

Global coverage and weighted average prices per tonne of emitted CO2. *Global
emissions coverage is based on 2012 total anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions. Source: World Bank Carbon Pricing Dashboard, 2017.

Table 2: Carbon pricing

British
Alberta Manitoba
Columbia

Washington
Oregon
California

This indicator tracks the extent to which carbon
pricing instruments (eg, The World Bank’s Carbon
Pricing Dashboard) are applied around the world as a
proportion of total greenhouse gas emissions, and the
weighted average carbon price such instruments
provide (table 2).
Between 2016 and 2017, the proportion of global
emissions covered by carbon pricing instruments and
the weighted average price of these instruments (and
thus the global weighted average price for all
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions) increased.
This increase followed the introduction of four new
instruments in 2017 (this data runs up to April 1, 2017):
the carbon taxes in Alberta, Chile, and Colombia, and
an Emissions Trading System (ETS) in Ontario. As
such, over 40 national and 25 subnational jurisdictions
now put a price on at least some of their greenhouse
gas emissions (with substantially varying prices, from
less than $1 per tonne emitted CO2 in Chongqing to
more than $126 per tonne emitted CO2 in Sweden).
The past decade has seen a rapid increase in the
number of carbon pricing instruments around the
world, with a doubling in the number of jurisdictions
introducing them.176 More than 75% of the greenhouse
gas emissions covered by carbon pricing instruments
are in high-income countries, with most of the
remainder covered by the eight pilot pricing
instruments in China (figure 37).
South Korea

Sweden
Norway
Denmark
Iceland EU
Quebec
UK and
Ireland
Ontario
France
Switzerland
RGGI*

Finland
Ukraine
Turkey

Kazakhstan

Japan
China

Mexico
Thailand

Brazil
Australia
Chile
ETS implemented or
scheduled for implementation
Carbon tax implemented or
scheduled for implementation
ETS or carbon tax under
consideration
Carbon tax implemented or
scheduled, ETS under consideration
ETS and carbon tax implemented
or scheduled

Rio de Janeiro
São Paulo

South Africa
Saitama
Kyoto

Beijing
Tianjin
Chongqing

Hubei

Shanghai

New Zealand

Tokyo

Guangdong
Shenzhen

Figure 37: Carbon pricing instruments implemented, scheduled for implementation, and under consideration
Prices for 2016 and 2017 are those as of Aug 1, 2016, and April 1, 2017, respectively. For 2017, the indicator includes only instruments that had been introduced by
April 1, 2017. Instruments without price data are excluded. ETS=Emissions Trading System. EU=European Union. Adapted from the Carbon Pricing Watch 2017,176 by
permission of the World Bank.

38 

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An additional 21 carbon pricing instruments are
either scheduled for implementation or are under
consideration. This includes the commencement of a
national ETS in China in the second half of 2017.
Although a national ETS would replace the eight pilot
schemes already in place in China, it could expand their
emissions coverage four-fold, surpassing the European
ETS to become the largest carbon pricing instrument in
the world.176

Indicator 4.8: Use of carbon pricing revenues
This indicator reports that 40% of government revenues
generated from carbon pricing are spent on climate change
mitigation, totalling $9 billion.
Carbon pricing instruments require those responsible
for producing the emissions to pay for their emissions.
In most cases, this generates revenue for the
governments or authorities responsible for introducing
the instrument. Such revenue may be put to a range of
uses. For example, revenue could be invested in climate
change mitigation or adaptation or put towards
environmental tax reform (ETR), which involves shifting
the burden of tax from negative activities (eg, the
generation of pollution) to positive activities (eg, labour
or environmentally beneficial products or activities).
Such options could produce a double dividend of
environmental improvement with social and economic
benefits.177 This indicator tracks the total government
revenue from carbon pricing instruments and how such
income is allocated.
The total government revenue generated by carbon
pricing instruments in 2016, and four categories of
expenditure for this revenue are presented in table 3. The
largest expenditure category is climate change mitigation,
which is in receipt of more than $9 billion in funds
annually. Nevertheless, less than half of revenuegenerating instruments allocate revenue for mitigation.
ETR policies accounted for around 20% of revenue
allocation in 2016. Just two instruments (the Portuguese
and British Colombia Carbon Taxes) allocate all their
revenue to allowing revenue-neutral reduction in other
taxes (eg, income taxes), with another four allocating
part of their revenue to this purpose. By contrast, only
four instruments do not have any revenue allocated to
general government funds (the British Colombian,
Swiss, Japanese, and Portuguese carbon taxes), and
11 instruments allocate all revenues to this category
(reaching €8 billion, or more than a third of revenues
generated in 2016). Data for individual carbon pricing
instruments are provided in the appendix (p 88).
Data on revenue generated are provided on the World
Bank’s Carbon Pricing Dashboard, with revenue
allocation information obtained from various sources
(appendix p 89). We considered only instruments with
revenue estimates and with revenue received by the
administering authority before redistribution. Revenue
must be explicitly allocated to climate change mitigation

