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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RENATA SINGLETON; MARC
MITCHELL; LAZONIA BAHAM; JANE
DOE; TIFFANY LACROIX; FAYONA
BAILEY; and SILENCE IS VIOLENCE,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action No. 17-10721
Section H
Judge Jane Triche Milazzo
Division 1
Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld

LEON CANNIZZARO, in his official
capacity as District Attorney of Orleans
Parish and in his individual capacity; DAVID
PIPES; IAIN DOVER; JASON NAPOLI;
ARTHUR MITCHELL; TIFFANY
TUCKER; MICHAEL TRUMMEL;
MATTHEW HAMILTON; INGA
PETROVICH; LAURA RODRIGUE; and
JOHN DOE, in their individual capacities,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

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Leon Cannizzaro (in his individual capacity); David Pipes; Iain Dover; Jason Napoli;
Arthur Mitchell; Tiffany Tucker; Michael Trummel; Matthew Hamilton; Inga Petrovich; and
Laura Rodrigue (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”), through undersigned counsel,
respectfully submit this memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss the claims against them
filed by Renata Singleton; Marc Mitchell; Lazonia Baham; Jane Doe; Tiffany LaCroix; Fayona
Bailey; and Silence Is Violence (“SIV”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Complaint, Doc. No. 1.
INTRODUCTION
This lawsuit alleges that District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro and nine Assistant District
Attorneys, in their efforts to aggressively prosecute those who commit serious crimes in Orleans
Parish—specifically, the offenses of murder, child molestation, child pornography, and domestic
violence, as described in the Complaint—have violated the rights of six witnesses and one
organization. The Plaintiffs broadly challenge the efforts of Orleans Parish prosecutors to question
material witnesses to such serious crimes who are unwilling to cooperate with the prosecution,
alleging that the Defendants have “create[d] a culture of fear and intimidation that chills crime
victims and witnesses from asserting their constitutional rights”—i.e., their purported right to
refuse to speak to prosecutors. Complaint at 3. Many of the allegations concern the use of materialwitness warrants, which “shall issue” upon a showing by the prosecution—or the defense—that
“the testimony of any witness is essential to the prosecution or the defense” and that “it may
become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.” LA. REV. STAT.
§ 15:257.1 Notwithstanding the Plaintiffs’ implications, such warrants are a critical tool for

1

Federal law contains a similar statute applicable to witnesses in criminal proceedings. See 18
U.S.C. § 3144.
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procuring essential testimony in criminal matters. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184
(1953) (“[I]nterrogation of those who know something about the facts is the chief means to solution
of crime. The duty to disclose knowledge of crime rests upon all citizens. It is so vital that one
known to be innocent may be detained, in the absence of bail, as a material witness.”), overruled
on other grounds by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Although Plaintiffs’ Complaint stretches to 62 pages, the actual claims against the
Individual Defendants are discrete and straightforward:
1.

Three of the Plaintiffs (Ms. Singleton, Ms. Baham, and Mr. Mitchell) allege that

their Fourth Amendment rights were violated by six of the Individual Defendants because they
were arrested pursuant to material-witness warrants that were obtained using warrant applications
that allegedly contained false statements, material omissions, and insufficient factual allegations.
Complaint at ¶¶ 295–297. These Plaintiffs allege that the same conduct also violates the First
Amendment (because it constitutes “threat[s] and retaliati[on] against crime victims, witnesses and
advocates who engage in constitutionally protected free speech, including the right to decline to
speak voluntarily with investigating prosecutors”); violates the substantive-due-process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment (because it “shocks the conscience”); and constitutes abuse of process
and fraud under Louisiana law. See id. at ¶¶ 302–303, 309, 318–330.
2.

The other three individual Plaintiffs (Ms. Bailey, Ms. LaCroix, and Ms. Doe) allege

that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated by three of the Individual Defendants because
they were compelled to attend private meetings at the DA’s office through allegedly “unlawful
subpoenas, accompanied by threats of arrest and imprisonment.” See Complaint at ¶¶ 299–300.
These Plaintiffs likewise allege that the same conduct also violates the First and Fourteenth

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Amendments and constitutes abuse of process and fraud under Louisiana law. See id. at ¶¶ 302–
303, 309, 318–330.
3.

Ms. Baham additionally alleges that Mr. Napoli violated her Fourteenth

Amendment due-process rights by causing her to be “jailed without a prompt court appearance
after an arrest on a material witness warrant.” Complaint at ¶ 306.
4.

The Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Cannizzaro is personally liable for the alleged

wrongful acts described above because he failed to adequately train, supervise, and discipline the
Assistant District Attorneys and others under his control. Complaint at ¶¶ 311–313. The Plaintiffs
further allege that each of the Individual Defendants is liable for the alleged wrongdoing of every
other Individual Defendant because he knew or should have known about it but failed to intervene
and prevent it. Id. at ¶¶ 314–317.
5.

SIV alleges that the Fourth Amendment rights of its unnamed “clients” were

violated in the same manner described above, and that its own First Amendment rights were
violated based on alleged threats that Mr. Cannizzaro made to its Executive Director. Complaint
at ¶¶ 295, 299, 304. SIV also asserts a state-law abuse-of-process claim on the same grounds
described above. Id. at ¶ 321.
* * * * *
All of these claims are fatally flawed for multiple reasons. First, most of the claims are
prescribed because they were filed more than one year after the date of the alleged injury. Second,
most of the claims are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity, and the remaining claims are
barred by qualified immunity. Third, the claims fail on the merits because the Plaintiffs have not
alleged facts plausibly showing that the Individual Defendants violated their rights. Accordingly,
the claims against the Individual Defendants must be dismissed.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The specific factual allegations against each Defendant, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, are set
forth below. Although these allegations are replete with inaccuracies and material omissions, they
are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion only, as required by Rule 12(b)(6) standards.
A.

