Approved FOLRelease 2005/11/29 I Z4 S-E-C-R-E-T CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 80ctoberl96lr MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR SUBJECT: Khrushchev and the American Election SUMMARY A. Two major uncertainties will condition Soviet foreign policy in the coming weeks the effects of the election on US policy and the December meeting of Communist parties to deal with the China problem. B. The Soviets clearly expect President Johnson to win the election, and are probably basing their policy planning accordingly. For the purposes of this memorandum, we treat only Soviet policies in the event President Johnson is elected. If Senator Goldwater is elected, the Soviets will have to review their assumptions concerning US policy, and it is difficult to estimate what changes in Soviet policy they would then contemplate. C. Though the Soviets are probably confident that they can foresee the outcome of the election, they are nevertheless worried that the campaign may cause a hardening in US policy. The Soviets are going to be reserved and cautious until they can determine what, if any, changes of American policy have occurred. Khrushchev will be angling for a meeting with the President and probably will make some amiable gestures after the election. D. We foresee no great change in the general lines of Soviet policies. The factors which led to the improvement of Soviet- American relations last year are still operative. The China problem in particular provides a strong incentive for Khrushchev to keep GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved ngriRelease 2005/11/29 -e stions with the West fairly stable. There are, however, Eigoitint issues, such as Cube, where the Soviets may hevetligitzs g??n choice but to take a. strong position winch would heighten ex]: hev i. . and jeopardize other aspects of their Western policy. Eirustii he is likely to try to postpone any such challenges at leau- us 1 . has aeelt with the problem of China at the Communist meetingt nra? December, a meeting which will demonstrate how far the disin egssed tion of Soviet authority over the Communist movement has progre . This memorandum has been prepared with the assistance and concurrence of 0/01. - 2 Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved FocBelease 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 1. Early this year the Soviet leaders apparently concluded that no important business could be transacted with the West until the American election is out of the way. They indicated that the most they hoped for in the interim was to keep relations with the US on an even keel. In the last few months, however, some new elements in the Soviet attitude have become evident. Vinitially, they seemed generally relaxed about the election, but since the nomination of Senator Goldwater, the Soviets have taken up a harsher propaganda line. I i ?he Election Campaign i 2. The new aspect of Soviet obsermations on American politics is ii; emphasis on the differences between the 196h campaign and previous ones. Usually, the Soviets have a preference between the candidates but adopt the standard propaganda position that in the US system there can be little basic difference between opposing candidates or policies. This year, however, they have made it plain that there are sharp distinctions between the con~ tending parties and policies, and their preference for President Johnson was implied in Khrushchev's open attack on Senator Goldwater. S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved Form/Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 To 3. i A second significant departure in the Soviet analysis of the election is the conclusion they have evidently drawn about the effect of Senator Gol?reter's candidacy. There is a clear effort by the Soviets to credit the emergence of tense situations, as in Vietnam and Cyprus, to American election' pressures. While they here been careful not to criticize the Presi?ent personally, they have esserte? that the administration is reacting to the growing pressures from the right wing. As one Soviet leader put it typically last week, ?in the countries of the capitalist west, a new activizetion of the forces of extreme reaction is taking place Reaction is raising its head in the US. The US wildmen are fanning cheuvinism in its most extreme form." b. We believe that this propaganda line reflects some genuine concern among the Soviet leaders. Insofar as they are ectuall* worried about hardening of US policy, however, they almost certainly attribute this to the temporary factor of election pressure. There is little doubt that Khrushchev expects - Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved FQLReIease 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 S-E-C-R-E-T President Johnson to be elected in Nevember. In the light of this expectation, the present Soviet treatment of the election campaign has some advantages for Khrushchev. He will be able to hold up President Johnson's election as a vindication of the USSR's peace- ful coexistence policy and as a rebuff of "fascist" forces. Of course, if Senator Goldwater is elected, then the Soviet propaganda machine has laid the groundwork for a change of Soviet policy, if need be. a 5. 1n the next few weeks before the election, the Soviets are not likely to embark on any major policy ventures. Khrushchev will be reluctant to become involved in any critical situations with the US (Southeast Asia, Cuba, Berlin) where he would probably anticipate that election pressures in the US would force the administration to react sharply. At the same time, as their recent responses to the situations in Cyprus, Indonesia, and Zanzibar demonstrate, the Soviets are not forgoing opportunities. Post-Election Policies* 6. Looking past the election, we do not foresee any pre- planned moves to confront the US with sharp challenges. Though a For the purpose of this memorandum, we treat only probable Soviet policies in the event of a victory by President Johnson, because Khrushchev is probably planning policies on this expectation. If Senator Goldwater is elected, the Soviets will have to review their assumptions about US policy, and it is difficult to estimate what changes in Soviet policy they then would contemplate. Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved FonRelease 2005/11/29 caster of issues are hanging fire because of the election campaign, the Soviets are likely to move slowly at first, testing and probing the US to determine what effect the campaign has had on American policy. We would expect some earhy gesture toward the President intended to make it clear that Khrushchev endorses the outcome and to stimulate hopes for a further reduction of international tensions. The Soviets have already hinted at a summit, and Khrushchev is quite capable of appearing in New York for the UN General Assembly. Soviet tactics will depend to a great extent on the US reaponse to such gestures and probes. T. There are strong forces still operative in Soviet policy which appear to rule out an abrupt shift to a rough line. Soviet military programs in the two years since Cuba have not led to any basic changes in the strategic situation which would support a more aggressive policy. Khrushchev still needs more and longer~ term economic credits from the West. He has made some progress in this respect over the past year, and the caspetition for Soviet orders which he has stimulated promises to yield even more signifi- cant gains. He probably attributes this success, at least in part, to the better climate of East-West relations since the test ban treaty. This economic offensive, therefore, is likely to set some limits on Khrushchev's free?om of action. Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved For-?ERelease 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 8. The line Khrushchev has adopted for dealing with the Chinese Communists has reduced his maneuverability regardless of the outcome of the American election; Presumably, one way of meeting the Chinese challenge would have been to compete in revolutionary fervor, militancy and aggressiveness. But, at least since the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev has adopted the alternative response and has endeavored to stabilize his Western front and demonstrate that it is possible to deal with the West. ASjpointed out by Togliatti in his much publicized memorandum, the test ban was a significant blow against the Chinese. Though Soviet ambitions in the underdeveloped areas are contrary to Western interests, much of their energy has been devoted to freezing out the Chinese, or at least undercutting Peiping?s position with such non~revolutionary tactics as diplomacy, personal visits, economic and military aid. And in Laos and Vietnam, where the Soviets might have effectively competed with China in militancy, Khrushchev has deliberately tried to disen~ gage the USSR from any responsibility or commitments, even going so far as to hint strongly that Hanoi and Peiping cannot count on automatic Soviet support in a war with the west. -7- Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved FoaRelease 2005/11/29 9. We conclude from the record of the past two years that the Chinese problem has not had the effect of pushing the USSR onto a more aggressive course in the non~Communist world. This is likely to hol? true in the near future. Even though Khrushchev will seek to strengthen the Soviet position against the Chinese in preparation for the anti-Chinese conference in December, we so not think that his efforts to this one will take the form of tough new moves against the us; he almost certainly does not want two confrontations with the US and with China at the some time. Some Soccific Problens u?mr 10. Two important issues are likely to arise shortly after the election: US overflights of cube, and Soviet refusal to pay up its arrears for UN peacekeeping operations. Cuba ll. Both Khrushchev end Castro have mass it clear that the issue of overflights will be raised once the American election is over. Castro has not yet inscribed this question on the General Assembly agenda, but he has in?icased that he intends to put the issue before the UN in some way. The main question is whether the Cubans will eventually order a shootoown if they make a Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved FogRelease 20085111129 no head or with political solution. Castro may have been schered by the example of American retaliatory action in the Gulf of Tonkin, but the US cannot count on Castro's moderation. 12. As for Khrushchev, he doubtless hopes that his sherp warnings last summer will have some effect. as probably will be looking for some sign after the election that the program is being out bash or suspended. Castro, however, has considerable bargaining power with Khrushchev,on the issue, since Cuba's support against China in the December Communist meeting is by no means assured. Thus Khrushchev almost certainly will proviso Cuba with strong political support, in the UN and elsewhere, on the overflight issue. But the Soviets probably will sent to avoid a showdown with the US at least until after the December meeting of Communist parties. Article 19 13. A second issue could arise when the Uh General Assembly convenes for its 19th session on 10 November. Under Article 19, the Soviets ere teehzioelly liable to lose their General Assembly vote if they do not pay on their arrears for the UN peacekeeping forces in the Midele East and the Congo. The Soviets have been .