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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

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SHANNON DAVES,
SHAKENA WALSTON,
ERRIYAH BANKS,
DESTINEE TOVAR,
PATROBA MICHIEKA,
JAMES THOMPSON,
On behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS,
SHERIFF MARIAN BROWN,
TERRIE MCVEA,
LISA BRONCHETTI,
STEVEN AUTRY,
ANTHONY RANDALL,
JANET LUSK,
HAL TURLEY,
Dallas County Magistrates
ERNEST WHITE (194TH),
HECTOR GARZA (195TH),
TERESA HAWTHORNE (203RD),
TAMMY KEMP (204TH),
JENNIFER BENNETT (265TH),
AMBER GIVENS-DAVIS (282ND),
LIVIA LIU FRANCIS (283RD)
STEPHANIE MITCHELL (291ST),
BRANDON BIRMINGHAM (292ND),
TRACY HOLMES (363RD),
ROBERT BURNS (NO. 1),
NANCY KENNEDY (NO. 2),
GRACIE LEWIS (NO. 3),
DOMINIQUE COLLINS (NO. 4),

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Case No. 3:18-cv-154

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CARTER THOMPSON (NO. 5),
JEANINE HOWARD (NO. 6),
STEPHANIE FARGO (NO. 7),
Judges of Dallas County Criminal District Courts

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DAN PATTERSON (NO. 1),
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JULIA HAYES (NO. 2),
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DOUG SKEMP (NO. 3),
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NANCY C. MULDER (NO. 4),
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LISA GREEN (NO. 5),
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ANGELA KING (NO. 6),
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ELIZABETH CROWDER (NO. 7),
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TINA YOO CLINTON (NO. 8),
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PEGGY HOFFMAN (NO. 9),
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ROBERTO CANAS, JR. (NO. 10),
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SHEQUITTA KELLY (NO. 11),
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Judges of Dallas County Criminal Courts at Law )
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Defendants.
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________________________________________________)
COMPLAINT—CLASS ACTION
1.

This case is about Dallas County jailing some of its poorest people because they

cannot afford to make a monetary payment.

Named Plaintiff Shannon Daves is currently

unemployed and homeless. She was arrested for a misdemeanor offense on Wednesday, January
17, and Dallas County has detained her since then solely because she cannot afford to pay a $500
money bail. Because Ms. Daves is transgender and cannot afford to purchase her release, she is
being kept in solitary confinement. The other Named Plaintiffs—Shakena Walston, Erriyah
Banks, Destinee Tovar, Petroba Michieka, and James Thompson—are also impoverished
individuals who were arrested this week for misdemeanor or felony offenses in Dallas County.
They are all being kept in jail cells at the Dallas County Jail because they cannot afford to pay the
money bail amount required for release.
2.

The Named Plaintiffs’ money bail amounts are being required pursuant to Dallas

County’s schedules of secured monetary bail amounts and without any inquiry into their ability to

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pay or any consideration of or findings concerning alternative conditions of release. Because they
are impoverished and cannot afford the payment required by the County for their release, the
Plaintiffs—who are presumptively innocent—will be detained in Dallas County jail cells for days
or weeks, until they are finally brought to court on the “jail chain.”
3.

In Dallas County, while wealthier arrestees are released from custody almost

immediately upon payment of money to the County, arrestees like the Named Plaintiffs who are
too poor to purchase their freedom remain in jail because of their poverty. Misdemeanor arrestees,
like Ms. Daves and Ms. Tovar, who cannot afford to purchase their release must wait at least four
to ten days before they are brought to court on the jail chain for a first appearance. Felony arrestees,
like Ms. Walston, Ms. Banks, Mr. Michieko, and Mr. Thompson, must wait at least two to three
weeks for this appearance if they waive indictment—and two to three months if they do not.
4.

First appearance is the first even theoretical opportunity for an arrestee to speak to

a judge who can consider ability to pay or challenge conditions of release. However, in practice,
even this “appearance” is not a true opportunity to raise ability to pay and challenge conditions of
release, because arrestees are not brought into the courtroom unless they are pleading guilty. And,
faced with the prospect of lengthy pretrial detention, the majority of detained misdemeanor and
low-level felony arrestees do plead guilty at this first appearance. These guilty pleas typically in
sentences of “time served” and release from Dallas County custody that same day.
5.

Although the Supreme Court has explained that pretrial detention must be the

“carefully limited exception” in our legal system, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755
(1987), as a result of these policies and practices, almost 70% of people in the Dallas County Jail—
thousands every night—have not been convicted of a crime. Instead, they languish in jail cells
because they cannot afford to pay the amount of money required for their release.

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This mass detention based on wealth has devastating consequences for Plaintiffs,

for their families, and for the community. Pretrial detention of presumptively innocent human
beings causes people to lose their jobs and shelter, interrupts vital medication cycles, and separates
parents and children. It coerces guilty pleas and results in longer sentences. Even a few days of
pretrial detention make people more likely to commit crimes in the future and cost Dallas County
tens of millions of dollars every year.
7.

On behalf of the many other arrestees subjected to Dallas County’s unlawful and

ongoing post-arrest wealth-based detention scheme, Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ use of money
bail to detain only the most impoverished arrestees. Dallas County’s wealth-based pretrial
detention system violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States
Constitution. It has no place in our society.
8.

By and through their attorneys and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly

situated, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest procedures, and a
declaration that Defendants cannot employ a system of wealth-based detention by imposing and
enforcing secured money bail without an inquiry into and findings concerning the arrestee’s
present ability to pay, and without individualized consideration of less-restrictive, alternative
conditions of release.
Nature of the Action
9.

It is the policy and practice of Defendants to refuse to release arrestees from custody

unless they pay a monetary sum. The amount of money required is determined by an offensebased, secured money bail schedule, and it is the policy and practice of Dallas County officials to
require the generic, predetermined amount without considering the person’s ability to pay or
alternatives to secured money bail, and without making the substantive findings or providing the

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procedural safeguards that the Constitution requires to ensure that a person’s resulting detention is
necessary to further the government’s interests.
10.

This policy and practice results in the systemic wealth-based detention of those

arrestees who are too poor to pay money bail. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief
prohibiting Defendants’ wealth-based, post-arrest detention scheme.
Jurisdiction and Venue
11.

This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201,

et seq., and the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
12.

Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Parties

13.

Named Plaintiff Shannon Daves is a 47-year-old woman. She was arrested on

Wednesday, January 17, 2018, for an alleged misdemeanor offense. She is currently experiencing
homelessness and does not have a job. She cannot afford the $500 money bail amount required for
her release, without an inquiry or findings concerning her ability to pay. Because she is transgender
and is being held in the men’s unit of the jail, Dallas County is keeping her in solitary confinement
24 hours a day. She represents herself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people
subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 1, Declaration of
Shannon Daves.
14.

Named Plaintiff Shakena Walston is a 29-year-old woman. She was arrested on

Friday, January 19, 2018, for an alleged felony offense. She is indigent and currently unemployed,
and avoids homelessness by staying with her sister. She cannot afford the $15,000 money bail
amount required for her release without an inquiry or findings concerning her ability to pay. She

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is trying to start a program at a local community college with the help of financial aid, but cannot
pursue those plans while she is in custody. She represents herself as an individual and a class of
similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See
Exhibit 2, Declaration of Shakena Walston.
15.

Named Plaintiff Erriyah Jones is a 26-year-old woman. She was arrested on Friday,

January 19, 2018, for two alleged felony offenses. She is currently unemployed and lives with and
takes care of her mother, who receives disability payments and food stamps. She cannot afford the
$50,000 money bail amount required for her release without an inquiry or findings concerning her
ability to pay. She has health issues requiring medication and a special diet, but is not being
provided either at the Jail. She represents herself as an individual and a class of similarly situated
people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 3,
Declaration of Erriyah Jones.
16.

Named Plaintiff Destinee Tovar is a 19-year-old woman. She was arrested on

Janaury 19, 2018, for an alleged misdemeanor offense. She is currently unemployed and without
stable housing. She cannot afford the $1,500 money bail amount required for her release without
an inquiry or findings concerning her ability to pay. She represents herself as an individual and a
class of similarly situated people subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention
scheme. See Exhibit 4, Declaration of Destinee Tovar.
17.

Named Plaintiff Patroba Michieka is a 30-year-old man. He was arrested on January

19, 2018, for an alleged state-jail-felony offense. He struggles to meet the basic necessities of life
and lives with his mother to avoid homelessness. He cannot afford the $500 money bail amount
required for his release without an inquiry or findings concerning his ability to pay. He was
working a few days a week before his arrest, but fears he will lose that job because he is in custody.

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He represents himself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people subjected to
Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 5, Declaration of Patroba
Michieka.
18.

Named Plaintiff James Thompson is a 28-year-old man. He was arrested on

Thursday, January 18, 2018, for two alleged state jail felonies. He is indigent and unemployed,
and avoids homelessness by living with his parents. He cannot afford the $60,000 money bail
amount that Dallas County requires for his release without an inquiry or findings concerning his
ability to pay. He represents himself as an individual and a class of similarly situated people
subjected to Defendants’ wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme. See Exhibit 6, Declaration of
James Thompson.
19.

Defendant Dallas County is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of

the State of Texas.1 The County, through the Commissioners Court, makes policy decisions about
which arrestees are eligible for release on unsecured bond or non-financial conditions, and which
arrestees, among those arrested by Dallas County law enforcement officers, may be released on a
citation instead of being arrested. The County also makes policy decisions about whether and at
what level to fund the County’s jail, courts, and pretrial services agency. The County’s policies
result in systemic wealth-based pretrial detention of Dallas County arrestees.
20.

The Dallas County Sheriff is a County official, the head of the Dallas County

Sheriff’s Department, and the keeper of the County Jail. The Dallas County Sheriff, Defendant

1

The Dallas County Sheriff, Dallas County Commissioners Court, Dallas County Criminal Court at Law Judges, and
Dallas County Criminal District Court Judges are all final policymakers for various aspects of Dallas County’s postarrest policies and practices. Each is named separately from the County as a Defendant in the event the Court concludes
any of them is acting on behalf of the State or that the Judges are acting judicially with respect to any particular
function. If the Court agrees that these Defendants are final policymakers for Dallas County, then Plaintiffs agree that
naming them individually is redundant of a suit against the County.

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Marian Brown, is the final policymaker for running and administering the jail in Dallas County.
She is sued in her official capacity.
21.

Roberto Canas, Jr., Elizabeth Crowder, Lisa Green, Julia Hayes, Peggy Hoffman,

Shequitta Kelly, Angela King, Nancy C. Mulder, Dan Patterson, Doug Skemp, and Tina Yoo
Clinton are the Dallas County Criminal Court at Law Judges (“misdemeanor Judges”). Sitting en
banc as an administrative body, the misdemeanor Judges promulgate the generally applicable bail
misdemeanor schedule applied by the County systemically to determine the conditions of pretrial
release for all misdemeanor arrestees. Exhibit 7. Each misdemeanor Judge is sued in her individual
and official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief.
22.

Jennifer Bennett, Brandon Birmingham, Robert Burns, Dominique Collins,

Stephanie Fargo, Livia Liu Francis, Hector Garza, Amber Givens-Davis, Teresa Hawthorne, Tracy
Holmes, Jeanine Howard, Tammy Kemp, Nancy Kennedy, Gracie Lewis, Stephanie Mitchell,
Carter Thompson, and Ernest White are the Dallas County District Court Judges (“felony Judges”).
Sitting en banc as an administrative body, the felony Judges promulgate the generally applicable
felony bail schedule applied by the County systemically to determine the conditions of pretrial
release for all felony arrestees. Exhibit 8. Each felony Judge is sued in her individual and official
capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief.
23.

