STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A16-1282

Original Jurisdiction

Per Curiam
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, McKeig, J.
Took no part, Lillehaug, Hudson, and Chutich, JJ.
Dietzen, Christopher J., Acting Justice *

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action
against Michelle Lowney MacDonald,
a Minnesota Attorney, Registration
No. 0182370.

Filed: January 17, 2018
Office of Appellate Courts

________________________
Susan M. Humiston, Director, Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for petitioner.
Paul Engh, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent attorney.
________________________
SYLLABUS
1.

An attorney’s good-faith reliance on her client’s representations is not an

absolute defense to attorney discipline, nor does the First Amendment immunize an
attorney’s false statements impugning the integrity of a judge.
2.

A 60-day suspension, followed by 2 years of supervised probation, is the

appropriate discipline for an attorney who failed to competently represent a client; made
false statements about the integrity of a judge with reckless disregard for the truth;

*

Appointed pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10, and Minn. Stat. § 2.724, subds.
2–3 (2016).
1

 improperly used subpoenas; knowingly disobeyed a court rule and failed to follow a
scheduling order; and engaged in disruptive courtroom conduct, including behavior
resulting in her arrest.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility filed a petition
for disciplinary action against respondent Michelle Lowney MacDonald alleging various
acts of professional misconduct. After MacDonald responded to the allegations, we
appointed a referee, who held a hearing and determined that MacDonald’s conduct violated
numerous provisions of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.

The referee

recommended that we impose a 60-day suspension followed by 2 years of probation, and
that we require MacDonald to undergo a mental-health evaluation. We conclude that the
referee’s findings and conclusions are not clearly erroneous and that a 60-day suspension
followed by 2 years of supervised probation is the appropriate discipline for MacDonald’s
misconduct. We decline, however, to impose a mental-health evaluation as a condition of
MacDonald’s probation.
FACTS
MacDonald was admitted to practice law in Minnesota in 1987. Her primary area
of practice is family law. Her only prior discipline was a private admonition in 2012 for
trust-account violations and failing to cooperate with the Director’s investigation. Before
addressing MacDonald’s specific arguments, we first summarize the referee’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
2

 MacDonald began representing S.G. in 2013, as her fourth attorney of record, in a
family-law matter. Among her first actions, MacDonald filed a motion challenging the
constitutionality of Minnesota’s family-law statutes in response to one of the court’s orders.
MacDonald’s motion relied exclusively on S.G.’s rendition of the facts—specifically, that
the order was the result of an ex parte communication between the district judge and
opposing counsel. It turns out, however, that the district court entered the order by mutual
agreement of the parties’ attorneys. Indeed, S.G.’s attorney at the time even drafted the
order. The court denied MacDonald’s motion and explained that it was predicated upon
an inaccurate factual assumption.
As the matter advanced toward trial, MacDonald directed an associate to subpoena
S.G.’s three prior attorneys to produce their bills and appear at trial because she believed
that their testimony was necessary to lay the foundation for a request for attorney fees.
MacDonald never contacted the attorneys, however, to ask whether the bills could be
provided without a subpoena, nor did she contact opposing counsel to determine if a
stipulation could be reached. Opposing counsel later testified that she would not have
stipulated to the amount of the bills.
S.G.’s former attorneys moved to quash the subpoenas. The court granted their
motions, concluding that MacDonald failed to take reasonable steps to avoid placing an
undue burden on the attorneys. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 45.03(a) (“A party or an attorney
responsible for the issuance and service of a subpoena shall take reasonable steps to avoid
imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to that subpoena.”). MacDonald
was personally sanctioned in the amount of $6,202.50 for her conduct. See Minn. R. Civ.
3

 P. 45.03(d) (providing for “reasonable compensation for the time and expense involved in
preparing for and giving such testimony or producing such documents”).
MacDonald appealed the order, but the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that
MacDonald could have established the amount of attorney fees using alternative means,
such as having her client testify to the amount of fees she personally paid to her attorneys.
The referee concluded that MacDonald’s use of the subpoenas violated Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 3.1, 1 3.4(c), 2 4.4(a), 3 and 8.4(d). 4
During the hearing on the motions to quash, MacDonald interrupted the judge
several times. When the judge told her that she was being disruptive, prompting him to
call a deputy forward, she replied, “[t]he rules are that an attorney can’t talk in court?”
MacDonald also interrupted the judge dozens of times during other hearings in the case.
The referee concluded that MacDonald’s disruptive conduct during these hearings violated
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.5(h). 5

1

“A lawyer shall not bring . . . a proceeding . . . unless there is a basis in law and fact
for doing so that is not frivolous . . . .” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.1.
2

“A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal
except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists . . . .” Minn.
R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c).
3

“In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person . . . .” Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 4.4(a).
4

“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d).
5

“A lawyer shall not engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.” Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 3.5(h).
4

 On the day that S.G.’s trial was set to begin, MacDonald filed a civil-rights lawsuit
in federal court on S.G.’s behalf against the district judge personally, not in his official
capacity. MacDonald then moved for the judge’s recusal from the case based on the
pending federal lawsuit against him.

The judge denied the motion, at which point

MacDonald stated, “[a]nd you are telling me that you can be impartial in this trial, which
you haven’t done since day one.” The referee found that this statement violated Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 8.2(a) 6 and 8.4(d), because it was made with reckless disregard for the truth.
Because she had expected the judge to recuse, MacDonald admitted that she was
“not ready to proceed” with the trial. She called only one witness, referred to the
proceeding as a “pretend trial,” and interrupted the court at least half a dozen times. The
referee concluded that her lack of preparation violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 7 and
that her repeated interruptions violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.5(h).
Before the official start of the second day of trial, but after the judge had briefly
taken the bench, MacDonald approached the court reporter and accused her of inaccurately
recording the prior day’s testimony. MacDonald announced that, if the court reporter was
unwilling to accurately record the events at trial, she would do so herself. MacDonald then
began taking pictures of the courtroom. Court deputies approached MacDonald and

6

“A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a
judge . . . .” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.2(a).
7

“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1.
5

 reminded her that she knew not to take pictures in the courtroom. See Minn. Gen. R. Prac.
4.01 (“[N]o pictures . . . shall be taken in any courtroom . . . during a trial . . . .” (emphasis
added)); Order Regarding Cameras and Other Recording Equipment in Court Facilities
(Dakota Cty. Dist. Ct. July 1, 2005) (providing, in a standing district-court order adopted
“pursuant to Rule 4 of the General Rules of Practice,” that “[n]o pictures . . . shall be taken
in any courtroom . . . .” (emphasis added)).
Later that morning, during a recess, the deputies again approached MacDonald and
advised her that she would receive a contempt citation for taking photographs in the
courtroom. MacDonald initially cooperated with the deputies by accompanying them to a
holding area to complete the necessary paperwork, but thereafter refused to give the
deputies her full legal name, date of birth, and address. When asked for her name, for
example, she replied, “[y]ou know my name.” 8 The deputies tried for approximately 15
minutes to obtain basic biographical information for the citation, but MacDonald refused
to cooperate. Eventually, the deputies placed her in custody. 9

8

MacDonald’s full legal name is Michelle Lowney MacDonald Shimota.
Professionally, however, she uses the name Michelle Lowney MacDonald.

