Case Document 73 Filed 01/04/18 Page 1 of 15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

DARLENE COLLINS, 21:11.,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. 

CHARLES w. cf 01.,
Defendants.

mamamc?mmamom

ORDER GRANTING JUDICIAL RULE 1.1 MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants Charles W. Daniels, Edward L. Chavez, Petra Jimenez
Maez, Barbara J. Vigil, Judith K. Nakamura, the New Mexico Supreme Court, Nan Nash, James
Noel, the Second Judicial District Court, Henry A. Alaniz, Robert L. Padilla, and Bernalillo County
Metropolitan Court?s (collectively, ?Judicial Defendants?) Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against Plaintiffs Darlene Collins, Bail Bond Association of
New Mexico, Richard Martinez, Bill Sharer, Craig Brandt, and Carl Trujiilo?s (collectively,
?Plaintiffs?). (Doc. 33). After due consideration, Judicial Defendants? Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions
shall be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This dispute centers on the constitutionality of the New Mexico Supreme Court Rules
regarding pretrial release and detention in criminal proceedings adopted pursuant to Supreme Court-
Order effective on July 1, 2017 (?2017 Rules?). Plaintiffs are the Bail Bond
Association of New Mexico, three New Mexico Senators, one member of the New Mexico House of
Representatives, and Darlene Collins, a criminal defendant who has been charged in New Mexico
state court with aggravated assault, a fourth-degree felony, and released on nonmonetary conditions
pending trial after her first appearance before a Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court judge. (Doc.

56 at 1] 18). Defendants are the New Mexico Supreme Court and all of its Justices, the Second

 

1 Plaintiffs incorrectly identify Justice Charles Daniels of the New Mexico Supreme Court as ?Charies W. Daniel? in
the caption of their Complaint. (Doc. 56 at 

 

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Judicial District Court and its Chief Judge and Court Executive Officer, the Bernalillo County
Metropolitan Court and its former Chief Judge and Court Executive Of?cer, and the Board of County
Commissioners of the County of Bernalillo.2 (101.).

Plaintiffs allege that in promulgating the 2017 Rules, the New Mexico Supreme Court
violated the Eighth Amendment?s guarantee against excessive bail, Fourth Amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Arnendment. (Id. at 1111 119?29, 131417, 149?61). In addition, Plaintiffs assert that the
implementation of a pretrial release risk assessment tool in Bernalillo County which was authorized
by the New Mexico Supreme Court violates the Eighth Amendment by prioritizing nonmonetaly
conditions of release. (Id. at 1] 126). Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare the 2017 Rules
unconstitutional and enjoin enforcement of the 2017 Rules, to award Plaintiffs monetary damages
against all Defendants individually pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, along with attorney?s fees under 42
U.S.C. 1988, and to certify this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of ?[a]ll New Mexico criminal
defendants who are or will be subject to the liberty-restricting conditions of pre?trial release
permitted by the [2017] Rules. . . without having the opportunity to be considered for release on
secured bond.? (Id.'at ii 86).

On August 18, 2017, Judicial Defendants (all defendants except Bernalillo County) filed their
Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 14). On August 28, 2017, Bernalillo County adopted the Motion
to Dismiss filed by the New Mexico Judicial Defendants. (Does. 18, 59). On September 19, 2017,
Plaintiffs ?led their Opposed Motion to Amend Complaint. (Doc. 31). On December 11, 2017, this
Court granted Defendants? Motions to Dismiss and denied Plaintiffs? Motion to Amend. (Doc. 67).

Speci?cally, the Court found that Plaintiffs Bail Bond Association of New Mexico, Senator

Richard Martinez, Senator Bill Sharer, Senator Craig Brandt, and Representative Carl Trujillo lacked

 

2The Court pleviousiy granted Defendant Julie Morgas Baca? 5 Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 54) on
OctOber 25, 2017, and 01 dei ed Plaintiffs to prope11y name the Board of County Commissioners of the County of
as a Defendant in this case (1300.53).