Steven Autry, Lisa Bronchetti, Janet Lusk, Terrie McVea, Anthony Randall, and

Hal Turley are all Dallas County Magistrates. Each is a County employee who is appointed by a
unanimous vote of Defendant Judges.2 The Magistrates can be fired by a majority vote of the

Tex. Code Ann. § 54.301(a) (authorizing the Judges of the District Courts and County Criminal Courts to “appoint
a magistrate to perform the duties authorized by this subsection.”); id. at §54.401(c) (“If a magistrate serves more
than one court, the magistrate’s appointment must be made with the unanimous approval of all the judges under
whom the magistrate serves.”).
2

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Defendant Judges.3 The Magistrates act only at the direction of the Judges, and have only whatever
authority or discretion the Judges allow them to exercise.4 The Magistrates are sued for declaratory
relief only.
Factual Background
A.

The Named Plaintiffs Are in Jail Because They Are Unable to Pay the Money
Bail Demanded for Their Release

24.

At Dallas County Jail, each Plaintiff appeared before a Magistrate, in a room at the

jail that is closed to the public, and the Magistrate informed them of the charges and the money
bail amount required for release. Ex. 1 ¶ 5; Ex. 2 ¶ 4; Ex. 3 ¶ 3; Ex. 4 ¶ 3; Ex. 5 ¶ 6; Ex. 6 ¶¶ 5–7.
They were told by Dallas County Sheriff’s Deputies not to speak at the hearing. Ex. 1 ¶ 4; Ex. 3
¶ 3; Ex. 4 ¶ 5; Ex. 5 ¶ 5. The hearings each lasted less than 60 seconds and, pursuant to the policies
and practices described in this Complaint, no inquiry was made into any Plaintiff’s ability to pay,
nor was there any consideration of alternative, non-financial conditions of release. Ex. 1 ¶ 5; Ex.
2 ¶ 5; Ex. 3 ¶ 4; Ex. 4 ¶ 4; Ex. 5 ¶ 7; Ex. 6 ¶ 8.
25.

Plaintiff Shannon Daves is a 47-year-old woman. Ex. 1 ¶ 1. Ms. Daves is currently

unemployed and experiencing homelessness. Id. ¶ 10–11. She struggles to meet the basic
necessities of life. Id. ¶ 11.
26.

Ms. Daves was arrested on Wednesday, January 17, and taken into Dallas County

custody for an alleged misdemeanor offense. Id. ¶ 2. She was informed that, because of the Dallas
County bail schedule, she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a money bail amount

Tex. Code Ann. § 54.305(b) (“The services of a magistrate who serves more than one court may be terminated by a
majority vote of all the judges whom the magistrate serves.”).
3

Davis v. State, 956 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“However, a magistrate is not a judge in his own right and
acts as a surrogate of the duly elected judge. . . .”); Gambling Paraphernalia, Devices, Equipment, & Proceeds v.
State, 22 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. App.—Dall. 2000, no pet.) (“[The Magistrate] acts as an agent of the district courts
and has no authority of his own.”).
4

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of $500—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. See id. ¶ 5. She was told
that she would be detained by Dallas County if she does not pay. See id. ¶¶ 2–5.
27.

Because she cannot afford to purchase her freedom, and because of the jail’s

policies relating to people who are transgender, Ms. Daves is being kept in solitary confinement
24 hours a day, segregated from the rest of the jail population. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. She has not been
permitted to exercise, and she eats alone in her cell. Id. ¶ 8.
28.

Plaintiff Shakena Walston is a 29-year-old woman. Ex. 2 ¶ 1. Ms. Walston is

currently unemployed and living with her sister to avoid homelessness. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. She struggles
to meet the basic necessities of life. Id. ¶ 6.
29.

Ms. Walston was arrested on Friday, January 19, and taken into Dallas County

custody for an alleged felony offense. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. She was informed that, because of the Dallas
County bail schedule, she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a money bail amount
of $15,000—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. See id. ¶ 4. She was
told that she would be detained by Dallas County if she does not pay. See id. ¶¶ 4–5, 10. Because
she cannot afford to purchase her freedom, she remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 10. She was
trying to start a program at a local community college with the help of financial aid, but cannot
pursue those plans until she is released. Id. ¶ 9.
30.

Plaintiff Erriyah Banks is a 29-year-old woman. Ex. 3 ¶ 1. Ms. Banks is currently

unemployed and living with her mother to avoid homelessness. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Her mother relies on
her as her caretaker. Id. ¶ 10. Ms. Banks struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id. ¶ 6.
31.

Ms. Banks was arrested on Friday, January 19, and taken into Dallas County

custody for an alleged state jail felony and felony offense. Id. ¶ 2. She was informed that, because
of the Dallas County bail schedule, she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a

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money bail amount of $50,000—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule.
See id. ¶ 3. She was told that she would be detained by Dallas County if she does not pay. See id.
¶¶ 3–7. Because she cannot afford to purchase her freedom, she remains in the Dallas County Jail.
Id. ¶ 7. She has not been given the medication or special diet that she needs to treat ongoing health
issues, and her mother remains without a caretaker. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.
32.

Plaintiff Destinee Tovar is a 19-year-old woman. Ex. 4 ¶ 1. Ms. Tovar is currently

unemployed and without stable housing. Id. ¶ 6. She struggles to meet the basic necessities of life.
Id.
33.

Ms. Tovar was arrested on Friday, January 19, by the Mesquite Police Department

for an alleged misdemeanor and taken to Mesquite’s jail. Id. ¶ 2. She was informed by a judge
there that she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a bond amount of $500. Id. ¶ 2.
She could not afford to pay, so she remained in custody until she was transferred to the Dallas
County Jail. Id. ¶ 3. At the Dallas County Jail, she saw a Magistrate Judge, who informed her that
she would be released immediately, but only if she paid a bond amount of $1,500—an amount
predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. Id. She was told that she would be detained by
Dallas County if she does not pay. See id. Because she cannot afford to purchase her freedom, she
remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7.
34.

Plaintiff Patroba Michieka is a 30-year-old man. Ex. 5 ¶ 1. Before his arrest, Mr.

Michieka was working a few days a week and was living with his mother to avoid homelessness.
Id. ¶¶ 9–10. He struggles to meet the basic necessities of life. Id. ¶ 8.
35.

Mr. Michieka was arrested on Friday, January 19, for an alleged state-jail felony

offense. Id. ¶ 2. He was informed that, because of the Dallas County bail schedule, he would be
released immediately, but only if he paid a money bail amount of $500—an amount predetermined

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by the Dallas County bail schedule. See id. ¶ 6–7, 11. He was told that he would be detained by
Dallas County if he did not pay. See id. ¶¶ 6–7, 11. Because he cannot afford to purchase his
freedom, he remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 11. He fears he may lose his job because he is
unable to go to work. Id. ¶ 10.
36.

Plaintiff James Thompson is a 38-year-old man. Ex. 6 ¶ 1. He is currenly

unemployed and living with his parents to avoid homelessness. Id. ¶ 10. He struggles to meet the
basic necessities of life. Id.
37.

Mr. Thompson was arrested on Thursday, January 18, by the Garland Police

Department for two alleged state-jail felony offenses and taken to Garland’s jail. Id. ¶ 2. He was
informed by a judge there that he would be released immediately, but only if he paid a bond amount
of $90,000. Id. ¶ 2. He could not afford to pay, so he remained in custody until he was transferred
to the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶ 3–4. At the Dallas County Jail, he saw a Magistrate Judge, who
informed him that he would be eligible for release from Dallas County custody, but only if he paid
a bond amount of $60,000—an amount predetermined by the Dallas County bail schedule. Id. ¶ 7.
He was told that he would be detained by Dallas County if he does not pay. See id. Because he
cannot afford to purchase his freedom, he remains in the Dallas County Jail. Id. ¶¶ 9, 12.
B.

Defendants’ Wealth-Based Detention System Detains Arrestees Who Cannot
Pay Secured Money Bail Amount While Releasing Those Who Can Pay

38.

As a matter of policy and practice, Dallas County requires all arrestees to pay

secured money bail to be released from jail. The bail amounts are not individualized; they are set
according to a “bail schedule”—a list of monetary amounts that correspond to the offense charged.
Dallas County uses a bail schedule to determine conditions of release, even though Texas law

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allows Dallas County to permit release on nonfinancial conditions or unsecured bail, and to issue
citations for various misdemeanor offenses, instead of making arrests.5
39.

“Bail” means “conditions of release.” The phrase “money bail” or “secured money

bail” means that the person’s release is conditioned on the pre-payment of a monetary amount, i.e.
the person must pay some amount of money upfront in order to be released. The phrase “unsecured
bail” or “unsecured bond” means that the person’s release is conditioned on a promise to make a
monetary payment if the person does not appear for court; the person is not required to make a
monetary payment upfront in exchange for release.6
40.

Arestees who cannot afford the predetermined money bail amount are detained

pursuant to the bail schedule—without even a theoretical opportunity to raise ability to pay and
challenge the generic, secured financial condition required automatically by Dallas County—until
their first appearance in court. As a matter of policy and practice, impoverished misdemeanor
arrestees are detained pursuant to the bail schedule for four to ten days before they are brought to
court. Felony arrestees who waive indictment are detained pursuant to the bail schedule for two to
three weeks. Felony arrestees who do not waive indictment are detained pursuant to the bail
schedule for two to three months.

5

Texas law gives Dallas County the authority to cite and release a person accused of certain misdemeanor offenses.
Tex. C.C.P. Art. 14.06(b)–(d). However, Dallas County has rejected the cite-and-release option as a matter of policy
for all eligible offenses except possession of less than four ounces of marijuana. See Kevin Cokely, Dallas ‘Cite and
Release’ Policy Goes Into Effect Friday For Small Amounts of Marijuana, Dall. Morning News, Nov. 28, 2017,
available
at
https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/Dallas-Hosts-Forum-in-Preparations-for-Cite-and-ReleaseProgram-460489773.html.
6

See Tim Schnacke, United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Fundamentals of Bail: A
Resources Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform 112–13 (2014), available
at http://www.clebp.org/images/2014-11-05_final_bail_fundamentals_september_8,_2014.pdf (“[B]ail is best
defined in terms of release, and most appropriately as a process of conditional release. . . . The purpose of bail, rather,
is to effectuate and maximize release. There is ‘bail’—i.e., a process of release—and there is ‘no bail[]’—a process
of detention.”).

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In practice, this first court appearance is not a true opportunity to raise ability to

pay or challenge conditions of release, because arrestees are brought into the courtroom to speak
to the Judge only if they are pleading guilty, and most misdemeanor and low-level-felony arrestees
do plead guilty, typically accepting sentences of time served.
42.

As a result of Defendants’ policies and practices, impoverished arrestees are kept

in jail for days or weeks solely because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment, while
arrestees with access to money are released.
1.
43.

Arrest and transport to the Dallas County Jail

The Dallas County Sheriff’s Department, the City of Dallas Police Department, and

numerous other agencies within Dallas County have the authority to arrest people for misdemeanor
and felony offenses. Dallas County and the City of Dallas are responsible for the vast majority of
the arrests in Dallas County.
44.

The post-arrest process is substantially the same for all arrestees, regardless of

which agency makes the arrest, and regardless of whether the person is arrested pursuant to a
warrant or a warrantless arrest.7
45.

When a person is arrested by an agency other than Dallas County or the City of

Dallas, she will be taken first to the local lockup run by that agency.

7

However, people who are arrested by agencies other than Dallas County or the City of Dallas are typically subjected
to longer periods of wealth-based detention than those arrested by Dallas County or the City of Dallas, because they
are kept initially in the local lockup of the arresting authority before they are transferred to the Dallas County Jail.
Often, several days pass prior to transfer from one of these outlying jails. For example, Dallas County transports
arrestees from Richardson City Jail every one to three days. Some municipal jails transport arrestees only once or
twice per week. Arrestees who are detained initially at these other jail facilities learn the money bail amount required
for release soon after they are taken to the local lockup.

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In about half of the jurisdictions that make arrests within Dallas County, a local

magistrate informs the arrestee of her bail amount in person at the local jail.8 Some of these
magistrates apply the Dallas County bail schedules, and some apply their own local policies for
setting bail.
47.

