4.11.14 ILU Hula-f THE STATE OF TEXAS IN THE DISTRICT COURT V. 416th JUDICIAL DISTRICT WARREN KENNETH PAXTON, JR COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS MOTION TO DISMISS AND SET ASIDE INDICTMENT FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT BEFORE THE GRAND JURY (FAILURE To REGISTER INDICTMENT) TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE GEORGE GALLAGHER: Comes Now Warren Kenneth Paxton, Jr. (?Paxton?), by and through his attorneys of record, and requests that this Court hold a hearing where he will demonstrate that the indictment against him for failure to register as an investment adviser representative (TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ART. 581-290)) was procured by pervasive violations of the grand jury clause of the Texas Constitution and the due process clauses of the Texas and United States Constitutions by the pro tem attorneys? misconduct in: Misrepresenting the date by which grand jurors should calculate the statute of limitations. - Asking grand jurors to indict based on the wrong de?nition of an ?investment adviser representative.? A de?nition that was?and had been?preempted by federal law. . Omitting to instruct the grand jurors that, as a matter of law, Paxton did not have to register with the State Securities Board because the entity that he worked under, Mowery Capital Management, was itself federally registered. Making the false assertion, without evidentiary support, that Paxton knew that certain disclosure documents generated by Mowery Capital Management were backdated and falsi?ed. - Misleading the grand jury as to the proper legal standard for pursuing a criminal prosecution versus administrative action. Allowing Judge Oldner to be present in the the grand jury room and to make improper statements before the grand jury. After the hearing, Paxton will ask that the Court dismiss the indictment with prejudice. I. BACKGROUND Paxton was indicted by the 416th Grand Jury sitting in Collin County, Texas, on July 7, 2015, for allegedly acting as an investment adviser representative without being registered with the State Securities Board (the ?Indictment?). Judge Christopher Oldner presided over the Grand Jury. At the pretrial hearing, held on February 16, 2017, the State produced grand jury materials for this Court?s in camera review. This Court has since turned over to the defense several documents that it presumably deemed material. Among these items, are partial transcripts of the grand jury proceedings and a PowerPoint presentation made by prosecutors. This Court also held a February 22, 2017, conference call with the attorneys for the defense and the pro tem lawyers, during which certain grand juror notes that have not been produced to the defense were described. The Grand Jury Materials and description of the grand juror notes reveal that the Indictment was procured after signi?cant procedural misconduct, pervasive material omissions, and misstatements of law and fact by pro tem attorneys. These are detailed in the bullet points above. Each of these instances of misconduct, individually and in the aggregate, deprived Paxton of due process of law and of his constitutional right to a proper grand jury screening of his case under Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution] Thus, the Indictment was improperly obtained and should be dismissed pursuant to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as the Texas and United States Constitutions. II. LEGAL AUTHORITY ?Article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution, [and] article 1.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure . . . prohibit trying a defendant for a felony without ?rst presenting the accusation to the grand jury.? Sledge v. State, 903 105, 108 (Tex. App?Fort Worth, 1995). The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for setting aside an indictment based on grand jury irregularities, including for ?any other ground authorized by law.? TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ART. Surprisingly. the grand jury clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution is one of the few rights in the Bill of Rights that has not been incorporated to the States via the Faurteenth Amendment. See McDonald City OfChicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n. 13 (2010). 