Mitigation
Proportion of total
funds (%)

40·4%

Value (US$2016)

$9·01 billion

Adaptation
4%
$0·9 billion

Environmental
tax reform

General funds

19·5%

36·1%

$4·34 billion

$8·06 billion

Total revenue
(US$2016)
··
$22·31 billion

Source: World Bank Carbon Pricing Dashboard, 2017.

Table 3: Carbon pricing revenues and allocation in 2016

or adaptation, or for ETR, to be considered in these
categories. If such explicit earmarking is not present, or
no data are available, then we assumed revenue to be
allocated to general funds.

Indicator 4.9: Spending on adaptation for health and
health-related activities
This indicator reports that only 4·63% of the world’s total
adaptation spending ($16·46 billion) is on health and
13·3% ($47·29 billion) is on health-related adaptation.
This indicator reports estimates of spending on
health and health-related climate change adaptation and
resilience. Many adaptation activities within and beyond
the formal health sector have health co-benefits that are
important to understand and capture. Here, estimates
of the total health and health-related adaptation
spending were derived from the Adaptation & Resilience
to Climate Change dataset produced by kMatrix. This
global dataset, covering financial transactions relevant
to climate change adaptation, was compiled from a
relevant subset of more than 27 
000 independent
databases and sources (such as public disclosures and
reports from insurance companies, the financial sector,
and governments).178 In this case, entries were
triangulated between at least seven independent sources
before being included.
Examples of transactions captured here include the
procurement of goods or services (eg, purchasing
sandbags for flood levees) and spending on research
and development (eg, for vulnerability and adaptation
assessments) or staff training.178 Each of these adaptation
activities are grouped into 11 sectors: agriculture and
forestry, built environment, disaster-preparedness,
energy, health, information and communications
technology, natural environment, professional services,
transport, waste, and water. Although adaptation
spending relevant directly to the formal health sector is
clearly important (the health category), interventions
outside of the health-care system will also yield
important benefits for health and wellbeing. Healthrelated adaptation spending included additional
adaptation spending from the agricultural sector
(because food and nutrition are central to health) and
the disaster preparedness sector (because these efforts
often have direct public health benefits).
Here we report data from the Adaptation & Resilience
to Climate Change dataset, showing health and

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39

 Review

spending. First, spending for agriculture and disaster
preparedness was included here, but other forms of
adaptation spending clearly have important health
implications. Second, only economic data relating to the
financial year 2015–16 were available, precluding timetrend analysis. Third, since public sector transactions
might not leave a sufficient footprint to be picked up by
this methodology, adaptation spending data here might
exclude some public-sector spending.