In the other jurisdictions, arrestees appear by videolink before the Defendant Dallas

County Magistrates. In these jurisdictions, Dallas County Magistrates refer to the Dallas County
misdemeanor and felony bail schedules to determine the amount of secured money bail required
for release.
48.

Dallas County transports arrestees from the local lock-ups run by agencies other

than Dallas County and the City of Dallas.
49.

It can take two or three days for a person arrested by an agency other than Dallas

County or the City of Dallas to be transported to the Dallas County Jail. Arrestees who are kept at
these local jails have no access to appointed counsel during this entire period of time, but they can
leave the local jail at any time if they pay the money bail amount.
50.

People arrested by Dallas County or the City of Dallas are taken directly to the

Dallas County Jail, known locally as “Lew Sterrett.”
51.

On average, Dallas County books 182 new arrestees into the Dallas County Jail,

every day.
52.

The Defendant Sheriff detains arrestees at the Dallas County Jail, which houses all

inmates to be held pending trial in the Dallas County courts.

8

At some of the municipal jails, local Magistrates visit the jail once per day to inform newly arrested individuals of
the money bail amounts required for their release. At others, the local Magistrates visit the municipal jail several times
a day for this purpose. As a result, the amount of time after arrest and before a person who has been transported to a
municipal jail learns the money bail amount required for release varies from municipal jail to municipal jail.

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53.

Page 16 of 59 PageID 16

Regardless of the arresting agency, once an arrestee arrives at the Dallas County

Jail, a Magistrate determines probable cause for warrantless arrests on the basis of documents filed
by the arresting officer.
54.

If the Magistrate concludes that probable cause existed for a warrantless arrest, or

if the arrest was pursuant to a warrant, the booking process will begin.
2.
55.

Arraignment

Arrestees are informed during the booking process of the money bail amount

required for release during a proceeding that is closed to the public, and is referred to locally as
“arraignment.”
56.

During the booking process at the jail, and typically within a few hours of arriving

there, Sheriff’s deputies take groups of arrestees to appear for “arraignment” in person, in the jail,
before a Magistrate.9 Sheriff’s Department employees and agents supervise, monitor, and give
instructions to the arrestees before, during, and after “arraignment.”
57.

Although the proceedings are called “arraignments,” the purposes of arraignments

as set forth in Texas law—to “fix[]” the arrestee’s identity and “hear[] his plea,” Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art. 26.02—are not fulfilled by these proceedings.
58.

Instead, at so-called “arraignments,” Magistrates inform the arrestees of certain

rights, as required by Article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as the offense
charged and the monetary payment required for release pending trial.10 The allegations giving rise
to the charges are not read aloud at arraignment, and no plea is entered.

9

Arrestees who appeared before a magistrate while being kept at an outlying jail will also appear before a Dallas
County Magistrate during the booking process at the Dallas County Jail.
10

Most warrants do not have a money bail amount written on them. However, warrants for probation violations or
bond forfeitures typically do have bond amounts on them. Arrestees who are aware of the existence of a warrant and
have access to money can post a bond without ever being fully booked into the jail. Those who know about active
warrants for their arrest can avoid even being arrested if they pay for a “non-arrest” bond.

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59.

Page 17 of 59 PageID 17

If a person is too sick to be kept with the general population, or if the person does

not speak English and needs an interpreter to understand the proceedings, the person’s appearance
before a Magistrate at the Dallas County Jail will be delayed, sometimes several days, until the
person’s health stabilizes, or a translator can be located.
60.

The number of people who appear before Magistrates for arraignment at one time

varies. Dockets can regularly be as small as two or three people, or as large as 15 to 20 arrestees,
and sometimes more.
61.

There are no defense attorneys or prosecutors at these hearings.

62.

The Sheriff’s Office has closed the hearings to the public and refused a request by

undersigned counsel to observe the hearings. A deputy at the jail recently refused another request
to observe the hearings, stating that the proceedings are “for inmates and no one else.”
63.

Most hearings are not recorded on audio or video, despite a Texas statute requiring

that the hearings be recorded.11 See Tex. C.C.P. 15.17(a), (e).
64.

Arraignments occur at intervals every day of the week around the clock.

65.

Before an arraignment docket begins, Sheriff’s deputies order arrestees not to speak

and not to ask questions unless the Magistrate gives them permission.
66.

Some deputies also tell arrestees that the Magistrate will increase the money bail

amount required for their release if the arrestees say anything during the hearing.

11

Other arraignments which take place by videolink from outlying jails are recorded. Additionally, when a person is
already in jail and charges are enhanced or reduced, or new charges are levied, a Defendant Magistrate will conduct
an arraignment by videolink. These hearings are also recorded. Videos of these recorded hearings can be viewed in
the discretion of the Chief Magistrate Judge, Terrie McVea. An attorney with the ACLU of Texas was permitted to
watch a few magistration dockets in the jail before the Sheriff made the decision to close the hearings to the public.
Allegations about what happens during the hearing are based on undersigned counsel’s review in Judge McVea’s
office of about 20 video recordings and the recollections of the attorney who was permitted to watch the dockets in
person before they were closed to the public.

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67.

Page 18 of 59 PageID 18

When the hearings begin, the Magistrate first informs the group of arrestees of

certain rights, for example, to remain silent, and to appointed counsel if they cannot afford an
attorney, as required by Article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
68.

Then, the Magistrate begins calling individual names and informs the arrestee of

the charge or charges against her (but not the allegations underlying the charge or charges), and
the amount of money she must pay to be released.
69.

The process of setting bail is a rote exercise. The Magistrate simply recites the

secured money bail amount required by the County’s bail schedule.
3.
70.

The bail schedules

During each “arraignment,” a Magistrate sets money bail amounts according to the

predetermined money bail schedules promulgated by the Defendant Judges.
71.

The misdemeanor Judges, voting en banc as an administrative body, promulgated

a schedule that applies to misdemeanor arrestees, see Exhibit 7 (bail schedule for misdemeanor
arrestees).
72.

The felony Judges, voting en banc as an administrative body, promulgated a

schedule that applies to felony arrestees, see Exhibit 8 (bail schedule for felony arrestees).
73.

The bail schedules are the exclusive means for determining conditions of pretrial

release for arrestees who are taken to the Dallas County Jail.
74.

The bail schedules require Magistrates to impose secured money bail in every case.

75.

The misdemeanor bail schedule states explicitly that “[a]ll bonds are cash or surety

unless otherwise specified by the Judge.”
76.

The misdemeanor Judges permit Magistrates to adjust the specific amount of

secured money bail required, in light of only the following factors: “the nature of the offense, the

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Page 19 of 59 PageID 19

safety of the complaining witness and the community, as well as ensuring the appearance of the
Defendant at court settings.”12 Id.
77.

The misdemeanor Judges have not authorized Magistrates to consider ability to pay

or alternative methods of reasonably assuring appearance in court.
78.

Upon information and belief, the misdemeanor Judges recently authorized—but did

not require—Magistrates to grant release on unsecured bond if a misdemeanor arrestee is charged
with a non-violent offense and has no or minimal criminal history.
79.

However, the Magistrates are not exercising this limited authority to consider non-

financial conditions. The Magistrates continue their well-settled, widespread practice of requiring
secured money financial conditions in every case consistent with the formally promulgated policy.
The Magistrates do not inquire about ability to pay in any case.
80.

The felony bail schedule is similar to the misdemeanor bail schedule.

81.

As a matter of policy and practice, the Magistrates interpret the felony Judges’ bail

schedule to require secured money bail in every case, and the felony Judges acquiesce in that
interpretation.
82.

The felony Judges permit Magistrates to deviate from the bail amounts “if justified

by the facts of the case and the circumstances of the defendant.” Exhibit 8.
83.

Whatever authority the felony judges have granted magistrates to deviate from the

bail schedule, Magistrates do not use it: Magistrates have a well-settled, widespread practice of
requiring secured money bail pursuant to the bail schedule.
84.

Magistrates do not consider an arrestee’s ability to pay when determining

conditions of release in misdemeanor or felony cases.

12

A previous version of the bail schedule prohibited Magistrates from reducing the money bail amount in any case.

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85.

Page 20 of 59 PageID 20

Indeed, Magistrates cannot consider ability to pay—in misdemeanor or felony

cases—because they have no financial information about the arrestees who appear before them,
and they make no inquiry into arrestees’ ability to pay any particular money bail amount.
86.

Moreover, arrestees are told that they may not speak until after everyone’s hearing

is concluded and the Magsitrate has informed each arrestee of the charge or charges against them
and the money bail amounts required for release.
87.

Nor do the Magistrates—or any other government official—consider alternatives

to secured financial conditions of release, or make findings that a secured financial condition of
release is necessary to meet any governmental interest.
88.

In addition to making no affirmative inquiry into or findings concerning ability to

pay, Magistrates affirmatively refuse to hear any argument from an arrestee who is bold enough
to raise her inability to pay. If an arrestee does ask for a lower money bail amount or for release
on non-financial conditions, as a matter of policy and practice, the Magistrate refuses to change
the money bail amount required by the Judges’ schedule and tells the person to speak with her
lawyer. Of course, indigent arrestees do not yet have a lawyer.
89.

Magistrates refuse to reduce money bail amounts or grant release on unsecured bail

or non-financial conditions, even when the Magistrate knows or should know that the person will
be detained as a result of a secured financial condition of release.
90.

Magistrates do not make any findings, on the record or otherwise, about the

appropriateness of the conditions of release they require or alternative conditions of release in light
of any government interest.
91.

Magistrates also do not make any findings concerning the arrestee’s ability to pay

money bail, or the reasons for the specific amount of money bail required for release.

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92.

Page 21 of 59 PageID 21

Each person’s entire judicial hearing for determining the conditions of release (or

resulting in de facto money-based orders of pretrial detention) lasts about one minute or less.
4.
93.

After the arraignment docket

After arraignment, the officers and employees of the Sheriff’s Department are

authorized by County policy to accept money bail as predetermined by the schedule and to release
arrestees who pay money bail in accordance with the bail schedule.
94.

After each arraignment docket concludes, Sheriff’s deputies ask arrestees whether

they can afford the secured money bail required for their release.
95.

Arrestees who were booked into the Dallas County Jail with sufficient cash on hand

to pay the money bail amount will be taken to the “vault”13 in the jail to get the money necessary
for their release.
96.

Other arrestees who can afford the money bail amount, but do not have cash on

hand, will be escorted to an ATM machine located in the booking area of the jail. Using this ATM,
arrestees with sufficient funds in personal bank accounts can access their bank accounts, withdraw
money, and purchase their release.
97.

Arrestees who cannot afford the full amount of money bail on their own can make

a phone call to ask a friend or family member to pay the monetary amount on their behalf, or they
can contact a for-profit bonding company to assist in making the payment.
98.

Arrestees who tell the Sheriff’s deputies that they cannot afford to make the

monetary payment will be assigned to a housing unit and confined to a jail cell after arraignment.
Arrestees are housed together with convicted prisoners, under the exact same conditions.
5.

13

The moment of differential treatment

When someone is arrested, their personal clothing and belongings are inventoried and stored in a vault.

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99.

Page 22 of 59 PageID 22

From the moment an arrestee who is otherwise eligible for release (i.e., who is not

subject to an immigration detainer, parole hold, or out-of-county warrant) learns the amount of
money required for her release, a person with access to money can make the monetary payment
required for release and be released within a few hours. This is the moment of differential
treatment.
100.

Secured money bail prolongs the detention of even those individuals who would be

detained for other reasons, for example, those who are subject to probation holds or out-of-county
warrants. Although these individuals would not be released from detention entirely if they paid the
money bail amount, they would be released from Dallas County custody and eligible for transport
to the other jurisdiction that requires their presence, or they could potentially secure release in the
other jurisdiction. A secured financial condition of release thus prolongs the detention of a person
who faces other proceedings if she is too poor to pay the money bail amount required by the Dallas
County bail schedule.
101.

