UNCLASSIFIED UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF 7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE. FLORIDA 33621?5101 CCDC-COS [181 08 2015 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Classi?cation Determination Report of Investigation into the Civilian Casualty Near Al Hatra, Iraq, 13 March 2015 1. Pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and the May 5, 2011 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, SUBJECT: Delegation of Top Secret Original Classification Authority, I am a TOP SECRET original classi?cation authority for all documents that originate within or are classi?ed by Headquarters USCENTCOM and/or our subordinate units. 2. United States Air Force Central Command, submitted a report of investigation, with exhibits, of the civilian casualty (CIVCAS) investigation after execution of an air strike near Al Hatra, Iraq, on 13 March 2015. The report of investigation, as originally submitted, included a number of documents and photographs that bore various Information Security classi?cation markings. In order to ensure that all markings are appropriate and correctly annotated, I directed that a team Of subject matter experts from across this Headquarters review the full report of investigation for anticipated public release. 3. In my capacity as a TOP SECRET Original Classi?cation Authority, I have now thoroughly reviewed the team?s complete proposal and personally adopt their various classi?cation and annotation recommendations in their entirety as well as approve a publicly releasable version of the lnvesti gating Of?cer?s report that fully redacts all classi?ed material, in addition to other appropriate redactions of information, as authorized by the Freedom of lnforrnation Act. 4. A copy of this memorandum will be appended at or near the beginning of each version of the report that is kept on ?le within this Headquarters or that may be shared with others outside of this command. Points of contact for this matter are the Special Security Of?ce $80) and the Staff Judge Advocate?s Of?ce. RR Major General, US. Army UNCLASSIFIED USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 10/9/2015 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina SUBJECT: Executive Summary of Allegations of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Resulting from March 13, 2015 Airstrike in the vicinity of (IVO) Al Hatra, Iraq 1. On March 13, 2015, coalition aircraft conducted a dynamic airstrike on a manned ISIL checkpoint near Al Hatra, Iraq. The ISIL checkpoint was successfully destroyed as a result of the airstrike. Unfortunately, the airstrike is assessed as likely resulting in the deaths of four civilians. el ea se 2. In mid-March 2015, the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT), received a report made by an Iraqi citizen that a coalition airstrike destroyed her vehicle on 13 March 2015, and resulted in the deaths of five civilians whom she stated were passengers in her vehicle. The description in the report of an airstrike near Al Hatra, Iraq was consistent with the dynamic airstrike on the ISIL checkpoint referenced above. ed fo rR 3. In April 2015, CAOC personnel completed a civilian casualty Credibility Assessment, finding the information in the Iraqi citizen’s report correlated with the coalition airstrike on the manned ISIL checkpoint near Al Hatra, Iraq. After receiving the Credibility Assessment, the Commander, United States Air Forces Central Command, appointed a Commander-Directed Investigation (CDI) to inquire into the civilian casualty claim. Ap pr ov 4. The Investigating Officer (IO) interviewed U.S. and coalition personnel involved in the coordination and execution of the March 13 airstrike, and reviewed the initial civilian casualty Credibility Assessment, intelligence information reports, imagery of the strike area, and tactical guidance applicable to the airstrike, as well as the targeting process in place at the time of the airstrike. 5. The IO determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike likely resulted in the deaths of four civilians at the targeted location, based on a review of the available evidence. The approved target for the March 13, 2015 airstrike consisted of ISIL personnel and the checkpoint. However, before coalition air forces could complete the airstrike, two vehicles arrived at the checkpoint and parked within the target area. The drivers of the two vehicles exited and interacted with the checkpoint personnel for approximately 40 minutes, while several other vehicles passed through the checkpoint after a brief stop. The aircrew executing the airstrike relayed the arrival of the two vehicles and described the actions taken by the drivers to the CAOC strike cell. Based upon the actions on the ground by the personnel at the check point, the aircrew and CAOC personnel assessed that the drivers and vehicles, as well as the checkpoint, were ISIL and therefore lawful targets. The strike on the checkpoint and the additional vehicles USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 001 10/2/2015 was authorized. The aircrew completed the approved strike, resulting in the destruction of the ISIL checkpoint, two vehicles, and all associated personnel within the target area. 6. The identification of the two vehicles and the drivers interacting with the checkpoint personnel as valid military targets was consistent with previous coalition analysis of ISIL TTPs based upon the information available to command personnel and the aircrew at the time the aircrew released weapons on the target area. Post-strike imagery analysis of onboard weapons system video footage indicated that four additional personnel whose status was unknown, and previously undetected, exited the two vehicles after the aircrews had released weapons on the target and immediately before the weapons impacted the target area. Video footage review indicates the aircrew had no opportunity to detect the presence of the likely civilians in the target area prior to weapons impact. Ap pr ov ed fo rR el ea se 7. Due to the presence of unknown individuals in the immediate target area moments before weapons impact, the investigating officer concluded that, more likely than not, those individuals were civilians. The investigating officer determined the proper status of those four unknown personnel was that of civilians/non-combatants because CAOC targeting personnel, previously unaware of their presence inside the vehicles within the targeting area, did not execute procedures to positively identify those individuals. The investigating officer’s conclusion is consistent with the operational presumption that unidentified individuals are civilians/noncombatants unless an analysis of the facts and circumstances shows they meet the definition of a “hostile force.” That presumption, coupled with the initial Iraqi citizen’s report that five civilian passengers were killed by coalition airstrikes that destroyed her vehicles on 13 March 2015, led the investigating officer to conclude those individuals were, more likely than not, civilians. 