Arthur Mitchell (claims by Renata Singleton)

Renata Singleton reported to the police a crime by Vernon Crossley on November 2, 2014.
See Complaint at ¶ 155. On April 21, 2015, an unnamed “investigator from the District Attorney’s
Office” delivered two documents that were styled as “subpoenas,” directing her to appear for
questioning at the DA’s office on April 24, 2015, but which had not been presented to or approved
by a court. Id. at ¶¶ 157–158. The Plaintiffs do not allege whose signature was on the documents.
Ms. Singleton did not go the DA’s office on April 24, 2015, as requested. Id. at ¶ 160. On that day,
Mr. Mitchell “applied for a material witness warrant asking the court to put [her] in jail,” including
as part of the factual basis that she had failed to appear at the DA’s office pursuant to the two
“subpoenas.” Id. at ¶ 161.
Judge Robin Pittman issued the material-witness warrant for her arrest with a bond of
$100,000. Complaint at ¶ 163. On May 28, 2015, police officers came to her house to arrest her
pursuant to that warrant, but her friend, who was also a police officer, persuaded the officers (who
called the DA’s office for approval) to leave without arresting her on the condition that she
voluntarily appear at the DA’s office the next morning. Id. at ¶¶ 165–167. She appeared the next
morning and was greeted by Mr. Mitchell, who led her to a room with other attorneys and
questioned her about the incident with Mr. Crossley, telling her that she did not need a lawyer
because she was not a criminal. Id. at ¶¶ 168–170. After she refused to answer any questions
without an attorney present, an unnamed supervisor who was in the room called for a police officer,
who arrived and arrested her. Id. at ¶¶ 171–172. She was brought to court on June 2, 2015, and a
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lawyer hired by her mother succeeded in having the bond reduced to $5,000. Id. at ¶ 181. Her
mother paid the bond, and she was released. Id. at ¶¶ 181–182. Mr. Crossley pleaded guilty to two
misdemeanors, and Ms. Singleton was never asked to testify. Id. at ¶ 183.
B.

David Pipes (claims by Renata Singleton)

The sole allegation against Mr. Pipes is that he “reviewed and approved Defendant
Mitchell’s application for the arrest warrant” for Ms. Singleton. Complaint at ¶ 162.2
C.

Tiffany Tucker (claims by Renata Singleton)

The sole allegation against Ms. Tucker is that she was present, along with Mr. Mitchell and
an unnamed supervisor, in a meeting with Ms. Singleton that culminated in Ms. Singleton being
arrested pursuant to a material-witness warrant. See Complaint at ¶ 169.3 However, the Plaintiffs
do not allege that Ms. Tucker said or did anything at that meeting or otherwise played any part in
her arrest.
D.

Michael Trummel (claims by Marc Mitchell)

In July 2014, Marc Mitchell was shot multiple times by Jonterry Bernard after a
confrontation with Gerard Gray at a basketball court. Complaint at ¶¶ 187–188. Mr. Bernard and
Mr. Gray were both charged with attempted murder. Id. at ¶ 189. As Mr. Gray’s trial approached,
Mr. Trummel met with Mr. Mitchell to prepare. Id. at ¶ 192. Mr. Mitchell felt that Mr. Trummel
“seemed more intent on telling him what had happened than actually listening to [his] account of
the shooting,” and that the DA’s office was not “taking concerns about his safety seriously.” Id. at
¶¶ 194–195. On April 4, 2016, Mr. Mitchell met with Mr. Trummel “to inform him that he wanted

2

The Plaintiffs also allege that Mr. Pipes approved a warrant application pertaining to an unnamed
person who is not a party to this case. See Complaint at ¶ 93.
3

The Plaintiffs also allege that Ms. Tucker signed allegedly improper subpoenas and applied for
a material-witness warrant pertaining to unnamed persons who are not parties to this case. See
Complaint at ¶¶ 46, 47, 55, 78, 79.
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no further private contact with the District Attorney’s Office,” and also “signed a subpoena to
come to court to testify against Gray.” Id. at ¶¶ 197–198.
On April 6, 2016, Mr. Trummel applied for a material-witness warrant for Mr. Mitchell,
relying on Mr. Mitchell’s statements at the April 4 meeting and stating that Mr. Mitchell “had a
bus ticket to leave town,” although Mr. Mitchell had not in fact bought a bus ticket. Complaint at
¶¶ 199–200. The application did not inform the court that Mr. Mitchell had signed a subpoena to
appear in court for Mr. Gray’s trial. Id. at ¶ 201. The warrant was issued, and on April 7, 2016,
Mr. Mitchell was arrested by two police officers pursuant to the warrant and held on a $50,000
bond. Id. at ¶ 203–206. Mr. Mitchell’s family sought assistance from SIV, and Tamara Jackson
advocated for his release. Id. at ¶ 207. Mr. Mitchell was released the next morning, April 8, 2016,
on his own recognizance. Id. The day before Mr. Gray’s trial, Mr. Mitchell “reluctantly” agreed to
meet with prosecutors, and he discussed his testimony with Mr. Trummel once again. Id. at ¶ 208.
Mr. Mitchell testified at trial, and Mr. Gray was convicted. Id. at ¶ 210.4
E.

Matthew Hamilton (claims by Marc Mitchell)

Aside from conclusory allegations that Mr. Hamilton violated Mr. Mitchell’s rights, see
Complaint at ¶¶ 296, 303, there are no specific factual allegations against Mr. Hamilton.
F.