For arrestees who cannot afford money bail, the secured financial condition of

release operates as a de facto order of pretrial detention, even though Defendants do not provide
the findings or procedures that the Constitution requires prior to the entry of an order of pretrial
detention. None of the robust procedures required for a valid order of preventative detention exist
in Dallas County, including that there is no inquiry, let alone an inquiry with counsel and basic
evidentiary standards, into whether a compelling interest exists to detain a particular defendant,
whether any particular identifiable danger or risk exists, and whether there are alternatives to the
use of secured money bail that could mitigate any particularized risk.
102.

No transparent legal standards are applied to the decision that results in the de facto

pretrial detention orders.

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103.

Page 23 of 59 PageID 23

The Magistrates’ custom of requiring secured money bail as a condition of release

in every case, the Judges’ acquiescence in this custom, and the Sheriff’s policy of enforcing
unconstitutional orders conditioning release on a monetary payment causes systemic and automatic
wealth-based detention in Dallas County.
6.
104.

Delays in appointing counsel for indigent arrestees

Dallas County routinely jails arrestees who cannot afford to pay money bail for two

or three days before appointing a lawyer to represent them.
105.

However, arrestees typically wait another several days after appointment, and

sometimes a week or two, for meaningful representation to begin. The delay is caused in part by
Dallas County’s refusal, as a matter of policy, to computerize or automate the process for
appointing counsel. The entire appointment process is done on paper and, as a result, takes several
days.
106.

Public defenders’ crushing caseloads cause further delays in the beginning of

meaningful representation for indigent arrestees.
107.

Sheriff’s deputies distribute election-of-counsel forms after the arraignment

dockets. Arrestees who wish to be appointed an attorney must provide financial information on
the form. The Judges and their court coordinators14 use the financial information to determine each
arrestee’s eligibility for appointed counsel.

Each Judge employs a “court coordinator,” who is responsible for managing the Judge’s docket, including
appointing attorneys to impoverished arrestees in accordance with that judge’s individual policies and the Countywide policies.
14

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108.

Page 24 of 59 PageID 24

Sheriff’s Department employees sort the forms into the Judges’ mailboxes. (When

a person is arrested for a misdemeanor, the case is randomly assigned to a specific Judge. 15 New
felony arresetes are randomly assigned to a specific Judge at arraignment.)
109.

Court coordinators collect the forms once each day from the mailbox of the Judge

for whom they work.
110.

The court coordinators review the forms to determine which arrestees assigned to

the Judge requested appointed counsel and, applying both countywide and Judge-specific criteria,
whether those arrestees qualify.
111.

Because court coordinators do not work on evenings, weekends, or holidays, and

only retrieve the forms once each day, an individual who is arrested on a Thursday or Friday will
not be appointed an attorney until Monday or Tuesday at the earliest.
112.

As a matter of policy and practice, if an arrestee is in jail because she has not paid

a monetary bail amount, Judges and their court coordinators presume that the individual is indigent
and assign the individual appointed counsel.
113.

Once court coordinators determine that an arrestee is entitled to appointed counsel,

the court coordinators assign an attorney to the case and notify the attorney of the appointment.
114.

All appointed attorneys are required to contact new clients within 24 hours of

appointment either by visiting in person, by videolink, or by sending a letter.
115.

However, there is no oversight or enforcement of this rule, and many defense

attorneys do not comply with it.
116.

15

As a result, even once an attorney is appointed, representation is further delayed.

All misdemeanor family violence cases are assigned to County Courts at Law Numbers 10 and 11.

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117.

Page 25 of 59 PageID 25

Arrestees lack any ability to contact an attorney who has been appointed to

represent them because Judges have directed court coordinators to refrain from informing arrestees
when an attorney has been appointed. Arrestees must wait until the attorney affirmatively contacts
and meets with them, at the attorney’s initiative.
118.

Even if an arrestee being kept in the Dallas County Jail somehow did know the

name and contact information of her assigned attorney, contacting the attorney would be slow,
expensive, or impossible: the arrestee’s options for contacting an attorney are to send a letter,
which would take days to reach the attorney, or pay to use a phone to call the attorney. There is no
way to make a no-cost call to a lawyer from the jail, where the phone system has been contracted
to a private, multi-billion dollar corporation called Securus.
119.

As a result of these policies and practices, arrestees who are in jail because they

cannot afford to pay money bail routinely wait two or three days days, and sometimes a week,
before being appointed an attorney.
120.

Most wait even longer before meeting their attorneys: Impoverished arrestees who

cannot pay money bail typically meet their lawyers when they are brought to court for a first
appearance, which will occur only after the District Attorney’s Office decides to file the charge.
7. Delay in the DA’s decision to file charges
121.

The misdemeanor judges allow the District Attorney’s (“DA”) Office four business

days (or almost a week) to decide whether to file a misdemeanor case.
122.

The felony judges allow the DA’s Office five business days (or one calendar week)

to decide whether to file most felony cases, and ten business days (or two calendar weeks) to file
thirty-six more serious felony cases, and thirty days to file three of the most serious felonies.
123.

The DA’s Office can request additional time to file any charge.

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124.

Page 26 of 59 PageID 26

If charges are not filed within the relevant period of time, the arrestee must be

released from jail, though the DA’s Office retains the option to pursue the case.
125.

The time period within which charges must be filed or the arrestee released begins

on the “date aware,” which the Judges have defined as “the date the Dallas County Sheriff’s Office
enters the arrested person’s information” into its database.
126.

If the arrested person’s information is entered after 8:00 a.m., Dallas County

considers the information to have been entered the next day. Id.
127.

As a result of the Judges’ policies, indigent arrestees who cannot afford money bail

are routinely kept in jail cells for eight days (if charged with a misdemeanor) and more than two
weeks (if charged with a felony) before an ADA even files a charge.
128.

This time period will be longer if there is an intervening holiday.

129.

The total time period that a person is detained before charges are filed will also be

longer if the person was arrested by an agency other than the City of Dallas or Dallas County.
These arrestees are kept for several days at outlying jails before being transferred to the Dallas
County Jail, but the “date aware”—which triggers the five- or ten-business-day clock for filing
charges—occurs only after the person arrives at the Dallas County Jail.
130.

If the DA’s Office does not file charges within the permitted time periods,

impoverished arrestees who have been kept in jail since their arrest due to their inability to pay
money bail will be released on their own recognizance after days or weeks of wealth-based
detention.16

16

Some impoverished arrestees, after being subjected to days or weeks of wealth-based detention but before the ADA
makes a charging decision, manage to scrape together enough money from family and friends to pay a for-profit
bonding company a non-refundable fee of hundreds, or thousands, of dollars to secure release from jail. Even if the
ADA decides not to pursue the case, that person will never get her money back.

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131.

Page 27 of 59 PageID 27

In felony cases, after the DA’s Office files charges, arrestees are entitled to

indictment by a grand jury. Because of backlogs at the grand jury, it can take two to three months
for the indictment process to conclude.
132.

The DA’s Office must first file charges and (if the case is a felony case) a grand

jury must issue an indictment before an arrestee will be brought to court for a first appearance.
133.

Due to the grand jury backlogs, felony arrestees—especially those charged with

low-level felony offenses—routinely waive indictment so that they can be brought to court as soon
as the ADA files charges.
8.

134.

Arrestees cannot challenge conditions of release before charges are
filed

In theory, once a defense attorney is appointed and meets her client after

approximately four days to one week of detention, the attorney could file a motion seeking
alternative conditions of release for an arrestee who cannot afford the money bail amount required
by the bail schedule.
135.

In practice, however, some judges refuse to entertain these motions before the DA

files formal charges. Some Judges even claim that they lack jurisdiction to consider bond-reduction
motions before a case is formally filed.
136.

Even when a defense attorney files a bond-reduction motion, Judges typically

schedule the hearing for days or a week in the future.
137.

During this period of time, an arrestee who cannot afford to pay money bail will be

kept in jail.
138.

The Presiding Judge of the misdemeanor courts referred to the four-to-ten-day

period before a misdemeanor case is filed as a “black hole”: during this time, nothing can happen
in the case, and impoverished arrestees are left to languish in jail cells.

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9.
139.

Page 28 of 59 PageID 28

First appearance

Even after a case is filed, an arrestee may wait even longer to be taken to court. As

of January 21, 2018, there were at least two individuals, arrested on January 9, 2018—one for
possession of less than two ounces of marijuana and the other for trespass—who were being kept
in the Dallas County Jail due to their inability to pay a $500 money bail amount. The cases were
filed on January 16 and January 17, respectively, but neither has been assigned an attorney, and
neither has been taken to court.
140.

First appearance is not an adequate opportunity to raise ability to pay or challenge

conditions of release. Instead, the Judges’ policies concerning first appearance ensure that a guilty
plea is the fastest way for an impoverished arrestee to secure freedom. The Judges leverage Dallas
County’s money-based post-arrest system to minimize the backlog of cases on their dockets so
that they can process as many cases as possible per week, and prosecutors use it to increase
conviction rates.
141.

One of the purposes and effects of Dallas County’s post-arrest money-based

detention scheme is to coerce and process large numbers of guilty pleas prior to any person
conducting any legal or factual investigation into the charges, let alone the complete and zealous
investigation and defense required by professional standards and the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
142.

The system begins with court coordinators, to whom the Judges give responsiblity

for scheduling arrestees’ first appearances.
143.

As a matter of County policy, court coordinators do not schedule first appearances

until the DA’s Office files charges and (if applicable and not waived) an indictment has issued.

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144.

Page 29 of 59 PageID 29

As a result of Dallas County’s policies to allow the DA’s Office four business days

to file charges in misdemeanor cases, and five or ten business days within to file most felony
charges, first appearances for misdemeanor arrestees occur between four and ten days after arrest;
first appearances for felony arrestees who waive indictment occur between two and three weeks
after arrest; and first appearances for felony arrestees who do not waive indictment occur between
two and three months after arrest.
145.

On the day of an arrestee’s first appearance, officers and employees of the Sheriff’s

Department will transport the arrestee from the jail to the “lock-up”—which is a holding cell that
is connected to, but outside of, the courtroom—on the so-called “jail chain.”
146.

“Jail chain” is the term used to refer to the group of impoverished detained arrestees

who are brought to court, shackled with metal chains, for their first appearance.
147.

In theory, first appearance is the first opportunity an arrestee who cannot afford to

purchase her release has to speak or make any challenges to the conditions of release required by
the Magistrate at “arraignment.”
148.

But, as a matter of policy and practice, there is no meaningful review of the money

bail amount previously imposed pursuant to the schedule. Instead, judges refuse to permit arrestees
to enter the courtroom from lockup unless they have agreed to plead guilty.
149.

If an arrestee agrees to plead guilty at first appearance, she will be brought into the

courtroom to enter a guilty plea.
150.

Most misdemeanor and low-level felony arrestees who are detained at first

appearance plead guilty.
151.

In fact, some court coordinators delay bringing detained arrestees to court until they

believe, based on past experience, that the individual is likely to plead guilty.

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152.

Page 30 of 59 PageID 30

Most misdemeanor and low-level felony arrestees who plead guilty at first

appearance accept a sentence of time served and are then released from jail that day.17
153.

Others who plead guilty at first appearance but are not released that day accept

sentences that nonetheless result in their release well before any subsequent court appearance
would occur. The defense attorney is responsible for scheduling subsequent court appearances.
154.

Although requesting a bail reduction or seeking release on a personal bond is a

theoretical possibility at the first appearance, it almost never happens. When it does, a hearing on
the motion is typically set for about a week in the future as a matter of policy. Defense attorneys
must ask the judge to break with custom to hear any matters at first appearance related to arrestees
who are not pleading guilty.
155.

Even when Judges finally rule on bail reduction applications, they refuse to

consider ability to pay, basing the decision instead on other factors, such as the person’s criminal
history or current charge. Judges very rarely grant bond reductions or permit release without
requiring secured money bail.
156.