 

Case Document 73 Filed 01/04/18 Page 3 of 15

standing and dismissed their claims against Defendants with prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Further, the Court found that Plaintiff Darlene Collins failed to state a claim
under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and dismissed Plaintiff Collins?s claims
against Defendants with prejudice. In addition, the Court found that Judicial Defendants are
immune from suit. Finally, the Court denied Plaintiffs? Motion to Amend as futile. 
On September 22, 2017, Judicial Defendants ?led their Motion for Sanctions under Rule ll.
(Doc. 33). On October 17, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their Response to the Motion for Sanctions. (Doc.
45). On October 31, 2017, Judicial Defendants ?led their Reply in support of the Motion for
Sanctions. (Doc. 58). The Court heard oral argument at a hearing held on November 27, 2017. This
matter is now ready for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), ?[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney?s namewor by a party personally if the party
is unrepresented.? Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other papermwhether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it?~an attorney or unrepresented party
certi?es that to the best of the person?s knowledge, information and belief, formed
a?er an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or
for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specificaliy so identi?ed,
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). ?[T]he award of Rule 11 sanctions involves two steps.? Adamson v. Bmven,
855 F.2d 668, 672 (10th Cir. 1988). First, the Court. must find that a pleading violates Rule ll,

which ?typically involves subsidiary findings, such as the current state of the law or the parties? and

 

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attorneys? behavior and motives within the context of the entire litigation.? Id. Second, the Court
imposes an ?appropriate sanction.? Id.

?The standard by which courts evaluate the conduct of litigation is objective
a reasonable attorney admitted to practice before the district court would
?le such a document.? Id. Accordingly, after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could
not form a reasonable belief that the pieading is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law, then such conduct is sanctionable under Rule 11.? Id. (citation omitted). The language of Rule
11 ?stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the
affirmative duty imposed by the rule.? Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes (1993
Amendment). In determining whether the signer?s conduct is reasonable, ?the court is expected to 
avoid using the wisdom of hindsight? and inquire only as to ?what was reasonable to believe at the
time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted.? 10?.

?The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as
striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring participation in
seminars or other educational programs; ordering a fine payable to the court; referring the matter to
disciplinary authorities.? Id. The Court may consider the following factors: (1) whether the
improper conduct was willful, or negligent; (2) whether it was part of a pattern of activity, or an
isolated event; (3) whether it infected the entire pleading, or only one particular count or defense;
(4) whether the person. has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation; (5) whether it was intended
to injure; (6) what effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense; (7) whether the
responsible person is trained in the law; (8) what amount, given the ?nancial resources of the
responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case; and (9) what
amount is needed to deter similar activity by other litigants. Id. The Court has discretion to

determine what sanctions, if any, should be imposed for a violation,'but ?sanctions should not be

 

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more severe than reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by the offending person or
comparable conduct by similarly situated persons.? Id.
DISCUSSION

Judicial Defendants move the Court to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule ll of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure because ?Plaintiffs? attorneys ignore and actively misrepresent controlling
law in their Amended Complaint and other pleadings, and they have ?led this federal lawsuit against
Judicial Defendants not with any colorable prospect of obtaining a ruling in their favor, but for the
improper purpose of advancing a local and national public relations campaign on behalf of the money
bail industry against bail reforms in New Mexico and throughout the United States.? (Doc. 33 at 2).
Judicial Defendants contend that ?[a]ny minimally qualified attorney conducting the most
rudimentary research would have to be aware that Plaintiffs? claims under the Fourth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution are both utterly unsupported and filed in
direct contravention of governing law.? Further, Judicial Defendants assert that ?any
minimally qualified attorney would have to be aware that there is no legal basis for Plaintiffs? claims
for money damages against any of the Judicial Defendants.? 

