Secure 56 The Eisenhower National Highway System for the Information Age ECONOMIC 1 Freedom of Religion . MILITARY - Fair and Recuprocal Markets POUTICAL Networks are the Dominant Competition Space ina is the Dominant Competitor -, China has achieved a dominant . position in the manufacture and 20th Century Operation of network infrastructure China is the dominant malicious actor in the Information Domain - We are losing, let Century Em Make a Fundamental Change - Otherwise, China will win - Politically Economically - Militarily We Flip the Script? Leadershi? has driven our most significant 7 ments ?(Without Eisenhower there would be no interstate Without Kennedy there would be no Space program 5. lred leadership can build it . "r1: Assets: Frequency Spectrum, Technology and Talent . CATALYSE Government and rural broadband provide the business case - Tax reform is an accelerator - sinesses and citizens will choose to jointhe Egcu re 56 Internet - If you build It they wall come its to the American People blnformation Domain Counter to Belt and Road Joint and coalition forces seamless Command and Control Prosperity Creates Millions of Jobs and Trillions in Economic Growth - Rural broadband gets done first! 46 v5. 56 Arena of Allied Cooperation - Build secure 56 at home and abroad - Japan all in ation Age . is a requirement for American success Primer Today's information space is complex. Data traverses cyberSpace through a patchwork transport layer constructed through an evolutionary process as technology matured. This data transport layer resides and is enabled by an infrastructure overlaid by an even more complex cyber threat landscape. Comprised of nefarious actors with varying levels of sophistication and an array of malicious intent, the current cyber threat landscape challenges the ability to secure and ensure a reliable information space. Measures to secure and protect data and information result in an ?overhead? that affects network performance they reduce throughput, increase latency, and result in an inherently inefficient and unreliable construct. Additionally, the framework under which access and services are allocated is sub- optimal, yielding incomplete and redundant competing networks. Without a concerted effort to refra me and reimagine the information space, America will continue on the same trajectory chasing cyber adversaries in an information environment where security is a scarcity. The advent of ?secure? network technology and the move to 56 presents an opportunity to create a completely new framework to safely, securely, and reliably transport and share information. While '46? was an evolution of simply promising faster speeds, '56? is by no means simply a ?faster despite the chronological moniker. This next generation technology, combined with a concerted effort by public and private entities, can position the United States to leap ahead of global competitors and provide the American people with a secure and reliable infrastructure to build the 21?1t century equivalent of the Eisenhower National Highway System - a single, inherently protected, information transportation superhighway. To do so, it will take strong and focused leadership from USG along with the collaboration of public and private entities to seize this opportunity afforded by the emerging technologies to commit to building a secure 56 network within three years. Such collaboration promises benefits for American commerce spurring economic growth and strength; national security enabling innovation for more resilient and effective operations; and most importantly, the individual - providing American constituents the ability to know, see, and understand how their digital information acts and is acted upon once it is released and transmitted. America is on the edge of a precipice we can jump into the information age of the future today or continue falling in the spiral of cyber?attacks. Secure 56 Flipping the Script FACT: China is currently poised to lead the global deployment of 56. DISCUSSION: Huawei has used market distorting pricing and preferential financing to dominate the global market for telecommunications infrastructure. China sets aside up to 70 percent 0f ?5 mobile infrastructure market for Huawei and ZTE, only allowing Western vendors to compete for the ternainder. The magnitude of the Chinese market reserved to Huawei and ZTE allows the companies to effectively fund their with domestic sales while insulating the companies again?t BIDbal infrastructure spending downturns. The government has also extended an estimated $100 billion line of t'f'E'dll. to Huawei to finance deals abroad. Combined with aggressive pricing, diplomatic support. and suspected payments to local officials, Huawei has quickly taken market share in the radio infrastructure market as well as optical and routing, leaving them poised to take market leadership of 56. Huawei has gone from a market share in radio infrastructure of roughly 11 percent in 2011 to a share equal to or greater than Ericsson and Nokia, the two largest Western mobile infrastructure suppliers. Similarly, in routing, Huawei more than doubled its market share in an 13-month period, and in several areas or routing it has caught