IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CRIMINAL DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Respondent 
I
v. No. 95 CR 18602 
Thomas Sierra, j:
Hon. William Lacy
Petitioner. presiding.

 

tut if? 4 

1:



NOTICE OF FILING AND PROOF OF SERVICE 

 

 

To: Carol Rogala
Assistant State?s Attorney
Post-Conviction Unit
2650 S. California Avenue
Chicago, IL 60608

Please take notice that on September 20, 2017, we caused to be ?led the attached Second
Supplement to Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the above-entitled case with

the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Criminal Division a copy of which is hereby
served on you.

Respectfully Submitted,

    

 

One of Petitioner?s Attorneys

Steve Art

Anand Swaminathan

Joshua Tepfer

Exoneration Project (Atty No. 44407)
311 N. Aberdeen St, 3mt Floor
Chicago, IL 60607

312-789-4955

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CRIMINAL DIVISION

 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Respondent, 

V. No. 95 CR 18602

THOMAS SIERRA, 
Hon. William Lacy
Petitioner. presiding.

 

SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

 

Petitioner, THOMAS SIERRA, through his attorneys, THE EXONERATION PROJECT,
?les this Second Supplement to his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. In support
thereof, Petitioner states as follows:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Following an appellate court remand for stage two proceedings, see People v. Sierra,

Nos. 1-00-0910 1-00-1461 (lSt Dist. March 15, 2002) (unpublished Rule 23 Order), on

April 18, 2011, through counsel, Petitioner Thomas Sierra ?led an Amended Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief. The Amended Petition raised a claim related to a jury instruction,

and a separate constitutional claim based on newly discovered information about the

pattern and practice of investigative misconduct by Detective Reynaldo Guevara and his
partners.

2. On June 7, 2013, this Court denied the State?s motion to dismiss the amended petition
and ordered an evidentiary hearing.

3. Petitioner, thereafter, filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings related to the jury

instruction issue. After the State?s written objection and argument, this Court denied the
motion on October 27, 2016.

4. On May 4, 2017, this Court granted undersigned counsel leave to file an appearance.

5. An evidentiary hearing is pending on, at minimum, Petitioner?s due process claim on the
pattern and practice of investigative misconduct of Detective Guevara, as raised in
Petitioner?s April 2011 amended petition.1

6. On August 1, 2017, Petitioner ?led a First Supplement to Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, setting out signi?cant new evidence relating to Detective Guevara?s
pattern and practice of investigative misconduct.

7. Last year in People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, 1] 24, the Illinois Supreme Court

6?

recognized that eyewitness misidenti?cation is now the single greatest source of
wrongful convictions in the United States, and responsible for more wrong?il convictions
than all other causes combined.?? (quoting State Dubose, 699 582, 591-92
(Wis. 2005)). not only have seen that eyewitness identi?cations are not always as
reliable as they appear, but we also have learned, from a scienti?c standpoint, why this is
often the case.? Id. The Supreme Court decided that scienti?c evidence regarding the
reliability of eyewitness identi?cations is ?well settled, well supported, and in appropriate
cases a perfectly proper subject for expert testimony.? Id. Sierra has enlisted the services

of eyewitness expert Dr. Nancy Franklin to testify about the reliability of the eyewitness

identi?cations in this matter.

 

i Following this Court?s order granting an evidentiary hearing, the State ?led a motion in limine
requesting that Petitioner identify, with speci?city, the evidence of Guevara?s other acts he intends to
present at the evidentiary hearing. The parties have had preliminary discussions about this matter and
hope to reach an agreement on how to proceed. Petitioner?s evidence Will focus on the facts identi?ed in
paragraphs 37.b?48 of this pleading, as well as the testimony of Jose Melendez, discussed below. See
infra footnote 4.

10.

11.

. Petitioner ?les this second supplement to his pleading to disclose the eyewitness expert

report of Dr. Nancy Franklin, to identify facts and witnesses he may rely upon at the
upcoming evidentiary hearing, and to add to his actual innocence claim.

THE EYEWITNESS EXPERT REPORT OF DR. NANCY FRANKLIN

. As the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized recently, modern science regarding

eyewitness identi?cation provides an additional and compelling reason to doubt the
accuracy of identi?cations made by State?s witnesses Melendez and Rodriguez. In
addition, the science of eyewitness identi?cations provides additional evidence that
Melendez and Rodriguez identi?ed Sierra only at Detective Guevara?s behest, and
demonstrates that Detective Guevara?s testimony on the stand at Sierra?s trial is
inaccurate.

Petitioner hereby disclosed Dr. Nancy Franklin, who has prepared the expert report
attached at Exhibit 22 to this supplement, as an expert witness in this case. Dr. Franklin
will explain this modern scienti?c evidence in detail at the hearing of this matter.

In People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, 11 24 (2016), our Supreme Court recognized that
meyewitness misidenti?cation is now the single greatest source of wrongful convictions
in the United States, and responsible for more wrongful convictions than all other causes
combined.?? (quoting State Dubose, 699 582, 591?92 (Wis. 2005)). not
only have seen that eyewitness identi?cations are not always as reliable as they appear,
but we also have learned, from a scienti?c standpoint, why this is often the case.? M. The
Court held that because of advancements in eyewitness identi?cation research it was
?able to recognize that such research is well settled, well supported, and in appropriate

cases a perfectly proper subject for expert testimony.? Id.

12.

13.

14.

15.

Expert testimony on eyewitness testimony is especially appropriate in cases like this one.
In Lerma, ?[t]he only evidence of defendant?s guilt . . . [was] the eyewitness
identi?cations made by [two witnesses. There [was] no physical evidence tying defendant
to the crime, and defendant neither confessed nor made any other type of incriminating
statement. In other words, the State?s case against defendant hangs 100% on the
reliability of its eyewitness identi?cations.? Id. 26. Exactly the same is true in this case.
Dr. Franklin is a renowned expert in human and eyewitness identi?cations.
She is a professor of at Stony Brook University; she holds a from
Stanford University; and she specializes in cognition, memory, and false memory. Ex. 22
(Franklin Report) at 1. Dr. Franklin regularly peer reviews and publishes articles in the
field of eyewitness memory, and she has been quali?ed as an expert in hundreds of cases
in jurisdictions throughout the United States. Id. Dr. Franklin?s complete CV is attached
to her report. EX. (Franklin CV).

In this case, Dr. Franklin has reviewed all of the circumstances of the various
identi?cation procedures performed by Detective Guevara and his partners in this case,
including the complete transcripts of People v. Thomas Sierra, police reports, and crime
scene and identi?cation procedure photographs. In her report she will present scienti?c
evidence that ?estimator variables? (those relating to the incident itself) and ?system
variables? (those related to police activity during investigation and prosecution of the
crime) render the ?identi?cations? of Sierra made by both Melendez and Rodriguez
unreliable. Ex. 22 (Franklin Report) at 1.

Dr. Franklin concludes that Petitioner?s case ?is characterized by a particularly

comprehensive set of factors that the research literature has associated with ?awed

16.

witness evidence.? Id. at 1. She opines that ?had Sierra been tried in recent years, his
attorneys would likely have been allowed to educate the jury on some or all of these
causes of error.? Id.

In her report, Dr. Franklin comprehensively discusses the scienti?c factors relating to the
incident?so called ?estimator variables??that show to a reasonable degree of scienti?c
certainty that the eyewitness identi?cations of Melendez and Rodriguez were inaccurate,
including but not limited to the following:

a. Stranger identi?cations. Optimal laboratory tests reveal accurate eyewitness
identi?cations of strangers occur at a rate between 50% and 70%. Melendez?s and
Rodriguez?s identi?cations were of a person who was a stranger to them,
decreasing the likelihood of an accurate identi?cation in optimal conditions. Id. at
2-3.

h. Tendency to Choose. Presented with a lineup or photo array, research shows that
a witness will choose the person who most closely matches their memory, even if
the suspect is actually not present, increasing the chance of a false identi?cation.
Id. at 2-3. Even absent coercion, Melendez and Rodriguez would have tended to
select from lineups the person who most closely resembled the person they
recalled from the night of the shooting.

c. Short Duration of Exposure. Research shows that where a witness is exposed to
a person for 12 seconds, false identifications occur at a rate between 80% and
90%. in Petitioner?s case, Melendez and Rodriguez most likely had far less than
12 seconds to actually observe the shooter. Research also shows that witnesses

tend to overestimate the duration by traumatic events, which explains why

Rodriguez estimated that he viewed the perpetrator for a minute. Most like,
Melendez and Rodriguez had such insufficient exposure to the shooter that the
probability of a false identi?cation is increased dramatically. Id. at 3-4.

Partial Disguise. The shooter seen by Melendez and Rodriguez was obstructed
by a hood over his head. Research shows that such an obstruction reduces the
accuracy of an identi?cation by approximately 50% and increase false
identi?cations by 50%. Id. at 5.

Weapon Focus. Scienti?c analysis reveals that memory for a stranger?s face is
impaired if a weapon is present at the time of the incident. As Dr. Franklin
explains, ?Weapons capture attention, drawing cognitive processing away from
the perpetrator?s face, even if the witness?s eyes are not directly pointed at the
weapon.? Id. at 5. In this case, Dr. Franklin opines that ?much or most of the two
eyewitnesses? exposure to the perpetrator occurred in an active shooter situation.
Given classic ?ndings concerning weapon focus and attention capture,
eyewitnesses Rodriguez and Melendez were at risk for identi?cation impairment.?
Id.