Jason Napoli (claims by Lazonia Baham)

After Lazonia Baham’s daughter’s boyfriend was murdered in February 2013, multiple
investigators from the DA’s office (including Michael Kitchens, who is not a party to this case)
contacted her on several occasions with questions about Isaac Jones, the murder suspect.
Complaint at ¶¶ 214–218. After Mr. Kitchens told her that she could be arrested if she refused to

4

The Plaintiffs also allege that Mr. Trummel applied for a material-witness warrant pertaining to
an unnamed person who is not a party to this case. See Complaint at ¶¶ 83–84.
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tell prosecutors what she knew, she stopped taking his calls. Id. at ¶¶ 218–219. She told the DA’s
office that “she would come to court if subpoenaed, but . . . would not change her story.” Id. at
¶ 220. In the following months, she received several allegedly “unlawful” subpoenas directing her
to appear at the DA’s office, but she did not appear. Id. at ¶¶ 221–221.
On October 13, 2015, Mr. Napoli applied for a material-witness warrant for Ms. Baham,
alleging that Ms. Baham “refused to meet with ADA Jason Napoli and cut off all communication
with the District Attorney’s Office.” Complaint at ¶ 223. Mr. Napoli did not state in the application
that Ms. Baham had talked to him on multiple occasions, or that she had told him she planned to
attend court. Id. at ¶ 224. The warrant was issued, and on December 29, 2015, police officers
arrested Ms. Baham. Id. at ¶¶ 224–225. On January 6, 2016, she was brought to court, where she
met with Mr. Napoli privately. Id. at ¶¶ 227–228. She was released later that evening. Id. at ¶ 233.
Since then, Ms. Baham has testified twice in pretrial proceedings. Id. at ¶ 234.5
G.

Iain Dover (claims by Jane Doe)

Jane Doe is a victim of juvenile molestation and child pornography. Complaint at ¶ 236. In
September 2016, Mr. Dover brought an allegedly “fraudulent” subpoena to her home, directing
her to appear at the DA’s office for questioning. Id. at ¶ 237. An attorney for Ms. Doe responded
with a letter asking Mr. Dover to “honor their right to privacy, their right to be left alone,”
explaining that “[t]hey do not want to be badgered, bothered or harassed by anyone from law
enforcement in any way,” and telling him to direct any questions to Ms. Doe’s attorney. Id. at
¶ 238. Later, an investigator from the DA’s office who worked for Mr. Dover came to Ms. Doe’s

5

The Plaintiffs also allege that Mr. Napoli obtained a material-witness warrant pertaining to an
unnamed person who is not a party to this case. See Complaint at ¶¶ 88–90.
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high school, accompanied by a uniformed police officer, with a “document” directing her to appear
for questioning at the DA’s office the next morning. Id. at ¶ 239.
Ms. Doe did not appear the following morning, and Mr. Dover “called her attorney and left
a voicemail threatening that, if [she] did not arrive by 11 a.m., he would seek her arrest on a
material witness warrant.” Complaint at ¶ 242. A hearing in the case was held later that day, and
although Mr. Dover “arrived at the hearing with a completed material witness warrant application”
for Ms. Doe, he did not present it, and no warrant was issued. Id. at ¶ 243–244. Instead, “[t]he
court ordered [Ms. Doe’s attorney] to arrange a meeting for Ms. Doe to meet with prosecutors.”
Id. at ¶ 244. Ms. Doe met with Mr. Dover at the DA’s office later that same day. Id. at ¶ 245. Mr.
Dover “interrogated her about the offenses that victimized her, including a number of intimate
questions,” and allegedly “mocked [her] when she did not answer his questions.” Id. at ¶ 246.
H.

Inga Petrovich (claims by Fayona Bailey)

Fayona Bailey is a potential witness in a murder case, and Ms. Petrovich issued an allegedly
“fraudulent” subpoena directing her to appear at the DA’s office on March 16, 2017, for
questioning. Complaint at ¶¶ 250, 252. The document, which was entitled “SUBPOENA” and
threatened jail and fines for failure to obey, was delivered to Ms. Bailey’s home by two
investigators from the DA’s office. Id. at ¶ 253. One of the investigators told her that she could be
sent to jail if she did not attend. Id. at ¶ 254. The investigators asked her to sign the document to
acknowledge receipt, but she did not do so. Id. at ¶ 256. Later, an unnamed “representative” of the
DA’s office called Ms. Bailey and again threatened her with jail time if she did not appear. Id. at
¶ 258. Ms. Bailey hired an attorney, who filed a motion to quash the subpoena, but the subpoena
was withdrawn by the prosecution. Id. at ¶ 267. Ms. Bailey was never called to testify at trial. Id.
at ¶ 268.

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I.

Laura Rodrigue (claims by Tiffany LaCroix)

Tiffany LaCroix is a potential witness in a murder case, and Ms. Rodrigue issued an
allegedly “fraudulent” subpoena in November 2016 directing her to appear at the DA’s office for
questioning and threatening fines or imprisonment for failure to obey. Complaint at ¶¶ 250, 262.
Ms. LaCroix “did not want to be pressured to reveal private information about [the defendant]
unless she was compelled by law to do so” and did not want to miss work, so she hired an attorney,
who filed a motion to quash the subpoena. Id. at ¶¶ 263–267. The subpoena was withdrawn by the
prosecution, and Ms. LaCroix was never called to testify at trial. Id. at ¶¶ 267–268.
J.

Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., in his individual capacity

With one exception, the claims against Mr. Cannizzaro in his individual capacity arise from
his alleged failure to adequately train, supervise, and discipline the Assistant District Attorneys
and other agents under his control with respect to the allegedly unlawful conduct described above.
See Complaint at ¶¶ 311–313. The Plaintiffs also allege that Mr. Cannizzaro personally violated
the First Amendment rights of SIV (1) by warning its Executive Director, Tamara Jackson, in 2016
that “if it appeared that she was encouraging victims not to communicate with his office, he could
prosecute her for witness coercion”; and (2) by warning Ms. Jackson three years earlier that “if
she dissuaded victims from assisting prosecutors, she could be charged with obstruction.”
Complaint at ¶¶ 151–153, 304.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must “take all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and ask whether the pleadings contain
‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Howell v. Town of Ball, 827
F.3d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” and a court is not bound
to accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
I.