Judicial Defendants? Motion for Sanctions was served on August 30, 2017, giving Plaintiffs?
counsel the 21-day safe harbor required by Rule ll to withdraw any untenable claims without
incurring sanctions. In addition, Judicial Defendants consented to a 10~day extension of time for
Plaintiffs to respond to the Motion to Dismiss, allowing them ample time to conduct any inquiry into
the law that they may have omitted prior to ?ling suit. Yet, Plaintiffs did not voluntarily dismiss any
parties or claims. Instead, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend Complaint seeking to add additional
parties and claims, which this Court subsequently denied as futile.

A. Constitutional Claims
First, Judicial Defendants contend that Plaintiffs? counsel violated Rule ll by ignoring

controlling law that bars their constitutional claims. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that. Judicial



 

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Defendants violated the rights of Plaintiffs under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. in its Order Granting Defendants? Motion to Dismiss, this Court
found that ?there is no provision in the 1972 Rules, or any other source of law, guaranteeing the
option of money bail to criminal defendants in New Mexico.? (Doc. 67 at 23). As a result, the Court
determined that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for any violation of the Eighth Amendment.

In addition, the Court held that ?[s]ince Collins had a pretrial detention hearing on July 5,
2017, with the opportunity to afford herself all of the protections under New Mexico law and the
Constitution, and Collins consented on the record to the nonmonetary conditions in exchange for her
reiease from jail, the Court ?nds that Plaintiffs faii to state a claim for any violation of procedural
due process.? (Id. at 25). In addition, the Court determined that ?the fact that Collins was released
on her own recognizance. with minimal conditions does not shock the Court?s conscience, nor does
the absence of a monetary bail option in lieu of, or in addition to, any potential restrictions that are
aimed at deterring dangerousness.? (Id. at 26). Because ?Collins failed to challenge any
nonmonetary conditions of release when she had the opportunity to do so at her pretrial detention
hearing? and ?Plaintiffs present no grounds for finding that a criminal defendant?s option to obtain
monetary bail is a fundamental right or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,? the Court
concluded that ?Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for any violation of substantive due process.? (Id. at
27).

The Court also found that ?the pretrial conditions imposed on Collins? were not unreasonable
considering that ?Collins has not been subjected to any severe restrictions of her liberty as a result of
the 2017 Rules? and ?Collins was released on her own recognizance with minimal conditions.? 
at In addition, the Court noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ?has
expressly declined to adopt a ?continuing seizure? analysis that would deem pretrial release
conditions a ?seizure? under the Fourth Amendment.? As a result, the Court determined that

?Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for any violation of the Fourth Amendment.? (Id. at 29).

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Moreover, the Court found Plaintiffs? claims that Judicial Defendants modi?ed statutory law
without legislative authority to be meritless since the ?New Mexico Legislature has long recognized
the New Mexico Supreme Court?s ruie?making authority, which encompasses the authority to
promulgate rules of criminal procedure.? (Id. at 30). The Court also determined ?Plaintiffs fail to
state a claim that the Public Safety Assessment Tool in Bernaliilo County is unconstitutional?
because the Public Safety Assessment Tool ?does not displace the discretion ofjudges.? (Id. at 31).
Lastly, the Court concluded that ?Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for money damages? since ?Plaintiffs
cannot state a claim for any violation of Collins?s Eighth, Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights.?


Although Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for any constitutional violation, the Court is of the
opinion that Piaintiffs? constitutional claims are not frivolous. The Court ?nds that Plaintiffs bring
their constitutional claims seeking to change or clarify the law regarding monetary bail. While the
Court disagrees with Plaintiffs? interpretation of the cases relied upon, their interpretation is not
untenable as a matter of law as to necessitate sanctions. Because there is some legal basis for
Plaintiffs? constitutionai claims, the Court finds no violation of Rule 11.