27.03. ?Any other ground authorized by law" has been construed broadly by the Texas courts. State v. Terr-ems(Tex. Crim. App. 1998). It includes a violation of the defendant?s recognized Texas constitutional right to have a grand jury determine probable cause on each element of the offense charged. Rose v. State, 807 626, 629, 631 (Tex. App?Houston [14th Dist], 1991) (reversing conviction and vacating indictment where amendment process violated defendant?s ?constitutional right to the grand jury determination of probable Citizens of Texas, therefore, have a ?constitutional right to the grand jury determination of probable cause? on each element of a charged offense. Rose, 807 at 629. If this right means anything, it must hold, like the right to a grand jury under the federal constitution, that grand juries cannot be misled or ?deceived? into returning an indictment by a prosecutor?s misrepresentation of law or fact. United States v. Cederquist, 641 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). ?Implicit? in the grand jury right must be ?the guarantee that a defendant will be indicted only upon the informed and independent determination of a legally constituted grand jury." United States 12. Sears, Roebuck Ca, 719 F.2d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir. 1983). And dismissal of an indictment is warranted where prosecutorial misconduct has undermined the grand jury?s ability to make an informed and objective evaluation Notably, TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ART. 55.01, which addresses expunction of criminal records, speci?cally contemplates the dismissal of indictments shown to be presented out of ?false information.? of the case. Id.; United States v. Kilpam'ck, 821 F.2d 1456, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Red Elk, 955 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (D.S.D. 1997). Comparatively, in a search warrant context, courts have universally rejected probable cause determinations when they are based on misleading information or omissions by law enforcement. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1978) the Fourth Amendment demands a factual showing suf?cient to comprise ?probable cause,? the obvious assumption is that there will be a truthful showing? (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted?; State v. Verde, 432 475, 434 (Tex. App.?Texarkana, 2014) (material omission of relative date violated Franks). The law should expect no less?4n fact, it should be more stringent?in the case of an where personal liberty is even more at stake. If that were not the case?if a prosecutor could willfully present misleading information to a grand jury to indict?the ?mdamental role of the grand jury in our system as a buffer to protect free citizens from overly zealous prosecutors would be subverted. It would mean that prosecutors could intentionally mislead grand jurors into indicting an accused. It would mean that a prosecutor, who carries a veil of trust, could present the wrong facts and wrong law so that grand jurors would indict just about anyone. It would be an unthinkable setback for the liberties that the state and federal constitutions were written to protect. Cf Franks, 438 U.S. at 165 (the notion that false information could be presented in support of probable cause is ?unthinkable?). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has allowed trial courts the discretion to dismiss cases with prejudice and has stated that in cases involving egregious prosecutorial misconduct, due process violations, or due course of law violations, dismissal with prejudice is permissible to neutralize constitutional violations. See State v. Mungia, 119 814, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); State v. Frye, 897 324, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (?nding that the defendant?s Sixth Amendment right had been violated due to egregious prosecutorial misconduct and af?rming dismissal with prejudice). Even if it were somehow determined that no constitutional provision prohibits a prosecutor from misleading a grand jury into an indictment, it must be remembered that conduct that does not rise to the level of a constitutional error can still justify dismissal, if a substantial right is affected. Mason v. State, 322 251, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). To determine if such effect or in?uence warrants dismissal ?[w]hen addressing a grand jury statutory violation, the proper subject of the harm analysis is the product of the grand jury proceedings: the charging decision.? Id. at 257. The prejudicial inquiry must focus on whether any violations had an effect on the grand jury?s decision to indict. If violations did substantially in?uence this decision, or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was ?'ee ?om such substantial in?uence, the violations cannot be deemed harmless. Id. (emphasis added). Finally, trial courts have the ?discretionary authority to hold pretrial evidentiary hearings on preliminary matters that can, and should be, resolved expeditiously.? State v. Hill, 499 853, 866~67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Thus, Paxton respectfully requests an evidentiary hearing to make these showings, after which, he respectfully requests that this Court dismiss the Indictment. 11L ARGUMENT To convince the grand jurors to indict, the pro tem lawyers had to establish probable cause for actus reus elements that Paxton: (1) rendered services as an investment adviser representative, (2) without being registered as required by the Act. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ART. 581-290). They did so by presenting misstatements of fact and law before the grand jury through a process that violated Paxton?s right to have the grand jury screen this case for probable cause based on accurate information and accurate law. TEX. CONST. ART. 1 10; Rose, 807 at 629. And in their totality, these abuses caused the violation of Paxton?s grand jury and due process rights. Each will be addressed in turn. A. To avoid an obvious statute of limitations problem, prosecutors misled the grand jury concerning the date of the operative act alleged in the indictment. During the grand jury session held on July 7, 2015, the pro tem attorneys presented a PowerPoint entitled ?Texas Rangers Special Investigation? (the ?Presentation?), which is attached as Exhibit A. The Presentation contains several material misstatements of fact and law.3 One of the most egregious misrepresentations concerns the applicable statute of limitations date. Failure to register as an investment adviser representative carries a three?year statute of limitations. TEX. CRIM. Pnoc. Cons ART. 1201(7). The pro tem lawyers? presentation claims that Paxton referred the Henrys to Mowery Capital Management on ?July 18, 2012.? See Presentation, Ex. A at 8. That is false. The alleged referral?assuming it happened at all?undisputedly occurred, at the latest, three weeks earlier. A letter of authorization dated June 26, 2012, which was in the prosecutors? possession at the time of grand jury, showed that the Henrys authorized Paxton and Frederick Mowery, the owner of MCM, to ?discuss any and all business related matters? concerning the Henrys? ?business and personal accounts at Mowery.? Authorization Letter, Ex. B. So quite obviously, Paxton had already ?referred? the Henrys to Mowery at least as late as the date of this Authorization Letter on June 26, 2012.1d. But the prosecutors could not?and did notwpresent this date because it is more than three years before the July 7, 2015 indictment?13.3., outside the limitations period. Instead, they fabricated a different date. 3 No issue raised here involves the pro tem lawyers? failure to present exculpatory evidence, which they have no duty to do under state or federal law, See United States v. Williams, 5(14 US. 36 (1992); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 129 140 (Tex. App.?San Antonio, 2003). Rather, we are dealing with material misrepresentation of the applicable law and facts to this case. What is more, the previous slide in the Presentation explained the applicable three?year statute of limitations to the grand jurors. See Presentation, Ex. A at 7. Therefore, the grand jurors were given the wrong date of referral immediately after being told that the allegation in question carried a three-year statute of limitations. Had the correct date of the operative act?ale. the referral-w?been presented, the grand jury could not have indicted Paxton. Grand jurors would have clearly recognized that the operative conduct was outside the limitations period. Such conduct deprived Paxton of due process, an adequate screening of probable cause for the crime alleged, and caused demonstrable prejudice against him. There is no other adequate remedy at law than to set aside the indictment under Tax. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 27.03. B. The Special Prosecutors provided the wrong definition of an ?Investment Adviser Representative? to the grand jury when the proper de?nition did not apply to Paxton. The statute under which Paxton was indicted, Section 29(1) of the Texas Securities Act, provides that any person who shall: Render services as an investment adviser or an investment adviser representative without being registered as required by this Act shall be deemed guilty of a felony of the third degree. To have properly indicted Paxton, therefore, the grand jury had to determine he was rendering services as an investment adviser representative. On this front, the pro tem lawyers again wrongly instructed the grand jury??this time concerning the legal de?nition of an investment adviser representative. Page 6 of the Presentation tells the grand jury that an investment adviser representative is ?each person or company who, for compensation, is employed, appointed, or authorized by an investment adviser to solicit clients for the investment adviser.? Presentation, Ex. A at 6. That is the former de?nition of an ?investment advisor representative.? The de?nition was federally preempted, and it was preempted at the time of the grand jury presentation} Speci?cally, the National Markets Improvement Act of 1996 preempted all past and ?lture attempts by states to de?ne an ?investment adviser representative.? The preper de?nition, developed by the SEC, is now codi?ed at 17 C.F.R. 275.203A-3, which states: (1) Investment adviser representative. ?Investment adviser representative? of an investment adviser means a supervised person of the investment adviser: (1) Who has more than ?ve clients who are natural persons (other than excepted persons described in paragraph of this section); and 4 In additional support of the authority stated here, Paxton refers the Court to his prior Second Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which he adopts by reference. Paxton would also refer the Court to the attached opening brief, which he ?led in his appeal to the Fifth Court of Appeals. Importantly, the Fifth Court of Appeals did not deny the portion of Paxton?s appeal relating to the proper definition of an investment adviser representative based on any substantive determination. Instead, it merely found that Paxton?s claim was not cognizable for purposes of a writ application. Ex parte Paxton, 493 292, 303 -04 (Tex. App?Dallas, 2016). 