SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF MONROE THE COUNTY OF MONROE, Plaintiff, v. PURDUE PHARMA L.P.; PURDUE PHARMA INC.; THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY, INC.; TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.; CEPHALON, INC.; JOHNSON & JOHNSON; JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ORTHOMCNEIL-JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. N/K/A JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, INC. N/K/A JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ENDO HEALTH SOLUTIONS INC.; ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; INSYS THERAPEUTICS, INC.; RUSSELL PORTENOY; PERRY FINE; SCOTT FISHMAN; and LYNN WEBSTER, Index No. COMPLAINT Defendants. Plaintiff, the County of Monroe, New York (“Monroe County” or “the County” or “Plaintiff”), by and through the undersigned attorneys, for its Complaint against Defendants Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma Inc., The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Cephalon, Inc., Johnson & Johnson, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. n/k/a Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc., Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. n/k/a Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Endo Health Solutions Inc., Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Insys Therapeutics, Inc., Russell 1 Portenoy, Perry Fine, Scott Fishman, and Lynn Webster (collectively, “Defendants”) alleges as follows: INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiff spends millions of dollars each year to provide or pay for the health care, pharmaceutical care, and other necessary services and programs on behalf of indigents and otherwise eligible residents, including payments for prescription opiumlike painkillers ("opioids"), which are manufactured, marketed, promoted, sold, and/or distributed by the Defendants. 2. Plaintiff also provides a wide range of other services on behalf of its residents, including services for families and children, public assistance, emergency and ambulatory services and law enforcement. 3. Monroe County contains one city, 19 towns, and 10 villages. Plaintiff is a large employer in Monroe County, employing approximately 4,500 people in 23 departments, offices, bureaus and agencies. Plaintiff funds its own health insurance plan for the benefit of its employees, through which it pays part or all of its employees’ health care costs, including the cost of prescription drugs, including opioids. Plaintiff also funds workers compensation and provides disability care programs for its employees participating in the healthcare plan. 4. Opioids include brand-name drugs like OxyContin and Percocet and generics like oxycodone and hydrocodone. They are derived from or possess properties similar to opium and heroin, and, as such, they are highly addictive and dangerous and 2 therefore are regulated by the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) as controlled substances. 5. Opioids provide effective treatment for short-term post-surgical and trauma-related pain, and for palliative end-of-life care. They are approved by the FDA for use in the management of moderate to severe pain where use of an opioid analgesic is appropriate for more than a few days. Defendants, however, have manufactured, promoted, and marketed opioids for the management of pain by misleading consumers and medical providers through misrepresentations or omissions regarding the appropriate uses, risks, and safety of opioids. 6. Addiction encompasses a spectrum of substance use disorders that range from misuse and abuse of drugs to addiction.1 Throughout this Complaint, "addiction" refers to the entire range of substance abuse disorders. Individuals suffer negative consequences wherever they fall on the substance use disorder continuum. 7. Defendants knew that, barring exceptional circumstances, opioids are too addictive and too debilitating for long-term use for chronic non-cancer pain lasting three months or longer ("chronic pain"). 8. Defendants knew that, with prolonged use, the effectiveness of opioids wanes, requiring increases in doses to achieve pain relief and markedly increasing the risk of significant side effects and addiction.2 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013) ("DSM-V"). See, e.g., Russell K. Portenoy, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Nonmalignant Pain: Current Status, 1 Progress in Pain Res. & Mgmt., 247-287 (H.L. Fields and J.C. Liebeskind eds., 1994). 1 2 3 9. Defendants knew that controlled studies of the safety and efficacy of opioids were limited to short-term use (i.e., not longer than 90 days) in managed settings (e.g., hospitals) where the risk of addiction and other adverse outcomes was significantly minimized. 10. To date, there have been no long-term studies demonstrating the safety and efficacy of opioids for long-term use. 11. Despite the foregoing knowledge, in order to expand the market for opioids and realize blockbuster profits, Defendants sought to create a false perception of the safety and efficacy of opioids in the minds of medical professionals and members of the public that would encourage the use of opioids for longer periods of time and to treat a wider range of problems, including such common aches and pains as lower back pain, arthritis, and headaches. 12. Defendants accomplished that false perception through a coordinated, sophisticated, and highly deceptive marketing campaign that began in the late 1990s, became more aggressive in or about 2006, and continues to the present. 13. Defendants accomplished their marketing campaign goal by convincing doctors, patients, and others that the benefits of using opioids to treat chronic pain outweighed the risks, and that opioids could be safely used by most patients. 14. Defendants, individually and collectively, knowing that long-term opioid use causes addiction, misrepresented the dangers of long-term opioid use to physicians, pharmacists, and patients by engaging in a campaign to minimize the risks of, and to encourage, long-term opioid use. 4 15. Defendants’ marketing campaign has been extremely successful in expanding opioid use. Since 1999, the amount of prescription opioids sold in the U.S. nearly quadrupled.3 In 2010, 254 million prescriptions for opioids were filled in the U.S. – enough to medicate every adult in America around the clock for a month. In that year, 20% of all doctors’ visits resulted in the prescription of an opioid (nearly double the rate in 2000).4 While Americans represent only 4.6% of the world’s population, they consume 80% of the opioids supplied around the world and 99% of the global hydrocodone supply.5 By 2014, nearly two million Americans either abused or were dependent on opioids.6 16. Defendants’ campaign has been extremely profitable for them. In 2012 alone, opioids generated $8 billion in revenue for drug companies. Of that amount, $3.1 billion went to Purdue for its OxyContin sales. By 2015, sales of opioids grew further to approximately $9.6 billion.7 17. Defendants’ marketing campaign has been extremely harmful to Americans. Overdoses from prescription pain relievers are a driving factor in a 15-year CDC, Injury Prevention & Control: Opioid Overdose, Understanding the Epidemic. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (accessed December 4, 2017) (internal footnotes omitted). 4 M. Daubresse, et al., Ambulatory Diagnosis and Treatment of Nonmalignant Pain in the United States, 2000-2010, 51(10) Med. Care 870-78 (2013). 5 L. Manchikanti, et al., Therapeutic Use, Abuse, and Nonmedical Use of Opioids: A TenYear Perspective, 13 Pain Physician 401-435 (2010). 6 CDC, Injury Prevention & Control: Opioid Overdose, Prescription Opioids. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/prescribed.html (as viewed May 10, 2016). 7 D. Crow, Drugmakers hooked on $10bn opioid habit, Financial Times (August 10, 2016). 3 5 increase in opioid overdose deaths. Deaths from prescription opioids have also quadrupled since 1999. From 2000 to 2014 nearly half a million people died from such overdoses. Seventy-eight Americans die every day from an opioid overdose.8 18. In 2012, an estimated 2.1 million people in the United States suffered from substance use disorders related to prescription opioid pain relievers.9 Between 30% and 40% of long-term users of opioids experience problems with opioid use disorders.10 19. On January 1, 2016, the Centers for Disease Control announced that “[o]pioids, primarily prescription pain relievers and heroin, are the main drugs associated with overdose deaths.” Alarmingly, the CDC noted that in 2014 there were approximately one and a half times more drug overdose deaths in the United States than deaths from motor vehicle crashes.11 20. Opioid addiction and overdose have reached epidemic levels over the past decade. On March 22, 2016, the FDA recognized opioid abuse as a “public health crisis” CDC, Injury Prevention & Control: Opioid Overdose, Understanding the Epidemic, supra. 9 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Results from the 2012 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings, NSDUH Series H46, HHS Publication No. (SMA) 13-4795. Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2013. 10 J. Boscarino et al., Risk factors for drug dependence among out-patients on opioid therapy in a large US health-care system, 105(10) Addiction 1776 ( 2010); J. Boscarino et al., Prevalence of Prescription Opioid-Use Disorder Among Chronic Pain Patients: Comparison of the DSM-5 vs. DSM-4 Diagnostic Criteria, 30(3) Journal of Addictive Diseases 185 (2011). 11 CDC, Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths – United States, 2000-2014. Available at: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6450a3.htm (accessed December 4, 2017). 8 6 that has a “profound impact on individuals, families and communities across our country.”12 21. Defendants’ marketing campaign has failed to achieve any material health care benefits. Since 1999, there has been no overall change in the amount of pain that Americans report.13 22. The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) not only recognizes the opioid abuse problem, but also identifies Defendants’ “aggressive marketing” as a major cause: “Several factors are likely to have contributed to the severity of the current prescriptions drug abuse problem. They include drastic increases in the number of prescriptions written and dispensed, greater social acceptability for using medications for different purposes, and aggressive marketing by pharmaceutical companies.”14 As shown below, the “drastic increases in the number of prescriptions written and dispensed” and the “greater social acceptability for using medications for different purposes“ are not really independent causative factors but are in fact the direct result of “the aggressive marketing by pharmaceutical companies.” FDA announces enhanced warnings for immediate-release opioid pain medications related to risks of misuse, abuse, addiction, overdose and death. Available at http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm491739.htm (accessed December 4, 2017). 13 CDC, Injury Prevention & Control: Opioid Overdose, Understanding the Epidemic, supra. 14 America’s Addiction to Opioids: Heroin and Prescription Drug Abuse. Available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/legislative-activities/testimony-tocongress/2015/americas-addiction-to-opioids-heroin-prescription-drug-abuse#_ftn2 (accessed December 4, 2017) (emphasis added). 12 7 23. The rising number of persons addicted to opioids have led to significantly increased health care costs as well as a dramatic increase of social problems, including drug abuse and diversion15 and the commission of criminal acts to obtain opioids throughout the United States, including New York State and Monroe County. Consequently, public health and safety throughout the United States, including the County, has been significantly and negatively impacted due to the misrepresentations and omissions by Defendants regarding the appropriate uses and risks of opioids, ultimately leading to widespread inappropriate use of the drug. 24. Between 1996 and 2006, the New York State consumption of hydrocodone increased from approximately 2,000 milligrams (mgs) per person to 12,000 mgs per person. Oxycodone consumption increased from approximately 1,000 mgs per person to 16,000 mgs per person. At the same time, health care admissions for opioid analgesic abuse have risen both nationally and in New York State at rates of greater than 300%. Accidental poisoning, mainly due to prescription opioids, was the leading cause of unintentional death in New York State in 2015, according to a report from the National Safety Council.16 According to the CDC, when prescription medicines are obtained or used illegally, it is called “drug diversion.” 16 J. Roby, Opioids lead accidental deaths in New York, again, Poughkeepsie Journal (June 2, 2017). 15 8 25. Between 2003 and 2014, at least 417 residents of Monroe County suffered from opioid-related overdose fatalities.17 In Monroe County in 2014, there were 1,513 opioid-related emergency department admissions, a 90.1% increase since 2010, 18 and 1,804 inpatient hospital admissions for the same reason.19 There were 2,379 Monroe County residents admitted to chemical dependence treatment programs in 2016.20 The use of naloxone in Monroe County, administered to reverse the effects of opioids, jumped from 2015 to 2016, from 537 incidents to 692 incidents.21 26. The commission of criminal acts to obtain opioids is an inevitable consequence of opioid addiction, and Monroe County is no exception. 27. The Defendants’ course of conduct has violated and continues to violate state and common law as laid out herein: a. Deceptive Acts and Practices, New York General Business Law §349, in that Defendants have engaged in acts and/or practices that are deceptive or misleading in a material way to the citizens of the County, which conduct causes harm to the County; b. False Advertising, New York General Business Law §350, in that Defendants have engaged in false advertising which causes harm to the County; c. The common law perpetuation of a public nuisance, in the Defendants have intentionally, recklessly, or negligently engaged in conduct or omissions NYDatabase.com by pressconnects.com, (accessed January 5, 2018), http://pressconnects.nydatabases.com/database/opioid-related-deaths-new-yorkstate. 18 New York State Department of Health, New York State Opioid Poisoning, Overdose and Prevention: 2015 Report to the Governor and NYS Legislature, p. 36. 19 Id. at 41. 20 New York State Department of Health, “New York State—County Opioid Quarterly Report for Counties Outside of New York City,” October 2017, p. 59. 21 Id. 17 9 which endanger or injure the property, health, safety or comfort to the County; d. New York Social Services Law §145-B, in that Defendants knowingly, by means of a false statement or representation, or by deliberate concealment of any material fact, or other fraudulent scheme or device, on behalf of themselves or others, attempted to obtain or obtained payment from public funds for services or supplies furnished or purportedly furnished pursuant to Chapter 55 of the Social Services Law. e. The common law prohibition against fraud, in that all Defendants knowingly made material misrepresentations and omissions of facts to Plaintiff to induce them to purchase, administer, and consume opioids. Alternatively, Defendants recklessly disregarded the falsity of their representations regarding opioids. Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions of material fact led the County to suffer actual pecuniary damage. Defendants’ conduct was willful, wanton, and malicious; f. The common law prohibition on unjust enrichment, in that all Defendants have acted willfully, wantonly, and with conscious disregard of the rights of the County. As a result of their conscious wrongdoing Defendants have profited and benefited from opioid purchases made by Plaintiff. In equity and good conscience, it would be unjust and inequitable to permit Defendants to enrich themselves at the expense of the County. 28. A 2016 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention study estimated the national economic impact of prescription opioid overdoses, abuse and dependence to be $78.5 billion dollars annually. The study broke down the distribution of this impact further:22 • Lost Productivity: $42 billion (53.3%) • Health Insurance: $26.1 billion (33.3%) • Criminal Justice: $7.6 billion (9.7%) C. Florence, et al., The Economic Burden of Prescription Opioid Overdose, Abuse, and Dependence in the United States, 54(10) Medical Care 901 (Oct. 2016). 