Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 No. 14-20249 _____________________________________________ IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _____________________________________________ BOBBY R. BROWN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, WILLIAM E. SCOTT; TYRONE DAY; KENNETH HICKMAN; R. WAYNE JOHNSON; TORRANCE FLEMINGS; KENNETH PRYOR; JULIAN A. RANDALL; LONNIE DEAN COLLINS; LAMONT EDWARD WILSON, Intervenor Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BRAD LIVINGSTON, Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Defendant-Appellant. ************************************ Consolidated with 14-20444 BOBBY R. BROWN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 TYRONE DAY; KENNETH HICKMAN; R. WAYNE JOHNSON; TORRANCE FLEMINGS; KENNETH PRYOR; JULIAN A. RANDALL; LONNIE DEAN COLLINS; LAMONT EDWARD WILSON, Intervenor Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BRAD LIVINGSTON, Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division Case No. 4:69-cv-074 _________________________________________________ BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES URGING AFFIRMANCE _________________________________________________ Kevin H. Theriot William D. Taylor (TX 24046954) ktheriot@alliancedefendingfreedom.org TAYLOR & TAYLOR LAW, P.C. Erik W. Stanley 4115 Highgrove Dr. Christiana M. Holcomb Arlington, TX 76001 ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 817.483.8388 Fax: 817.483.8390 15100 N. 90th Street Email: wtaylor@taylorandtaylorlaw.com Scottsdale, Arizona 85260 (480) 444-0020 (480) 444-0028 Counsel for Alliance Defending Freedom ii Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Fifth Circuit Rule 28.2.1 have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal. Plaintiffs-Appellees • Bobby R. Brown Counsel Edward Mallett MALLETT SAPER BERG, LLP Gerald M. Birnberg WILLIAMS BIRNBERG & ANDERSEN, LLP • William E. Scott (Intervenor) Deborah C. Milner Crystal Robles VINSON & ELKINS LLP • Kenneth Hickman, Lonnie Collins, Kenneth Pryor, Torrance Flemings, Wayne Everret Johnson, Lamont Wilson, Tyrone Day, Julian Randall (Intervenors) Brian R. McGiverin James F. Harrington Amin Alehashem TEXAS CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT Defendant-Appellant • Brad Livingston Counsel Andrew S. Oldham Alex Potapov Michael P. Murphy Douglas D. Geyser Kyle D. Highful Celamaine Cunniff Nadine Phillpotts Craig Jacobs OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL iii Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Amicus Curiae • Alliance Defending Freedom Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Counsel William D. Taylor TAYLOR & TAYLOR LAW, P.C Kevin H. Theriot Erik W. Stanley Christiana M. Holcomb ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM Dated January 9, 2015 s/ Kevin H. Theriot Counsel for Amicus Curiae iv Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS ................................................. iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................vi INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .......................................................................... 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................2 ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................2 I. Firm Adherence to RLUIPA’s Strict Scrutiny Standard is Crucial to Protecting Religious Exercise From Government Burdens in Accordance with Congressional Intent and This Court’s Precedent. .............. 2 A. Congress enacted RLUIPA to ensure that neutral and generally applicable government burdens on religious exercise were subject to strict scrutiny. ..................................................................................3 B. This Court has consistently afforded strict scrutiny its proper and rigorous interpretation, and should reject attempts to weaken the government’s burden of proof. ........................................................................ 5 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................10 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................12 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................12 v Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Betenbaugh v. Needville I.S.D. 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010) ...........................................................................5 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).....................................................................................8 Chance v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 730 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2013) .......................................................................6, 9 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah 508 U.S. 520 (1993).........................................................................................3 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).........................................................................................6 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).....................................................................................7, 8 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).....................................................................................2, 3 Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2007) ...........................................................................7 Moussazadeh v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2013) ....................................................................... 6-8 Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2012) .......................................................................5, 8 Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 506 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2009) ....................................................................... 