9

Despite MacDonald’s failure to cooperate, the deputies eventually were able to issue
the contempt citation and a separate citation for obstruction of legal process. MacDonald
spent 30 hours in jail for the offenses. The failure to release MacDonald after issuing the
two misdemeanor citations violated Minn. R. Crim. P. 6, but the judge on the criminal case
concluded that the detention “was justified by [MacDonald’s] actions.” See id. (requiring
a peace officer who issues a citation and acts without a warrant to “release the defendant”
unless one of three conditions is present). The prosecutor decided not to charge her with
obstruction of legal process, and the district court dismissed the contempt-of-court citation.
MacDonald’s underlying conduct, not the criminal charges, is the basis for our decision
today.
6

 The deputies asked MacDonald to remove her jewelry, glasses, and shoes, and to
submit to a pat-down search. The deputies then placed MacDonald in a holding cell. When
the time came for her to return to the courtroom, MacDonald refused to stand up or walk
to the courtroom on her own. The deputies therefore placed her in a wheelchair and
handcuffed her hands to a belt that they had secured around her waist to bring her to the
courtroom. Video footage of the incident shows that the deputies attempted to return
MacDonald’s shoes, but she refused to put them on.
While MacDonald was in custody, S.G. retrieved MacDonald’s files, including her
trial materials, and left the courthouse. Once MacDonald returned to the courtroom, the
judge reminded her that she had an obligation to her client and repeatedly inquired about
how she wished to proceed, including offering her numerous chances to contact her client
and retrieve her files. Each time, MacDonald refused to respond or otherwise seek an
accommodation. Her involvement in the remainder of the trial was minimal. In fact,
MacDonald agrees that she did not competently represent her client, but she testified at the
disciplinary hearing that her inadequate representation was due solely to her illegal arrest.
She maintains that there was “nothing [she] could say or do” to correct the situation and
that she “didn’t do anything wrong.”
The referee found that MacDonald’s actions, both before and after her arrest, were
an effort to produce a mistrial or support an appeal in S.G.’s case, or to gather evidence for
the federal lawsuit against the judge. The referee concluded that MacDonald’s conduct
violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 3.4(c), 3.5(h), and 8.4(d). The referee also concluded
that MacDonald’s separate failure to perfect an appeal in S.G.’s case, by neglecting to serve
7

 the notice of appeal on the guardian ad litem in a timely fashion, violated Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 1.1.
MacDonald subsequently amended the complaint in the federal lawsuit to include
the facts surrounding the photo-and-arrest incident. The complaint alleged that the judge
had retaliated against S.G. and MacDonald, compromised the Minnesota Court
Information System (MNCIS), “usurped” case files with the assistance of opposing
counsel, signed documents that he knew were false, and acted without jurisdiction or legal
authorization. The federal district court dismissed all of the claims in the complaint,
describing them as “futile” and noting that “nothing in the record supports the[m].” When
asked at the disciplinary hearing about the basis for her allegations, MacDonald responded,
“[t]he record speaks for itself.” The referee concluded that MacDonald violated Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 3.1, 8.2(a), and 8.4(d) by making recklessly false allegations against the
judge that no reasonable attorney would have made based on the evidence available.
In addition to filing a federal lawsuit against the district judge in S.G.’s case,
MacDonald wrote a letter to the Board on Judicial Standards complaining about the judge’s
behavior and asserting that he had acted unethically during S.G.’s trial. In total, she wrote
four letters to the Board, each impugning the judge’s integrity and repeating the allegations
from the federal lawsuit. She sent copies of these letters to numerous elected officials and
made similar remarks in letters to other attorneys. The referee concluded that MacDonald’s
statements were false, made with reckless disregard for the truth, and violated Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 8.2(a) and 8.4(d).
Although the petition for disciplinary action focused primarily on MacDonald’s
8

 representation of S.G., it also alleged that MacDonald acted unethically in her
representation of J.D. in a separate lawsuit. MacDonald, who was J.D.’s third attorney of
record, defied the court’s scheduling order by submitting trial exhibits 11 days late and
failing to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. MacDonald has admitted
that she did not fully comply with the court’s scheduling order.
The district court scheduled J.D.’s trial for only 2 days, but due in part to
MacDonald’s lack of preparation, the trial lasted 9 days, which was, as the court stated,
“virtually unheard of in this kind of case.” During the trial itself, MacDonald repeatedly
interrupted the judge, who ordered MacDonald to discontinue her disruptive behavior.
Based in part on MacDonald’s “disorganization, noncompliance with scheduling orders . . .
and poor trial preparation,” the court ordered J.D. to personally pay $20,000 in conductbased attorney fees. At the disciplinary hearing, MacDonald blamed J.D. for her lack of
preparation and failure to comply with the scheduling order.
The referee concluded that MacDonald “knew or should have known she was
responsible for . . . compliance with court scheduling orders” and that her failure to follow
the scheduling order violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c) and 8.4(d). The referee further
concluded that MacDonald’s recurring disruptions violated Rule 3.5(h).
Following a 2-day disciplinary hearing, which included the presentation of evidence
and testimony, the referee determined that the Director had proven by clear and convincing
evidence that MacDonald’s conduct violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 3.1, 3.4(c),
3.5(h), 4.4(a), 8.2(a), and 8.4(d). The referee recommended a 60-day suspension followed
by 2 years of probation, including a requirement that MacDonald undergo a mental-health
9

 evaluation as a condition of her probation.
ANALYSIS
Because MacDonald ordered a transcript of the attorney-discipline proceedings,
“the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are not binding.” In re Glasser, 831
N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn. 2013). Nonetheless, we give them “great deference” and “will
uphold them if they have evidentiary support in the record and are not clearly erroneous.”
In re Paul, 809 N.W.2d 693, 702 (Minn. 2012); see also In re Aitken, 787 N.W.2d 152,
158 (Minn. 2010) (providing that we “review the interpretation of the MRPC de novo,” but
“review the application of the MRPC to the facts of the case for clear error”). The referee’s
findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only “when they leave us with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Glasser, 831 N.W.2d at 646 (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I.
MacDonald first challenges the referee’s factual findings, primarily because she
believes that the referee omitted critical facts. Among the facts excluded, according to
MacDonald, is that her client had no billing records to provide, making her decision to
subpoena S.G.’s past attorneys reasonable, and that opposing counsel in the S.G. matter
was also late to court several times. Because nothing in the record, other than MacDonald’s
testimony, supports these allegedly omitted facts, there is no clear error in the referee’s
findings. See In re Grigsby, 764 N.W.2d 54, 60–61 (Minn. 2009) (holding that it was not
clear error for the referee to “fail[] to make the requested findings” in part because there
was “no documentation in the record”). Moreover, neither fact, even if true, undermines
10

 the referee’s findings that MacDonald herself was late to court and acted unreasonably in
failing to explore other options before pursuing the subpoenas.
MacDonald further challenges the referee’s findings surrounding her arrest and
detention, again arguing that the referee missed crucial facts, not the least of which was
that the deputies illegally arrested her and that her predicament left her powerless to remedy
the situation. Again, we disagree. The record supports the referee’s finding that the
deputies would not have arrested MacDonald if she had provided basic biographical
information, such as her name, date of birth, and address, as they had repeatedly requested.
The video of the incident, the trial transcript, and the testimony of the two deputies provide
ample support for the referee’s findings surrounding the photo-and-arrest incident.
Furthermore, even if the eventual arrest were illegal, MacDonald had a choice about
whether to cooperate or escalate the situation. She elected to make things worse by refusing
to cooperate with the deputies in even the most perfunctory way, which supports the
referee’s overarching finding that, had she provided the requested information to the
deputies, “she would [have been] allowed to return to the courtroom.”
Finally, MacDonald challenges numerous findings that simply restate the actual
words that she used during S.G.’s trial and the disciplinary hearing. MacDonald fails to
explain why she believes these findings are erroneous. Even so, we reject MacDonald’s
challenges because we have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the official transcripts relied
upon by the referee in making these findings. Likewise, the referee did not clearly err in
summarizing the allegations from MacDonald’s federal lawsuit because there is ample
“evidentiary support in the record” for each finding, including from the amended complaint
11

 and the federal district court’s order dismissing MacDonald’s lawsuit. Paul, 809 N.W.2d
at 702. Accordingly, even if there is some contrary evidence in the record on some of these
points, in light of the record as a whole, we cannot conclude that the referee’s findings
were clearly erroneous.
II.
Having upheld the referee’s findings, we now turn to MacDonald’s challenges to
the referee’s conclusions of law. MacDonald challenges nearly every conclusion of law.
She specifically challenges the referee’s conclusion that she violated both Minn. Gen. R.
Prac. 4.01 and a standing district-court order by taking photographs in the courtroom. She
also raises two general defenses, good-faith reliance and free-speech immunity, which she
says excuse her false statements and filings.
A.
MacDonald’s first legal challenge is to the validity of the Dakota County standing
order prohibiting anyone, including attorneys, from taking pictures “in any courtroom.”
Order Regarding Cameras and Other Recording Equipment in Court Facilities (Dakota Cty.
Dist. Ct. July 1, 2005). Unlike the General Rule of Practice that bans anyone from taking
photographs “during a trial,” Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 4.01, the standing order is broader and
appears to ban an individual from taking photographs at any time.