22 10 • 29. Substance Abuse Treatment: $2.8 billion (3.6%) The economic impact of prescription opioid overdoses on the County is well in line with national trends. As a direct and foreseeable consequence of Defendants’ egregious conduct, the County paid, and continues to pay, millions of dollars for health care costs that stem from prescription opioid dependency created by Defendants’ deceptive marketing campaign. These costs include unnecessary and excessive opioid prescriptions, substance abuse treatment services, ambulatory services, emergency department services, and inpatient hospital services, investigative autopsy costs, among others. Defendants’ conduct also caused the County to incur substantial economic, administrative and social costs relating to opioid addiction and abuse, including criminal justice costs, victimization costs, lost productivity costs, and education and prevention program costs, forensic costs, Narcan for first responders, among others. Defendants’ misrepresentations regarding the safety and efficacy of long-term opioid use proximately caused injury to Plaintiff. 30. The County seeks a judgment requiring all Defendants to pay restitution, damages, including multipliers of damages, disgorgement, civil penalties, attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses, injunctive relief, and any other relief to which the County may be entitled. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 31. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to New York Constitution, article VI, § 7(a) and CPLR 301 and 302. 32. Venue is proper in Monroe County pursuant to CPLR 503(a). 11 33. This action is non-removable because there is incomplete diversity of residents and no substantial federal question is presented. PARTIES 34. Plaintiff Monroe County is organized and existing under the laws of the state of New York. Monroe County is in the western portion of the state of New York and is situated along Lake Ontario’s southern shore. Monroe County contains one city, 19 towns, and 10 villages. Plaintiff provides a wide range of services on behalf of its residents, including services for families and children, public health, public assistance, law enforcement, and emergency care. 35. Defendant Purdue Pharma L.P. (“PPL”) is a limited partnership organized under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business in Stamford, Connecticut. 36. Defendant Purdue Pharma Inc. (“PPI”) is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Stamford, Connecticut. 37. Defendant The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc. (“PFC”) is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Stamford, Connecticut. 38. PPL, PPI, and PFC (collectively, “Purdue”) are engaged in the manufacture, promotion, distribution, and sale of opioids nationally, in the State of New York and in Monroe County, including the following: Table 1. Purdue Opioids Drug Name Chemical Name Schedule23 Since passage of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) in 1970, opioids have been regulated as controlled substances. As controlled substances, they are categorized in five schedules, ranked in order of their potential for abuse, with Schedule I being the most 23 12 OxyContin MS Contin Dilaudid Dilaudid-HP Butrans Hysingla ER Targiniq ER 39. Oxycodone hydrochloride extended release Morphine sulfate extended release Hydromorphone hydrochloride Hydromorphone hydrochloride Byprenorpine Hydrocodone bitrate Oxycodone hydrochloride and naloxone hydrochloride Schedule II Schedule II Schedule II Schedule II Schedule III Schedule II Schedule II OxyContin is Purdue’s largest-selling opioid. Since 2009, Purdue’s national annual sales of OxyContin have fluctuated between $2.47 billion and $2.99 billion, up four-fold from 2006 sales of $800 million. OxyContin constitutes roughly 30% of the entire market for analgesic drugs (i.e., painkillers). 40. In 2007, Purdue settled criminal and civil charges against it for misbranding OxyContin and agreed to pay the Unites States $635 million – at the time, one of the largest settlements with a drug company for marketing misconduct. Pursuant to its settlement, Purdue operated under a Corporate Integrity Agreement with the Office of the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which required the company, inter alia, to ensure that its marketing was fair and accurate, and to monitor and report on its compliance with the Agreement. dangerous. The CSA imposes a hierarchy of restrictions on prescribing and dispensing drugs based on their medicinal value, likelihood of addiction or abuse, and safety. Opioids generally had been categorized as Schedule II or Schedule III drugs. Schedule II drugs have a high potential for abuse, have a currently accepted medical use, and may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. Schedule III drugs are deemed to have a lower potential for abuse, but their abuse still may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence. 13 41. Defendant Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (“Teva USA”) is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in North Whales, Pennsylvania. Teva USA is a wholly owned subsidiary of Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. (“Teva Ltd.”), an Israeli corporation. 42. Defendant Cephalon, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Frazer, Pennsylvania. In 2011, Teva Ltd. acquired Cephalon, Inc. 43. Teva USA and Cephalon, Inc. (collectively, “Cephalon”) work together to manufacture, promote, distribute and sell both brand name and generic versions of the opioids nationally and in Monroe County, including the following: Table 2. Cephalon Opioids Drug Name Actiq Fentora 44. Chemical Name Fentanyl citrate Fentanyl citrate Schedule Schedule II Schedule II Teva USA was in the business of selling generic opioids, including a generic form of OxyContin from 2005 to 2009 nationally and in Monroe County. 45. Defendant Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”) is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in New Brunswick, New Jersey. 46. Defendant Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Janssen Pharmaceuticals”) is a Pennsylvania corporation with is principal place of business in Titusville, New Jersey, and is a wholly owned subsidiary of J&J. 14 47. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was formerly known as Ortho-McNeil- Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which in turn was formerly known as Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. 48. Defendant Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“OMP”), now known as Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Titusville, New Jersey. 49. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. (“Janssen Pharmaceutica”), now known as Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Titusville, New Jersey. 50. J&J is the only company that owns more than 10% of Janssen Pharmaceuticals stock. Upon information and belief, J&J controls the sale and development of Janssen Pharmaceuticals drugs and Janssen Pharmaceuticals profits inure to J&J’s benefit. 51. J&J, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, OMP, and Janssen Pharmaceutica (collectively, “Janssen”) are or have been engaged in the manufacture, promotion, distribution, and sale of opioids nationally and in Monroe County, including the following: Table 3. Janssen Opioids Drug Name Duragesic Nucynta24 Nucynta ER 24 Chemical Name Fentanyl Tapentadol extended release Tapentadol Schedule Schedule II Schedule II Schedule II Depomed, Inc. acquired the rights to Nucynta and Nucynta ER from Janssen in 2015. 15 52. Together, Nucynta and Nucynta ER accounted for $172 million in sales in 2014. Prior to 2009, Duragesic accounted for at least $1 billion in annual sales. 53. Defendant Endo Health Solutions Inc. (“EHS”) is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Malvern, Pennsylvania. 54. Defendant Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“EPI”) is a wholly owned subsidiary of EHS and is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Malvern, Pennsylvania. 55. EHS and EPU (collectively, “Endo”) manufacture, promote, distribute and sell opioids nationally and in Monroe County, including the following: Table 4. Endo Opioids Drug Name Opana ER Opana Percodan Percocet 56. Chemical Name Oxymorphone hydrochloride extended release Oxymorphone hydrochloride Oxymorphone hydrochloride and aspirin Oxymorphone hydrochloride and acetaminophen Schedule Schedule II Schedule II Schedule II Schedule II Opioids made up roughly $403 million of Endo’s overall revenues of $3 billion in 2012. Opana ER yielded revenue of $1.15 billion from 2010 to 2013, and it accounted for 10% of Endo’s total revenue in 2012. Endo also manufactures and sells generic opioids, both directly and through its subsidiary, Qualitest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., including generic oxycodone, oxymorphone, hydromorphone, and hydrocodone products. 16 57. The Food and Drug Administration requested that Endo remove Opana ER from the market in June 2017. The FDA relied on postmarketing data in reaching its conclusion based on the concern that the benefits of the drug may no longer outweigh its risk of abuse.25 58. Insys Therapeutics, Inc. (“Insys”) is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Chandler, Arizona. 59. Insys develops, markets, and sells prescription drugs, including Subsys, a sublingal spray of fentanyl, in Monroe County, the State of New York, and nationally. 60. Russell Portenoy, M.D., is an individual residing in New York. Dr. Portenoy was instrumental in promoting opioids for sale and distribution nationally and in Monroe County. 61. Perry Fine, M.D., is an individual residing in Utah. Dr. Fine was instrumental in promoting opioids for sale and distribution nationally and in Monroe County. 62. Scott Fishman, M.D., is an individual residing in California. Dr. Fishman was instrumental in promoting opioids for sale and distribution nationally and in Monroe County. FDA requests removal of OPANA ER for risks related to abuse. Available at: https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm562401.htm (accessed December 4, 2017). 25 17 63. Lynn Webster, M.D., is an individual residing in Utah. Dr. Webster was instrumental in promoting opioids for sale and distribution nationally and in Monroe County. FACTS RELEVANT TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION A. The Pain-Relieving and Addictive Properties of Opioids 64. The pain-relieving properties of opium have been recognized for millennia. So has the magnitude of its potential for abuse and addiction. Opioids are related to illegal drugs like opium and heroin. 65. During the Civil War, opioids, then known as "tinctures of laudanum," gained popularity among doctors and pharmacists for their ability to reduce anxiety and relieve pain – particularly on the battlefield – and they were popularly used in a wide variety of commercial products ranging from pain elixirs to cough suppressants to beverages. By 1900, an estimated 300,000 people were addicted to opioids in the United States,26 and many doctors prescribed opioids solely to avoid patients’ withdrawal. Both the numbers of opioid addicts and the difficulty in weaning patients from opioids made clear their highly addictive nature. 66. Due to concerns about their addictive properties, opioids have been regulated at the federal level as controlled substances by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) since 1970. The labels for scheduled opioid drugs carry black Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Medication-Assisted Treatment for Opioid Addiction in Opioid Treatment Programs, Treatment Improvement Protocol (TIP Services), No. 43 (2005). 26 18 box warnings of potential addiction and “[s]erious, life-threatening, or fatal respiratory depression,” as the result of an excessive dose. 67. Studies and articles from the 1970s and 1980s also made clear the reasons to avoid opioids. Scientists observed negative outcomes from long-term opioid therapy in pain management programs; opioids’ mixed record in reducing pain long-term and failure to improve patients’ function; greater pain complaints as most patients developed tolerance to opioids; opioid patients’ diminished ability to perform basic tasks; their inability to make use of complementary treatments like physical therapy due to the side effects of opioids; and addiction. Leading authorities discouraged, or even prohibited, the use of opioid therapy for chronic pain. 68. In 1986, Dr. Russell Portenoy, who later became Chairman of the Department of Pain Medicine and Palliative Care at Beth Israel Medical Center in New York while at the same time serving as a top spokesperson for drug companies, published an article reporting that “[f]ew substantial gains in employment or social function could be attributed to the institution of opioid therapy.”27 69. Writing in 1994, Dr. Portenoy described the prevailing attitudes regarding the dangers of long-term use of opioids: The traditional approach to chronic non-malignant pain does not accept the longterm administration of opioid drugs. This perspective has been justified by the perceived likelihood of tolerance, which would attenuate any beneficial effects over time, and the potential for side effects, worsening disability, and addiction. According to conventional thinking, the initial response to an opioid drug may appear favorable, with partial analgesia and salutary R. Portenoy & K. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-Malignant Pain: Report of 38 cases, 25(2) Pain 171 (1986). 27 19 mood changes, but adverse effects inevitably occur thereafter. It is assumed that the motivation to improve function will cease as mental clouding occurs and the belief takes hold that the drug can, by itself, return the patient to a normal life. Serious management problems are anticipated, including difficulty in discontinuing a problematic therapy and the development of drug seeking behavior induced by the desire to maintain analgesic effects, avoid withdrawal, and perpetuate reinforcing psychic effects. There is an implicit assumption that little separates these outcomes from the highly aberrant behaviors associated with addiction.28 According to Dr. Portenoy, the foregoing problems could constitute “compelling reasons to reject long-term opioid administration as a therapeutic strategy in all but the most desperate cases of chronic nonmalignant pain.”29 70. For all the reasons outlined by Dr. Portenoy, and in the words of one researcher from the University of Washington in 2012, and quoted by a Harvard researcher the same year, “it did not enter [doctors’] minds that there could be a significant number of chronic pain patients who were successfully managed with opioids, because if there were any, we almost never saw them.”30 71. Discontinuing opioids after more than just a few weeks of therapy will cause most patients to experience withdrawal symptoms. These withdrawal symptoms include: severe anxiety, nausea, vomiting, headaches, agitation, insomnia, tremors, hallucinations, delirium, pain, and other serious symptoms, which may persist for R. Portenoy, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Nonmalignant Pain: Current Status, 1 Progress in Pain Res. & Mgmt., 247-287 (H.L. Fields and J.C. Liebeskind eds., 1994) (emphasis added). 29 Id. 30 J. Loeser. Five crises in pain management, Pain Clinical Updates. 2012;20 (1):1–4 (cited by I. Kissin, Long-term opioid treatment of chronic nonmalignant pain: unproven efficacy and neglected safety?, 6 J. Pain Research 513, 514 (2013)). 28 20 months after a complete withdrawal from opioids, depending on how long the opioids were used. 72. When under the continuous influence of opioids over time, patients grow tolerant to their analgesic effects. As tolerance increases, a patient typically requires progressively higher doses in order to obtain the same levels of pain reduction to which he has become accustomed – up to and including doses that are “frighteningly high.”31 At higher doses, the effects of withdrawal are more substantial, thus leaving a patient at a much higher risk of addiction. A patient can take the opioids at the continuously escalating dosages to match pain tolerance and still overdose at recommended levels. 73. Opioids vary by duration. Long-acting opioids, such as Purdue’s OxyContin and MS Contin, Janssen’s Nucynta ER and Duragesic, Endo’s Opana ER, Actavis’s Kadian, are designed to be taken once or twice daily and are purported to provide continuous opioid therapy for, in general, 12 hours. Short-acting opioids, such as Cephalon’s Actiq and Fentora, are designed to be taken in addition to long-acting opioids to address “episodic pain” and provide fast-acting, supplemental opioid therapy lasting approximately 4 to 6 hours. 