2 USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 002 10/2/2015 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE UNITED STATES AIR FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND AL UDEID AIR BASE QATAR QUN 28 2:15 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD FROM: SUBJECT: Appointing Authority Approval Possible IVCAS IVO Al Hatra Checkpoint, Iraq, 13 Mar 15 I have reviewed the commander-directed investigation completed by Investigating Of?cer (IO) (bus). (bxs) land the subsequent legal review of the investigation. I concur with the ?ndings and conclusions of the IO, who substantiated by a preponderance of the evidence that civilian casualties had occurred, and also noted an apparent communication error during the target approval process. I believe the strike was lawful, and the target approval process error, now addressed, did not affect the ?nal outcome. W. HESTERMAN Lieutenant General, USAF Commander SW USCENTCOM 00310/2/2015 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE UNITED STATES AIR FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND AL UDEID AIR BASE QATAR 20 April 2015 MEMORANDUM FOR I (bxs). (M) FROM: USAF SUBJECT: Commander-Directed Investigation (CDI) into Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Alleged to Have Occurred on 13 March 2015 at an ISIL Checkpoint in Hatra District, Iraq I. You are hereby appointed as CDI Investigating Officer (IO) to assess the veracity of a CIVCAS claim. On 2 Apr 15, received a claim alleging that a 13 Mar 15 Coalition airstrike on an checkpoint in Hatra District, Iraq, resulted in the deaths of ?ve non- combatant civilians, two women and three children. On 14 Apr 15, an Initial Credibility Assessment concluded the claim was credible based on an initial correlation of details in the allegation related to -strike on a Hatra ISIL Checkpoint (13 Mar IS, ATO DO). 2. (U) This appointment has been coordinated with your commander, Brig Gen Darren Hartford, 379 This is your primary duty until you have submitted your ?nal report and it has been approved by me. Until then, you should not go TDY, unless necessary to facilitate your investigation, or take leave until I have accepted your ?nal report. I authorize you to interview personnel, take sworn statements or testimony, and examine /copy all relevant Air Force records, ?les, and correspondence pertinent to this CDI. 3. (U) In conducting the CDI, follow the guidance in the Commander-Directed Investigation Guide. Prepare and submit to me a report of investigation in the format described in the Guide. You must submit your report to me no later than 30 days from the date of this appointment memo unless you request, and I grant, an extension. Include in your report any recommendations that you deem appropriate. 4. (U) Prior to beginning your investigation, you will meet with[ (MG), 1, who will be your designated legal advisor for purposes of conducting this CDI. You may reach him via phone at DSN ?r via email at (bxa). (bxe) lorl (bx3). (W6) 1 S. (U) You may not release any information related to this CDI without my prior approval. Based on the information contained herein, this appointment letter is classi?ed and should be treated appropriately. .IO W. Ill Lieutenant General, USAF Commander Attachment: CDI Guide USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 004 10/2/2015 SEER-WW REPORT OF INVESTIGATION COMMANDER DIRECTED REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PREPARED BYI INVESTIGATING OFFICER CONCERNING POSSIBLE CIVCAS IN VICINITY OF AL HATRA CHECKPOINT 13 MAR 15 USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 005 - 10/2/2015 Ap pr ov ed fo rR el ea se SECRET//REL USA, FVEY SECRET//REL USA, FVEY USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 006 - 10/2/2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS Tab A: Appointment Letter Tab B: Authority and Scope Tab C: Background Tab D: Findings, Analysis, and Conclusion Tab E: Testimony Index of Witnesses: E-1 I (bX6) E-2: I (0x3). I E-3: I I E-4I I I E-5: I I E-6: I (bX1)1.4a E-7: I (0x3). (bin )1 .4a I Tab F: Evidence Index of Exhibits F-1: CAOC CIVCAS Credibility Inquiry 19 Mar 2015 F-2: MISREP, ATO DQ, mission l3653 F-3: Intelligence Information Reports (HR) Al Hatra F-4: Imagery of Al-Hatra area USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 007 10/2/2015 SEGR-EIHR-EEU-SATWH F-5: CFACC Operation Inherent Resolve Daily Spins extract F-6: Dynamic Targeting Legal Review, F-7: OneNote excerpt, JTM- F-8: ?31 Dec 14 Tab G: Legal Review Tab H: Appointing Authority Approval and Actions USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 008 10/2/2015 Authorig and Scope?U): Commanders have the inherent authority to conduct a Commander-Directed Investigation (CDI) to investigate matters under their command, unless preempted by higher authority. Pursuant to this authority, the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), Lieutenant General Hesterman, appointed Ion 20 April 2015 to conduct an Investigation to assess the veracity of a civilian casualty (CIVCAS) claim alleging a 13 March Coalition airstrike on resulted in the deaths of five non-combatant civilians This CDI was conducted from 22 April 2015 to 1 June 2015. The Investigation Officer (IO) investigated the following allegations: Allegation(U): none. However, investing officer was tasked to determine the veracity of the CIVCAS claim. Additionally, with a stated intent of non-combat victims (NCV) the investigating officer was tasked to examine the targeting process to determine whether this objective was met. If not, the IQ was to conduct a thorough review of the JTM targeting and tasking cycle to determine if any errors occurred or process changes are required. USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 009 10/2/2015 Backgroundw): (U) On or around 5 April 2015, received a forwarded email reporting the loss of a civilian owned vehicle and the death of two women and three children in a Coalition airstrike on 13 March 2015 at an ISIL checkpoint in Hatra District, Iraq. This claim has five points of correlation with a strike conducted under Joint Target Message (JTM) completed by ight, a two-ship of- No open source reporting could be located that corroborates the CIVCAS claim. The initial TARGET JTM identified enemy personnel (EPAX) and an ISIL checkpoint structure as the two valid targets for this strike. However, during the time while the JTM was being briefed to the target engagement authority (TEA), two vehicles arrived and pulled off the side of the road next to the checkpoint structure within the target area outline (TAO). (SLLREEUSATFVEA) After dialogue with the Dynamic Targeting (DT) cell, callsignl lflight received verbal clearance to include the two vehicles and the associated passengers (pax) in the JTM strike. The vehicles struck match the description of those described in the original email claim. However, this change to the JTM was neither briefed to the TEA nor was it logged in any documentation medium other than _recorded audio and their filed mission report _?ight successfully struck all EPAX, vehicles, and checkpoint building. Subsequent weapons system video (WSV) review by an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division (ISRD) imagery analyst confirmed at least 4 personnel associated with the two vehicles, with the possibility of one being a child. However, based on approximately one second of WSV prior to rounds impact, it is not possible to positively assess the makeup of the personnel. Furthermore, based on extensive tape review, there is no evidence that the aircrew had any opportunity to detect civilians prior to their strike. USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 010 10/2/2015 FindingsI Analysis and ConclusionsiU): Determine the veracity of a CIVCAS claim that a 13 March 2015 Coalition airstrike on an ISIL checkpoint in Hatra District, Iraq, resulted in the deaths of ?ve non-combatant civilians: two women and three children. Findings(U): (U) On 2 April 2015, received and email from a person named ?