5-8 U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 255 (1982).........................................................................................4 U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).....................................................................................6, 9 vi Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005) .......................................................................6, 9 Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2007) ........................................................................6, 8 Statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.................................................................................................9 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) ................................................................................................5 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) .......................................................................................5, 9 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).............................................................................................5 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(b)............................................................................................8 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) ............................................................................................5 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2404 ............................................................................................9 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 35/15 ..........................................................................................9 Ala. Const. art. I, § 3.01 .............................................................................................9 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1493.01............................................................................9 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b ........................................................................................9 Fla. Stat. § 761.03 ......................................................................................................9 Idaho Code Ann. § 73-402 .........................................................................................9 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5303 .........................................................................................9 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446.350 ...................................................................................9 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:5233 ....................................................................................9 vii Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Miss. Code. Ann. § 11-61-1 .......................................................................................9 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.302 ...............................................................................................9 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-22-3 .........................................................................................9 Okla. Stat. tit 51 § 253 ...............................................................................................9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80 ..............................................................................................9 S.C. Code Ann. § 1-32-40 ..........................................................................................9 Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-407 .......................................................................................9 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 110.003 ...............................................................................9 Va. Code Ann. § 57-2.02 ...........................................................................................9 viii Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1 Alliance Defending Freedom is a non-profit, public interest legal organization that provides strategic planning, training, funding, and direct litigation services to protect religious civil liberties and family values. Alliance Defending Freedom and its over 2,500 allied attorneys regularly litigate religious freedom cases, based on constitutional provisions and statutes like the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), to protect individuals and churches whose religious exercise is burdened by neutral and generally-applicable laws. Alliance Defending Freedom has strong interest in ensuring that these laws, which are designed to alleviate government-imposed burdens on religion, are preserved in a full and robust state. In this instance, the interest addressed by this amicus brief is both narrower and broader than the interests addressed by the parties. Rather than addressing the factual and legal issues addressed by the parties, this brief focuses on the applicable legal standard under RLUIPA. Conversely, it is somewhat broader than the parties’ briefs in that it addresses the importance of this standard outside the facts of this case, and even outside of the prison context. 1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), Alliance Defending Freedom certifies that no party’s counsel wrote this brief in whole or in part, that no counsel or party contributed money intended to fund this brief, and that no one other than amicus, its members, and its counsel made such a contribution. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 1 Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) to heighten protection for religious liberty in the wake of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, which permits neutral laws of general applicability to evade Free Exercise scrutiny. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). These ostensibly-neutral laws nevertheless have substantial capacity to burden the religious exercise not only of prisoners like those in this case, but also of the many churches and religious institutions that Alliance Defending Freedom frequently represents. As discussed in the Argument below, RLUIPA is intended to protect against these burdens on religious exercise, and the rigorous application of RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standards – and in particular, the least restrictive means test – is critical to maintaining robust religious liberty protections against laws that appear neutral but nevertheless profoundly restrict religious exercise. ARGUMENT I. Firm Adherence to RLUIPA’s Strict Scrutiny Standard is Crucial to Protecting Religious Exercise From Government Burdens in Accordance with Congressional Intent and This Court’s Precedent. The government in this case advances arguments that subtly undermine the strict scrutiny–and particularly, the least restrictive means test–that Congress intentionally imposed upon government action in RLUIPA. Perhaps recognizing 2 Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 the infirmity of its case, the government urges this Court to rely not on the record below, but on RLUIPA decisions reached in other cases – which had very different factual records. See Appellant Brief (“AB”) p.28. Similarly, when it does point to its record, the government takes a “trust me” approach and relies on conclusory statements and speculation. See id. at p.39-41; see also Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“FF/CL”) at *31 (the government’s claim that the direct supervision requirement improved prison security is “pure speculation and is not supported by evidence.”). Permitting the government to in any way evade its weighty burden under strict scrutiny in this case would contravene both Congressional intent and this Court’s precedent, as well as weaken religious liberty protections for prisoners, churches, and other religious institutions across the nation. A. Congress enacted RLUIPA to ensure that neutral and generally applicable government burdens on religious exercise were subject to strict scrutiny. Neutral and generally applicable laws pose one of the gravest threats to religious exercise today. Laws that overtly target religious practices or beliefs undergo the “most rigorous of scrutiny.