74. Defendants promoted the idea that pain should be treated by taking long- acting opioids continuously and supplementing them by also taking short-acting, rapidonset opioids for episodic pain. M. Katz, Long-term Opioid Treatment of Nonmalignant Pain: A Believer Loses His Faith, 170(16) Archives of Internal Med. 1422 (2010). 31 21 75. In 2013, in response to a petition to require manufacturers to strengthen warnings on the labels of long-acting opioid products, the FDA warned of the “grave risks” of opioids, including “addiction, overdose, and even death.” The FDA further warned, “[e]ven proper use of opioids under medical supervision can result in lifethreatening respiratory depression, coma, and death.” Because of those grave risks, the FDA said that long-acting or extended release opioids “should be used only when alternative treatments are inadequate.”32 The FDA required that – going forward – opioid makers of long-acting formulations clearly communicate these risks in their labels. 76. In 2016, the FDA expanded its warnings for immediate-release opioid pain medications, requiring similar changes to the labeling of immediate-release opioid pain medications as it had for extended release opioids in 2013. The FDA also required several additional safety-labeling changes across all prescription opioid products to include additional information on the risk of these medications.33 77. The facts on which the FDA relied in 2013 and 2016 were well known to Defendants in the 1990s when their deceptive marketing began. Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Dir., Ctr. For Drug Eval. & Res., to Andrew Kolodny, M.D., Pres. Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing, Re Docket No. FDA2012-P-0818 (Sept. 10, 2013) (emphasis in original). 33 FDA announces enhanced warnings for immediate-release opioid pain medications related to risks of misuse, abuse, addiction, overdose and death. Available at http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm491739.htm (accessed December 4, 2017). 32 22 B. Opioid Therapy Makes Patients Sicker Without Long Term Benefits 78. There is no scientific evidence supporting the safety or efficacy of opioids for long-term use. Defendants are well aware of the lack of such scientific evidence. While promoting opioids to treat chronic pain, Defendants failed to disclose the lack of evidence to support their use long-term and have failed to disclose the substantial scientific evidence that chronic opioid therapy actually makes patients sicker. 79. There are no controlled studies of the use of opioids beyond 16 weeks, and no evidence that opioids improve patients’ pain and function long-term. For example, a 2007 systematic review of opioids for back pain concluded that opioids have limited, if any, efficacy for back pain and that evidence did not allow judgments regarding longterm use. 80. Substantial evidence exists that opioid drugs are ineffective to treat chronic pain, and actually worsen patients’ health. For example, a 2006 study-of-studies found that opioids as a class did not demonstrate improvement in functional outcomes over other non-addicting treatments.34 81. Increasing duration of opioid use is strongly associated with an increasing prevalence of mental health conditions (including depression, anxiety, post-traumatic A. Furlan et al., Opioids for chronic noncancer pain: a meta-analysis of effectiveness and side effects, 174(11) Can. Med. Ass’n J. 1589 (2006). This same study revealed that efficacy studies do not typically include data on opioid addiction. In many cases, patients who may be more prone to addiction are pre-screened out of the study pool. This does not reflect how doctors actually prescribe the drugs, because even patients who have past or active substance use disorders tend to receive higher doses of opioids. K. Seal, Association of Mental Health Disorders With Prescription Opioids and High- Risk Opioids in US Veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, 307(9) J. Am. Med. Ass’n 940 (2012). 34 23 stress disorder, or substance abuse), increased psychological distress, and greater health care utilization. 82. While opioids may work acceptably well for a while, when they are used on a long term basis, function generally declines, as does general health, mental health, and social function. Over time, even high doses of potent opioids often fail to control pain, and patients exposed to such doses are unable to function normally.35 83. The foregoing is true both generally and for specific pain-related conditions. Studies of the use of opioids long-term for chronic lower back pain have been unable to demonstrate an improvement in patients’ function. Instead, research consistently shows that long-term opioid therapy for patients who have lower back injuries does not cause patients to return to work or physical activity. This is due partly to addiction and other side effects. 84. For example, as many as 30% of patients who suffer from migraines have been prescribed opioids to treat their headaches. Users of opioids had the highest increase in the number of headache days per month, scored significantly higher on the Migraine Disability Assessment, and had higher rates of depression, compared to non-opioid users. A survey by the National Headache Foundation found that migraine patients who used opioids were more likely to experience sleepiness, confusion, and rebound headaches, and reported a lower quality of life than patients taking other medications. 35See A. Rubenstein, Are we making pain patients worse? Sonoma Medicine (Fall 2009). 24 C. Defendants’ Scheme to Change Prescriber Habits and Public Perception 85. Before Defendants began the marketing campaign complained of herein, generally accepted standards of medical practice dictated that opioids should only be used short-term, for instance, for acute pain, pain relating to recovery from surgery, or for cancer or palliative care. In those instances, the risks of addiction are low or of little significance. 86. The market for short-term pain relief is significantly more limited than the market for long-term chronic pain relief. Defendants recognized that if they could sell opioids not just for short term pain relief but also for long-term chronic pain relief, they could achieve blockbuster levels of sales and their profits. Further, they recognized that if they could cause their customers to become physically addicted to their drugs, they would increase the likelihood that their blockbuster profits would continue indefinitely. 87. Defendants knew that in order to increase their profits from the sale of opioids they would need to convince doctors and patients that long-term opioid therapy was safe and effective. Defendants needed, in other words, to persuade physicians to abandon their long-held apprehensions about prescribing opioids, and instead to prescribe opioids for durations previously understood to be unsafe. 88. Defendants knew that their goal of increasing profits by promoting the prescription of opioids for chronic pain would lead directly to an increase in health care costs for patients, health care insurers, and health care payors such as Plaintiff. 89. Marshalling help from consultants and public relations firms, Defendants developed and executed a common strategy to reverse the long-settled understanding of 25 the relative risks and benefits of chronic opioid therapy. Rather than add to the collective body of medical knowledge concerning the best ways to treat pain and improve patient quality of life, however, Defendants instead sought to distort medical and public perception of existing scientific data. 90. As explained more fully herein and illustrated in Exhibit A, Defendants, collectively and individually, poured vast sums of money into generating articles, continuing medical education courses (“CMEs”), and other “educational” materials, conducting sales visits to individual doctors, and supporting a network of professional societies and advocacy groups, which was intended to, and which did, create a new but phony “consensus” supporting the long-term use of opioids. D. Defendants Used “Unbranded” Marketing to Evade Regulations and Consumer Protection Laws 91. Drug companies’ promotional activity can be branded or unbranded; unbranded marketing refers not to a specific drug, but more generally to a disease state or treatment. By using unbranded communications, drug companies can evade the extensive regulatory framework governing branded communications. 92. A drug company’s branded marketing, which identifies and promotes a specific drug, must: (a) be consistent with its label and supported by substantial scientific evidence; (b) not include false or misleading statements or material omissions; and (c) fairly balance the drug’s benefits and risks. The regulatory framework governing the marketing of specific drugs reflects a public policy designed to ensure that drug companies, which are best suited to understand the properties and effects of their drugs, 26 are responsible for providing prescribers with the information they need to assess accurately the risks and benefits of drugs for their patients. 93. Further, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) places further restrictions on branded marketing. It prohibits the sale in interstate commerce of drugs that are “misbranded.” A drug is “misbranded” if it lacks “adequate directions for use” or if the label is false or misleading “in any particular.” “Labeling” includes more than the drug’s physical label; it also includes “all … other written, printed, or graphic matter … accompanying“ the drug, including promotional material. The term “accompanying” is interpreted broadly to include promotional materials – posters, websites, brochures, books, and the like – disseminated by or on behalf of the manufacturer of the drug. Thus, Defendants’ promotional materials are part of their drugs’ labels and required to be accurate, balanced, and not misleading. 94. Branded promotional materials for prescription drugs must be submitted to the FDA when they are first used or disseminated. If, upon review, the FDA determines that materials marketing a drug are misleading, it can issue an untitled letter or warning letter. The FDA uses untitled letters for violations such as overstating the effectiveness of the drug or making claims without context or balanced information. Warning letters address promotions involving safety or health risks and indicate the FDA may take further enforcement action. 95. Defendants generally avoided using branded advertisements to spread their deceptive messages and claims regarding opioids. Defendants did so in order to evade regulatory review. 27 96. Instead, Defendants disseminated much of their false, misleading, imbalanced, and unsupported statements through unregulated unbranded marketing materials – materials that generally promoted opioid use but did not name a specific opioid while doing so. Through these unbranded materials, Defendants presented information and instructions concerning opioids generally that were false and misleading. 97. By acting through third parties, Defendants were able to give the false appearance that their messages reflected the views of independent third parties. Later, Defendants would cite to these sources as “independent” corroboration of their own statements. Further, as one physician adviser to Defendants noted, third-party documents had not only greater credibility, but also broader distribution, as doctors did not “push back” at having materials, for example, from the non-profit American Pain Foundation (“APF”) on display in their offices, as they would with drug company pieces. 98. As part of their marketing scheme, Defendants spread and validated their deceptive messages through the following unbranded vehicles (“the Vehicles”): (i) socalled “key opinion leaders” (i.e., physicians who influence their peers’ medical practice, including but not limited to prescribing behavior) (“KOLs”), who wrote favorable journal articles and delivered supportive CMEs; (ii) a body of biased and unsupported scientific literature; (iii) treatment guidelines; (iv) CMEs; and (v) unbranded patient education materials disseminated through groups purporting to be patient-advocacy and professional organizations (“Front Groups”), which exercised their influence both 28 directly and indirectly through Defendant-controlled KOLs who served in leadership roles in these organizations. 99. Defendants disseminated many of their false, misleading, imbalanced and unsupported messages through the Vehicles because they appeared to uninformed observers to be independent. Through unbranded materials, Defendants presented information and instructions concerning opioids generally that were false and misleading. 100. Even where such unbranded messages were disseminated through third- party vehicles, Defendants adopted these messages as their own when they cited to, edited, approved, and distributed such materials knowing they were false, misleading, unsubstantiated, unbalanced, and incomplete. In addition, and as described herein, Defendants’ sales representatives distributed third-party and unbranded marketing material to Defendants’ target audience that was deceptive. 101. Defendants took an active role in guiding, reviewing, and approving many of the misleading statements issued by third parties, ensuring that Defendants were consistently in control of their content. By funding, directing, editing, and distributing these materials, Defendants exercised control over their deceptive messages and acted in concert with these third parties fraudulently to promote the use of opioids for the treatment of chronic pain. 102. The unbranded marketing materials that Defendants assisted in creating and distributing either did not disclose the risks of addiction, abuse, misuse, and overdose, or affirmatively denied or minimized those risks. 29 i. Defendants’ KOLs 103. Defendants cultivated a select circle of doctors who were chosen and sponsored by Defendants solely because they favored the aggressive treatment of chronic pain with opioids. As set forth herein and as depicted in Exhibit A, pro-opioid doctors have been at the hub of Defendants’ promotional efforts, presenting the appearance of unbiased and reliable medical research supporting the broad use of opioid therapy for chronic pain. These pro-opioid doctors have written, consulted on, edited, and lent their names to books and articles, and given speeches and CMEs supportive of opioid therapy for chronic pain. They have served on committees that developed treatment guidelines that strongly encouraged the use of opioids to treat chronic pain and on the boards of pro-opioid advocacy groups and professional societies that develop, select, and present CMEs. Defendants were able to exert control of each of these modalities through their KOLs. 104. In return for their pro-opioid advocacy, Defendants’ KOLs received money, prestige, recognition, research funding, and avenues to publish. Defendant KOL Dr. Webster has received funding from Endo, Purdue, and Cephalon. Defendant KOL Dr. Fine has received funding from Janssen, Cephalon, Endo and Purdue. 105. Defendants cited and promoted their KOLs and studies or articles by their KOLs to broaden the chronic opioid therapy market. By contrast, Defendants did not support, acknowledge, or disseminate the publications of doctors critical of the use of chronic opioid therapy. 30 106. Defendants carefully vetted their KOLs to ensure that they were likely to remain on-message and supportive of their agenda. Defendants also kept close tabs on the content of the materials published by these KOLs. 107. In their promotion of the use of opioids to treat chronic pain, Defendants’ KOLs knew that their statements were false and misleading, or they recklessly disregarded the truth in doing so, but they continued to publish their misstatements to benefit themselves and Defendants. ii. Defendants’ Corruption of Scientific Literature 108. Rather than actually test the safety and efficacy of opioids for long- term use, Defendants led physicians, patients, and health care payors to believe that such tests had already been done. As set forth herein and as depicted in Exhibit A, Defendants created a body of false, misleading, and unsupported medical and popular literature about opioids that (a) understated the risks and overstated the benefits of long-term use; (b) appeared to be the result of independent, objective research; and (c) was likely to shape the perceptions of prescribers, patients, and payors. This literature was, in fact, marketing material intended to persuade doctors and consumers that the benefits of longterm opioid use outweighed the risks. 