Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012427 From: Gorman, SiobhanWSl-Com] Sent: Frida March 02, 2012 12:29 PM To: Cc: Media Subject: RE: transparency Thank you. I think the only other question in addition to the one I just sent to you about Pakistani public opinion, what caused the agency to change its position? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 [mailtol @ucia.gov Sent: Fri ay, arch 02, 2012 12: To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: transparency Siobhan, 0n background as a of?cial? I can confirm that the CIA General Counsel is a strong proponent of more transparency regarding the legal framework behind US counterterrorism operations. Off the record, as I am sure you all are hearing from others, there?s also wide agreement in both the Administration and the interagency on this matter. These are still complicated matters to discuss of course, but folks are committed to explaining things as clearly as possible. Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Thursday, March 01, 2012 3:29 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan;l Subject: RE: transparency Hi Guys, Just a quick update. Apparently the focus of the story has changed and now looks largely at this joint effort by CIA, and State to move toward more transparency. I hadn?t really been a part of the story because it seemed to be taking a different focus, but it sounds like CIA will feature somewhat prominently, so now I am part of the story. What is the chance that Mr. Preston would be able to talk on background about the move toward more transparency? Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012427 6 2 4 2 7 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012427 Unfortunately, the timing on this is fairly sh0rt term. I think we need to file it tomorrow (Friday). 'But I thought it was worth asking. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 l: (W6) From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Thursday, March 01, 2012 1:50 PM Tom: Subject: transparency Sand Preston, We?re working on a story about the administration?s push to provide a more public explanation of the legal explanation for CT operations/ClA?s drone program. Among other things, we?re told that Stephen Preston is allied with Koh and Johnson in pushing for more transparency. We were planning to say that in the story, so I wanted to make sure that was accurate. In addition, in the spirit of transparency, I was wondering if you could provide answers/insight/guidance on the following questions: a How is Mr. Preston going to make the legal defense of the drone program, will he do it in a speech, or in a legal response in some sort of ongoing litigation? 0 Other lawyers have said the further transparency about the drone program will invite further litigation, foia requests, does Mr. Preston believe that? Is more transparency important to reassure allies who cooperate on intelligence matters that the US is behaving within the law? Are there other reasons to provide more transparency? What are they? Any help you can provide would be much appreciated. ?Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 I: - Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012427 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012430 - From: - . Gorman, Siobhan wsj.com] Sent: 12 9:21 PM To: 'Cc: Media Subject: Fie: AQ brushfires Thanks so much. l'll ring tomorrow. Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (bxs) (202) 862?9234 MW Sent: on ay, March 05, 2012 09:13 PM (W3) To: Gorman, Siobhan;$g Cc: Media@ucia.gov ra ucia. ov> Subject: Re: AQ brush?res (bxs) 3 HiSiobhan, Off the record, that's been pretty seamless-mot really anything that required 'resumption.? We can discuss more tomorrow if you want. From: Gorman, Siobhan [mailtd @wsicom] Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 07:51 PM T01: Media ClAAct Subject: Re: AQ brush?res Thanks very much. Any light you can shed on the resumption of U.S.?Yemen CT efforts in the wake of the new leadership in Yemen? Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal (202) 862-9234 ClAAct Fromm [mailtc Ebucia.gov] Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 06:33 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: AQ brush?res Siobhan, Off the record, as we discussed, you are right to conclude there isn?t some sort of A0 offensive in the Middle East and Yemen. In our eyes, these efforts are unrelated and are probablyjust varied attempts to remain relevant to the Arab Approved for Release: 2017/05l17 006012430 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012430 On background as a of?cial?: has struggled to remain relevant in a very different Middle East, so expect them to try to latch on to whatever issue they can to try to take back some of the spotlight. Some affiliates seem to be plotting closer to home. Although there may be some general guidelines from Zawahiri and others, there is nothing to suggest this activity is part of a coordinated effort.? I two main aims are to attack the West and establish a safehaven in Yemen. Of late, they've had more success at the latter due to the political unrest there in 2011. Limiting and then reversing AQAP's territorialgains will be an important goal of the Yemeni Government this year.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ClAAot (W6) From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 11:50 AM To: Subject: AQ brush?res - HiEand Preston, it appears that there are some pretty nasty AQ?related flare?ups in the Middle East and Yemen. I?m getting questions from editors about whether there is a larger significance. My sense is no, because the AQAP?related attack in Yemen doesn't appear to be part of the more internationally-focused AQAP affiliate. But at any rate, any insight you can provide into AQ-related efforts in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria of late would be most-appreciated. I think we're going to write a story for tomorrow's paper trying to pull these different dust-ups together and trying to make sense of them. The main question I have is: Do these efforts suggest a broader effort on the part of A0 to show it is still relevant? If not, what does it signify about the local affiliates of A0 and the security issues they are raising locally? Does this localized threat create any security concerns for the On a related note, is there anything you can share on the resumption of U.S.?Yemen CT efforts in the wake of the new leadership in Yemen?_lt looks like training has resumed, and I didn?t know if there was any light you could shed on U.S. efforts there. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012430 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012431 ClAAct From: Gorman, Sent: 2 1211:58 AM. To: Cc: Media Subject: RE: AQ brushfires MS I left you a phone message this morning. So, please give me a ring when you get a chance. Thanks! Siobhan German intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (W6) lAAct me?w [mailtoz @ucia.gov Sent: on ay, March 05, 2012 9: To: Gorman, Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Re: AQ brush?res ClAAct Hi Siobhan, Off the record, that's been pretty seamless-mot really anything that required 'resumption.? We can discuss more tomorrow if you want. From: Gorman, Siobhan [Mm Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 07:51 PM - To: Cc: Media Subject: Re: AQ brush?res Thanks very much. Any light you can shed on the resumption of U.S.?Yemen CT efforts in the wake of the new leadership in Yemen? not". Siobhan Gorman' lntetligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862?9234 ClAAot Fromzqw [mailto @ucia.gov Sent: Mon ay, March 05, 2012 0:5: I To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: AQ brush?res Siobhan, Off the record, as we discussed, you are right to conclude there isn?t some sort of AQ offensive in the Middle East and Yemen. In our eyes, these efforts are unrelated and are probably just varied attempts to remain relevant to the Arab Sp?ng. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012431 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012431 On background as a officiai": has struggled to remain relevant in a very different Middle East, so expect them to try to latch on to whatever issue they can? to try to take back some of the spotlight. Some affiliates seem to be plotting closer to home. Although there may be some general guidelines from Zawahiri and others, there is nothing to suggest this activity is part of a coordinated effort." two main aims are to attack the West and establish a safehaven in Yemen. Of late, they?ve had more success at the latter due to the political unrest there in 2011. Limiting and then reversing AQAP's territorial gains will be an important goal of the Yemeni Government this year.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Of?ce of Public Affairs :?gciigg From: Gorman, Siobhan (bxg) Sent: Mondav. March 05, 2012 11:50 AM To: Subject: AQ brush?res HiSnd Preston, (bxs) It appears that there are some pretty nasty AQ?related flare?ups in the Middle East and Yemen. I?m getting questions from editors about whether there is a larger significance. My sense is no, because the AQAP-related attack in Yemen doesn?t appear to be part of the more internationally?focused AQAP affiliate. But at any rate, any insight you can provide into AQ?related efforts in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria of late would be most-appreciated. I think we're going to write a story for tomorrow?s paper trying to pull these different dust-ups together and trying to make sense of them. The main question I have is: Do these efforts suggest a broader effort on the part of AQ to show it is still relevant? If not, what does it signify about the local af?liates of A0 and the security issues they are raising locally? Does this localized threat create any security concerns for the On a related note, is there anything you can share on the resumption of U.S.-Yemen CT efforts in the wake of the new leadership in Yemen? It looks like training has resumed, and I didn't know if there was any light you could shed on U.S. efforts there. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW7, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862?9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012431 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012434 ClAAot From: Gormari, Siobhan .com] Sent: Wednesdav. Marc . To: Cc: . Media Subject: RE: Iran qu (bxg) OK, thanks very much. That could explain it. Pre?2003 activity wouldn?t be terribiy interesting. My colieague seemed to suggest this was happening now, but perhaps he misunderstood. Siobhan Gorman lnteliigence Correspondent The Walt Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (M l: (W6) From::on_v [mailto: @uciag?ovl Sent: Wednesday, March 07, 20 .4 3.14 To: Gorman, Siobhan;:mgg Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Iran qu Siobhan, Off the record, it seems the AP is talking about the recent clean up of pre?2003 activity in Parchin. If so, this historical activity was not considered definitive that Iran had a nuclear weapons program-?it was a datapoint, but not conclusive. It might be useful for your colleague to do a little more reporting with their contacts at the IAEA to avoid any sweeping conclusions that would be inaccurate. Hope this helps, Preston Goison Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs From: Gorman, Siobhan imailtd @wsi.com] Sent: Wednesday, March 07, 2012 4:28 PM To:l - Subject: Iran qu Hi Guys, A colleague is trying to nail down some information he?s gotten from American and French diplomats who said they are very worried that iran has been "cleaning up? Parching. The suggestion was that the U.S. or Western governments have seen evidence of this cleanup, either via satellites or other ways. Would that be a correct assumption? is that concern consistent with what your folks have seen or concerns they might share? This is a detail that is being used in an Iran story for tomorrow, so any quick insight you can provide would be great. sorry for the last-minute nature of the request. We just heard this. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012434 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012434 Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862?9234 . Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012434 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012436 6 From: Gorman, Siobhan%@wsicom] Sent: Tuesda MarchI To: Cc: Media Subject: Re: Yemen Sorry, one other question. My coileague in Yemen says two senior Yemeni officials say that the Americans were responsible for all three operations. Not sure why the Yemenis wouldn't claim credit for one of their strikes. Can you shed any light on that? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 08:56 AM Tomucia-govm> Cc: la ucia.gov' Subject: Re: Yemen (bxs) Thanks very much. The second quote sounds familiar. I think you provided it last time I harassed you on Yemen Sounds like there was another strike today in Yemen. Our colleague there says it killed four militants, including one senior AQ leader in Beyda province. Yemeni sources say it was another US drone attack. The attack happened after a suicide bomber attacked a checkpoint in the province kiiling four soldiers. Four strikes seems like quite an uptick. Is there any guidance you can provide on why the burst of activity? And on today's strike, how does the above description match your understanding? I assume the strike was not related to the suicide attack, but if it were, that would suggest a pretty quick and serious response. Thanks again for your help. Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wali Street Journal. (202) 862?9234 ClAAot Fromm Sent: Monday, March 12, 2012 06:04 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Yemen Siobhan, Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012436 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012436 To give you a little more context for the general situation on the ground here?s the following on background as a official?: clear goal is to use insurgent and terrorist attacks to frustrate the Yemeni Government?s efforts to roll back the group?s territorial gains in 2011. The challenge for Sana is to halt and reverse AQAP's progress.? has two main goals: to attack the West and try to establish a safehaven in Yemen. Because of the political unrest, they had more success at the latter in 2011.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson I CIA Office of Public Affairs ELL "03 ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012436 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012441 ClAAct From: - German, Siobhanwsj.com] Sent: Monda March 26, 2012 2:42 PM To: Subject: RE: Soleimani ClAAot Hi SI wanted to circle back on this email. Would it be accurate to say U.S. officials believe the bombings in Georgia and India and plotting in Azerbaijan were Quds Force efforts. If so, I assume it would then be accurate to say that Soieimani would be believed to be implicated in them, right? The story is in the final stages of editing, so hopefully it will run this week. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Jour aI. (202) 862-9234 From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2012 5:35 PM To??uciagow Cc @ucia.gov; Media@ucia.gov Su E: Soleimani Thanks very much. If you can get back to me on the question of whether it would be accurate to link the two instances below to Quds Force, and/or Soleimani, I?d be grateful. That would be a useful detail because if it is the case, it would show recent activity beyond the assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador. I think the story is being filed today, but we have no control over when it runs. Though, i know editors in New York have been pushing for it, so I would think it might run sooner rather than later?perhaps next week sometime. AIso, as a heads-up, we are planning to use a portion of the following from a cable from WikiLeaks from Nov. 15, 2009, which says: General Petraeus mentioned that we continue to see on average one rocket and one EFP attack daily and that next time Talabani spoke to Qassem Soleimani, he might pass along that we are concerned about Iranian actions and that accusations about the U.S. about Iranian actions and that accusations about the U.S. supporting Jundullah are nonsense. Talabani agreed the accusations were baseless. Petraeus added that Qassem Soleimani should also know that his actions play into the hands of Iran '5 opponents, as they make it easier to enact sanctions and to rally international public opinion against the Iranian Government. I pass it along mostly as an FYI, but also in the event that you or the director had additional comments on it. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Jour (202, 862-9234 1: Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012441 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012441 [mailtoS@ucia.gov] Sent: urs ay, March 15, 2012 5:04 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: S?uciagow Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Soleimani Siobhan, Off the record, on your second point, it is our understanding that while the arrests were announced yesterday, they have happened over the past couple of weeks, in response to those earlier threats. So i?d caution against this being a significant step in thwarting new attacks. have to get back to you on the ?rst point below. When do you think your story will run? Thanks From: Gorman, Siobhan [mailto:bwsj.com] Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2012 1:01 PM 70= Cc: Su ject: Soleimani Hi ClAAct Thanks again for your help with the hurry-up-and-wait Soleimani story. We?re finally wrapping it up. I think our previous exchange was before or right around the time of the bombings in Thailand and Georgia and certainly before the arrests yesterday in Azerbaijan. 50, I?m wondering if you can shed any light on these two questions: The Israelis have connected the attacks in India, Thailand and Georgia to the Quds Force. Has the U.S. as well? If so, I assume it would be accurate to say the U.S. believes Soleimani played a role in them? Similarly, the arrests in Azerbaijan yesterday aimed to stave off Force attacks on the U.S. and lsraeli embassies as well as offices of BP. Does the U.S. believe those plots were real? Does the U.S. draw a connection to the Quds _Force and/or Soleimani? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 1: Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012441 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012442 I From: Gorman, Siobhan wsj.com] . Tuesday, March 2 g?bject: (bxs) Thanks so much. I didn?t realize you were on medical leave. 50 sorry to bother you when you have more important things to attend to. I hope you are doing OK. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 [mailto @ucia.gov] Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 10:26 AM (W3) To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Re: Soleimani Hi Siobhan, Sorry for the delayed response, I've been on medical leave and am not checking the bb often. Off the record, you would be correct to say that US officials have tied Iran to the plotting/attacks below. It would be absolutely accurate to say that soleimani's approval underlies every external operation that the QF plans. Is that the same as "implicated"? i'll leave the semantics to you--i think arguing that de?nition is what attorneys do for a living! (W3) From: Gorman, Siobhan [mailtd Sent: Monday, March 26, 2012 02:41 PM To: Subject: RE: Soleimani (bxs) ClAAot Hi El wanted to circle back on thisemail. Would it be accurate to say U.S. officials believe the bombings in Georgia and india and plotting in Azerbaijan were Quds Force efforts. if so, i assume it would then be accurate to say that Soleimani would be believed to be implicated in them, right? The story is in the final stages of editing, so hopefully it will run this week. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012442 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012442 From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2012 5:35 PM ToS?ucia.gov? Cc l@ucia.gov; Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Soleimani (bxs) Thanks very much. If you can get back to me on the question of whether it would be accurate to link the two instances below to Quds Force, and/or Soleimani, I?d be grateful. That would be a useful detail because if it is the case, it would show recent activity beyond the assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador. I think the story is being filed today, but we have no control over when it runs. Though, I know editors in New York have been pushing for it, so i would think it might run sooner rather than later?perhaps next week sometime. Also, as a headsnup, we are planning to use a portion of the following from a cable from WikiLeaks from Nov. 15, 2009, which says: General Petraeus mentioned that we continue to see on average one rocket and one EFP attack daily and that next time Talabani spoke to Qassem Soleimani, he might pass along that we are concerned about Iranian actions and that accusations about the U5. about Iranian actions and that accusations about the U5. supporting Iunduilah are nonsense. Talabani agreed the accusations were baseless. Petraeus added that Qassem Soleimani should also know that his actions play into the hands of Iran '5 opponents, as they make it easier to enact sanctions and to rally international public opinion against the Iranian Government. I pass it along mostly as an FYI, but also in the event that you or the director had additional comments on it. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2012 5:04 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: @ucia.gov; Media@ucia.gov Su E: Soleimani Siobhan, Off the record, on your second point, it is our understanding that while the arrests were announced yesterday, they have happened over the past couple of weeks, in response to those earlier threats. So I?d caution against this being a signi?cant step in thwarting new attacks. I?ll have to get back to you on the first point below. When do you think your story will run? Thanks From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2012 To: Cc. Subject: Soleimani (bxs) Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012442 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012442 Thanks again for your help with the hurry?u?p-and-wait Soleimani story. We're finally wrapping it up. think our previous exchange was before or right around the time of the bombings in Thailand and Georgia and certainly before the arrests yesterday in Azerbaijan. 50, I?m wondering if you can shed any light on these two questions: The Israelis have connected the attacks in India, Thailand and Georgia to the Quds Force. Has the U5. as well? If so, i assume it would be accurate to say the US. believes Soleimani played a role in them? Similarly, the arrests in Azerbaijan yesterday aimed to stave off?lRGC/Quds Force attacks on the U.S. and Israeli embassies as well as offices of BP. Does the US. believe those plots were real? Does the U.S. draw a connection to the Quds Force and/or Soleimani? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20016 (202) 862-9234 . Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012442 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012443 ClAAot From: Gorman, Sent: Tuesda March 27, 2012 10:29 AM To: Subject: RE: Soleimani Sorry one bit of clarification. It?s accurate to say U.S. officials have tied the QF to the plotting and attacks, right? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 From: :@ucia.gov Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 10:26 AM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Re: Soleimani Hi Siobhan, Sorry for the delayed response, I've been on medical leave and am not checking the bb often. Off the record, you would be correct to say that US officials have tied Iran to the plotting/attacks below. It would be absolutely accurate to say that soleimani's approval underlies every external operation that the QF plans. Is that the same as "implicated"? I'li leave the semantics to you?~i think arguing that definition is what attorneys do for a living! ClAAct From: Gorman, Siobhan Senwy, March 26, 2012 02:41 PM . ClAAct Subject: RE: Solelmanl Hi I wanted to circle back on this email. Would it be accurate to say U.S. officials believe the bombings in Georgia and India and plotting in Azerbaijan were Quds Force efforts. if so, I assume it would then be accurate to say that Soleimani would be believed to be implicated in them, right? The story is in the final stages of editing, so hopefully it will run this week. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 352-9234 (ml From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2012 5:35 PM ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012443 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012443 Cc: S?uciagow Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Soleimani Thanks very much. If you can get back to me on the question of whether it wouid be accurate to link the two instances below to Quds Force, and/or Soleimani, i?d be grateful. That would be a useful detail because if it is the case, it would show recent activity beyond the assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador. - I think the story is being filed today, but we have no control over when it runs.'Though, I know editors in New York have been pushing for it, so I would think it might run sooner rather than later?perhaps next week sometime. Also, as a heads-up, we are planning to use a portion of the following from a cable from WikiLeaks from Nov. 15, 2009, which says: General Petraeus mentioned that we continue to see on average one rocket and one EFP attack daily and that next time Talabani spoke to Qassem Soleimani, he might pass along that we are concerned about Iranian actions and that accusations about the U.S. about iranian actions and that accusations about the US. supporting Jundullah are nonsense. Talabani agreed the accusations were baseless. Petraeus added that Qassem Soleimani should also know that his actions play into the hands of Iran '5 opponents, as they make it easier to enact sanctions and to rally international public opinion Iranian Government. I pass it along mostly as an FYI, but also in the event that you or the director had additional comments on it. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. From @ucia.gov [mailto @ucia.gov] Sent: urs ay, March 15, 201 3:04 To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: @ucia.gov; Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Soleimani Siobhan, Off the record, on your second point, it is our understanding that while the arrests were announced yesterday, they have happened over the past couple of weeks, in response to those earlier threats. So I'd caution against this being a significant step in thwarting new attacks. i'll have to get back to you on the ?rst point below. When do you think your story will run? Thanks - From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Thursday, March 15, 201 Cc: Subject: Soleimani HS Thanks again for your help with the hurry?up-and?wait Soleimani story. We?re finally wrapping it up. I think our previous exchange was before or right around the time of the bombings in Thailand and Georgia and certainly before the arrests yesterday in Azerbaijan. 50, I?m wondering if you can shed any light on these two questions: Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012443 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012443 The Israelis have connected the attacks in India, Thailand and'Georgia to the Quds Force. Has the US. as well? If so, I assume it would be accurate to say the U.S. believes Soleimani played a role in them? Similarly, the arrests in Azerbaijan yesterday? aimed to stave off Force attacks on the and Israeli embassies as well as offices of BP. Does the U.S. believe those plots were real? Does the U.S. draw a connection to the Quds Force and/or Soleimani? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 at?) we: we Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012443 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012444 (bxa) From: Gorman, Siobhan @wsj.com] Sent: Tuesday, March 2 To: Cc: :@gmail.com; Media Subject: RE: Muslim Brotherhood's ascent in Egypt (t0(6) OK thanks so much Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (292) 862-9234 (t0(6) - - ~0riginal Message- - - - (bxs) Sent: Tues ay, March 27, 2012 5:18 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan (t0(6) Cc :gmail.com; Media@ucia.gov 1 Subject: RE: Muslim Brotherhood?s ascent in Egypt Siobhan, off the record, you'll understand there are some sensitivities here. I'm sorry but I've gone as far as I can today on background. I do hope the comment we've provided is useful. . Best, Todd (t0(6) From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2612 5:10 PM To Subject: RE: Mus 1m Brotherhood's ascent in Egypt Thanks I got this one. (t0(6) Drawing on your earlier comment. Is there any way I could also say, without quotes: U.S. officials believe that the Egyptian military is not in a strong position to push back against the Muslim Brotherhood and that trying to suppress the group would be highly risky and likely to incite violence? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent (t0(6) The Wall Street Journal. . . (202) 862-9234 [mailto bucia.gov] Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 5:67 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan ClAAot Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012444 (bxa) Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012444 . Subject: Fw: Muslim Brotherhood?s ascent in Egypt Please confirm receipt!? Thanks, Todd --??-0riginal From: Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 4:42 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media Subject: RE: Muslim Brotherhood's ascent in Egypt Hi Siobhan, I can offer the following, on background as a official": "The Muslim Brotherhood, like any political organization, is maneuvering for position. The military is a proud institution and has redlines, but also wants to solidify its role in a new Egypt. Their relationship is evolving and looking to the past for insight into where it's going may not be so helpful." Hope this is helpful! Best, Todd Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs @ucia.g0v From: Gorman, Siobhan [mailtoz bwsj.com] Sent: esday, March 27, 2612 4:85 PM To: Subject: RE: Muslim Brotherhood's ascent in Egypt Todd, Thanks again. This is all super helpful. I really appreciate it. I'd really like to be able to use some of your good work in the story. Is there any way that we could use the following bits, cited to a U.S. official or another similarly vague citation? Ideally would use as quotes, but could paraphrase and cite to U.S. offiCials, if that makes it a little easier. The military is not in a strong position to push back. Trying to suppress the MB would be highly risky and couldn't be done without violence-- probably a lot. There are probably limits to how far the MB can test the military without a backlash, but looking to the 19505 for analogies isn't that helpful. Anything additional, too, would be great. Thanks again, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012444 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012444 (292) 862-9234 Message-??-- Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 3:50 PM To: German, Siobhan Subject: FN: Muslim Brotherhood's ascent in Egypt Hope you receive this. . 1Message-??-- Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 3:31 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan' Cc: 'media@ucia.gov' Subject: RE: Muslim Brotherhood's ascent in Egypt Hi Siobhan, In response to your questions on the Muslim Brotherhood, please find some perspective below, which I hope is helpful. Off the record, the Muslim Brotherhood is an opportunistic organization that is feeling its - way through Egypt's political transition. What looks like a power grab may be more the result of the MB's taking advantage of a fluid political situation. The political accommodation between the MB and the military seems to be fraying and there probably are several reasons for this. Looking at Egypt's economic and security situation, it's reasonable to think the MB wants a say now over developments so it's not left holding the bag when the military turns over power. Pushing for a greater role in government means taking some responsibility for righting the ship, so it's not risk free. Running a presidential candidate would be upping the ante but circumstance may be driving decisions as the options probably aren't that appealing to MB militants. Continuing off the record, the military is not in a strong position to push back. Plus, the priority is protecting itself in a new Egypt and the best way to do that is through the constitutional process. Trying to suppress the MB would be highly risky and couldn't be done without violence--probably a lot. There are probably limits to how far the MB can test the military without a backlash, but looking to the 1950s for analogies isn't that helpful. Wishing you a great day, Todd Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (b)c3)CH/v4ct E??uumgovmxs) (t0(6) ??-?-0r1g1nal Message?-?-? From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 1:27 PM o: Subject: Fw: Muslim Brotherhood's ascent in Egypt Todd, Thanks for your help. Here's the note I sent to Preston. Approved for Release: 2017/05/11 C06012444 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012444 Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent (t0(6) The Wall Street Journal. (292) 352-9234 Message-?--? From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Tuesday, March 27, 2012 9:53 AM To: Subject: Muslim Brotherhood's ascent in Egypt Hi Preston, We have a story for tomorrow on the Muslim Brotherhood's abrupt and robust push to control almost every organ of government. we're wondering what the U.S. take is. Is the Brotherhood really taking everything over, and is that a U.S. concern? What is the U.S. take on what the Egyptiam military plans to do about this? Is there U.S. Concern that we could have a scenario like Egypt's last revolution in the early 19505, when the military fell out with the Brotherhood and ended up banning all political parties? Field Marshall Tantawi already alluded to this in a recent speech, warning the Brotherhood against "repeating the mistakes of the past." I'd really appreciate your perspective. If there's any way to get back to me in the early afternoon, I'd appreciate it. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent (t0(6) The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012444 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012450 ClAAot From: Gorman, Siobhan @wsj.com] Sent: Frida March 30, 2012 3:41 PM c2: Media ClAAct Subject: Re: Xilai's Wife Thanks very much. By the way, you guys got my interview request, right? I just realized I hadn?t gotten a note back. Have a good weekend. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent I The Wail Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 ClAAct From:le [maiito: @ucia.gov] Sent: Friday, March 30, 2012 05: To: German, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Xilai's Wife Siobhan, Off the record, from my read of the I think your folks are pretty on top of this case and have quite a few bio details on Xilai's wife already. They have her name (Gu Kailai) and her profession (lawyer). The only thing they may want to look for in Chinese press is the she?s reportedly the daughter of Gu Jingsheng?a Revolutionary era General. This makes her a princeling/scion of the original revolutionary luminaries. Have a great weekend, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs may ClAAot Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012450 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012452 From: Gorman, Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2012 10:1 1 AM To: Subject: RE: Pakistan Hi Preston, I just rang your office and no one pickedup. You must be in a meeting. Just wanted to circle back with you this morning per our chat last night. Can you ring my cell when you get a chance? I?m at Also, I wanted to check one thing in our story on Soleimani today. We were told by two people who should know that Soleimani?s message to Gen. Petraeus was conveyed through Ahmed Chalabi. wish I'd thought to double check that with you guys when I was checking on the quote. Ijust wanted to make sure that was accurate because a source of mine who read the story this morning said he thought the message was conveyed through Talebani. Thanks, Siobhan . Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (wi i [mailto::bucia.gov] Sent: ues ay, April 03, 2012 6:56 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Pakistan Siobhan, On background as a official": "It really is not that complicated. This effort, from its outset, has always been dynamic. it is designed to target terrorists?preciser and effectively?in order to protect America's interests. There?s no question it has been successful against al-Qaeda and its militant allies." Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (b)(3)ClAAct ?Cia'm? (b)(3)ClAAct From: Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 12:46 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan' Cci: Media Subject: RE: Pakistan Siobhan, Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012452 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012452 Off the record, some of the thinking you are hearing about is based upon a common misunderstanding that the effectiveness of the program is measured mainly by a quota of explosions. numbers of actions equals success. Below is a background quote explaining that effectiveness is the key indicator. Also logically, it would follow that an AQ with diminished bench strength would offer fewer targets now than they did in 2010. i think it might be time for people to ?consider alternative explanations when looking at the pace of strikes. Continuing off the record, sorry but we?re not going to get into the myriad of reports/claims about the back and forth, many of which are inaccurate (especially the concessions ciaimed in the AP article last week). I?ll get back to you soon on the email you just sent me. A Here are some things I can offer on background as a of?cial": "The pace isn?t the most important thing; it is the effectiveness of the actions that matters most. There?s been a long run of aggressive counterterrorism operations which have weakened al-Qaeda to the point where there are fewer targets than there Were a year ago. This year already, an al?Qaeda external ops planner and a critical Pakistani militant ally have been removed from the equation, and last fall several more senior figures were removed. The job is not finished; al?Qaeda can still regain some strength. However, another way to look at the current pace is to view the number as the result of sustained effectiveness, plain and simple.? "With fewer al?Qaeda operatives on the battlefield, naturally it takes time to develop information on the location of a smaller number of leaders who are spending a great deal of time in hiding.? ?The US is conducting, and will continue to conduct, effective counterterrorism Operations to protect the U.S. and its interests." Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs I ClAAot Sm ClAAct From: Gorman, Siobhan [mailto wsj.com] Sent: Monday, April 02, 2012 2:12 PM ClAAct Subject: Pakistan Hi Preston, We're back to one of our favorite topics this week. Drone-strike frequency spawns stories as it goes up and down. I wanted to run past you what we have been hearing lately to see how it squares with your understanding. In speaking with of?cials on the U.S. and Pakistani side, it sounds like the U.S. has adjusted its focus for strikes to focus on certain categories, including personality strikes and force protection strikes. We?re told that personality strikes are pursued as usual, but signature strikes are now being pursued primarily when they are connected to a specific threat to folks on the ground. This is the explanation we have been given, in part, for why the frequency of strikes has declined. From what has been described to us, it appears that these are adjustments the U.S. has made on its own volition?as opposed to as part of an agreement with the Pakistanis. We are told there is no agreement with the Pakistanis, though a number of options have been discussed. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012452 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012452 Among the options that were rejected were having the US. do surveillance for the strike and have Pakistani F-165 fire at the target. Among the options still under discussion would be some type ofjoint effort in which the US. takes the strike, but the Pakistanis are involved in a way that would allow them to have some ownership over the effort and possibly be the public fate of the strikes when it comes to public discussion of them. We are told that the CIA opposes this option. We are also told that some lawmakers on Capitol Hill are frustrated with the pace and think it should be faster. So, we wanted to check in with you on these elements of a story that we are planning to pull together in the coming days. In addition, if it is possible to talk through some numbers to ensure accuracy, that would be most appreciated. I know that public counts are often low, which can exaggerate periods of low-frequency. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gonnan Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. ?1025 Connecticut Ave, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862?9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012452 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012453 ClAAct ClAAct From: Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2012 6:59 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media Subject: Pakistan Siobhan, On background as a of?cial?: ."If the main concern is sovereignty, the Pakistanis might want to deal with the al-Qaeda foreigners who are living within their borders and planning attacks on Pakistan, their neighbors, and the Nest. These are the true threats to Pakistani sovereignty." Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs we anAct ClAAot Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012453 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012458 ClAAct ClAAct From: Sent: I 11,2012 5:40 PM To: @gmailnom Subject: FW: Bo Xilai Affair Only because we had problems the last time around I?m forwarding to your personal account, just to be on the safe s'de! Todd ClAAct From: Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 5:39 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan? Cc: 'media@ucia.gov' Subject: Bo Xilai Affair Hi Siobhan, Preston indicated you might find some background perspective on the Bo Xilai affair useful. I can share the following, on background as a official?: "Just about everyone agrees that the events surrounding Bo Xilai?s precipitous fall are fueling China?s biggest political scandal in decades. China's leaders have closed ranks around the need to deal decisively with Bo and that's significant. lt?s reasonable to think they would be focused now on protecting the Communist Party?s image and credibility, especially during a time of major leadership transition.? I hope this is indeed helpful. Please have a great evening. Best, Todd Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ClAAct SW Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012458 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012459 ClAAct From: :l Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 11:20 PM To: @wsj.com' Subject: e: 0 MI aIr Please do reach out tomorrow. Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 11:08 PM TO Subject: Re: Bo Xilai Affair Hi Todd, Thanks so much. Apologies for not responding sooner. I though I had and just realized I hadn't. i think we may do a story tomorrow or Friday specifically on the US assessment, so I'll give you a call tomorrow to follow up on a couple things. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street journal. (202) 862-9234 (ml ClAAct Fromm [maith @uciagov] Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 05:38 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Bo Xilai Affair Hi Siobhan, Preston indicated you might find some background perspective on the Bo Xilai affair useful. I can share the following, on background as a official": "Just about everyone agrees that the events surrounding Bo Xilai?s precipitous fall are fueling China?s biggest political scandal in decades. China?s leaders have closed ranks around the need to deal decisively with 30 and that's significant. It's reasonable to think they would be focused now on protecting the Communist Party?s image and credibility, especially during a time of major leadership transition.? I hope this is indeed helpful. Please have a great evening. Best, Todd Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs may ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012459 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012461 ClAAct l? From: Gorman, Siobha??wsjcom Sent: Thursdaj, April 1 . To: Subject: Re: Response - Bo Xilai Query ClAAct Super, thanks again. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (bxa) (202) 862-9234 Fromm [mailto @ucia.gov Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 05:48 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan . Subject: RE: Response - Bo Xilai Query Hi I havn?t forgotten about you! Checking something and I?ll be back with you asap. From: Gorman, Siobhan [m Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 5:09 PM To: Media Subject: Re: Response - Bo Xilai Query Thanks so much. This is very helpful, and i appreciate your working to provide additional material. Would it be alright and accurate to say something like:U.S. officials are watching the Party's handling of the investigation, which they see as a test of its ability to maintain its legitimacy/credibility with the public? Siobhan Gorman intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 ClAAct Fromm [maith @ucia.gov] Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 05:01 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc::@gm:i@gmx Media@ucia.gov Subject: Response - Bo Xilai Query Hi Siobhan, Following up on our earlier discussion, I have fleshed out a bit the comment I provided yesterday. Please let me know if this is helpful. Thanks very much, Todd Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012461 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012461 On background, as a official?: ?Just about everyone agrees that the events surrounding Bo Xilai?s precipitous fall are fueling China?s biggest political scandal in decades. China's leaders have closed ranks around the need to deal decisively with Bo and that?s significant. His ouster looks less like a playing out of factional struggles than the Party?s need to protect its image and credibility, especially during a time of major leadership transition. So far, there?s not a lot to suggest the political balance inside China?s ruling elite has been upset by the Bo saga.? Continuing on background: "Looking down the line, it?s reasonable to think the Party?s investigation will try to show that Bo is an aberration. He has supporters but he alienated a lot of people too. Keeping the focus on Bo and his associates will probably be a pretty high priority for a Party in full self-protection mode.? Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson Office of Public Affairs ucia. ov ClAAot ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012461 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012462 (bxa) From: Gorman, Siobhamwe?com] Sent: Thursday, Aprili 12 6:06 To: 3 Cc: F?gmailcom? Media Subject: e: esponse - Bo Xilai Query Great, thanks so much. Really appreciate your help. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (wl ClAAct ClAAct Fromm [mailtol @uciagov] Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 06:03 PM 6 To: Gorman, Siobhan Gem mm? Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Response - Bo'Xilai Query You're most welcome, Siobhan. How about: US officials are watching the Party?s handling of the investigation, which they see as a test of its abilitv to maintain credibility with the Chinese public, especially the elites. From: Gorman, Siobhan [mm Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 WE Media Subject: Re: Response - Bo Xilai Query Thanks so much. This is very helpful, and I appreciate your working to provide additional material. Wouldit be alright and accurate to say something like: US. officials are watching the Party?s handling of the investigation, which they see as a test of its ability to maintain its legitimacy/credibility with the public? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 melEle [mailto @ucia.gov Sent: ursday, April 12, 2012 05:01 PM To: Gorman Siobhan Cc: - mail.com Subject: Response - Bo Xilai Query - mail.com>; Media@ucia.gov HiSiobhan, Following up on our earlier discussion, I have fleshed out a bit the comment i provided yesterday. Please let me know if this is helpful. Thanks very much, Todd Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012462 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012462 On background, as a official?: "Just about everyone agrees that the events surrounding Bo Xilai's precipitous fall are fueling China?s biggest political scandal in decades. China?s leaders have closed ranks around the need to deal decisively with Bo and that's significant. His ouster looks less like a playing out of factional struggles than the Party?s need to protect its image and credibility, especially during a time of major leadership transition. So far, there?s not a lot to suggest the political balance inside China's ruling elite has been upset by the Bo saga.? Continuing on background: "Looking down the line, it?s reasonable to think the Party's investigation will try to show that Bo is an aberration. He has supporters but he alienated a lot of people too. Keeping the focus on Bo and his associates will probably be a pretty high priority for a Party in full self-protection mode.? Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of blic Affairs @uciagov ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012462 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012463 ClAAct I ClAAct From Sent To Cc Subject Wednesday, April 18, 2012 4:58 PM 'Gorman, Siobhan' 'media@ucia.gov' Response on Bo Xilai Hi Siobhan, I hope the comment below gets you to where you want to be. Best, Todd On background, as a official": "Any information that Wang Lijun may have provided to US officials hasn?t changed topline US assessments of Chinese leadership or politics.? Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs :ELia-gol (bxs) ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012463 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012465 From: Sent: Friday, April 20, 2012 2:02 PM To: - 'Gorman, Siobha?n' Subject: RE: back to Bo Sure - I?il call you in a sec. From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Frida April 20, 2012 1:5 "d Cc: Media Subject: RE: back to Bo Thanks very much. I did get your Yemen comment, and was going to circle back with you this afternoon after your meeting for awhile. Can you give me a ring when you free up? I appreciate the clarification. I assumed that is what you meant on Bo, but I just wanted to clarify. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street (202) 862-9234 (bxs) Rummy [maith @uciagov] Sent: Friday, April 20, 2012 1:56 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: back to Bo Hi Siobhan, Hope you got the AQAP comment. I?ll turn back to that subject now that our meeting is over. Off the record, the question you asked is not in our lane. Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan [mailto @wsjcom] Se ,April20,201212:1 3 Cc: Media Subject: RE: back to Bo Thanks for the quick response. Can you not offer comment because this is not CiA's jurisdiction or because you can't discuss this aspect of the story? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wail Street 10 (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012465 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012465 megmgol [maiito: @uciagov] Sent: rI ay, April 20, 2012 11:33 AM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: back to Bo (bxs) Hi Siobhan, Off the record, I?m sorry that the aspect of the story you raise is not an area on which I can offer any comment. You?re welcome to come back to us with other Bo?related queries, of course. Best, Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Friday, April 20, 2012 10:27 AM . To Subject: back to Bo Hi Todd, So we?re picking up a few more tidbits that I wanted to run past you. We?re told that the U5. is increasingly concerned about the British response to the Heywood murder, and is particularly unhappy that William Hague publicly confirmed that the U5. provided Britain with information on the Heywood case that the US. got from Wang Lijun. So, I?m wondering how this squares with your understanding. Andy guidance?on or off record?would be very helpful. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 ConnectiCut Ave? NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012465 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012514 ClAAct ClAAct From: - Sent: Friday, April 13, 2012 2:27 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan' Subject: RE: N. Korea foliow-up Of course, Siobhan. Makes sense. ClAAct From: Gorman, Siobhan [m Sent: Friday, April 13, 2012 2:18 PM T0: Cc: Media ClAAct SUbiect: RE: N. Korea follow-up Thanks very much. I thought it wouid probably take awhile to know for sure, but I needed to ask. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. - (202) 862-9234 (wl 6 ClAAct From @ucia.qov[mailto buciaoov] ClAAct Sent: Friday, April 13, 2012 2:02 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: N. Korea follow-up Hi Siobhan, Off the record, the launch failure is clearly a setback to North Korea's program. Right now, our rocket scientists are focused on assessing what went wrong and that may take some time. It may be a while yet before anyone starts to grind away at a recalculation of timeframes. I hope this is helpful. Best to you, Todd Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ClAAct 0" ClAAct From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Friday, April 13, 2012 12:1?3 PM To: Subject: N. Korea tonow-up ClAAct Hi Guys, Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012514 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012514 We seem to be doing an around the world tour this week. Thanks for the comments last night on North Korea. I have a quick follow up on that today. Will the failed test prompt a recalculation of projections for a North Korean ICBM by 2015ish? In January 2011, Gates estimated they would have one within 5 years, so our understanding is the projection has been 2015/16. We?re wondering if the us. time frame estimates are expected to shift in light of the fourth failed test. Any sense of that? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862?9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012514 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012518 ClAAct ClAAct From: Sent: Monday, April 23, 2012 7:11 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan' Subject: RE: Response on AQAP It?s my pleasure, Siobhan. Please do. Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Monday, April 23, 2012 7:08 PM To: CC: 8 la Subject: Re: Response on AQAP Thank you, Todd. I appreciate this. I'll ring you in the am with a quick follow up. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (bll5) (202) 862-9234 (wll Fromsz ClAAct Sent: Monday, April 23, 2012 06:14 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Response on AQAP (bxs) Hi Siobhan, Referencing our conversations, please find below what I can offer on the issues you raised. I do hope the comments provide some useful perspective. Best, Todd (bxg) We are not providing steers on theSstory, so please note that CIA declined to comment. Off the record, I would steer you off the idea that changes on the ground in Yemen are affecting US counterterrorism strategy. You?ll recall from the and the testimony at the September hearing on terrorism that AQAP was clearly described as the most dangerous regional node in the global jihad the group has planned and carried out two attacks aimed at the US homeland since December 2009. Whatever the course of the AQAP's anti-government insurgency, the US has a clear interest in taking off the battlefield operatives who pose a threat to the lives of Americans. As you know, the US is not interested in getting involved in Yemen's internecine military struggles, but exploring ways to increase the advantage against our enemies makes a lot of sense. On background, as a official?: expanding footprint in southern Yemen increases the risk that the group will establish a regional safehaven. This would be a dangerous development because anti-government insurgency and its terrorist plotting against the West are two sides of the same coin. The group would have more flexibility to conduct external attacks from a position of strength than if its gains are being reversed.? Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012518 Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ucia. ovn Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012518 ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012518 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012520 ClAAct From: Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 12:35 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan' Cc: r'media@ ucia.gov' Subject: Comments on Hi Siobhan, Please find below responses to the questions you raised and additional background comments per your request. I do hope this is helpful as you move forward with your story. Best, Todd Off the record, we have no additional information on Muhammad al?Umdah's status. Continuing off the record, we are not going to get into specifics about the frequency of US CT activities in Yemen. They are ongoing. We do wish to underscore that the convergence of growing expertise, enhanced targeting, and the use of increasingly refined methodology naturally allows for more opportunities. On background, as a official?: "The loss of Aulaqi was a severe blow to AQAP and the group is looking to fill his shoes, probably with several people to make up for his absence. Despite Aulaqi's death, AQAP during the last six months has grown in strength. AQAP's seizure of territory in southern Yemen enhances its ability to. attract and train recruits, especially Yemeni fighters for its anti? government insurgency. The group also remains sharply focused on external plotting and attacking the West.? Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs @322 From: Gorman, Siobhan [Dim] Sent: Tuesda April 24, 2012 7:57 PM To: Subject: Re: quotes Thanks very much. Talk with you tomorrow. Siobhan Gorman intelligence Correspondent The Wali Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 [mailtol @ucia.gov Sent: Tuesday, April 24, 2012 07:06 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Subject: RE: quotes 7 7 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012520 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012520 Hi Siobhan, I saw that you had sent this note earlier (thank you) and wanted to say now that We come up for air that I'll get back to you early in the day tomorrow with a response. i?li put as much of this on background as i can. Please have an enjoyable evening, Todd . From: Gorman, Siobhan [Wm] Sent: Tuesday, April 24, 2012 2: T0: Subject: quotes Todd, Thanks for your help. These are the ones that I?d like to put on background. 0n al-Awlaki: "Our view is that they? re certainly looking to replace him, but it may not be with one ?gure it may be with multiple ?gures." On territorial gains: heir ability to seize territory has a had a positive effect on their ability to recruit. They remaking series gains inside Yemen, and that is adding to their strength in multiple ways.? Would that include training camps? Haven't seen it yet but: "certainly it?s something we?d be concerned about if they' re able to hold territory." Also, I meant to double check when we were chatting, but when we spoke initially, you said it would be accurate to say that since al-Awlaki?s death the AQAP threat has increased because you have seen the threat grow in the last six months or 50. Just want to make sure that is indeed accurate and usable. I'll circle back with you tomorrow on the issue of who died in the Sunday strike in Yemen. (Just discussed it briefly with Preston who was unlucky enough to answer the phone). Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862?9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012520 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012527 From: Gorman, Siobhan wsj.com] Sent: Tuesda May 01, 2012 3:30 PM To: Cc: Meme Subject: RE: Translating the UBL trove Thank you for this rundown and for the follow up call. As I mentioned, we're holding off for at least a day, given all the pushback, so that we can try to reconcile why we're getting such different versions of the story. I'll follow up with you tomorrow to let you know 1 whether we've resolved the discrepancies and how that affects the story. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent (t0(6) The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862?9234 [mailto: pucia.gov] Sent: ues ay, May 61, 2012 3:1 To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Translating the UBL trove Siobhan, Off the record, to be frank you're hearing from people who don't understand how doCument exploitation works. It may also be that your sources don't understand the translations and gists are available to them on IC systems. Here's what happened in general. All the documents were gisted by interagency linguists and reviewed by subject matter experts who triaged the documents for what was of possible intelligence value. So it is correct to say that a translator looked at all of the documents. Now, say hypothetically, a grocery receipt from the corner store, a tranche of Arabic newspaper articles the IC already has translations for, and a letter from Atiyah are gisted. The experts put the Atiyah letter in for immediate full priority translation. All documents are still gisted (translated at a level that is useful to English speaking and available to the IC Now, add to that, several of the documents are duplicates and found on multiple storage devices and you'd understand that the documents of value were fully translated--in record time actually. We will have to push back hard if you guys run with this and insinuate somehow that intelligence was missed or not made available. On background as a "senior US official" "We're confident the documents of intelligence value have been translated and disseminated. The interagency task force completed its review in June 2611 of over ten thousand documents and disseminated over four hundred reports to the Intelligence Community.? Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012527 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012527 "It has always been clear that the documents would be of intelligence value for some time to come. The information will continue to be available to intelligence community for future research." "If there's something that is clearly apparent from the CT fight to date it is that the intelligence community has become expert at document exploitation. There's a science to triaging massive amounts of data and getting to the heart of the valuable intelligence. Hundreds of linguists and went over the Bin Laden documents with a fine-tooth comb, in record time after the raid. A reflection of this effort is apparent in all the insights learned from the materials gathered in the raid that people have been talking about for the past year." Preston Golson Media Spokesperson cm Office of Public Affairs ucia.gov (t0(6) From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Tuesda Ma 61, 2612 11: To: Cc: Media Subject: RE: Translating the UBL trove Thank you for looking into it. There's always a chance we're getting steered incorrectly, but two people in a position to know said that the majority hadn?t been fully translated and it was recently recognized as an issue and it now being dealt with. Two others confirmed the lagging translation part, so I have a hard time thinking all these folks are confused. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent (t0(6) The Wall Street Journal. (262) 862-9234 From: much . gov [mailto ucia .gov] Sent: es ay, May 01, 2012 16:59 AM To: Gorman, (b)63)CH/Mkct Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Translating the UBL trove Siobhan, Off the record, this doesn't sound quite right, but we?re checking and will get back you this afternoon. Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs Approved for Release: 006012527 for Release: 2017/05/17 006012527 @ucia.gov I (t0(6) From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2012 9:56 AM Subject: Translating the UBL trove (b)c3)cn/vect Hi Guys, 50 do I wish you a "happy anniversary" today? 0n the departed terrorist leader, we're told that the pace of translating his small college library of stuff has lagged. We know it was triaged by Arabic speakers, but most of the stuff hasn't been translated. We're pulling together a story for tomorrow on it, and I wanted to get your take on the question of why the lag and when/why/how translation was stepped up in recent weeks. CIA officers were among those who complained they couldn't get access to info, so we're also wondering when that came to CIA's attention and what was done about it. Here's a summary of what we've been told: We're told that the majority of the documents seized from Osama bin Laden?s compound have not been translated. The failure to quickly translate the.documents has meant that information that could shed light on al Qaeda's weakness and control of operatives, has not been available to intelligence or military special operations teams. The problem was recognized only after CIA operatives and military officers began complaining they did not have access to the material and arguing that important intelligence was going unexploited. The pace of translation has stepped up in recent weeks as more senior leaders were briefed on the issue. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street 30 (202) 862-9234 (w)TEnal4T Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012527 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012528 - - From: Gorman, Siobhan we].com] Sent: Wednesda May 02, 2012 5:14 PM To: Subject: rans ating the UBL trove (bxs) On a separate note, my editor just swung by saying that he loves the story and would like it ASAP. . So, if there's a way to make another run at it--even if to just use some facts on background w/o quotes or anything like that--I'd be grateful. I could go through with you the facts I'm seeking to use on background, if that's helpful. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (t0(6) (262) 862-9234 1 . Sent: We nes ay, MaijZ, 2612 4:58 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Subject: RE: Translating the UBL trove Siobhan, Thank you for the update. No worries, getting to the right context is why we're here. Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs uc1a . gov From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 4:92 PM To: Subject: RE: Translating the UBL trove Hi Preston, Just wanted to circle back with you on this. At this point, it sounds like we've reached an accord among sources on what happened, but there's a difference between the military and intelligence interpretation about whether additional translation is needed. That leaves us with a pretty muddled story, so absent new facts or insights that suggest there is more of a story, I think we're going to put this one aside. 4 Thanks for your help, and I'm sorry for the busywork yesterday, though I imagine your preferred outcome is no story, anyhow. Thanks, Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012528 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012528 Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (t0(6) (292) 862-9234 ?-?--0riginal Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2012 3:16 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Translating the UBL trove Siobhan, Off the record, to be frank you're hearing from people who don't understand how document exploitation works. It may also be that your sources don't understand the translatibns and gists are available to them on IC systems. Here's what happened in general. All the documents were gisted by interagency linguists and reviewed by subject matter experts who triaged the documents for what was of possible intelligence value. So it is correct to say that a translator looked at all of the documents. Now, say hypothetically, a grocery receipt from the corner store, a tranche of Arabic newSpaper articles the IC already has translations for, and a letter from Atiyah are gisted. The experts put the Atiyah letter in for immediate full priority translation. All documents are still gisted (translated at a level that is useful to English speaking and available to the IC Now, add to that, several of the documents are duplicates and found on multiple storage devices and you'd understand that the documents of value were fully translated-~in record time actually. We will have to push back hard if you guys run with this and insinuate somehow that intelligence was missed or not made available. On background as a "senior US official" "We're confident the documents of intelligence value have been translated and disseminated. The interagency task force completed its review in June 2011 of over ten thousand documents and disseminated over four hundred reports to the Intelligence Community." "It has always been clear that the documents would be of intelligence value for some time to come. The information will continue to be available to intelligence community for future research." "If there's something that is clearly apparent from the CT fight to date it is that the intelligence community has become expert at document exploitation. There's a science to triaging massive amounts of data and getting to the heart of the valuable intelligence. Hundreds of linguists and went over the Bin Laden documents with a fine-tooth comb, in record time after the raid. A reflection of this effort_is apparent in all the insights learned from the materials gathered in the raid that people have been talking about for the past year." Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012528 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012528 :puciagov -?-?-Original From: Gorman, Siobhan (t0(6) Sent: Tuesda Ma 61, 2612 11:46 AM To: Cc: Media Subject: RE: Translating the UBL trove Thank you for looking into it. There's always a chance we're getting steered incorrectly, but two people in a position to know said that the majority hadn?t been fully translated and it was recently recognized as an issue and it now being dealt with. Two others confirmed the lagging translation part, so I have a hard time thinking all these folks are confused. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (t0(6) (292) 862-9234 (bxs) Sent: Tuesday, May 61, 2612 16:59 AM To: Gorman, Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Translating the UBL trove Siobhan, Off the record, this doesn't sound quite right, but we're checking and will get back you this afternoon. Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs - . From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Tuesday, May 61, 2612 9:56 AM To;? Subject: Translating the UBL trove Hi Guys, 50 do I wish you a "happy anniversary" today? On the departed terrorist leader, we're told that the pace of translating his small college library of stuff has lagged. We know it was triaged by Arabic speakers, but most of the stuff hasn't been translated. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012528 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012528 We're pulling together a story for tomorrow on it, and I wanted to get your take on the question Of why the lag and when/why/how translation was stepped up in recent weeks. CIA officers were among those who complained they couldn't get access to info, so we're also wondering when that came to CIA's attention and what was done about it. Here's a summary of what we've been told: We're told that the majority of the documents seized from Osama bin Laden?s compound have not been translated. The failure to quickly translate the documents has meant that information that could shed light on a1 Qaeda's weakness and control of operatives, has not been available to intelligence or military special operations teams. The problem was recognized only after CIA operatives and military officers began complaining they did not have access to the material and arguing that important intelligence was going unexploited. The pace of translation has stepped up in recent weeks as more senior leaders were briefed on the issue. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012528 Approved for Release: mag/17 006012530 From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Sunda May 06, 2012 7:15 PM To: Meme Subject: Re: Quso? CIAACI Looks like reports say the strike was courtesy of CIA. If we do a story, would that be an accurate thing to say? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (292) 862-9234 Ori inal Message [mailt Sent: un ay, May 06, 2012 04:01 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan; Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Quso? Siobhan, Off the recOrd, Quso was indeed imprisoned in Yemen for his role in the Cole bombing (he was released several years ago as I recall). As_you know, we're fairly cautious on these sorts of things, so it would likely be a while before we could confirm the below. Just don't have anything at this time. Thanks. (t0(6) ?