Number of Perpetrators. Dr. Franklin observes that there were three individuals
in the car at the time of the shooting. In situations where three perpetrators are
viewed in simulated crime scenes, witness accurately identi?ed one of the
perpetrators only 30% of the time. Id. at 6.

Poor Quality of Descriptions. Shortly after the shooting occurred, Melendez and
Rodriguez were interviewed, and according to of?cers were only able to describe

two male Latinos and one male African-American. This was the limit of the

physical description immediately after the crime. Dr. Franklin opines that this low
quality description is extremely important is assessing whether Melendez and
Rodriguez were able to identify the actual perpetrator in later identi?cation
procedures. Id. at 7.

h. Forgetting Because of Belay. Dr. Franklin also reviews the research that shows
that a witness?s ability to recognize a perpetrator declines by 21% after just four
hours of delay, and it declines by 50% after a week. Other research shows that
false identi?cations occur at a rate the same as correct identi?cation after 48
hours of delay. in this case, this provides strong reason to doubt Melendez?s and
Rodriguez?s identi?cations because those identi?cations ?rst occurred days after
the incident. Id. at 7-8.

17. Dr. Franklin?s report also discusses the scienti?c factors relating to the police
investigation?so called ?system variables??that demonstrate that the eyewitness
identi?cations of Melendez and Rodriguez were inaccurate, including but not limited to
the following:

3. Exposure Effect. Dr. Franklin explains the extensive research demonstrating that
repeated viewing of the same face, whether in photographs or lineups, causes an
increased chance of wrongly identifying that face. Id. at 10. Increased exposure
to the same face cause commitment effects, whereby witnesses come to more
strongly believe their identi?cations. Id. Dr. Franklin opines that Rodriguez?s
identi?cations were subject to these effects. Id.

b. Identi?cation Administrator?s Knowledge of the Suspect. Dr. Franklin also

explains the various ways that administrators of the identi?cation procedures in

this case steered witnesses toward particular outcomes, reducing the accuracy of
their identi?cations. Id. at 10-11.

c. Non-Identi?cations. Dr. Franklin also discusses the importance of Melendez?s
non-identi?cation of Sierra in a photo array, and she opines that this non-
identi?cation is probative of the identi?cation of Sierra being mistaken.

CONCLUSION
18. Dr. Franklin?s expert testimony explains the science of eyewitness identi?cation essential
to the factual issues in this case.
19. For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner requests that this Court allow Petitioner to
supplement his petition.
20. Petitioner further reserves the right to further supplement with additional evidence as

investigation continues.

Respect?illy Submitted,

 

 

One of Petitioner?s Attorneys

Anand Swaminathan

Joshua Tepfer

Steve Art

Exoneration Project (Atty No. 44407)
311 N. Aberdeen St., 3ICE Floor
Chicago, IL 60607

312-789-4955

I am a faculty member in the Department at Stony Brook University. I have a 
in from Stanford University (1989), and my areas of specialization are cognition,
memory, and false memory. I have conducted research, taught courses, and trained
undergraduate and graduate students at Stony Brook University since 1989. I am an active
member of the Society, the American Society, and the Society for
Applied Research in Memory and Cognition and present my work frequently to the research
community. I am regularly asked to review articles submitted by research colleagues from
around the world to the primary scienti?c journals in my ?eld. As part of my responsibilities as a
researcher, author, supervisor, and reviewer, I am well-acquainted with current ?ndings in
the ?eld of eyewitness memory. With regard to the criminal justice system, I have consulted as a
memory and identi?cation expert in several hundred cases in New York State, Massachusetts,
Ohio, Texas, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Maryland, and Washington, DC, since 2008.

I have reviewed about 500 pages of hearing and trial minutes from People Thomas Sierra and
have viewed photos taken of the crime scene and identi?cation procedures as part of the police
investigation. I understand that Sierra was found guilty of murder following the testimony of
multiple witnesses in this case. Following my review of the relevant Witness testimony, I have
volunteered my services to the Exoneration Project in support of its efforts to have the case
formally revisited.

Courts in the US. and the state of Illinois have become increasingly receptive to scienti?c
?ndings that demonstrate shortcomings and systematic biases in human perception, attention,
memory, and judgment. This scienti?c literature has grown tremendously over the last several
decades, relying on both lab-based research and data from real-world criminal cases, and it has
consistently demonstrated the high risk of error in stranger identi?cation. It is only in recent
years, well after Sierra?s conviction, that Illinois courts have consistently allowed jurors to be
informed of such ?ndings.

Research shows that jurors respond well to expert testimony concerning eyewitness memory,
increasing their scrutiny of identi?cation evidence (Cutler Penrod, 1995; Cutler, Penrod, 
Dexter 1990) without disregarding witnesses? claims (Goodman Loftus, 1992). In contrast,
jurors are inclined to believe witness testimony in the absence of an effective challenge to it, and
to weight it heavily in their decisions, particularly testimony provided by witnesses who express
high con?dence (Cutler, Penrod, Stuve, 1988; Leippe, 1980; Leippe, Manion, 
1992; Lindsay, Wells, O?Connor, 1989; Luus Wells, 1994; Penrod Cutler, 1995; Read,
Lindsay, Nicholls 1998). Research further shows that allowing jurors to hear direct and cross
examination of experts is superior to brie?ng them on the frailties of eyewitness memory only as
part of their charging instructions (Goodman Loftus, 1992).

My review of People Sierra suggests that this case is characterized by a particularly
comprehensive set of factors that the research literature has associated with ?awed witness
evidence. Given the nature of the cases for which I have been allowed to provide expert
testimony, my opinion is that, had Sierra been tried in recent years, his attorneys would likely
have been allowed to educate the jury on some or all of these causes of error. Below I summarize
the scienti?c ?ndings that I believe to be relevant to this case.

Basic Principles Of Memory

Encoding, Storage, and Retrieval

More than 60% of laypeople subscribe to the belief that memory behaves like a video camera,
faithfully recording details of a situation and storing them without distortion for later retrieval
(Simons Chabris, 2011). This lay belief is particularly strong with regard to memory for
details encountered under stress (Schmechel, O?Toole, Easterly, Loftus, 2006). In contrast,
100% of memory experts in a relatively recent survey disagreed with the characterization that
memory behaves like a video camera (Simons Chabris, 2011), and a large majority of experts
claim that stress acts to impair memory for detail (Da?ary?Kapur Penrod, 2009).

Decades of research demonstrate that substantial distortion is possible at the time of initial
encoding Bartlett, 1932; Kerstholt, Raaijrnakers, Valenton, 1992; Oliva Torralba, 2007;
Warren, 1970). These errors typically persist during later stages of memory storage and retrieval.
In addition, the weaker and less detailed the initial encoding of an object or event, the more
susceptible the memory is to subsequent alteration, embellishment, and decay. Remembering is a
reconstructive process, based on details that can be recovered at the time of retrieval (including
those in error), combined with knowledge, expectations, goals, and additional information to
which one has been exposed in the interim (Davis Follette, 2001; Hovland, Lumsdaine, 
Shef?eld, 1949; Johnson, Hashtroudi, Lindsay, 1993; Klauer Meiser, 2000; Kleider,
Pezdek, Goldinger, Kirk, 2008; Meiser Broder, 2002; Tulving Thomson, 1973; Wixted,
2004). These individual details are generally not tagged in memory with information about their
respective sources, and thus people generally do not have insight into the extent to which their
memory may have been in?uenced (Charman Wells, 2008; Hovland et a1., 1949).

Stranger Identification

Memory has been studied for a large variety of content types, and recognition for unfamiliar
faces is known to be among the poorest. Under optimal circumstances in laboratory-based
research with good lighting, no threat, extended interaction, and short delay to test), correct
identi?cations are typically between 50% and 70%, with false identi?cations typically 20%-
25%. Similar rates of Hits and False le have been demonstrated in real-world criminal
identi?cation procedures as well, with suspect IDs treated for these purposes as Hits (Wright 
McDaid, 1996). Lab based perceptual matching tasks, which do not require memory, show that
these errors are quite persistent and involve ?awed perceptual as well as ?awed memory
processes (Bruce, Henderson, Greenwood, Hancock, Burton, Miller, 1999; Bruce, Henderson,
Newman, Burton, 2001; Burton, Miller, Bruce, Hancock, Henderson, 2001; Henderson,
Bruce, Burton, 2001; Megreya Burton, 2006, 2007).

Such ?ndings are counterintuitive for the average layperson (Schmechel et a1., 2006), but they
are consistent with what we know of human evolution (Dunbar, 1992). Until quite recently in
evolutionary history, people lived in small kin-based groups and likely had rare contact with
members of other groups. When they did encounter members of other groups, there was
generally little need to remember speci?c individuals. Creating a detailed, stable representation

of another person?s face is costly in terms of cognitive resources, and in the absence of adaptive
pressures toward committing the nuances of new faces to memory, humans do not appear to have
been well-adapted for it. Acquiring a stable memory representation for a novel face remains slow
and unreliable.

Poor baseline stranger identi?cation accuracy is relevant in the Sierra case because witnesses
Jose Melendez and Alberto Rodriguez both stated that the perpetrator was a stranger.

