Case 2:17-cv-04214 Document 155 Filed 12/29/17 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 2388

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
AT CHARLESTON
MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-04214

AN EASEMENT TO CONSTRUCT, OPERATE
AND MAINTAIN A 42-INCH GAS
TRANSMISSION LINE ACROSS PROPERTIES
IN THE COUNTIES OF NICHOLAS,
GREENBRIER, MONROE, SUMMERS,
BRAXTON, HARRISON, LEWIS, WEBSTER
AND WETZEL, WEST VIRGINIA, OWNED
BY D. LANE MCMILLION, ET AL.,
Defendants.
DEFENDANTS RESPONSE AND BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IMMEDIATE POSSESSION
NOW COME Defendants Norvel P. Mann, Jean M. Mann, Thomas B. Mann,
Hannah G. Mann, Chloda Crosier, William H. Mann, Lucy G. Booth, Harry L. Mann, Nancy L.
Phillips, Donald E. Mann, Carl E. Mann, Larry W. Mann, Bonnie K. Barberie, John White, II,
Petrie Dobbs Brown, Addision Dunlap Dobbs, Lee Filmore Dobbs, III, Maury W. Johnson,
David Allen Johnson, Wayne Johnson, Everett Johnson, Jr., Clarence Frank Sills, Jr. Kelley
Anne Sandell Sills, James O. Gore, Barry G. Meadows, Lisa B. Meadows, Zane R. Lawhorn,
Stephen M. Miller, Melanie J. Miller, Cynthia A. Broyles Morris, Trustee of the William S.
Broyles Revocable Trust and the Virginia B. Broyles Revocable Trust, Roy P. Reese, Joyce A.
Reese, Dennis F. Fountain, Carla D. Fountain, Patricia J. Williams, Roger D. Crabtree, Rebecca

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H. Crabtree, Rodger L. Boothe, Marjorie Boothe, Cheryl Bowers, Bonnie Larew Walsh, Gladys
Larew Carter, James Tully Larew, Janet Larew Haag, Kerry N. Boone, Cheryl L. Boone,
(collectively “Landowners”), by counsel, as their response and brief in opposition to the motion
for partial summary judgment and immediate possession (the “QuickTake Motion”) under the
Natural Gas Act, 15 USC §§7-717z (“NGA”) and Rules 56 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“FRCP”) filed herein by Plaintiff Mountain Valley Pipeline, L.L.C. (“MVP”), and
state as follows:
I.
Preliminary Statement
On October 24, 2017, MVP filed its complaint (the “Complaint”) in this Court to
condemn property interests of numerous defendants, including Landowners, in this case, under
the NGA and FRCP Rule 71.1. On October 27, 2017, MVP filed its QuickTake Motion, a
memorandum and declaration of Robert J. Cooper (the “Cooper Declaration”) in support of
access to and possession of properties of Landowners and other defendants, to begin trenching,
blasting, and/or direct drilling through those properties. MVP argues that Section 7(h) of the
NGA grants this newly-formed company the extraordinary and immediate “quick-take” power
reserved for traditional governmental acquisitions for purely public use projects, such as those
undertaken by the federal government under the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3114 (b).
MVP claims this is necessary, in the public interest, and urgent in order to construct a 42”
diameter pipeline for the high-pressure transmission of natural gas captured through hydraulic
fracturing of shale rock formations in the Marcellus and Utica regions of West Virginia,
southwestern Pennsylvania and southern Ohio, approximately 300 miles to an area in Pittsylvania
County, Virginia, where it intersects with an existing Transco gas pipeline. MVP further claims

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the pipeline will help meet the public’s demand for natural gas in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic
and Southeast regions of the United States.
MVP’s motion for partial summary judgment on its substantive right to condemn
easements hinges on MVP establishing there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The
only evidence MVP’s cites in support of its motion is the Cooper Declaration and FERC record.
Landowners assert that there are facts in dispute which are material to MVP’s claim of a
substantive right to condemn property, and they respectfully request that this Court allow
sufficient time, as provided under FRCP Rule 56(d) (2) to discover those facts so they may be
properly considered by this Court.
II.
Rule 56 Summary Judgment
MVP argues that its power to condemn easements stems from Section 7(h) of the NGA:
(h) Right of eminent domain for construction of pipelines, etc.
When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot
acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the
compensation to be paid for, the necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, and
maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the transportation of natural gas, and the
necessary land or other property, in addition to right-of-way, for the location of
compressor stations, pressure apparatus, or other stations or equipment necessary
to the proper operation of such pipe line or pipe lines, it may acquire the same by
the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United
States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts.