According to

MacDonald, these two rules conflict, and based on our authority to regulate practice within
the district courts, the conflicting standing order must yield to the statewide General Rule
of Practice.
The conflict that MacDonald identifies does not exist, either as a factual or legal
12

 matter. Rather than picking one rule over the other, as MacDonald now argues, the referee
applied both rules and concluded that “[t]he Director has proven by clear and convincing
evidence that [MacDonald’s] conduct in taking pictures in violation of Court rule and
District Court Order violated Rule 3.4(c) (MRPC) and Rule 8.4(d) (MRPC).” (Emphasis
added.) Factually, therefore, the referee’s conclusion does not suggest that the local
standing order preempts a statewide general rule of practice.
Legally, moreover, leaving aside whether it is appropriate to have a local standing
order that addresses the same subject as a General Rule of Practice, there is no actual
conflict between the two rules. One rule, General Rule of Practice 4.01, prohibits taking
photographs “in any courtroom . . . during a trial” and the other, the Dakota County
standing order, expands a situational prohibition into one of across-the-board applicability.
Neither rule, however, affirmatively allowed MacDonald to take photographs in the
courtroom, which is the only way that MacDonald could have established an actual conflict
between the two rules. Accordingly, because it is undisputed that MacDonald took
photographs in the courtroom, we conclude that the referee did not err in concluding that
MacDonald’s conduct violated the Dakota County standing order. 10
B.
MacDonald’s second legal challenge, the first of her two general defenses, is her
theory that she was “permitted to believe” and “act upon” her client’s representations in

10

We need not reach the issue of whether MacDonald’s conduct also violated Minn.
Gen. R. Prac. 4.01, which would require us to decide the meaning of the phrase “during a
trial.” It is sufficient that MacDonald violated the local standing order, and it would make
no difference if her conduct also violated another rule.
13

 good faith, even if they turned out not to be true. To be sure, an attorney “has an obligation
to present the client’s case with persuasive force” and “is usually not required to have
personal knowledge of matters asserted” in “pleadings and other documents prepared for
litigation.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3, cmts. 1, 3.
But neither of the aforementioned principles was inconsistent with MacDonald’s
duty to “provide competent representation,” including her obligation to employ the
“knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation” that was “reasonably necessary.” Minn.
R. Prof. Conduct 1.1. Nor did they conflict with her duty to ensure that “the allegations
and other factual contentions [in her litigation documents] ha[d] evidentiary support.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02(c). In fact, contrary to MacDonald’s position, the Minnesota Rules
of Professional Conduct specifically recognize an attorney’s obligation to exercise
reasonable care before making claims during the course of litigation, emphasizing that
competency “includes inquiry into . . . the factual and legal elements of the problem” and
that lawyers need to “inform themselves about the facts of their clients’ positions.” Minn.
R. Prof. Conduct 1.1 cmt. 5; Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.1 cmt. 2.
MacDonald’s claim that “she was entitled to believe her client” without performing
any investigation into her client’s story is therefore untenable under the circumstances.
The record establishes that MacDonald had access to records and information that would
have undermined the accuracy of S.G.’s account. Yet MacDonald did not use the “sources
and . . . information” available to her to verify what S.G. had told her. In re File No. 17139,
720 N.W.2d 807, 814 (Minn. 2006). The referee was accordingly entitled to conclude,
despite MacDonald’s claims of good faith, that a reasonable attorney would not have made
14

 serious allegations against a district judge without first verifying her client’s account. In
re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322 (Minn. 1990); see also In re Nathan, 671 N.W.2d 578,
585 (Minn. 2003) (“[T]he standard for judging statements [under Minn. R. Prof. Conduct
8.2] is an objective one.”).
C.
MacDonald’s final legal challenge, and the second of her general defenses, is that
the First Amendment absolutely immunizes her criticisms of the district judge, including
her decision to file the federal lawsuit and to write letters disparaging him to the Board on
Judicial Standards and to other attorneys and public officials.

To the extent that

MacDonald claims that she had an absolute right to criticize the judge, even in the absence
of a reasonable investigation or sufficient evidence in support of her allegations,
MacDonald is wrong.
As an officer of the court, an attorney does not have an absolute right to make false
and disparaging remarks about judges or other attorneys. Rather, attorneys are subject to
a modified version of the constitutional standard for defamation claims. The standard,
adapted from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), applies a version of
the actual-malice standard from defamation cases, but modifies it to ask what a “reasonable
attorney . . . would do in the same or similar circumstances.” 11 Graham, 453 N.W.2d at

11

MacDonald suggests that our standard from Graham is no longer good law in light
of two Supreme Court decisions, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991),
and Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). But neither of these cases involved a challenge
to an ethical rule like Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 8.2(a). And to the extent that MacDonald
relies on In re Yegman, a Ninth Circuit case, Yegman actually supports the Graham
standard. Specifically, Yegman recognizes that an “objective standard” applies to whether
15

 321–22, 321 n.6. Our modified standard provides adequate protection for attorney speech
but also preserves our ability to discipline attorneys who make baseless allegations against
judges or other attorneys during the course of litigation. See id. at 321–22.
Applying the modified actual-malice test from Graham, we agree with the referee
that MacDonald is not entitled to First Amendment protection for her statements because
no reasonable attorney in MacDonald’s shoes would have made such serious allegations
about a judge’s integrity and impartiality without substantiating evidence. Our conclusion
applies equally to her allegations in the federal lawsuit, in her complaints to the Board on
Judicial Standards, and in her correspondence to other attorneys and public officials. As
we have held, when “an attorney abuses” her First Amendment rights, “she is subject to
discipline.” Id. at 321.
III.
We now turn to the appropriate discipline. The referee recommended that we
impose a 60-day suspension followed by 2 years of probation, including requiring
MacDonald to undergo a mental-health evaluation and comply with its recommendations
as a condition of her probation. MacDonald maintains that her misconduct does not
warrant any discipline, and the Director, for her part, requests that we suspend MacDonald
for 90 days. “Although we place great weight on the referee’s recommended discipline,
we retain ultimate responsibility for determining the appropriate sanction.” In re Rebeau,

an attorney may be disciplined for recklessly false statements about “the qualifications,
integrity, or record of a judge.” 55 F.3d 1430, 1437–38 (9th Cir. 1995).
16

 787 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Minn. 2010). 12
The purpose of attorney discipline “is not to punish the attorney, but rather to protect
the public [and] the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined
attorney as well as by other attorneys.” In re Fairbairn, 802 N.W.2d 734, 742 (Minn.
2011) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We consider four factors in
determining the appropriate discipline: “(1) the nature of the misconduct; (2) the
cumulative weight of the disciplinary violations; (3) the harm to the public; and (4) the
harm to the legal profession.” In re Nelson, 733 N.W.2d 458, 463 (Minn. 2007). Beyond
those four factors, we consider the discipline imposed in similar cases and any aggravating
or mitigating circumstances that may exist. In re Tigue, 900 N.W.2d 424, 431 (Minn.
2017).
A.
We first address the four factors, beginning with the nature of MacDonald’s
misconduct. Some of MacDonald’s misconduct—such as making false statements about a
judge with reckless disregard for the truth, both in pleadings and elsewhere—involves
dishonesty, which “is significant misconduct.” In re Nwaneri, 896 N.W.2d 518, 525
(Minn. 2017); accord In re Nett, 839 N.W.2d 716, 722 (Minn. 2013) (stating that an