Tendency To Choose

When presented with a photo array or lineup, witnesses tend to identify the alternative who most
closely matches their memory of what the perpetrator looked like. Given reasonable candidates,
there will likely be at least one suf?ciently close match, and even in target-absent situations (in
which ?not there? is the correct answer), people show a tendency to make an identi?cation.
Wells (1984) reported research in which witnesses were tested with either a 6-person target~
present lineup or a 5?person target?absent lineup (consisting of the 5 ?llers given to the ?rst
group). The target-present group correctly identi?ed the target 54% of the time and identi?ed a
?ller 25% of the time (consistent with typical Hit and False ID rates in the literature). If the 54%
Hit rate had occurred because of reliable memory for the perpetrator?s face, then 54% of the
group that received the 5-person target-absent lineup should see that the target was not present
and should therefore reject the lineup. Instead, 2/3rds of participants made a false identi?cation
in the target-absent lineup. This bias to choose is consistently found in eyewitness ID research,
and it demonstrates the common result of identi?cations being nearly as frequent in target-absent
as in target-present situations.

Speci?c Factors In?uencing Eyewitness Reliability

In what follows, relevant factors will be divided into the categories of estimator variables (those
related to the incident itself and to the eyewitnesses) and system variables (those related to the
ensuing investigation and prosecution of the crime and typically associated with police activity).

Nearly 80% of convictions that have been overturned based on DNA evidence included
eyewitness identi?cation as a basis for the original conviction. Both estimator and system
variables associated with eyewitness error are typically present in these cases. Many involved
multiple witnesses who falsely identi?ed the innocent suspect with approximately one-third
involving incorrect identi?cations by three or more witnesses).

Estimator Variables

Duration of Exposure. When identi?cations are made from memory, brief exposure at the time
of initial encoding is associated with increased error rates (Shapiro Penrod, 1986). For
example, false identi?cations of 80-90% have been found after an exposure duration of 12
seconds (Memon, Hope, Bull, 2003; see also Shapiro Penrod, 1986).

This factor is relevant to the Sierra case because witnesses Melendez and Rodriguez apparently
only had moments to view the shooter. My understanding is that their exposure to the shooter?s
face can be reasonably estimated as lasting a fraction of the duration of the incident itself.
Melendez testi?ed to the shooter?s car being in front of him just before the incident (trial
testimony, p. E168). Rodriguez testi?ed to ducking at about the time of the second shot (trial
testimony, p. E104), where he would no longer be able to see the shooter. Rodriguez (trial
testimony, p. E104) and Melendez (trial testimony, p. E187) testi?ed that soon after shooting
started, Melendez turned right (away from the shooter) and drove with the shooter?s car behind
him. Given that the eyewitnesses testi?ed to 8-10 shots in total (pp. E105, E200), exposure to the
shooter?s face appears to have constituted only a small fraction of the incident, with a hood
covering the shooter?s head or face most of that time.

Research has consistently shown that witnesses overestimate event duration, often by a factor of
two or three, particularly when the event is unanticipated, stressful, and uncontrolled (Buckhout,
Figueroa, Hoff, 1975; Cutler, Penrod, Martens, 1987; Loftus, Schooler, Boone, Kline,
1987)

In Sierra, Rodriguez estimated one minute of exposure to the shooter (trial testimony, p. E102).
My understanding is that this represents total exposure time, both from both before the gun was
produced and after it was produced. Given research ?ndings in this area, there is signi?cant risk
that estimate of one minute is a substantial overestimate, particularly given that exposure to the

shooter?s face constituted only a fraction of the entire incident.

Lighting. Not surprisingly, low levels of illumination signi?cantly diminish witnesses? ability to
accurately observe and to later identify perpetrators Yarmey, 1986). In low lighting,
humans rely on the scotopic visual system and the rod receptor of the retina. Rod cells are not
well adapted for perceiving either ?ne detail or color. In addition, information extraction from
low-luminance scenes is signi?cantly reduced in comparison to information extraction from
well-lit scenes (Loftus, 1985). Finally, non-uniform lighting such as that produced by street
lamps creates shadowing, which is known to alter the perception of face shape and to impair
subsequent identi?cation (Braje Kersten Tarr Troje 1998; Johnston, Hill, Carman, 1992; Liu,
Collin, Burton, Chaudhuri, 1999).

In the Sierra case, the shooting took place at night, with ambient lighting coming from
intermittent street lamps and from the monument area nearby. The shooter, however, was sitting
in an enclosed car, and seeing inside may have been challenging if the luminance outside the
windows exceeded that inside the car. Thus, the conditions for perceiving the shooter?s face were
far from optimal.

Angle of Exposure. Viewing a face at a non-optimal angle impairs the quality of memory for it.
The opportunity for con?gural processing, encoding a coherent set of features with respect to
each other, is a signi?cant predictor of the ability to uniquely identify a particular face 
Richler, Cheung, Gauthier, 2011). Non-optimal angles by their nature reduce such
opportunities. Further errors arise when a face previously viewed at one angle is presented at a
different angle during an identi?cation task (Hill, Akamatsu, 1997; Longmore, Lin, 
Young, 2008).

My understanding is that during a signi?cant proportion of the time that eyewitnesses Rodriguez
and Melendez had some opportunity to view the shooter, that view may have been largely at an
angle that deviated substantially from an optimal viewpoint.

Partial disguise. Clothing or other obstructions that impair a witness?s ability to View elements
of another person?s face tend to not only reduce correct identi?cations (typically by about 50%)
but also to increase false identi?cations (also typically by about Several individual studies
have demonstrated this ?nding with various types of obstructing devices, including hats and
other head coverings Cutler et al., 1987). Individually and in meta-analysis (Shapiro 
Penrod, 1986), this factor has emerged as a reliable means for impairing the reliability of
identi?cations.

Both eyewitnesses testi?ed to the shooter throwing a hood over his head at the beginning of the
incident. Rodriguez stated that the hood covered most of the shooter?s hair trial minutes, p.
E102). Melendez stated that the hood covered the shooter?s face (trial minutes, p. E196) and that
he (Melendez) had been unable to see the shooter prior to the hood going up E197). Melendez
further testi?ed that he ?knew that something was up? and that he began driving (turning right,
away from the shooter?s car) when he saw the hood go up E205), which speaks to both the
quality and duration of his exposure to the shooter.

Weapon Focus. Two meta-analyses have shown that memory for a stranger?s face is impaired,
both with regard to descriptions and identifications, if a weapon had been present at the time of
the incident (Fawcett, Russell, Peace, Christie, 2011; Steblay, 1992). Weapons capture
attention, drawing cognitive processing away from the perpetrator?s face, even if the witness?s
eyes are not directly pointed at the weapon. Although face processing is impaired, the tendency
to choose remains high, increasing the risk of false identi?cations (Carlson Carlson, 2012).

Weapon focus effects have been demonstrated under a variety of scenarios and with a variety of
threatening objects, most frequently guns Cutler et al., 1987; Kramer, Buckhout, 
Eugenio, 1990). The effect holds for real-world criminal cases as well as for lab-based ones
(Fawcett et al., 2011).

In the current case, much or most of the two eyewitnesses? exposure to the perpetrator occurred
in an active shooter situation. Given classic ?ndings concerning weapon focus and attention
capture, eyewitnesses Rodriguez and Melendez were at risk for identi?cation impairment.

Stress. Independently of weapon presence, stressful circumstances are known to impair stranger
identi?cations. In a meta?analysis combining data from 27 different studies conducted in
multiple laboratories, using a variety of stress?induction techniques and a variety of methods for
testing face memory, Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, McGorty (2004) found that IDs made
for faces viewed under high stress were nearly as likely incorrect as correct 

Stress inductions in laboratory settings are limited, both by ethical restrictions and by practical
limitations on creating believable threats in the lab. It is remarkable that performance suffers
even under these limitations. But there are data from highly stressful military training exercises

that demonstrate such impairments remain (and appear to increase) under high stress. Military
personnel who had undergone a stressful 40-minute interrogation in a well-lit room were twice as
likely the following day to make a false identi?cation of their interro gator and/or guard as they
were to make a correct ID (Morgan, Hazlett, Doran, Garrett, Hoyt, Thomas, Baranoski, 
Southwick, 2004). With regard to identi?cations in criminal cases, Kuehn (1974) found that
victims of relatively less violent crimes robbery) produce more detailed descriptions of
their attackers than do victims of more violent, and arguably more stressful, crimes rape
and assault).

Rodriguez and Melendez witnessed the violent murder of a friend, and the perpetrator pursued
them while continuing to ?re shots. This situation would be expected to produce a strong stress
response, even for people who have had extensive experience with weapons and personal threat
(Morgan et al., 2004).

Flashbulb Memories. Highly emotional, personally salient events sometimes produce ?ashbulb
memories, which are characterized by a very strong sense of detail, vividness, and con?dence
(Brown Kulik, 1977). Several studies of accuracy and consistency of such flashbulb
memories, however, demonstrate that they are subject to patterns of forgetting and distortion
comparable to those for mundane memories (Hirst, Phelps, Buckner, et al., 2009; Talarico 
Rubin, 2003). The research clearly shows that ?ashbulb events are not ?burned into memory,? as
rememberers often believe, but that they are subject to the ?aws and biases that impact memory
as a whole. The most unique feature of ?ashbulb memories, then, appears to be their vivid
subjective phenomenology rather than their extraordinary accuracy or consistency.

Nevertheless, laypeople, including prospective jurors, commonly believe that ?the act of
remembering a traumatic event is like a video recording in that one can recall details as if they
had been imprinted or burned into one?s brain? (Schmechel et al., 2006). Without an expert who
can correct jurors? erroneous beliefs, jurors are at risk of overestimating the credibility of
testimony from witnesses who had experienced personally salient, highly emotional events.