>st [reported the loss of a civilian owned vehicle and the death of two women and three children in a Coalition airstrike on 13 March 2015 at an ISIL checkpoint in Hatra District, Iraq. The email sought reimbursement for the loss of property (tab F-1, pg 1-2). The email describes two vehicles, a GMC suburban and a black KIA sedan, that were stopped at the checkpoint of Hatra district.? The letter claims that these two vehicles were struck by a missile of the International Air Forces and that both cars burned up. It further asserts that the families inside burned to death. The person authoring this email purported to be the owner of the black sedan and appears to not have been at the location of the strike but is requesting remuneration for the loss of the vehicle only. No financial claim in reference to the alleged civilian deaths is made. Both the IO and the 609 AOC attempted to verify the identity of the claimant and searched for corroborating open source reporting of civilian casualties that match the time, location, and description of the this claim. No corroboration on the persons involved or further communication from the claimant has been found. However, Coalition forces did conduct a strike on an ISIL checkpoint on the date and location as described in the letter. At 12182 on 13 March 2015, _Iight struck an ISIL checkpoint that included personnel (PAX), a structure, and two vehicles. The strike was executed as a Dynamic Targeting mission under the control of CFACC TEA with Joint Targeting Message (JTM) issued by _he Dynamic Targeting Chief) at USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 011 10/2/2015 SEER-WW approximately 12102 on 13 March 2015. The original JTM Line 3 (Track #/DMPl/Description) only included EPAX and Structure at active checkpoint. ?ight observed two vehicles on the side of the road and reported these to? after receipt of the initial JTM. At 12152, after dialogue withl ?ight was verbally approved to include the two vehicles in the JTIV- strike. )1 .43 Post-stri ke it appears there are two adult-sized PAX who have exited the suburban vehicle. I I In the 60 seconds prior to second pass commencement, little movement is seen at the target area. At 6 seconds prior to rounds impact, 4 PAX are seen emerging from both vehicles. Three originate from the SUV (larger) vehicle and one originates from the sedan (smaller) vehicle. One of the persons observed exiting the SUV presents a signature smaller than the other persons. This signature was assessed by an ISRD imagery analyst and AF FOR A3T (tab F-1, pg 8) as a possible child. The small signature is only visible for approximately one second before rounds impact meaning the -pilot had completed firing before the small signature became visible. It is important to note that the 4 PAX seen, the last of which appears as a possible child, are only seen ir?targeting sensor WSV. The sizing assessment is only made USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 012 10/2/2015 by pausing this tape on a large debrie?ng screen and measuring shadow height. There is no reasonable expectation that could have seen, assessed, and called for ABORT on the strike through real-time viewing of his targeting pod display inflight. Additionally, at his weapons employment envelope-would not have been able to discriminate between combatant and non-combatant personnel within the TAO at weapons release. Finally, based on the normal time of flight of the 4 seconds), it is assessed that rounds were already in the air before the possible child signature is visible. Post-strike, both vehicles are on fire and it appears like there is one person still moving at the rear of the sedan. At 12202?releases a single GBU-38 on the guard shack. Weapon successfully guides and goes high order at desired point of impact. Guard shack structure is destroyed and a crater typical of a 500lb munition with short delay is readily apparent. Prior to weapon impact, but after weapon release a single adult-sized PAX is seen slowly moving to the north. This person is knocked down by the weapon impact and is not seen moving again. At 123OZ_flight checks off-station. Their inflight report passes a battle damage assessment (BDA) of 4 EKIA, 2 vehicles destroyed, and 1 structure destroyed. WSV review confirms this assessment to be accurate. Investing officer found no discrepancies with the 609 AOC CIVCAS credibility report strike assessment as follows: USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 013 10/2/2015 Analysis(U) (U) Based on this information and the initial email claim, the following facts corroborate the CIVCAS claim. a. The claimants date matches _strike. b. The claimant?s description of a black Kia Sorrento and a GMC Suburban matches the WSV of a dark colored sedan and an SUV c. The claimant confirms the general location (Hatra) and the fact that the vehicle was stopped at an ISIL checkpoint. d. The claimant?s description of burning vehicles is consistent with the WSV. Additionally, the 609 AOC assessed the claimant?s description of vehicle occupants as follows: ?the driver, two women and three children? roughly matches the imagery analyst?s assessment of women and children. The ?driver? may have been counted as one of the guards if they were outside of the vehicle/interacting with the guards. Conclusion(U) Corroborating evidence confirms that two vehicles matching type and description were struck at the place and location described in the email claim. These vehicles did not display characteristics typical of transient vehicles at checkpoints; instead, they were on the side of the road and static and appeared to be functionally and geospatially tied to the ISIL checkpoint and personnel authorized for strike under JTM While there exists the possibility that the PAX seen in the WSV may have included women and/or children, no positive identification can be made with reasonable certainty as to the person's gender or age without further forensics or USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 014 10/2/2015 on the ground investigation. However, based on the specificity and accuracy of the email claim on all other aspects that can be confirmed, and the evidence of pax associated with these vehicles being struck as a part of JTM- the preponderance of the evidence supports the veracity of the CIVCAS claim. Therefore, the is SUBSTANTIATED. Tasking(U): Examine the targeting process to determine whether the objective was met. If not, conduct a thorough review of the JTM targeting and tasking cycle to determine if any errors occurred or process changes are required. Findings(U): (U) Based on the substantiated finding for tasking 1, above, the preponderance of the evidence supports that the objective was not met. Therefore, the JTM targeting and tasking cycle were examined as follows: (SALR-E-ITUSATWEAL) Target development for the AI Hatra ISIL Checkpoint was conducted by the 609th AOC in support of the Dynamic Targeting Cell. This target was developed fromI (bx1i1.4a I Since as early as October 2014, multi-source reporting has indicated that ISIL had been using the AI-Hatra ruins area I las a training camp for newly recruited members who join from the area southwest of Ninewa Province, Iraq (tab F-3). (bX1 )1 .4c USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 015 10/2/2015 Ap pr ov ed fo rR el ea se Page 16 redacted for the following reason: --------------------(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c SEGR-EIHR-EEU-SATWH On 13 Mar 15, this target was validated by the CFACC TEA. The area was a functionally and geospatially defined object of attack and considered a legitimate militar tar et in accordance with LOAC and (bX1)1.4c In total, approximately 40 minutes passes where the DT cell is coordinating and briefing the TEA. During this time, the two vehicles in question drive up to the checkpoint, pull to the side of the road within the TEA, and their occupants begin to interact with the checkpoint personnel. Additionally seven different USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 017 10/2/2015 vehicles pass through the checkpoint as transients. These transients slow to stop brie?y as checkpoint personnel interact with them and they drive on. )1 .4a On or about 12002, the CAOC Director, serving as TEA, directs JTM as follows: I (hm-4a JTMwanmlW )1 .4a THIS VALID UNTIL RETASKED BY- This JTM is relayed verbally t_ over?coordination frequency as Joint Targeting Message (JTM)-issued by_the Dynamic Targeting Chief) at approximately 12102 on 13 March 2015. After full receipt of the (-informs _of the two vehicles