A
27 500

Health and health-related A&RCC (US$ millions)

25 000

Health A&RCC
Health-related A&RCC

22 500
20 000
17 500
15 000

Indicator 4.10: Health adaptation funding from global
climate financing mechanisms

12 500
10 000
7500
5000
2500
0

B

Health and health-related A&RCC as percentage of GDP

0·10
0·09
0·08
0·07
0·06
0·05
0·04
0·03
0·02
0·01
0

Low-income
country total

Lower-middle-income
country total

Upper-middle-income
country total

High-income
country total

Figure 38: Spending on Adaptation & Resilience to Climate Change (A&RCC)
(A) Health and health-related total spending on A&RCC. (B) Health and health-related spending on A&RCC as a
proportion of GDP for the financial year 2015–16. All plots are disaggregated by World Bank Income Grouping.
GDP=gross domestic product.
For the Climate Funds Update
see http://www.climatefunds
update.org/

40 

health-related adaptation spending for 180 countries for
the 2015–16 financial year. Global health adaptation
spending for the financial year 2015–16 totalled
$16·46 billion, representing 4·63% of the global
aggregate adaptation spend. Health-related adaptation
spending totalled $47·29 billion, or 13·3% of the global
total adaptation spend (figure 38).
Health-related adaptation and resilience spending, both
national totals and per capita levels, is extremely low in
low-income countries and increases across the continuum
towards high-income countries. Health and health-related
adaptation spending as a proportion of total adaptation
spending is relatively constant across income groups.
Further work is required to more completely determine
what should be considered as health-related adaptation

This indicator reports that between 2003 and 2017,
0·96% of total adaptation funding for development,
flowing through global climate change financing
mechanisms, was dedicated to health adaptation.
The final indicator in this section was designed in
parallel with Indicator 4.9 and aims to capture development
funds available for climate change adaptation. It reports
global financial flows for health adaptation to climate
change, moving through established global climate
financing mechanisms. Data were drawn from the
Climate Funds Update, an independent source that has
been aggregating funding data from multilateral and
bilateral develop­ment agencies since 2003. Data from the
Climate Funds Update is presented in four categories
(pledged, deposited, approved, and disbursed); this
indicator uses data designated as approved.
Between 2003 and 2017, only 0·96% of approved
adaptation funding was allocated to health adaptation,
corresponding to a cumulative total of $39·55 million
(figure 39). Total global adaptation funding peaked in 2013
at $910·36 million and decreased thereafter. However,
health-related adaptation funding peaked in early 2017,
resulting in the near doubling in the proportion of
adaptation funding allocated to health. A brief overview of
growing interest in health and climate change from the
international donor community is provided in panel 8.

Conclusion
The indicators presented in this section seek to highlight
the status of the economics and finance associated with
climate change and health across four themes:
investment in a low-carbon economy, economic benefits
of tackling climate change, pricing of greenhouse gas
emissions from fossil fuels, and adaptation financing.
Many of the trends show positive change with time,
most notably in global investment in zero-carbon
energy supply, energy efficiency, new coal-fired electricity
capacity, employment in the renewable energy sector,
and divestment in fossil fuels. However, the change is
relatively slow and must accelerate rapidly to meet the
objectives of the Paris Agreement.

Section 5: Public and political engagement
Policy change relies on public support and government
action. This is particularly true of policies with the reach

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1000
900

Total approved adaptation funding
Total approved adaptation funding 2017 to date
Total approved health adaptation funding
Total approved health adaptation funding 2017 to date

Adaptation funding approved (US$ millions)

800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010
Year

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Figure 39: Year-on-year multilateral and bilateral funding for all adaptation projects and health adaptation projects, from January, 2003, to May, 2017

and impact to enable societies to transition to a lowcarbon future.179 The overarching theme of this section
is therefore the importance of public and political
engagement in addressing health and climate change
and the consequent need for indicators that track
engagement in the public and political domains.
The aim is to track engagement with health and climate
change in the public and political domains and to identify
trends since 2007. In selecting indicators, priority has been
given to high-level indicators, which can be measured
globally, tracked over time, and provide a platform for
more detailed analysis in future Lancet Countdown
reports. The indicators relate to coverage of health and
climate change in the media, science, and government.
Search terms for the indicators are aligned, and a common
time-period was selected for all indicators (2007–16). The
period runs from before the resolution on health and
climate change by the 2008 World Health Assembly,
which marked a watershed moment in global engagement
in health and climate change; for the first time, member
states of the UN made a multilateral commitment to
protect human health from climate change.180
We present three indicators. Headline findings for each
indicator are provided at the beginning of each indicator;
additional detailed disussion of the data and methods is
provided in the appendix (p 97).