Due to these policies and practices, for people who cannot afford money bail, a

guilty plea at first appearance is typically the fastest way out of jail.
157.

If an arrestee does not plead guilty at the first appearance, she will be taken back to

Dallas County Jail, where she will be kept in a jail cell until her attorney decides to schedule
another court appearance.

17

The policies and practices in Dallas County are similar to the system that was enjoined in Harris County, where
67% of detained misdemeanor arrestees who pled guilty at their first appearance were released within a day of
conviction, and 83% who pled guilty at first appearance were released within five days of conviction. ODonnell v.
Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1114 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2017).

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158.

Page 31 of 59 PageID 31

It can take weeks or months for a subsequent appearance. As opposed to the federal

system, which imposes strict time limits on pretrial detention through the Speedy Trial Act, Texas
has mandated no strict time limits on pretrial detention.
10.
159.

Summary of the post-arrest process

The above-described policies and practices mean that a typical individual without

financial means will be detained solely because of her inability to make a monetary payment for
at least one week if charged with a misdemeanor, at least two weeks if charged with a felony and
the arrestee decides to waive indictment, and for two or three months if charged with a felony and
the arrestee does not waive indictment, before there is even a theoretical opportunity to challenge
conditions of release.
160.

Many arrestees will be kept in jail even longer solely because they cannot pay

money bail and are not willing to plead guilty.
161.

At any moment in the post-arrest process, an arrestee who is otherwise eligible for

release can pay the money bail required by the County’s bail schedule and walk out of the doors
of the jail.
162.

Defendants’ foregoing policies have consistently, for years, resulted in the needless

and devastating jailing of impoverished arrestees in Dallas County.
163.

In 2017, about 50% of misdemeanor cases and about 50% of felony cases were

resolved while the arrestee was in a jail cell because she could not afford secured money bail.

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Page 32 of 59 PageID 32

C. Arrestees who cannot afford to pay secured money bail will be detained in the
Dallas County Jail for days or weeks due to their inability to pay
164.

In Dallas County, there are four types of bonds an arrestee can post to secure release

from jail after arrest and before disposition: cash bonds, surety bonds, pretrial-release bonds, and
personal bonds (also referred to as “personal recognizance bonds”).
165.

Each of these mechanisms of release requires either an upfront monetary payment,

or significant time in jail.
166.

A person will be released on a “cash bond” if she pays the full money bail amount

required for release. Arrestees who can afford to pay a cash bond typically do so quickly after
arrest and are generally released the same day as their arrest, usually within hours of being arrested.
167.

A “surety bond” involves a contract between an arrestee and a for-profit bail bond

company. Arrestees securing release from jail using a surety bond typicially pay the company a
nonrefundable fee equal to 10% of the total money bail amount required for release.
168.

In 2016 (as in September 2017), Dallas County arrestees who contracted with bail

bond companies to secure release suffered, on average, four days of wealth-based detention before
paying the non-refundable premium to a commercial bonding company. Thus, arrestees who
eventually manage to pay the bond company’s “[r]ansom”18 to purchase their release, must still

18

As Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg observed more than 50 years ago in the Forward to the 1965 book by
Ronald L. Goldfarb, Ransom: A Critique of the American Bail System, “If it is true that ‘the quality of a nation’s
civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law,’ then the American
bail system as it now operates can no longer be tolerated. At best, it is a system of checkbook justice; at worst, a highly
commercialized racket.”

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spend days or weeks in jail due to their inability to pay while their family and friends try to come
up with the money.19
169.

“Pretrial-release bonds” are a third type of bond. A pretrial-release bond is the term

used for the low-cost bonds for which Dallas County’s Pretrial Services Department screens
arrestees. These bonds require arrestees to pay an administrative fee of either 3% of the full bond
amount or $20, whichever is greater, to secure release. They are issued pursuant to Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure Article 17.03(g) and Article 17.42.
170.

Arrestees who are released on pretrial-release bonds remain in jail an average of

three days before being released.
171.

Dallas County’s Pretrial Services agency—which is chronically understaffed and

under-resourced as a matter of County policy, and does not provide meaningful pretrial
supervision—screens arrestees for pretrial-release bonds according to criteria that the Dallas
County Commissioners Court set forth in a generally applicable Order issued in 1999. Exhibit 9.
172.

The Order constitutes a policy decision regarding the categories of arrestees who

are ineligible for pretrial release without paying the full amount of the secured financial condition
required by the bail schedule. It renders the vast majority of arrestees ineligible for a pretrialrelease bond.
173.

The criteria an arrestee must satisfy to be eligible for a pretrial-release bond, as set

forth in the Order, include: (1) residence in Dallas County or an adjoining county and (2) the ability
to provide contact information for two (previously four) “references” who can confirm both the
arrestee’s residence and employment.

19

In this way, the use of surety bonds effectuates the transfer of wealth from some of the poorest members of the
community to private for-profit companies and traps arrestees in cycles of debt and imprisonment. See generally,
Campaign for Smart Justice, Selling Off Our Freedom: How Insurance Corporations Have Taken Over Our Bail
System 26–33 (2017), available at https://colorofchange.org/bail-industry-report/.

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174.

Page 34 of 59 PageID 34

Because people who are homeless have no residence that their “references” could

“verify,” the Commissioners’ Order renders them categorically ineligible for pretrial-release
bonds. This policy affects hundreds of people every month: in September 2017 alone, 399 people
who were homeless were booked into the Dallas County Jail.
175.

Arrestees are ineligible if they were convicted in the previous ten years of any

violent felony, or if they were convicted in the last 12 months, or are currently charged with, any
misdemeanor involving assault. Arrestees are also ineligible if they were convicted of a felony in
the past year, or more than two felonies within the past ten years.20
176.

Arrestees are ineligible if they have ever forfeited a bond in a felony case, if they

forfeited a bond in a misdemeanor case in the last three years, or if they forfeited bonds in two
misdemeanor cases in the past ten years.
177.

Arrestees must “exhibit a demeanor which implies a willingness to cooperate with

the conditions of Pre-Trial Release” to be eligible for a pretrial-release bond, a criterion that invites
arbitrary and discriminatory decision-making by County employees making this decision.
178.

Pretrial Services does not consider a person’s ability to pay when determining

eligibility.
179.

Pretrial Services also does not consider the availability of non-financial alternative

conditions of release that would reasonably assure appearance and community safety.
180.

Because of the strict criteria set forth by the Commissioners in this written policy,

the vast majority of arrestees are deemed ineligible for release on a pretrial-release bond. Once all

20

This exclusion affects hundreds of impoverished arrestees every year because in Texas, many non-violent and minor
offenses are crimes of poverty and are considered felonies, including, for example, third-offender theft under $750
(i.e. an enhanced misdemeanor offense). See Cary Aspinwall, Why Dallas County Can Set $150,000 Bail for a $105
Shoplifting Charge—and How Taxpayers Lose, Dall. Morning News, Dec. 29, 2016, available at
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/social-justice-1/2016/12/29/dallas-county-demands-150000-bail-105-shopliftingcharge-taxpayers-lose. Many other felonies are non-violent drug possession charges.

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of the restrictions on eligibility are applied, it is generally only first time offenders charged with
non-violent offenses who are even eligible to receive pretrial-release bonds.
181.

Eligibility for pretrial-release bonds is never assessed prior to arraignment and

booking.
182.

If a person appears to be eligible based on all the criteria in the Commissioner’s

Court’s 1999 order, a pretrial services agent will interview the person after booking.
183.

Interviews generally take place the first business day after an arrest, but they can

be delayed for several reasons, including that Pretrial Services agents work only Monday through
Friday, so a person arrested on Thursday or Friday will not be assessed for eligibility until Monday
or Tuesday at the earliest. In September 2017, 132 people were interviewed: an average of about
4.4 interviews per day. This number is typical.21
184.

During the interview, arrestees are asked to provide their current address,

information about how they can be contacted, and employment information. Pretrial Services also
asks the arrestee for the contact information of two or more “references” who will have to verify
the arrestee’s address before a pretrial-release bond can be granted.
185.

Pretrial Services does not collect information about the person’s finances or

education history, and does not screen arrestees to determine indigency.
186.

Not everyone who is interviewed will be released on a pretrial-release bond. For

example, in September 2017, only 83 of the 132 people who were interviewed were released on a
pretrial-release bond. In August 2017, only 99 of the 166 people who were interviewed were
released on a pretrial-release bond. The gap between the number of people interviewed for pretrial-

21

Between October 2016 and September 2017, the average monthly number of interviews was 153.5 (about 5
interviews per day). The number of interviews per month ranged from a low of 119 in June 2017 to a high of 199 in
January 2017.

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release bonds and the number of people released on pretrial-release bonds is due primarily to the
fact that many arrestees are homeless, and that people’s references cannot be contacted.
187.

Other arrestees who are interviewed are never released because their references

cannot be reached or cannot confirm the arrestee’s information.
188.

The raw numbers correspond to very low percentages of arrestees being released

on pretrial-release bonds. In 2016, about 3.3% of people booked into the jail were released on
pretrial-release bonds; in 2015, about 4.6% of people booked into the jail were released on pretrialrelease bonds. As of September 2017, the year-to-date monthly average for 2017 was 3.2%.
189.

If the arrestee’s information is not verified, she will not be released on a pretrial-

release bond, though at any time during the verification process, an arrestee can pay the money
bail amount required by the bail schedule and be freed.
190.

Some arrestees who cannot afford the money bail required for their release resolve

their cases before the verification process can conclude.
191.

Even once the person’s references are verified, release is not certain. The arrestee

must then agree to follow the rules of the program, which include checking in by phone every two
weeks with a Pretrial Service officer and agreeing to notify Pretrial Services of any new arrest or
other court-related information, changes in address, or changes in any other information provided
to Pretrial Services during the interview process.
192.

Contrary to best practices, Dallas County’s Pretrial Services agency does not

provide varying levels of supervision tailored to the arrestee’s specific needs, and Pretrial Services
agents and Judges do not impose the kind of non-financial conditions proven to mitigate
heightened risks of nonappearance and new criminal activity, such as more intense supervision
including in-person check-ins, drug treatment, mental health care, or curfews.

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193.

Page 37 of 59 PageID 37

If the Pretrial Services agent determines that the risk someone poses of

nonappearance or new criminal activity cannot be effectively mitigated by the standard conditions,
that person will be denied a pretrial-release bond.
194.

Finally, to be released on a pretrial-release bond, the arrestee must make an upfront

monetary payment of 3% of the bond amount or $20, whichever is the greater amount, though this
fee can be waived in the discretion of the Manager of Pretrial Services.
195.

An arrestee approved for release on a pretrial-release bond who cannot afford to

pay the reduced fee required for release will be kept in jail for at least one more day: the Director,
who has discretion to waive the fee, generally will not consider a waiver until the business day
following approval of a pretrial-release bond. Thus, if the pretrial-release bond was approved on a
Friday, and the arrestee cannot afford the fee, she will be kept in jail at least until Monday, although
the Director routinely attempts to expedite the review process for people who are approved for
pretrial-release bonds on a Friday.
196.

This policy further extends the wealth-based detention of those individuals who are

deemed eligible for release pursuant to the County’s strict criteria for pretrial-release bonds and
yet are too poor to pay the fee.
197.

The County’s strict criteria for pretrial-release bonds render the vast majority of

arrestees ineligible to receive them.
198.

The fourth type of bond in Dallas County is a “personal recognizance bond,”

sometimes referred to as a “personal bond.” Personal-recognizance bonds are unsecured bonds,
meaning that the arrestee is released without any up-front payment, but will be required to pay the
full amount of the bond if she fails to appear and the bond is forfeited.

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199.

Page 38 of 59 PageID 38

In 2016, people who were released on personal-recognizance bonds were kept in

jail, on average, for more than three weeks (25 days) prior to release. Between January and
September 2017, the average time to release for people released on personal-recognizance bonds
was 19 days, with a high of 24 days in February 2017, and a low of 16 days in September 2017.
200.