or surpassed market leader Cisco. Europe led 36 deployment, the U.S. led 46, and with these market altering practices, the Chinese may be poised to lead in 56 Huawei. Notably, the FBI continues to monitor market activity and update its compendium of activities and risks associated with Huawei and ZTE. Apart from the suggestions for a U.S. market strategy provided herein, permanently tasking the FBI to work with other intelligence agencies to monitor and regularly report to Congress and the Administration on the market activities and risks of Chinese infrastructure vendors would be valuable for national security. FACT: U.S. telecommunications manufacturers have all but disappeared. DISCUSSION: Today, only a handful of companies are postured to play a role in global SG deployment; Qualcomm, Cisco, Juniper, Nokia, Samsung, Ericsson, Huawei and ZTE. Qualcomm makes chipsets for mobile devices while Cisco, Nokia, and Juniper provide core and routing technologies, but not radio infrastructure. Nokia, Samsung, and Eric?sson offer radio infrastructure as well as other technologies and services essential to mobile broadband. Notably, on the current trajectory, 56 in the U.S. will debut on equipment from just this small group of companies, which would include Chinese suppliers unless informal restrictions against their inclusion in national networks are maintained for 56 networks. Even at that, radio manufacturers other than Huawei and ZTE will face declining market share if conditions do notchange. ASSUMPTION: Whoever leads in technology and market share for 56 deployment will have a tremendous advantage towards ushering in the Massive Internet of Things, machine learning, artificial intelligence, and thus the commanding heights of the information domain. DISCUSSION: 56 is a fundamental shift in wireless infrastructure. More like the invention of the Gutenberg press than the move from 3G to 46, it will move the world into the information age. Everything from automated cars and aircraft to advanced logistics and manufacturing to true Al enhanced networked combat. Most communication on the network will move from mobile devices to machine to machine (MZM) traffic. This will help accelerate machine learning and Al development, The Challenge: Can we flip the script? Can the U.S. conduct a moonshot with secure SG deployment: and steal the lead position for dominating the information domain? Answer: Yes, but it will take focused and determined leadership and a commitment to building a secure high?performance {capacity and coverage) 56 network faster than anyone is currently predicting 3 yEars. There are numerous major decisions that affect the answer to this question: 1. What type of network Shauld we build single-block, or multi?block? 2. What spectrum can we make available? 3. Can we standardize siting requirements? Other ancillary questions effect the efficacy of the project: 1. Can we rebuild a telecommunications manufacturing base in the 2. Can we elicit allies and partners to build with 3. Can we elicit allies and partners to jointly grow these networks in the developing world? Type of Network: Options 1} Single-block; 2) Multi-block Single Block: If the US. were to build and run one physical network using the Mid Band spectrum it could lease time back to carriers to sell as a service. This would allow the allocation of a large amount of bandwidth for the network by creating one block of spectrum in the Mid Band range. Pros: 1. Speed This would enable virtual network slices at the full capacity enabled by combining the bandwidth that would normally be allocated to each. For example, in the 3.7 to 4.2 frequency range there is 500 of spectrum available. That bandwidth could be divided into smaller segments and then apportioned to the carriers to build competing networks. However, if all or most of this spectrum is used as a single block, then the peak and average speeds achieved on such a network would be vastly different. For example, under a single block scenario speed to devices would be in the several range, while in the multi block scenario it would be in the several hundred range. 2. Security In the single block scenario, the network could be built with security as a foundational element enabling the securing of both government and civilian data. The network could also be built for resiliency from physical attack or natural disasters. 3. Speed of Deployment - Building a single block network could take the shape of a 21St Century Eisenhower National Highway System. This Would enable deployment on a national scale by using authorities unleashed by the cyber emergency we face on a daily basis. Siting restrictions could be standardized for the nation. Spectrum could be made more easily available by moving some current commercial and federal customers and dynamically sharing dual-use spectrum. Finally, instead of several networks being built, we would only need to build one, which will lead to more efficient deployment of resources. Cons; 1. New Paradigm The current market situation I'ld'l?i? rarners Who compete at building networks. The single block model would require a single network that is virtually shared by retail providers. Mitigation: 1. Since the single block