Indicator 5.1: Media coverage of health and climate
change
This indicator reports that global newspaper coverage of
health and climate change has increased by 78% since
2007, with marked peaks in 2009 and 2015 coinciding

Panel 8: International donor action on climate change
and health
In 2017, the World Bank released three independent reports
on climate change and health, articulating (1) a new action
plan for climate change and health, (2) geographical focus
areas, and (3) new strategy for climate-smart health care.
In addition to training staff and increasing government
capacity, the World Bank outlines an approach to ensuring
that at least 20% of new World Bank health investments are
climate-smart by 2020, corresponding to as much as
US$1 billion in new climate-smart health finance for
countries. Other development institutions and foundations
are also getting involved. Two separate, large gatherings of
public and private funders occurred in Helsinki in May, 2016,
and in Chicago, IL, USA, in May, 2017, toward establishing
new channels for health and climate finance, and a third is
planned for October, 2017 (Washington, DC).

with the 15th and 21st Conference of the Parties,
respectively.
Media has a crucial role in communicating risks
associated with climate change.181 Knowledge about
climate change is related to perceptions of risk and
intentions to act.182,183 Public perceptions of a nation’s
values and identity are also an important influence
on public support for national action.184 Indicator 5.1
therefore tracks media coverage of health and climate
change, with a global indicator on newspaper coverage on
health and climate change (Indicator 5.1.1) complemented
by an in-depth analysis of newspaper coverage on health

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41

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1 500

Southeast Asia
Eastern Mediterranean
All newspapers combined

Europe

Americas

Western Pacific

Articles per source

1200

900

600

300

0
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012
Year

2013

2014

2015

2016

Figure 40: Newspaper reporting on health and climate change (for 18 newspapers), by WHO region

and climate change for two national newspapers
(Indicator 5.1.2).

Indicator 5.1.1: Global newspaper reporting on health and
climate change
Focusing on English-language and Spanish-language
newspapers, this indicator tracks global coverage of
health and climate change in high-circulation national
newspapers from 2007 to 2016. Using 18 high-circulation
so-called tracker newspapers, global trends are shown
and disaggregated regionally to provide a global indicator
of public exposure to news coverage of health and
climate change.
Since 2007, newspaper coverage of health and climate
change has increased by 78% worldwide (figure 40).
However, this trend is largely driven by southeast Asian
newspapers. Although mostly due to the higher number
of southeast Asian newspapers included in this
analysis, their average coverage of health and climate
change was higher than in other regions, particularly
among Indian sources (appendix p 98). This generally
high volume of coverage in the Indian press can be
attributed to the centrality of newspapers as
communication channels for elite-level discourse in
India and to relatively high levels of climate change
coverage throughout Asia.185–187 For the eastern
Mediterranean, Americas, and western Pacific, media
reporting does not have a strong trend. Apart from
some notable peaks in 2009 in Europe, this trend is
largely maintained for the rest of the time series. In the
Americas, a secondary peak is seen between 2012 and
2014. The first large peak in worldwide coverage was in
2009, coinciding with the Conference of the Parties in
Copenhagen, for which expectations were high.
Newspaper reporting then dropped around 2010 but
has been rising worldwide since 2011.
42 

Data were assembled by accessing archives through
the Lexis Nexis, Proquest, and Factiva databases. These
sources were selected through the weighting of four
main factors: geographical diversity (favouring a greater
geographical range), circulation (favouring higher
circulating pub­lications), national sources (rather than
local or regional sources), and reliable access to archives
over time (favouring those accessible consistently for
longer periods). Search terms were aligned to those used
for the indicators of scientific and political engagement
and searches, with Boolean searches in English and
Spanish.