Prosecutors are protected by absolute immunity with respect to actions taken as an
advocate of the State and by qualified immunity with respect to other official actions.
“[P]rosecutors are absolutely immune with respect to activities that are ‘intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 631–
32 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). “Conduct falling
within this category is not limited ‘only to the act of initiation itself and to conduct occurring in
the courtroom,’ but instead includes all actions ‘which occur in the course of [the prosecutor’s]
role as an advocate of the State.’” Id. at 632 (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272–
73 (1993)); see also Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 (“[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for
the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an
advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.”).
With respect to any other official actions—such as “administrative duties and those
investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a
prosecution or for judicial proceedings”—prosecutors are entitled to qualified immunity. Loupe v.
O’Bannon, 824 F.3d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). “The doctrine of qualified
immunity protects government officials from civil damages liability when their actions could
reasonably have been believed to be legal.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011)
(en banc). “This immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.” Id. at 371 (quotation omitted). “[A] plaintiff seeking to defeat qualified immunity must
show: (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was

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clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A Government
official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the
contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that
what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quotation
omitted). Courts “do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id.
II.

Fourth Amendment claims based on material-witness warrants
“Section 1983 claims pending in federal courts in Louisiana are subject to a one year

statute of limitations period,” which “commences to run from the day injury or damage is
sustained.” Gordon v. James, No. 16-cv-16540, 2017 WL 4311125, at *6 (E.D. La. Sep. 26, 2017)
(citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492); see also Elzy v. Roberson, 868 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1989) (same).
Three of the Plaintiffs assert Fourth Amendment claims arising out their arrest on allegedly
improper material-witness warrants: (1) Ms. Singleton alleges that a warrant was issued on April
24, 2015, and that she was arrested on May 29, 2015, and released on June 2, 2015; (2) Mr. Mitchell
alleges that a warrant was issued on April 6, 2016, and that he was arrested on April 7, 2016, and
released on April 8, 2016; (3) Ms. Baham alleges that a warrant was issued on October 13, 2015,
and that she was arrested on December 29, 2015, and released on January 6, 2016. The injuries
alleged by these Plaintiffs—seizure on allegedly unconstitutional grounds—clearly were sustained
on the day they were arrested, and in no event could have occurred at any point after they were
released from custody. Because these Plaintiffs were all arrested and released more than one year
before the date this lawsuit was filed (October 17, 2017), their claims are prescribed on the face of
the Complaint and must be dismissed.
Alternatively, these claims are barred by the Individual Defendants’ absolute prosecutorial
immunity. “Other circuits that have addressed the question have held that prosecutors are
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ordinarily entitled to absolute immunity for conduct falling within a prosecutorial function when
they seek detention of a material witness pursuant to judicial order.” Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d
397, 403 (3rd Cir. 2011); see also Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 172 (2nd Cir. 2013)
(“[W]hen a prosecutor seeks a material witness warrant, he does so as an advocate and is immune
from suit. Any alleged misstatements by [the prosecutor] in his application for the material witness
warrant therefore cannot form the basis for liability.”) (citation omitted); Daniels v. Kieser, 586
F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor was absolutely immune from § 1983 suit alleging that he made
false statements to the court to obtain a material-witness warrant). The claim that the Individual
Defendants “rel[ied] on false allegations, material omissions, and plainly insufficient factual
allegations in applications for material witness warrants,” Complaint at ¶ 295, plainly concerns
alleged conduct taken as an advocate. Accordingly, these claims are barred by absolute immunity.
See Adams, 656 F.3d at 405 (“Because [the prosecutor’s] actions fell within her prosecutorial role,
she is entitled to absolute immunity even if her statements were false or misleading.”).6
III.

Fourth Amendment claims based on allegedly unlawful subpoenas
Three of the Plaintiffs (Ms. Doe, Ms. Bailey, and Ms. LaCroix) allege that “unlawful”

subpoenas were used to “seize” them in violation of the Fourth Amendment—more specifically,
that certain Individual Defendants “compel[ed] [them] to attend private meetings at the District

6

Additionally, Ms. Singleton’s claims against Mr. Pipes and Ms. Tucker, along with Mr.
Mitchell’s claims against Mr. Hamilton, fail because the Complaint does not plausibly allege facts
suggesting any wrongdoing on their part. Ms. Singleton alleges that Mr. Pipes “reviewed and
approved” the warrant application for her arrest, which allegedly contained false statements
(because the “subpoenas” sent to Ms. Singleton allegedly were not true subpoenas). See Complaint
at ¶ 161–162. However, Ms. Singleton does not allege that Mr. Pipes knew the statements in the
application were false, and the facts as alleged do not plausibly raise such an inference. Further,
Ms. Singleton does not allege that Ms. Tucker had anything to do with the issuance of the warrant,
or her arrest, at all. See id. at ¶ 169 (sole allegation against Ms. Tucker). Finally, the Complaint
contains no specific factual allegations whatsoever concerning Mr. Hamilton.
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Attorney’s Office by using unlawful subpoenas, accompanied by threats of arrest and
imprisonment.” Complaint at ¶ 299. However, the claims by Ms. Doe are prescribed because the
presentation of the allegedly fraudulent subpoena and her meeting with Mr. Dover occurred in
September 2016, more than one year before this suit was filed. Moreover, because the alleged
actions—sending allegedly improper subpoenas to witnesses in an attempt to review and discuss
the witnesses’ testimony in advance of trial—were “undertaken by . . . prosecutor[s] in preparing
for . . . trial” and “occur[red] in the course of [their] role as an advocate for the State,” Buckley,
509 U.S. at 273, the claims of all three Plaintiffs are barred by absolute immunity.
Alternatively, even if absolute immunity does not apply, the claims are certainly barred by
qualified immunity because the Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged the violation of any
constitutional right, clearly established or otherwise. “A person is ‘seized’ for Fourth Amendment
purposes ‘when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of the citizen.’” McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 691 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). “A seizure occurs ‘only if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that [they were]
not free to leave.’” Id. (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)).
Two of these plaintiffs—Ms. Bailey and Ms. LaCroix—admit that they did not appear for
questioning at the DA’s office as requested; thus, they were not actually “compel[ed] . . . to attend
private meetings at the District Attorney’s Office.” Complaint at ¶ 299. Notwithstanding this
failure to appear, they do not allege that they were arrested or subjected to any other restraint on
their liberty. The law is clear that a threat of possible imprisonment, without more, does not
constitute a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment if the subject does not actually yield or submit
to it. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991); see also Brower v. County of Inyo,