At very least, this section requires MVP to establish that: 1) MVP holds a valid FERC certificate;
2) the easements MVP seeks are necessary; and 3) MVP has been unable to acquire easements by
agreement. Genuine issues of material fact exist to all three of these requirements; therefore, as
discussed below, partial summary judgment should not be granted.
A. MVP has not met all preconditions of the FERC Certificate specified to begin
condemnation and construction of its project.
On October 13, 2017, FERC granted MVP a conditional Certificate of Public
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Convenience and Necessity (“Certificate”). Within the order granting the Certificate, FERC
identified numerous conditions that must be met by MVP prior to commencement of
construction on Landowners’ properties. See Exhibit A to Complaint (the “FERC Order”).
Appendix C. It sets out 12 pages of “Environmental Conditions,” setting out more than 30
conditions which must be met prior to the commencement of construction. CM/ECF # 1-1 at
121–132. For example, MVP must obtain all applicable authorizations required under federal
law. Id. at 125. Those authorizations include (1) certifications from Virginia under Section 401
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)); (2) authorization from the
Pittsburgh, Huntington and Norfolk Districts of the United States Army Corps of Engineers for
the disposal of dredged and/or fill material into waters of the United States (33 U.S.C. §
1344(a)); (3) final approval from Virginia Department of Historic Resources required under §
106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. § 306108; (4) authorization by the
United States Forest Service for construction across the Jefferson National Forest (including a
special use permit and condemnation agreement); (5) a permit from the Virginia Marine
Resources Commission for crossing 18 Virginia streams and rivers with drainage areas greater
than 5 square miles; and (6) leases with the Bureau of Land Management which are required for
the pipeline to go through lands of the U.S. Forest Service.
To support its claim in the QuickTake Motion, MVP relies heavily on East Tenn. Nat.
Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir. 2004). Sage, however, arose in different economic
times with much different facts. The only conditions in the certificate FERC granted the gas
company in Sage were construction conditions to be met during construction, rather than prior to
construction. 361 F.3d at 819. It is quite apparent that MVP will not be able to satisfy the many
conditions in Appendix C prior to its target February 1, 2018 pipeline construction start date.
As a result, MVP has no substantive right of condemnation to begin construction of the
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pipeline. See e.g., Delaware Dept. of Natural Resources v. FERC, 558 F.3d 575, 579 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (stating that a FERC conditioned certificate “cannot possible authorize [the project] until
the condition is met.), also Ruby Pipeline, 113 FERC ¶61,015 (2010) at 18 (observing that
“[c]onditional Commission orders have been described in the context of constitutional standing
analysis as “without binding effect.” Id, p. 21, n.27.
Because MVP has not demonstrated that it has met the conditions set forth by FERC, its
Certificate grants no present authority to act on any right granted under Section 7(h) of the NGA.
MVP’s request for partial summary judgment as to a substantive right of eminent domain should
therefore be denied.
B. MVP cannot show that the property interests it seeks to condemn are necessary.
For the same reasons (the MVP Certificate is conditional), MVP cannot establish that this
project is necessary. Unless MVP can satisfy these conditions, the project may never begin. As
stated above, since MVP is unable to demonstrate that is has met the conditions set forth by
FERC in its issuance of the Certificate, the Certificate has no present legal effect. Without a valid
Certificate from FERC, MVP is unable to proceed with its intended project. Therefore, by
extension, MVP is also unable to show that the property interests it seeks to condemn are
necessary as, without a valid Certificate, its proposed project is unable to advance. If the project
is unable to advance, MVP no longer needs to condemn the property interests it seeks to
condemn. Because MVP is unable to demonstrate that the property interests it seeks to condemn
are necessary, MVP should be denied summary judgment in the present case.
C. MVP has failed to establish that it has been unable to acquire easements by
agreements with landowners.
MVP must engage in good faith negotiations with the landowners before condemning
land. See Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. 118 Acres, 745 F. Supp. 366, 369 (E.D. La.