12

The referee concluded that MacDonald’s improper pursuit of subpoenas and failure
to perfect her client’s appeal violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, but it is unclear
whether the referee considered either type of misconduct in making a recommendation on
the appropriate discipline. Regardless, we consider all misconduct in determining the
appropriate discipline and we will do so here, including MacDonald’s misuse of subpoenas
and failure to perfect an appeal. See In re Overboe, 867 N.W.2d 482, 488 (Minn. 2015)
(providing that “[w]e consider [respondent’s] misconduct as a whole”).
17

 attorney’s misconduct, which included making false statements about members of the
judiciary, “warrants a serious disciplinary sanction”). Her other misconduct—including
repeatedly disrupting court proceedings and taking photographs in violation of a court
rule—oversteps the “bounds of proper professional behavior,” which require attorneys to
“comply with court rules and orders, develop a courteous and civil rapport . . . and maintain
respect for the bench.” In re Torgerson, 870 N.W.2d 602, 614 (Minn. 2015) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Getty, 401 N.W.2d 668, 671
(Minn. 1987) (stating that discipline was “mandated” for an attorney who was “rude, loud
and disrespectful” and needed to “learn to show more restraint and more respect for the
judicial system even while disagreeing strongly with it or its decisions”).
Cumulatively, MacDonald’s misconduct was committed over the course of more
than a year, eliminating the possibility that her violations were merely a “brief lapse in
judgment or a single, isolated incident.” Nwaneri, 896 N.W.2d at 525 (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Her misconduct was far-reaching and varying, from
making recklessly false statements about a judge to failing to competently represent a
client. See Torgerson, 870 N.W.2d at 615 (discussing the “length and variety” of the
misconduct). As the Director points out, MacDonald “violated seven ethics rules through
multiple acts in the course of two matters.” Because MacDonald committed “multiple
disciplinary rule violations” over more than one matter, the cumulative weight of her
misconduct warrants “severe discipline even when a single act standing alone would not
have warranted such discipline.” Nelson, 733 N.W.2d at 464 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
18

 The final two factors—harm to the public and to the legal profession—require us to
“consider the number of clients harmed and . . . their injuries.” Nwaneri, 896 N.W.2d at
526. Here, MacDonald harmed two clients through incompetent legal representation, both
through her failure to perfect an appeal in one of the cases and her lack of preparation for
trial in both cases. See In re Saltzstein, 896 N.W.2d 864, 872 (Minn. 2017) (discussing
clients who lost their appeals based on attorney errors).
Despite these facts, MacDonald’s position is that she has not harmed the public,
claiming that her clients were satisfied with her performance and that neither filed a
malpractice action or ethical complaint against her. Yet, in addition to the harm her clients
actually suffered, regardless of their level of satisfaction, MacDonald fails to recognize that
“making false statements to a court harms [both] the public and the legal profession” in
and of itself. Nwaneri, 896 N.W.2d at 526. So too does baselessly attacking the integrity
of a judge and repeatedly disrupting court proceedings, the latter of which “prolong[s] and
delay[s] proceedings and caus[es] needless expenditure of judicial . . . resources.” Nett,
839 N.W.2d at 722 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Jensen, 468
N.W.2d 541, 546 (Minn. 1991) (“An attorney does not advance the client’s cause . . . by
making unfounded allegations about [a] judge[] . . . .”).

In sum, MacDonald’s

“unprofessional actions and demeanor reflect adversely on the bar, and [were] destructive
of public confidence in the legal profession.” Torgerson, 870 N.W.2d at 616.
B.
We must also consider any aggravating and mitigating factors. The referee found
four aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. We review the referee’s application of
19

 law to the facts, including any findings on aggravating and mitigating factors, for clear
error. In re Fett, 790 N.W.2d 840, 847 (Minn. 2010).
First, the referee found that MacDonald’s legal experience was an aggravating
factor. She has practiced law since 1987, a career that has spanned over 30 years. We
agree that “[c]ommitting misconduct despite this substantial experience is an aggravating
factor.” Tigue, 900 N.W.2d at 432.
Second, the referee found three additional aggravating factors based on
MacDonald’s (1) decision to blame others rather than accept responsibility for her actions;
(2) her “lack of insight into how her acts affected others”; and (3) her “continual inability
to acknowledge facts found by the courts.” To be sure, MacDonald testified at her
disciplinary hearing that she was “sorry for whatever [she] did.” Nevertheless, there is
adequate support in the record that, even if MacDonald expressed remorse at her hearing,
she continues to lack insight into how her misconduct has affected others, including the
courts and her clients. Accordingly, we conclude that MacDonald’s lack of remorse, lack
of insight, and blaming of others are aggravating. Due to the substantial overlap among
these factors, however, they give rise to only a single aggravating factor, not three. 13 See
In re Ulanowski, 800 N.W.2d 785, 803–04 (Minn. 2011) (considering the “[f]ailure to
acknowledge wrongfulness or express remorse,” as well as “shift[ing] the blame . . . onto
others,” to be only one aggravating factor).

13

Even if the dissent were correct that lack of insight, absence of remorse, and
projecting blame on others are three separate aggravating factors, despite the substantial
overlap in the referee’s description of these factors, our determination of the appropriate
discipline would not change.
20

 On the issue of mitigation, MacDonald challenges the referee’s failure to find any
mitigating factors. MacDonald believes she should receive two, one for her limited
disciplinary history and the other for her pro-bono work. As to her disciplinary history,
MacDonald has received only a single private admonition over the course of her career for
unrelated misconduct. Nevertheless, we have repeatedly held that “an attorney’s lack of
prior disciplinary history is not a mitigating factor, but instead constitutes the absence of
an aggravating factor.” Fairbairn, 802 N.W.2d at 746.
The other factor MacDonald identifies is her pro-bono work, which she describes
as “extensive” and culminated in her receipt of the Northstar Lawyers pro-bono award on
several occasions. It is true that we have recognized that “extensive pro bono or civil work”
might constitute mitigation. In re Wylde, 454 N.W.2d 423, 426 n.5 (Minn. 1990). But
here, despite claiming that she handled S.G.’s case without charging a fee, she does not
dispute the fact that she has an attorney lien against S.G. for $193,190.05. This fact, in
addition to the qualitative judgment required of the referee when determining whether probono work is adequately extensive to deserve mitigation, leads us to conclude that the
referee did not clearly err in concluding that MacDonald is not entitled to mitigation for
her pro-bono work. See In re Albrecht, 779 N.W.2d 530, 539 (Minn. 2010).
C.
Finally, we examine similar cases to ensure the imposition of consistent discipline,
Tigue, 900 N.W.2d at 431, even though we impose discipline on a case-by-case basis, In
re Walsh, 872 N.W.2d 741, 749 (Minn. 2015) (indicating that we “tailor the sanction to the
specific facts of each case”). No case involves the same circumstances and constellation
21