109. To accomplish their goal, Defendants – sometimes through third-party consultants and/or front groups – commissioned, edited, and arranged for the placement of favorable articles in academic journals. 110. Defendants’ plans for these materials did not originate in the departments within the Defendant organizations that were responsible for research, development, or 31 any other area that would have specialized knowledge about the drugs and their effects on patients; rather, they originated in Defendants’ marketing departments and with Defendants’ marketing and public relations consultants. 111. In these materials, Defendants (or their surrogates) often claimed to rely on “data on file” or presented posters, neither of which are subject to peer review. Still, Defendants presented these materials to the medical community as scientific articles or studies, despite the fact that Defendants’ materials were not based on reliable data and subject to the scrutiny of others who are experts in the same field. 112. Defendants also made sure that favorable articles were disseminated and cited widely in the medical literature, even when Defendants knew that the articles distorted the significance or meaning of the underlying study. Most notably, Purdue frequently cited a 1980 item in the well-respected New England Journal of Medicine, J. Porter & H. Jick, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics, 302 (2) New Eng. J. Med. 123 (1980) (“Porter & Jick Letter”), in a manner that makes it appear that the item reported the results of a peer reviewed study. It is also cited in two CME programs sponsored by Endo. Defendants and those acting on their behalf failed to reveal that this “article” is actually a letter-to-the-editor, not a study, much less a peer-reviewed study. The letter states that the authors examined their files of hospitalized patients who had received opioids. 113. The patients referred to in the letter were all treated prior to the letter, which was published in 1980. Because of standards of care prior to 1980, the treatment of those patients with opioids would have been limited to acute or end-of-life situations, not 32 chronic pain. The letter notes that, when these patients’ records were reviewed, the authors found almost no references to signs of addiction, though there is no indication that caregivers were instructed to look for, assess, or document signs of addiction. Nor, indeed, is there any indication whether the patients were followed after they were discharged from the hospital or, if they were, for how long. None of these serious limitations was disclosed when Defendants and those acting on their behalf cited the letter, typically as the sole scientific support for the proposition that opioids are rarely addictive. 114. Dr. Jick has complained that his letter has been distorted and misused – as indeed it has. 115. Defendants worked to not only create and promote favorable studies in the literature, but to discredit or suppress negative information. Defendants’ studies and articles often targeted articles that contradicted Defendants’ claims or raised concerns about chronic opioid therapy. In order to do so, Defendants – often with the help of thirdparty consultants – used a broad range of media to get their message out, including negative review articles, letters to the editor, commentaries, case-study reports, and newsletters. 116. Defendants’ strategy – to plant and promote supportive literature and then to cite the pro-opioid evidence in their promotional materials, while failing to disclose evidence that contradicted those claims – was flatly inconsistent with their legal obligations. The strategy was intended to, and did, distort prescribing patterns by distorting the truth regarding the risks and benefits of opioids for chronic pain relief. 33 iii. Defendants’ Misuse of Treatment Guidelines 117. Treatment guidelines have been particularly important in securing acceptance for chronic opioid therapy. They are relied upon by doctors, especially the general practitioners and family doctors targeted by Defendants, who are generally not experts, and who generally have no special training, in the treatment of chronic pain. Treatment guidelines not only directly inform doctors’ prescribing practices, but also are cited throughout scientific literature and relied on by third-party payors in determining whether they should pay for treatments for specific indications. a. The Federation of State Medical Boards 118. The Federation of State Medical Boards ("FSMB") is a trade organization representing the various state medical boards in the United States. The state boards that comprise the FSMB membership have the power to license doctors, investigate complaints, and discipline physicians. The FSMB finances opioid- and pain-specific programs through grants from Defendants. 119. Since 1998, the FSMB has been developing treatment guidelines for the use of opioids for the treatment of pain. The 1998 version, Model Guidelines for the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain ("1998 Guidelines") was produced "in collaboration with pharmaceutical companies" and taught not that opioids could be appropriate in limited cases after other treatments had failed, but that opioids were "essential" for treatment of chronic pain, including as a first prescription option. 120. A 2004 iteration of the 1998 Guidelines and the 2007 book, Responsible Opioid Prescribing, also made the same claims as the 1998 Guidelines. These guidelines 34 were posted online and were available to and intended to reach physicians nationwide, including in Monroe County. 121. The 2007 publication of Responsible Opioid Prescribing was backed largely by drug manufacturers, including Purdue, Endo and Cephalon. The publication also received support from the American Pain Foundation and the American Academy of Pain Medicine. The publication was written by Dr. Fishman and Dr. Fine served on the Board of Advisors. In all, 163,131 copies of Responsible Opioid Prescribing were distributed by state medical boards (and through the boards, to practicing doctors). The FSMB website describes the book as the "leading continuing medication (CME) activity for prescribers of opioid medications." 122. Defendants relied on 1998 Guidelines to convey the alarming message that “under-treatment of pain” would result in official discipline, but no discipline would result if opioids were prescribed as part of an ongoing patient relationship and prescription decisions were documented. FSMB turned doctors’ fear of discipline on its head: doctors, who used to believe that they would be disciplined if their patients became addicted to opioids, were taught instead that they would be punished if they failed to prescribe opioids to their patients with chronic pain. b. American Academy of Pain Medicine/American Pain Society Guidelines 123. American Academy of Pain Medicine (“AAPM”) and the American Pain Society (“APS”) are professional medical societies, each of which received substantial funding from Defendants from 2009 to 2013. In 1997, AAPM issued a “consensus” 35 statement that endorsed opioids to treat chronic pain and claimed that the risk that patients would become addicted to opioids was low.36 The Chair of the committee that issued the statement, Dr. J. David Haddox, was at the time a paid speaker for Purdue. The sole consultant to the committee was Defendant Portenoy. The consensus statement, which also formed the foundation of the 1998 Guidelines, was published on the AAPM’s website. 124. AAPM and APS issued their own guidelines in 2009 (“2009 Guidelines”) and continued to recommend the use of opioids to treat chronic pain. Fourteen of the 21 panel members who drafted the 2009 Guidelines, including KOLs Defendant Dr. Portenoy and Defendant Dr. Fine, received support from Defendants Janssen, Cephalon, Endo, and Purdue. 125. The 2009 Guidelines promote opioids as “safe and effective” for treating chronic pain and conclude that the risk of addiction is manageable for patients regardless of past abuse histories. The 2009 Guidelines have been a particularly effective channel of deception and have influenced not only treating physicians, but also the body of scientific evidence on opioids; they were reprinted in the Journal of Pain, have been cited hundreds of times in academic literature, were disseminated in Monroe County during the relevant time period, and were and are available online. The Use of Opioids for the Treatment of Chronic Pain, APS & AAPM (1997). Available at http://opi.areastematicas.com/generalidades/OPIOIDES.DOLORCRONICO.pdf (as viewed March 31, 2016). 36 36 126. Defendants widely cited and promoted the 2009 Guidelines without disclosing the lack of evidence to support their conclusions. c. 127. Guidelines That Did Not Receive Defendants’ Support The extent of Defendants’ influence on treatment guidelines is demonstrated by the fact that independent guidelines – the authors of which did not accept drug company funding – reached very different conclusions. 128. The 2012 Guidelines for Responsible Opioid Prescribing in Chronic Non- Cancer Pain, issued by the American Society of Interventional Pain Physicians (“ASIPP”), warned that “[t]he recent revelation that the pharmaceutical industry was involved in the development of opioid guidelines as well as the bias observed in the development of many of these guidelines illustrate that the model guidelines are not a model for curtailing controlled substance abuse and may, in fact, be facilitating it.” ASIPP’s Guidelines further advise that “therapeutic opioid use, specifically in high doses over long periods of time in chronic non-cancer pain starting with acute pain, not only lacks scientific evidence, but is in fact associated with serious health risks including multiple fatalities, and is based on emotional and political propaganda under the guise of improving the treatment of chronic pain.” ASIPP recommends long-acting opioids in high doses only “in specific circumstances with severe intractable pain” and only when coupled with “continuous adherence monitoring, in well-selected populations, in 37 conjunction with or after failure of other modalities of treatments with improvements in physical and functional status and minimal adverse effects.”37 129. Similarly, the 2011 Guidelines for the Chronic Use of Opioids, issued by the American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, recommend against the “routine use of opioids in the management of patients with chronic pain,” finding “at least moderate evidence that harms and costs exceed benefits based on limited evidence.”38 130. The Clinical Guidelines on Management of Opioid Therapy for Chronic Pain, issued by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) and Department of Defense (“DOD”) in 2010, notes that their review revealed a lack of solid evidence-based research on the efficacy of long-term opioid therapy.39 iv. Defendants’ Misuse of CMEs 131. A CME (an acronym for “Continuing Medical Education”) is a professional education program provided to doctors. Doctors are required to attend a certain number and, often, type of CME programs each year as a condition of their licensure. These programs are delivered in person, often in connection with professional organizations’ Laxmaiah Manchikanti, et al., American Society of Interventional Pain Physicians (ASIPP) Guidelines for Responsible Opioid Prescribing in Chronic Non-Cancer Pain: Part 1, Evidence Assessment, 15 Pain Physician (Special Issue) S1-S66; Part 2 – Guidance, 15 Pain Physician (Special Issue) S67-S116 (2012). 38 American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine’s Guidelines for the Chronic Use of Opioids (2011). 39 Management of Opioid Therapy for Chronic Pain Working Group, VA/DoD Clinical Practice Guideline for Management of Opioid Therapy for Chronic Pain (May 2010). Available at http://www.healthquality.va.gov/guidelines/Pain/cot/COT_312_Fuller.pdf (accessed December 4, 2017). 37 38 conferences, and online, or through written publications. Doctors rely on CMEs not only to satisfy licensing requirements, but also to get information on new developments in medicine or to deepen their knowledge in specific areas of practice. Because CMEs typically are taught by KOLs who are highly respected in their fields, and are thought to reflect these physicians’ medical expertise, they can be especially influential with doctors. 132. The countless doctors and other health care professionals who participate in accredited CMEs constitute an enormously important audience for opioid reeducation. As one target, Defendants aimed to reach general practitioners, whose broad area of practice and lack of expertise and specialized training in pain management made them particularly dependent upon CMEs and, as a result, especially susceptible to Defendants’ deceptions. 133. Defendants sponsored CMEs that were delivered thousands of times, promoting chronic opioid therapy and supporting and disseminating the deceptive and biased messages described in this Complaint. These CMEs, while often generically titled to relate to the treatment of chronic pain, focus on opioids to the exclusion of alternative treatments, inflate the benefits of opioids, and frequently omit or downplay their risks and adverse effects. 134. The American Medical Association ("AMA") has recognized that support from drug companies with a financial interest in the content being promoted "creates conditions in which external interests could influence the availability and/or content" of the programs and urges that "[w]hen possible, CME[s] should be provided without such 39 support or the participation of individuals who have financial interests in the education subject matter."40 135. Monroe County physicians attended or reviewed Defendants’ sponsored CMEs during the relevant time period and were misled by them. 136. By sponsoring CME programs put on by Front Groups like APF, AAPM and others, Defendants could expect instructors to deliver messages favorable to them, as these organizations were dependent on Defendants for other projects. The sponsoring organizations honored this principle by hiring pro-opioid KOLs to give talks that supported chronic opioid therapy. Defendant-driven content in these CMEs had a direct and immediate effect on prescribers' views on opioids. Producers of CMEs and Defendants measure the effects of CMEs on prescribers’ views on opioids and their absorption of specific messages, confirming the strategic marketing purpose in supporting them. v. Defendants’ Misuse of Patient Education Materials and Front Groups 137. Pharmaceutical industry marketing experts see patient-focused advertising, including direct-to-consumer marketing, as particularly valuable in "increas[ing] market share . . . by bringing awareness to a particular disease that the drug treats."41 Physicians are more likely to prescribe a drug if a patient specifically requests it, and physicians’ willingness to acquiesce to such patient requests holds true even for Opinion 9.0115, Financial Relationships with Industry in CME, Am. Med. Ass’n (Nov. 2011). 41 Kanika Johar, An Insider’s Perspective: Defense of the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Marketing Practices, 76 Albany L. Rev. 299, 308 (2013). 40 40 opioids and for conditions for which they are not approved.42 Recognizing this phenomenon, Defendants put their relationships with Front Groups to work to engage in largely unbranded patient education about opioid treatment for chronic pain. 138. Defendants entered into arrangements with numerous Front Groups (i.e., groups purporting to be patient-advocacy and professional organizations) to promote opioids. These organizations depend upon Defendants for significant funding and, in some cases, for their survival. They were involved not only in generating materials and programs for doctors and patients that supported chronic opioid therapy, but also in assisting Defendants’ marketing in other ways—for example, responding to negative articles and advocating against regulatory changes that would constrain opioid prescribing. They developed and disseminated pro-opioid treatment guidelines; conducted outreach to groups targeted by Defendants, such as veterans and the elderly; and developed and sponsored CMEs that focused exclusively on use of opioids to treat chronic pain. Defendants funded these Front Groups in order to ensure supportive messages from these seemingly neutral and credible third parties, and their funding did, in fact, ensure such supportive messages. In one study, for example, nearly 20% of sciatica patients requesting oxycodone received a prescription for it, compared with 1% of those making no specific request. J.B. McKinlay et al., Effects of Patient Medication Requests on Physician Prescribing Behavior, 52(2) Med. Care 294 (2014). 