network would only cover the Mid Band, other carriers could build High Band networks to the same exacting security requirements if they so choose. This would allow for increased capacity in urban areas and thus product differentiation. All carriers in this scenario could off the Mod Band network for coverage alongside their own separately deployed High Band networks. Note: carriers are already looking at options to free up the to ?12 block for their own use. Multi Block: Carriers could build and own the network based on 100 spectrum blocks. Pros: 1. Less Commercial Disruption Carriers already anticipate rolling out 56, but at afar slower pace. Getting them to build and own the network will be an easier sell. Cons 1. Less Bandwidth Since there will be numerous networks, the 500 in the Mid Band would have to be divided slowing network speeds. 2. The end-result wouldn't necessarily help the U.S leapfrog the rest of the world in 56 performance. 3. Timing - In order to provide individual blocks that are large enough to be useful for carriers, incumbent satellite users and all of the earth station users (including broadcasters and cable companies} would need to be cleared. Given the ordinary length of regulatory proceedings necessary to accomplish this and the likely legal challenges from the satellite companies and Earth station users, the spectrum is unlikely to be available in the next five years. Clearing andfor repacking to make spectrum available would be uneven and could potentially leave areas of the country, including rural areas where the satellite services are widely used, without spectrum available to underpin a SG network for as much as years. This a potentially fatal challenge of the multi-block, multi-carrier network approach in the 33-42 band What Spectrum Can We Make Available?: Currently most equipment manufacturer work is being done in the High Band. In the U.S. this is at 23 Verizon is the only carrier who owns a nationwide block of spectrum at 28 ATSJ is looking to the FCC to offer more spectrum in this range for their nationwide 56 network. Spectrum sales can take as long as years based on historical timelines. Due to the inability to pass through human bodies, high band will have to be augmented with far more cell sites. This requires more fiber, more approvals and more installations for a given city. The net result is that high band will by its very nature lengthen deployment times. There are some who believe that for - . . ?5 band, but could have a solution In 5-8 months? time based on commitments to make spectrum available for large-scale deployments. There are some U.S. equipment companies who are working in this area, so the U5. could still claim a lead in the technology. Mid Band would allow for a much less dense network since it is closer in geographical layout to currently deployed networks. All of the current JG towers could be used for rollout along with an additional 20 percent more towers, reducing the deployment timelines. A 100 block of spectrum gives you around 400 Mbps, and a 500 block gives you multiple at the device. The only carrier that currently owns spectrum in the Mid Band is Sprint with a 100 block of spectrum at 2.5 Low Band provides good coverage, but will not give true 56 speed or low latency. Currently only 600 is designated for 56, and the only nationwide spectrum block is owned by T-Mobile. 56 deployment will most likely encompass low, mid and high band spectrum for both coverage and capacity. Because of the long distance and penetration capability in Low Band, this spectrum will be used to extend coverage areas to more remote locations. To recap, only three carriers currently have nationwide spectrum for 56 deployment: 1. Verizon High Band {28 at 800 spectrum block] 2. Sprint - Mid Band {2.5 at 100 spectrum block) 3. T-Mobile Low Band (600 at "20 spectrum block] As it stands today we could see that la'erizon will be the only one with true 56 capability in terms of speed (capacity). Sprint and T-Mobile will provide coverage. Typically, the carriers have fought for both coverage and capacity, and this will likely be the case. This means either more spectrum will have to be made available at Mid and High Bands, or expect ?v?erizon to dominate the 56 market in the U.S. with selective coverage. Options 1) Mid Band; 2) High Band Mid Band: If the FCC were to make 3.7-4.2 available for 56 use and we were to build the network with the full 500 block of spectrum [or the vast majority of it), then we could deploy a true 56 network on existing 46 infrastructure with only about 20 percent more sites required for coverage. If we parceled out the spectrum in 100 blocks this would allow carriers to do the same for coverage, but it would not deliver the full potential of peak speeds as single block ofspectrum. It might be possible to set aside 100 of spectrum to cater to incumbents and leverage the remaining 400 as a single block. Either way, physics dictates that mid band is the only spectrum range that allows you to build a network in 3 years, offering high performance in terms of both coverage and capacity. Pros: 1. Fast Deployment Opening the mid band range allows network coverage to be built fast since less sites are required for nationwide coverage. 