In order to be released on a personal-recognizance bond, a person’s attorney must

either file a motion or informally ask the Judge to consider a request for a bond reduction.
201.

Some judges refuse to hear such a request until the case has been filed, i.e. one-to-

three weeks after arrest, at a minimum.
202.

Since April 2017, Dallas County has begun to use personal-recognizance bonds to

divert people with mental illnesses from the jail and to expedite the release of people booked into
the jail who are suffering from mental illnesses.22
203.

People charged with certain offenses, or who have active warrants in other counties,

are ineligible for mental-health bonds. As a matter of policy and practice, anyone who is homeless
is deemed ineligible for a mental-health bond. In fact, very few arrestees with mental-health
diagnoses are released on mental-health bonds; the rest are kept in jail, largely because they are
homeless and cannot afford money bail. Most individuals who are released pursuant to this new
policy spend several days in jail prior to their release.
D.

Defendants know that arrestees in Dallas County are kept in jail solely because
they cannot afford money bail amounts set pursuant to the bail schedule
without an inquiry and findings

22

The Dallas County Jail is the second-largest mental health care provider in Texas, second only to the Harris
County Jail. One-third of inmates at the Dallas County Jail have a diagnosed mental illness. See Stephanie Kuo,
Dallas County Plan Strives To Help People With Mental Illness Avoid Unnecessary Jail Time, KERA News, Apr. 5,
2017, available at http://keranews.org/post/dallas-county-plan-strives-help-people-mental-illness-avoid-unnecessaryjail-time.

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204.

Page 39 of 59 PageID 39

The Defendant Judges—and every other actor in the County’s post-arrest system,

as well as anyone who has observed the bail hearings (before they were closed to the public) or
first appearances—know that many of the detained individuals who appear in front of them are
being confined in jail solely because they are too poor to pay the money bail amount required by
the predetermined schedule.
205.

Each Judge is aware of the Magistrates’ well-settled, widespread practice of

requiring secured money bail based on the bail schedule without an inquiry into or findings
concerning an arrestee’s present ability to pay the amount set.
206.

Each Judge knows that Magistrates refuse to consider ability to pay—indeed, that

Magistrates have no financial information about arrestees, and therefore cannot consider ability to
pay. Each Judge also knows that Magistrates do not make findings concerning alternative
conditions of release during the bail-setting hearings.
207.

Each Judge knows that, as a result of these practices, thousands of individuals are

detained in Dallas County every day solely because they are too poor to pay the money bail
amounts imposed pursuant to the predetermined bail schedules that they promulgated.
208.

For example, Judges receive a “24-hour list,” which is a list of individuals assigned

to their court who were booked into the jail in the last 24 hours. From this list, each Judge can
determine whether an arrestee is in jail solely because she is unable to pay a secured financial
condition of release.
209.

Each Judge accepts guilty pleas and issues time-served sentences every day from

arrestees who are in jail solely because of a money bail amount they cannot afford. Those same
judges routinely find those arrestees to be indigent for purposes of appointing counsel.

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210.

Page 40 of 59 PageID 40

The Defendants know that, for thousands of arrestees in the jail every day, there is

no reason for detention other than the inability to pay a secured financial condition of release.
211.

The Defendants know that secured money bail amounts are imposed in every case

without an inquiry or findings concerning ability to pay and without consideration of or findings
concerning alternatives, and without any of the findings or procedures required for a valid order
of pretrial detention under federal law.
212.

The Judges are aware of the Magistrates’ systemic failure to consider ability to pay.

213.

The Judges are also aware of the Magistrates’ systemic failure to consider non-

financial alternative conditions, or to make findings concerning ability to pay or the necessity of
any particular condition of release to meet a specific government interest.
214.

Each Defendant Judge knows that the Sheriff’s Department enforces the

Magistrates’ secured money bail orders for every individual the Sheriff’s Department arrests, or
accepts into custody after arrest by another agency, without an inquiry into or findings concerning
the person’s ability to pay the predetermined amount required and without meaningful
consideration of alternative conditions of release.
215.

Each Judge has acquiesced in the Magistrates’ custom of failing and refusing to

consider ability to pay and of consistently requiring secured money bail that results in the pretrial
detention of impoverished arrestees. Each Judge has also acquiesced in the Sheriff’s enforcement
of these unconstitutional detention orders. The misdemeanor and felony Judges have not taken any
formal action to correct these constitutional violations.
216.

For example, the presiding judges of the felony and misdemeanor courts have each

admitted to news outlets that they know people who cannot afford their bond under the bail
schedule are detained just because they are poor. The presiding Judge of the misdemeanor courts

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recently stated, “There’s a lot of people who end up in jail who can’t afford a bond, who lose their
jobs, lose their apartment and end up homeless.”23
217.

Yet the Judges have left the bail schedules in place, and have taken no formal action

to correct the widespread practices that result in wealth-based detention. The Sheriff, too, knows
that secured money bail is required of arrestees without any inquiry into or findings concerning a
person’s ability to pay the amount set. The Sheriff knows that bail is set in hearings that are closed
to the public, during which arrestees are prohibited from presenting evidence or making any
arguments.
218.

The Sheriff knows that secured money bail results in the post-arrest detention of

hundreds of presumptively innocent arrestees every week, and thousands every month. The Sheriff
has ready access to the list of detainees in her custody, which provides the basis for each inmate’s
detention, including whether any inmate would be released if she paid a monetary bail amount,
and the amount of money that any inmate is required to pay for immediate release. The Sheriff
therefore knows that the imposition of secured money bail results in systemic, wealth-based
detention, and that there are thousands of people in the jail every night who would be released but
for their inability to pay a predetermined money bail amount required pursuant to Dallas County’s
bail schedules.
219.

The Sheriff has discretion under state law to refuse to enforce unlawful orders.

220.

But, by policy and practice, the Sheriff chooses to enforce secured money bail

amounts that operate as de facto orders of pretrial detention entered without any of the substantive
findings or procedural safeguards required for valid orders of pretrial detention under federal law.

23

Tanya Eiserer, Dallas County Program to Get More Prisoners Out on Bond, WFAA, Jun. 23, 2017, available at
http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/dallas-county/dallas-county-program-to-get-more-prisoners-out-onbond/451683951.

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221.

Page 42 of 59 PageID 42

The Sheriff enforces these de facto detention orders even though she knows or

should know that they were issued without an inquiry and findings concerning ability to pay,
without meaningful consideration of or findings concerning alternative less-restrictive conditions,
without application of any transparent legal standard governing detention, and without the arrestee
receiving notice and opportunity to be heard at an adversarial hearing. The Sheriff knows or should
know that they operate to detain only impoverished arrestees.
222.

Even if the Judges and the Sheriff did not actually know about the foregoing

practices and resulting constitutional violations, they would have constructive knowledge of them.
These practices occur frequently and flagrantly. They result in severe and obvious constitutional
violations, to which the Judges’ and the Sheriff’s attention has been called, and which have been
the subject of considerable public debate:
a.

Magistrates require arrestees to pay secured money bail pursuant to the bail

schedule and without any individualized determination of ability to pay or the need for
particular conditions of release in well over 100 cases every day.
b.

Magistrates issue these orders flagrantly, by rote imposition of secured

money bail amounts from the bail schedule in proceedings lasting approximately 60
seconds, without any inquiry into ability to pay. Indeed, the Magstrates do not have any
information about the arrestees’ ability to pay and do not permit arrestees to speak prior to
conditions of release being determined. Sheriff’s deputies attend these proceedings every
day.
c.

The constitutional violations resulting from the bail schedule are severe.

People are locked in jail cells for days or weeks, without the rigorous procedures or

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substantive findings required for issuing a valid order of preventive detention, just because
they are poor.
d.

The constitutional violations resulting from the bail schedule are obvious.

Arrestees do not get any meaningful opportunity to challenge the bail amounts mandated
by the schedule for days or weeks. There can be little question that people who remain
locked up are unable to afford their bail: immediately following arraignment, sheriff’s
deputies collect financial affidavits from people who are requesting appointed counsel
because they are too poor to afford a lawyer. The Judges then make an affirmative finding
that these individuals qualify for appointed counsel because they are, in fact, too poor to
afford one. The Sheriff herself has ready access to a list of detainees, which shows that the
vast majority of detainees in her jail are held pretrial under a secured bond they have not
been able to pay. And it is no secret that this system is unconstitutional: Harris County,
which operates the largest jail in Texas, was recently enjoined from detaining people using
a bail schedule that operates in a substantially similar manner.
e.

The Judges and Sheriff have discussed these policies with other officials,

system stakeholders, and affected people. They sit on a committee that discusses ways to
reduce the jail population, including adoption of a pretrial assessment tool.
f.

There

has

been

significant

public

discussion

about

Dallas’s

unconstitutional, ineffective, and costly post-arrest system. For example, the Dallas
Morning News and other local news outlets have repeatedly reported on how the County’s
use of access to money to make release and detention decisions results in the systemic
pretrial detention of impoverished arrestees. The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public
Affairs produced a white paper on pretrial detention highlighting Dallas as an example of

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an unconstitutional system. The County’s post-arrest system and its use of rigid secured
money bail schedules have been topics of debate in the election for district attorney.
E.

Detention in the Dallas County Jail Causes Serious and Irreparable Harm

223.

The Dallas County Jail is one of the largest jails in Texas. In 2016, the jail booked

67,122 people total: an average of 5,594 people every month, and 183 people every day.24
224.

On any given day, the vast majority of people in Dallas County Jail cells—almost

70%—are presumptively innocent people who are there because they cannot afford to make a
monetary payment.
225.

One-third of the Dallas County Jail population has a mental illness.25

226.

The Dallas County Jail is a notoriously dangerous place. Between January 2012

and the present, 20 people died while being kept there in pretrial custody.26
227.

There is a documented history of inmate abuse by jail guards, deaths and suicides

in the jail, inadequate training of jail staff, sexual abuse, and lack of access to medications and
medical services.27

24

Jail Population Committee Meeting Report, at 3 (Oct. 13, 2017), available at
https://www.dallascounty.org/Assets/uploads/docs/criminal-justice/jail-pop/2017/2017%20-%2009.pdf.
25

See Stephanie Kuo, Dallas County Plan Strives To Help People With Mental Illness Avoid Unnecessary Jail Time,
KERA News, Apr. 5, 2017, available at http://keranews.org/post/dallas-county-plan-strives-help-people-mentalillness-avoid-unnecessary-jail-time.
An analysis of the Texas Attorney General’s Custodial Death Report revealed that at least 20 people died while in
pretrial custody at the Dallas County Jail between January 1, 2012, and November 19, 2017. See Custodial Deaths
Report, available at https://oagtx.force.com/cdr/cdrreportdeaths, and Dallas County Felony and Misdemeanor Courts
Case Information, available at https://www.dallascounty.org/criminalBackgroundSearch/captcha.
26

27

See also Cary Aspinwall & Stephanie Lamm, Unresponsive: Women are Going to Jail in Need of Drug and
Alcohol Treatment. Help Often Comes Too Late, Dall. Morning News, Dec. 17, 2017, available at
https://interactives.dallasnews.com/2017/ unresponsive/; Naomi Martin, Brutal Killing Inside Dallas County Jail
Leaves Experts Asking Whether It Could Have Been Prevented, Dall. Morning News, Jan. 7, 2017, available at
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/dallas-county/2017/01/07/brutal-killing-inside-dallas-county-jail-leaves-expertsasking-whether-prevented.

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228.

Page 45 of 59 PageID 45

For years, the County has been aware of these intolerable conditions, and has failed

to remedy them.28
229.

None of the people being detained in the Dallas County Jail due to their inability to

pay a secured financial condition of release received an inquiry into their ability to pay or
consideration of alternative, less restrictive conditions. In no case were findings made that secured
money bail was necessary to achieve any government interest. Only those individuals who are too
poor to purchase their release are subjected to these conditions and to the health and safety risks
of pretrial jailing.
F.