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1990). Landowners never received written appraisals substantiating MVP’s claims for just
compensation but instead only received spread sheet like offers which provide little if any
explanation for how MVP arrived at their conclusion of just compensation. For these reasons,
material facts are in dispute as to whether MVP has been unable to obtain easement by
agreement, and thus further discovery on this issue should proceed.
Conclusion
As genuine issues of material facts exist to all of the above requirements accordingly
summary judgement on MVP’s right to condemn should be denied.
III
Rule 65 Mandatory Injunction
A. MVP will NOT suffer irreparable harm absent the issuance of an injunction
because no immediate need to begin construction exists
MVP contends that if denied access by this court to immediately begin construction it
will suffer irreparable harm by incurring “additional delays and contractor costs.” (See MVP
Memo p. 12) However, this argument is premature. When examining the potential harm that the
party seeking the injunction may suffer, “the injury must be both certain and great; it must be
actual and not theoretical.” Injunctive relief "will not be granted against something merely feared
as liable to occur at some indefinite time," See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674,
51 S. Ct. 286, 291, 75 L. Ed. 602 (1931); the party seeking injunctive relief must show that "[t]he
injury complained of [is] of such imminence that there is a 'clear and present' need for equitable
relief to prevent irreparable harm." Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297, 307 (D.D.C.),
aff'd, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citations and internal quotations omitted). MVP has yet to
satisfy all requirements incident to commencement of construction set out in the Certificate; thus,
MVP could experience additional delays and additional costs caused by forces totally outside the
purview of this Court. Unlike the Patriot Project in East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361

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F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2004), which MVP cites as its primary authority, here the harm MVP’s alleges
is purely conjectural as there is no danger that MVP will be unable to comply with the
construction and service deadlines in its Certificate Order without expedited relief. 361 F.3d at
829 (concluding that the pipeline developer would not be able to meet FERC deadline without
preliminary relief). FERC’s Order allows MVP until October 13, 2020 to construct and place the
pipeline in service, thus even if MVP were to experience delays in construction as a result of
ruling from this court, it would still have ample time to complete construction in compliance
with FERC. CM/ECF No. 1-2 at 106 (Certificate Order at 105). In the Cooper Declaration
offered as evidence herein by MVP, the pipeline can be constructed and placed in service in less
than twelve months. See CM/ECF No. 4-1 at ¶ 13 (stating that “MVP plans to construct the
pipeline and place it into service by December 2018”).
Ultimately; MVP cannot show that any of the potential delays it has alleged rise to the
level of irreparable harm and its claim of irreparable harm in the form increased costs or lost
revenue is unpersuasive as district courts have made it clear that irreparable harm requires a
showing of “more than mere economic harm.” Wisconsin Gas Co. v. F.E.R.C., 758 F.2d 669,
674, 244 U.S. App. D.C. 349, 354 (C.A.D.C.,1985). For these reasons, MVP is not entitled to
injunctive relief.
B. The granting of immediate access to begin construction in not in the public interest
because the public purpose of MVP’s project is being challenged
The public “purpose” of the MVP project has been questioned since details of the project
were first announced. Prior to FERC’s issuance of the Certificate to MVP, multiple lawsuits were
filed in federal court alleging that FERC’s “rubber stamp” approach of approving natural gas
pipelines generally and, more specifically, the issuance of a certificate to MVP does not adhere to
the “public use” standards imposed by the Fifth Amendments Takings Clause. Currently,