Number of Potential Perpetrators. The more faces encountered during an incident, the greater
the division of attention and the less likely that suf?cient information extraction will occur for
any of the individual faces (Loftus, 1985). Thus, increasing the number of potential target faces
directly identi?cation performance (Clifford Hollin, 1981; DeCarlo, 2010; Megreya Burton,
2006; Shapiro Penrod, 1986). For example, observers who had seen three perpetrators in a
simulated crime were only 30% accurate in subsequently identifying one of the perpetrators
(Clifford Hollin, 198]), substantially reducing ID accuracy compared to a comparable
situation with a single perpetrator. Similar results have been found in real world criminal cases
such as bank robberies (Fahsing, Ask, Granhag, 2004).

In the Sierra case, the eyewitnesses testi?ed to being aware of three people in the shooter?s car.
Although it appears that there ultimately was only one attacker, Melendez and Rodriguez had
reason to distribute their cognitive resources and attempt to monitor all three as potential threats.
To the extent that they did, their ability to commit characteristics of the shooter to memory may
have been further diminished.

Descriptions. As explained earlier, post-event information is easily incorporated into memory,
with poor ability to subsequently retrieve the original source of individual details. Because of
this general principle (along with the principle of the forgetting curve to be discussed shortly),
descriptions of a perpetrator prior to the introduction of suggestive input (including photos and
comments by investigators) are generally more reliable than descriptions reported after such
opportunities for tainting (Wells Quinlivan, 2009).

In Sierra, the eyewitnesses underwent extensive interviews starting about 15 minutes after the
shooting Rodriguez?s suppression hearing testimony, p. A20, and trial testimony, pp.
E107, E134). According to Of?cer Trempe trial testimony, p. E61), the only immediate
physical description was of two male Hispanics and one male Black (see also trial testimony, p.
E190 and suppression hearing, p. A21). Rodriguez confirmed that this was the only physical
description he was able to give during the initial 1 1/2 hours of interviews (trial testimony, p.
E134).

Similarly to Rodriguez, eyewitness Melendez testified that he could not initially describe the
shooter in greater detail than as a ?Hispanic guy? (trial minutes, p. E237). Melendez further
indicated that he did not perceive much more than that because ?the car had tint windows? 
E238).

Such testimony from both eyewitnesses regarding the low quality description they could initially
give, even when pressed by officers immediately after the incident, constitutes diagnostically
relevant information about their quality of view and is predictive of their impaired ability to
uniquely identify the actual perpetrator in a subsequent 1D task.

One or both eyewitnesses described the shooter at some point as having hair ?pushed back.?
From the testimony record, it was not clear Whether both eyewitnesses or only Rodriguez gave
this description, Whether it was given when the eyewitnesses ?agged down the police officer (as
indicated in the Judge?s decision) or only after the eyewitnesses arrived at the police station (as
Rodriguez both disputed and agreed to on p. 135 of his trial testimony), or only following
exposure to Sierra?s photo. Finally, it is not clear whether that description referred to a hair style
or simply to the state of the shooter?s hair with a hood thrown on top of it. Thus, the value of this
detail is uncertain.

Forgetting Curve (Delay). As stated at the outset of this report, memory is typically incomplete
and prone to error. in addition to this, irreversible forgetting sets in immediately after an event,
with the steepest rate of loss occurring in the period immediately following exposure
(Ebbinghaus, 1885/ 1913). A 2008 meta-analysis of 53 face memory studies con?rmed that
memory strength decreases with delay (Bornstein, Deffenbacher, Penrod, McGorty, 2012). An
experiment cited in the study reveals that participants? ability to identify a perpetrator declined
by 21% just four hours after the incident. A week later, the participants had only about a 50%
chance of being accurate. Other researchers have found false identifications to reach levels
comparable to correct identi?cations Within 48 hours of initial exposure Egan, Pittner, 
Goldstein, 1977).

This factor is relevant to both Melendez and Rodriguez because all ID procedures leading to
identi?cations of the suspect occurred days after the incident. For example, Rodriguez?s ?rst
identi?cation of Sierra was 2 days after the incident, and Melendez?s ?rst identi?cation of Sierra
was nearly a week after the incident.

The phenomenon of forgetting with delay is also relevant to Detective Guevara, who testi?ed to
recalling speci?c details regarding a car he had incidentally observed in a previous occasion days
before. The research ?ndings concerning memory and delay, combined with those of hindsight
bias (to be discussed later), raise concern regarding the accuracy of Det. Guevara?s claims.

Social Contagion. People in various roles can each serve as sources for memory distortion. In
discussions of witnessed events, simple word choice regarding how fast two cars were
going when they contacted vs. bumped vs. smashed -- each other) can have profound impact
on an eyewitness?s memory for the event. In the above example, ?smashed? produces estimates
of speed nearly 30% higher than does ?contacted,? as well as producing frequent false memories
of broken glass (Loftus Palmer, 1974). Risk for these effects increase further to the extent that
an investigator includes false detail that had been previously reported by one witness in questions
that he or she poses to other witnesses.

An estimated 60-85% of co-witnesses discuss the witnessed events, making social contagion of
memory elements, including memory errors, quite common (Paterson Kemp, 2006;
Skagerberg Wright, 2008). This increases the risk of errors that multiple witnesses report in
common (French, Garry, Mori, 2001; Gabbert, Memon, Wright, 2006, 2007; Jack,
Zydervelt, Zajac, 2014; Luus Wells, 1994; Memon Wright, 1999; Pasupathi, 2001;
Roediger, Meade, Bergman, 2001; Schacter, 2001; Shaw, Garven, Wood, 1997; Skagerberg
Wright, 2009). The risk of suggestibility of all types, including co-witness conformity
(Gabbert, Memon, Allan, Wright, 2004), grows as details from the original memory fade
(Hoffman, Granhag, See, Loftus, 2001).

Flashbulb memories are by no means immune to such contagion effects (Brewin, Huntley, 
Whally, 2012). In fact, even highly trained military personnel are easily in?uenced by
misinformation concerning a personally salient, emotional event, not only about incidental
details, but also about weapon presence, the existence of prominent features of the target 
glasses), and the identity of the target himself (Morgan, Southwick, Steffian, Hazlett, Loftus,
2013)

The nature of the relationship between co-witnesses can exacerbate risk for memory errors, in
several ways. First, repeated interpersonal contact provides opportunities to rehearse memory
details, increasing the correspondence between witnesses? memory reports. Second, with
?iendships and other close relationships come increased credibility assessments (French, Garry,
Mori, 2001) and increased likelihood of accepting co-witness claims. Third, confusion
between the experiences of self and other increases for close relationships (Mashek, Aron, 
Boncimino, 2003), in?ating the risk that one person?s recalled detail will later be remembered as
one?s own previously recalled detail.

Knowledge that another witness agrees with one?s reported memory or identi?cation tends to
substantially increase one?s con?dence, whether or not the agreed upon information is accurate
(Luus Wells, 1993). This in?ated con?dence has been found in turn to increase witness
credibility assessment and the weighting of witness evidence in decision making by mock jurors
(Cutler, Penrod, Stuve, 1988; Luus Wells, 1993).

Social contagion may be relevant to the Sierra case. Eyewitnesses Rodriguez and Melendez were
present together during and in the immediate aftermath of the shooting. It also appears trial
testimony, p. E192) that they may have jointly responded to some questions and/or may have
heard each other?s responses during some of the police interview procedures. Rodriguez and
Melendez were friends, presumably giving them many opportunity to further discuss details of
the case after the immediate investigation.

System Variables

The next sections will focus on variables associated with investigation activities and typically
under varying degrees of control of law enforcement and/or criminal justice agents.

Contagion From Authoritative Sources (Police). In addition to the risk of in?uence from a
fellow eyewitness, people can be in?uenced by of?cers who hold beliefs about facts of the case
Loftus Palmer, 1974; see also Payne, Toglia, Anastasi, 1994) or about the identity of
the suspect g, Greathouse Kovera, 2009). This can take one or both of two common forms:
an of?cer directly in?uencing multiple witnesses through suggestive questions or comments,
and/or an of?cer putting comments or closed questions to a witness that were developed from
answers given by a previous witness. No deliberate attempt to in?uence witnesses is necessary.
On the contrary, these effects can be extremely dif?cult to avoid, but they can be responsible, at
least in part, for what appears to be impressive agreement among co-witnesses. Furthermore,
in?uences from co?witnesses and police are additive, with increased memory distortions for
witnesses who experience input from both of these sources (Jack et al., 2014).

Exposure/Familiarity Effects. Prior exposure to a face increases processing ?uency for it,
which, if suf?ciently strong, can produce a subjective sense of familiarity. People are better at
detecting this sense of familiarity than they are at determining its source. This forms the basis of
exposure effects, such as mugshot exposure (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, 2006),
whereby the presentation of a new face following a target incident increases the likelihood that
that new face will be later falsely identified as having been involved in the original incident.

Exposure effects occur in real-world ID procedures for which witnesses have requested a second
viewing of lineup members (Horry, Memon, Wright, and Milne, 2012; see also Steblay, Dietrich,
Ryan, James, 2011). That is, when a witness has not made an identification after
viewing all candidates but is presented with a second ?lap? through the set, the risk of an
incorrect identi?cation increases.

The likelihood of further identi?cations of the suspect (Deffenbacher et al., 2006), along with
in?ated confidence in those IDs over time Steblay, Tix, Benson, 2013) increases as a

function of prior exposures to the suspect, feedback, and opportunities to review incident details
(Douglass Steblay, 2006; Odinot, Wolters, van Koppen, 2008).