 of misconduct as MacDonald’s case, to be sure, but some cases are instructive on the
disciplinary options available to us here.
In Torgerson, perhaps the most analogous case to this one, we disciplined an
attorney for “ma[king] false statements, disobey[ing] a court order, [and] act[ing]
belligerently toward a judge and court staff,” among other misconduct. 870 N.W.2d at
605. Like MacDonald, Torgerson “filed various pleadings . . . alleging the judge was
biased,” which contained statements that were false or made with reckless disregard for
their truth. Id. at 606. Torgerson also shouted at court employees and “interrupted [a]
judge multiple times” during a hearing. Id. at 608. Finally, like MacDonald, Torgerson
had “substantial experience” practicing law and “fail[ed] to recognize the wrongfulness of
her actions.” Id. at 613. Although the referee recommended a public reprimand, we
imposed a 60-day suspension. Id. at 606, 616.
In Graham, another case bearing some similarities to this one, an attorney pursued
“groundless and frivolous” allegations and repeatedly accused a judge of conspiring against
his clients. 453 N.W.2d at 315, 324–25. As in this case, the attorney made these statements
with reckless disregard for the truth and had an “attitude” that suggested he “believe[d] in
a conspiracy against him and preferred to find fault with others [rather] than himself.” Id.
at 325. Although Graham did not include some additional misconduct committed by
MacDonald, such as violating court rules, repeatedly disrupting court proceedings, and
failing to represent a client competently, we imposed a 60-day suspension. Id.
Weighing the nature and extent of MacDonald’s misconduct together with the
aggravating factors present here, we conclude that a 60-day suspension followed by 2 years
22

 of supervised probation is the appropriate sanction. We are confident that a suspension of
this length is consistent with our precedent and will adequately protect the public in light
of the conditions attached to MacDonald’s probation.
Although we have decided to place additional conditions on MacDonald during her
probation, we do not accept one condition proposed by the referee.

The referee

recommended, and the Director agrees, that we order MacDonald to undergo a mentalhealth evaluation and follow all of its recommendations as a condition of her probation.
Not only is there limited precedent for imposing such a condition when the attorney has
not placed her mental health at issue in the disciplinary proceeding, but the referee here has
made no factual findings that support it. See In re Fuller, 621 N.W.2d 460, 470 (Minn.
2001) (concluding that the attorney’s “possible psychological problem,” which was “not
acknowledged” by the attorney, “need[ed] to be addressed in the sanction”); cf. In re
Hanson, 592 N.W.2d 130, 130–31 (Minn. 1999) (requiring the attorney to “affirmatively
show that she is psychologically fit to practice law” after “the referee found that . . . [the
attorney] ha[d] been treated for clinical depression and addiction to gambling”). Under
these circumstances, we decline to require a mental-health evaluation as a condition of
MacDonald’s probation.
Accordingly, we order that:
1.

Respondent Michelle Lowney MacDonald is suspended from the practice of

law for a minimum of 60 days, effective 14 days from the date of this opinion.
2.

Respondent shall comply with Rule 26, Rules on Lawyers Professional

Responsibility (RLPR) (requiring notice of suspension to clients, opposing counsel, and
23

 tribunals), and shall pay $900 in costs under Rule 24(a), RLPR.
3.

Respondent shall be eligible for reinstatement to the practice of law

following the expiration of the suspension period provided that, not less than 15 days before
the end of the suspension period, respondent files with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts
and serves upon the Director an affidavit establishing that she is current in continuinglegal-education requirements; has complied with Rules 24 and 26, RLPR; will be practicing
law in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5(c) below upon reinstatement; and
has complied with any other conditions for reinstatement imposed by the court.
4.

Within 1 year of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file with the Clerk

of the Appellate Courts and serve upon the Director proof of her successful completion of
the written examination required for admission to the practice of law by the State Board of
Law Examiners on the subject of professional responsibility. Failure to timely file the
required documentation shall result in automatic resuspension, as provided in Rule
18(e)(3), RLPR.
5.

Upon reinstatement to the practice of law, respondent shall be placed on

supervised probation for 2 years, subject to the following conditions:
(a)
Respondent shall cooperate fully with the Director’s Office in its efforts to
monitor compliance with this probation. Respondent shall promptly respond to the
Director’s correspondence by the due date. Respondent shall provide the Director
with a current mailing address and shall immediately notify the Director of any
change of address. Respondent shall cooperate with the Director’s investigation of
any allegations of unprofessional conduct that may come to the Director’s attention.
Upon the Director’s request, respondent shall provide authorization for release of
information and documentation to verify compliance with the terms of this
probation.
(b)

Respondent shall abide by the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.
24

 (c)
Respondent shall not engage in the solo practice of law, but shall work in a
setting where she is in daily contact with, and under the direct supervision of,
another Minnesota licensed attorney. The attorney who directly supervises
respondent’s work must co-sign all pleadings, briefs, and other court documents that
respondent files. This attorney may not be an associate who works for respondent’s
law firm. Any attorney or law firm with whom she practices shall be informed of
the terms of this probation.
(d)
In addition to the supervision provided by the attorney referenced in
paragraph (c), respondent shall be supervised by a licensed Minnesota attorney,
appointed by the Director, to monitor her compliance with the terms of this
probation (“probation supervisor”). Respondent shall give the Director the names
of four attorneys who have agreed to be nominated as respondent’s probation
supervisor within 2 weeks of the date of this opinion. If, after diligent effort,
respondent is unable to locate a probation supervisor acceptable to the Director, the
Director shall appoint a probation supervisor. Until such probation supervisor has
signed a consent to supervise, respondent shall, on the first day of each month,
provide the Director with an inventory of client files as described in paragraph (e)
below. Respondent shall make active client files available to the Director upon
request.
(e)
Respondent shall cooperate fully with the probation supervisor and the
Director’s efforts to monitor her compliance with this probation. Respondent shall
contact the probation supervisor and schedule a minimum of one in-person meeting
per calendar quarter. Respondent shall provide the probation supervisor with an
inventory of all active client files by the first day of each month during the probation.
With respect to each active file, respondent shall disclose the client name, type of
representation, date opened, most recent activity, next anticipated action, and
anticipated closing date. Respondent’s probation supervisor shall file written
reports with the Director quarterly or at such more frequent intervals as the Director
may reasonably request.
(f)
Respondent shall initiate and maintain procedures that ensure thorough
inquiry into, and verification of, factual allegations in pleadings and court filings.
Respondent shall also initiate and maintain procedures to ensure timely appeals,
including service on all required entities. Within 30 days of the date of this opinion,
respondent shall provide the Director and the probation supervisor, if any, with a
detailed written plan outlining such procedures.
(g)
Respondent shall take 15 credits in continuing-legal-education coursework
in the areas of civil-trial and appellate practice, with at least one course emphasizing

25

 each of the following: trial preparation and courtroom decorum.

LILLEHAUG, HUDSON, and CHUTICH, JJ., took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

26

 CONCURRENCE&DISSENT
MCKEIG, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
We impose discipline for attorney misconduct “to protect the public, to protect the
judicial system, and to deter future misconduct.” In re Rebeau, 787 N.W.2d 168, 173
(Minn. 2010). We have said that “[t]he public interest is and must be the paramount
consideration” and that our “primary duty . . . must be protection of the public.” In re
Hanson, 103 N.W.2d 863, 864 (Minn. 1960). The court concludes that a 60-day suspension
is adequate to protect the public, the profession, and the administration of justice in this
case. I disagree. I conclude that our duty to the public and the administration of justice
requires a 6-month suspension, along with a petition for reinstatement, as opposed to an
application for reinstatement by affidavit. See Rule 18, Rules on Lawyers Professional
Responsibility (RLPR). I would also require respondent Michelle MacDonald to undergo
a mental-health evaluation. Cf. In re Jellinger, 728 N.W.2d 917, 922–23 (Minn. 2007)
(recognizing that to further the goals of “protect[ing] the public, the courts, and the legal
profession,” we must sometimes impose “rigorous” conditions on reinstatement).
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
ANALYSIS
I concur with the court’s conclusions in Parts I and II that the referee’s findings and
conclusions were not clearly erroneous. I disagree, however, with the court’s decision in
Part III to impose only a 60-day suspension and 2 years of probation without requiring a
mental-health evaluation.