Indicator 5.1.2: In-depth analysis of newspaper coverage on
health and climate change
The second part of this indicator provides an analysis of
two national newspapers: the French Le Monde (France)
and the German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Le Monde
and FAZ were chosen for this analysis because they are
leading newspapers in France and Germany, two countries
with political weight in Europe. Both newspapers continue
to set the tone of public debates in France and Germany.188,189
Only a small proportion of articles about climate
change mentioned the links between health and climate
change (5% in Le Monde and 2% in Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung). The analysis also pointed to important national
differences in reporting on health and climate change.
For example, in Le Monde, 70% of articles referring to
health and climate change represented the healthclimate change nexus as an environmental issue,
whereas in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, articles had a
broader range of references: the economy (23%), local
news (20%), and politics (17%). The recommended
policy responses also differed; Le Monde emphasised
mostly adaptation (41% of articles), whereas Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung emphasised mostly mitigation

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This indicator reports that since 2007, the number of
scientific papers on health and climate change has
more than tripled.
Science is pivotal to increasing public and political
understanding of the links between climate change and
health, to informing mitigation strategies, and to
accelerating the transition to low-carbon societies.190,191
This indicator, showing scientific engagement with health
and climate change, tracks the volume of peer-reviewed
reports in English-language scientific journals in PubMed
and Web of Science (appendix p 104). The results show a
marked increase in published research on health and
climate change in the past decade, from 94 reports in
2007, to more than 275 reports in both 2015 and 2016.
Within this overall upward trend, the volume of scientific
reports increased particularly rapidly in 2007–09 and from
2012, plateauing between these periods (figure 41).
The two periods of growth in scientific outputs coincided
with the run-up to the UNFCCC Conference of Parties in
Copenhagen in 2009 and in Paris in 2015. This pattern
suggests that scientific and political engagement in health
and climate change are closely linked, with the scientific
community responding quickly to the global climate
change agenda and the need for evidence.
Most reports focus on the impacts of climate change
and health in Europe and North America. Overall, we
identified more than 2000 scientific articles, 30% of
which focused on Europe and 29% of which focused on
the Americas. Within the Americas, most reports (72%)
were about health and climate change in North America
(appendix p 106). By contrast, only 10% of articles had a
focus on Africa or the eastern Mediterranean region,
demonstrating a marked global inequality in the science
of health and climate change (appendix p 106).
Among the journals included in the analysis, infectious
diseases, particularly dengue fever and other mosquitotransmitted infections, are the most frequently
investigated health outcomes; about 30% of selected
reports covered these health-related issues. We identified
important gaps in the scientific evidence base such as
migration and mental health.
For this indicator, we did a scoping review of peerreviewed reports about health and climate change that
were written in English and published between 2007
and 2016, an appropriate approach for broad and interdisciplinary research fields.192 We searched PubMed and
Web of Science with keywords to identify reports

300
250
Number of articles

Indicator 5.2: Health and climate change in scientific
literature

350

200
150
100
50
0
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Year

Figure 41: Number of scientific publications on climate change and health per year (2007–16) from PubMed
and Web of Science

120
Total number of references per
United Nations General Debate session

(40% of articles). The co-benefits that public health
policies can represent for mitigation were mentioned in
17% of Le Monde articles and in 9% of Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung articles. Overall, the analysis points to
the marked differences in media reporting of health and
climate change and in the information and perspectives
to which the public is exposed (appendix p 99).

100

80

60

40
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Year

Figure 42: Political engagement with the intersection of health and climate change, represented by joint
references to health and climate change in the United Nations General Debate

through a bibliometric analysis (appendix p 104).193
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied to capture
the most relevant literature about the impacts of climate
change on human health within the chosen timeframe,
and reports were independently reviewed and screened
three times to identify relevant articles.194

Indicator 5.3: Health and climate change in the United
Nations General Assembly
This indicator reports that there is no overall trend in
United Nations General Debate (UNGD) references to
health and climate change, but the number of references
peaked twice, in 2009 and in 2014.
The UNGD takes place every September at the start of
each new session of the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA). Governments use their annual
statements to present their perspective on events and
issues they consider the most important in global politics