Furthermore, if the witness had identi?ed the innocent target on ?rst viewing him, additional
commitment effects increase the likelihood of a subsequent identi?cation still further
(Deffenbacher, Bernstein, Penrod, 2006). When such conditions follow a particularly stressful
event, the false identi?cation rate is nearly 6 times as high as when no interpolated exposure had
occurred (Morgan et al., 2013).

In-court identi?cations are subject to these same principles of exposure effects and commitment
effects, in addition to other factors that seriously challenge the reliability of an in?court 1D 
substantial delay; highly suggestive show-up procedure).

In the Sierra case, Detective McMurry described eyewitness Rodriguez?s viewing of the photos
during the initial identi?cation procedure, describing Rodriguez as going through the full set,
then returning to the ?rst photo, setting the photos down, and reviewing the set a second time
(suppression hearing, p. trial, p. F54). This is corroborated in Rodriguez?s own testimony
(trial minutes, p. E118). Their testimony raises concerns regarding multiple laps through the
photo set, comparable to circumstances that Horry et al. (2012) found to increase rates of false
IDs in criminal investigations.

Rodriguez reported having identified Sierra in a corporeal lineup administered approximately 5
days after selecting Sierra in the photo array (trial testimony, p. E112). This is consistent with
both mugshot exposure and commitment effects.

Furthermore, Rodriguez testi?ed to having viewed the photo array once again during a previous
court proceeding (trial minutes, p. E137).

There is some dispute in the testimony (trial minutes p. E232 vs. pp. F107-108) regarding
whether Melendez was presented with a corporeal lineup and if so, whether and under what
conditions he made an identi?cation. The reliability of any identi?cation he may have made was
imperiled by exposure effects similar to those discussed above for Rodriguez.

Administrator?s Knowledge of Suspect. Experimenter effects are by now well documented in
research Rosenthal, 1976), illustrating the more general principle that beliefs or desires are
easily communicated and can easily in?uence other people?s behavior, even in the absence of
either party recognizing such in?uences (see also Greathouse Kovera, 2009).

In his analysis of 161 DNA-based exonerations, University of Virginia Law School professor
Brandon Garrett (2011) determined that 78% had involved police contamination of eyewitness
identifications. In the lab, several studies have demonstrated a remarkable number of ways, both
verbally and non-verbally, that people playing the role of 1D task administrators can steer
witnesses toward the suspect (Clark, Brower, Rosenthal, Hicks, Moreland, 2013), even if they
have been instructed to avoid doing so and even without awareness of doing so Greathouse
Kovera, 2009). Even seemingly innocuous words and subtle cues -- pauses, gestures,
hesitations, or smiles -- can in?uence a witness?s behavior (Charrnan, 2016; Greathouse 

10

Kovera, 2009; Gurney, Vekaria, Hewlett, 2014), and even these subtle social cues can double
or triple the rate of false IDs of innocent suspects over baseline levels (Alberts, Duncan, Wallace,
Penrod, 2008; Greathouse Kovera, 2009). Thus, in the absence of blind administration, a
suspect ID can carry substantial risk of having arisen as a product of witness steering. In fact, a
meta-analysis of 345 studies across eight broad categories of behavioral research concluded that
such risk is extremely high (Rosenthal Rubin, 1978).

Findings in the use of non-blind administrators are relevant to both Rodriguez and Melendez.
Det. Guevara was involved in naming Sierra as a suspect and so was not blind during the ID
procedures he was involved in. Detective McMurray testi?ed that he, too, knew who the suspect
was when visiting Rodriguez to administer the photo array (trial minutes, p. F68). Even more
concerning, Melendez testi?ed to overt steering toward Sierra on p. E208, where he
testi?ed that Det. Guevara had indicated he knew who the perpetrator was, and on p. E209-E210,
where Melendez described Det. Guevara as having selectively held Sierra?s photo while the
?llers were on the table (trial testimony, pp. 209-210).

Both eyewitnesses in the Sierra case testi?ed to undergoing an automobile identi?cation
procedure of sorts. Drawing from an extensive research literature on poor and potentially
suggestive identi?cation procedure methods, two elements of this procedure raise concerns.
First, to the extent that it was a showup procedure, with the witnesses being asked to make a
yes/no judgment regarding the one dark colored Buick Park Avenue in the parking lot, this
situation increases the risk of a false ID because of a suggestive showup (Steblay, Dysart, Fulero,
Lindsay, 2003). In fact, Melendez testi?ed that he was taken to the front of a particular car by
Det. Guevera, who was not blind with regard to the ?suspect car,? and was asked to make a
yes/no ID decision about it (trial minutes, pp. E216, E218).

Second, my understanding is that the lot had other cars in it, varying in makes, models, shapes,
sizes, and colors, constituting very poor matches to the car described by the eyewitnesses. It is
unclear how many other cars were present in the lot, but a single ?dud? ?ller near the target in
face ID tasks is known to substantially increase the risk of falsely identifying an innocent suspect
(Fitzgerald, Price, Oriet, Charman, 2013).

Identi?cation Procedure Comments and Instructions. Even seemingly innocuous comments
made to witnesses prior to or during an ID procedure can substantially impact their behavior and
subsequent memory. These include indications that the police have a suspect, any instruction
encouraging the witness to choose someone (Malpass Devine, 1981), or an instruction to
determine which of the choices was the perpetrator (Leippe, Eisenstadt, Rauch, 2008). Other
comments or instructions known to increase the rate of false identi?cations include asking the
witness ?Could that be him?? when the witness has narrowed consideration to a single candidate
(Clark, Marshall, Rosenthal, 2009), encouraging a hesitating witness to ?take your time?
(Clark et al., 2009), referring to the possibility that the witness may be ?unable? to make an
identi?cation (implying that one of the choices is indeed the perpetrator, Clark et al., 2009), and
stating that the perpetrator?s appearance may have changed (Austin, Zimmerman, Rhead,
Almeida, Kovera, 2012). The use of double-blind identi?cation procedures, referred to in the
preceding section, can make good headway toward reducing the risk of these in?uences.

11

In Sierra, eyewitness Rodriguez testi?ed to Det. Guevara?s statement, just before the photo ID
procedure, ?that they probably got the guy? (suppression hearing, pp. trial, p. E139).
Similarly, eyewitness Melendez testi?ed that Guevara had ?told me to point him out because he
had reason to believe this was the guy? E208). Melendez also testi?ed that the instructions
included a comment about ?see[ing] if I can identify the guy that did the shooting? (suppression
hearing, p. see also McMurray?s hearing testimony, p. A3 7), consistent with suggestive
instructions found to increase the risk of false IDs.

Diagnosticity of In some cases, witnesses who are presented with ID procedures
indicate that the perpetrator is not present. Several studies have shown that non-IDs of this sort
carry probative value, occurring more often in target-absent situations than in target-present ones
(Wells Lindsay, 1980; Clark Wells, 2008). That is, research demonstrates that non-
identi?cations have probative value pointing toward innocence.

This ?nding is relevant to eyewitness Melendez, who testi?ed that his original response to the
photo array containing Sierra was a non-identification (trial minutes, pp. E207, E208), and that
his subsequent identi?cation of Sierra followed suggestive or coercive instructions by Detective
Guevara (pp. E207, E208).

When presented with the defendant in court, Melendez testi?ed (minutes, p. E197) that he did
not recognize Sierra to be the shooter. To the extent that the witness testimony is to be
considered in this case, this non-identification of Sierra under the highly suggestive
circumstances of a courtroom show-up, is informative.

Both eyewitnesses were initially shown several hundred photographs from a mug book and did
not identify anyone. If Sierra?s photo was in that set, then both eyewitnesses made non?
identi?cations on their ?rst ID procedure containing the suspect. In contrast to the initial IDs that
the eyewitnesses made of Sierra at 2 days and nearly 1 week after the incident, whatever memory
they had of the shooter?s face would have had less time for decay and distortion at the time of
this initial niugbook procedure.

With regard to the car identi?cation procedure, I have referred to three factors that would be
expected to bias the witnesses toward identifying the suspect?s car as the shooter?s. First, as
stated earlier, if Det. Guevara had conducted this as a show-up, it would have been an inherently
suggestive ID procedure. Second, the other cars around the Park Avenue may have produced a
classic ?dud? effect, whereby Witnessess?s bias toward identifying the Park Avenue would be
substantially increased over baseline levels Fitzgerald et al., 2013). Finally, Melendez stated
(trial minutes, p. E214) that he and Rodriguez underwent this ID procedure together, creating the
risk for social contagion effects (described earlier in this document). Despite these potential
in?uences, Melendez responded that the shooter?s car was not present (pp. E214-215). Given the
?ndings regarding non?identi?cations, his non-identi?cation carries probative value indicative of
innocence (Clark et al., 2008).

Identification Latency. The time it takes a witness to make an identification is one of the most
diagnostic postdictors of identi?cation reliability (Srnith, Lindsay, Pryke, 2000; Weber,
Brewer, Wells, Semmler, Keast, 2004; Dunning Stern, 1994). Face recognition is a rapid,

12

automatic process (Besson, Barragan-Jason, Thorpe, Febre-Thorpe, Puma, Ceccaldi, Barbeau,
2017; Dunning Perretta, 2002). Thus, assuming there are no factors that would otherwise
speed an identi?cation decision (such as extremely poor ?llers, suggestive steering, or exposure
to the suspect in a previous ID procedure), the latency of an ID is negatively correlated with
likelihood of accuracy. Researchers have generally found low accuracy overall for identi?cations
that take 30 or more seconds to make Dunning Perretta, 2002; Weber et al., 2004). For
example, Dunning Perretta (2002) reported accuracy to be 18% (where chance is
approximately 17%) for latencies beyond 30 seconds.