42 41 d. American Pain Foundation 139. The most prominent of Defendants' Front Groups was the American Pain Foundation (“APF”), which received more than $10 million in funding from opioid manufacturers from 2007 until it closed its doors in May 2012. 140. APF issued purported “education guides” for patients, the news media, and policymakers that touted the benefits of opioids for chronic pain and trivialized their risks, particularly the risk of addiction. APF also engaged in a significant multimedia campaign – through radio, television and the internet – to “educate” patients about their "right" to pain treatment with opioids. All of the programs and materials were intended to, and did, reach a national audience, including residents of Monroe County. 141. By 2011, APF was entirely dependent on incoming grants from Defendants Purdue, Cephalon, Endo, and others to avoid using its line of credit. APF board member, Dr. Portenoy, explained the lack of funding diversity was one of the biggest problems at APF. 142. APF held itself out as an independent patient advocacy organization, yet engaged in grassroots lobbying against various legislative initiatives that might limit opioid prescribing. In reality, APF functioned largely as an advocate for the interests of Defendants, not patients. 143. In practice, APF operated in close collaboration with Defendants. APF submitted grant proposals seeking to fund activities and publications suggested by Defendants. APF also assisted in marketing projects for Defendants. 42 144. The close relationship between APF and Defendants demonstrates APF's clear lack of independence, in its finances, management, and mission, and its willingness to allow Defendants to control its activities and messages supports an inference that each Defendant that worked with it was able to exercise editorial control over its publications. 145. In May 2012, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee began looking into APF to determine the links, financial and otherwise, between the organization and the manufacturers of opioid painkillers. Within days of being targeted by the Senate investigation, APF’s board voted to dissolve the organization “due to irreparable economic circumstances.” APF then “cease[d] to exist, effective immediately.”43 e. The American Academy of Pain Medicine 146. The American Academy of Pain Medicine (“AAPM”), with the assistance, prompting, involvement, and funding of Defendants, issued the treatment guidelines discussed herein, and sponsored and hosted CMEs essential to Defendants' deceptive marketing scheme. 147. AAPM received over $2.2 million in funding since 2009 from opioid manufacturers. AAPM maintained a corporate relations council, whose members paid $25,000 per year (on top of other funding) to participate. The benefits included allowing members to present educational programs at off-site dinner symposia in connection with AAPM’s marquee event – its annual meeting held in Palm Springs, California, or other resort locations. AAPM describes the annual event as an “exclusive venue” for offering 43 American Pain Foundation Website. Available at http://www.painfoundation.org (accessed December 4, 2017). 43 CMEs to doctors. Membership in the corporate relations council also allows drug company executives and marketing staff to meet with AAPM executive committee members in small settings. Defendants Endo, Purdue, and Cephalon were members of the council and presented deceptive programs to doctors who attended this annual event. 148. The conferences sponsored by AAPM heavily emphasized CME sessions on opioids – 37 out of roughly 40 at one conference alone. AAPM’s presidents have included top industry-supported KOLs and Defendants, Dr. Fine, Dr. Portenoy, and Dr. Webster. Dr. Webster was elected president of AAPM while under a DEA investigation. Another past AAPM president, Defendant Dr. Scott Fishman, stated that he would place the organization “at the forefront” of teaching that “the risks of addiction are … small and can be managed.”44 149. AAPM’s staff understood that they and their industry funders were engaged in a common task. Defendants were able to influence AAPM through both their significant and regular funding and the leadership of pro-opioid KOLs within the organization. E. Defendants Acted in Concert with KOLs and Front Groups in the Creation, Promotion, and Control of Unbranded Marketing. 150. Like cigarette makers, which engaged in an industry-wide effort to misrepresent the safety and risks of smoking, Defendants worked with each other and with the Front Groups and KOLs they funded and directed to carry out a common 44 Interview by Paula Moyer with Scott M. Fishman, M.D., Professor of Anesthesiology and Pain Medicine, Chief of the Division of Pain Medicine, Univ. of Cal., Davis (2005), http://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/500829 (accessed December 4, 2017). 44 scheme to deceptively market opioids by misrepresenting the risks, benefits, and superiority of opioids to treat chronic pain. 151. Defendants acted through and with the same network of Front Groups, funded the same KOLs, and often used the very same language and format to disseminate the same deceptive messages regarding the appropriate use of opioids to treat chronic pain. Although participants knew this information was false and misleading, these misstatements were nevertheless disseminated nationwide, including to Monroe County prescribers and patients. 152. One vehicle for Defendants’ marketing collaboration was Pain Care Forum (“PCF”). PCF began in 2004 as an APF project with the stated goals of offering “a setting where multiple organizations can share information” and “promote and support taking collaborative action regarding federal pain policy issues.” APF President Will Rowe described the forum as “a deliberate effort to positively merge the capacities of industry, professional associations, and patient organizations.” 153. PCF is comprised of representatives from opioid manufacturers and distributors (including Cephalon, Endo, Janssen, and Purdue); doctors and nurses in the field of pain care; professional organizations (including AAPM, APS, and American Society of Pain Educators); patient advocacy groups (including APF and American Chronic Pain Association ("ACPA")); and other like-minded organizations, almost all of which received substantial funding from Defendants. 154. PCF, for example, developed and disseminated “consensus recommendations” for a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (“REMS”) for long45 acting opioids that the FDA mandated in 2009 to communicate the risks of opioids to prescribers and patients.45 This was critical because a REMS that went too far in narrowing the uses or benefits or highlighting the risks of chronic opioid therapy would undermine Defendants’ marketing efforts. The recommendations claimed that opioids were “essential” to the management of pain, and that the REMS “should acknowledge the importance of opioids in the management of pain and should not introduce new barriers.” Defendants worked with PCF members to limit the reach and manage the message of the REMS, which enabled them to maintain, not undermine, their deceptive marketing of opioids for chronic pain. F. Insys Therapuetics, Inc.’s False Marketing Tactics 155. Insys was co-founded in 2002 by Dr. John Kapoor, a serial pharmaceutical industry entrepreneur “known for applying aggressive marketing tactics and sharp price increases on older drugs.”46 156. In 2012, Insys received U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval for Subsys, a fentanyl sublingual spray product designed to treat breakthrough cancer pain. However, Insys encountered significant obstacles due to insurers employing a process known as prior authorization. Prior authorization prevents the over prescription and The FDA can require a drug maker to develop a REMS—which could entail (as in this case) an education requirement or distribution limitation—to manage serious risks associated with a drug. 46 U.S. Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee, Insys Therapeutics and the Systemic Manipulation of Prior Authorization (quoting Fentanyl Billionaire Comes Under Fire as Death Toll Mounts From Prescription Opioids, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 22, 2016)(www.wsj.com/articles/fentanylbillionaire-comes-under-fire-as-death-tollmounts-from-prescription-opioids-1479830968)). 45 46 abuse of powerful and expensive drugs. The prior authorization process requires “additional approval from an insurer or its pharmacy benefit manager before dispensing…” and may also impose step therapy which requires beneficiaries to first use less expensive medications before moving on to a more expensive approach. 47 157. Insys circumvented this process by forming a prior authorization unit, known at one point as the Insys Reimbursement Center (“IRC”), to facilitate the process using aggressive and likely illegal marketing techniques. Insys published education articles that praised their products’ non-addictive nature; and funded patient advocacy groups who unknowingly promoted Insys’ agenda of raising the profile of pain so that drugs could be prescribed to treat it. Furthermore, Insys’ former sales representatives, motivated by corporate greed, paid off medical practitioners to prescribe Subsys in spite of any medical need.48 Insys employees were pressured internally and received significant monetary incentives to increase the rate of prescription approvals.49 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Combatting the Opioid Epidemic: A Review of Anti-Abuse Efforts in Medicare and Private Health Insurance Systems; see also Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, How Medicare Prescription Drug Plans & Medicare Advantage Plans with Prescription Drug Coverage Use Pharmacies, Formularies, & Common Coverage Rules. 48 Lopez, Linette. “It’s been a brutal week for the most shameless company in the opioid crisisand it’s about to get worse,” Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/opioid-addiction-drugmaker-insys-arrests-justicedepartment-action-2017-7. 49 Boyd, Roddy. Murder Incorporated: Insys Therapeutics. Part 1. Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation. http://sirf-online.org/2015/12/03/murder-incorporated-theinsys-therapeutics-story/; see also Indictment. United States v. Babich, et al., D. Mass. (No. 1:16 CR 10343). 47 47 158. According to a federal indictment and ongoing congressional investigation by Sen. Claire McCaskill, IRC employees pretended to be with doctors’ offices and falsified medical histories of patients. The report, acquired by McCaskill’s investigators, includes transcripts and an audio recording of employees implementing these techniques in order to obtain authorization from insurers and pharmacy benefit managers. The transcript reveals an Insys employee pretending to call on behalf of a doctor and inaccurately describes the patient’s medical history. 50 For example, Insys employees would create the impression that the patient had cancer, without explicitly saying so, because cancer was a requirement for prior clearance to prescribe Subsys. Insys was warned by an outside consultant, Compliance Implementation Services (CIS), that it lacked needed policies for governing such activities, but the executives failed to implement corrective internal procedures. 159. Specifically, CIS determined and informed Insys that Insys did not match prior authorization efforts with sufficient compliance processes to prevent fraud and was internally aware of the danger of problematic practices. 160. CIS suggested that IRC management put in place a mechanism to obtain proper review and approval of an IRC specific policy which should detail the appropriate communications that should occur while performing the IRC associate job functions. U.S. Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee, Fueling an Epidemic: Insys Therapeutics and the Systematic Manipulation of Prior Authorization, see p. 710. 50 48 161. CIS suggested that Insys management draft IRC-specific standard operating procedures and training to assist in understanding these procedures. To ensure compliance with these standards, Insys was also directed to create an electronic system to allow management to monitor employee communications. Finally, CIS recommended that Insys institute a formal process for revising and updating patient and healthcare provider’s data. 162. Yet within a year of this conclusion, an Insys IRC employee appears to have misled a representative regarding the IRC employee’s affiliation and the diagnosis applicable to a patient. The alleged result, in that case, was death due to inappropriate and excessive Subsys prescriptions. 163. In a class action law suit against Insys, it was revealed that Insys management “was aware that only about 10% of prescriptions approved through the Prior Authorization Department were for cancer patients,” and an Oregon Department of Justice Investigation found that 78% of preauthorization forms submitted by Insys on behalf of Oregon patients were for off-label uses. 51 Physicians are allowed to prescribe medications for indications outside of FDA guidelines if they see fit, but it is illegal for pharmaceutical companies to market a drug for off-label use. 164. Additionally, Insys created a “legal speaker program” which turned out to be a scam. The Justice Department commented on the program and stated: Gusovsky, Dina. The Pain Killer: A drug Company Putting Profits Above Patients, CNBC (https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/04/the-deadly-drug-appeal-of-insyspharmaceuticals.html) 51 49 The Speaker Programs, which were typically held at high-end restaurants, were ostensibly designed to gather licensed healthcare professionals who had the capacity to prescribe Subsys and educate them about the drug. In truth, the events were usually just a gathering of friends and co-workers, most of whom did not have the ability to prescribe Subsys, and no educational component took place. “Speakers” were paid a fee that ranged from $1,000 to several thousand dollars for attending these dinners. At times, the sign-in sheets for the Speaker Programs were forged so as to make it appear that the programs had an appropriate audience of healthcare professionals. 165. Insys paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to doctors in exchange for prescribing Subsys and three top prescribers have already been convicted of taking bribes. 166. Fentanyl products are considered to be the most potent and dangerous opioids on the market and up to 50 times more powerful than heroin.52 167. One former Insys sales representative described the motto of the company’s approach to patients as “Start them high and hope they don’t die.”53 G. Defendants’ Misrepresentations 168. Defendants, through their own marketing efforts and publications and through their sponsorship and control of patient advocacy and medical societies and projects, caused deceptive materials and information to be placed into the marketplace, including to prescribers, patients, and payors in Monroe County. These promotional U.S. Department of Justice. Drug Enforcement Administration. A Real Threat to Law Enforcement: Fentanyl. https://www.dea.gov/druginfo/DEA%20Targets%20Fentanyl%20%20A%20Real%20T hreat%20to%20Law%20Enforcement%20(2016).pdf. 53 Amended Class Action Complaint, Larson v. Insys Therapeutics Inc. (D. Ariz. Oct. 27, 2014). 52 50 messages were intended to and did encourage patients to ask for, doctors to prescribe, and payors to pay for chronic opioid therapy. 169. Doctors are the gatekeepers for all prescription drugs so, not surprisingly, Defendants focused the bulk of their marketing efforts, and their multi-million dollar budgets, on the professional medical community. Particularly because of barriers to prescribing opioids, which are regulated as controlled substances, Defendants knew doctors would not treat patients with common chronic pain complaints with opioids unless doctors were persuaded that opioids had real benefits and minimal risks. Accordingly, Defendants did not disclose to prescribers, patients or the public that evidence in support of their promotional claims was inconclusive, non-existent or unavailable. Rather, each Defendant disseminated misleading and unsupported messages that caused the target audience to believe those messages were corroborated by scientific evidence. As a result, Monroe County doctors began prescribing opioids long-term to treat chronic pain – something that most never would have considered prior to Defendants’ campaign. 