that have been parked at the checkpoint for the past 40 minutes. Through comms back a forth between the DT cell and it is relayed that there are 5 total PAX with the vehicles and they appear to be working the checkpoint. )1 .4a USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 018 10/2/2015 According to the best recollection of the DT cell chief, in that eighty seconds he talked with (M) l, the Battle Director, for approval from the TEA. Shortly after his communication with the Battle Director he receives approval passed by[ (W) pn behalf of the TEA to proceed on JTM-including vehicles and all associated PAX. The OT cell chief was not present when (M) sought approval from the TEA authority on this amendment. Within the next three minutes _conducts all strikes as previously described earlier in this report. In their MISREP, reports the following: (bX1)1.4a However, in the DT I authorization to strike vehicles is not mentioned. Legal Review does not include the struck vehicles in its sufficiency analysis. The TEA specifically does not recall being rebriefed and asked for clearance to include striking vehicles as a JTM- Analysis(U): PID is established with reasonable certainty on the checkpoint and associated EPAX for the Al-Hatra ISIL checkpoint that is issued through USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 019 10/2/2015 JTMI )1 .48 (mm I The information that is passed to the TEA meets legal sufficiency. The DT cell team briefs, and the TEA directs, JTM-ully in accordance with LOAC and ROE. However, when the vehicles in the TAO are relayed to the DT cell, the JTM authorization no longer fully covers the target area situation. With the inclusion of the vehicles there is not a different target set requiring re-evaluation and rebrief to the TEA. In order to fully understand the situation,l I have dialogue to describe the new situation within the (mm I 5W USCENTCOM 15?0277 020 10/2/2015 (bX1)1-48 Conclusion(U): (bX1)1.4a USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 021 - 10/2/2015 (-SALREE-USATWEAL) The 0 objective was not met. There were no problems noted with the established JTM cycle, and no changes are recommended to the process required for JTM execution. However, there were three execution errors leading to this objective not being met. mm.? USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 022 10/2/2015 6/23/2015 (0X6) Investigating Officer USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 023 10/2/2015 ONY OFI I On 3 May 2015, at 13002_ appeared at the investigation, was informed of. privacy act rights, and testi?ed substantially as follows: has held. current position as Dynamic Targeting (DT) Cell Chief for the Combat Operations Division, since-and a DT Chief since-arrival in_ In 3 day to day activities-lid?lls the role leading a (bx1)1.4a on call I (bxnuc I Within the target engigement area. Thi? mom I I I (bX6) as on station in the CAOC during the issuance of JTM-the Al Hatra ISIS checkpoint strike under investigation. For TMI (bxm 4a had been assigned??light, a two ?ship of tasked to pcrformI (bx1)1.4c I I (mall-4a Isubsequently tasked ?ight to observd (blah-4a I was an ISIS checkpoint in IV 0 of the A1 Hatra Ruins. As recalls, ISIS had been operating in and around these ruins for many months, and multiple strikes had occurred in this vicinity] (mall-4a I I (bX1 )1.4a I I I From the information provided by in (bx1)1.4a I more speci?city on the exact checkpoint informed the DT PID decision: ?explained that ight received its initial tasking to look at this POI based on this prior information and information from the target duty officer that showed that between I (MUN-48 Iwas erected at the strike location. The initial observation passed from ?ight was personnel in the open and one structure. _elayed these pax appeared to be operating a checkpoint, as cars were slowed down, interacted with the personnel and then continued on. ?stated that with these confmners-had positive identi?cation (PID) of the speci?c targets -I mom I USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 024 10/2/2015 SEW (bX1)1.4a, The investigator reviewed the transcript of communication between I (WW-43 with? After approximately four minutes of TM passage, readback and some weaponeering discussion, _states it is the ?rst time-is informed by_that there are two vehicles and additional PAX stopped at the JTM location. _asked for some amplifying information on the additional PAX and vehicles. states that relayed that there were two vehicles at the checkpoint with up to ?ve pax, and that all appeared to be associated with the checkpoint. asked _or an (bx1)1.4a Following this communication withI (bx1)1.4a ?Tl seeks approval to target the vehicles and all associated PAX. _states that-talked with the Battle Director, for approval from the TEA. Shortly after .communication with the Battle Directolreceives approval passed by Ion behalf of the TEA to proceed on UN- including vehicles and all associated PAX. was not present when I (axe) ls?ought approval from the TEA authority on this amendment. verbally relays to _they are cleared to execute JTM- including vehicle and all associated PAX with PID. USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 025 - 10/2/2015 SW con?rms that this JTM amendment was verbally passed to and that the addition of PAX and two vehicles did not make it into the written OneNote log. did not recall if the TDO or LEGAD were consulted regarding the amendment, but stated ma: has not attended a s?ated that usually a LEGAD representative would attend and provide any salient feedback to the DT cell. (bxs) was asked about how-considered vehicles at a checkpoint. I (bx1)1.4a I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoii Air Base, Qatar, on 9 May 2015. (axe) I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the wimess. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, tar nn 0 Mm! 7015 (0X3). (DXG) nvestlgatmg Uthcer USCENTCOM SW 026 400/2015 PNY OF I (bxa). I (bxa). (bxe) On 3 May 2015, at 10302, appeared at the investigation, was informed of). 6) Privacy Act rights, and testified substantially as follows: ?has heldWcurrent position as deputy legal advisor to the Combat Operations Division, since I (axe) Ilri (taxmlday to day activities, has provided legal support almost exclusively to the Dynamic Targeting (DT) Cell, but provides training, guidance and support throughout the COD, as needed. ?as been trained on, and is fully informed of the applicable Special Instructions (SPINS), Rules of Engagement (ROE), and Law of Armed Con?ict (LOAC) that must be applied on all DT strikes. .has the ability to ?mnel information to the Combat Plans Division (CPD) for recommended changes or updates to the SPIN S, but has no direct role in their creation or modi?cation. -states that a Judge Advocate (JA) legal advisor (LEGAD) that is involved in all DT strikes. As- explains it, the DT Chief and the Targets Duty Of?cer (TDO) ?work? the target to establish Positive Identi?cation (PID). As they do so, they may bring the legal advisor at various times throughout the DT process. During this, the LEGAD provides input and/or recommendations on the PID determination. This advice is based on current operational guidance ROE and SPINS), as well as the target engagement authorities? intent and interest items. The LEGAD also gives advice on military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity in accordance with LOAC and stated ROE. Additionally, the LEGAD also aids the DT team by reviewing the Joint Targeting Message (JTM), and providing a second set of eyes to ensure coordinates within match information on the target coordinates. Once this is done and a dra? JTM is authored, the LEGAD is part of the team that briefs the TEA on the proposed DT strike. It is the role of LEGAD to provide legal recommendations on the strike to the TEA and to inform the TEA on any concerns the LEGAD has with the strike, including PID, and LOAC. states that prior to learning of this CIVCAS allegation, following TEA approval, _would typically return to-desk to handle post-TEA brief administrative duties. A?er learning of the allegation, amended-ractice to observing the passing of the JTM and monitor the strike by remaining close to the DT Cell until completion of the strike. According to this allows the LEGAD one more chance to ensure that the intent is properly executed. Once complete, the LEGAD will ?ll out a dynamic target legal review for all strikes. The legal review for the JTlv-trike was provided by and is attached to this report. Finally the LEGAD will include any relevant pass down information in the A Duty Log, but clays that this information tends to be very generic if there are no abnormalities during the DT process. If there are abnormalities or lessons learned about the intent, that is included in the duty log. USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 . 