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489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (“Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition
of physical control.”); Martinez v. Carr, 479 F.3d 1292, 1299 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he mere
issuance of a citation requiring presence at future legal proceedings does not qualify as a
constitutional ‘seizure.’”); Britton v. Maloney, 196 F.3d 24, 29–30 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Terry cannot
be read to mean that the issuance of a summons (any more than a testimonial subpoena or a call to
jury duty) would constitute a seizure simply because it threatens a citizen with the possibility of
confinement if he fails to appear in court.”). Because Ms. Bailey and Ms. LaCroix plainly have
not stated any cognizable cause of action, Ms. Rodrigue and Ms. Petrovich are entitled, at a
minimum, to qualified immunity.
Although Ms. Doe alleges that she actually appeared at the DA’s office for questioning,
her claim is likewise deficient. Even assuming that a voluntary meeting with prosecutors under
threat of imprisonment could constitute a “seizure,” Ms. Doe does not allege that any such seizure
resulted from the subpoena that was sent to her—rather, she alleges that she initially refused to
appear as directed by the subpoena and met with prosecutors only later, after “[t]he court ordered
[her lawyer] to arrange a meeting.” Complaint at ¶ 244–245. In other words, Ms. Doe cannot show
that Mr. Dover improperly coerced her to meet with him when it was the court that ultimately
ordered the meeting.
Finally, Ms. Doe’s voluntary decision to meet with Mr. Dover pursuant to a court order or
purported subpoena does not constitute a Fourth Amendment “seizure” under clearly established
law. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in McLin is instructive: In that case, the Court held that, although
the plaintiff’s voluntary surrender to an arrest warrant constituted a “seizure” under the Fourth
Amendment, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the relevant law was not
clearly established. See 866 F.3d at 695–96. The Court noted that “neither the Supreme Court nor

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the Fifth Circuit has decided that an officer’s acceptance of a voluntary surrender to an arrest
warrant constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure,” and that “there is no [sic] a robust consensus of
persuasive authority” on the question. Id. at 696 (quotation omitted). And if the law is unclear with
respect to a criminal defendant’s surrender for arrest on a criminal charge, it is much less clear
with respect to a witness’s pre-trial meeting with prosecutors. Accordingly, Mr. Dover is entitled
to qualified immunity.
IV.

First Amendment retaliation claims
“[T]o establish a First Amendment retaliation claim . . . , [plaintiffs] must show that (1)

they were engaged in constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendants’ actions caused them
to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that
activity, and (3) the defendants’ adverse actions were substantially motivated against the plaintiffs’
exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.” Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir.
2002).
Three of the Plaintiffs (Ms. Singleton, Mr. Mitchell, and Ms. Baham) appear to allege that
their First Amendment rights were violated because certain Individual Defendants obtained
material-witness warrants in “retaliation” for their assertion of their purported “right to decline to
speak voluntarily with investigating prosecutors.” Complaint at ¶ 302–303. As discussed above,
these claims are prescribed because the injury they complain of occurred more than one year before
suit was filed. Also, as with the Fourth Amendment claims asserted by these Plaintiffs, these First
Amendment claims are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity because they arise out of the
Individual Defendants’ actions in seeking and obtaining material-witness warrants. Alternatively,
these claims are barred by qualified immunity because there is no clearly established law holding
that it is “constitutionally protected activity” for a witness to a serious crime to refuse to speak
with prosecutors.
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The other three individual Plaintiffs (Ms. Doe, Ms. Bailey, and Ms. LaCroix) appear to
allege that their First Amendment rights were violated because certain Individual Defendants sent
allegedly fraudulent subpoenas to them in “retaliation” for their assertion of their purported “right
to decline to speak voluntarily with investigating prosecutors.” Complaint at ¶ 302–303. As
discussed above, Ms. Doe’s claim is prescribed because her alleged injury occurred more than one
year before suit was filed. Furthermore, the claims of all three Plaintiffs are barred by absolute
immunity because the allegedly improper subpoenas were sent by prosecutors in their role as
advocate for the State, in an attempt to review witness testimony in advance of trial. Alternatively,
these claims are barred by qualified immunity because none of these Plaintiffs “suffer[ed] an injury
that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in” the allegedly
protected activity. Keenan, 290 F.3d at 258. Receiving an allegedly fraudulent subpoena that
threatens fines or imprisonment if the recipient does not appear, without more, does not give rise
to a constitutionally adequate “injury.” Nor would it “chill a person of ordinary firmness” from
continuing the activity of not speaking voluntarily with prosecutors. Notably, neither Ms. Doe,
Ms. Bailey, nor Ms. LaCroix felt sufficiently “chilled” or threatened to actually comply with the
subpoenas. And again, there is no clearly established law holding that it is “constitutionally
protected activity” for a witness to a serious crime to refuse to speak with prosecutors.
V.

Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process claims
The Plaintiffs allege that “[e]ach of Defendant Cannizzaro’s official policies, practices and

customs described [in the Complaint], separately and in combination, shocks the conscience and
violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of all Plaintiffs.” Complaint at ¶ 309. A plaintiff
asserting a Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process claim must show that the defendant’s
actions (1) caused an injury; (2) “were grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the
circumstances”; and (3) “were inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of
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zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience.” Petta v. Rivera,
143 F.3d 895, 902 (5th Cir. 1998). “The burden to show state conduct that shocks the conscience
is extremely high, requiring stunning evidence of arbitrariness and caprice that extends beyond
mere violations of state law, even violations resulting from bad faith to something more egregious
and more extreme.” Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849,
868 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also Jordan v. Fisher, 823 F.3d 805, 812–13 (5th Cir.
2016) (“The Court’s test for the substantive component of the due process clause prohibits only
the most egregious official conduct, and it will rarely come into play.”) (quotation omitted); Kinzie
v. Dallas Cty. Hosp. Dist., 239 F. Supp. 2d 618, 630 (“[C]ourts have shown great reluctance to
find that the behavior of a state official ‘shocks the conscience.’”).
As a threshold matter, it is not clear whether this claim is asserted against the Individual
Defendants. Although the caption states that it is “Against all Defendants,” the language refers
only to Mr. Cannizzaro’s “official policies, practices and customs” and does not refer to any
specific alleged acts by any specific Defendants. See id. Assuming the Plaintiffs intended to assert
Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process claims against the Individual Defendants, they
have plainly failed.
First, as discussed above, the claims asserted by Ms. Singleton, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Baham,
and Ms. Doe are all barred by prescription. The only Plaintiffs whose claims do not appear to be
prescribed are Ms. Bailey and Ms. LaCroix—who were never arrested, detained, or even privately
questioned by prosecutors, despite failing to comply with allegedly “fraudulent” subpoenas.
Second, any claim arising out of the Individual Defendants’ actions in obtaining material-witness
warrants from a court, or sending allegedly improper subpoenas, is once again barred by absolute
prosecutorial immunity.

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Third, assuming any part of any of the claims is not barred by absolute immunity, it is
barred by qualified immunity because the Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged the violation of
any constitutional right—clearly established or otherwise. Even accepting the Plaintiffs’
allegations at face value, the Individual Defendants’ actions were neither “grossly disproportionate
to the need for action under the circumstances” nor “inspired by malice rather than merely careless
or unwise excess of zeal.” Petta, 143 F.3d at 902. Indeed, the Plaintiffs essentially accuse the
Individual Defendants of excessive zeal in securing witness testimony to successfully prosecute
serious crimes—murders, child molestation, child pornography, and domestic violence. The
Plaintiffs do not suggest that the Individual Defendants abused their office for some ulterior or
personal motive, such as profit or vengeance. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that
one or more Individual Defendants sent subpoenas without proper court authorization or obtained
material-witness warrants that were defective in some respect, this would not amount to an “abuse
of official power that shocks the conscience” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Petta, 143 F.3d at 902.
Finally, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Fourteenth Amendment rights of
one or more Plaintiffs was violated, such rights were not clearly established. As the Fifth Circuit
has explained, “[m]any cases that have applied the [shocks-the-conscience] standard have involved
the use of extreme force by police officers or other state actors.” Doe, 675 F.3d at 867–68
(collecting cases). By contrast, the undersigned is unaware of any case law holding that sending
improper subpoenas to witnesses or improperly obtaining material-witness arrest warrants would
violate the witnesses’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process rights. See, e.g., Rivera v.
Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 38 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]here may be an extreme set of facts involving
such deliberate and malevolent actions by police against witnesses as to shock the conscience and

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implicate a constitutional violation. Those await another day.”). Absent such precedent, the
Individual Defendants are, at a minimum, entitled to qualified immunity.
VI.

Abuse of process
“[T]he essential elements of an abuse of process claim” are “(1) the existence of an ulterior

purpose; and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the
proceeding.” Waguespack, Seago and Carmichael (A PLC) v. Lincoln, 768 So. 2d 287, 290–91
(La. App. 1st Cir. 2000). Because the tort of abuse of process is subject to a prescriptive period of
one year, see No Drama, LLC v. Caluda, 177 So. 3d 747, 751–52 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2015), the
claims by Ms. Singleton, Mr. Mitchell, Ms. Baham, and Ms. Doe are prescribed.
Further, with respect to state-law tort claims, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that
“prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for conduct within the course and scope of their
prosecutorial functions,” Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944, 950 (La. 1996); see also
Muhammad v. State, No. 99-cv-3742, 2000 WL 1568210, at *4 & n.5 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2000)
(holding that abuse-of-process claim was barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity). The Court
further noted that state-law immunity rules have been generally been interpreted in harmony with
federal immunity principles. See id. at 947. Accordingly, for the same reasons explained above
with respect to the Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, the Individual Defendants are absolutely
immune from suit under state tort law.
The abuse-of-process claims also fail on the merits. The Plaintiffs allege that certain
Individual Defendants obtained material-witness warrants illegally and for an improper purpose
(“to coerce private, out-of-court meetings with prosecutors and to coerce testimony consistent with
the prosecution’s theory of the case”), and that other Individual Defendants “circumvent[ed] the
requirements of [Code of Criminal Procedure] Article 66” by sending subpoenas that were not
properly authorized by a court. See Complaint at ¶¶ 318–319. However, “[t]he tort of abuse of
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process involves the malicious use of a legal process after the process has been instituted.” Duboue
v. City of New Orleans, 909 F.2d 129, 132 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). Thus, alleging that the
Individual Defendants acted wrongfully in obtaining material-witness warrants does not state a
valid cause of action. Further, abuse of process requires “malicious perversion of a legally issued
process whereby a result not lawfully or properly obtainable under it is attempted to be secured.”
Succession of Cutrer v. Curtis, 341 So. 2d 1209, 1214 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).
Because the Plaintiffs allege that the material-witness warrants and subpoenas were issued
illegally, they have not stated a valid cause of action.
VII.