In Sierra, eyewitness Rodriguez testi?ed that it took him ?a couple minutes? to ID Sierra from
his photograph (trial testimony, p. E111), despite the presence of several factors that would have
been expected to create a fast, positive decision. Rodriguez later clari?ed E139) that he took
five minutes and agreed that he had testi?ed in an earlier proceeding about having taken 
ten minutes? (suppression hearing, p. A11, trial p. E140). In addition, this extended decision time
was accompanied by at least two laps through the photos, increasing the risk of a false ID based
on mugshot exposure effects.

Five days after making this initial ID, Rodriguez testi?ed to taking ?about a minute? to identify
Sierra from a lineup (trial testimony, p. E113). Again, this long latency occurred despite the
presence of factors non-blind administrator, recent exposure to Sierra in the photo array)
that would be expected to produce a rapid ID.

Confidence Diagnosticity and Confidence Malleability. Despite the fact that memory is
subject to rapid and continued forgetting, eyewitness confidence for speci?c details often
increases with time. This divergence of accuracy and con?dence is common and serves to lower
the correlation between the two, thus lowering the probative value of witness certainty over time.

Several factors contribute to increasing con?dence, including several factors discussed above. In
addition, simple repeated exposure to, or repeated thinking about, a detail tends to increase
memory strength and vividness, leading to strong subjective experience of authenticity even for
incorrect details (Hastie et al., 1978; Hirst, Phelps, Buckner, et al., 2009; Odinot et al., 2009;
Pezdek, Sperry, Owens, 2007; Shaw, 1996; Shaw Porter, 2015; Wells, Ferguson, 
Lindsay, 1981). With each retrieval, new interpretations and embellishments are likely to be
incorporated into and reconsolidated with the memory (Dudai, 2006). Indeed, con?dence in
inaccurate details that had been provided through post-event suggestion is as high on average as
is con?dence in accurate details Payne et al., 1994).

Con?dence malleability of this sort is dif?cult to avoid in the criminal justice system and can
also be quite dif?cult to detect. First, a memory retrieved at any given time is often accompanied
by a con?dent sense of having always ?known? that detail to be true Davis, Kemmelmeier,
Follette, 2005; Hawkins Hastie, 1990). This hindsight bias re?ect can be quite compelling
and is often accompanied by high confidence (Christensen-Szalanski Willham, 1991;
Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins Hastie, 1990; Hoffrage Pohl, 2003). As such, witnesses are poor
gauges of the history of their own memories (see also Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, Posavac,
2004), and subjective reports about earlier states of con?dence that are not supported with
acceptable objective corroboration should be met with skepticism. In a dramatic demonstration

13

of this, Garrett (2010) reported that in 57% of the exoneration cases he reviewed, eyewitnesses
had initially expressed equivocal con?dence in their identi?cations and later expressed certainty
in court.

The research concerning Witness con?dence, its potential to mislead jurors, and the
circumstances under which it carries probative value have led to growing consensus in the
research community that high con?dence expressed by witnesses can be indicative of reliability
only under a very narrow range of circumstances. These include the following: Con?dence
must be assessed at the time of the initial identi?cation, in the witness?s own words and without
any feedback regarding the possible accuracy of the witness?s identi?cation response, 
Con?dence statements must be memorialized, verbatim, at the time they are expressed, and 
There must be no suggestive element present before or during the identi?cation that could
in?uence the witness?s con?dence prior exposure to the suspect, administration by a non-
blind agent, suggestive comments or non-verbal cues from an identi?cation procedure
administrator, etc.).

My understanding is that in Sierra, all of the above parameters were violated with regard to the
eyewitnesses. Hence, the diagnostic value of a highly con?dent identi?cation made under these
circumstances would be quite poor.

In addition, the case against Sierra rested largely on memories for detail that Det. Guevara
claimed he was able to recover after the passage substantial time. To the extent that Guevara?s
recollection is subject to the classic principles governing human cognition, we would expect it to
be vulnerable to effects of delay, hindsight, distortion in the direction of beliefs, and con?dence
malleability.

Trained Observers: Police. Several investigators have examined whether police constitute more
reliable witnesses than do civilians. Findings do not consistently show superiority of police
witnesses Kalteis, 2013; Smart, Berry, Rodriguez, 2014), though police sometimes show
greater overcon?dence in their performance than do civilian witnesses Smart et al., 2014).

Furthermore, police have been shown to take incomplete notes, particularly when they are aware
of who the suspect is (Steblay, 2011), and to interpret ambiguous evidence as consistent with
their prior beliefs (Charrnan, Kavetski, Mueller, 2017).

Despite the above findings demonstrating substantial opportunity for distortion of evidence as a
function of of?cers? cognitive processing, laypeople express the belief that police have superior
abilities as witnesses (Schmechel et al., 2006).

Detective Reynaldo Guevara served as a witness in the Sierra case, testifying that he developed
Sierra as a suspect because of characteristics of a car he had seen with Sierra several days earlier.
According to the research literature, there are reasons to be concerned about both the veracity of
Det. Guevara?s memory for details and about jurors? assumptions of its veracity.

14

Commentary

My review of Sierra leads me to conclude that there are a substantial number of factors
characterizing the incident itself, as well as factors presented after the incident to both
eyewitnesses that are known to substantially increase risk to eyewitness memory. Most
importantly, these factors would on the whole create a bias both to identify Thomas Sierra as the
shooter and to identify the Buick Park Avenue in the police station parking lot as the shooter?s
car.

I am aware of concerns in this case that one or more people who provided testimony may have
deliberately misrepresented their memory. I developed this affidavit based on an assumption that
all testimony was sincere. The relevant factors for purposes of this affidavit are the estimator and
system variables described above. In my opinion as an expert, the conditions of the incident
rendered the opportunity to encode a representation of the shooter?s face at the time of the
incident to be poor. The system variables similarly indicate unusually high risk of systematically
steering the witnesses toward identification of the defendant and his car, both with high
confidence.

15

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20

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22

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23

 Nancy anklin, af?m?i tastier penalty of pazjury that have ?ubmi?ed the a?ac?ned af?davit
{39118511}ng the case 9f Th?mas Sierra, angi :hai tin: af?davit m?em?s my undergianding {3f haw
311mm in eyewitness mamory regearsh appiy is) facts 9f this cage.

Juiy 2:3, 2817

Alana}? Frankiin Date

W943 Eggs? $15? I 7

 

 

 

 
 

243

Nancy J. Franklin

Department of 
State University of New York
Stony Brook, NY 11794-2500

631-632-7840



Education

1985
1989

BA. University of California, Santa Barbara
Stanford

Professional Appointments

 

1989-95 Assistant Professor, SUNY Stony Brook

1995-

Associate Professor, SUNY Stony Brook

Awards Honors

1991, 1992, 1995, 1996 Professor of the Year Dept.)

1992 Undergraduate Studies Recognition Award
1993 Divisional Award for Undergraduate Education
1994 Dean's Award and Fellowship for Untenured Faculty
1995 President's Award for Excellence in Teaching
1995 Chancellor's Award for Excellence in Teaching
1999 Hugh Cleland Memorial Distinguished Professor Award
2011 Award for Excellence in Community Service, Stony Brook University
2012 Supervised Ken Mutlu, Semi-Finalist in Intel National Science Competition
2015 Fellow, Association for Science
Service
General

Editorial Board, EP: Learning, Memory, Cognition

Grant reviews (NSF, AF OSR)

Conference reviews (Cognitive Science)

Manuscript reviews (Memory Cognition, Journal of Memory and Language, Cognitive
JEP: General, JEP: Learning, Memory, Cognition, Memory, JEP:
Human Perception and Performance, Perception 
Bulletin Review, Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, Canadian

Journal of Experimental Science, orschung,
Discourse Processes, Journal of Applied Cognitive Journal of Applied
Quarterly Journal of Experimental 

Invited Panelist. estijjzing and Consulting as an Expert in Eyewitness Identification
Cases. Annual Meeting of the American Society, Atlanta, GA. (2016).

Universng
Executive Of?cer, Arts Sciences Academic Judiciary

Chair, President?s/Chancellor?s Awards for Excellence in Scholarship Creative Activities
Chair, SUNY SB Diversity Committee

Chair, President?s Selection Committee for Excellence in Teaching

Chair, University Concerts Committee

Board of Directors, Faculty Student Association

Board of Directors, Ombuds Office

Advisory Board, SBU School of Journalism

President's Advisory Council on Diversity and Af?rmative Action

Stony Brook Southampton Task Force

Steering Committee, Long Island Conference

School of Medicine Curriculum Committee

Search Committee, Communications Director, College of Arts Sciences
Emcee, TEDXSBU

Department Representative to University and Arts Sciences Senates

Department

Cognitive/ Experimental Area Head
Advisor, Psi Chi Honors Society
Director, Masters Program

Publications

Gogol, W. C., Loomis, J. M., Newman, N. ., Sharkey, T. J. (1985). Agreement between
indirect measures of perceived distance. Perception 3 7, 17-27.

Franklin, N., Bower, G. H. (1988). Retrieving actions from goal hierarchies. Bulletin of
the Society, 26, 15-18.