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multiple parties are challenging the issuance of certificates by FERC in various instances before
both this Court (Berkley, et al. v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, et al., Case No. 7:17-cv00357, filed July 27, 2017) and in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Bold
Alliance et al., v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-01822-RJL, filed
Sept. 5, 2017). Similar to the case at hand, a large part of these lawsuits concerns FERC’s routine
grant of certificates of convenience and necessity to projects whose sole or primary purpose is to
benefit foreign commerce. (See generally Bold Alliance, et al). In addition to these federal
lawsuits, over twenty requests for a rehearing have been filed by FERC intervenors, as interested
parties, many requesting a stay of the certificate order (FERC Docket No. CP16-10). These
lawsuits, including the present, and rehearing requests, as well as the Constitutional challenges
posed wherein, should be fully discovered, briefed, argued, and adjudicated prior to the
construction of a project of this magnitude on the private properties of landowners. To find
otherwise would violate the due process and property rights of all those parties named in the
above-mentioned suits.
It is also noteworthy that following the decision by FERC, in a split 2-1 vote, to issue the
Certificate to MVP, FERC’s former acting chair, Commissioner LaFleur, wrote a dissenting
opinion asserting that MVP’s project as proposed is not in the public interest. Commissioner
LaFleur argues that the proposed project does not meet the public interest for two reasons: 1) the
FERC records demonstrate that regional needs may be met by alternate approaches that could
provide significantly fewer environmental impacts, and 2) the need for gas to be provided by the
MVP proposed project is unknown, a fact that shifts the balance analysis toward denial of the
certificate. (Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, Equitrans, L.P. 161 FERC ¶ 61,744). Despite
issuing a certificate to the MVP, FERC ultimately conceded that whether the project meets the
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“public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is beyond their jurisdiction,
stating, “Only the courts can determine whether Congress’s action in passing section 7(h) of the
NGA conflicts with the Constitution.” (See ORDER 63). Because the public purpose of this
project has yet to be fully adjudicated any issuance of an injunction granting immediate access,
possession, and construction is premature and thus not in the public interest.
C. Immediate access threatens landowners’ ability to obtain just compensation
guaranteed under the fifth amendment
A grant of immediate possession poses a direct threat to a landowner’s ability to obtain just
compensation. MVP claims it can remedy this threat by posting a bond prior to commencement
of construction. This ignores; however, two harsh realities that landowners face is condemnation
actions: 1) seldom is the bond posted by the condemning authority the same as the court’s final
determination of just compensation (usually it is less) and 2) when a private company such as
MVP gains possession prior to a trial on just compensation there is always the possibility that the
company could go under and thereby avoid its responsibility to pay the remainder of just
compensation or other lawfully owed fees. This concern rings especially true in the present case
as MVP does currently own or operate any other existing pipelines and is made up of several
different subsidiary companies all of whom have joined together only for the sole purpose of
constructing and operating this project. (Certificate Order at 2)
The limit on private entities ability to exercise the power of “quick take,” exists not as a
sword to burden or delays private projects but rather a shield to protect a landowner’s ability to
obtain just compensation under the 5th amendment of the United States Constitution. For this
reason, a grant of immediate possession prior to judicially determined just compensation is
improper.