027 - 10/2/2015 ?was asked?pinion and understanding of PID as it pertained to the JTM strike. _cxplained that the TEA must have reasonable certainty of PID in order to approve a strike. While the PID authority rests with the TEA, anyone in the chain or DT cell has the responsibility to call an abort on the strike if conditions change. In order to satisfy the SPINS requirement for multi-source intelligence for PID, the DT cell team will talk to the TEA about information beyond the direct line of sight sensors, such as previous activity, previous strikes, traf?c density, SIGINT, HUMINT, and enemy Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) observed. For the JTMI (axe) [relayed that-does not remember the speci?cs based on the time and number of other similar strikes .has been involved in since. However, in reviewing .DT legal review-recalled thatl I 9 bxa). (bxdl Finally, we discussed procedures by which the DT cell would be appraised on SPINS changes or information passed VET-I Wstated that the LEGAD attendance to these briefs was limited to whichever LEGAD was on duty and that a representative from the DT cell rarely attended due to their inability to leave their posts for an extended time during their shifts. .is CC?ed on the distro of these slides, but .does not now if the DT cell is on the distro list. Additionally, there is no requirement or sign off for LEGADs to read these slides. When a LEGAD becomes aware of a change to the SPle or AOD is annotated in the A duty log to notify the other LEGADs to read the updated document; however, there is no requirement or sign off log for these changes. I declare under @an perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, 3 ay 2015. (0X3). (DXG) USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 028 10/2/2015 SEW I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at A1 Udeid Air Base, tar (m ?4 Mav 701s (bX3). (0X6) Investigating Of?cer USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 029 10/2/2015 SW FIJMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF I I (bx3). (bxs) I On 5 May 2015, at 10002, (bxa). (axe) lappeared at the investigation, was informed of .Privacy Act rights, and testi?ed substantially as follows: has been present at-current duty location in sinc- As a part of-normal duties,- is assigned to be a Target Duty O?icer (TDO), working with the Dynamic Targeting (CT) Cell in the Combat Operations Division (COD). typical work week will be 6 days on, one day off. In a typical day-will spend 6 hours on the ??oor? working with-DT cell team, and 6 hours in the ISRD working-target job. _as had no real exposure to the there is nothing that mandate- reading or awareness of these instructions. As a focuses on target development and collateral damage concern estimates (CDE). While in the ISRD- focus is on BDA and data mining of collected intelligence for target development. relays that is a dedicated position to support the TDO in the COD. HoweverI (WW-43 I (bX1)1.4a _was asked about ho_ developed. provided the investigator multiple documents tI (bx1)1._Nas queued up to _to look at. _related that once OWN-43 [was told that the checkpoint was active, and that there were individuals manning the structure, stopping vehicles,Io;Ibegal- CDE process. We) (0X6) USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 030 10/2/2015 (DX1 )1 48. (W3). (W6) -was asked if any vehicles were included in the brie?ng to the TEA, and. responded that no. stated that they only vehicles. knew about had departed to the second possible checkpoint location, and were not included in this JTM request. As far as-) recalls, the TEA only approved strike onto EPAX and the structure at active checkpoint. -does recall that there was comm about additional vehicles now at the checkpoint as relayed MUN-46 HWIdid not hear all of the comm between (?"148 1-does remember thatl Imade a phone call to the Battle Director seeking approvalto strike on the newly arrived vehicles?stated that this coordination was all verbal, and was accomplished in 80 seconds in line with transcript of communication betweenl (bx1)1-4a Post-strike, relayed there was nothing signi?cant to report (N STR) other than the BDA passed of 4 EKIA, 2 vehicles destroyed, and 1 guard shack destroyed. The second checkpoint was still active after ?rst strike was accomplished, and -?ight checked off soon after due to fuel. ?provided some very good insight to the DT process and how they consider positive identi?cation (PID), CDE, and potential for civilian casualty USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 031 10/2/2015 relayed that if there were WSV onstation for this strike then there would have been DGS capability to perform pre-emptive scans, have better ?delity on the PAX, and provide CDE of the vehicles themselves. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoin is true and correct. ,Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, on 9 May 2015. (DX3). (0X6) I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, on 9 May 2015. (0X3). (DXS) Investigating Officer USCENTCOM 032 - 10/2/2015 SW SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OFI (we) I (MS) I On 3 May 2015, at 10302, I (axe) lappeared at the investigation, was informed of privacy act rights, and testi?ed substantially as follows: (MS) I (bxs) I In May to day role .position is fairly separated from the specific actions of the Dynamic Targeting (DT) Cell. Instead,-duties requir-to a broad view execution of the whole Air Tasking Order (ATO). As- day to day duties pertain to DT,-may have awareness of their action, but ultimately goes direct to the Target Engagement Authority (TEA) for JTM approval. The is not in the target engagement chain for DT. I (bxe) kxplained that there are four DT cell chiefs that rotate in a cycle to provide 24 hour manning. I ?mom I I I (bX1)1.4a mom I (bX3). (bxs) Iexplained that it is the DT chief who writes the 5W5 for any DT stn'ke. This 3 May interview was the ?rst timeI (bxei Iwas made aware of a potential Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) incident at the Al Hatra Checkpoint on 13 Mar 15 (JTMI I (bxe) Jas asked ifIhad ever attended a I (bnga I (bX6)II'epiled that-tad not, but perhapsIle6)I deputy or the DT cell chiefs had. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, on 3 May 2015. (DXG) I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base. Qatar. on 3 May 2015 (bX3). (0X5) Investigating Of?cer USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 033 10/2/2015 SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY or] On 8 May 2015, at 10302, appeared at the investigation, was informed of- privacy act rights, and testi?ed substantially as follows: Since] Ihas served as the CAOC director here at Al Udeid Air Base. As a part of his normal duties, Iserves as the Target Engagement Authority (TEA) for lethal strikes against ISIL and KG in Syria and in designated areas of western Iraq, as delegated by CDR CJTF-OIR. i?s familiar with the strike associated with TM the vicinity of (NO) the Al Hatra ruins in Iraq. recalls that this strike was intended to employ weapons against enemy personnel (EPAX) and a guard shack associated with an ISIL checkpoint. described the information provided to- by the DT Cell team (DT Chief, TDO, LEGAD) in order to seek Iauthorization for engagement. was briefed that the target was in Iraq, Al Hatra, in and around a known ISIL location where multiple previous strikes had been conducted. .was briefed that the intended target was EPAX and a recently constructed guard shack. Iwas provided imagery analysis showing the location, the ISIL checkpoint, and the new structure. ?con?rmed that this checkpoint had a single use purpose, and that throughput was limited. Iwas briefed a gameplan of strafe froml (bxmn I?t lg 7 and a single GBU-38 on the structure. At no point was there any discussion of vehicles in association with this strike. gave authorization for JTM (bx1)1.4a IDIRECTS of the EPAX and guard shack, and included in remarks for aircrew to clear for transients prior to weapons release. Until the mail surfaced alleging vehich and collateral persons struck-heard or saw no further information on this strike. investigator showed timeline and audio transcript from to In it, Iwas shown that the JTM was verbally amended in its transmission fro_ to include the following language: -ou?re cleared to execute JTM -including vehicles and all associated PAX with stated that Iwas not briefed on this change to the target environment, nor did Igrant the authority to strike any vehicles in conjunction with this JTM. explained to the investigator that based on the I (bx1)1.4a [even if the aviators could identify the vehicles as hostile, (bxm.4a Ithere was still no authority to strike without requesting authorization for a TM change from the TEA. r_elayed that this dialogue did not happen. USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 034 - 10/2/2015 As clari?ed by the DT chief should have understood clearly what the limit of the authority was, and when there was a change in the target environment should have recognized it and rebriefed the TEA. Investigator informed that the DT Chiefs statement stated that the DT Cell Chief relayed the requested TM change to the Battle Director, and at some point was granted verbal authority to the change to include vehicles. again af?rmed that the request was never presented to- nor was authorization given. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, on 8 May 2015. I declare under penalty that the' foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Oatar?m 3 May 2015. (W3). (0X6) Investigating Of?cer USCENTCOM FOIA 150277 035 - 10/2/2015 SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY oiil (bxa). thG) On 27 May 2015, at 18002the investi ation via video teleconference between A1 Udeid Air Base and (bxa). was informed of privacy act rights, and testi?ed substantially as follows: Fromi I served as a Combat Mission Read (M6). (W6) ?@th the Flight Lead 0 ?ight on 13 March 2015, (bx1)1.4a I _was familiar with the strike associated with JTN-that was passed and successfully struck by formation. To the best of recollection, .was passed the known location of the Al Hatra checkpoint area in?ight. 0n the way to air refuelin? ?ight noticed that this checkpoint was manned a?er surveying the area with their targeting pods. The checkpoint was manned with 1818 associated vehicles for 45 minutes to an hour, and- ?ight relayed what they were seeing to At some point, two vehicles left multiple pax at the primary checkpoint location and drove to a southern location to set up another checkpoint. _assigned- wingman to keep eyes on this second southern checkpoint. WEI-was working up a Joint Targeting Message (JTM) for the primary checkpoint, two additional vehicles show up at the primary checkpoint location. continues to monitor these two vehicles and the primary checkpoint. The vehicles pull off to the side of the road at the checkpoint and interact with the personnel at the checkpoint for 10-15 minutes. When?returns to the radio, they pass a full to?that only authorizes TARGET against epax and the guard shack. As the JTM is passed, directs wingrnan to the target area, and has[ A?cr recei of the HM, (bX3). (bxc) informs?f the two vehicles at the chec int. (bX1)1.4a )1 .4a then let go. However, the two vehicles in question continue to remain parked of? the side of the road and the personnel continue to interact and act like they are associated with the checkpoint personnel. I (bx1)1.4a (bxa), (axe) [to be an on the vehicles, and is asked to PID them. _states that these two vehicles appeared to be a part of the checkpoint. _relays exactly win-ecs and gives-?opinion? (per tape script), but does not ever assume responsibility for PID. When?states that-will ?seek additional authority? _believec that PID responsibility still rests wi_ Since the JTM is updated verbally over the radio, and ?ight is cleared onto the vehicles as well as the pax and structure? states that .expectation was that ROE, PID, and commander?s guidance have been satis?ed by the TEA directing the TM. Per the spins, uses b0 sensors, and[ (bX1)1.4a No other collateral concerns or transients enter the target operation area (TOA). USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 036 10/2/2015 __conductspasses on target for the epax and vehicles, and? follows up with a single GBU-38 on the guard shack. _estimates that time of ?ight of the rounds is 3-4 seconds, from nigger squeeze to impact. At weapons release there are no apparent civilian or other collateral concerns. _provides in?ight report of 4 EKIA, 2 vehicles destroyed, and 1 guard shack destroyed. This concludes the narrative of the video teleconference conducted between? investigating of?cer, an_ witness. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. (bxe) (axe) bn 27 May 2015. (bxs). I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the wimess. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, on 27 May 2015. (0X3). Investiga?ng O?icer USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 037 - 10/2/2015 SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF I (bxe). (bx1)1.4a On 27 May 2015, at 19%me at the investigation via video teleconference between A1 Udeid Air Base andI (bxe) Iwas informed 0. privacy act rights, and testi?ed substantially as follows: Froml (0x3). (bits) Iserved as a Combat Mission Ready (CMR) (0X6) states that'has a pretty good recollection of the strike associated with that was passed and successfully struck by their formation. .recalls being passed the known location of the Al Hatra checkpoint area in?ight. I exam I I (bX1)1.4a 1 The formation continues to monitor for 45 minutes to an hour as they wait for?to pass the JTM. At some point, two vehicles leave multiple pax at the primary checkpoint location and drive to a southern location to set up another checkpoint. ?is assigned to keep-sensors on this second southern checkpoint by the ?ight lead. As the JTM is passed, the ?ight lead directs- to the target area, and I (bX1)14a I Alter receipt of the informs of the two vehicles at the checkpoint. During the JTM transmission. there are about 4 vehicles that are stopped at the checkpoint and then let go. (bxe). (bx1)1.4a I (bx1)1.4a I However, the two vehicles in question continue to remain parked off the side of the road and the personnel continue to interact and act like they are associated with the ISIS checkpoint personnel. To they do not appear to be transients. sensor remains padlocked on these vehicles within the target operation area (TOA), but does not see any collateral concerns. In ?estimation, conversation between I (bXWa (bxs). (we) I is accurate and precise in describing this situation. When the JTM is updated verbally over the radio, and-light is cleared onto the