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43

 Total number of references per United Nations General Debate session

Review

60

Africa
Eastern Mediterranean

Europe
Latin America and the Caribbean

North America
Southeast Asia

Western Pacific

40

20

0
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Year

Figure 43: Regional political engagement with the intersection of health and climate change, represented by joint references to health and climate change in
the United Nations General Debate, by WHO region

and to call for strengthened action from the international
community. All UN member states can address the
UNGA, free from external constraints. General Debate
statements are therefore an ideal data source on political
engagement with health and climate change, which is
comparable spatially and temporally. This indicator
focuses on the extent to which governments refer to
linkages between health and climate change issues in
their annual statements in the General Debate, with each
reference representing one hit.
Health and climate change are often raised in General
Debate statements (appendix p 110). However, statements
less frequently link health and climate change together.
Between 2007 and 2016, between 44 and 124 linked
references were made to health and climate change in the
annual General Debate (figure 42). By comparison,
between 378 and 989 references were made to climate
change alone. We found no overall trend in conjoint
references to health and climate change across the period.
Although no overall trend is apparent, the number of
references that link health and climate change peaked
twice, once in 2009–11 and again in 2014. In both 2009
and 2014, 124 references were made to the link between
health and climate change in the General Debate
statements. The 2009 peak was after the 2008 World
Health Day, which focused on health and climate
change, and in the build-up to the 2009 Conference of
Parties in Copenhagen. The 2014 peak is indicative of the
influence of the large UNGA on climate change in 2014
and the lead up to the 2015 Conference of Parties in
Paris. The 2015 UNGA, which focused on the Sustainable
Development Goals, made relatively limited reference to
climate change, and, after the 2014 peak, conjoint
references to health and climate change decreased. This
irregular pattern points to the importance of key events
44 

in the global governance of health and climate change in
driving high-level political engagement.
We found many country-level differences in the
attention given to health and climate change in General
Debate statements (figure 43). Countries in the western
Pacific, particularly by the Small Island Developing States
in these regions, made most references to the issue. By
contrast, governments in the east Mediterranean, the
Americas, and southeast Asia made fewest references to
health and climate change.
This indicator is based on the application of keyword
searches in the text corpus of debates. A new dataset of
General Debate statements was used (UNGD corpus), in
which the annual statements have been preprocessed
and prepared for use in quantitative text analysis
(appendix p 108).195

Conclusion
The indicators in this section have demonstrated the
importance of global governance in mobilising public
and political engagement in health and climate change.
The UN and the annual Conference of Parties have an
important role in clearly influencing media and
promoting scientific and political engagement with
health and climate change.
To further improve understanding of public and
political engagement, indicators relating to national
governments’ health and climate change legislation,
private sector engagement, the inclusion of climate
change in professional health education, and the
prominence given to health in UNFCCC negotiations are
proposed for future analysis. The previous sections in
this report have presented findings on the impacts of
climate hazards, adaptation and resilience, co-benefits of
mitigation, and finance and economics. All of these

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9

 Review

factors hinge on policy, which in turn depends on public
and political engagement.