C/D-1

 I.
There are four underlying bases for my conclusion that more severe discipline is
warranted here: (1) the facts establish that MacDonald engaged in an extensive pattern of
making false statements and pursuing frivolous claims, disrupting court proceedings, and
disregarding court rules and orders—misconduct that, in other instances, would result in a
lengthy suspension; (2) MacDonald’s misconduct is far more serious than that in Torgerson
or Graham, where we imposed 60-day suspensions; (3) MacDonald’s misconduct has
caused serious harm; and (4) multiple aggravating factors are present. Taking these
considerations together, it is clear that a 60-day suspension is inadequate.
A.
In calculating the appropriate discipline, I first look to the nature of MacDonald’s
misconduct and the suspensions we have previously imposed for similar misconduct. See
In re Tigue, 900 N.W.2d 424, 431 (Minn. 2017). I also look to the cumulative nature of
MacDonald’s misconduct, which includes multiple, repeated rule violations. See id. When
viewed in this comprehensive light, I can only conclude that a sanction more severe than a
60-day suspension, together with a mental-health evaluation, is necessary to fulfill our duty
to protect the public.
MacDonald violated at least seven separate Rules of Professional Conduct over the
course of two different client matters. But the number of violations alone does not
adequately reflect the seriousness of her misconduct.

MacDonald’s conduct can be

grouped into three broad categories: (1) making false statements about the integrity of a
judge and pursuing frivolous claims; (2) disrupting court proceedings; and (3) disregarding
C/D-2

 court rules and orders.
First, MacDonald filed a federal lawsuit against the district judge on behalf of her
client S.G., seeking injunctive relief and damages in excess of $55 million for alleged
constitutional violations, false imprisonment, battery, and other tort claims. The federal
court concluded that these allegations lacked support in the record and were “futile” under
the “well-settled” doctrine of judicial immunity. The federal lawsuit contained false
statements concerning the integrity of the judge that MacDonald made in reckless disregard
for their truth. MacDonald also repeatedly made similar false statements concerning the
integrity of the district judge in reckless disregard for their truth, both in state court
proceedings and in multiple letters to the Board on Judicial Standards (BJS).
“[G]enerally, making false statements is serious misconduct” that warrants “severe
discipline.” In re Grigsby, 815 N.W.2d 836, 845 (Minn. 2012). The seriousness of an
attorney’s false representations is exacerbated when multiple false statements are made in
multiple proceedings before multiple courts. See In re Houge, 764 N.W.2d 328, 337–38
(Minn. 2009). This type of misconduct has previously resulted in a 3-month suspension.
See, e.g., In re Tieso, 396 N.W.2d 32, 33–34 (Minn. 1986) (suspending an attorney for
filing a single lawsuit that was “groundless,” “frivolous, [and] vexatious”). When attorneys
have “use[d] convoluted, frivolous pleadings . . . to delay litigation,” we have imposed
even lengthier suspensions. In re Murrin, 821 N.W.2d 195, 208, 210 (Minn. 2012)
(suspending an attorney for 6 months for filing frivolous lawsuits that “required three
courts and nearly 50 defendants to . . . wade through thousands of pages”).
Second, on multiple occasions in two separate matters, MacDonald engaged in
C/D-3

 disruptive conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice, including
persistently interrupting the court, disrupting proceedings during the photo-and-arrest
incident, and being unprepared for two trials.

These efforts not only delayed the

administration of justice, resulting in unnecessarily prolonged proceedings, but in the S.G.
matter, they also appear to have been a cover for MacDonald’s inadequate preparation for
a scheduled trial. Indeed, MacDonald herself conceded that she was not prepared for the
start of trial in the S.G. matter. See In re Waite, 782 N.W.2d 820, 827 (Minn. 2010) (noting
that competent representation requires “the skills and thoroughness ‘reasonably necessary
for the representation’ ” (quoting Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1)). In In re Torgerson, we
suspended an attorney for 60 days for similar behavior. See 870 N.W.2d 602, 605, 608,
610, 616 (Minn. 2015) (describing how Torgerson had, among other things, “interrupted
the judge multiple times,” “acted belligerently toward a judge and court staff,” and
disobeyed a judge’s instructions to remain near the courthouse during jury deliberations
and then defiantly refused the judge’s request to return).
Third, MacDonald abused the subpoena process in the S.G. matter and violated the
scheduling order in the J.D. case. Although we have never specifically disciplined an
attorney for abusing subpoenas, we have suspended attorneys for disobeying similar
discovery rules and court orders. See, e.g., In re Walsh, 872 N.W.2d 741, 743–44 (Minn.
2015) (suspending an attorney for 6 months for failing to timely serve an affidavit of expert
review and a response to a motion, among other documents, and “repeatedly fail[ing] to
comply with deadlines in the court’s scheduling order,” among other misconduct); In re
Paul, 809 N.W.2d 693, 697–99, 706 (Minn. 2012) (concluding a 4-month suspension was
C/D-4

 warranted for an attorney who failed to file necessary appellate documents and abused the
civil rules on intervention); In re O’Brien, 809 N.W.2d 463–65, 467 (Minn. 2012)
(suspending an attorney for 90 days for failing to timely file an appellate brief, failing to
conduct discovery, and violating the disciplinary referee’s scheduling order); In re
Brehmer, 620 N.W.2d 554, 557, 562 (Minn. 2001) (imposing a 1-year suspension on an
attorney who, among other things, “failed to provide discovery responses,” “did not comply
with the district court’s orders regarding deadlines for providing witness and exhibit lists,”
and “was not prepared for trial”).
Each of these violations is independently deserving of significant discipline. See In
re Sigler, 512 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Minn. 1994) (“Based on our cases, each of respondent’s
violations taken alone would warrant discipline . . . .”). Given the sheer number of these
separate violations, and that MacDonald repeatedly engaged in several of the violations, a
60-day suspension is inadequate and inconsistent with our precedent. I also recognize that
we consider each discipline case individually, but “we strive for consistency” in our
decisions. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 268 (Minn. 2006). A 60-day suspension
introduces inconsistency into our precedent.
The appropriate discipline based on the cumulative impact of MacDonald’s multiple
violations is a suspension of 6 months. Our case law demonstrates that this is well within
the range of suspensions for similar misconduct. See, e.g., In re Selmer, 866 N.W.2d 893,
894 (Minn. 2015) (suspending an attorney for 12 months for “a pattern of harassing and
frivolous litigation” and a failure to “abide by court orders,” among other misconduct); In
re Jensen, 542 N.W.2d 627, 628, 633–34 (Minn. 1996) (concluding an 18-month
C/D-5

 suspension was warranted for an attorney who violated procedural rules and court orders,
pursued harassing and frivolous claims, made misrepresentations in court, and “contributed
to . . . protracted litigation [that] resulted in a drain on judicial resources,” although the
referee had recommended only a public reprimand); In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 395,
397–98 (Minn. 1987) (imposing a 6-month suspension on an attorney whose repeated
misbehavior included “continually interrupting” others and engaging in “tactics” intended
to “provoke” others and “obfuscate the record,” which was prejudicial to the administration
of justice).
B.
The majority relies on two cases—In re Torgerson, 870 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 2015),
and In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 1990)—to support its conclusion that a 60-day
suspension is appropriate. I agree that there is some similarity between MacDonald’s
misconduct and the misconduct of the attorneys in these cases. MacDonald’s misconduct,
however, is more extensive than the misconduct in each of these cases. As a result,
Torgerson and Graham actually demonstrate that a 60-day suspension is an inadequate
sanction.
In Torgerson, we suspended an attorney for 60 days for “ma[king] false statements”
about other attorneys, “disobey[ing] a court order, [and] act[ing] belligerently toward a
judge and court staff.” 870 N.W.2d at 605–08. Torgerson “filed various pleadings . . .
alleging that the judge was biased,” which contained statements that were made with
reckless disregard for their truth, and “interrupted the judge multiple times” during an
omnibus hearing. Id. at 606, 608–09, 611.
C/D-6

 Although MacDonald committed the same types of misconduct as Torgerson,
MacDonald committed additional misconduct that Torgerson did not commit. Unlike
Torgerson, MacDonald filed a frivolous lawsuit against the district judge, and MacDonald
incompetently represented S.G. in both the district court and at the court of appeals. Both
Torgerson and MacDonald made false statements concerning the integrity of a judge, but
MacDonald made such statements in three different forums—state court, federal court, and
before the Board on Judicial Standards—whereas Torgerson only made them in state court.
Id. at 606.