- .. s-s-c-esue Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved FonRelease 2005I11I29 adamant in their refusal to pay, and they are not likely to change this position. Article 19 is not likely to he applied automatically, and the Soviets seem fairly confident that the unwillingness of many UN members to face a showdown on this issue will enable them to defeat any parliamentary maneuvering to deprive them of a vote. Nevertheless, the Soviets are not looking for a showdown. They have repeatedly hinted that they would welcome a postponement or compromise and the Soviets will be probing for some flexibility in the US position. If the US, however, forces the issue, the Soviets will stand their ground. Potential Trouble Spots 1h. The completion of the American election is not likely to have such effect on Soviet moves in a number of trouble spots where the USSR is already involved. It is clear that the limited rapprochement with the West was not intended to curb anti?western policies in the underdeveloped world or cause the Soviets to forgo opportunities. we would emphasize Cyprus and Indonesia as situations where the Soviets are being pressured to take riskier actions. Details of the Soviet-Cypriot agreement will be available soon, and Sukarno has been in Moscow, evidently to determine how much political end materiel support he can count on from Moscow for his confronta- tion with Mhleysia. 10 Approved For Release 2005I11I29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved FonRelease 200511 1129 Berlin and Germany 15. One area where we expect a cautious and reserved nolicy from Moscow is Berlin. Trouble can always erunt in Berlin suddenly and small incidents can escalate rapidly. But we think that in this area Soviet policy is to pursue a more conciliatory line, aimed at establishing greater contacts between the East German and West Berlin authorities, and to the extent possible also with Bonn. It is also evident that Soviet policy is shifting from the question of Berlin to the broader question of Germany. What Khrushchev has in mind in pressing for a meeting with Erhard (probably in January) is difficult to perceive, but it is apparent that Soviet diplomacy in Europe is being reactivated. After the Erhard meeting, the Soviets will he urging a visit by de Gaullc, and contacts with a new (or old) British Prime Minister are to he expected. 16. The Soviets are also unlikely to push an aggressive line in Laos and Vietnam. The main effect of the American election on Soviet policy in these areas may be to revive diplomatic efforts for a Geneva conference. Despite earlier threats by Moscow to withdraw from its responsibility as co?chairman of the Geneva conference, Khrushchev has put off any final decision. Some time ago the I Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved FonRelease 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Soviets tols the Laotian ambassador that there was little chance for a diplomatic movement until after the election. Thus Moscow might make one more try to put Laos, and Vietnam as well, under international negotiation. In the Process, they would be likely, on the one hani, to threaten the US with the prospect that they will wash their han?s of the problem, while indicating to China -and North Vietnam, on the other hand, that in any enlarged con- frontation the USSR might publicly side against than, as in the Sins-Indian border war. They have already sent diplomatic notes to unaligned countries attaching both US and Chinese policy in Southeast Asia. The China Problem 17. Overshadowing almost every other aspect of Soviet policy is the coming meeting of Communist parties in December. Scarcely a move is made in Moscow that is not in some any related to anti? Chinase maneuvering. The meeting in December will be a landmark in the breakup of the Communist movement. Of the 25 parties invited to Moscow, six will probably boycott the meeting: those of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Japan, Indonesia, and Albania. 0f the remaining parties, many are reluctant to attend and will come only to ?expound their own views,? as the Italian party has put it. 12 - Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved Fore-Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 18. This reluctance has already established certain limiter tions on what the Soviets can accomplish. No formal condemnation of China is likely, no "excommunication" of China is likely, and no new International is likely. Thus the Soviets will have to be satisfied with a general statement of Communist policies, although the Soviet delegates will almost certainly exert heavy pressure for a declaration that can be turned against Chinese views. l9. Soviet acceptance of such limitation on the objectives of the meeting may sway the Romanians and persuade them to attend. As of now, however, they are still uncommitted, and there is a possibility that they are making another attempt at mediation during the current visit of their high level delegation in Peiping. If the Rumanians do attend, their presence will strengthen the faction that seeks to play down the dispute, avoid a general conference, nrolong negotiations, and extend overtures to China. It is possible that this group, which has the behind?theescenes support of Tito, will succeed in selling Togliatti's proposal for a group of parties to undertake a mission of conciliation to Peiping. 20. Regardless of the specific outcome of the December meeting, the fact that the Soviets are going ahead to hold the conclave without China and its allies, marks an important turning point for l3 Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved ForeBeIease 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001 100010022-4 world tammnniem. In effect, the Communist camp will have formally split. The Chinese may counter by organizing a meeting of their own. They hinted an this possibility when they published a resolution by the New Zealand party, suggesting a conference of parties which shared their views in order to "coordinate policy" if Moscow forced its plan on the rest of the Communist world. FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES: 25X1 SHERMAN Chairman Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 25)? Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4 Approved For Release 2005/11/29 CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010022-4