Franklin, N., Tversky, B. (1990). Searching imagined environments. Journal of
Experimental General, 119, 63-76.

Bryant, D. ., Tversky, B., Franklin, N. (1992). Internal and external spatial frameworks
for representing described scenes. Journal of Memory and Language, 31, 74-98.

Franklin, N. (1992). Spatial representation for described environments. Geoforum, 23,
165- 1 74.

Franklin, N., Tversky, B, Coon, V. (1992). Switching points of View in spatial mental
models. Memory Cognition, 20, 507-518.

Franklin, N. (June 1992). Inquiring into the SRS: Commentary on Bryant on Space.
PSYCOLOQUY 3(40).

Tversky, B., Franklin, N., Taylor, H. A., Bryant, D. J. (1994). Spatial mental models
from descriptions. Journal of the American Society for Information Science, 45, 656-668.

Franklin, N., Henkel, L., Zangas, T. (1995). Parsing surrounding space into regions.
Memory Cognition, 23, 397-407.

Franklin, N. (1996). Language as a means of constructing and conveying cognitive maps.
In J. Portugali The construction of cognitive maps. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers. pp. 275?295.

Franklin, N., Federico, T. (1997). Representing described spatial and temporal situations
in memory. In Proceedings, Workshop on Language and Space. pp. 14-26. Providence,
RI.

Radvansky, G. A., Zwaan, R., Federico, T., Franklin, N. (1998). Retrieval from
temporally organized situation models. Journal of Experimental LearningMemory,
Cognition, 24, 1224?1237.

Henkel, L., Franklin, N. (1998). Reality monitoring of physically similar and
conceptually related objects. Memory Cognition, 26, 659-673.

Henkel, L., Franklin, N. (1998). Comments on Mumane Bayen?s "Measuring memory
for source: Some theoretical assumptions and technical limitations." Memory &C0gnition, 26,
678-680.

Federico, T., Franklin, N. (1998). Long-term spatial representations ?om pictorial and
textual input. In Proceedings, Conference on Spatial Information Theory. New York: Springer-
Verlag. pp. 261-278.

Franklin, N. (1999). Discovering study guide. New York: Addison Wesley
Longman.

Franklin, N. (1999). Discovering faculty guide. New York: Addison Wesley
Longman.

Tversky, R, Morrison, J. B., Franklin, N., Bryant, D. J. (1999). Three spaces of Spatial
cognition. Professional Geographer, 51, 516-524.

Franklin, N. (1999). The continued broadening of the window on the mind. Cahiers de
Cognitive, 18, 509-521.

Henkel, L. A., Franklin, N., Johnson, M. K. (2000). Cross-modal source monitoring
confusions between perceived and imagined events. Journal of Experimental 
Learning, Memory, Cognition, 26, 321-335.

Graber, M., Franklin, N., Gordon, R. R. (2002). Reducing diagnostic errors in medicine
-- What's the goal? Academic Medicine, 77, 981?992.

Franklin, N., Federico, T. (2002). Organization of temporal situations. In K. R.
Coventry and P. Olivier (Eds) Spatial language: Cognitive and computational perspectives.
Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht: The Netherlands. pp. 103?120.

Gordon, R. Franklin, N. (2003). Cognitive underpinnings to Diagnostic Error: Reply
to Croskerry. Academic Medicine, 78, 782.

Geraci, L., Franklin, N. (2004). The in?uence of linguistic labels on source-
monitoring decisions. Memory, 12, 571-585.

Franklin, N. (2004). Discovering study guide. New York: Addison Wesley
Longman.

Franklin, N. (2004). Discovering faculty guide. New York: Addison Wesley
Longman.

Gordon, R. R., Franklin, N., Beck, J. L. (2005). Wishful Thinking In Source
Monitoring. Memory Cognition, 33(3), 418?429.

Graber, M., Franklin, N., Gordon, R. (2005). Diagnostic Error In Internal Medicine.
Archives of Internal Medicine, 165, 1493-1499.

Franklin, N. (2006). The Social Dynamics of Power and Cooperation in the Wizarding
World. In N. Mulholland The 0f Harry Potter. Dallas, BenBella Books.

Franklin, N. (2007). House calls: Why are they better than everyone else's? In L. Wilson

House Unauthorized: Vasculitis, Clinic Duty, and Bad Bedside Manner. Dallas, Tx:
BenBella Books.

Gordon, R. R., Gerrig, R. ., Franklin, N. (2009). Qualitative Characteristics of
Memories for Reality, Imagination, and Fiction. Discourse Processes,46, 70-91.

Barber, S. A., Gordon, R. R., Franklin, N. (2009). Memory facilitation and wishful

thinking in self-referential situations. Memory Cognition, 3 7, 434-446.

Barber, S. J., Franklin, N., Naka, M., Yoshirnura, H. (2010). Higher social intelligence
can impair source monitoring memory. Journal of Experimental Learning, Memory, 
Cognition, 36(2), 545-551.

Moyer, A., Franklin, N. (2011). Strengthening the educational value of participation in
research as part of a department subject pool. Journal of Empirical Research in
Human Research Ethics, 75-82.

Franklin, N. (2012). Representing space: A look back. IQUES.

Franklin, N., Greenstein, M. (2013). A brief guide to factors that commonly in?uence
identi?cation and memory for criminal events. New York State Bar Association Journal, 2, 11-
1 9.

Franklin, N. (2016). Management of Problematic Memories in Vulnerable Populations:
Science or Art? 61(2).

Greenstein, M. J., Franklin, N., Martins, M., Sewack, C., Meier, M. (2016). When
Anticipation Beats Accuracy: Threat Alters Memory For Dynamic Scenes. Memory Cognition,
44, 633-649.

Greenstein, M. J., Franklin, N., Klug, J. (2016). In-Group vs. out?group source memory:
Spontaneously inferred features can both facilitate and impair source monitoring. Experimental
63(3), 150-158.

Franklin, N., Greenstein, M. (In Press). Nothing but the truth? An assessment of narrative

goals in the criminal justice system. In H.A. Taylor I. M. Zacks, Representations in mind and
world. Hove, England: Press. pp. 24?41

Greenstein, M. J., Franklin, N. Anger and the misinformation effect. In Preparation.

Greenstein, M. J., Franklin, N. Anger In Lineup Identi?cation And Creation. Under
Revision.

Greenstein, M. ., Cruz, M., Franklin, N. Does Suspense Increase or Decrease
Vulnerability to Misinforrnation? In Preparation.

Swets, 8., Franklin, N., Viccellio, A. Interruptions In The Emergency Room. In
Preparation.

Franklin, N., Swets., B., Viccellio, A. How interruptions can enhance complex task
performance. In Preparation.

Franklin, N., Greenstein, M. J., Ensor, K. Expert survey on eyewitness memory: Some
updates and clari?cations. In Preparation.

Franklin, N., Hau, C.-L. V., Beck, 1. L., Sylvester, P., Belazi, A. Familiarity matching as
a strategy for determining source. In Preparation.

Paper Presentations and Invited Talks Since 1993
Franklin, N. (1993). Parsing surrounding space. Colloquium, New York University.

Henkel, L., Franklin, N. (1994). Reality monitoring confusions for physically similar
and semantically related memories. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern
Association, Providence.

Li, L., Franklin, N. (1994). Indirect tasks and implicit knowledge about falling
trajectories. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Association,
Providence.

Li, L., Franklin, N. (1994). Animation and perceptual knowledge about projectile
motion. Paper presented at the Workshop on Object Perception and Memory (OPAM-94), St.
Louis.

Henkel, L. A., Franklin, N. (1994). Reality monitoring confusions as a function of
physical and semantic similarity. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the 
Society, St. Louis.

Franklin, N. (1995). Mental models of time? Paper presented at the annual Winter Text
Conference, Jackson Hole, Wyoming.

Franklin, N., Li, L. (1995). Representational momentum and mental extrapolation for
parabolic motion. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern 
Association, Boston.

Federico, T., Franklin, N. (1995). Mental models involving space and time. Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Association, Boston.

Henkel, L. A., Franklin, N. (1995). Reality monitoring across modalities. Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Society, Los Angeles.

Federico, T., Franklin, N. (1996). Long-term representation of spatial mental models.
Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society, Chicago.

Radvansky, G. A., Zwaan, R. A., Franklin, N., Federico, T. (1996). Retrieval from time-

based situation models. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society,
Chicago.

Franklin, N., Federico, T. (1997). Representing described spatial and temporal situations
in memory. Paper presented at the Workshop on Language and Space, Providence, RI.

Franklin, N., Henkel, L. A. (1997). Parsing space around another observer. Paper
presented at the Roma Workshop on Spatial Cognition, Rome, Italy.

Federico, T., Franklin, N. (1997). Medium of input and long-term representations of
Space. Paper presented at the annual Conference on Spatial Information Theory, Laurel Highlands,
PA.

Franklin, N. (1998). Situationiness. Paper presented at the annual Winter Text
Conference, Jackson Hole, Wyoming.

Geraci, L., Franklin, N. (1998). The role of identity and linguistic label in reality
monitoring. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society, Dallas.

Henkel, L. A., Johnson, M. K., Franklin, N. (1998). How we access memories affects false
memory rates. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society, Dallas.

Franklin, N. (1999). False memories and source monitoring. Invited Colloquium, Austin
College, Sherman, TX.

Gordon, R., Franklin, N. (1999). Wishful thinking and source monitoring. Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Society, Los Angeles.