B. Standing I

Judicial Defendants argue that Plaintiffs? counsel violated Rule 11 by either not researching
or intentionally ignoring legal requirements of standing. (Doc. 33 at 9). In its Order Granting
Defendants? Motions to Dismiss, the Court found that the Bail Bond As'sociation of New Mexico did
not have ?rst-party standing because it was not asserting its own constitutional rights. (Doc. 67 at
15). In addition, the Court found that the Bail Bond Association of New Mexico lacked third-party
standing because criminal defendants faced no obstacles or hindrances in asserting claims that their
constitutional rights were violated. (Id. at 16).

Likewise, the Court found that the New Mexico State Legislators lacked standing because ?a

single legislator, acting individually, does not have standing to prosecute an injury to the entire

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legislature.? (Id. at 18). Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Bail Bond Association of New
Mexico and the legislator Plaintiffs? claims against Defendants. However, the Court found that
Plaintiff Darlene Collins has standing to challenge the constitutionality of her arraignment hearing
under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

While Plaintiff Collins has standing to assert that she was injured by the holding of a hearing
that allegedly did not afford her constitutional rights, the legislator Plaintiffs unquestionably lack
standing because they assert only an institutional injury. Moreover, there is no basis for the Bail
Bond Association of New Mexico to assert the rights of a criminal defendant who is fully capable of
asserting her own rights, and is in fact, a named party in this lawsuit. As a result, Rule ll sanctions
are appropriate because the legislator Plaintiffs and the Bail Bond Association of New Mexico have
no objectively reasonable basis for asserting standing to sue. Searcy Hosts. Lighting Power C0.,
907 F.2d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that Rule 11 sanctions were proper where the plaintiff
lacked standing to sue); Kama-10m v. idea?, 26 F. App?x 630, 631?32 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished)
(determining that Rule 11 sanctions were properly imposed where the plaintiffs failed to offer
colorable arguments in support of standing).

The failure of Plaintiffs? counsel to identify a reasonable basis for standing of the legislator
Plaintiffs and the Bail Bond Association of New Mexico prior to ?ling suitjustifies the imposition of
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. Further, the Court ?nds that Plaintiffs? counsel added the legislator
Plaintiffs and the Bail Bond Association of New Mexico as parties to this case for in improper
purpose?namely, for political reasons to express their opposition to lawful bail reforms in the State
of New Mexico rather than to advance colorable claims forjudicial relief. (Doc. 33 at 15??l6) (letter
from Plaintiffsi . counsel dated August '10, 2017, to New Mexico Legislative Council Service
promoting this lawsuit and making unsolicited offer to appear before the New Mexico Legislature to
?answer questions?). While Plaintiffs? counsel is entitled to express opinions regarding bail reform

in New Mexico, Plaintiffs are not entitled to file claims in a federal court without standing solely to

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achieve political objectives. Thompson v. RelationServe .Media, 1:40., 610 F.3d 628, 665?66 (1 
Cir. 20l0) (holding that improper purpose under Rule 11 may be ?inferred from an attorney?s ?ling
of factually or legally frivolous claims?) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

C. Immunity and Money Damages Against Judicial Defendants

In the present case, Plaintiffs not only seek prospective relief in the form of an injunction, but
they bring claims for money damages against Judicial Defendants in their of?cial and individual
capacities. The Court finds Plaintiffs? claims for money damages against Judicial Defendants to be
groundless. Plaintiffs? counsel has a continual obligation ?to refrain from pursuing meritless or
frivolous claims at any stage of the proceeding.? Arlene?! v. 1m"! Ass Ofiirlachim'sts and Aerospace
Workers, 6l3 .3d 609, 628 (6th Cir. 2010). At oral argument on the Motion for Sanctions,
Plaintiffs? counsel argued that they should not be penalized for pursuing money damages as a form of
relief. However, the Court finds that Rule 11 sanctions are proper since Plaintiffs? counsel was
presented with a motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions raising immunity defenses to Plaintiffs?
claim for money damages and Plaintiffs? counsel refused to withdraw these frivolous claims.
Hernandez v. Jolfet Police Dep 197 F.3d 256, 264 (7th Cir. 1999).