Fraud
“Louisiana jurisprudence indicates that the following are the elements of the tort of fraud:

1. a misrepresentation of material fact; 2. made with the intent to deceive; 3. reasonable or
justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and 4. resulting injury. The intent to deceive is a specific
intent.” Schaumburg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 421 F. App’x 434, 442 (5th Cir. 2011); see
also Chateau Homes by RJM, Inc. v. Aucoin, 97 So. 3d 398, 404 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
elements of the tort of fraud are a misrepresentation of material fact made with the intent to deceive
when there was reasonable or justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and resulting injury.”). Because
the tort of fraud is subject to a prescriptive period of one year, see Cerullo v. Heisser, 213 So. 3d
1232, 1236 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2017), the claims by Ms. Singleton, Mr. Mitchell, Ms. Baham, and
Ms. Doe are prescribed. Additionally, as explained above, these state-law tort claims are barred by
absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Knapper, 681 So. 2d at 950.
The fraud claims likewise fail on the merits. The Plaintiffs argue that the Individual
Defendants mispresented to them that the “subpoenas” sent to them “were real, had been obtained
legitimately, and had to be honored by certain Plaintiffs under threat of fines and incarceration.”
Complaint at ¶ 324. The Plaintiffs further allege that they “reasonably and justifiably relied on the
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authenticity, truthfulness, and lawfulness of the fraudulent subpoenas,” Complaint at ¶ 327, but
this is false. Of the five Plaintiffs who allegedly received such subpoenas (Ms. Singleton, Ms.
Baham, Ms. Doe, Ms. Bailey, and Ms. LaCroix), none of them actually appeared at the DA’s office
as directed. See id. at ¶¶ 157–160, 221–222, 237–238, 250–251, 257, 266–267. Thus, even
assuming for the sake of argument that the subpoenas included statements that were intentionally
deceptive, the Plaintiffs sustained no injuries in reliance on the truthfulness of such statements.
The Plaintiffs also argue that the Individual Defendants “made material misrepresentations
in seeking to jail certain Plaintiffs,” and that “they were . . . harmed when courts justifiably relied
on Defendants’ material witness warrant applications.” Complaint at ¶¶ 325–327. However,
Louisiana law requires justifiable reliance by the plaintiff. Schaumburg, 421 F. App’x at 442.
Alleging that the Plaintiffs were harmed by misrepresentations allegedly made to a court simply
does not state a cognizable cause of action for fraud.
VIII. Fourteenth Amendment claim based on prolonged detention without court
appearance
Ms. Baham alleges that Mr. Napoli violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by “causing
[her] to be jailed without a prompt court appearance after [her] arrest on a material witness
warrant.” Complaint at ¶¶ 306–307. For the same reasons explained above, this claim is prescribed
because Ms. Baham’s detention occurred more than one year before suit was filed. Additionally,
to the extent that Ms. Baham challenges Mr. Napoli’s actions in obtaining the warrant upon which
she was arrested (including his alleged request that she be held without bond)—or other actions
taken by Mr. Napoli as an advocate—her claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Beyond her initial arrest, Ms. Baham does not allege any facts showing that Mr. Napoli is
personally responsible for violating her Fourteenth Amendment rights by causing her to be
detained without a prompt court appearance. Ms. Baham alleges that she was held in jail for eight

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days before being brought to court for the first time, see Complaint at ¶¶ 226–227, but she does
not allege that Mr. Napoli took any actions to delay or prevent her from being brought to court.
Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that the delay in being brought before a judge could
constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Ms. Baham does not adequately allege that it
was caused by Mr. Napoli.
And finally, even if Ms. Baham could show that Mr. Napoli somehow were responsible for
some action that is not covered by absolute immunity, she cannot show any violation of her clearly
established rights. “[T]he existence of ‘clearly established’ law that would guide prosecutors and
law enforcement officers to act reasonably in the context of executing a material witness warrant,
as opposed to a ‘criminal suspect’ warrant, is slim.” Simon v. City of New York, 247 F. Supp. 3d
285, 292 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). Indeed, as recently as 2011, four Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
opined that material-witness-arrest warrants “might not [be] warrants within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause,” and that such warrants “might [instead] be governed by
the Fourth Amendment’s separate reasonableness requirements for seizures of the person.”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 745 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The fact that the Supreme Court
has not even clearly established which constitutional provisions govern the use of material-witness
warrants only underscores the uncertainty and lack of clear guidance. In any event, because the
law does not clearly establish when a person arrested on a material-witness warrant must be
brought before a judge, Mr. Napoli is entitled to qualified immunity.
IX.