10 (ii) More than ten percent of whose clients are natural persons (other than excepted persons described in paragraph of this section). (2) Notwithstanding paragraph of this section, a supervised person is not an investment adviser representative if the supervised person: Does not on a regular basis solicit, meet with, or otherwise communicate with clients of the investment adviser; or (ii) Provides only impersonal investment advice. (3) For purposes of this section: ?Excepted person? means a natural person who is a quali?ed client as described in 275.205 1). (ii) ?Impersonal investment advice? means investment advisory services provided by means of written material or oral statements that do not purport to meet the objectives or needs of speci?c individuals or accounts. There is a night and day di??erence between the de?nition provided to the grand jury by the Special Prosecutors and the actual de?nition of an investment adviser representative. Under the actual de?nition, a person must do more than merely ?solicit clients? for an investment adviser. Among many other things, he must do so on a ?regular basis,? he must be a ?supervised person,? and he must provide more than merely ?impersonal investment advice.? 17 C.F.R. 275.203A-3. Proving that Paxton met the actual de?nition provided by federal law would have required the pro tem lawyers to present much more involved information. Because the Special Prosecutors improperly instructed the grand jurors on this 11 crucial term, coupled with the extreme likelihood that they did not present any of the additional evidence needed to indict under the SEC de?nition (which they could not have because Paxton simply does not qualify under the correct federal de?nition of an investment adviser representative), the indictment must be set aside. Paxton has a constitutional right to have a grand jury screen his case and ?nd (or reject) probable cause on each element of the alleged offense. That right, along with his right to due process, was violated by the prosecutors? use of the wrong definition of an investment adviser. C. The Special Prosecutors omitted material evidence in their possession, including that Mowery Capital Management was federally registered until October 11, 2012, and therefore, Paxton did not need to register as an ?investment adviser representative? with the Texas State Securities Board. Nowhere in the Special Prosecutors? Presentation is there mention of the irre?itable fact that the entity by which Paxton was allegedly compensated - Mowery Capital Management was registered with the SEC during the operative time period in June and July of 2012.5 That is a critical omission because the statute under which Paxton was indicted criminalizes only the failure to ?register," not the failure to ?notice See TEX. REV. Ctv. STAT ART. 581-290). And because MCM was a ?federally 5 The Court will recall the import of such fact given the defense?s First Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus which it refers the Court to and adopts by reference herein Paxton also refers the Court to his Opening Brief before the Court of Appeals, which is attached as Exhibit C. Speci?cally, Paxton refers the Court to that portion dealing with the denial of his First Application. 12 covered? investment adviser in June, and even July of 2012, by law, Paxton needed only to, at most, ?notice ?le? pursuant to Section of the Texas Securities Act. TEX. REV- STAT ART. In other words, Paxton had no duty to register with the State Securities Board because MCM was federally covered at the time in question. Therefore, even if Paxton?s relationship with MCM somehow quali?ed him as an ?investment adviser representative,? which it does not, his only duty was to notice ?le. And the failure to notice ?le is not a criminal violation. But the pro tem lawyers? incomplete presentation, and their failure to apprise the grand jury of this case determinative information, mandates that the Indictment be dismissed. This was not mere suppression of exculpatory evidence. This was either a willful omission of, or a careless disregard for, legal principles that bore directly on the grand jury?s probable cause determination. D. Prosecutors made the false assertion, without any evidentiary support, that Paxton knew that disclosure documents generated by MCM without his knowledge had been falsi?ed. Another