As explained in the Court?s Order Granting Defendants? Motion to Dismiss, the ?New
Mexico Supreme Court is a component part of the State of New Mexico, and therefore immunized
from any suit for damages.? (Doc. 67 at 32). in addition, the Court explained that ?State officials
and employees, like the judges and court administrators sued here,? are likewise provided immunity
as ?an arm of the state.? The Court concluded that ?[b]ecause Plaintiffs? claims for damages
against [the Judicial Defendants] are barred by sovereign immunity, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for
?dlamages to compensate for the injuries they have suffered as a result of Defendants?
unconstitutional conduct.? (Id. atl33).

If Plaintiffs? counsel had performed a reasonable inquiry into Judicial Defendants? immunity

defenses, they would have discovered that state officials, such as Judicial Defendants, sued in their

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official capacities are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Hatter: v. White, 275
F.3d - 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002). The law is clear that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs?
monetary damages claims against Judicial Defendants in their official capacities. Therefore,
Plaintiffs? counsel should have limited their claims against Judicial Defendants in their of?cial
capacities to equitable claims that are not subject to the Eleventh Amendment bar. See Hatter? v.
White, 275 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002).

Under Ex parte Young, 209 US. 123 (1908) ?a federal court, consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal
law.? Quern v. Jordan, 440 US. 332, 337 (1979). As explained in the Court?s Order Granting
Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for an ongoing violation of federal law under the
Fourth Amendment, EighthAmendment, or Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 67 at 33). Therefore, the
Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply and Plaintiffs fail to
state official-capacity claims against Judicial Defendants.

Furthermore, the Complaint alleges wrongdoing by the New Mexico Supreme Court Justices
in their rule-making capacity. (Doc. 56 ii 9). As a result, legislative immunity protects the state court
justices from suit. (Doc. 67 at 35). In addition, Plaintiffs sue the Second Judicial District Court,
Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court and those courts? chief judges and court executive officers on
the basis that they ?adepted and implemented the Public Safety Assessment court-based pretrial risk
assessment tool.? (Doc. 56 5). This Court ruled that Judge Nash and Judge Alaniz are protected by
judicial immunity in connection with their implementation of the 2017 Rules. Similarly, Mr. Noel
and Mr. Padilla ?are likewise. protected by quasi?judicial immunity.? (Doc. 67 at 35). Plaintiffs sued
the court staff defendants only because they implemented court rates and orders, and thus, they are
protected from suit. (1d) Accordingly, this Court held that ?Plaintiffs fail to state individual-

capacity claims against the Judicial Defendants.? 

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In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiffs? claims for money damages against judicial Defendants
are frivolous because Judicial Defendants are protected by well-established immunity doctrines.
Bethesda Lutheran flames and Stems, Inc. v. Born, 238 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2001) (reversing
district court?s denial of Rule 11 sanctions in a case where ?it should have been obvious to any
lawyer that relief was barred on multiple grounds, including. . . the Eleventh Amendment. . . and
quali?ed immunity?). Judicial Defendants made Plaintiffs aware of the law regarding their claims
for money damages; yet, Plaintiffs? counsel forged ahead with these groundless claims. As a result,
Rule ii sanctions are appropriate. Marley v. Wright, l37 FRI). 359, 363?64 (WD. Okla. 1991), 
968 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1992) (imposing Rule ll sanctions against attorney for filing claims
against state court judges and court staff clearly barred bylabsolute immunity); Hernandez, 197 F.3d
at 264?65 (affirming Rule 11 sanctions where plaintiffs attorney overlooked defendant?s ?obvious?
Eleventh Amendment defense and failed to voluntarily dismiss after it was brought to his attention);
Sveeggen v. United States, 988 F.2d 829, 830?31 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal of suit and 
award of Rule i1 sanctions because judges have absolute judicial immunity for acts taken in the
course of ful?lling their judicial duties); Bedlard v. Dorms, 161 F. App?x. 886, 887 (1 1th Cir. 2006')
(unpublished) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions where judicial immunity clearly applied to bar plaintiffs?
claims); DeSisto College, 1110. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755, 766 (11th Cir. 1989) (determining that
Plaintiffs? counsel was prOperly sanctioned for failing to sufficiently research precedent on
legislative immunity and failing to acknowledge that such precedent foreclosed their position).