170. Drug company marketing materially impacts doctors’ prescribing behavior.54 Doctors rely on drug companies to provide them with truthful information See, e.g., P. Manchanda & P. Chintagunta, Responsiveness of Physician Prescription Behavior to Salesforce Effort: An Individual Level Analysis, 15 (2-3) Mktg. Letters 129 (2004) (detailing has a positive impact on prescriptions written); I. Larkin, Restrictions on Pharmaceutical Detailing Reduced Off-Label Prescribing of Antidepressants and Antipsychotics in Children, 33(6) Health Affairs 1014 (2014) (finding academic medical centers that restricted direct promotion by pharmaceutical sales representatives resulted in a 34% decline in on-label use of promoted drugs); see also A. Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99(2) Am J. Pub. 54 51 about the risks and benefits of their products, and they are influenced by their patients’ requests for particular drugs and payors’ willingness to pay for those drugs. 171. Defendants spent millions of dollars to market their drugs to prescribers and patients and meticulously tracked their return on that investment. In one recent survey published by the AMA, even though nine in ten general practitioners reported prescription drug abuse to be a moderate to large problem in their communities, 88% of the respondents said they were confident in their prescribing skills, and nearly half were comfortable using opioids for chronic non-cancer pain.55 These results are directly due to Defendants’ fraudulent marketing campaign. 172. As described in detail below, Defendants: • misrepresented the truth about how opioids lead to addiction; • misrepresented that opioids improve function; • misrepresented that addiction risk can be managed; • misled doctors, patients, and payors through the use of misleading terms like “pseudoaddiction;” • falsely claimed that withdrawal is simply managed; • misrepresented that increased doses pose no significant additional risks; • falsely omitted or minimized the adverse effects of opioids and overstated the risks of alternative forms of pain treatment. Health 221 (2009) (correlating an increase of OxyContin prescriptions from 670,000 annually in 1997 to 6.2 million in 2002 to a doubling of Purdue’s sales force and trebling of annual sales calls). 55 Research Letter, Prescription Drug Abuse: A National Survey of Primary Care Physicians, JAMA Intern. Med. (Dec. 8, 2014), E1-E3. 52 173. Defendants’ misrepresentations were aimed at doctors, patients, and payors. 174. Underlying each of Defendants’ misrepresentations and deceptions in promoting the long-term continuous use of opioids to treat chronic pain was Defendants’ collective effort to hide from the medical community the fact that there exist no adequate and well-controlled studies of opioid use longer than 12 weeks.56 i. Defendants, acting individually and collectively, misrepresented the truth about how opioids lead to addiction. 175. Defendants’ fraudulent representation that opioids are rarely addictive is central to Defendants’ scheme. Through their well-funded, comprehensive, aggressive marketing efforts, Defendants succeeded in changing the perceptions of many physicians, patients, and health care payors and in getting them to accept that addiction rates are low and that addiction is unlikely to develop when opioids are prescribed for pain. That, in turn, directly led to the expected, intended, and foreseeable result that doctors prescribed more opioids to more patients – thereby enriching Defendants. 176. Each of the Defendants claimed that the potential for addiction from its drugs was relatively small or non-existent, even though there was no scientific evidence to support those claims. 177. For example, Cephalon and Purdue sponsored APF’s Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain (2007), which taught that addiction is rare and limited to Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Dir., Ctr. For Drug Eval. & Res., to Andrew Kolodny, M.D., Pres. Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing, Re Docket No. FDA2012-P-0818 (Sept. 10, 2013). 56 53 extreme cases of unauthorized dose escalations, obtaining opioids from multiple sources, or theft. 178. For another example, Endo sponsored a website, painknowledge.com, through APF, which claimed that: “[p]eople who take opioids as prescribed usually do not become addicted.” Although the term “usually” is not defined, the overall presentation suggests that the rate is so low as to be immaterial. The language also implies that as long as a prescription is given, opioid use will not become problematic. 179. For another example, Endo distributed a patient education pamphlet edited by KOL Defendant Dr. Portenoy entitled Understanding Your Pain: Taking Oral Opioid Analgesics. It claimed that “[a]ddicts take opioids for other reasons [than pain relief], such as unbearable emotional problems.” This implies that patients prescribed opioids for genuine pain will not become addicted, which is unsupported and untrue. 180. For another example, Janssen sponsored a patient education guide entitled Finding Relief: Pain Management for Older Adults (2009) in conjunction with the AAPM, ACPA and APF, which, as set forth in the excerpt below, described as a “myth” the fact that opioids are addictive, and asserts as fact that “[m]any studies show that opioids are rarely addictive when used properly for the management of chronic pain.” 54 Although the term “rarely” is not defined, the overall presentation suggests that the rate is so low as to be immaterial. The language also implies that as long as a prescription is given, opioid use is unlikely to lead to addition, which is untrue. 181. The guide states as a “fact” that “Many studies show that opioids are rarely addictive when used for chronic pain.” In fact, no such studies exist. 182. For another example, Purdue sponsored and Janssen provided grants to APF to distribute Exit Wounds (2009) to veterans, which taught, “[l]ong experience with opioids shows that people who are not predisposed to addiction are very unlikely to become addicted to opioid pain medications.” Although the term “very unlikely” is not defined, the overall presentation suggests that the rate is so low as to be immaterial. 55 183. For another example, Purdue sponsored APF’s A Policymaker’s Guide to Understanding Pain & Its Management, which inaccurately claimed that less than 1% of children prescribed opioids would become addicted.57 This publication also falsely asserted that pain is undertreated due to “misconceptions about opioid addiction.” 184. For another example, in the 1990s, Purdue amplified the pro-opioid message with promotional videos and featuring Dr. Portnoy and other doctors in which it was claimed, “the likelihood that treatment of pain using an opioid drug which is prescribed by a doctor will lead to addiction is extremely low.”58 185. Rather than honestly disclose the risk of addiction, Defendants attempted to portray those who were concerned about addiction as callously denying treatment to suffering patients. To increase pressure on doctors to prescribe chronic opioid therapy, Defendants turned the tables: they suggested that doctors who failed to treat their patients’ chronic pains with opioids were failing their patients and risking professional discipline, while doctors who relieved their pain using long-term opioid therapy were following the compassionate (and professionally less risky) approach. Defendants claimed that purportedly overblown worries about addiction cause pain to be undertreated and opioids to be over-regulated and under-prescribed. The Treatment Options guide funded by Purdue and Cephalon states “[d]espite the great benefits of opioids, they In support of this contention, it misleadingly cites a 1996 article by Dr. Kathleen Foley concerning cancer pain. 58 Excerpts from one such video, including the statement quoted here, may be viewed at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324478304578173342657044604 (accessed December 4, 2017). 57 56 are often underused.” The APF publication funded by Purdue, A Policymaker’s Guide to Understanding Pain & Its Management, laments that: “Unfortunately, too many Americans are not getting the pain care they need and deserve. Some common reasons for difficulty in obtaining adequate care include … misconceptions about opioid addiction.”59 186. Let’s Talk Pain, sponsored by APF, AAPM and Janssen, likewise warns, “strict regulatory control has made many physicians reluctant to prescribe opioids. The unfortunate casualty in all of this is the patient, who is often undertreated and forced to suffer in silence.” The program goes on to say, “[b]ecause of the potential for abusive and/or addictive behavior, many health care professionals have been reluctant to prescribe opioids for their patients…. This prescribing environment is one of many barriers that may contribute to the under treatment of pain, a serious problem in the United States.” ii. Defendants, acting individually and collectively, misrepresented that opioids improve function 187. Defendants produced, sponsored, or controlled materials with the expectation that, by instructing patients and prescribers that opioids would improve patient functioning and quality of life, patients would demand opioids and doctors would prescribe them. These claims also encouraged doctors to continue opioid therapy for patients in the belief that lack of improvement in quality of life could be alleviated by increasing doses or prescribing supplemental short-acting opioids to take on an asneeded basis for breakthrough pain. 59 This claim also appeared in a 2009 publication by APF, A Reporter’s Guide. 57 188. Although opioids may initially improve patients’ function by providing pain relief in the short term, there exist no controlled studies of the use of opioids beyond 12 weeks and no evidence that opioids improve patients’ function in the long-term. Indeed, research such as a 2008 study in the journal Spine has shown that pain sufferers prescribed opioids long-term suffered addiction that made them more likely to be disabled and unable to work.60 Despite this lack of evidence of improved function, and the existence of evidence to the contrary, Defendants consistently promoted opioids as capable of improving patients’ function and quality of life without disclosing the lack of evidence for this claim. 189. Claims that opioids improve patients’ function are misleading because such claims have “not been demonstrated by substantial evidence or substantial clinical experience.”61 190. The Federation of State Medical Boards’ Responsible Opioid Prescribing (2007), sponsored by drug companies including Cephalon, Endo and Purdue, supported by APF and AAPM, and written by Dr. Fishman and with Dr. Fine on the Board of Advisors, taught that relief of pain itself improved patients’ function: “While significant pain worsens function, relieving pain should reverse that effect and improve function.”62 60 Jeffrey Dersh, et al., Prescription opioid dependence is associated with poorer outcomes in disabling spinal disorders, 33(20) Spine 2219-27 (Sept. 15, 2008). 61 Letter from Thomas W. Abrams, RPh., MBA, Dir., Div. of Marketing, Advertising and Communications to Brian A. Markison, Chairman, King Pharmaceuticals, Re: NDA 21-260 (March 24, 2008). Responsible Opioid Prescribing, (available at https://archive.org/stream/279187responsible-opioid-prescribing-info/279187-responsible-opioid-prescribinginfo_ 62 58 191. Cephalon and Purdue sponsored the APF’s Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain (2007), which taught patients that opioids, when used properly “give [pain patients] a quality of life we deserve.” The Treatment Options guide notes that non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (e.g., Aspirin or Ibuprofen) have greater risks with prolonged duration of use, but there was no similar warning for opioids. The APF distributed 17,200 copies of this guide in one year alone, according to its 2007 annual report, and it is currently available online. 192. Endo sponsored a website, painknowledge.com, through the APF, which claimed in 2009 that with opioids, “your level of function should improve; you may find you are now able to participate in activities of daily living, such as work and hobbies, that you were not able to enjoy when your pain was worse.” Elsewhere, the website touted improved quality of life as well as “improved function” as benefits of opioid therapy. 193. Janssen sponsored a patient education guide entitled Finding Relief: Pain Management for Older Adults (2009) in conjunction with the AAPM, ACPA and APF. This guide features a man playing golf on the cover and lists examples of expected functional improvement from opioids like sleeping through the night, returning to work, recreation, sex, walking, and climbing stairs. 194. As set forth in the excerpt below, the guide states as a “fact” that “opioids may make it easier for people to live normally” (emphasis in the original). The myth/fact djvu.txt (accessed December 4, 2017). 59 structure implies authoritative support for the claim that does not exist. The targeting of older adults also ignored heightened opioid risks in this population. 195. Janssen sponsored a website, Let’s Talk Pain in 2009, acting in conjunction with the APF, AAPM, and American Society for Pain Management Nursing whose participation in Let’s Talk Pain Janssen financed and orchestrated. This website featured a video interview, which was edited by Janssen personnel, claiming that opioids were what allowed a patient to “continue to function,” falsely implying that her experience would be representative. 196. Purdue sponsored APF’s A Policymaker’s Guide to Understanding Pain & Its Management (2011), which inaccurately claimed that “multiple clinical studies” have 60 shown that opioids are effective in improving daily function, psychological health, and health-related quality of life for chronic pain patients,” with the implication these studies presented claims of long-term improvement. The sole reference for the functional improvement claim (i) noted the absence of longterm studies and (ii) actually stated, “For functional outcomes, the other analgesics were significantly more effective than were opioids.” 197. Purdue sponsored and Janssen provided grants to APF to distribute Exit Wounds to veterans, which taught that opioid medications “increase your level of functioning” (emphasis in the original). iii. Defendants, acting individually and collectively, misrepresented that addiction risk can be effectively managed 198. Defendants each continue to maintain to this day that most patients safely can take opioids long-term for chronic pain without becoming addicted. Presumably to 61 explain why doctors encounter so many patients addicted to opioids, Defendants have come to admit that some patients could become addicted, but that doctors can effectively avoid or manage that risk by using screening tools or questionnaires. These tools, they say, identify those with higher addiction risks (stemming from personal or family histories of substance abuse, mental illness, or abuse) so that doctors can more closely monitor patients at greater risk of addiction. 199. There are three fundamental flaws in Defendants’ representations that doctors can consistently identify and manage the risk of addiction. First, there is no reliable scientific evidence that doctors can depend on the screening tools currently available to materially limit the risk of addiction. Even if the tools are effective, they may not always be applied correctly, and are subject to manipulation by patients. Second, there is no reliable scientific evidence that high-risk or addicted patients identified through screening can take opioids long-term without triggering or worsening addiction, even with enhanced monitoring. Third, there is no reliable scientific evidence that patients who are not identified through such screening can take opioids long-term without significant danger of addiction. 