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D. MVP lacks a substantive right to condemn therefore it cannot prevail on the merits
Should the court get beyond the above issues, it still cannot grant MVP the injunctive
relief its requests, as it has failed to demonstrate it has a substantive right to exercise the power
of eminent domain, a prerequisite to obtaining a remedy in equity. Because MVP’s certificate is
conditional, MVP has no substantive right to eminent domain, for which this Court could fashion
a remedy in equity to enforce.
Conclusion
As MVP cannot show that will suffer irreparable harm and a balance of the equities does
not weigh in MVP’s favor, this court should deny MVP motion for a preliminary injunction in
the form of immediate possession to begin construction.
IV
Eminent Domain Quick-Take Power
A. Congress Never Granted Gas Companies Quick-Take Power Under the
Natural Gas Act
When Congress delegates the power of eminent domain it also has the power to prescribe
the manner in which this power is delegated. 2,953.15 Acres of Land v. United States, 350 F.2d
356, 359 (5th Cir. 1965); See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-86, 72
S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952). Eminent domain power when delegated can be exercised only
in the manner authorized. Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, 257 F.2d 885, 894
(2d Cir.).
Congress can directly grant two types of eminent domain authority:
(1) the straight take or ordinary power of eminent domain; and (2)
(2) the quick-take or extraordinary power of eminent.
Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3-4, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 2190-91 (1984). The first
authorizes the condemning authority to takes possession of the land after an order of
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condemnation and a trial determining just compensation has occurred. In contrast, the harsher
(“quick-take”) power authorizes the condemning authority to take possession of property before a
trial on just compensation. Congress has granted “quick-take” authority in only a limited number
of statutes, such as the Atomic Energy Act and the Second War Powers Act, and only for use by
the federal government, not private companies. See United States v. Parcel of Land, etc., 100 F.
Supp. 498, 501, 503, n. 8 (D.D.C.1951). This limitation exists for good reason as “quick-take”
poses serious due process concerns for private property owners. Unless Congress specifically
grants the power of “quick-take” to a private condemnor, it is improper for the condemnor to
exercise such power. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 706 F. 2d 1312. Courts examining this
issue have made it clear that the NGA does not authorize quick-take power, nor can it be implied,
because eminent domain statutes are strictly construed to exclude those rights not expressly
granted. Humphries v. Williams Nat'l Gas Co., 48 F.Supp.2d 1276, 1281 (D.Kan.1999); see also
Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 144 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir.1998);
Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. The 20″ x 1,430′ Pipeline Right of Way, 197 F.Supp.2d 1241, 1243–
1244 (E.D.Wash.2002); Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land, More or Less in
Williams County, N.D., 520 F. Supp. 170, 173 (D.C.N.D.1981). A party with the ordinary power
of eminent domain has no right to an owner’s property until after just compensation is judicially
determined and paid. See Kirby Forest , supra, at 3-5, 104 S. Ct. at 2190-91; Northern Border ,
144 F.3d at 472 (explaining that “the Natural Gas Act does not create an entitlement to
immediate possession of the land” without prior payment of compensation) see also Natural Gas
Act, Section 717f(h)(conferring ordinary power of eminent domain). Because MVP has not
alleged it has “quick take” power nor can it; it should be denied immediate access to begin
construction.

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B. Courts cannot authorize quick-take when Congress has not as such an action
would be a clear violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine
The Constitution divides government into three distinct branches and “it is the duty of
each to abstain from, and to oppose, encroachments on either Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346, 355-56 (1911). As such a court cannot substitute its will for that of the legislature. Purity
Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 202 (1912). See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863, 941, 343 U.S. 579, 692 (U.S. 1952).
Once a court determines that Congress has not granted MVP quick-take power, its
judicial inquiry should end. A party cannot use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as
MVP is doing here with FRCP 65, to unilaterally authorize MVP to exercise an
additional power of eminent domain only Congress can grant by statute. Rules of procedure
do not empower courts to enlarge the powers of eminent domain granted by Congress. “Courts
are not at liberty to create an exception where Congress has declined to do so.” Freytag v. C.I.R.,
501 U.S. 868, 874, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2636 (1991). While “[t]he Supreme Court [has]. . . the
power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . [s]uch rules shall not . . . enlarge
or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072. By using the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to grant the quick-take power when Congress has withheld it, district courts
impermissibly substitute their judgment for that of Congress. See Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot, 560 U.S. 702, 723-24, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2607 (2010) (stating
that the “Florida Legislature” and “not [] the Florida Supreme Court” determines how to carry