slide of the Presentation contains an especially in?ammatory false and. misleading claim?namely, that ?Paxton and his attorney did not disclose [to the that the disclosure documents had been falsi?ed? in 2014. Presentation, Ex. A at 11. This statement relates to letters created in 2014 by Fritz Mowery, the owner of MCM. In those letters, Mowery purported to advise his clients that he had paid Paxton referral fees for Paxton?s services. Mowery later admitted to falsifying and backdating the disclosure documents. And he did so 13 without Patton?s knowledge. But implicit in the pro tem lawyers? statement is the assertion that during the course of 2014 investigation into referral practices, Paxton not only knew that MCM did not send the required notices, but also knew that the notices themselves were backdated by MCM. Both assertions are patently false. MCM created, sent, and executed the referenced notices, none of which contained Paxton?s signature or required Paxton?s involvement. See Ross Letter, Ex. Henry Letter, Ex. E. The State has failed to produce any evidence that would suggest Paxton was even aware of the notices at the time. This, again, is not mere withholding of exculpatory information,- it is a troubling and deliberate misrepresentation of fact. This false implication that Paxton had a role in these notices, once again, demonstrates the prosecutors? intent to mislead the grand jury, unfairly in?uence the charging decision, and deprive Paxton of his right to due process and to a proper grand jury screening of his case. It justi?es dismissal. E. Prosecutors intentionally and knowingly misled the grand jury as to the standard necessary for pursuing criminal prosecution versus administrative action. The next to last slide of the pro rem lawyers? Presentation contains the rhetorical header: ?Is this a crime or an administrative issue?? See Presentation, Ex. A at 13. Under this heading, the slide depicts a rudimentary balance scale, upon which ?weights? are placed on either the ?Administrative Issue? side or the ?Crime? side. Id. The scale is tipped toward ?Crime,? as it holds four ?weights? 14 versus only two that sit on the ?Administrative Issue" side. Each ?weight? is of equal size, and they are labeled with simple statements relating to the case, as follows: Atllninistl'utii?r Issue ("time Paxton scores a 92 on the TSSB Exam Paxton votes for Senate Bill 1060 This was j_ust a (sic) an oversight. Paxton has been an attorney since 1991 Paxton didn?t know. Disclosure documents were falsi?ed Forgetting the misrepresentation of fact for a moment, this graphic is a gross misrepresentation of the legal standard to establish probable cause. Indeed, it is a malicious and subversive attempt to trick grand jurors into believing that completely irrelevant information?such as TSSB Exam scores or years practicing as an attorney?are relevant to the determination of probable cause. It is a knowing and intentional misstatement of law and fact, adopted and promoted by special prosecutors whose clear intent was to secure an indictment without regard for the constitutions that regulate their conduct. However, because the special prosecutors presented this slide to a lay group of grand jurors, the grand jurors were much more likely to accept the prosecutors? false explanations and unsupported claims. And because these topics are so complicated, the special prosecutors counted on the fact that lay grand jurors would gravitate toward simple, graphic depictions of the ?law? to guide their charging decision. 15 In sum, the prosecutors engaged in purposeful and cumulative misconduct that improperly in?uenced the grand jury, all to Paxton?s detriment and in violation of his grand jury and due process rights. The only appropriate remedy for this conduct is to set aside the Indictment. F. Judge Oldner improperly entered the grand jury room and made improper statements before the grand jury As set forth in Paxton?s ?Motion to Quash Indictments, Because Judge Oldner?s Cumulative Actions Compromised the Integrity of the Indictment Process? (the ?Oldner MTQ?)?which is incorporated herein by reference?Judge Oldner?s cumulative actions surrounding the Indictment also deprived Paxton of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the US. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 13, 14, and 19 of the Texas Constitution. In the Oldner MTQ, Paxton identi?ed the following actions by Judge Oldner, the cumulative effect of which Paxton argued warranted quashing the Indictments: . Improper empanelment of the 416th Grand Jury; The ordering of information restrictions on the identity of grand jurors contrary to Texas law; - Improper entry into the grand jury room while the 416th Grand Jury was in session; . Violation of grand jury secrecy by informing an unauthorized person that Paxton had been indicted when the information was sealed and non- public; Improper withholding of the July 7th Indictment docmnent upon a true bill and not providing it to the Collin County District Clerk; and Improper denial of summons and issuing arrest warrants for Paxton 16 See discussion, Oldner MTQ. However, based on information provided by this Court during the Telephonic Hearing, it is clear that Judge Oldner not only improperly entered the grand jury room, but also instructed the grand jury in direct violation of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ARTS. 20.011, 20.02, and 20.06. This conduct exacerbated the prejudicial impact that Judge Oldner had on the grand jury process and the charging decision in this case, further justifying dismissal of the Indictments. According to this Court, members of the 416th Grand Jury took notes while Paxton?s case was being presented, and Judge Oldner and his court reporter inexplicably retained the notes under seal until delivering them to this Court on January 5, 2017. Based on these notes, it was clear to this Court that Judge Oldner came into the grand jury room on July 6, 2015, and because his name was written at the top of four grand jurors? notes, this Court had the impression that Judge Oldner came before the grand jury ?rst on that day. At least two grand jurors made additional notes beneath Judge Oldner?s name and before any presenters? or witnesses? names were written. These additional notes included phrases like ?unusual case,? ?exception,? ?is there probable cause for illegal activities,? ?Ken Paxton recusal,? ?special 9! prosecutors, you can ask questions,? and ?do not talk to Collin County Of?ce about the case.? 17 From these notations, one can infer that before special prosecutors presented evidence or witnesses regarding Paxton on the morning of July 6, 2017, Judge Oldner spoke directly to the 416th Grand Jury, priming them for an ?unusual case? against Paxton that required recusal? and ?special prosecutors,? and instructing them ?not [to] talk to [the] Collin County Of?ce about the case.? As Paxton previously asserted in the Oldner MT Q, Judge Oldner?s mere presence in the grand jury room during proceedings is unlawful. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 20.011 and 20.02. Judges are not excepted from Art. 2002?s secrecy requirement, and grand jurors are prohibited from corresponding with the grand jury judge, except when asking questions in the judge?s courtroom or via written submission. Id. at Art. 20.02 and 20.06. liven when such correspondence is allowed, grand jurors are legally required ?not to divulge the particular accusation before them.? Id. at Art. 20.06. Under Mason, this Court should examine the whole grand jury record to evaluate whether Judge Oldner?s numerous statutory violations in?uenced the grand jury, and if so, set aside the Indictments. See Mason, 322 S.W. 3d at 25 7. By calling the grand jurors? attention to the ?unique? nature of the case and going against protocol and statute to instruct grand jurors regarding the Paxton hearings, Judge Oldner was likely to have more than ?just a slight effect? on the charging decision. See id. 13 Judge Oldner?s unlawful statements and instructions to the grand jury were just part of the purposeful and cumulative efforts he and the attorneys pro tem took to subvert the Grand Jury process, all of which prejudiced Paxton and violated his due process rights under the United States and Texas Constitutions. There is no justi?able basis for Judge Oldner to have engaged in such conduct, and the only appropriate remedy for this conduct is to set aside the Indictment. IV. CONCLUSION The indictment in this case was not a product of an honest grand jury presentation. It was not obtained within the parameters of the law and the Texas and U.S. Constitutions. The grand jury materials provided by the Court show that the pro tem lawyers misrepresented the law, turned a blind to legal inconveniences, and wove facts from whole cloth. This indictment should be dismissed because it was obtained by violating Paxton?s right to due process and his right under the Texas Constitution to have a grand jury screen his case for probable cause on each element of the alleged crime. 19 Dan Cogdell Co-Lead Counsel Dennis Hester Cogdell Law Firm, L.L.C. 402 Main Street Fourth Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 426-2244 Facsimile: (713) 426-2255 Terri Moore 300 Burnett St, Ste. 160 Fort Worth, Texas 76102-2755 Telephone: (817) 877-4700 moore@terrimoorelaw.eom Heather J. Barbieri Barbieri Law Firm, RC. 1400 Gables Court Plano, Texas 75075 Telephone: 972.424.1902 Facsimile: 972.208.2100 Respectfully submitted, HILDER ASSOCIATES, P.C. Philip H. Hilder Philip H. Hilder State Bar No. 09620050 Co-Lead Counsel Stephanie K. McGuire ?Of Counsel State Bar No. 11100520 819 Lovett Blvd. Houston, Texas 77006 Telephone: (713) 655-91 11 Facsimile: (713) 655-9112 William B. Mateja Polsinelli PC 2950 N. Harwood St, Suite 2100 Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: (214) 754-5751 Facsimile: (214) 397-0033 matej a@polsinelli.eom ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT, WARREN KENNETH PAXTON 20