200. Addiction is difficult to predict on a patient-by-patient basis, and there are no reliable, validated tools to do so. An Evidence Report by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (“AHRQ”), which “systematically review[ed] the current evidence on long-term opioid therapy for chronic pain” identified “[n]o study” that had “evaluated the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies, such as use of risk assessment instruments, opioid management plans, patient education, urine drug screening, 62 prescription drug monitoring program data, monitoring instruments, more frequent monitoring intervals, pill counts, or abuse-deterrent formulations on outcomes related to overdose, addiction, abuse or misuse.”63 Furthermore, attempts to treat high-risk patients, like those who have a documented predisposition to substance abuse, by resorting to patient contracts, more frequent refills, or urine drug screening are not proven to work in the real world, even when well meaning, but doctors were misled to employ them.64 201. Defendants’ misrepresentations regarding the risk of addiction from chronic opioid therapy were particularly dangerous because they were aimed at general practitioners or family doctors (collectively “GPs”), who treat many chronic conditions but lack the time and expertise to closely manage patients on opioids by reviewing urine screens, counting pills, or conducting detailed interviews to identify other signs or risks of addiction. One study conducted by pharmacy benefits manager Express Scripts concluded, after analyzing 2011-2012 narcotic prescription data of the type regularly used by Defendants to market their drugs, that, of the more than half million prescribers of opioids during that time period, only 385 were identified as pain specialists.65 The Effectiveness and Risks of Long-term Opioid Treatment of Chronic Pain, Agency for Healthcare Res. & Quality (Sept. 19, 2014). 64 M. Von Korff, et al., Long-term opioid therapy reconsidered, 15595, Annals Internal Med. 325 (Sept. 2011); L. Manchikanti, et al., American Society of Interventional Pain Physicians (ASIPP) Guidelines for Responsible Opioid Prescribing in Chronic Non-Cancer Pain: Part I – Evidence Assessment, 15 Pain Physician S1 (2012). 65 Express Scripts Lab, A Nation in Pain: Focusing on U.S. Opioid Trends for Treatment of Short-Term and Longer-Term Pain (December 2014). 63 63 202. In materials they produced, sponsored, or controlled, Defendants instructed patients and prescribers that screening tools can identify patients predisposed to addiction, thus making doctors feel more comfortable prescribing opioids to their patients and patients more comfortable starting on opioid therapy for chronic pain. Defendants’ marketing scheme contemplated a “heads we win; tails we win” outcome: patients deemed low risk were to receive opioids on a long-term basis without enhanced monitoring, while patients deemed high risk were also to receive opioids on a long-term basis but with more frequent visits, tests and monitoring – with those added visits, tests, and monitoring to be paid for or reimbursed by payors, including Plaintiff. This, of course, led to a “heads you lose; tails you lose” outcome for patients – all of whom are subjected to an unacceptable risk of addition – and for payors, including Plaintiff. 203. Cephalon and Purdue sponsored APF’s Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain (2007), which falsely reassured patients that “opioid agreements” between doctors and patients can “ensure that you take the opioid as prescribed.” 204. Endo paid for a 2007 supplement available for continuing education credit in the Journal of Family Practice written by a doctor who became a member of Endo’s speaker’s bureau in 2010. This publication, entitled Pain Management Dilemmas in Primary Care: Use of Opioids, (i) recommended screening patients using tools like (a) the Opioid Risk Tool created by Defendant Dr. Webster and linked to Janssen or (b) the Screener and Opioid Assessment for Patients with Pain, and (ii) taught that patients at high risk of addiction could safely receive chronic opioid therapy using a “maximally structured approach” involving toxicology screens and pill counts. 64 205. Purdue sponsored a 2011 webinar taught by Defendant Dr. Webster, entitled Managing Patient’s Opioid Use: Balancing the Need and Risk. This publication misleadingly taught prescribers that screening tools, urine tests, and patient agreements have the effect of preventing “overuse of prescriptions” and “overdose deaths.” iv. Defendants, acting individually and collectively, misled physicians, patients, and payors through the use of misleading pseudowords like “pseudoaddiction.” 206. Defendants instructed patients and prescribers that signs of addiction are actually the product of untreated pain, thereby causing doctors to prescribe ever more opioids despite signs that the patient was addicted. The word “pseudoaddiction” was concocted by Dr. J. David Haddox, who later went to work for Purdue, and was popularized in opioid therapy for chronic pain by Defendant Dr. Portenoy. Much of the same language appears in other Defendants’ treatment of this issue, highlighting the contrast between “undertreated pain” and “true addiction” – as if patients could not experience both. 207. In the materials they produced, sponsored, or controlled, Defendants misrepresented that the concept of “pseudoaddiction” is substantiated by scientific evidence. 208. Cephalon, Endo and Purdue sponsored the Federation of State Medical Boards’ Responsible Opioid Prescribing (2007), written by Dr. Fishman and with Dr. Fine on the Board of Advisors, which taught that behaviors such as “requesting drugs by name,” “demanding or manipulative behavior,” seeing more than one doctor to obtain 65 opioids, and hoarding, which are in fact signs of genuine addiction, are all really signs of “pseudoaddiction.” 209. Purdue did not mention that the author who concocted both the word and the phenomenon it purported to describe became a Purdue Vice President; nor did Purdue disclose the lack of scientific evidence to support the existence of “pseudoaddiction.”66 210. Purdue posted an unbranded pamphlet entitled Clinical Issues in Opioid Prescribing on its unbranded website, PartnersAgainstPain.com, in 2005, and upon information and belief circulated this pamphlet after 2007. The pamphlet listed conduct including “illicit drug use and deception” that it claimed was not evidence of true addiction but rather was indicative of “pseudoaddiction” caused by untreated pain. It also stated, “Pseudoaddiction is a term which has been used to describe patient behaviors that may occur when pain is untreated …. Even such behaviors as illicit drug use and deception can occur in the patient’s efforts to obtain relief. Pseudoaddiction can be distinguished from true addiction in that the behaviors resolve when the pain is effectively treated.” v. Defendants, acting individually and collectively, claimed withdrawal is simply managed. 211. In an effort to underplay the risk and impact of addiction, Defendants claimed that, while patients become physically “dependent” on opioids, physical J. David Haddox & David E. Weissman, Opioid pseudoaddiction – an iatrogenic syndrome, 36(3) Pain 363 (Mar. 1989). 66 66 dependence is not the same as addiction and can be addressed, if and when pain relief is no longer desired, by gradually tapering patients’ dosage to avoid the adverse effects of withdrawal. Defendants fail to disclose the extremely difficult and painful effects that patients can experience when they are removed from opioids – an adverse effect that also makes it less likely that patients will be able to stop using the drugs. 212. In materials Defendants produced, sponsored, and/or controlled, Defendants made misrepresentations to persuade doctors and patients that withdrawal from their opioids was not a problem and they should not be hesitant about prescribing or using opioids. These claims were not supported by scientific evidence. 213. A CME sponsored by Endo entitled Persistent Pain in the Older Adult, taught that withdrawal symptoms can be avoided entirely by tapering a patient’s opioid dose by 10% to 20% per day for ten days. This claim was misleading because withdrawal in a patient already physically dependent would take longer than ten days – when it is successful at all.67 214. Purdue sponsored APF’s A Policymaker’s Guide to Understanding Pain & Its Management, which taught that “Symptoms of physical dependence can often be ameliorated by gradually decreasing the dose of medication during discontinuation,” but the guide did not disclose the significant hardships that often accompany cessation of use. See Jane Ballantyne, New Addiction Criteria: Diagnostic Challenges Persist in Treating Pain With Opioids, 21(5) Pain Clinical Updates (Dec. 2013). 67 67 vi. Defendants, acting individually and collectively, misrepresented that increased doses pose no significant additional risks. 215. Defendants claimed that patients and prescribers could increase doses of opioids indefinitely without added risk, even when pain was not decreasing or when doses had reached levels that were “frighteningly high,” suggesting that patients would eventually reach a stable, effective dose. Each of Defendants’ claims was deceptive in that it omitted warnings of increased adverse effects that occur at higher doses. 216. In materials Defendants produced, sponsored or controlled, Defendants instructed patients and prescribers that patients could remain on the same dose indefinitely, assuaging doctors’ concerns about starting patients on opioids or increasing their doses during treatment, or about discontinuing their patients’ treatment as doses escalated. These claims were not supported by scientific evidence. 217. Cephalon and Purdue sponsored APF’s Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain (2007), which claims that some patients “need” a larger dose of an opioid, regardless of the dose currently prescribed. The guide taught that opioids differ from NSAIDs in that they have “no ceiling dose” and are therefore the most appropriate treatment for severe pain. The publication attributes 10,000 to 20,000 deaths annually to NSAID overdose when the true figure was closer to 3,200 at the time.68 218. Cephalon sponsored a CME written by KOL Defendant Dr. Webster, Optimizing Opioid Treatment for Breakthrough Pain, offered by Medscape, LLC from Robert E. Tarone, et al., Nonselective Nonaspirin Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs and Gastrointestinal Bleeding: Relative and Absolute Risk Estimates from Recent Epidemiologic Studies, 11 Am. J. of Therapeutics 17-25 (2004). 68 68 September 28, 2007 through December 15, 2008. The CME taught that non-opioid analgesics and combination opioids containing non-opioids such as aspirin and acetaminophen are less effective at treating breakthrough pain because of dose limitations on the non-opioid component. 219. Endo sponsored a website, painknowledge.com, through APF, which claimed in 2009 that opioids may be increased until “you are on the right dose of medication for your pain,” at which point further dose increases would not be required. 220. Endo distributed a patient education pamphlet edited by KOL Defendant Dr. Portenoy entitled Understanding Your Pain: Taking Oral Opioid Analgesics, which was published on Endo’s website. In Q&A format, it asked, “If I take the opioid now, will it work later when I really need it?” The response is, “The dose can be increased. … You won’t ‘run out’ of pain relief.” 221. Purdue sponsored APF’s A Policymaker’s Guide to Understanding Pain & Its Management, which taught that dose escalations are “sometimes necessary,” even indefinite ones, but did not disclose the risks from high-dose opioids. This publication is still available online. 222. Purdue sponsored Overview of Management Options, a CME issued by the AMA in 2003, 2007, 2010, and 2013. The 2013 version remains available for CME credit. The CME was edited by KOL Defendant Dr. Portenoy, among others, and taught that NSAIDs and other drugs, but not opioids, are unsafe at high doses. 69 vii. Defendants, acting individually and collectively, deceptively omitted or minimized the adverse effects of opioids and overstated the risks of alternative forms of pain treatment. 223. In materials they produced, sponsored or controlled, Defendants omitted known risks of chronic opioid therapy and emphasized or exaggerated risks of competing products so that prescribers and patients would be more likely to choose opioids and would favor opioids over other therapies such as over-the-counter acetaminophen or over-the-counter or prescription NSAIDs. None of these claims was supported by scientific evidence. 224. In addition to failing to disclose in promotional materials the risks of addiction, abuse, overdose, and respiratory depression, Defendants routinely ignored the risks of hyperalgesia, a “known serious risk associated with chronic opioid analgesic therapy in which the patient becomes more sensitive to certain painful stimuli over time;”69 hormonal dysfunction;70 decline in immune function; mental clouding, confusion, and dizziness; increased falls and fractures in the elderly;71 neonatal abstinence syndrome (when an infant exposed to opioids prenatally suffers withdrawal after birth), and potentially fatal interactions with alcohol or benzodiazepines, which are Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Dir., Ctr. For Drug Eval. & Res., to Andrew Kolodny, M.D., Pres. Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing, Re Docket No. FDA2012-P-0818 (Sept. 10, 2013). 70 H.W. Daniell, Hypogonadism in men consuming sustained-action oral opioids, 3(5) J. Pain 377-84 (2001). 71 See Bernhard M. Kuschel, The risk of fall injury in relation to commonly prescribed medications among older people – a Swedish case-control study, Eur. J. Pub. H. (July 31, 2014). 69 70 used to treat post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety. Post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety also often accompany chronic pain symptoms.72 225. Cephalon and Purdue sponsored APF’s Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain (2007), which taught patients that opioids differ from NSAIDs in that they have “no ceiling dose” and are therefore the most appropriate treatment for severe pain. The publication attributes 10,000 to 20,000 deaths annually to NSAID overdose when the figure is closer to 3,200.73 Treatment Options also warned that risks of NSAIDS increase if “taken for more than a period of months,” with no corresponding warning about opioids. 226. Endo sponsored a website, painknowledge.com, through APF, which contained a flyer called “Pain: Opioid Therapy.” This publication included a list of adverse effects that omitted significant adverse effects including hyperalgesia, immune and hormone dysfunction, cognitive impairment, tolerance, dependence, addiction, and death. 227. Janssen and Purdue sponsored and Endo provided grants to APF to distribute Exit Wounds (2009), which omits warnings of the risk of potentially fatal interactions between opioids and certain anti-anxiety medicines called benzodiazepines, commonly prescribed to veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder. Karen H. Seal, Association of Mental Health Disorders With Prescription Opioids and High-Risk Opioids in US Veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, 307(9) J. Am. Med. Ass’n 94047 (2012). 73 Robert E. Tarone, et al., Nonselective Nonaspirin Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs and Gastrointestinal Bleeding: Relative and Absolute Risk Estimates from Recent Epidemiologic Studies, 11 Am. J. of Therapeutics 17-25 (2004). 72 71 228. As a result of Defendants’ campaign of deception, promoting opioids over safer and more effective drugs, opioid prescriptions increased even as the percentage of patients visiting a doctor for pain remained constant. A study of 7.8 million doctor visits between 2000 and 2010 found that opioid prescriptions increased from 11.3% to 19.6% of visits, as NSAID and acetaminophen prescriptions fell from 38% to 29%, driven primarily by the decline in NSAID prescribing.74 H. Defendants’ Promotion of Their Branded Drugs Was Also Deceptive 229. While Defendants worked in concert to expand the market for opioids, they also worked to maximize their individual shares of that market. Each Defendant promoted opioids for chronic pain through sales representatives (which Defendants called “detailers” to deemphasize their primary sales role) and small group speaker programs to reach out to individual prescribers nationwide and in Monroe County. By establishing close relationships with doctors, Defendants were able to disseminate their misrepresentations in targeted, one-on-one settings that allowed them to differentiate their opioids and to allay individual prescribers’ concerns about prescribing opioids for chronic pain. M. Daubresse, et al., Ambulatory Diagnosis and Treatment of Nonmalignant Pain in the United States, 2000-2010, 51(10) Med. Care, 870-878 (2013). For back pain alone, the percentage of patients prescribed opioids increased from 19% to 29% between 1999 and 2010, even as the use of NSAIDs or acetaminophen declined from 39.9% to 24.5% of these visits; and referrals to physical therapy remained steady. See also J. Mafi, et al., Worsening Trends in the Management and Treatment of Back Pain, 173(17) J. of the Am Med. Ass’n Internal Med. 1573, 1573 (2013). 