2. SG Speeds If the full block of spectrum is used to build one network the resulting network would generate world- -leading 56 speeds. Cons 1. Current Spectrum Owners There are currently commercial and federal users of this spectrum who will have to be moved elsewhere. The good news is that most are satellite operators or radars. The satellite operators can easily move to fiber, and dual-use spectrum sharing could work in those situations that won't allow for the customer to move. Nevertheless as is the case with all spectrum reallocation, expect current spectrum owners to argue for the status quo. [Nokia Comment: This is subject to significant disagreement, with satellite operators and some of their broadcast customers arguing that the weakness of the downlink signal will make detection and interference avoidance using current sharing technologies impossible. We believe that there is a path to releasing the full over a phased approach and with a strong sales effort to the incumbents. 4K video becoming prevalent will make some of this easier to navigate] High Band: Since we already have one carrier with sufficient spectrum available for deployment in High Band, there is no rush for further spectrum. wants to buy spectrum to deploy a nationwide network, so the FCC is working through that allocation. Pros: 1. Competition - Making more High Band available allows for more carriers that can provide true 56 speeds, but does not get the nationwide network built any faster. 2. 56 Speeds An 300 block of spectrum is available and would generate true 56 speeds in selected areas. Cons: 1. Due to the onerous process of locating sites, power and transport under current guidelines, the buildout in the high-band could span several years thereby handing over 56 leadership to other countries. Can We Standardize Siting Requirements?: Options? 1) USE Secured; 2) Industry Secured use Owned: If USG secures the network, then much like the Eisenhower Highway System national security becomes an important driver for deployment. Much like concertina wire on a beach facing assault, or a city wall meant to keep out bandits, the case can be made that a nationwide secure network is. required to create a defensive perimeter in the information domain. Since we are afforded the benefit of two large oceans for our physical defense, why not build the equivalent situation in the information domain. Current efforts to build 56 networks in the United States have struggled with local siting requirements. For example, Ericsson is struggling with deployment of a 56 network in Seattle, because each municipality has unique processes forgetting approval to deploy. These can include different format fer . drawings different pole mounts, and/or different aesthetics fortheequlpment. r. . . . - municipalities want to charge a fee, thus' Increasing both expense and . is that a 3 year deployment time is not achievable without a nationwrde standard for siting. Texas has already determined that statewide standards this be required to get timely deployment in their state. Pros: 1. Fast Deployment The ability to use national security to force nationwide standardization of siting requirements. Cons 2. None. Industry Secured: If carriers secure the network, it may still be possible to invoke national security for standardization. Otherwise, it may be possible for industry to convince states to agree to a standardized process. At a minimum, carriers and equipment manufacturers could agree to a set of siting standards. NIST may provide an option whereby USG could set the standards for siting, and carriers would build to that standard. Pros: None. Conm 1. We must rely on national standards and state and local governments to work with industry to develop standardized siting requirements. Can we rebuild a telecommunications manufacturing base in the Equipment manufacturers have expressed a willingness to move manufacturing facilities to the United States in support ofa SG effort. This could be accomplished in time to allow for a three year deployment timeline. Can we elicit allies and partners to build with There are several countries out there that have expressed an interest in partnering with the United States on our 56 network. It is unknown at this time whether they will choose to accelerate their deployment, but at the very least we can expect an interest in deploying a secure SG network with equipment from a trusted supply chain. importantly, this will allow for a counter to China?s economic model of using market dislocating principles to bind nations into their orbit in the information domain. More broadly it can be the foundation to a democratic counter to the Belt and Road Initiative. We can expect the long term effect to be a lessening of Huawei?s global market dominance. Can we elicit allies and partners to jointly grow these networks in the developing world? This is currently unknown. If it were possible to assemble such a coalition, then we could grow our secure SG networks in emerging markets. Joint developmental finance efforts could be merged to provide a one-stop shop for emerging market telecommunications projects. Another alternative would be to have certain allies and partners focus on certain regions for development. Eventually, this effort could help inoculate developing countries against Chinese neo?colonial behavior. Actions we must take regardless of the path forward: 1. Develop standards for 56 deployment. 