Supervisory liability / failure to intervene
The Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Cannizzaro is liable for the specific alleged violations of the

First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments described above because he failed to adequately train,
supervise, and discipline the attorneys and agents under his supervision. Complaint at ¶ 311.
Because the Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged any actionable violation of their constitutional
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rights, their supervisory-liability claims against Mr. Cannizzaro necessarily fail. The Plaintiffs
further allege that each of the Individual Defendants is liable for the wrongdoing of each of the
others because they “knew or should have known that they and others within the District
Attorney’s Office were violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights” yet acted with deliberate
indifference in failing to intervene. Id. at ¶¶ 314–315. Again, in the absence of any underlying
actionable constitutional violations, such secondary claims necessarily fail. Further, such
conclusory allegations lack the factual specificity necessary to plausibly allege that any of the
Individual Defendants acted with deliberate indifference with respect to alleged wrongdoing by
others within the DA’s office.
X.

Silence Is Violence claims
SIV alleges that various policies and practices have violated “the rights of Silence Is

Violence’s clients” under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Complaint at ¶¶ 295, 299,
306, 309. However, the only client mentioned by name in the Complaint is Mr. Mitchell, see id. at
¶¶ 277, and his claims fail for all the reasons explained above. Assuming for the sake of argument
that SIV would have standing to seek redress for alleged harm to its clients,7 SIV has failed to
adequately allege facts showing that the rights of any specific clients were violated. Nor has SIV
adequately alleged facts showing that its own rights were violated.
A.

First Amendment claim

SIV alleges that Mr. Cannizzaro violated its First Amendment rights “by threatening its
Executive Director with prosecution for her public statements on behalf of the organization.”
Complaint at ¶ 304. Specifically, SIV alleges that Mr. Cannizzaro informed its director, Tamara
Jackson, that she could be subject to criminal prosecution if she encouraged witnesses not to assist

7

The Defendants do not concede that SIV has standing.
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or communicate with prosecutors. See id. at ¶¶ 152–153. However, SIV cannot show that Mr.
Cannizzaro’s alleged threats were made in retaliation for SIV’s constitutionally protected activity,
or that it “suffer[ed] an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to
engage in that activity.” Keenan, 290 F.3d at 258.
The crime of obstruction of justice, as codified in Louisiana law, includes “[i]nducing or
persuading or attempting to induce or persuade any person to . . . [t]estify falsely or, without right
or privilege to do so, withhold any testimony” or “[w]ithout the right or privilege to do so, absent
himself from such proceedings despite having received service of a subpoena.” LA. REV. STAT.
§ 14:130.1(A)(4). Encouraging a witness who has received a subpoena pursuant to Code of
Criminal Procedure article 66 from communicating with prosecutors as directed by the subpoena
would clearly constitute obstruction of justice. Similarly, encouraging a witness to generally avoid
all contact and communications with the DA’s office for the purpose of evading service of a
subpoena would at least arguably constitute obstruction of justice. To the extent that SIV’s
purported “core political speech” involves unlawful obstruction of justice, see Complaint at ¶ 304,
it is not constitutionally protected, and it would not be improper for Mr. Cannizzaro to inform SIV
of this.
Further, even assuming that Mr. Cannizzaro’s alleged threats could be construed as being
motivated in some part by SIV’s constitutionally protected speech, SIV has suffered no resulting
“injury” as required to support a retaliation claim. See Keenan, 290 F.3d at 258. SIV does not
allege that any of its members were ever arrested, prosecuted, or subjected to personal abuse or
ongoing harassment by police or prosecutors. As a matter of law, two warnings from Mr.
Cannizzaro about the law over a three-year period that did not result in any adverse action being
taken against SIV do not give rise to a First Amendment retaliation claim. See, e.g., Osborne v.

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Grussing, 477 F.3d 1002, 1005 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007) (the “verbal tongue-lashings” given to the
plaintiffs by county officials would not constitute an injury sufficient to support a First
Amendment retaliation claim). Certainly Mr. Cannizzaro’s alleged actions did not violate “clearly
established law,” such that “every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
violates” SIV’s rights. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741 (quotation omitted).
B.

Abuse-of-process claim

SIV also asserts a claim for abuse of process, alleging that it “was injured because it had
to redirect its resources to remedy and prevent harms to its clients caused by the abuse of the
material witness statute and the Article 66 investigative subpoena by the District Attorney’s
Office.” Complaint at ¶ 321. However, because SIV does not attempt to connect specific, concrete
actions by specific Defendants with specific injuries that it allegedly suffered, SIV cannot satisfy
the basic tort-law requirement of causation.8 Further, alleging that SIV chose to “redirect its
resources to remedy and prevent harms to its clients” fails, as a matter of law, to allege a harm that
was directly caused by the Individual Defendants. Finally, for the reasons explained above, SIV’s
state-law tort claims are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Individual Defendants respectfully request that the
claims against them be dismissed.

8

See Hall v. Lilly, 666 So. 2d 1328, 1332 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1996) (“Abuse of process is a cause
of action originating from the common law and recognized in our jurisprudence as a compensable
tort under LSA—C.C. Art. 2315.”); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315(A) (“Every act whatever of man that
causes damages to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”) (emphasis
added); Moss v. Town of Rayville, 181 So. 3d 809, 812 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 2015) (“In a suit for
damages, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove the damage he suffered as the result of the defendant’s
fault.”).
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Matthew J. Paul
Richard C. Stanley, 8487
W. Raley Alford, III, 27354
Matthew J. Paul, 37004
STANLEY, REUTER, ROSS, THORNTON
& ALFORD, LLC
909 Poydras Street, Suite 2500
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
Telephone: (504) 523-1580
Facsimile: (504) 524-0069
Counsel for Leon Cannizzaro (in his
individual capacity); David Pipes; Iain
Dover; Jason Napoli; Arthur Mitchell;
Tiffany Tucker; Michael Trummel;
Matthew Hamilton; Inga Petrovich; and
Laura Rodrigue

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of November, 2017, a copy of the foregoing was filed
electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, and that service will be provided
through the CM/ECF system, as well as by U.S. Mail for any non-CM/ECF participant.

/s/ Matthew J. Paul

26