Finally, MacDonald’s disruptive behavior was more extensive than

Torgerson’s. Torgerson failed to follow a judge’s instructions by not returning to court
after a jury had finished deliberating, and she interrupted a judge at one hearing in another
matter. See id. at 606, 608. MacDonald interrupted the court in the S.G. and J.D. matters
during many court proceedings, she disrupted the trial in the S.G. matter through the photoand-arrest incident, and her disruptive conduct in the J.D. matter was partially responsible
for a trial that should have taken 2 days lasting for 9 days.
In Graham, we suspended an attorney for 60 days for pursuing “groundless and
frivolous” allegations that accused a judge, a magistrate judge, and two attorneys of
conspiring against him and his clients. 453 N.W.2d at 315, 324–25. Graham made these
false statements with reckless disregard for their truth. Id. at 324. But even the court
acknowledges that “Graham did not include some additional misconduct committed by
MacDonald, such as violating court rules, repeatedly disrupting court proceedings, and
failing to represent a client competently.” Although Torgerson and Graham are helpful
because there is some similarity to the misconduct MacDonald committed, MacDonald
C/D-7

 should receive a longer suspension because she committed more misconduct than these
lawyers.
C.
The significant harm that MacDonald’s misconduct has caused lends further support
for the lengthier suspension that I propose. See In re Nelson, 733 N.W.2d 458, 463 (Minn.
2007) (stating that two of the factors that we consider when determining the appropriate
discipline are “the harm to the public, and . . . the harm to the legal profession”). Like the
court, I am troubled by respondent’s inability to distinguish fact from fiction, and by her
pattern of brazenly alleging falsehoods as facts. MacDonald’s conduct in making false
statements about the district judge in court motions, pleadings, BJS complaints, and legal
correspondence demonstrates a pervasive disregard for truth. Neither the public nor the
profession benefits when attorneys make baseless accusations about allegedly biased
judges and “pretend trials.”
The integrity of the judicial system depends on the public’s belief that judges are
fair, and false accusations of biased judges erode that public trust. See Wiedemann v.
Wiedemann, 36 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Minn. 1949) (stating that “it is of transcendent
importance to the litigants and the public generally that there should not be the slightest
suspicion as to [a judge’s] fairness and integrity” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The integrity of our judicial system also depends on
the integrity of lawyers. In re Schmidt, 402 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn. 1987). Thus, “[w]e
should not hesitate to impose severe discipline when a lawyer demonstrates a lack of
truthfulness and candor to . . . the judicial system.” In re LaChapelle, 491 N.W.2d 17, 21
C/D-8

 (Minn. 1992). As the Director recently argued before the court in another disciplinary
matter, “without honesty, one can’t be a lawyer.”
I am also concerned by MacDonald’s disrespectful and unprofessional behavior. 1
The following remarks provide a window into MacDonald’s inability to give judicial
officers, and in turn the judicial system, the respect and decorum required:
“The rules are that an attorney can’t talk in court?”
“And you are telling me that you can be impartial in this trial, which you
haven’t done since day one[?]”
“Do you want the evidence or not?”
See In re Michael, 836 N.W.2d 753, 765 (Minn. 2013) (disciplining an attorney for a
“flippant rhetorical question” directed at a judge, which was “unprofessional and
disrespectful”); see also In re Getty, 401 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. 1987) (“[T]here is a line
that should not be crossed and respondent has crossed it.”). As we have previously

1

I take this opportunity to note additional unprofessional behavior that was not
considered by the referee or the court: MacDonald’s criminal convictions for obstructing
the legal process and third-degree test refusal. MacDonald was convicted of obstructing
legal process for repeatedly refusing to get out of her car during a traffic stop. See State v.
Shimota, 875 N.W.2d 363, 364–65 (Minn. App. 2016) (affirming convictions), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 27, 2016). After being told she was under arrest, she continued to “resist[] the
officers’ effort by grabbing the shift knob, the steering wheel, and [an officer’s] wrist.” Id.
The officers had to “pr[y] [her] free” and forcibly remove her from her car. Id. at 365. The
referee did not consider MacDonald’s criminal history because the Director’s petition for
disciplinary action did not allege any misconduct based on these convictions.
A lawyer is prohibited from “commit[ing] a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 8.4(b). And an attorney’s criminal conviction is “conclusive evidence that
the lawyer committed the conduct for which the lawyer was convicted.” Rule 19(a), RLPR.
I recognize that MacDonald’s criminal convictions are not before us and thus are not to be
considered in her discipline. But I question why this criminal conduct was not included in
the petition for discipline when it arguably is further evidence of MacDonald’s
obstructionist conduct.
C/D-9

 explained, attorneys must demonstrate “restraint and . . . respect for the judicial system
even while disagreeing strongly with it or its decisions.” Getty, 401 N.W.2d at 671
(indicating discipline was “mandated” for an attorney who was “rude, loud and
disrespectful”); see also Williams, 414 N.W.2d at 397 (“To be vigorous . . . does not mean
to be disruptively argumentative; . . . to be zealous is not to be uncivil.”). We perhaps said
it best in In re Pinotti, 585 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Minn. 1998):
While we are fully aware of a lawyer’s responsibility to aggressively
represent his or her clients’ interest, respondent’s conduct here far exceeds
the limits of professional representation, despite the numerous warnings of
lower tribunals and heavy sanctions imposed. . . . [R]espondent marched
relentlessly onward . . . to the great detriment of [her] clients and in total
disregard of the waste of judicial resources.
MacDonald’s lack of respect and decorum caused a separate and significant harm:
a drain on judicial resources and a detriment to the administration of justice. See In re
Letourneau, 792 N.W.2d 444, 453 (Minn. 2011) (discussing how an attorney’s misconduct
“needlessly increased the burden on a heavily loaded and underfunded court system”). For
example, the J.D. trial that was scheduled for 2 days took upwards of 9 days due, in part,
to MacDonald’s lack of preparation. The district court judge noted that such a long trial
was “virtually unheard of.” During the photo-and-arrest incident in the S.G. trial, the judge
noted that her behavior appeared “orchestrated” to delay the proceedings.
But these delays do not take into account the costs to MacDonald’s clients, opposing
counsel, and opposing parties—both in terms of time and money. See Murrin, 821 N.W.2d
at 208 (discussing how failing to follow court rules and orders “cause[s] harm to the
public”); In re Ulanowski, 800 N.W.2d 785, 801 (Minn. 2011) (addressing how frivolous

C/D-10

 claims took a toll on public confidence in the legal system and caused financial harm to
opposing parties).

MacDonald’s obstructionist behavior has undoubtedly delayed

resolution for families in crisis, including both MacDonald’s own clients and other litigants
waiting for their day in court. We fail to adequately protect the public by imposing
discipline that does not fully account for the significant harms caused by MacDonald’s
misconduct.
D.
An analysis of the aggravating and mitigating factors provides further support for
my proposed discipline. Although the court concludes that two aggravating factors are
present, I count four aggravating factors.

I agree with the court that MacDonald’s

significant legal experience is an aggravating factor and that her disciplinary history is
neither aggravating nor mitigating. 2
The court counts respondent’s lack of remorse, lack of insight, and blaming of others
as a single aggravating factor. 3 Yet our case law suggests that these are three independent

2

MacDonald’s disciplinary history includes a private admonition in 2012 for failing
to deposit client settlement funds into her firm’s trust account; failing to maintain adequate
and correct trust-account books and records; and failing to cooperate with the Director’s
investigation, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a), 1.15(c)(3), 1.15(c)(4),
1.16(d), 5.3(c)(2), and 8.1(b), and Rule 25, RLPR. The referee concluded that this
disciplinary history was neither an aggravating nor mitigating factor, in part because the
rule violations were unrelated to the misconduct in this case.