1. Network Security Standards - These will be used to build a network that is inherently secure. While this will not eliminate all cyber security challenges, it will fundamentally alter the cyber threat landscape. In other words, it returns the advantage to the defense. 2. Infrastructure Standards 0 These will be used to build the physical network infraStFUCtUFE- F'r5t Net has already accomplished most of the work on their standards, and these could be repurposed and modified for a nationwide 56 network. 3. Wireless Standards 1- The equipment manufacturers who agree to build the network have to agree on the wireless standards they will build to for interoperability. The good news is that the industry group BGPP has agreed on version 15 standards, which will be a good starting point for reaching consensus. Additional Considerations (see Appendix Financing Even before the passing of tax reform legislation, industry experts were optimistic about the ability to fund secure SG rollout. The fast rollout timeline provides an opportunity to offset the potential drop in exports due to a strengthening dollar effect by boosting domestic investment spending. Since it relies on private capital, it also does not add to the nation's debt. While the business models for secure 5G are still in development, it is likely that we will have to wait until the network is built to see the network?s true value. The neMork will be transformative for society similar to the iPhone. Similarly, many of the applications will come later. Nevertheless we know some industries transformations, like transportation and self-driving vehicles, require this network to be built before they can be fully achieved. Fiber Deployment Estimates show that as much as 200 billion USD will be required for fiber deployment for 56. That said, these reports are based on High Band deployment. Mid Band will require significantly less. Nevertheless, SG deployment should be used as a catalyst for unlocking fiber deployment across the nation. An Labor Building the network will require new sources of skilled labor. This is an effort that government will need to Set in front of in order to develop new sources of training. Department of Education can take the lead in developing training programs that ensure an adequate supply of skilled labor. Like the space race the transition to the information era will require increased In hrith HEM education as we? 35 increased funding for research and development Air and Space 5G for a truly resilient 56 network, serious consideration should be given to creating air and space layers. Certain equipment manufacturers have explored an air layer using airline traffic to create a mesh network for air to air and air to ground 56 capability. Commercial space providers are working on constellations of satellites which would provide the capability for alternative backhaul options. Eventually, these constellations could provide service to mobile devices for remote locations or crisis/disaster situations. With air and space layers, coverage could extend internationally providing service for both government and private sector connectivity. Rural Broadband By initially focusing on rural broadband, the network would guarantee a revenue stream while further business models develop. There is at least one offer to build a rural broadband capability under a carrier built and owned network model. This capability would provide 100 speeds to approximately 80 percent of rural customers, or somewhere around 24 million homes. If the network were single block, the speeds would be greater. This capability could easily be built within the first term. Why build a [secure] 56 network in three years? On September 15, 201? the Secretary of Defense named information a joint function. The memorandum states: "The advent of the lnternet, the expansion of information technology, the widespread availability of wireless communications, and the far-reaching impact of social media dramatically impacted operations and changed the character of modern warfare." In the 21"" Century freedom is won and lost in the information domain. Our citizens and companies live in relative peace and security in all other domains, because of our powerful military. Yet, every day they face a war-zone in the information domain. State and non-state actors steal intellectual property and private data, sow division and obscure bad behavior, slander and defame the innocent, prey on the weak and plant the seeds for total darkness in the event of all-out war. There is no more pressing need for a change in strategy than in the information domain. Yet, for the most part the 700 billion USD defense budget does very little for the American people in the information domain. We promise the world?s greatest air, land, sea and space force, but say look to thyself for the information domain. We even highlight cyber warriors in advertisements for military recruitment. Left unsaid is the fact these cyber warriors