Gordon, R., Franklin, N. (2001). Comparing memory characteristics of real, imaginary,
and ?ctional events. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society,
Orlando.

Gordon, R., Franklin, N. (2002). Locus of the Wishful thinking effect in source
monitoring. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society, Kansas City.

Gordon, R., Franklin, N., Beck, J. (2003). The role of retrieval in the wishful thinking
effect. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society, Vancouver, Canada.

Franklin, N. (2004). Where memories come from: Rational and irrational biases in
source monitoring. Invited colloquium, UC Santa Barbara.

Klug, ., Franklin, N. (2004). Inferred features as discriminative cues in source
monitoring. Poster presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society, Minneapolis,
MN.

Franklin, N. (2005). What the errors tell us about how accurate source decisions usually
are. Paper presented as part of a symposium at the Annual Meeting of the Midwestern
Association, Chicago, IL.

Franklin, N., Hau, C.-L. V, Beck, J. L., Sylvester, P. C. (2005). Familiarity matching in
source monitoring. Paper presented at Society Annual Meeting, Toronto.

Franklin, N. (2006). Source decisions for memories people care about. Paper presented at
the International Conference on Memory, Sydney.

Barber, 8., Gordon, R., Franklin, N. (2007). Self-relevance: Facilitation and distortion in
source memory. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Association for 
Science, Washington, D. C.

Franklin, N., Barber, S. ., Allen, S., Gordon, R. (2007). Emotional Aspects of Source
Monitoring. Paper presented at the Society Annual Meeting, Long Beach.

Franklin, N. (2008). Eyewitness Memory and Identification. Invited address, Continuing
Legal Education Workshop for the Queens County Bar Association, New York.

Barber, S. ., Franklin, N., Naka, M., Yoshimura, H. (2008). Higher social intelligence
can impair memory. Paper presented at the Society Annual Meeting, Chicago.

Naka, M., Ishizaki, C., Yamamsaki, Y., Barber, J., Franklin, N. (2009). Re?ecting upon
a victim's feelings. Paper presented at the Society Annual Meeting, Boston.

Greenstein, M., Franklin, N. (2009). Anger's impact on a lineup recognition task. Poster
presented at the Society Annual Meeting, Boston.

Swets, 8., Franklin, N., Viccellio, A. (2009). Interruptions in the Emergency Room.
Poster presented at the Society Annual Meeting, Boston.

Franklin, N. (2010). Eyewitness memory and identi?cation. Invited Colloquium, Legal Aid
Society, New York, NY.

Franklin, N. (2010). Limitations of eyewitness memory and the effects on identi?cation.
Invited Colloquium, New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Brooklyn, NY.

Franklin, N., Swets, 8., Ring, L., Wright, J., Greenstein, M., Viccellio, A., Plastaras, B.
(2011). Those Irritating Interruptions And Why We Can?t Live Without Them. Presented at the
Converging Science Summit To Advance Healthcare, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY.
[Winner, Best Scienti?c Paper.]

Franklin, N., Swets, 8., Ring, L., Wright, 1., Greenstein, M., Viccellio, A., Plastaras, B.
(2011). The Bene?ts of Interruption on Complex Task Performance. Presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Society, Seattle, WA.

Franklin, N. (2011). Where Cognition Meets Criminal Law. Invited lecture on eyewitness
testimony and juror decision making, Columbia Law School.

Greenstein, M., Franklin, N., Martins, M., Maier, M. (2011). Threat Extends Implied
Motion In Remembered Scenes. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society,
Seattle, WA.

Franklin, N. (2011). What Memory Research Can Tell Us About The Reliability Of
Eyewitness Evidence. Continuing Legal Education Workshop for New York State Defenders
Association, Brockport, NY.

Cruz, M. 13., Franklin, N., Greenstein, M. (2012). Does the feeling of suspense make
you more vulnerable to misinformation? Presented at the Annual Conference of the Eastern
Association, Philadelphia.

Franklin, N., Greenstein, M. (2012). Identifying While Angry. Paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Society, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Franklin, N. (2012). Where Cognition Meets Criminal Law. Invited lecture on eyewitness
testimony and juror decision making, Columbia Law School.

Franklin, N. (2013). How Anger Impacts Lineup Fairness and Identi?cation Decisions.
Colloquium at John Jay College of Criminal Justice.

Greenstein, M., Franklin, N., Klug, I. (2013). Memory Accuracy for People depends on
Whether and When You Can Identify with Them. Paper presented at Eastern 
Association Meeting, New York, NY.

Franklin, N. (2013). Memory and Task Performance after Interruption. Keynote address
given at the North Shore LIJ Conference on Nursing, Long Island, NY.

Greenstein, M., Franklin, N. (2013). Lineup Creation and Anger. Paper presented at the
Meeting of the Society on Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, Rotterdam, The
Netherlands.

Greenstein, M., Franklin, N. (2013). Anger and memory: Misleading People is Easy
When They are Mad. Poster presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society,
Toronto.

Franklin, N. (March 18, 2014). Where Cognition Meets Criminal Law: Attention,
Memory, and Decision Making. Invited colloquium, New York County Defender Services, New
York, NY.

Greenstein, M., Franklin, N., Martins, Sewack, C., Maier, M. (2014). Is
anticipation more important than accuracy? Threat alters memory for implied motion. Paper
presented at Annual Meeting of the Eastern Association, March 2014, Boston.

Science on Tap. Interviewed by School of Journalism professor Steve Reiner (formerly of
60 Minutes) on Eyewitness Memory. Filmed for broadcast by the Alan Alda Center for
Communicating Science, March 24, 2014.

Franklin, N. (June, 2014). How Research In Human Cognition Can Improve Our
Criminal Justice System. Invited talk, Stony Brook Foundation Board of Trustees, New York,
NY.

Harman, B., Franklin, N. (2014). Exaggeration Contagion: Do Eyewitnesses Adopt
Each Other?s Reporting Style? Annual Meeting of the Society, Long Beach, CA.

Harman, B., Franklin, N. (2015). 100 vs. 10,000 Matches To An Eyewitness?s
Description: Are Potential Jurors Sensitive to Base Rates? Annual Meeting of the American
Society, San Diego, CA.

Franklin, N. (2015). Cognition In The Courtroom. Invited talk, Stony Brook Council,
Stony Brook, NY.

Franklin, N. (2015). Representations of Criminal Events. Invited talk, In
Honor Of Professor Barbara Tversky, Chicago, IL.

Franklin, N., Miller, S. (2015). Emotion Can Change The Boundary Extension Effect.
Annual Meeting of the Society, Chicago, IL.

Franklin, N. (2015). The Minds of Diagnosticians and Practitioners: Cognition and Better
Medicine. Grand Rounds, Department of Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY.

Franklin, N. (2016). Cognition in the Courtroom. Invited Colloquium, Stony Brook
Alumni Association, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY.

Franklin, N. (2016). Some Inconvenient Truths About Eyewitness Identi?cation and
False Confessions. Invited Continuing Legal Education Colloquium, Queens Law Associates,
Queens, NY.

Franklin, N. (2016). Invited Panelist. esti?zing and Consulting as an Expert in Eyewitness
Identi?cation Cases. Pro-conference workshop, Annual Meeting of the American 

Society, Atlanta, GA.

Franklin, N. (2016). And The Law. Keynote Address, 2016 Law and Civic
Education Summer Institute. Long Island, NY.

Franklin, N. (2016). Who Would Confess To A Murder They Didn?t Commit? Maybe You.
TEDXSBU, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY.

Franklin, N. (2017). The of Eyewitness Testimony. Cross To Kill Seminar.
Meeting of the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. New York, NY.

Franklin, N. (2017). Eyewitness Memory ID Research. National Forensic College,
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. New York, NY.

Fundin

1990 Cognitive Science GRI Lab. SUNY SB Grant for Computing and
Communications). $400. Susan Brennan)

1992-95 MULTI: Multimedia User-interface Laboratory for Teaching and Instructional
Material Development. NSF, $210,000. (PI: Arie Kaufman; Philip Lewis, Prateek Mishra,
Gerhard Schloss, Susan Brennan).

1993 -96 AIM: Applied Internships for Minorities. Apple Computer, Inc. Support for
tuition, stipend, travel, equipment, for three Master's students and their advisers. $166,529. (Co-
PIs: Susan Brennan, Arthur Samuel, Philip Lewis, Wendy Katkin).

1993 Ethics in REU. NSF. $7,617. Mark Schneider, Ivan Chase).

1994 Ethics in REU. NSF. $5,958. Albert Cover, Ivan Chase).

1994-97 Multimedia and User Interface Laboratory. NSF, $75,000. (PI: Arie
Kaufman; Co?PIs:Susan Brennan, Prateek Mishra, Gerhard Schloss).

1999 Use of Distinctive Features in Reality Monitoring. Psi Chi.

2001-02 Diagnostic Error In Medicine. National Patient Safety Foundation. $100,000. (PI,
Mark Graber, VAMC Northport).

2008-2010 Interruptions in the Emergency Room. James S. Todd Memorial Research
Grant, National Patient Safety Foundation. $99,964. (PI: Nancy Franklin).

2012-2013 Management of distractions and interruptions during nursing care in ICU,
National Patient Safety Foundation, $100,000. (Consulting Scientist; PI: Mary Elizabeth Happ)

Expert Testimony

Jurisdictions in which testimony regarding eyewitness identi?cation and memory has been

admitted include several counties in New York State, as well as Massachusetts and Washington,
D. C.