In conclusion, Plaintiffs? claims for money damages against Judicial Defendants are not
supported by existing law and Plaintiffs do not make any argument ?for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law.? Fed. R. Civ. P. Therefore, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs? counsel violated Rule 1 I. and is subject to sanctions because they either failed to

make a reasonable inquiry into or disregarded the relevant law.

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D. Sanctions for Violation of Rule 11

The Court has considered the relevant factors set forth in the Advisory Committee Notes to
the 1993 Amendment to Rule 11. First, the Court ?nds that the conduct of Plaintiffs? counsel was
willful in failing to make a reasonable inquiry into any legal basis to assert (1) standing of the
legislator Plaintiffs and the Bail Bond Association of New Mexico, and (2) claims for monetary
damages against Judicial Defendants in the face of their immunity defenses. Second, the conduct of -
Plaintiffs? counsel infected the entire pleading because the claims of the legislator Plaintiffs and the -
Bail Bond Association of New Mexico are intertwined with and dependent upon the claims of the
only plaintiff with standing, Darlene Collins. In addition, Plaintiffs? counsel sought money damages
against Judicial Defendants in their individual and of?cial capacities for each alleged constitutional
violation asserted. Third, the conduct of Plaintiffs? counsel substantially increased the time and
expense of the litigation because Judicial Defendants were required to raise their immunity defenses
to every claim (including Plaintiffs? frivolous claims for money damages) made by each Plaintiff
(including those without standing). Fourth, Plaintiffs? counsel is trained in the law.

pleading containing both frivolous and nonfrivolous claims may violate Rule 11.? Dodd
Ins. Saws, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. (if/1111., 935 F.2d 1152, 1158 (10th Cir. 199i). Even though the
Court concludes that Plaintiff Darlene Collins?s constitutional claims were not frivolous, sanctions
remain appropriate. Thompson v. RelationSewe Media, Inc, 610 F.3d 628, 664 (lith Cir. 2004)
the ordinary Rule ll context, where. a complaint contains multiple claims, one nonfrivolous
claim will not preclude sanctions for frivolous claims?); Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 677 (9th
Cir. 2005) (same). Here, Plaintiffs? Complaint contains groundless claims asserted by Plaintiffs
without standing, including the legislator Plaintiffs and the Bail Bond Association of New Mexico, as
well as frivcilous claims for money damages against Judicial Defendants despite their immunity
defenses. Therefore, sanctions are appropriate to deter Plaintiffs? counsel from filing unsupportable

lawsuits for political reasons.

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The Court further finds that imposing attorney?s fees and costs is an appropriate sanction in
this case. The legislator Plaintiffs and the Bail Bond Association of New Mexico?s ?ling of their
claims without standing as well as Plaintiffs? claims for money damages against Judicial Defendants
in spite of their immunity'defenses has prejudiced Judicial Defendants in that they have been
required to defend against frivolous claims with no basis in law. Therefore, the Court orders
Plaintiffs? counsel Blair Dunn to pay to Judicial Defendants ?all of the reasonable attorney?s fees and .
other expenses directly resulting from the violation.? Fed. R. Civ. P. 