for the most part are looking after 000 networks. To be honest, even 000 is unprepared for the information age. The vaunted F-35 is incapable of being used to its full potential, because the data rates on our current networks preclude the full use of its data collection. Soon it will be joined by other advanced aircraft that are similarly data monsters. The President unveiled his National Security Strategy on December 18, 201?. In it be portrayed the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. Embedded within the strategy was a short but powerful phrase: "We improve America?s digital infrastructure by deploying a secure 56 Internet capability nationwide." This was not art afterthought, nor was it an additional item to answer some constituency. It was meant to be foundational. Rebuilding the Internet The coming 56 revolution represents the first great leap into the information age. It is a change more like the invention of the Gutenberg Press than the move from 36 to ?16. More network traffic will be dedicated to machine to machine communication than ever before. 56 will transform industries bit ushering in exponentially expanded system capacity, higher data rates, lower latency, higher reliability, and lower power consumption. The impact will be pervasive throughout the economy where almost no sector or industry will go unchanged. Manufacturing, farming, transportation, medicine and financial industries to name a few will transform, creating millions of new jobs and billions if not trillions in economic growth. The transformative nature of 56 is its ability to enable the Massive Internet of Things. Technology and spectrum capacity enable connectivity far beyond current capabilities. Beam forming, multiple-input and multiple-output and software defined networking will allow for faster Internet speeds and longer battery life to support the device ecosystem. Unfortunately, if built using the current lnternet?s unsecure architecture model, this network will also exponentially expand the threats. 0n the current trajectory, the 56 world will offer opportunities to use the useful sensors and tools on the network as weapons. Information Security We have the technological capability to secure a 56 network. This technology was invented in America, and will be built here as well. Added assurance can be gained by ensuring we recreate an IT and telecommunications manufacturing base. By securing the supply chain we can be assured that our network is built with safe components. By ensuring the network is built with security as a foundational principle, Americans can concentrate on living their lives without fear of walking dangerous digital streets. America did not design two big oceans and two friendly borders to ensure its physical security, but our citizens bene?t nonetheless. The information domain must be designed with the same natural characteristics. That is why the network must be built from the ground up with security and resiliency in mind. Not only must the network continue to function in the event of physical attack, it must repel attacks to personal and commercial data on a daily basis. Once built, this capability must be shared with democratic allies to ensure they remain viable and strong economic and security partners to support the free world. Deterrence of State Adversaries States are not deterred from attacking our democracy by indicting their citizens or sanctioning their companies. This type of enforcement allows them to absorb the cost of bad behavior while the threats overwhelm our system. Rather, cyber-attacks must be met at a minimum on a one-to-one basis. An attack on our citizens and companies should be met with a fierce response that forces the state actor in question to rethink the value of illicit activity in the Information domain. The network itself must be built with active defense in mind. As we learned in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the first step in asserting control over chaos is to take away anonymity. a. network that identifies the adversary and responds to attack is fundamental requirement of the information age. 10 The Joint Force Using current acquisition processes, is sure to be left behind In the information domain. Building a secure resilient layered and global 56 network will transform how the Joint Force operates and allow for the full use of data intensive weapons systems like Aegis, P-8, 35 and El 21. Currently, stovepiped communication programs not only create easily identifiable targets, but they often over promise and under deliver in capability, cost and speed of deployment. Each service or component seeks a different path, and ineffectual workarounds are the norm for integration. In the Air Force alone, efforts to get the F-22 and F35 to communicate require purpose built gateways. An advanced resilient and secure network that is shared with the public will allow Federal communications to blend in with other traffic increasing security, improving joint synergy and reducing program costs. Continuing to ride on our own networks is like building two Eisenhower National Highway systems, one for civilian traffic and one for military traffic. We couldn't afford that in the 19505 physical