Conclusion—the Lancet Countdown in 2017
In June, 2015, the Lancet Commission on Health and
Climate Change2 laid the groundwork for a global
monitoring platform designed to systematically track
progress on health and climate change and to hold
governments to account for their commitments under
the then-to-be-finalised Paris Agreement.1 The
Lancet Countdown will continue this work, reporting
annually on the indicators presented in this Review and
on new indicators developed in the future.
The data and analysis presented in this Review cover a
wide range of topics and themes from the lethality of
weather-related disasters to the phase-out of coal-fired
power. The report begins with an indicator set to track
the health effects of climate change and climate-related
hazards. We found that the symptoms of climate change
have been clear for a number of years, with the health
impacts far worse than previously understood. These
effects have been spread unequally. For example, a
9·4% increase in vectorial capacity of the dengue fevercarrying A aegypti has predominantly spread in LMICs
since 1950, and India has been disproportionately
affected by the additional 125 million exposure events to
potentially fatal heatwaves since 2000.
These indicators also suggest that populations are
beginning to adapt, with improvements in the world’s
overall health profile strengthening its resilient capacity
and national governments beginning to invest in
health-adaptation planning for climate change. About
$47·29 billion is spent annually on health-related
adaptation (about 13·3% of global total adaptation spend).
However, the scientific literature and past experience make
it clear that there are very real and immediate technological,
financial, and political barriers to adaptation.13
The indicators in Section 3 track health-relevant
mitigation trends across four sectors, with an ultimate
focus of keeping global temperature rise well below 2°C
and meeting the Paris Agreement. At an aggregate level,
the past two decades have seen limited progress here,
with many of the trends and indicators remaining flat or
moving strongly in the opposite direction. More recently,
trends in the electricity generation (deployment of
renewable energy and a dramatic slow-down in coal-fired
power) and transport sectors (soon-to-be cost parity of
electric vehicles with their petrol-based equivalents)
provide cause for optimism because, if sustained, these
trends could reflect the beginning of system-wide
transformation.
Indicators in Sections 4 and 5 underpin and drive
toward this transition. Again, trends in the past two
decades reveal concerning levels of inaction. Only in
recent years have investment and interventions
accelerated. Employment in the renewable energy sector
has reached record high levels, overtaking employment

in the fossil fuel extraction sector, and fossil fuel
consumption subsidies have decreased worldwide.
Carbon pricing mechanisms are slowly widening and
now cover about 13·1% of worldwide CO2 emissions. In
Section 5 we consider the degree to which the public,
political, and academic communities have engaged with
the link between climate change and health. Our
findings point to uneven patterns of engagement and
the pivotal role of global institutions, the UN particularly,
in driving forward public, political, and scientific support
for enhanced mitigation and adaptation policies.
Overall, the trends elucidated in this Report provide
cause for deep concern, highlighting the immediate
health threats from climate change and the relative
inaction seen in all parts of the world in the past two
decades. However, more recent trends in the past 5 years
reveal a rapid increase in action, which was solidified in
the Paris Agreement. These glimmers of progress are
encouraging and reflect a growing political consensus
and ambition, which was seen in full force in response to
the USA’s departure from the 2015 climate change treaty.
Although action needs to increase rapidly, taken together,
these signs of progress provide the clearest signal to date
that the world is transitioning to a low-carbon world, that
no single country or head of state can halt this progress,
and that until 2030, the direction of travel is set.
Contributors
The Lancet Countdown: Tracking Progress on Health and Climate
Change is an international academic collaboration that builds off the
work of the 2015 Lancet Commission on Health and Climate Change,
convened by The Lancet. The Lancet Countdown’s work for this report
was conducted by its five working groups, each of which were
responsible for the design, drafting, and review of their individual
indicators and sections. All authors contributed to the overall structure
and concepts of the report and provided input and expertise to the
relevant sections. Authors contributing to Working Group 1:
Jonathan Chambers; Peter M Cox; Mostafa Ghanei; Ilan Kelman;
Lu Liang; Ali Mohammad Latifi; Maziar Moradi-Lakeh; Kris Murray;
Fereidoon Owfi; Mahnaz Rabbaniha; Elizabeth Robinson;
Meisam Tabatabaei. Authors contributing to Working Group 2:
Sonja Ayeb-Karlsson; Peter Byass; Diarmid Campbell-Lendrum;
Michael Depledge; Paula Dominguez-Salas; Howard Frumkin;
Lucien Georgeson; Delia Grace; Anne Johnson; Dominic Kniveton;
Georgina Mace; Maquins Odhiambo Sewe; Mark Maslin;
Maria Nilsson; Tara Neville; Karyn Morrissey; Joacim Rocklöv;
Joy Shumake-Guillemot. Authors contributing to Working Group 3:
Markus Amann; Kristine Belesova; Wenjia Cai; Michael Davies;
Andy Haines; Ian Hamilton; Stella Hartinger; Gregor Kiesewetter;
Melissa Lott, Robert Lowe; James Milner; Tadj Oreszczyn;
David Pencheon, Steve Pye; Rebecca Steinbach; Paul Wilkinson.
Authors contributing to Working Group 4: Timothy Bouley;
Paul Drummond; Paul Ekins. Authors Contributing to Working Group
5: Maxwell Boykoff; Meaghan Daly; Niheer Dasandi; Anneliese Depoux;
Antoine Flahault; Hilary Graham; Rébecca Grojsman; Slava Mikhaylov;
Stefanie Schütte. The coordination, strategic direction, and editorial
support for this paper was provided by Anthony Costello (Co-Chair),
Hugh Montgomery (Co-Chair), Peng Gong (Co-Chair), Nick Watts
(Executive Director), and Nicola Wheeler (Programme Officer). The
findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the official position of WHO, the World Bank,
or the World Meteorological Organization.
Declaration of interests
The Lancet Countdown’s work is supported by an unrestricted grant from
the Wellcome Trust (200890/Z/16/Z). The Lancet Countdown covered