vehicles as well as the pax and structure, ?understood that this meant that ROE, PID, and commander?s guidance have been satis?ed by the TEA directing the JTM. Per the spins and ?ight lead directionJ (bx1)1.4a I sees no other collateral concerns or transients enter the TAD. t-bbserves ?conductin-passes on target for the epax and vehicles, with USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 038 - 10/2/2015 good effects seen. follows up with a single GBU-38 on the guard shack. ?ight provides in?ight report of 4 EKIA, 2 vehicles destroyed, and guard shack destroyed. This concludes the narrative of the video teleconference conducted between investigating of?cer. and witneSS- I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correctl M6) I (ma) (0X6) I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. Executed at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatgr, on 27 May 2015. (bX3). (0X6) Investigating Of?cer USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 039 10/2/2015 SUMMARIZED TESTINIONY OF I (bxe) I I (axe) I On 23 June 2015, at 12302, I (bxa). (bxs) Iappeared telephonically at the investigation, and testi?ed substantially as follows: I (bxs) Ion 13 Mar 2015, though-doesn?t recall iflwas on call during this event. has no speci?c recollection of the event. Relaying of unclassi?ed information surrounding the event did not stir any further information on the actual occurrence of l- However?did have vague recollection of some similar situations. .relayed that many times there would be changes in the dynamic environment. .felt that-had a close working relationship with? (Dynamic Targeting Cell), and that they would ?ring up? to the Battle Cab if there ever was any substantive change to a JTM. lso relayed that ?would expect to be briefed on any and all changes proposed for any JTM. Based on proximity to found it very easy to brief any and all changes. Additionally,-shared that if the strike was at 1500 local time,-would usually have had up to three Generals available to act as TEA, and approve any changes. The idea that _vould be asked about a change from ?an. would not relay it to the TEA is not reasonable or accurate. .further stated that?did not hesitate to converse with the battlecab or TEA as required in these instances. I asked-about the 80 second timeline between radio calls from I (bx1)1.4a [?ight where approval for the change was sought after. said that while it was possible, 80 seconds would have to be very, very quick for-to take a call, gather the information, relay it to the TEA, get approval, and then relay it back down t- Due to-location and the nature of the phonecall, investigator is unable to get witness signature. I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the testimony given by the witness. I (M) Ion 23 June 2015 (0X3). Investigating Of?cer USCENTCOM FOIA150277 040 - 10/2/2015 CAOC CIVCAS Credibilit In ui 19 Mar 2015 BLUF: The 609th AOC can correlate a civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) claim received on 2 April by and processed by ARCENT Claims Service to an attack conducted mm.? Ion 13 March 2015 at an ISIL Checkpoint in Hatra District, Iraq. In addition, analysis of strike footage shows the probable presence of women and children at the strike location. Based upon the Weapon System Video (WSV) review and the claim, the 609th AOC assesses that this strike likely represents credible information of a potential CIVCAS incident and recommends a CDI. (U) CIVCAS Allegation: 1. (U) Source: An email from a person namedl I reported the loss of a civilian owned vehicle, and the death of two women and three children, in a Coalition airstrike on 13 March 2015 at an ISIL checkpoint in Hatra District, Iraq. The email sought reimbursement for the loss of property. a. Ori inal Email: Page 1 of 14 USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 041 10/2/2015 (bX3). (0X6) b. (U) Translated Email: ?Greetings, (W6) On Friday the 13th of March 2015 I sent my car [type Kia Sorrento, black, ?model 2011] from Mosul to go to Baghdad in order not to be confiscated by ISIL, because I?m wanted for lSlL, and there were a family in the car that consisted of the Driver, two women and three children. There was another car, GMC Suburban, was traveling together with the family in my car and they both stopped at the Checkpoint of Hatra district a Missile of International Air Forces stroke the Checkpoint and both cars with the families inside them were burned to death. I wish if you would agree to compensate me for my car because I have already lost my house that is con?scated by ISIL and i had hidden my car in a safe place in Mosul but ISIL learned were it was hidden and that is why I wanted to send it to Baghdad. have lost all my money and this car was all I have. Thank you for concern? (0X6) c. (U) Translation attributed to From? (bxe) Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2015 9:41 AM To: (bxa). (bX6) I [inserted text machine translated by AFFOR SEER-W Page 2 of 14 USCENTCOM 15?0277 042 10/2/2015 d. (U) The 609th AOC cannot verify the identity and/or associations of the claimant. 2. (U) The 609th AOC has not received a corroborating open source report of civilian casualties matching this strike location/time. a. (U) Location search criteria: i. Hatra, Iraq ii. AI Hadr, Iraq b. (U) Sources searched i. Reuters ii. bodycount.org/ ranodyCount.org 3. (U) Coalition Strike Activity a. struck an ISIL checkpoint (PAX, Vehicles and a structure) in Hatra Provence, Iraq, at 1218Z on 13 March. b. The strike was executed as a Dynamic Targeting mission under the control of CFACC TEA with Joint Targeting Message (JTM)-issued by?(the Dynamic Targeting Chief) at approximately 12102 on 13 March 2015. c. WISH-RIG) JTM-authorized ?to TARGET an ISIL Checkpoint with a single structure (guard shack) and a target area outline (TAO) to allow engagement of associated ISIL EPAX. i. A tasking authorizes aircrew to strike an already target if they can ensure CDE restrictions are met. Figure 1, JTM A0 (yellow) and Checkpoint structure. Close up on the TAO (left) and wider area to show surroundings. Note that the Checkpoint is bounded to the South East by the town of Hatra (Arabic ?Al Hadr? or HID and to the North West by the ancient Ruins of Hatra. Page 3 of 14 USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 043 10/2/2015 556W d. While receiving JTMI [observed and reported two vehicles stopped at the checkpoint, with between 2-5 people standing near the vehicles, moving back and forth from the vehicles to the guard shack and stepping into the road which caused other traffic to slow/stop. g. that additional information to and received a modified authorization to strike. h. At approximately mended JTM -0 ?including vehicle and all associated PAX with i. Full Strike Transcript with WSV review notes: SEW Page 4 of 14 USCENTCOM 15?0277 044 10/2/2015 Ap pr ov ed fo rR el ea se Pages 45 through 47 redacted for the following reasons: ---------------------------(b)(1)1 4a (b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c c. Four total PAX are apparent in the second strike footage. Three originate from the SUV (larger) vehicle and one originates from the sedan (smaller) vehicle. One of the persons observed exiting the SUV presents a signature smaller than the other persons. This signature is assessed by AFFOR A3T as a possible child. The small signature is only visible for a proximately one second before rounds impact meaning the pilot had completed firing before the small signature became visible. d. WWI I it is not possible to assess with certainty that the small signature is a child. There is low-likelihood that a pilot could have assessed this signature in flight without the benefit of slow-speed review/ playback. e. This video was reviewed an AOC imagery analyst who reported a probable CIVCAS: I I I I This assessment is due to the small size of shadow length compared to the woman that came over from the SUV. WDIS Page 8 of 14 USCENTCOM 15?0277 048 10/2/2015 It is likely that there were additional causalities before the second strafe run. Considering the only person to get out of the sedan was in the rear passenger side there would likely be at least one more adult in both vehicles.? f. GBU-38 attack against the guard shack at 12202. One person is visible in the strike footage (circled in yellow in Figure 4). g. All Strikes were confined within the approved TAO with approved ordnance. No transient concerns from outside the TAO are observed to bel Strike Plan Overview (U): 1. W?was the only strike formation. 