Secured Money Bail Is Not as Effective as Many Other Methods in Securing
Court Attendance or Public Safety

230.

Empirical evidence does not show any relationship between monetary conditions

of release and arrestees’ rates of appearance in court.29
231.

While tying pretrial freedom to wealth status is the norm in Dallas County, other

jurisdictions throughout the country do not detain people in jail because of their poverty. Instead

28

E.g., .D. Miles, Caught On Video: Inmate Claims Abuse At Dallas County Jail, CBS DGW, May 14, 2013, available
at http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/05/14/caught-on-video-inmate-claims-abuse-at-dallas-county-jail/; Kevin Krause,
Dallas County Doesn’t Want to Defend Jail Guards Accused of Causing Inmate’s Death, Dall. Morning News, May
5, 2010, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2010/05/04/dallas-county-doesnt-want-to-d; Kevin
Krause, UPDATE: Dallas County Jail Guard Arrested for Having Sex With An Inmate, Dall. Morning News, July 23,
2009, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2009/07/23/dallas-county-jail-guard-arres-1; Kevin
Krause, Former Dallas County Jail Guard Alleges Abuse in the Slammer in Tell-All Book, Dall. Morning News, Dec.
16, 2009, available at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2009/12/16/former-dallas-county-jail-guar; Diane
Jennings, Dallas County Detention Officer Accused of Sexually Abusing Inmate, Dall. Morning News, Apr. 2, 2013,
available
at
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2013/04/02/dallas-county-detention-officer-arrested-forabusing-an-inmate; Kevin Krause, Dallas County Jail Guard Admits Inmate Danced for Her, Dec. 31, 2009, available
at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2009/12/31/20091230-Dallas-County-Jail-guard-admits-inmate-8227.
29

See e,g., Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization 5 (2016), available
at http://www.columbia.edu/~cjh2182/ GuptaHansmanFrenchman.pdf (“We find no evidence that money bail
increases the probability of appearance.”); Michael Jones, Unsecured Bonds: The As Effective and Most Efficient
Pretrial
Release
Option
3
(2013),
available
at
http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/
Unsecured+Bonds,+The+As+Effective+and+Most+Efficient+Pretrial+Release+Option+-+Jones+2013.pdf (“Higher
monetary amounts of secured bonds are associated with more pretrial jail bed use but not increased court apperance
rates.”); Claire M.B. Brooker et al., The Jefferson County Bail Project: Impact Study Found Better Cost Effectiveness
for Unsecured Recognizance Bonds Over Cash and Surety Bonds (Pretrial Justice Institute, June 2014) (finding that
unsecured bail is equally effective as secured money bail at reasonably assuring appearing and mitigating the risk of
new criminal activity).

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of relying on money, other jurisdictions release arrestees with pretrial supervision practices and
procedures that can help increase court attendance and public safety without requiring detention.
232.

Other jurisdictions employ numerous less restrictive methods of maximizing public

safety and court appearances when necessary to guard against a particular risk. These include:
unsecured bond (which do not require payment up front for release but instead allow immediate
release upon a promise to pay the monetary amount if the person does not appear as required),
phone and text message reminders of court dates, rides to court for those without transportation,
pretrial supervision, counseling, stay-away orders, inpatient and outpatient treatment, and, in the
most serious cases, curfew, home detention, and electronic GPS surveillance.
233.

Jurisdictions that make full use of less-restrictive alternative conditions of release

achieve much higher release rates than Dallas County. While Dallas County releases only about
half of all arrestees prior to disposition—many of whom are released only after days or weeks of
illegal and unnecessary wealth-based detention, New York City releases 97% of all misdemeanor
arrestees, and Washington, DC releases 94.5% of all arrestees.
234.

Defendants are permitted by state law to use these less-restrictive alternatives but,

as a matter of routine, choose not to. Instead, Dallas County makes release and detention decisions
on the basis of blunt access to cash, eschewing non-monetary alternatives that increase pretrial
release while effectively mitigating risks of nonappearance or new criminal activity. As a matter
of policy and practice, Defendants do not consider less restrictive alternatives to detention based
on money bail that a person cannot afford.
235.

Jurisdictions with robust pretrial services and non-monetary conditions of release

achieve court-appearance rates of 90% for all appearances throughout the life of the cases, with

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more than 91% of those released pretrial remaining arrest-free (and 98-99% remaining arrest-free
for violent crimes).
236.

Empirical evidence suggests that unsecured bond alone is just as effective at

ensuring appearance in court as secured money bail.
237.

Moreover, studies show that those detained pretrial face worse outcomes at trial

and sentencing than those released pretrial, even when charged with the same offenses. Detention
on money bail increases the likelihood of conviction. One reason is that detained defendants are
more likely to plead guilty just to shorten their jail time, even if they are innocent. Detained
defendants also have a harder time preparing for their defense, gathering evidence and witnesses,
and meeting with their lawyers.
238.

Using data from Philadelphia, researchers have found that a person who is detained

pretrial is 13% more likely to be convicted and 21% more likely to plead guilty. 30 Additionally,
individuals detained pretrial receive longer jail sentences.31
239.

People who are detained—instead of released on money bail or on a personal

bond—when their case is resolved have significantly worse case outcomes.32

30

Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 18 (Jan. 8, 2017),
available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/mstevens/workingpapers/Stevenson%20Job%20Market%20Paper
%20Jan%202016.pdf; see also Gupta, et. al, supra note 29, at 13 (finding a 12% increase in the likelihood of
conviction using the same data); Paul Heaton, et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial
Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711 (2017).
31

Stevenson, supra note 30, at 18; Heaton, supra note 30, at 21.

32

Stevenson, supra note 30, at 18; Gupta, supra note 29, at 13 (finding a 12% increase in the likelihood of
conviction using the same data); Heaton, supra note 30, at 21; Sarah R. Guidry, et al., A Blueprint for Criminal
Justice Policy Solutions in Harris County 13, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/
legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2015/ls_sclaid_summit_03_tcjc_2015_harris_county_blueprint.authcheckdam.pdf
(“[D]efendants who are not released pre-trial are more likely to be incarcerated following a conviction, and they
generally receive longer sentences upon conviction.”); Lise Olson, Study: Inmates Who Can’t Afford Bond Face
Tougher Sentences, Hous. Chron., Sept. 15, 2013, available at http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/Study-Inmates-who-can-t-afford-bond-face-tougher-4817053.php (discussing Carlos Mathis,
an African-American man, who was held in jail for seven months on minor drug and theft charges because he could
not afford money bail, and whose charges were dismissed); Isami Arifuku & Judy Wallen, Racial Disparities at

47

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240.

Page 48 of 59 PageID 48

Moreover, pretrial detention due to inability to pay money bail makes a person more

likely to commit crime in the future and to fail to appear.33
241.

Studies also show that just two days of pretrial detention increases the likelihood

of future arrests and future missed court appearances of low level offenders.
242.

Setting secured money bail without an inquiry into ability to pay and in an amount

higher than a person can afford by definition defeats the purpose of money bail—to incentivize a
person to return to court—and removes any legitimate (let alone compelling) state interest in
requiring a financial condition.
243.

Nor is setting money bail without findings concerning ability to pay or

consideration of alternatives the most narrowly tailored way to meet any other legitimate or
compelling government interest.
244.

Pretrial detention causes instability in employment, housing, and care for dependent

relatives.

Pretrial and Sentencing and the Effects of Pretrial Services Programs (2013), available at
http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/Racial%20Disparities%20at%20Pretrial%20and%20Sentencing%20and
%20the%20Effects%20of%20Pretrial%20Services%20Programs%20-%20NCCD%202013.pdf; Cynthia E. Jones,
“Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 919 (2013);
Tina L. Freiburger, et. al, The Impact of Race on the Pretrial Decision, Am. J. of Crim. Just. (2010), available at
http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/Marcum_CD_2010_Impact_of_Race.pdf.
33

Heaton, supra note 30, at 787; Lowenkamp, et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention at 3, 19 (Nov. 2013),
available at http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/The%20Hidden%20Costs%20of%20Pretrial%20Detention%
20-%20 LJAF%202013.pdf (studying 153,407 defendants and finding that “when held 2-3 days, low risk defendants
are almost 40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than 24
hours”); Arnold Foundation, Pretrial Criminal Justice Research Summary 5 (2013), available at:
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/pdf/LJAF-Pretrial-CJ-Research-brief_FNL.pdf (finding that
“low-risk defendants held 2–3 days were 17 percent more likely to commit another crime within two years” and that
those detained “4–7 days yielded a 35 percent increase in re-offense rates.”).

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245.

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Pretrial detention is far more expensive than effective pretrial supervision

programs. Through non-monetary tools, pretrial supervision programs can save taxpayer money
while creating higher public safety and court appearance rates.
246.

The detention of arrestees who do not pose significant (let alone immitigable) risks

but who cannot pay the required amount for release, is a main driver of the jail population.
247.

Defendants’ use of money bail leads disproportionately to the detention of people

of color. Regardless of the amount of money bail imposed, people of color are more likely to be
detained at disposition than people who are white.34
248.

It costs Dallas County $225,321 per day—or $82.2 million per year—to incarcerate

presumptively innocent people in the Dallas County Jail.35
249.

Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania recently published a study of the

Harris County, Texas misdemeanor money bail system and concluded that if, from 2008 to 2013,
those misdemeanor arrestees for whom the minimum $500 money bail was imposed had instead
been released without requiring $500 money bail, the County would have released 40,000
additional people, avoided almost 5,900 criminal convictions, reduced incarceration days by more
than 400,000, and prevented the commission of 1,600 felonies and 2,400 misdemeanors due to the
criminogenic effects of even brief pretrial custody. The County would have saved roughly $20
million in supervision costs alone.36

34

Megan Stevenson, et al., Bail Reform: New Directions for Pretrial Detention and Release 8–9 (2017), available at
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2747&context=faculty_scholarship; Jones, supra note
32; Marie VanNostrand, Legal and Evidence-Based Practices: Applications of Legal Principles, Laws, and Research
to the Field of Pretrial Services (2007) (“Research has identified financial terms of bail as resulting in disparate
outcomes due to a person's financial status and may be a form of de facto racial and ethnic discrimination”); Stephen
Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Decisions and Outcomes: A Comparison of Hispanic,
Black, and White Felony Arrestees, 41 Criminology 873 (2003).
35

See Dallas County, Texas, Adult Criminal Justice Data Sheet, Texas Criminal Justice Coalition (2016), available at
https://www.texascjc.org/system/files/publications/Adult%20Dallas%20County%20Data%20Sheet%202016_0.pdf.
36

Heaton, supra note 30, at 787.

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250.

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Dallas County would almost certainly see similar or greater savings if Defendants

stopped imposing and enforcing automatic secured financial conditions of release that operate to
detain impoverished arrestees.
251.

Pretrial detention has devastating effects on people’s lives, exacerbating the effects

of poverty by causing people to lose jobs, housing, cars, medical care, and even child custody.
Pretrial detention also leads to more crime, increases the likelihood that the arrestee will be
convicted and sentenced to jail, and leads to longer jail sentences.
Class Action Allegations
252.

The named Plaintiffs bring this action, on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated, as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
253.

A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the

named Plaintiffs and unknown Class members can challenge the Defendants’ unlawful wealthbased post-arrest detention scheme.
254.

This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to

Rule 23(a)(1)–(4) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
255.

This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy

requirements of those provisions.
256.

The Plaintiffs propose one class, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief: All

arrestees who are or will be detained in Dallas County custody because they are unable to pay a
secured financial condition of release.
A.

Numerosity and Impractability of Joinder. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).

257.

Every person who is detained in the Dallas County Jail because she cannot afford

to pay money bail and has not been ordered detained pursuant to lawful procedures is subjected to

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Defendants’ wealth-based detention scheme in which an arrestee must either pay for her liberty or
remain in a jail cell.
258.

The average daily jail population in 2016 was 5,338 people.37

259.