74 72 230. Defendants developed sophisticated methods for selecting doctors for sales visits based on the doctors’ prescribing habits. In accordance with common industry practice, Defendants purchase and closely analyze prescription sales data from IMS Health, a healthcare data collection, management and analytics corporation. This data allows them to track precisely the rates of initial and renewal prescribing by individual doctors, which allows them to target and tailor their appeals. Sales representatives visited hundreds of thousands of doctors and disseminated the misinformation and materials described above throughout the United States, including doctors in Monroe County. viii. Defendants Knew That Their Marketing of Chronic Opioid Therapy Was False, Unfounded, and Dangerous and Would Harm Plaintiff and Its Residents 231. Defendants made, promoted, and profited from their misrepresentations – individually and collectively – knowing that their statements regarding the risks, benefits, and superiority of opioids for chronic pain were false and misleading. Cephalon and Purdue entered into settlements in the hundreds of millions of dollars to resolve criminal and federal charges involving nearly identical conduct. Defendants had access to scientific studies, detailed prescription data, and reports of adverse events, including reports of addiction, hospitalization, and deaths – all of which made clear the significant adverse outcomes from opioids and that patients were suffering from addiction, overdoses, and death in alarming numbers. 232. Defendants expected and intended that their misrepresentations would induce doctors to prescribe, patients to use, and payors to pay for their opioids for chronic pain. 73 233. When they began their deceptive marketing practices, Defendants recklessly disregarded the harm that their practices were likely to cause. As their scheme was implemented, and as reasonably foreseeable harm began to occur, Defendants were well aware that it was occurring. Defendants closely monitored their own sales and the habits of prescribing doctors, which allowed them to see sales balloon – overall, in individual practices, and for specific indications. Their sales representatives, who visited doctors and attended CME programs, knew what types of doctors were receiving their messages and how they were responding. Moreover, Defendants had access to, and carefully monitored government and other data that tracked the explosive rise in opioid use, addiction, injury, and death. ix. Defendants Fraudulently Concealed Their Misrepresentations 234. Defendants took steps to avoid detection of, and to fraudulently conceal, their deceptive marketing and conspiratorial behavior. 235. Defendants disguised their own roles in the deceptive marketing by funding and working through Front Groups purporting to be patient advocacy and professional organizations and through paid KOLs. Defendants purposefully hid behind the assumed credibility of the front organizations and KOLs and relied on them to vouch for the accuracy and integrity of Defendants’ false and misleading statements about opioid use for chronic pain. 236. While Defendants were listed as sponsors of many of the publications described in this Complaint, they never disclosed their role in shaping, editing, and approving their content. Defendants exerted their considerable influence on these 74 purportedly “educational” or “scientific” materials in emails, correspondence, and meetings with KOLs, Front Groups, and public relations companies that were not public. 237. In addition to hiding their own role in generating the deceptive content, Defendants manipulated their promotional materials and the scientific literature to make it appear these items were accurate, truthful, and supported by substantial scientific evidence. Defendants distorted the meaning or import of materials they cited and offered them as evidence for propositions the materials did no support. The true lack of support for Defendants’ deceptive messages was not apparent to the medical professionals who relied upon them in making treatment decisions. The false and misleading nature of Defendants’ marketing was not known to, nor could it reasonably have been discovered by, Plaintiff or its residents. 238. Defendants also concealed their participation by extensively using the public relations companies they hired to work with Front Groups to produce and disseminate deceptive materials. 239. Defendants concealed from the medical community, patients, and health care payors facts sufficient to arouse suspicion of the existence of claims that Plaintiff now asserts. Plaintiff did not discover the existence and scope of Defendants’ industry-wide fraud and could not have acquired such knowledge earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 240. Through the public statements, marketing, and advertising, Defendants’ deceptions deprived Plaintiff of actual or implied knowledge of facts sufficient to put them on notice of potential claims. 75 x. Defendants Entered into and Engaged in a Civil Conspiracy 241. Defendants entered into a conspiracy to engage in the wrongful conduct complained of herein, and intended to benefit both independently and jointly from their conspiratorial enterprise. 242. Defendants reached an agreement between themselves to set up, develop, and fund an unbranded promotion and marketing network to promote the use of opioids for the management of pain in order to mislead physicians, patients, health care providers, and health care payors through misrepresentations or omissions regarding the appropriate uses, risks and safety of opioids. 243. This network is interconnected and interrelated, as demonstrated by Exhibit A, which is incorporated herein, and relied upon Defendants’ collective use of and reliance upon unbranded marketing materials, such as KOLs, scientific literature, CMEs, patient education materials, and Front Groups. These materials were developed and funded collectively by Defendants, and Defendants relied upon the materials to intentionally mislead consumers and medical providers of the appropriate uses, risks and safety of opioids. 244. By knowingly misrepresenting the appropriate uses, risks, and safety of opioids, Defendants committed overt acts in furtherance of their conspiracy. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW §349 (Against All Defendants) 76 245. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations within all prior paragraphs within this Complaint as if they were fully set forth herein. 246. Defendants’ acts were consumer oriented. 247. Defendants’ acts and/or practices are “deceptive or misleading in a material way” and include but are not limited to: a. misrepresenting the truth about how opioids lead to addiction; b. misrepresenting that opioids improve function; c. misrepresenting that addiction risk can be managed; d. misleading doctors, patients, and payors through the use of misleading terms like “pseudoaddiction;” e. falsely claiming that withdrawal is simply managed; f. misrepresenting that increased doses pose no significant additional risks; and g. falsely omitting or minimizing the adverse effects of opioids and overstating the risks of alternative forms of pain treatment. 248. Defendants’ acts and/or practices caused actual harm to Plaintiff. 249. Plaintiff has been injured as a result of Defendants’ acts and/or practices. 250. New York General Business Law § 349 declares unlawful any deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in the state, and allows any person who has been injured by reason of any violation of that statute to bring an action to recover actual damages. 77 251. Defendants violated New York General Business Law § 349, because they engaged in false advertising in the conduct of a business, trade or commerce in this state. 252. Plaintiff and its residents have been injured by reason of Defendants’ violation of § 349. 253. Plaintiff is entitled to recover their damages caused by the violation of New York General Business Law § 349 by the Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial, subject to trebling, plus attorneys’ fees. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FALSE ADVERTISING NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW §350 (Against All Defendants) 254. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations within all prior paragraphs within this Complaint as if they were fully set forth herein. 255. Defendants violated New York General Business Law § 350, because they engaged in false advertising in the conduct of a business, trade or commerce in this state. 256. Defendants’ acts were consumer oriented and triggered reliance by patients, physicians and others 257. Defendants’ acts and/or practices are “deceptive or misleading in a material way” and include but are not limited to: a. misrepresenting the truth about how opioids lead to addiction; b. misrepresenting that opioids improve function; c. misrepresenting that addiction risk can be managed; 78 d. misleading doctors, patients, and payors through the use of misleading terms like “pseudoaddiction;” e. falsely claiming that withdrawal is simply managed; f. misrepresenting that increased doses pose no significant additional risks; g. falsely omitting or minimizing the adverse effects of opioids and overstating the risks of alternative forms of pain treatment. 258. Defendants’ acts and/or practices caused actual harm to Plaintiff. 259. Plaintiff has been injured as a result of Defendants’ acts and/or practices. 260. Plaintiff and its residents have been injured by reason of Defendants’ violation of § 350. 261. Plaintiff is entitled to recover their damages caused by the violation of New York General Business Law § 350 by the Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial, subject to trebling, plus attorneys’ fees. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION PUBLIC NUISANCE (Against All Defendants) 262. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations within all prior paragraphs within this Complaint as if they were fully set forth herein. 263. Defendants, individually and acting through their employees and agents, and in concert with each other, have intentionally, recklessly, or negligently engaged in conduct or omissions which endanger or injure the property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable number of persons in Plaintiff’s county by their production, promotion, and marketing of opioids for use by residents of Plaintiff’s county. 79 264. Defendants’ conduct and subsequent sale of its opioid products is not only unlawful, but has also resulted in substantial and unreasonable interference with the public health, and the public’s enjoyment of its right not to be defrauded or negligently injured. 265. Defendants’ conduct is not insubstantial or fleeting. Indeed, Defendants’ unlawful conduct has so severely impacted public health on every geographic and demographic level that the public nuisance perpetrated by Defendants’ conduct is commonly referred to as a “crisis” or an “epidemic.” It has caused deaths, serious injuries, and a severe disruption of public peace, order and safety; it is ongoing, and it is producing permanent and long-lasting damage. 266. Defendants' conduct constitutes a public nuisance. 267. Defendants' conduct directly and proximately caused injury to Plaintiff. 268. Plaintiff has been injured by reason of Defendants' creation of the public nuisance. 269. Plaintiff is entitled to recover their damages caused by Defendants’ creation of this public nuisance in an amount to be determined at trial, plus costs and attorneys’ fees. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF NEW YORK SOCIAL SERVICES LAW § 145-B (Against All Defendants) 80 270. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations within all prior paragraphs within this Complaint as if they were fully set forth herein. 271. Defendants violated Social Services Law § 145-b, because they knowingly, by means of a false statement or representation, or by deliberate concealment of any material fact, or other fraudulent scheme or device, on behalf of themselves or others, attempted to obtain or obtained payment from public funds for services or supplies furnished or purportedly furnished pursuant to Chapter 55 of the Social Services Law. 272. Plaintiff is a “political subdivision” of the State of New York as that term is used in § 145- b (1) (b) and a “local social services district” as that term is used in § 145-b (2). 273. As set forth herein, Defendants have knowingly set forth false statements or representations, deliberately concealed material facts, and/or perpetuated a fraudulent scheme, in attempts to obtain payment for opioids from public funds for services or supplies furnished by Plaintiff pursuant to Chapter 55. 274. By reason of Defendants’ violation of § 145-b, Plaintiff has been damaged. 275. Plaintiff is entitled to recover their damages caused by Defendants’ violation of § 145-b in an amount to be determined at trial and subject to the apportionment provisions of § 145-b. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FRAUD (Against All Defendants) 81 276. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations within all prior paragraphs within this Complaint as if they were fully set forth herein. 277. Defendants, individually and acting through their employees and agents, and in concert with each other, knowingly made material misrepresentations and omissions of facts to Plaintiff to induce them to purchase, administer, and consume opioids as set forth in detail above. 278. Defendants knew at the time that they made their misrepresentations and omissions that they were false. 279. Defendants intended that Plaintiff, physicians, patients, and/or others would rely on their misrepresentations and omissions. 280. Plaintiff, physicians, patients, and/or others reasonably relied upon Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions. 281. In the alternate, the Defendants recklessly disregarded the falsity of their representations regarding opioids. 282. By reason of their reliance on Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions of material fact Plaintiff suffered actual pecuniary damage. 283. Defendants’ conduct was willful, wanton, and malicious and was directed at the public generally. 284. Plaintiff is entitled to recover their damages caused by Defendants’ fraud in an amount to be determined at trial. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Against All Defendants) 82 285. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations within all prior paragraphs within this Complaint as if they were fully set forth herein. 286. Defendants acted willfully, wantonly, and with conscious disregard of the rights of the Plaintiff. 287. As an expected and intended result of their conscious wrongdoing as set forth in this Complaint, Defendants have profited and benefited from opioid purchases made by Plaintiff. 288. In exchange for the opioid purchases, and at the time Plaintiff made these payments, Plaintiff expected that Defendants had provided all of the necessary and accurate information regarding those risks and had not misrepresented any material facts regarding those risks. 289. Defendants, through the wrongful conduct described above, have been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff. 290. In equity and good conscience, it would be unjust and inequitable to permit Defendants to enrich themselves at the expense of the Plaintiff and its residents. 291. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants must disgorge its unjustly acquired profits and other monetary benefits resulting from its unlawful conduct and provide restitution to the Plaintiff. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, awarding Plaintiff: 83 i. compensatory damages in an amount sufficient to fairly and completely compensate Plaintiff for all damages; ii. treble damages, penalties, and costs pursuant to Social Services Law § 145-b; iii. Treble damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to General Business Law §§ 349(h) and 350-e(3); iv. punitive damages; v. interest, costs, and disbursements; and vi. such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. 84 JURY DEMAND Pursuant to NY CPLR § 4102 (2016), Plaintiffs demand a trial by a jury all issues triable under the law. Dated: January 24, 2018 Michael E. Davis, County Attorney County of Monroe Monroe County Law Department 307 County Office Building 39 West Main Street Rochester, NY 14614 585-753-1402 MichaelDavis@monroecounty.gov -andPaul J. Hanly, Jr. Jayne Conroy Andrea Bierstein Thomas I. Sheridan, III SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC 112 Madison Avenue New York, NY 10016 (212) 784-6401 phanly@simmonsfirm.com -andSarah S. Burns (pro hac vice application forthcoming) SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC One Court Street Alton, IL 62002 (618) 259-2222 sburns@simmonsfirm.com Attorneys for Plaintiff 85