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (striking down a law targeting the ritual slaughter of animals). But in the wake of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, neutral laws of general applicability bypass 3 Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Free Exercise scrutiny altogether. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”) (quoting U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)). Because of Smith, people of faith have been compelled to comply with neutral and generally-applicable laws without regard to their deeply-held religious beliefs, the coercion of their conscience, the significance of the government’s interest, or even the law’s breadth of application. Recognizing this grave threat to religious exercise, Congress took action to restore strict scrutiny of government action that substantially burdens religious exercise and enacted RLUIPA. Of particular importance to this case is RLUIPA’s substantial-burden clause in the prison context, which applies to all laws, even if they are “neutral” and of general applicability: No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 4 Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).2 Perhaps equally important, RLUIPA includes a rule of construction providing that it “shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(g). Yet despite RLUIPA’s strong substantial burden language and explicit rule of construction, RLUIPA’s rigorous religious liberty protections and high government burden are ever in danger of being whittled down at the behest of government actors. B. This Court has consistently afforded strict scrutiny its proper and rigorous interpretation, and should reject attempts to weaken the government’s burden of proof. This Court has been adamant in its determination that “strict scrutiny is the proper test” for claims under RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provisions. Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 292 n.12 (5th Cir. 2012) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) as “expressly” providing for strict scrutiny); see also Betenbaugh v. Needville I.S.D., 611 F.3d 248, 266-272 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying strict scrutiny in land-use context); Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 331-335 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying strict scrutiny in prison context). Moreover, as to the second prong of the substantial-burden provisions, this Court has held that the “phrase ‘least restrictive means’ has its plain meaning.” 2 In the land-use context, the equivalent provision is found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 5 Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Sossamon, 506 F.3d at 332. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has made clear that the plain meaning of “least restrictive means” requires the government to consider and reasonably reject available alternatives. See, e.g., U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989). The same plain meaning “applies with equal force to RLUIPA.” Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 284 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Chance v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 730 F.3d 404, 412-413 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding prison policy only after the government presented specific evidence that it considered and reasonably rejected a variety of alternatives, including the alternatives suggested by the plaintiff); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 99 (9th Cir. 2005) (requiring government to specifically demonstrate that it considered and rejected available alternatives). Furthermore, this Court recently confirmed the point in no uncertain terms by emphasizing that the “least restrictive means” test “is the most demanding test known to constitutional law.” Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dept. of Crim. Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 795 (5th Cir. 2013). Despite such clear statements in the holdings of this Court, governments (and even a dissenting judge) have nevertheless asserted that the least-restrictive-means test is “less stringent than its language suggests.” See id. at 798 (Barksdale, J. dissenting in part). In general, these contentions take two forms, both of which are contrary to this Court’s precedents. 6 Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 First, some have argued that the RLUIPA test must be less stringent than its “plain language” indicates, because the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) (which has equivalent language) was struck down as applied to states and state subdivisions. See id. at 798 (Barksdale, J. dissenting in part). However, this Court determined that Congress avoided the constitutional defects of RFRA by relying on additional constitutional powers (such as the Spending Clause) and by limiting its scope to “laws and regulations concerning land use and institutional persons”—not by altering the meaning of “compelling government interest” and “least restrictive means.” E.g., Sossamon, 506 F.3d at 328-329; Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 2007). Instead, the Court has found that RLUIPA standards have been “carried over” from RFRA. E.g., Longoria, 507 F.3d at 902. Therefore, in at least one instance, this Court found that a previous RFRA case had decided the same issue and was precedential as to RLUIPA as well. Id. at 904. Second, some have argued—in the prison context—that certain “deference” language from the Supreme Court alters the plain meaning of RLUIPA. Moussazadeh, 703 F.3d at 798 (Barksdale, J. dissenting in part) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723, (2005)). However, such language is properly understood as a restatement of the principle that “[c]ontext matters” in applying the “compelling government interest” standard, and it is the prison officials’ 7 Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 experience that generally provides factual basis for the Court to make its evaluation under that standard. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723. In contrast, the Supreme Court’s deference language does not alter the principle that “least restrictive means” must be given its plain meaning, or the principle that such language represents the “most demanding test known to constitutional law.” See, e.g. Sossamon, 506 F.3d at 332; Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dept. of Crim. Justice, 703 F.3d at 795; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014) (“[t]he least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding”). Nor does it alter the principle that the government always bears the burden to establish that the law furthers a compelling state interest and that the law is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. See, e.g., Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 291 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(b)). Likewise, it does not allow a court to rely on conclusory statements, speculation, or inadmissible evidence from prison officials. Nor does it permit the government to rely on the record before the court in other cases that reach its desired result. Instead, the plain meaning of “least restrictive means” requires the government to specifically show that is has considered and reasonably rejected the other alternatives. See, e.g., Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 284 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing e.g., U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000)); 8 Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 99 (9th Cir. 2005); (accord); see also Chance v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim Justice, 730 F.3d 404, 412-413 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding policy only after government presented specific evidence that it considered and reasonably rejected a variety of alternatives, including the alternatives suggested by the plaintiff). Weakening scrutiny of government-imposed burdens in the prison context would, in turn, weaken religious liberty protections in other applications of RLUIPA, as well as other statutes. Many federal statutes employ the same strict scrutiny language and least restrictive means test contained in RLUIPA’s section three on institutionalized persons. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (religious land use), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (federal RFRA). Likewise, many states have passed their own versions of RFRA or RLUIPA, copying language from the federal statute.3 These statutes commonly provide the only legal remedy to churches and other religious institutions whose religious exercise has been substantially burdened by government action. 3 Examples include Alabama, Ala. Const. art. I, § 3.01; Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411493.01; Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b; Florida, Fla. Stat. § 761.03; Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. § 73-402; Illinois, 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 35/15; Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5303; Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446.350; Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:5233; Mississippi, Miss. Code. Ann. § 11-61-1; Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.302; New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-22-3; Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. tit 51, § 253; Pennsylvania, 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2404; Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80; South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 1-32-40; Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-407; Texas, Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 110.003; and Virginia, Va. Code Ann. § 57-2.02. 9 Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 18 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Therefore, reinterpreting the least restrictive means test to give the government wide discretion in narrow tailoring would trigger a ripple effect damaging to all religious freedom jurisprudence. As such, this Court should maintain its longstanding policy of rigorously applying strict scrutiny—and particularly the plain meaning of “least restrictive means”—in this case. CONCLUSION RLUIPA is to be broadly construed in favor of religious freedom. Congress designed RLUIPA, and laws like it, to alleviate substantial burdens on religious exercise from neutral laws of general applicability. Strict scrutiny of government-imposed burdens on religious exercise plays a vital role in protecting religious freedom. Requiring government officials to articulate a narrowly tailored and compelling interest eliminates frivolous or arbitrary barriers to religious exercise. Amicus respectfully urges this Court to reaffirm the application of strict scrutiny in its full, robust state to ensure strong religious liberty protections for prisoners, churches, and other religious institutions that find their religious liberty unnecessarily restricted. 10 Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 s/ Kevin H. Theriot Kevin H. Theriot ktheriot@alliancedefendingfreedom.org Erik W. Stanley Christiana M. Holcomb ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 15100 N. 90th Street Scottsdale, Arizona 85260 (480) 444-0020 (480) 444-0028 s/ William D. Taylor William D. Taylor (TX 24046954) TAYLOR & TAYLOR LAW, P.C. 4115 Highgrove Dr. Arlington, TX 76001 817.483.8388 Fax: 817.483.8390 Email: wtaylor@taylorandtaylorlaw.com January 9, 2015 11 Page: 19 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Case: 14-20444 Document: 00512896737 Page: 20 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(d) and 32(a)(7)(B) because the brief contains 2,500 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). This brief complies with the typeface and type style requirements of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and 32(a)(6) because the brief has been prepared using Microsoft Word, Version 2007 in fourteen-point Times New Roman font, which is a proportionally-spaced typeface. Dated January 9, 2015 s/ Kevin H. Theriot Counsel for Amicus Curiae CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on January 9, 2015, the above and foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae Alliance Defending Freedom in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees Urging Affirmance was served via the Court’s EM/ECT Document Filing System, https://ecf.ca5.uscourts.gov/ upon counsel for all parties. Counsel also certifies that on January 9, 2015, the foregoing document was transmitted to Mr. Lyle W. Cayce, Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, via the Court’s EM/ECT Document Filing System, https://ecf.ca5.uscourts.gov/. Counsel further certifies that 1) required privacy redactions have been made in compliance with Fifth Circuit Rule 24.2.13; 2) the electronic submission is an exact copy of the paper document in compliance with Fifth Circuit Rule 25.2.1; and 3) the document has been scanned with the most recent version of Sophos Protection and is free of viruses. Dated January 9, 2015 s/ Kevin H. Theriot Counsel for Amicus Curiae 12