2. all strikes in accordance with the JTM -directed restrictions for type of target, TAO, fuse delays, and weaoponeering. JTM -Target Information (U): 1. (U) Target Development for the Al Hatra ISIL Checkpoint was conducted by the 609th AOC in support of the Dynamic Targeting Cell. sec-3W Page 9 of 14 USCENTCOM 15?0277 049 10/2/2015 a. This target was developed from DT Workbook Point of Interest 1420. Intelligence reports (U): Redacted due to overall document classification. 3. (U) Target Identification. Page 10 of 14 USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 050 10/2/2015 )1 .4c 5. Target validation: On 20150314, this target was validated by the CFACC TEA. The target was deemed a legitimate military target and lawful object of attack pursuant to LOAC. SEER-WW Page 11 of 14 USCENTCOM 15?0277 051 10/2/2015 Ap pr ov ed fo rR el ea se Page 52 redacted for the following reason: --------------------(b)(1)1 4a b. The change in the JTM was authorized by c. The decision to include the vehicles was based upon (awaiting DT Chief Battle Director Statements) SEER-WW Page 13 of 14 USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 053 10/2/2015 9. Strike Assessment (MO )1 .4a Corroborating the CIVCAS Claim (U): 1. The claimants date matche-strike. 2. The claimant?s description of a black Kia Sorrento and a GMC Suburban matches the WSV of a dark colored sedan and an SUV 3. The claimant?s description of vehicle occupants (?the driver, two women and three children") roughly matches the imagery assessment of women and children. The ?driver? may have been counted as one of the guards if they were outside of the vehicle/interacting with the guards. 4. The claimant confirms the general location (Hatra) and the fact that the vehicle was stopped at an checkpoint. 5. The claimant?s description of burning vehicles is consistent with the WSV. Recommendation At this time, there is sufficient credible information of a possible CIVCAS incident to warrant further investigation. Way Ahead (Ul: As appropriate, the Air Component should transmit this credibility assessment to HHQ IAW CENTCOM CIVCAS reporting policy and direct a CDI into this matter. A3T will document these records in support of a pursuant CIVCAS investigation. Page 14 of 14 USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 054 10/2/2015 Ap pr ov ed fo rR el ea se Pages 55 through 72 redacted for the following reasons: ---------------------------(b)(1)1 4a (b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c (b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1 4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1 4c (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(6) 5.5 (U) DEFINITIONS NOTE: These de?nitions apply to US. Forces only. Each coalition partner has their own understanding and application of the following terms. Questions regarding their de?nitions can be vetted through their respective LEGAD and RED CARD holder. 5.5.1 (U) Direct Participation in Hostilities. Direct Participation in Hostilities is activity aimed at attacking, or directly causing harm or destruction to armed forces or civilians (including police) or designated property: undertaking actions preparatory to an attack, such as deploying to a position to attack; immediately ex?ltrating from an attack; transporting, manufacturing IEDs or other munitions in anticipation of an attack; and planning, directing, or approving adversary operations. Direct Participation in Hostilities also includes direct participation in activities that effectively and substantially contribute to an adversary?s ability to conduct or sustain operations. This includes (but is not limited to) training, funding, and supplying an adversary with material (including homemade explosives material and drug precursor chemicals), provided each of these activities effectively and substantially contributes to an adversary?s ability to conduct or sustain operations. 5.5.2 (U) Hostile Act. An attack or other use of force against the United States, US. forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US. forces including the recovery ofU.S. personnel or vital USG property. 5.5.3 (U) Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, US. forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US. forces including the recovery of US. personnel or vital USG property. 5.5.4 (U) Imminent Use of Force. The determination of whether the use of force against US. forces is imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known to US forces at the time and may be made at any level. Imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous. 5.5.5 (U) Intrusive Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance (IISR). IISR is encroachment by a directed ISR platform into another nation?s territorial waters, internal waters, land mass, or airspace for Page 19 of 78 USCENTCOM 073 - 10/2/2015 purposes without that nation?s consent. The consent applies to the encroachment, not the activity. conducted without host nation consent to the activity is not considered if personnel conducting enter the country host nation government entrance requirements. 5.5.6 (U) De-escalation. When time and circumstances permit, the forces committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent should be wamed and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions (eg. via calls on Guard frequency to aircraft). 5.5.7 (U) Necessity. Necessity exists when a hostile act occurs or when a force demonstrates hostile intent. When such conditions exist, use of force in self-defense is authorized while the force continues to commit hostile acts or exhibit hostile intent. 5.5.8 (U) Proportionality. The use of force in self-defense should be sufficient to respond decisively to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent. Such use of force may exceed the means and intensity of the hostile act or hostile intent, but the nature. duration and scope of force used should not exceed what is required. The concept of proportionality in self-defense should not be confused with attempts to minimize collateral damage during offensive operations. 5.5.9 (U) Pursuit. Self-defense includes the authority to pursue and engage forces that have committed a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, while those forces continue to commit hostile acts or demonstrate hostile intent. 5.6 (U) OPERATION (bX1 )1 .4c Page 20 of 78 SW USCENTCOM FOIA 15?0277 074 - 10/2/2015 Ap pr ov ed fo rR el ea se Pages 75 through 82 redacted for the following reasons: ---------------------------(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c (b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6) USCENTCOM FOIA 15-0277 083 - 10/2/2015 The Overall Classification of this Briefing is: SECRET // REL TO USA, ARE, BEL, BHR, DNK, FRA, ITA, JOR, MAR, NLD, QAT, SAU, FVEY CHANGE 2 / FDO RELEASE #20141230-04 ea 14 se31OPR:Dec AFCENT A3T el rR 8 fDec – 29 Dec 14 o ed ov pr Ap IRAQ/SYRIA FIRES Working Group VTC 1 Pages 84 through 126 redacted for the following reasons: ---------------------------(b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c (b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6) (b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1 4a, (b)(1)1 4c, (b)(5) ed ov pr Ap ea se el fo rR