www.thelancet.com Published online October 30, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)32464-9 

45

 Review

travel costs for meetings related to the development of the paper.
Seven of the authors (NWa, NWh, ML, PD, MB, MDa, and JC) were
compensated for their time while working on the drafting and
development of the Lancet Countdown’s report. HM is a board member
of the UK Climate and Health Council, an Advisory Board member of the
Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, and is developing an air pollution
mask (no competing interest). NWa is Director of the UK Health Alliance
on Climate Change. AJ is a Governor of the Wellcome Trust and a
member of the Adaptation Sub-Committee of the Committee on Climate
Change. All other authors declare no competing interests.
Acknowledgments
We thank the Wellcome Trust, in particular Saskia Heijnen, Sarah Molton,
and Sophie Tunstall-Behrens, for its financial and strategic support,
without which, this research collaboration would not be possible. While
carrying out its work, the Lancet Countdown received invaluable technical
advice and input from a number of individuals, including Neil Adger
(University of Exeter), Kevin Andrews (University of Colorado Boulder),
Nigel Arnell (University of Reading), Rob Bailey (Chatham House),
John Balbus (National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences),
Simon Bennet (International Energy Agency), Helen Berry (Australiana
National University), Kathryn Brown (Climate Change Committee),
Yossi Cadan (350.org), Tony Capon (University of Sydney), Carbon
Disclosure Project, Michelle Chan (Universidad Peruana Cayetano
Heredia), Lucia Fernandez (WHO), Lauren Gifford (University of
Colorado Boulder), Francesca Harris (London School of Hygiene &
Tropical Medicine), Mathieu Hemono (Centre Virchow-Villermé),
Niamh Herlihy (Centre Virchow-Villermé), Richard King (Chatham
House), Tord Kjellstrom (Australian National University), Noemie Klein
(Ecofys), Long Lam (Ecofys), Rachel Lowe (London School of Hygiene &
Tropical Medicine), Lucy McAllister (University of Colorado Boulder),
Marisa McNatt (University of Colorado Boulder), Jonathan Patz
(University of Wisconsin-Madison), Sonia Roschnik (Sustainable Health
Solutions), Osman Sankoh (INDEPTH), Ami Nacu-Schmidt (University
of Colorado Boulder), Pauline Scheelbeek (London School of Hygiene &
Tropical Medicine), Jan Semenza (European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control), Imogen Tennison (National Health Service),
Hanna Tuomisto (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine),
Armando Valdes Valasquez (Universidad Peruana Cayetano Heredia) and
Shelagh Whitley (Overseas Development Institute). Administrative and
communications advice was provided by Richard Black (Energy and
Climate Intelligence Unit), Pete Chalkley (Energy and Climate
Intelligence Unit), Tan Copsey (Climate Nexus), Tom Fern, Sarah Hurtes
(European Climate Foundation), Paige Knappenberger (Climate Nexus),
and George Smeeton (Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit). In
particular, the Lancet Countdown thanks Jack Fisher (University College
London) for his incredibly hard work and expertise, without which this
collaboration could not function. LG thanks the Economic and Social
Research Council and the Natural Environment Research Council for
funding (ES/J500185/1).
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