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out a taking and that the power to determine how “to effect a compensated taking” has “always
reside[d]” with the Legislature). Because the NGA does not confer pipelines companies with
quick take authority, this court must refrain from granting this authority in the form of an
injunction. In Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres, 144 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1998), the
Seventh Circuit held that general principles of equity prohibited courts from granting injunctive
relief that gives a private gas company possession of an owner’s property before trial. The
Seventh Circuit rejected the gas company’s argument that the “lack of quick-take authority
should not defeat the company’s request for a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 472 (holding that
there must be a specific source of statutory authority to allow private parties to take immediate
possession of property they seek to condemn). Before engaging in the balancing test for
injunctive relief, the Seventh Circuit noted that the gas company was not eligible for injunctive
relief because it lacked the quick take power. The Seventh Circuit declared that because a gas
company’s right to seize possession of the owner’s property will not “arise [until] the conclusion
of the normal eminent domain process, [the gas company] is not eligible for the [injunctive]
relief it seeks.” Id. at 471. The court explained that Congress granted private gas companies the
ordinary power of eminent domain but not the extraordinary and additional quick-take power. Id.
(“[T]he Natural Gas Act does not create an entitlement to immediate possession of the land.”).
Id. at 472 and as such, the court could not use equitable powers to grant quick take authority to a
party to which Congress has not granted such authority. Cases like Columbia Gas Transmission
v. 1.01 Acres, 768 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2014) and East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361
F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2004) and others which MVP cites to support its authority for immediate
possession are inapposite because not a single one of these cases addressed the constitutional
separation of powers issue. Columbia Gas focused largely on whether the pipeline’s “blanket”
certificate conferred a substantive right to condemn property up to one mile outside the existing
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easement. See Columbia Gas, 768 F.3d at 303. Finding a substantive right, the Third Circuit
proceeded to evaluate whether the pipeline’s motion for immediate possession under traditional
standards for injunctive relief, without ever analyzing the constitutionality of using its injunctive
powers to grant a right that Congress never granted in the Natural Gas Act. East Tennessee Gas
v. Sage, supra., suffers from the same infirmity in that it too, never addressed whether a court’s
authorization of quick-take power in the absence of congressional authorization violated the
separation of powers doctrine. Several of the other cases that Columbia cites examine whether
the court’s use of injunctive power constituted an improper and overly broad use of a procedural
rule to create a substantive right. However, these courts framed the issue as a matter of the scope
of the court’s authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and not as a constitutional
infirmity. See East Tennessee Gas, 361 F.3d at 823 (observing that proceedings in equity such as
those under Rule 65 cannot be used to create substantive rights). Neither the Third or Fourth
Circuit rulings cited by MVP prevent this Court from addressing Landowners’ constitutional
challenge to the use by MVP of quick-take under the NGA.
V
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court should deny MVP’s QuickTake Motion for partial
summary judgment and immediate possession, and strictly limit the rights MVP seeks to acquire
in this proceeding to only those rights granted in the Certificate, with all conditions imposed by
FERC.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Charles M. Lollar, Jr.
Charles M. Lollar, Jr.
W.V. I.D. No. 13105
Email: chip@lollarlaw.com
Charles M. Lollar*
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Email: chuck@lollarlaw.com
LOLLAR LAW, PLLC
109 E. Main St., Suite 501
Norfolk, VA 23510
Phone: (757) 644-4657
Facsimile: (757) 644-4659
*Not admitted before this Court,
Statement of Visiting Attorney filed

C. Joseph Stevens
W.V. I.D. No. 3604
Email: Joe@jstevenslaw.com
W. Jack Stevens
W.V. I.D. No. 7234
Email: Jackie@jstevenslaw.com
STEVENS & STEVENS
8137 Court Avenue
Hamlin, WV 25523
Phone (304) 824-5253
Facsimile (304) 824-7779
Counsel for Landowner

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on December 29, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing Response
and Brief in Opposition to the Motion for partial summary judgment and immediate possession
with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to
all counsel of record, including the following:
Nicolle R. Snyder Bagnell
REED SMITH
Reed Smith Centre
225 Fifth Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Email: nbagnell@reedsmith.com
Counsel for Mountain Valley Pipeline, L.L.C.
/s/Charles M. Lollar, Jr.
Charles M. Lollar, Jr.
W.V. I.D. No. 13105

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