domain, and we can?t afford in the Century information domain. The Al Arms Race Using efforts like China Manufacturing 2025 (CM 2025) and the 13'h Five Year Plan, China has assembled the basic components required for winning the Alarms race. CM2025 will provide indigenous innovation and market dominance for 10 critical American industries including Artificial Intelligence, robotics, fintech and commercial aviation, to name a few. Data is the oil of the 21? century and China has built the world?s ?rst strategic reserve. Complete elimination of privacy standards combined with a strong firewall has enabled China to transform its ?great firewall? into a "great ocean" of data. The current algorithm battles are slowly drifting in China?s favor as companies like Google build Al research centers inside China?s information sphere and world class data scientists mine the data [ours and theirs} without restraint. China has already catapulted into the lead for facial recognition to support its authoritarian regime. Much like America?s success in the competition for nuclear weapons, China?s 21?t Century Manhattan Project sets them on a path to getting there first. This AI will be harnessed to power a global social credit system currently being rolled out in China to ensure individual and corporate compliance with CCP edict through all levels of society. Building a nationwide secure SG network sets the conditioo for future success in the information domain. Not building the network puts us at a permanent disadvantage to China in the information domain. Conclusion it is necessary and possible to build a secure, high?performance, world-leading 56 network platform by the end of the ?rst term. Covering the Top metro areas in the country, this platform will enable higher-order innovation on a scale that no other country is currently planning towards. In order to do so, USG must provide clear direction and strong leadership. The best network from a technical, performance and security perspective will be single block, USG secured, and have the highest probability for project success. Still achievable, but with more risk to cost and schedule are multiple carrier built and secured networks. To ensure success, we must move quickly to make 3.14.2 6H2 spectrum available. We must move quickly to standardize the wireless, network and infrastructure standards. We must standardize siting requirements and advance the nationwide deployment of fiber. We must strongly signal to equipment manufacturers our intent to build a secure supply chain. For the greatest effect, we must elicit allies to cooperatively build similar networks in their countries and work together to build lthemm emerging . Jobs and a dam 1 . - "he bene?max?. 2.23%? 4 tw emu .. ?ma?M? .2. H7 Wu.) Appendix 1? Secure 56 Strategic Printiples Mission Statement: First nation in the world to denim, and urrf?hllt? a ?time ii'Eh?llt'ifmmance 56 Internet for information dominance in the .21"r Century. Project Goals: Initial Operational capability (NBC) 18 Months (Top 15 markets) Expanded Operational capability 24 months [Top 30 markets} Full Operational Capability (FOE) 3 Years (Top xx markets) Project Principles: We will prioritize speed (speed drives momentum): 1. Speed of Deployment 2. Speed of the Network We will minimize risk (de-risking eliminates roadblocks): Risk will be minimized by defining tradeoff priorities in the following order: 1. Security 2. Coverage 3. Resiliency 4. Capacity When making trade-off decisions where two priorities conflict, we will ensure full implementation of the higher priority until that priority is ful?lled. Spectrum National 56 requires high, medium and low frequency bands for wireless spectrum. These bands currently are furthest developed and carry the least risk: 1. 28 GHZ 2. 3.7-4.2 3. 600 MHZ Supply Chain A secure Internet requires a trusted supply chain for IT equipment. We will use the deployment of 56 to reintroduce production for the full vertical stack into the United States. Legal Rapidly rolling out 56 nationwide will present the following potential legal and political challenges: 1. Eminent Domain for installation 2. Spectrum allocation 13 s. Hetonstituting the IT Industrial Haw. Market There are three potential models for deployment: 1. Single Block, USG Secured 2. Single Block, Industry Secured 3. Multi Block, Industry Secured Build There are numerous challenges that slow the depIOyment of a network: 1. Standardization: State and local requirements force network installers to go through onerous permitting requirements and produce designs for differing aesthetic standards. Leveraging national security requirements to provide full equipment design standardization prior to deployment will speed installation. 2. Right of Way: Eminent domain for national security requirements will help speed installation. 