3

There is certainly some overlap between these factors, see In re Kalla, 811 N.W.2d
576, 583 (Minn. 2012) (“This attempt to deflect blame highlights Kalla’s lack of remorse
and insight into his own conduct.”), and at times we have suggested that these are three
sides of the same coin, see Ulanowski, 800 N.W.2d at 803–04 (counting the “[f]ailure to
acknowledge wrongfulness or express remorse,” which included the blaming of others, as
a single aggravating factor); In re Gherity, 673 N.W.2d 474, 480 (Minn. 2004) (citing In
C/D-11

 aggravating factors. See Michael, 836 N.W.2d at 760 (stating that respondent’s “lack of
remorse and failure to recognize and take responsibility for her conduct are aggravating
factors”); In re Wentzel, 711 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Minn. 2006) (considering respondent’s lack
of “insight into the moral and ethical nature of his acts” to be one aggravating factor).
Simply put, not understanding the wrongfulness of one’s conduct is different from not
being sorry for it. And it is further distinct from blaming others for one’s conduct instead
of taking responsibility.

Cf. In re Aitken, 787 N.W.2d 152, 163 (Minn. 2010)

(distinguishing between “express[ing] remorse for the consequences of [the] misconduct”
and expressing “remorse for [the] actual misconduct”).

I would therefore not give

respondent the benefit of lumping these three factors into one.
MacDonald claims that her pro bono services to S.G. and J.D. should be a mitigating
factor. In reality, she has an attorney lien against one of these “pro bono” clients in the
amount of $193,190.05. She insists that this lien is “symbolic.” But there is nothing
symbolic about a recorded lien. Like the court, I conclude that MacDonald’s pro bono
services do not qualify as a mitigating factor. If it were to be considered at all, it would be
an aggravating factor, see Ulanowski, 800 N.W.2d at 802 (“Making misrepresentations can
be considered an aggravating factor.”), but because the Director does not allege this is an
aggravating factor, I do not consider it at all, see In re Matson, 889 N.W.2d 17, 24–25
(Minn. 2017).

re Kaszynski, 620 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 2001), for the proposition that “the refusal to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of one’s actions and instead portraying oneself as a
victim and repeatedly casting blame on others was [one] aggravating factor”).
C/D-12

 Finally, I cannot help but note the contrast between the “slap on the wrist”
respondent receives today and the devastating consequences of disbarment that we readily
impose for even small amounts of misappropriation of client funds. In re Fredin, 552
N.W.2d 23, 25 (Minn. 1996) (Page, J., dissenting) (objecting to a 60-day suspension
followed by 2 years of supervised probation, which was “a mere slap on the wrist” and
inadequate to protect the public); see, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d 170, 170–71
(Minn. 2010) (order) (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting) (noting that this court had
disbarred an attorney who misappropriated $650 and was “deeply remorseful and
committed to recovery from his addictions”). I recognize that there are no sentencing
guidelines for attorney discipline, and that many disciplinary cases require us to compare
apples to oranges. But the disparity between disbarring an attorney for one financial
indiscretion, versus only suspending respondent for 60 days for her varied and harmful
misconduct, is unsettling. It is even more unsettling when I consider the significant
financial toll of MacDonald’s misconduct on her clients, opposing parties and counsel, and
the courts. As evidenced by her six-figure lien against S.G., the $6,202.50 sanction to
compensate the subpoenaed attorneys, the $20,000 sanction against J.D. for conduct-based
attorney fees, and the needlessly time-consuming motion work and trials in the S.G. and
J.D. cases, her misconduct comes at a high cost.
II.
In addition to suspension and probation, I believe that a mental-health evaluation is
warranted. The referee recommended a mental-health evaluation, and we “afford ‘great
weight’ to the referee’s recommendation.” In re Rambow, 874 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Minn.
C/D-13

 2016) (quoting In re Harrigan, 841 N.W.2d 624, 628 (Minn. 2014)). It is particularly
appropriate to defer to the referee on matters like a respondent’s demeanor and mental
state. See Pinotti, 585 N.W.2d at 62.
I recognize that “neither the referee nor this court is qualified to arrive at a diagnosis
or prognosis concerning the respondent’s mental health.” In re Davis, 264 N.W.2d 371,
373 (Minn. 1978). It is therefore unknown “[w]hether respondent is in need of” mentalhealth services. Id. It is clear, however, that the referee acknowledged her own limitations
and deferred to a mental-health professional on this matter. I would do the same.
We have recognized that mental-health conditions may have a causal relationship
with attorney misconduct. See, e.g., In re Clark, 834 N.W.2d 186, 187–88 (Minn. 2013)
(recognizing that mental-health issues may impact an attorney’s “life, her cognitive
abilities, and her emotional state,” which in turn may affect the attorney’s ability to
competently represent clients). If it is proper for us to require a disciplined attorney to
continue existing mental-health treatment and complete therapy programs recommended
by treating therapists—and it is—I do not see anything improper about requiring a mentalhealth evaluation under these circumstances. See, e.g., In re Fischer, 901 N.W.2d 155, 156
(Minn. 2017) (order). 4 If anything, requiring an evaluation is less onerous or invasive than

4

Imposing a mental-health evaluation as a condition of respondent’s probation
presents no due-process concerns. See Gherity, 673 N.W.2d at 478 (Minn. 2004) (“We
have held that an attorney has a right to know the nature of the charges filed against him
but we have never suggested that he has a due process right to know the exact
discipline . . . .”). The disciplinary petition here requests “appropriate discipline,” and
Rule 15(a), RLPR, specifically states that the disposition may include “probationary status
. . . with such conditions as this Court may specify.” See also id. at 479 (holding that “even
if [the disciplinary petition] does not specifically state” that the Director is seeking
C/D-14

 requiring treatment. Like the court in In re Fuller, 621 N.W.2d 460, 470 (Minn. 2001), I
“see no reason not to consider a [potential] psychological problem in determining the
appropriate sanction.” 5 See also id. (noting that addressing the potential mental-health
condition would help the respondent “competently and diligently serve his clients,” such
that his “possible psychological problem need[ed] to be addressed in the sanction”).
Though it is unclear “[w]hether respondent is in need of” mental-health services, it
is clear that she “would be well advised to consider it.” Davis, 264 N.W.2d at 373. I would
therefore adopt the referee’s recommendation to include a mental-health evaluation as a
condition of her probation, and further condition her reinstatement on “provid[ing]
adequate psychological or other medical evidence establishing that [she] has no . . .
psychological problems that would prevent [her] from practicing law competently,
diligently, and within the rules of conduct for attorneys.” In re Levenstein, 438 N.W.2d
665, 669 (Minn. 1989).
CONCLUSION
Today, the court hesitates to impose sufficient discipline, and it does so at the
expense of protecting the public. Although MacDonald portrays herself as a victim, the
true victim in all of this is the public. I respectfully disagree with the court’s decision to

disbarment, “the attorney’s due process rights are not violated when the Director’s petition
states that ‘appropriate discipline’ is requested and our rules of professional responsibility
specifically include disbarment as a discipline where appropriate”).
5

The court notes that there is “limited precedent” for imposing a mental-health
evaluation “when the attorney has not placed her mental health at issue” and the referee
“made no factual findings” to support this recommendation. But limited precedent is
precedent, nonetheless.
C/D-15

 suspend MacDonald for a mere 60 days and its reluctance to require a mental-health
evaluation. Our duty to the public demands more of us, and more of respondent. I conclude
that a 6-month suspension, including a petition for reinstatement, and a 2-year probation
term, including a mental-health evaluation, is warranted. On these grounds, I respectfully
dissent.

C/D-16