The Tenth Circuit has explained that district courts must consider at least the following
circumstances in determining the amount of monetary sanctions to impose pursuant to Rule ll:
(1) the reasonableness (lodestar calculation) of the requested fees; (2). the minimum amount
necessary to deter; (3) the sanctioned party?s ability to pay; and (4) other factors, such as the
offending party?s history, experience, ability, the severity of the violation, and the risk of chilling
effects on zealous advocacy. White v. Gen. Motors Corp, 908 F.2d 675, 684-85 (10th Cir. 1990). in
briefing the Motion for Sanctions, Judicial Defendants did not address the amount of any potential
attorney?s fees and costs and did not state whether they had consulted with the opposing party
regarding attorney?s fees and costs. The Court therefore directs Judicial Defendants to initiate a
consultation with Plaintiffs? counsel Blair Dunn regarding the amount of attorney?s fees and costs to
be awarded. If the parties reach an agreement, they shall file a stipulation and request for an order

setting forth the amount of fees and costs to be awarded. If the parties cannot agree, Judicial

Defendants shall, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, file a statement that the parties

 

3 Although the Court previously dismissed this case, the Court finds that it retains jurisdiction to impose monetary
sanctions-against Plaintiffs? counsel Blair Dunn. Doria v. Class Action Saws, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 678, 684 (SD. Fla.
2009) (quoting Confer Gel! v. Hartman Corp, 496 US 384, 395-96 (1990)) (?district courts may enforce Rule
ll even after the case is dismissed, as a district court?s jurisdiction is invoked by the filing of the underlying
complaint, which ?supports consideration of both the merits of the action and the motion for Rule ll sanctions
arising ??om that ?ling?); Bryant v. Brooklyn Barbecue Corp, 932 F.2d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that
district court had jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiff?s counsel, even though original complaint was
dismissed prior to service on defendants, where violation occurred when original complaint was filed for an
improper purpose and without the ?reasonable inquiry? required by Rule 1 1).

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have been unable to reach an agreement with regard to the fee award and a memorandum setting
forth the factual basis for each criterion that the court is asked to consider in making an award.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs? counsel violated Rule
l1(b)(2) by not making a suf?cient inquiry into the legal basis for the legislator Plaintiffs? standing
and the Bail Bond Association of New Mexico?s standing aslwell as Plaintiffs? claims for money
damages against Judicial Defendants regardless of their immunity defenses. The Court finds that
sanctions are necessary to deter Plaintiffs? counsel and other similarly situated individuals from
repeating this sort of conduct. Further, the Court finds that requiring Plaintiffs? counsel Blair Dunn
to pay reasonable attorney?s fees and costs associated with defending this litigation to Judicial 
Defendants is warranted in this case because of the prejudice caused to Judicial Defendants and to
further deter Plaintiffs? counsel Blair Dunn and others similarly situated. The Court limits the
sanctions imposed here to reasonable attorney?s fees-and costs because the Court is convinced these
sanctions will sufficiently deter the Violations outlined in this ruling.

it is therefore ORDERED that Judicial Defendants? Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 is GRANTED. (Doc. 33). Plaintiffs? counsel Blair Dum shall pay the reasonable
attorney?s fees and costs directly resulting from the Rule 11 violation. Judicial Defendants shall
initiate consultation with Plaintiffs? counsel Blair Dunn regarding the amount of attorney?s
fees and costs to be awarded. If the parties reach an agreement, they shall ?le a stipulation and
request for an order setting forth the amount of fees and costs to be aWarded. If the parties cannot
agree, Judicial Defendants shall, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, file a statement
that the parties have been unable to reach an agreement with regard to the fee award and a
memorandum setting forth the factual basis for each criterion that the court is asked to consider in

making an award.

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It is further ORDERED that Judicial Defendants shall submit an af?davit detailing their
reasonable costs and attorney?s fees incurred in defending this action within thirty (30) days of the
date of this Order. Upon submission of the stipulation or statement that the parties have been unable
to reach an agreement, the Court will consider the relevant factors and make a determination as to the
amount of attorney?s fees and costs to impose.

It is so ORDERED.

SIGNED this A day of .

     

 

ROBERT A.JUUL 

Senior United St te District Judge

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