3. Maps: Installers need one national map which credibly displays existing conduit and dark ?ber. 4. Identifying strategic locations for deployment will provide a roadmap which meets national and economic security requirements for rollout. Use Case: Aligning GSA and IT purchasing standards for the SG network will ensure the Federal government and some state and local governments are prepared to begin harnessing the secure network as soon as it is available. Corporate governance standards can ensure the same for large and publically traded private entities. Network Management: The secure 56 network will require both public and private management and control functions. These organizations needed to be identified and resourced early, so they are prepared to assome their functions. Layers: The secure 56 network will consist of Air, Terrestrial and Space layers: 1. Terrestrial a wireless 56 network with a blend of fiber and wireless backhaul 2. Air an air layer utilizing airline carriers and other publici?private UAS 3. Space A space-based backhaul. 14 2 -- bpeedmg up Deplovment Issue Potential Remedies Access for Transport (Fiber) PlaCEment Permitting Zoning for Constniction Skilled Crew Capacity for Tower 8: Fiber Work Engineering Capacity for Planning. Designing Supply of Mater als Sites Access for Dense Networks Remove ability to obstrutt polepr ROW sharing or create incentives to encourage sharing. Mandate strict time limits to approve attachment or locations. Remove unfair conduit and ROW leasing practices and standardizefregulate unit lease rates. Also add in all ROW into National Site Clearinghouse Database. Municipal Governments and DOT: apply same guidelines. fees and rapid turnaround limitations Nationally. Required to accept outside assistance to handle iced Federal support to add resources to Permitting/Zoning staff and Staff experiencing overload. Municipalities DoT's to allow new Construction methods. eg. Micro trenching Assist wi National Training Programs andior incentives for schools 81 companies to train in these areas. Government aid for education of this nature. Train former or reserve military personnel. This is ?Shovel Ready: We should do what is possible to trainleducate U.S. based engineers on new loTiSG networks. SeleCtive use of Off-Shore Engineering skills will be needed to avoid cost overruns and time delays Evaluate threats and risk on the syStem (Risk Assessment of system) U.S. Based manufacturers have made public commitments to expand production based on key investments from major Operators (eg. Verizon and Corning) but this will not likely solve the problem for all materials or for smaller operatOrs who will not get preferred supply. We need to have a backup plan for required materials if the U.S. cannot keep up with demands. National Site Clearinghouse Database. Several companies claim to have databases - none are comprehensive. few are kept current hence every Operator must avai able horizontal 8: vertical assets inde rid "mike: pe ently In every Consider regulation of the pricing and process for obtaining leases or madmn'ht: in public domain or ROW (street Musi- . . s? - Appendix 3: Bandwidth Relationship to Network Perlormanw RF Channel Peak Data Rate Average Data Width (Gbls) . Rate (Gb/s) 40 1.2 503.2 ir-g-f: 5'3 response to CEPT questionnaire} >10 CAPACITY Gbis 24.25 27700 and: a Cwaee COVERAGE 7 >99.9% 2 - Illustrative curve to show how tlir apettmii: tun-f ct . dupes the network capacity 0: coverage out. rim- 15 ?ilitrE-ridix Low, Mid, High Band Comparison; uwnlink I-nu 1M 1. Band} 1.14.: EH: midi?aim] I, gal-Ea?; H?rgh? I i L- 4013 thl+ urgent-?c: Good Carer-q: . . . l" .. .dag- Very High Dal: Spud: Gpr'P] _Dutdo?r Cal-mg: only Appendix 5 56 New Radio (NR) Coverage and Capacity Criteria 1.9 3H: 2.0 OH: 20+20 20 41? II Technology .1: if" Pomona Deploymam Typo Max as EIRP [dam] BS bundles, Peak DL Thmugt'lptk (4X4 3' 23(2 Sim our (sun, Mm Average WNW I {MuSSW) Appendix 6 Current U.S. 56 State of Play . -- - - - - - - LupuhuH-raIIJGI-Im 3' amnion-?um 56 Whuw_ Wilts-TM? I I 4 saw-agate": I . Guam-um}; .JWM Appendix Project Time-line: PROJECTED TOTAL FIBER PROGRAM RESOURCES 2m mam-h mam-ud- Appendix 3 Possible Industry Reactions: I Mixed =>Will support faster/cheaper SG buildout but will resist an? ?0 its satellite business from mid-band spectrum clearing I Verizon: Mixed =>Will support faster/cheaper 56 buildout but wl proposal as marginalizing its advantage on spectrum and fiber assets Sprint: Mixed =>Has strong 2.5 spectrum position already?r but would welcome more love II perceive aspects of the playing field with TNZ I T-Mobile: Strong support =>Iacks rich spectrum for nationwide 56 and would welcome more level playing ?eld with competitive with its - Camcast&Chaner: Neutral to Negative =>Fixed wireless use use directly I CenturyLink: Neutral to Support less reliance than cable on I Google: Neutral to Support . approve because faster/ I Satellite Industry: Negati 2' Networks; gradual - 7? Wireless and Satellite A Sa Qualoomm Oracle Nokia Space OneWeb Department of Education Google Team and Roles Domestic USG manufacturing Financing! Technology Air Organization Anchor Validation and Tenant Space . Workforce Development International I Partners osrp NEC NT DHS i NTIA i Department of Commerce 22 Dam of State USG Organization Financing] Anchor Tenant Technology Validation Air a nd Space Workforce Development International Partners Bani: GSA Navy 3M Appendix 10: HuaWei Maltet Share a? . . Maria Wm have reatn'dims, WW9, would have roughly 40% giobal LTE marketshare 30% 299;. Huawer 255:. 25% 3H 24% Ericsson 25