In September 2017, a typical month and the most recent month for which data could

be located, the average daily population of misdemeanor arrestees being detained pretrial was 409
people. The average daily population of state-jail felony38 arrestees being held pretrial was 253.
And the average daily population of felony arrestees (excluding state-jail-felony arrestees) being
held pretrial was 1,639. The vast majority of people being held prior to trial would be released if
they could afford to pay a secured financial condition of release.39
260.

On any given day, there are hundreds of outstanding arrest warrants issued in Dallas

County, and every day more are issued.
261.

Even arrestees who eventually pay the monetary amount required for release, or

who are eventually released on unsecured bail, suffer wealth-based detention prior to being
released. In 2016, arrestees who were released on surety bonds spent an average of four days in
jail prior to release; arrestees who were released on pretrial-release bonds spent an average of two
days in jail prior to release (between January and September 2017, the average increased to three

37

Jail Population Committee Meeting Report, supra note 24, at 3.

38

In the early 1990s, as part of its effort to address overcrowding in its state prisons and facilitate treatment during
incarceration for people struggling with drug addiction, the Texas legislature created a new category of felony offense:
the state jail felony. So-called “state jail” facilities were brought within the control of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, and individuals convicted of state jail felonies were no longer sent to Texas prisons, but rather to
“state jails.” State-jail felony offenses are typically non-violent offense and, in many instances, are misdemeanor
offenses enhanced by prior misdemeanor convictions. Although specific data on the frequency of charges is not
available in Dallas County, in Harris County, a majority of state-jail felony charges are for possession of less than a
gram of a controlled substance (40% of state-jail felony arrests), and third-offender theft under $2,500 (14%), which
is a misdemeanor offense unless the person charged has two prior convictions for the same misdemeanor offense.
Some are being held “no bond,” meaning that they have been ordered detained pretrial, albeit without the procedures
required for issuing a valid detention order. They are therefore not subjected to wealth-based detention, though their
constitutional rights are being violated in other ways. Others would not be released from custody even if they paid the
money bail amount because they are subject to out-of-county warrants, immigration detainers, or other holds, though
they would be eligible for transfer to the jurisdiction that requires their presence.
39

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days in jail); and arrestees who were released on personal bonds spent an average of 25 days in
jail prior to release.
262.

The amount of time arrestees are held in jail depends on how long it takes them to

come up with the money required for their release. Some arrestees are forced to wait days or weeks
until they or family members can make the payment required by the surety comopany. Others will
never be able to come up with any amount of money to pay for their release. The number of current
and future arrestees subject to Defendants’ policies and practices—if it is not enjoined—numbers
well into the tens of thousands every year.
263.

Joinder is impracticable because the members of the class are impoverished and

cannot hire lawyers to bring independent claims.
B.

Commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).

264.

Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class. The named

Plaintiffs seek common relief concerning whether the Defendants’ wealth-based policies,
practices, and procedures violate the rights of the class members, and relief mandating that the
Defendants stop these constitutional violations.
265.

The Plaintiffs’ claims raise common legal and factual questions arising from one

central set of policies and practices: Defendants’ post-arrest wealth-based detention scheme.
Defendants operate this scheme openly and in materially the same manner every day with respect
to all arrestees. Resolution of these legal and factual issues will determine whether all of the
members of the class are entitled to the constitutional relief that they seek.
266.

Among the most important common questions of fact for the class are:



Whether the Defendants have a policy and practice of determining the amount of
money required to secure post-arrest release without inquiry into ability to pay or
consideration of or findings concerning alternative conditions of release;



Whether the Defendants require an amount of money be paid up front before

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releasing a person from the jail;


Whether Defendants, at any stage in the post-arrest process, inquire into a person’s
ability to pay the predetermined amount of money, or make findings concerning an
arrestee’s present ability to pay any amount set or that any particular condition of
release is necessary to address a specific government interest;



How long arrestees must wait in jail after arrest before they have an opportunity to
raise their inability to pay for their release or to request alternative, non-financial
conditions.

267.

Among the most important common questions of law are:



Whether requiring arrestees to pay money up front to secure release from postarrest detention without an inquiry into or findings concerning the arrestee’s present
ability to pay the amount required, and without meaningful consideration of less
restrictive alternative conditions of release, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses;



Whether it is lawful to impose a secured financial condition of release that operates
as a de facto order of pretrial detention because of a person’s inability to pay
without complying with the substantive findings, legal standards, and procedures
required for issuing and enforcing a transparent order of preventive detention.

C.

Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).

268.

The Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the

class. Each class member suffers the same injury because Defendants refuse to comply with basic
constitutional requirements: class members are confined in jail because they could not afford to
pay the Defendants’ secured money bail. The answer to whether the Defendants’ policies and
practices are unconstitutional will determine the claims of the Named Plaintiffs and every other
class member.
D.

Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).

269.

The Named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the class because their

interests in the vindication of the legal claims they raise are entirely aligned with the interests of
the other class members, each of whom has the same basic constitutional claims. The Named
Plaintiffs are members of the class, and their interests do not conflict with those of the other class
members.

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270.

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There are no known conflicts of interest among members of the proposed class. All

of the members of the class have a similar interest in vindicating their constitutional rights in the
face of Defendants’ pay-for-freedom post-arrest detention system.
271.

Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Civil Rights Corps, Texas Fair Defense

Project, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas,
who have experience litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive
knowledge of both the details of Defendants’ scheme and the relevant constitutional and statutory
law. Counsels’ relevant qualifications are more fully set forth in the contemporaneously filed
Motion for Class Certification.
272.

The combined efforts of class counsel have so far included extensive investigation

into fixed money bail schemes over a period of months, including numerous interviews with
witnesses, court employees, jail inmates, families, judges, attorneys practicing in courts throughout
the region, community members, statewide experts in the functioning of state and local courts,
empirical researchers, and national experts in constitutional law, post-arrest procedure, law
enforcement, judicial procedures, criminal law, pretrial services, and jails.
273.

Class counsel have a detailed understanding of state law and practices as they relate

to federal constitutional requirements. Counsel have studied the way that these systems function
in other cities and counties in order to investigate the wide array of lawful options in practice for
municipalities.
274.

Counsel have devoted significant time and resources to becoming intimately

familiar with Defendants’ scheme and with all of the relevant state and federal laws and procedures
that can and should govern it. Counsel have also developed relationships with many of the
individuals and families victimized by unlawful wealth-based pretrial detention practices. The

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interests of the members of the class will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiffs and
their attorneys.
E. Injunctive or Declaratory Relief. Rule 23(b)(2).
275.

Class action status is appropriate because the Defendants, through the policies,

practices, and procedures that make up its wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme, have acted
in the same unconstitutional manner with respect to all class members. The Defendants apply and
enforce a wealth-based system of pretrial justice: some arrestees can purchase their immediate
release, while other arrestees must remain in jail solely because they cannot pay.
276.

The class therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that will prevent the

Defendants from detaining arrestees who cannot afford cash payments. Because the putative class
challenges the Defendants’ scheme as unconstitutional through declaratory and injunctive relief
that would apply the same relief to every member of the class, Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate and
necessary.
Claims for Relief
Count One: Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Due Process
Right Against Wealth-Based Detention by Jailing Them Because They Cannot Afford A
Monetary Payment.
277.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-262.

278.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibit

jailing a person because of her inability to make a monetary payment. Defendants violate
Plaintiffs’ substantive right against wealth-based detention by enforcing against them a system of
wealth-based detention that keeps them in jail solely because they cannot afford to make a
monetary payment. Defendants also infringe Plaintiffs’ rights to the presumption of innocence and
to a fair trial.

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Count Two: Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Right to Pretrial Liberty by Jailing
Them Without Procedural Due Process.
279.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-264.

280.

The Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental substantive right to pretrial

liberty, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair trial.
281.

The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from depriving anyone of the

fundamental right to pretrial liberty without notice that a hearing will occur, that the issue at the
hearing will be whether the arrestee is a flight risk or poses a danger to the community, and a
neutral decision-maker to preside over the hearing. The arrestee must have an opportunity to testify
at the hearing, to present evidence on her behalf, and to contest the evidence offered against the
arrestee.
282.

Further, to issue a transparent order of pretrial detention—or to issue a de facto

order of pretrial detention by requiring a condition of release that operates to detain—the judicial
officer must make written findings, on the record, that no condition or combination of conditions
could reasonably assure the appearance of the person in court and the safety of any other person
or the community, and she must explain her reasons for so concluding.
283.

Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to pretrial liberty by requiring

secured money bail amounts that operate to detain without making these substantive findings or
providing these necessary procedures.
Requests for Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the other Class members request that this Court issue the
following relief:
a. A declaratory judgment that Defendants violate the Named Plaintiffs’ and class members’
constitutional rights by operating a system of wealth-based detention that keeps them in
jail because they cannot afford to pay a secured financial condition of release required

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without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without consideration of nonfinancial alternatives, and without findings that a particular release condition—or pretrial
detention—is necessary to meet a compelling government interest;
b. An order preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants from operating and
enforcing a system of wealth-based detention that keeps the Named Plaintiffs and class
members in jail because they cannot afford a secured financial condition of release required
without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, without consideration of nonfinancial alternatives, and without any findings that a particular release condition—or
pretrial detention—is necessary to meet a compelling government interest.
c. Any other order and judgment this Court deems necessary to preliminarily and permanently
enjoin Defendants—whether acting on behalf of the State, the County, or some other
government entity—from implementing and enforcing a system of wealth-based pretrial
detention that keeps arrestees in jail because they cannot afford a secured financial
condition of release required without an inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay,
without consideration of non-financial alternatives, and without any findings that a
particular release condition—or pretrial detention—is necessary to meet a compelling
government interest;
d. An order certifying the class defined above;
e. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Elizabeth Rossi
Elizabeth Rossi* (Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming)
Maryland Attorney No. 1412180090
Alec Karakatsanis (Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming)
D.C. Bar No. 999294
Premal Dharia (Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming)
D.C. Bar No. 484091
Civil Rights Corps
910 17th Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20006
Tel: 202-599-0953
Fax: 202-609-8030
elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org
alec@civilrightscorps.org
premal@civilrightscorps.org
*Admitted solely to practice law in Maryland; not admitted
in the District of Columbia. Practice is limited pursuant to
D.C. App. R. 49(c)(3).*

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/s/ Trisha Trigilio
Trisha Trigilio
Texas Bar No. 24065179
Andre Segura
N.Y. Bar No. 5021647
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas
1500 McGowen Street, Suite 250
Houston, Texas 77004
Tel: 713.942.8146
Fax: 713.942.8966
ttrigilio@aclutx.org
/s/ Kali Cohn
Kali Cohn
Texas Bar. No. 24092265
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas
6440 N. Central Expressway
Dallas, TX 75206
Tel: 214-346-6577
Fax: 713-942-8966
kcohn@aclutx.org
/s/Brandon J. Buskey
Brandon J. Buskey
Alabama Bar Number: ASB-2753-A50B
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
Criminal Law Reform Project
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Tel: (212) 284-7364
Fax: (212) 549-2654
bbuskey@aclu.org
/s/ Susanne Pringle
Susanne Pringle
Texas Bar No. 24083686
springle@fairdefense.org
Emily Gerrick (Application for Admission forthcoming)
Texas Bar No. 24092417
Texas Fair Defense Project
314 E. Highland Mall Blvd., Suite 180
Austin, Texas 78752
Telephone: (512) 637-5220
Facsimile: (512) 637-5224
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of January, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the clerk of the court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the
electronic case filing system of the Court. The Summons and Complaint will be served in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

By:

/s/ Elizabeth Rossi
Elizabeth Rossi* (Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming)
Maryland Attorney No. 1412180090
Civil Rights Corps
910 17th Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20006
Tel: 202-599-0953
Fax: 202-609-8030
elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org
*Admitted solely to practice law in Maryland; not admitted
in the District of Columbia. Practice is limited pursuant to
D.C. App. R. 49(c)(3).

59