--?-Original From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Sunday, May 06, 2912 3:35 PM To: anAct Subject: Quso? Sorry for the double-header queries. This one may be more important. Colleagues in Yemen are saying that the mastermind of the Cole bombing, al-Quso, is no longer with us. Any truth to that? I Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862?9234 Original Message From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: SUnday, May 06, 2012 01:52 PM To: Subject: Feinstein/Rogers comments today Hi guys, Happy Sunday. Wondering what your take is on the Feinstein and Rogers comments today on CNN on the growing strength of the Taliban since the surge. Is this an assessment you share? Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012530 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012530 Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The wall Street Jo rnal. (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012530 I Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012531 . . (t0(6) From: Gorman, Siobhan @wsycom] - Sent: Sunda Ma 06 2 12 4:22 PM To: cc: Media Subject: Re: Feinstein/Rogers comments today Thanks very much for both responses. I'll check back tomorrow on our friend in Yemen. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent (t0(6) The Wall Street Journal. (292) 862-9234 1 Original Message Sent: un ay, May 06, 2012 04:13 PM To: Gorman, Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Feinstein/Rogers rnmments today . Siobhan, Off the record, we really do believe Sen Feinstein's and Rep Rogers' comments can and should stand on their own, and we are in very regular contact with our oversight committees on this issue. However, if needed, I could provide the following on background as a official": ?There's no question that the capabilities, intent, and motivation of the Taliban has been a pressing issue for the US government for years. There will be Taliban elements willing to continue their campaign for the foreseeable future." (t0(6) --?-?0r1g1nal Message--?-- From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Sunday, May 06, 2012 1:52 PM To:? 1 Subject: Feinstein/Rogers comments today Hi guys, Happy Sunday. Wondering what your take is on the Feinstein and Rogers comments today on CNN on the growing strength o? the Taliban since the surge. Is this an assessment you share? 1 Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street JOLrnal. ?mm (202) 862?9234 . Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012531 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012533 From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 6:08 PM To: ClAAct Subject: RE: AQAP plot Neither are accurate? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (wll Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 6:07 PM To: German, Siobhan Subject: RE: AQAP plot ClAAct No, it?s not accurate. From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 6:06 PM Tm: Subject: RE: AQAP plot (mm Thanks. is it accurate to say the bomb was seized in Yemen? Can you share anything about the guy? Would it be accurate to say he's in custody? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 362-9234 (w)l . Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 6:05 To: Gorman, Siobhan Subject: RE: AQAP plot I?m sure you have these by now, but just in DHS Statement: ?We have no specific, credible information regarding an active terrorist plot against the U.S. at this time, although we continue to monitor efforts by al-Qa?ida and its affiliates to carry out terrorist attacks, both in the Homeland and abroad. Since this IED demonstrates our adversaries? interest in targeting the aviation sector, DHS continues, at the direction of the President, to employ a risk-based, layered approach to ensure the security of the traveling public. These layers include threat and vulnerability analysis, prescreening and screening of passengers, using the best available technology, random searches at airports, federal air marshal coverage and additional security measures both seen and unseen. DHS will continue to work with our federal, state, local, international and private sector partners to identify potential threats and Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012533 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012533 take appropriate protective measures. As always, we encourage law enforcement and security officials, as well as the general public, to maintain vigilance and report suspicious activity to the appropriate authorities.? ?Matt Chandler, DHS Spokesman - - FBI statement: ?As a result of close cooperation with our security and intelligence partners overseas, an improvised explosive device designed to carry out a terrorist attack has been seized abroad. The FBI currently has possession of the IED and is conducting technical and forensics analysis on it. Initial exploitation indicates that the device is very similar to lEDs that have been used previously by al-Qa?ida .in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in attempted terrorist attacks, including against aircraft and for targeted assassinations. The device never presented a threat to public safety, and the US. Government is working closely with international partners to address associated concerns with the device. We refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, including the Transportation Security Administration, regarding ongoing security measures to safeguard the American people and the traveling public.? Statement WH COMMENT: he President was first informed about the plot in April by his Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor John Brennan, and he has received regular updates and briefings as needed from his national security team. While the . President was assured that the device did not pose a threat to the public, he directed the Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement and intelligence agencies to take whatever steps necessary to guard against this type of attack. The disruption of this IED plot underscores the necessity of remaining vigilant against terrorism here and abroad. The President thanks all intelligence and counterterrorism professionals involved for their outstanding work and for serving with the extraordinary skill and commitment that their enormous responsibilities demand. ?Cait in Hayden, Deputy NSC Spokesperson From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 5:55 PM To: - Subject: RE: AQAP plot Thank you Siobhan Gorman intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. - (202) 862-9234 Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 5:39 PM TO: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: AQAP plot From a senior US official: "The recovery of the device was a team sport. It is another example of outstanding international counterterrorism cooperation. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012533 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012533 "We disrupted this plot well before it was ever a threat to the United States.? is the responsible group here. We believe AQAP produced the device, and we believe it was intended to be used by a suicide bomber on an aircraft." "The device and the plot are consistent with what we know about plans, intentions, and capabilities. They remain committed to striking targets in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the Homeland, and Europe. And AQAP is probably feeling pressure to conduct a successful attack to, from their perspective, avenge the deaths of Bin Ladin and Aulaqi.? "It is our assessment that the threat form AQAP is growing due to the territorial gains the group made during the political standoff in Yemen that lasted from early 2011 until this past February. Those territorial gains have allowed the group to establish additional training camps.? ?The device is in the hands of the FBI and it is being thoroughly examined.? "We are confident that the study of the device will yield valuable insights that will aid us in adapting security practices and counterterrorism operations here and abroad.? "The device has the hallmarks of previous AQAP bombs that the group used in the failed assassination attempt on Saudi security official Mohammed Bin Nayif and that it used in the failed 2009 Christmas Day bombing. The device, like those earlier devices, is non-metallic.? "While similar, a preliminary review of this device shows that it has some significant differences from the device used in the Christmas day attack. It is clear that AQAP is revamping its bomb techniques to try to avoid the causes of the failure of the 2009 device.? From: Gorman, Siobhan gin: Monda?, May 07, 2012 5:38 PM (bxs) Subject: RE: AQAP plot Hey did you send out the background? I haven't gotten it yet. Hoping it?s. not in my quarantine. fee free to copy my gmaii . Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Waii Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 4:53 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Subject: RE: AQAP plot Siobhan - We Will be sharing background with you in just a few minutes. From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 4:25 PM Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012533 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012533 Tm: Cc: Media Subject: AQAP plot I just rang your office and no one picked up. Can you give me a call please? Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 (val Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C0601257337 A roved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012543 pp Sent: urs ay, ay 10, 2012 4:00 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan' Cc: Media Subject: RE: Siobhan, Off the record, we are sorry but we?re just not in a posture right now to be very helpful on the daily follow-up on the AQAP bomb-plot stories. Clearly, we'd be looking for any indicators recent events might lead to divisions within AQAP. However, these types of assessments just don?t lend themselves for the quick-look analysis of a day three story. I?m sorry. Please keep sending us your queries; hopefully we?ll be able to help on something else. We just can?t offer you anything on this or last night?s action right now. - Best wishes, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Of?ce of Public Affairs From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Thursday, May 10, 2012 1:38 PM To: Cc: Subject: Hey Guys, I spoke w/ Preston yesterday a bit about the impact of recent U.S. operations against AQAP on the organization?sowing mistrust, slowing operational planning, etc. I'm doing a story on that today. Would it b? possible to get any guidance, and ideally background, on the fact that U.S. officials are looking for these indicators and the fact that these types of things usually sow mistrust? I know it?s early, but if you're seeing any indicators at all of impact, that would be incredibly useful to know. Any info you could provide on divisions or issues recent other operations have created for AQAP would also be very helpful. On a semi-related note, is there any connection between the strike reported last night and information gathered in the course of the bomb plot operation? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012543 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012549 ClAAct From: Sent: urs ay, May17, 2012 8:45 PM To: wsj.com' Subject: Re: Libya - Question Thank you for the reprieve! I appreciate the clarification; that's helpful detail. I'll be in touch early in the day tomorrow. Hope you are enjoying this fine evening. Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan (bye) Sent: Thursday, May 17, 2012 07:47 PM To: Cc: Media Subject: Re: Libya - Question Thanks so much, Todd. My colleague hasn't bugged me yet for material, so ifyou can get more to me if we wait unti! tomorrow, that's great. On the surveillance question: i meant current duties. We're told that the Libyan government has switched back on its surveillance tools to monitor phone and internet communications inside the country. Officials say its needed to find supporters of the Gadhafi regime. Siobhan Gorman intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 ClAAct Fromm [mailto: @ucia.oov] Sent: Thursday, May 17, 2012 06:01 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Libya - Question Hi Siobhan, Off the record, I can provide some perspective on al-Hasi tonight if you need it, but I?d prefer to do a little more digging, if your colleagues can wait until tomorrow morning. I know they were shooting to draft tomorrow so I do want to provide a response that'stimely. Please let me know what works. Also, it's certainly not essential, but if you could provide more clarity on what is meant by "early activities in Libya which include internal surveillance? that would be helpful. As you probably know, al?Hasi joined the political opposition to Qadafi in the early 19805 and it?s not clear whether your colleagues are referring to his early opposition experience?which would be odd given the referenced activity?or something more recent related to his current duties. Thanks very much, Todd Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012549 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012552 ClAAct From: Sent: Friday, May 18, 2012 7:11 PM To: 'gmaiI-com' Subject: FW: Response - Query on Libya Sent earlier to WSJ address. Sending to your personal email just to make sure you receive the material. Have a great night. Best, Todd. From: Sent: Friday, May 18, 2012 5:31 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan' Cc: 'media@ucia.gov' Subject: Response - Query on Libya Hi Siobhan, Please find below what I am able to offer on al-Hasi. I do hope your colleagues find the perspective useful. Best, Todd Off the record, the new Libyan intel director appears to be an independent and serious?minded professional. There's no. reason to doubt that al-Hasi is a moderate guy who is committed to countering extremism in Libya. It?s natural, of course, that someone like a ~Hasi without a lot of government experience would want to move carefully. He certainly faces some challenges in rebuilding an institution so closely linked to the old regime along new lines. Al-Hasi looks like a consensus builder who is signaling he's a technocrat committed to?a new Libya. It?s not clear, however, how long he'll be around as Libya is slated to hold elections this summer and a new team might want to start with a clean slate. Continuing off the record, I'd steer you off the idea that the US facilitated al-Hasi's appointment. We definitely didn't, and anyone saying the US had a role may be trying to impugn al-Hasi's credibility inside Libya. Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs @uciagov ClAAct ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 0060172757572 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012560 (W3) From: Sent: Wednesday, May 23, 2012 11:01 AM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan cc=_ Mad'a Subject: RE: Siobhan, Off the record, yes it does seem he was sentenced. We'll see what this means in the longer term. 0n background as a ?senior US official with knowledge of CT operations against al?Qaeda in Pakistan? ?The doctor was never asked to spy on Pakistan. He was asked only to help locate al Qaeda terrorists, who threaten Pakistan and the US. He helped save Pakistani and American lives. His activities were not treasonous, they were heroic and patriotic. Preston Golson Media Spokesperson JCIA Office of Public Affairs (bxs) ClAAot (t0(6) From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Wednesday, May 23, 2012 9:06 AM To:? Subject: Afridi . Hi guys, AP is reporting that Dr. Afridi has been sentenced to 33 years in prison. Is that your understanding? For some reason this seems to be a less-than-public decision in Pakistan. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (292) 862-9234 1 1 (W6) Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012560 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012569 - From: Sent: Wednesday, May 30, 2012 11:11 AM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan' Cc: gmail.com'; 'media@ucia.gov' Subject: Response to your Iraq queries Hi Siobhan, I hope your day is off to a good start. Please find below our responses to your various queries on Iraq. Off the record, confirming Preston's initial response, I wouldn't steer you off any of the ideas you lay out in your 22 May email message. With respect to deliberations on personnel levels, I?m sorry that we won?t be able to provide any guidance on this particular internal issue. Continuing off the record, it?s clear AQI remains a threat to security and stability in Iraq. What?s less clear is the trendline as we are not prepared to say the threat is necessarily increasing. It's certainly no surprise that AQI has had more room to maneuver in the immediate aftermath of the US military?s departure. That said, the Iraqis are working to counter AQI and have some successes to their credit. It looks like the Situation on the ground may be more one of equilibrium than a resurgent AQI growing stronger, but we are watching developments closely as remains a dangerous group. I hope this perspective is'helpful as you move forward with your story. Kind regards, Todd Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (bxs) ucia.!ov WWApproved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012569 A roved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012573 ClAAct pp . From: Gorman, Siobhan q@wsj.com] (bxa) Sent: Monday, June 04, 2012 4:52 cg: Fe la ClAAct Subject: RE: Response - lraq Queries Thanks very much. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (2021 862-9234 ClAAct Fromm [mailto @uciagovl Sent: Monday, June 04, 2012 4:35 PM To: Gorman Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Response - Iraq Queries Hi Siobhan, I hope you find the perspective provided below helpful. Off the record, regarding your question about gaps, it's not as if there won?t still be a presence and sometimes, if you think about agility and secretiveness, it actually is true that you can do more with less. Continuing off the record, l?d steer you off the idea that there is an agreement along the lines you describe. If needed, please feel free to use the following comment, on background, as a official?: "The Iraqis are making a concerted effort to counter AQI and have some successes to their credit. AQI clearly is not a spent force, but the Iraqis are a determined and capable adversary.? Best, Todd Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ucia. ov Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012573 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012576 ClAAct From? Gorman, Siobhan Sent: une 05, 2012 1:09 PM To: Subject: - RE: Abu Yahya Thank you! Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wait Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (w)l From: [mailtolz ucia.govl Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 To: German, Siobhan Subject: Abu Yahya The following is on background and may be attributed to a official?: "Abu Yahya was among al?Qaeda?s most experienced and versatile leaders operational trainer and Central Shura head - and played a critical role in the group?s planning against the West, providing oversight of the external operations efforts.? "Zawahiri will be hard?pressed to find any one person who can readily step into Abu Yahya?s shoes in addition to his gravitas as a longstanding member of leadership, Abu Yahya?s religious credentials gave him the authority to issue fatwas, operational approvals, and guidance to the core group in Pakistan and regional affiliates. There is no one who even comes close in terms of replacing the expertise AG has just lost.? You may say that a US official confirmed Abu Yahya?s death. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012576 Approved for Release: 2017/05/12 006012477 ClAAct From: I Sent: Monday, July 23, To: 1 Cc: Media Subject: Re: story may finally run tomorrow The story is indeed about the gym. I went through just about every detail with Preston several weeks ago, back when I thought it was running soon. It hasn't changed markedly since then, though there was a little section added about Washington culture and a couple lines about Dunkin Donuts. The good carbs line is part of a paragraph that taiks about Find Your Fit and the healthy eating section on the exec dining menu. Happy to go thru the latest version with you, if you like. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 362-9234 (ml 1 (bye) ClAAct Fromm Sent: Monday, July 23, 2012 0 To: Gorman,? Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: story may ?nally run tomorrow Siobhan, Off the record, I'm starting to get worried that this is not really a story about the gym, but perhaps about the boss. Can you reassure me here please? From: Gorman, Siobhan [Mi-5m Sent: Monday, July 23, 2012 4:12 PM To Cc: ra Subject: Re: story may ?nally run tomorrow Sorry, now getting a million final questions from an array of editors in NY. I believe I ran this past you in an earlier conversation, but wanted double check the detail that the director has been known to launch into discourses on "good carbs and bad carbs.? Siobhan Gorman . Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Jo ms! (202) 862-9234 ClAAct Fromm [maiito @uciagovl Sent: on ay, July 23, 2012 04: To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: story,may ?nally run tomorrow Approved for Release: 2017/05/12 006012477 Approved for Release: 2017/05/12 006012477 Siobhan, Off the record, I think it would be safe to assume that the new idea?if it was completed?would have had space for a few more treadmills, among other things. Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ucia. ov From: Gorman, Siobhan [maiito @wsj.com Sent: Monday, July 23, 2012 3:12 PM Tm: ClAAct Cc: Media Subject: RE: story may ?nally run tomorrow Thanks very much. I wasn?t clear in my question: ljust meant that the proposal that is no longer being pursued would have involved space for new treadmills. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 Fromm [mailto l@ucia.gov Sent: Monday, July 23, 2012 2: To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: story may ?nally run tomorrow Siobhan, Off the record, thank you for the heads up. I?ll believe it when i read it Sorry l?m a little unclear on one of your questions. There is no new gym. Or, are you talking about plans to renovate and enhance the existing gyms? I can?t say right now what they'd use the space for. I assume more treadmills would be on the list, but really that enhancement effort is only in its earliest exploratory phases. On you other question, CIA Headquarters is a secure US Government facility requiring clearances, so it would stand to reason that its can only be used by cleared individuais. As you know, as a general rule, we don?t give out personnel numbers for nearly anything. What matters are you trying to account for in your story with these questions? lfyou'd like, we can suggest language. Thanks! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs From: Gorman, Siobhan [Wm] Sent: Monday, July 23, 2012 1: - Approved for Release: 2017/05/12 006012477 (W3) Approved for Release: 2017/05/12 C06012477 To: . Sug story may ?nain run tomorrow The lineup can always change last minute, but it looks like it is currently slated for tomorrow's paper. One thing I wanted to double check because it got tweaked in editing. I assume that it?s OK to say that the new would provide space for more treadmills, right? And it is accurate to call the a classified facility, correct? Correct to say CIA doesn't disclose the number of people who work out at the gyms? Siobhan Gonnan Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 2 0% (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/12 006012477 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012578 From: Gorman, Sent: Tuesda June 05, 2012 1:53 PM To: Subject: RE: Abu Yahya ClAAct Also, just to confirm, he died Monday, right? Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 ClAAct meqw [maith @ucia.gov] Sent: Tues ay, June 05, 2012 . To: Gorman, Siobhan Subject: Abu Yahya The following is on. background and may be attributed to a official": "Abu Yahya was among al-Qaeda's most experienced and versatile leaders operational trainer and Central Shura head and played a critical role in the group?s planning against the West, providing oversight of the external operations efforts." ?Zawahiri will be hard-pressed to find any one person who can readily step into Abu Yahya?s shoes - in addition to his gravitas as a longstanding member of leadership, Abu Yahya?s religious credentials gave him the authority to issue fatwas, operational approvals, and guidance to the core group in Pakistan and regional affiliates. There is no one who even comes close in terms of replacing the expertise AG has just lost.? You may say that a US official confirmed Abu Yahya?s death. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012578 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012579 From: Sent: ues ay, June 05,2012 2:08 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan'; Preston B.G. Cc: Media Subject: Syria Query Hi Siobhan, Off the record, l?m sorry but we really aren?t going to be able to help on your Syria query. Best, Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan [mm] Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 Tm: (W3) Cc: Media Subject: RE: separate query on Mohamed Merah Thanks very much. This was checking out reports out of France, so it appears that they lost something in translation. You saw my Syria qu, right? Many thanks. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234lwl: (bxs) Rommel [mailtol @uciagov] Sent: ues ay, June 05, 2012 12:50 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan?m Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: separate query on Mohamed Merah Hey Siobhan, Off the record, ljust double checked to be sure, and yes you have been told correctly. Information had been shared with the French months before the shooting. The French definitely had Merah on their radar screen prior to the shooting. They were well aware of his travel and linkages to extremist groups in Pakistan. As is often the case, after the fact there?s always more clarity that fills in some blanks. Perhaps this is what your folks have garbled. Hope this helps, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson Office of Public Affairs (W3) :lmia?m From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 11:34 AM To Cc: Media Subject: RE: separate query on Mohamed Merah Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012579 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012579 Thanks. I spoke with someone yesterday who said that the French did have Merah on their radar screen prior to the shooting, and they were surveiling him and then stopped. 50, if that's indeed the case, please let me know. A separate query, told that the CIA has been working to understand who makes up the FSA, and it has been helping elements of the FSA to organize themselves to better fight Assad. This is not lethal support but appears to be more logistical and organizational assistance. Any guidance you can provide would be most appreciated. Thanks again, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (w Fromm [mailtd l@ucia.gov] Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 1 To: Gorman, (bxs) Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: separate query on Mohamed Merah Siobhan, ClAAct Off the record, I?m working on this one and will get back to you soon. Thanks, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs From: Gorman, Siobhan [mailt ws'.com Sent: Monday, June 04, 2012 3:21 PM To; ClAAot Su. Ject: separate query on Mohamed Merah Hi Guys, Sorry for the tandem queries today. A query came over the transom on our friend Mohamed Merah about western intelligence services picking up data on Merah and connections to an organization close to AG and not passing it along to the French until after his shooting spree. Looks like a couple Internet addresses linked to Merah were picked up in Miranshah. I?m sure you?re familiar with this one as it comes from an upcoming report from two French journalists. Any guidance you can provide? Thanks, Siobhan Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012579 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012579 Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 by]: Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012579 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012580 ClAAct From: Gorman, Sent: Tuesda June 05,2012 3:58 PM To: Cc: Media Subject: RE: Abu Yahya Thanks. Can?t 1 use that information? Is there a reason for it to be off the record? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wail Street Journal. mm? (202) 862-9234 Fromm [mailto @ucia.gov Sent: Tuesday, June_05, 2012 3:56 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Abu Yahya Hi Siobhan, Off the record, Abu Yayha pursued his studies of Islam in various North African locations. Best, Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan [mm] (bxs) Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 3:41 PM To 1 CC: Madia Subject: RE: Abu Yahya OK, a more basic question: from where did he draw his sterling religious credentials? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent (bxa) The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 Fromm [mailto @ucia.gov Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 . To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Abu Yahya Hi? Off the record, I do appreciate the way you posed the question. There really isn?t anything we can say beyond the fact that we are confident. Best, Todd Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012580 A'pbiSVed for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012580 From: Gorman, Siobhan [m Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 2:18 PM Tot: Subject: RE: Abu Yahya Don't suppose there's anything you can say about how his death was confirmed or why there is con?dence in this conclusion? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent 6 The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (W): Fromm [mailtol Eucia.gov Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 1:08 PM To: German, Siobhan Subject: Abu Yahya (bxs) The following is on background and may be attributed to a official?: "Abu Yahya was among al-Qaeda?s most experienced and versatile leaders operational trainer and Central Shura head and played a critical role in the group?s planning against the West, providing oversight of the external operations efforts.? - "Zawahiri will be hard-pressed to find any one person who can readily step into Abu Yahya's shoes in addition to his gravitas as a longstanding member of leadership, Abu Yahya?s religious credentials gave him the authority to issue fatwas, operational approvals, and guidance to the core group in Pakistan and regional affiliates. There is no one who even comes close in terms of replacing the expertise AQ has just lost.? You may say that a US official confirmed Abu Yahya?s death. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012580 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012582 From: Gorman, Sent: Wednesda ,June To: CC: Medla Subject: RE: Pak anger inquired this morning on the story, and the editor handling it in NY has not gotten back to me. I?m equally mystified. it is all done, so far as I know. All I can assume is that the queue for a?heds (those quirky feature stories) is longer right now. There is only one slot a day, so they sometimes sail in and sometimes there is a backlog that holds it up. But I haven?t gotten an update. I?ll let you know when I do. Thanks very much for the background. Anything to make of the fact that there have been eight strikes since the NAOT conference? - - Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 352-9234 ml: From::lw [mailto @ucia.gov Sent: Wednesday, June 06, 201 . To: German, Siobhan Cc: We! Subject: RE: Pak anger Siobhan, Off the record, in some areas the Pakistanis are keeping up appearances with "protests," while in others their anger is cleariy genuine, even if it?s very short-sighted and highly hypocritical. Before I get to the background, what happened to the On background as a of?cial": "The Pakistani government is in a tough place, they want to be seen as protecting their sovereignty, but have proved unwilling or unable to deal with the terrorists in their midst. You'd think that deep down, they have to realize that the al-Qaeda terrorists planning attacks on Pakistan, their neighbors, and the West are the real threat to their sovereignty.? Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs Em From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Wednesday, June 06, 2012 1:59 PM Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012582 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012582 To: Cc: Subject: Pak anger Hi Guys, We're writing a follow on story today on reax to the al Libi strike. It focuses on Panetta?s comments today but also about Pakistani condemnations. What is your take on the level of angst that the Pakistanis have truly expressed over the al Libi Strike (and the ones preceding it)? It would be really helpful to get any perspective you have on background because the impression is that Pakistanis are outraged, but we've gotten some small indications that perhaps their response is not as strong as it has been in the past. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 8629234 or): Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 7 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012584 From: Gorman, Sent: une 11,2012 1:01 PM To: Cc: Media Subject: RE: Response - Query on Libya Thanks very much. Siobhan German intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (W): [mailtd Puciagow Sent: Mon ay, June 11, 2012 . To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov - Subject: RE: Response - Query on Libya Hi Siobhan, Just seeing this. I?ll take a look at the three parts and will get back to you a little later today. Hope all is well. Best, Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan [mm] mm? Sent: Monday, June 11, 2012 11:53 AM To: Cc: Media - Subject: RE: Response - Query on Libya Hi Todd, My colleague got tied up with another story and is coming back to the al-Hasi story. Any way we could use the following, or something like it on background: The new Libyan intel director appears to be an independent and serious-minded professional. He certainly faces some challenges in rebuilding an institution so closely linked to the old regime along new lines. AI-Hasi looks like a consensus builder who is signaling he?s a technocrat committed to a new Libya. Also, do you happen to know when he came to the United States and when he obtained his citizenship? From our reporting, he seems to have come to the US in the late 19905 and lived in the Falls Church, Va., area at that time. He doesn't seem to have a terribly strong resume (we have a copy) for a high-level post. Worked at a soccer store, got a degree in web design. Appeared to go to an unaccredited Islamic studies instruction that has some af?liation with the Pentagon. Later, he taught Arabic at North Georgia University. As part of his earlier history, my colleague says she was told that he lived in Chad in the 19805 as part of a group of Libyan dissident guerilla fighters who were working with GA support. if that?s not true, it would be important to be waved off of that one. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 (3706012584 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012584 Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 Fromm [mailt ucia. ov Sent: Friday, May 18, 2012 5:31 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Response - Query on Libya ClAAct Hi Siobhan, Please find below what I am able to offer on al-Hasi. I do hope your colleagues find the perspective useful. Best, Todd Off the record, the new Libyan intel director appears to bean independent and serious-minded professional. There?s no reason to doubt that al?Hasi is a moderate guy who is committed to countering extremism in Libya. It?s natural, of course, that someone like al-Hasi without a lot of government experience would want to move carefully. He certainly faces some challenges in rebuilding an institution so closely linked to the old regime along new lines. Al-Hasi looks like a consensus builder who is signaling he?s a technocrat committedto a new Libya. It's not clear, however, how long he?ll be around as Libya is slated to hold elections this summer and a new team might want to start with a clean slate. Continuing off the record, I'd steer you off the idea that the US facilitated al-Hasi?s appointment. We definitely didn?t, and anyone saying the US had a role may be trying to impugn aI-Hasi?s credibility inside Libya. Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson Office of Public Affairs (W3) Approved for Release: 2077177/05/17 C06012584 . C AA6ppr0Ved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012587 From: Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2012 6:54 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan' Cc: Media Subject: RE: Pakistan query Siobhan, Off the record, I guess our main concern is that we not be cast as being party to a negotiation with the Pakistanis on CT ops, because this would be incorrect. Now clearly there are negotiations going on between State/DOD and the Pakistanis on supply issues and such (and as I?m sure you can see these aren?t exactly moving anywhere in the direction of a grand bargain), however, when it comes to CT there is no negotiation. How do you plan to characterize that Zahir meeting? Are you taking our off-the-record guidance? Here?s some background below you can use. 0n background as a of?cial": "There is no negotiation when it comes to conducting the counterterrorism operations needed to protect the U.S. and its interests. There?s always room for discussion with the Pakistanis on ways they can partner with the U.S. and get more involved in the defense of their own country from terrorists. This sort of progress tends to happen incrementally, however.? Take care, Preston Goison Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs '1 Em From: Gorman, Siobhan (bll6) Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2012 3: Tm: Cc: Media Subject: RE: Pakistan query Thank you so much. I really appreciate the guidance. I didn?t imagine this would be the kind of proposal you would be supportive of. Please let me know if you are able to put on background your analysis of the feasibility of pursuing such a plan: ?Having worked with the Pakistanis for years we know you make small incremental gains with them, grand bargains are not realistic.? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. new?: Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012587 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012587 From @ucia.gov [mailt @ucia.gov] Sent: r, June 12, 2012 2: To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Pakistan query Good afternoon Siobhan, Off the record, if the sense of your story is there?s a host of issues preventing advancements in the partnership With Pakistan this is correct and clearly evident. However, what jumps out to me as being incorrect about your analysis/reporting is any ideas that we were on the verge of, or mulling, a ?negotiation? or ?grand bargain,? especially when, as we discussed last week, all available evidence argues to the contrary. We don't see any grand bargain or negotiation on the horizon here. To your specifics, there was never a plan to negotiate with Zahir. it was to continue the ongoing dialogue on CT operations that has been going'on for some time now. Also looking at the timing of the cancellation there were several other issues besides the supply routes (Congressional anger and slashing of funds following the Afridi conviction for one) which from a Pakistani perspective, probably complicated the timing of Zahir?s visit. Continuing off the record, we?ve always looked for ways we can better partner with and get the Pakistanis more engaged in the CT ?ght in ways that will help them, often with great frustration on our part. This isn?t negotiating, and as your conclusion correctly identifies, the US is going to keep doing what it is doing to defend itself. There may be some US official who is talking to you all about a ?grand bargain? proposal, but we?d question the seriousness of this proposal and would add you would be wrong to include us as being party to this plan. Having worked with the Pakistanis for years we know you make small incremental gains with them, grand bargains are not realistic. Please reply to all. i will be out of the office and away from email until around 1600. Thanks! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs . From: German, Siobhan Sent: Tuesday, June 12, 2012 11:34 AM To: Cc: Me ia Subject: RE: Pakistan query Hi Preston, 50, in light of the most recent stalemate with Pakistan, I think our story is going to be framed in terms of issues that are not being dealt with because of the US. decision not to apologize to the Pakistanis for the November border incident. A chief issue is proposals being considered that would rework counterterrorism Operations. So, I wanted to circle back with you on the summary below. We?re quite confident that the "grand bargain" proposal is one that US. officials are mulling. That does not mean that it will come to pass?and it seems particularly unlikely given the current stalemate. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012587 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012587 From a fact-checking standpoint, i did want to check one element of the summary below to makesure we are accurate: CIA invited the new ISI chief, Lt Gen. Islam, to Washington late last month to start negotiations, but the visit was postponed because Pakistani officials wanted to first sort out differences on NATO supply routes. And we'd welcome any additional perspective you can provide in terms of'what youthink of this proposal. The story, as we draft it, will probably mention that absent any additional compromises over counterterrorism operations, the U.S. will continue to proceed as it has been. This could run as soon as tomorrow?s paper, so I wanted to be sure to circle back with you early-ish in the day today. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 Sent: urs a June 07, 2012 4:24 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Pakistan query Hey Siobhan, Good afternoon. Thank you for bringing this to our attention. Off the record, without going into all the aspects of your email, whomever is telling you all this information?especially the iast paragraph?either does not know what they are talking about, or may be trying to get some wishful thinking into your piece. Clearly, there have aiways been conversations on improving CT, but this is well off base and even more muddled than what you came to us with before. Please keep in touch as your reporting progresses. Best wishes, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Of?ce of Public Affairs (W3) mm (W6) From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Thursday, June 07, 2012 9:53 AM TO Cc Subject: Pakistan query Hi Preston, You might recall a query a few months back on Pakistan regarding negotiations over adjustments to the CT campaign. As is often the case with Pakistan, things appeared pretty muddled for awhile, but it appears that there may now be a little more clarity. So, we?re picking this story back up now that the situations seems to have progressed. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012587 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012587 We?re told the following and would appreciate any guidance you can provide: The U.S. is looking to negotiate a broad new counter-terrorism accord with Pakistan that could give Islamabad a greater role. U.S. officials have held preliminary discussions with their Pakistani counterparts about the possibility of a joint campaign against militants that would incorporate U.S. drones, as well as Pakistani military aircraft (F-165) and ground forces. The U.S. would share more intelligence with Pakistan to support its ground forces? operations. CIA invited the new chief, Lt Gen. Islam, to Washington late last month to start negotiations, but the visit was postponed because Pakistani officials wanted to first sort out differences on NATO supply routes. The hope is to reach a ?grand bargain? with Pakistan regarding roles and responsibilities in a joint campaign against militants. Islamabad's backing is critical, advocates say, to ensure that counter-terrorism pressure can be sustained as the U.S. pulls its troops out of Afghanistan. There have been other proposals in recent months, but they haven?t gained traction. One U.S. proposal included running the program out of the headquarters of Pakistan?s intelligence service in Rawalpindi, but the Pakistanis balked at that option. U.S. officials even discussed whether it was possible to get a drone with a Pakistani flag painted on it. Your perspective would be much appreciated. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 (in: Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012587 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012589 ClAAct From: Gorman, Siobharl: @wsj.com] Sent: Wednesday, June 13, 2012 3:00 PM To: Subject: RE: Syria Query Thanks so much. Really appreciate it. The story is being filed today, and I think it will probably run in tomorrow?s paper. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (W3) From @ucia.gov [mailtoE@ucia.gov] Sent: We nesday, June 13, 2012 1:06 PM To: German, Siobhan Subject: RE: Syria Query (bxs) Thanks, Siobhan, for sharing this. I?m working on something right now. Off the record, you are definitely right about where we will be able to weigh in. Best, Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Wednesday, June 13, 2012 10:55 AM To Cc: Media Subject: RE: Syria Query Hi Todd, Just circling back with you on this Syria query. The story could run as soon as tomorrow, so I wanted to give you a heads up on key elements of it in case more specifics allow you to provide guidance or weigh in. This is the gist: The CIA and State have stepped up contacts with the Free Syrian Army to better understand their capabilities and to help organize their military operations against Assad. The Obama administration has not authorized the transferring of any weapons to the Free Syrian Army. But CIA and State, working with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and others, are in the early stages of assisting the FSA with developing logistical routes for moving supplies into Syria and is providing communications training. The CIA and State Department upped contacts with the FSA beginning in March, as a result of rising concerns about the presence of extremists groups and al Qaeda. The US. operatives are also providing guidance based on lessons learned in Libya and are conveying the message that the FSA needs to professionalize and better organize itself if it wants to seek further assistance. Able to provide any guidance? And in terms of the status of the FSA, which may be easier to weigh in on: I The FSA has grown into an increasingly sophisticated fighting force in recent months, after getting routed in Hama in February. The flow of ammunition has increased to the FSA through Syria?s northern border with Turkey, and the internal command structure appears more organized and able to communicate to a wide?ranging collection of Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012589 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012589 insurgent groups. Roughly nine local councils have been established by the FSA to coordinate its fight. Th? rebels have obtained increasingly lethal roadside bombs in recent months, as well as anti-tank rockets. U5. and Arab officials believe Mr. Assad is increasingly losing control of the Syrian even though he maintains power in key cities like Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia. Assad is also seen losing its ability to control major logistical supply routes connecting his forces to northern Syria and the coast. 7 Does this description of the state of organization/capabilities sound right? Are there any other elements of its organizing or fighting capabilities that we should include? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (wl [mailto @ucia.gov] Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 2:08 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan; ucia.gov Cc: Media@ucia.gov :p Subject: Syria Query Hi Siobhan, Off the record, I?m sorry but we really aren?t going to be able to help on your Syria query. Best, Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 1:41 PM Tm: Cc: Media Subject: RE: separate query on Mohamed Merah Thanks very much. This was checking out reports out of France, so it appears that they lost something in translation. You saw my Syria qu, right? Many thanks. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence CorreSpondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (wl I From @ucia.gov [mailto @ucia.gov] Sent: ues ay, June 05, 2012 1 To: Gorman, SiobhanE?ucia.gov Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: separate query on Mohamed Merah ClAAot Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012589 7 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012589 Hey Siobhan, Off the record, ljust double checked to be sure, and yes you have been told correctly. Information had been shared with the French months before the shooting. The French definitely had Merah on their radar screen prior to the shooting. They were well aware of his travel and linkages to extremist groups in Pakistan. As is often the case, after the fact there?s always more clarity that fills in some blanks. Perhaps this is what y0ur folks have garbled. Hope this helps, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson Office of Public Affairs (bxs) :l?u?ig? From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Tuesda June 05, 2012 1 To: Cc: Media Subject: RE: separate query on Mohamed Merah Thanks. I spoke with someone yesterday who said that the French did have Merah on their radar screen prior to the shooting-and they were surveiling him and then stopped. 50, if that?s indeed the case, please let me know. A separate query, told that the CIA has been working to understand who makes up the FSA, and it has been helping elements of the FSA to organize themselves to better fight Assad. This is not lethal support but appears to be more logistical and organizational assistance. Any guidance you can provide would be most appreciated. Thanks again, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 Fromeuciagov Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 11:20 AM To: Gorman, Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: separate query on Mohamed Merah Siobhan, Off the record, I?m working on this one and will get back to you soon. Thanks, Preston Golson Media SpokeSperson CIA Office of Public Affairs Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012589 C'AAQipproved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012589 Luge-my ClAAct From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Monda June 04, 2012 3:21 PM To Subject: separate query on Mohamed Merah Hi Guys, ClAAct Sorry for the tandem queries today. A query came over the transom on our friend Mohamed Merah about western intelligence services picking up data on Merah and connections to an organization close to A0 and not passing it along to the French until after his shooting spree. Looks like a couple Internet addresses linked to Merah were picked up in Miranshah. I'm sure you?re familiar with this one as it comes from an upcoming report from two French journalists. Any guidance you can provide? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 (W6) Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012589 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012590 ClAAct - From: Gorman, Siobhari @wsicom] Sent: Wednesday, Junei To: Cc: la Subject: Re: Response - Syria Query Thanks. This is heipful perspective. I appreciate it. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (wil (W6) From: @ucia.gov [mailto ucia.gov]' Sent: =sday, June 13, 2C :49 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan (bxs) ClAAct Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Response - Syria Query Hi Siobhan, Off the record, as a general rule we don?t discuss the operational activities. Please note in your story that "the CIA declined to comment.? Picking up off the record, the description you proVided about the opposition?s growing military sophistication strikes us as generally on the mark, with a couple of exceptions. We would be cautious about applying any of the developments to the FSA, which seems more like a brand name than any sort of tangible entity. Clearly there?s an armed insurgency that?s taking the fight to the regime, but right now it?s multifaceted and decentralized. Given this type of organization it makes some sense that there would be multiple command centers. if you?re ?ghting more effectively you're probabiy communicating better, but this doesn?t have to be happening in a top down manner. On the ground there?s been a lot of ebb and flow; if you look at where the regime has brought firepower to bear on the opposition you have to wonder if it really is facing any logistical roadblocks. i hope this helps put matters into perspective. Best, Todd Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ClAAct Swag! ClAAct (MB) From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Wednesda June 13, 2012 10:55 AM "i ClAAct Cc: Media Subject: RE: Syria Query Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012590 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012590 Hi TOdd?, Just circling back with you on this Syria query. The story could run as soon as tomorrow, so I wanted to give you a heads up on key elements of it in case more specifics allowyou to provide guidance or weigh in. This is the gist: The CIA and State have stepped up contacts with the Free Syrian Army to better understand their capabilities and to help organize their military operations against Assad. The Obama administration has not authorized the transferring of any weapons to the Free Syrian Army. But CIA and State, working with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and others, are in the early stages of assisting the FSA with developing logistical routes for moving supplies into Syria and is providing communications training. The CIA and State Department upped contacts with the FSA beginning in March, as a result of rising concerns about the presence of extremists groups and al Qaeda. . The U.S. operatives are also providing guidance based on lessons learned in Libya and are conveying th message that the FSA needs to professionalize and better organize itself if it wants to seek further assistance. Able to provide any guidance? And in terms of the status of the FSA, which may be easier to weigh in on: The FSA has grown into an increasingly sophisticated fighting force in recent months, after getting routed in Hama in February. The flow of ammunition has increased to the-FSA through Syria?s northern border with Turkey, and the internal command structure appears more organized and able to communicate to a wide-ranging collection of insurgent groups. Roughly nine local councils have been established by the FSA to coordinate its fight. The rebels have obtained increasingly lethal roadside bombs in recent months, as well as anti-tank rockets. U5. and Arab officials believe Mr. Assad is increasingly losing control of the Syrian even though he maintains power in key cities like Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia. Assad is also seen losing its ability to control major logistical supply routes connecting his forces to northern Syria and the coast. Does this description of the state of organization/capabilities sound right? Are there any other elements of its organizing or fighting capabilities that we should include? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German intelligence Correspondent The Wail Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (wl Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 2:08 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan; @ucia.gov Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Syria Query Hi Siobhan, (bxs) Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012590 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012590 Off the record, I'm sorry but we really aren?t going to be able to help on your Syria query. Best, Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan [mailtomwsicom] I Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 1:41 PM To Cc: Media Subject: RE: separate query on Mohamed Merah Thanks very much. This was checking out reports out of France, so it appears that they lost something in translation. You saw my Syria qu, right? Many thanks. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (wl [mailt @ucia.gov] Sent: Tuesda June 05, 2012 1 To: German, Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: separate query on Mohamed Merah Hey Siobhan, Off the record, ljust double checked to be sure, and yes you have been told correctly. Information had been shared with the French months before the shooting. The French definitely had Merah on their radar screen prior to the shooting. They were well aware of his travel and linkages to extremist groups in Pakistan. As is often the case, after the fact there?s always more clarity that fills in some blanks. Perhaps this is what your folks have garbled. Hope this helps, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs Swag (W6) From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Tuesda June 05, 2012 11:34 AM Tot Cc: Media Subject: RE: separate query on Mohamed Merah (bxs) Thanks. I spoke with someone yesterday who said that the French did have Merah on their radar screen prior to the shooting, and they were surveiling him and then stopped. 50, if that?s indeed the case, please let me know. A separate query, told that the CIA has been working to understand who makes up the FSA, and it has been helping elements of the FSA to organize themselves to better fight Assad. This is not lethal support but appears to be more logistical and organizational assistance. Any guidance you can provide would be most appreciated. Thanks again, Siobhan Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012590 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012590 Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862?9234 From @ucia.gov Sent: ues ay, June 05, 2012 11:20 AM To: Gorman, Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: separate query on Mohamed Merah Siobhan, Off the record, l?m working on this one and will get back to you soon. Thanks, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ClAAot ?x ClAAot From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Monday, June04, 2012 3: (W5) TO Subject: separate query on Mohamed Merah Hi Guys, ClAAct Sorry for the tandem queries today. A query came over the transom on our friend Mohamed Merah about western intelligence services picking up data on Merah and connections to an organization close to AC1 and not passing it along to the French until after his shooting spree. Looks like a couple Internet addresses linked to Merah were picked up in Miranshah. I?m sure you?re familiar with this one as it comes from an upcoming report from two French journalists. Any guidance you can provide? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gonnan Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. I 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 86mm): Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012590 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012619 From: Gorman, Siobhan @wsj.com] Sent: . To: l5 Cc: Media Subject: RE: Naamen Meziche Thanks, Preston. Sorry for the delayed response. I thought i wrote back yesterday. Yes, we?re primarily interested in Boko and AQIM, and an assessment of Boko?s size and scope at this point. We'd also be interested in any assessments of what the Nigerian government has been able to do thus far on its own. I understand a desire to start with an OTR back and forth, but surely there are things we can use on background, too? I recall getting several pomts on background fronl: around the time of the Uganda bombin(b)(3) My understanding is that Boko had grown from an original size of about a hundred to something more than that but not so big that we're talking more than 1,000. l'm interested in links between Boko and AQIM as well as other affiliates. i understand that there were communications a few years ago between Boko and UBL, as well as with other senior AQ leaders. I was also toid that they have communicated to some degree (a small degree, I assume) with AQAP. SO getting a better understanding of Boko, it's ties, and its limitations would be what we?d be most interested in. And we'd be interested in an assessment of what the Nigerian government as or hasn?t been able to do about it thus far. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202)862-9234twl: Froml @uciaoov lmailto: @uciabovl Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2012 To: Gorman, Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Naamen Meziche Siobhan, Off the record, I assume you are aware of reports of his past potential linkages to the 9/11 hijacker cell in Hamburg. Sorry, we're not offering anything on the detaiis of his arrest right now, nor do we have any light to shed on why your colleague pronounced him dead in 2010. On background as a officiai?: "Meziche has a long history with al-Qaeda and his capture deprives them of an operative whose experience living in Europe helped them plot against the West.? - Off the record, on the Boko request, it looks like we?re going to do fewer backgrounders over the summer months. However, we?d be happy to provide you with off-the-record points to assist you get the context and nuance of this issue. I assume you are interested in views of the size/impact of Boko Haram and the outiook for the organization. in addition, i presume you would like to better understand the extent of the relationship between Boko Haram and Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012619 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012619 AQIM. Those are all questions we can send you guidance on. We cannot discuss operational US options for dealing with the situation. I know this is short of your request, but it is what we have to offer at the moment. Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson Of?ce of Public Affairs ucia. 0v From: Gorman, Siobhan [Mm] Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2012 11:08 AM Tol:_ ClAAot Subject: Naamen Mezrche Just checking in on our al Qaeda friend Naamen Meziche, who is now enjoying the hospitality of Pakistani authorities. Any perspective you can offer on his significance, the signi?cance of picking him up, and whether this involved US- Pakistani cooperation would be much appreciated. Apparently he was reported dead (by a colleague of mine) in 2010, so any light you can shed on why he might have been dead then but not dead now would also be very helpful. - Also, just so it doesn't fall thought the cracks, my request on a backgrounder is still cooking, right? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 (202) 8629234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012619 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012621 From: Gorman, Sent: Frida June 22, 2012 7:44 PM . To: Cc: Media Subject: Re: circling back Thank you, I appreciate it. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 From: @uciagov [maiito ucia. ov Sent: Friday, June 22, 2012 05:1? . To: Gorman, Siobhan CC: Subject: RE: circling back Siobhan, Off the record, I am unaware of anyone else working on a similar story. On background as a of?cial": "It goes without question that any action that might limit Iran?s ability to help the Syrian government is likely to be viewed as a win in the international community.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs W6) ClAAct From: Gorman, Siobhan [Wm Sent: Friday, June 22, 2012 12: To:: Subject: circling back Hi Preston, On the Syria query, did you get my note earlier this week on the comment we?d like to use on background? Would it be possible to use it? We were just asked to file the story by Sunday, so I?d like to include that comment, if possible. Because our editing process has some lag time, I wanted to check and make sure that you hadn't had other inquiries about efforts to stop resupply shipments from Iran to Syria. Have you? Thanks, Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012621 Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW7, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 by: Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012621 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012621 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012622 - From: Gorman, Siobhan$?wsjcom1 Sent: We 25, To: Cc: Media - Subject: RE: Iran-related query on Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Thanks very much. Have a good night. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent (6) The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (W): ClAAct memuciagov 0 Sent: ay, June 25, 2012 5:35 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Iran-related query on Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Yes Siobhan, to round out our conversation, you can report that we declined to comment. Have a good evening! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs Lauciagov (bxs) From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Monda June 25, 2012 4:51 PM To Cc: Media Subject: RE: Iran-related query on Mohsen Fakhrizadeh OK, thank you. Should i say CIA declined to comment? Appreciate the point about characterizing the assessment of the program. My colleague noted that a Reuters story in March also talked about the intercepts, which he has confirmed it independently. I pasted it below. SPECIAL shows Iran nuclear threat not imminent 2976 words 23 March 2012 23:13 . LBA English Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012622 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012622 201.2 Reuters Limited (PDF version US. and allies agree Iran does not have atomic bomb US. says no new secret facility detected 1? Electronic intercepts key to confidence in assessment -By Tabassum Zakaria and Mark Hosenball WASHINGTON, March 23 (Reuters) The United States, European allies and even Israel generally agree on three things about Iran's nuclear program: Tehran does not have a bomb, has not decided to build one, and is probably years away from having a deliverable nuclear warhead. Those conclusions, drawn from extensive interviews with current and former US. and European officials with access to intelligence on Iran, contrast starkly with the heated debate surrounding a possible Israeli strike on Tehran's nuclear facilities. "They're keeping the soup warm but they are not cooking it," a US. administration official said. Reuters has learned that in late 2006 or early 2007, US. intelligence intercepted telephone and email communications in which Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a leading ?gure in Iran's nuclear program, and other scientists complained that the weaponization program had been stopped. That led to a bombshell conclusion in a controversial 2007 National Intelligence Estimate: American spy agencies had "high con?dence" that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wail Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 ClAAct - [mailtoi @uciagovl Sent: Monday, June 25, 2012 3: To: German, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Iran-related query on Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Hey Siobhan, Off the record, we?re not going to be able to offer much on the below. Without con?rming anything, we?d ask that as you write the story you consider the possible harm done by discussing what communications or content the US or its allies may or may not have collected. You will ?nd information on Fakhrizadeh in the IAEA BOG report. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012622 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012622 Continuing off the record, I?d point you to the Annual Threat Hearing language. While the NIE says the Iranians stopped building a nuclear weapon, it also said they continued to develop capabilities that would keep them in a position to do so if the decision is made. So your characterization of ?frozen? requires nuance, which is found both in the declassi?ed NIE and the latest threat hearing. - testimony ata.pdf WMD Threats: Iran and North Korea 7 We assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, shOuld it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. - Please keep in touch on this. Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs audagov From: Gorman, Siobhan [Wm] Sent: Monda June 25, 2012 1 ClAAct Subject: Iran-related query on Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Hi Guys, A colleague of mine is working on a story on a story about the apparent renewed efforts of top Iranian scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. There are some facts in the story that I wanted to seek'your guidance on, as well as a few broader questions. On the following, if you can provide guidance on accuracy from the US perspective: On Fakhrizaheh?s activities related to SPND (Farsi for the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research), we?re told: Fakhrizadeh was leading Iran?s alleged nuclear weapons research when Tehran reportedly froze much of the program's funding in 2003. The IAEA believes Mr. Fakhrizadeh secretly opened SPND in early 2011 and that elements of Iran?s nuclear weapons research, which they thought were shelved in 2003, may be taking place there. The SPND hosts six directorates that include research labs for metallurgy, chemistry, and explosives testing. The organization reports directly to the IRGC and has links to Iranian trading firms and universities that also are allegedly involved in Iran?s nuclear program. On Fakhrizaheh's past exploits related to the 2007 NIE, we're told: In 2005, US. spy agencies intercepted Mr. Fakhrizadeh's phone and email communications, complaining that Iran's government had supposedly cut off funding for his work two years earlier. These intercepts became a central element the 2007 US. National Intelligence Estimate conclusion that Tehran had frozen its attempts to build atomic weapons. The activities of the SPND are one factor causing the US. and allied intelligence agencies to reassess the 2007 NIE. In terms of speci?c questions, we?re wondering: 1.) Does the U.S. share the position that Mr. Fakhrizadeh remains active working on nuclear weapons- related research through organization the 2.) Do the activities challenge the 2007 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012622 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012622 3.) Does the 2007 NIE still stand, meaning that the US believes Iran?s atomic weapons program remains frozen since 2003? 4.) As detailed above, we're told that intercepts of Fakhrizadeh?s emails and phone calls formed an important part of the NIE. Is that accurate? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012622 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012623 From: Gorman, Siobhan @wsj.com] Sent: Mondav. June 25. cu mu. I I To: cc: Medla Subject: Re: AQAP's Norwegian recruit Thanks for getting back to me. Glad to hear you were able to get home to make dinner. Have a good night. Siobhan Gorman (t0(6) Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Jolrnal (202) 862-9234 Original Message Sent: Monday, June 25, 2012 08:53 PM To: German, Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Re: AQAP's Norwegian recruit Siobhan, Sorry I was hurrying home to make dinner. We are going to stay off the record on this one right now. Thanks! Preston Original Message From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Monday, June 25, 2012 06:51 PM To: Cc: Media Subject: Re: AQAP's Norwegian recruit Thanks very much. Any way to use the last part on background: the US, along with several European partners have a strong interest in tracking individuals who have gone to Yemen to fight with AQAP. The situation hasn't changed regarding the need for vigilance against the AQAP threat. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 Original Message (bxs) Sent: Monday, June 25, 2012 06:49 PM To: Gorman, Cc: Media@ucia.gov Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012623 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012623 Subject: RE: AQAP's Norwegian recruit Siobhan, Off the record, can't steer you away, but I can't offer you specifics. Only thing we'd add is the US, along with several European partners have a strong interest in tracking . individuals who have gone to Yemen to fight with AQAP. The situation hasn't changed regarding the need for vigilance against the AQAP threat. Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs @ucia_gov From: Gorman, Siobhan [mailto pwsj.com] Sent: Monday, June 25, 2012 6: Subject: AQAP 5 Norwegian recruit Hi guys, Duly checking in on the AP reports of AQAP having a Norwegian man awaiting orders to carry out an attack on the West. 155 this something you would be able to weigh in on at all? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman. Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862?9234 (tn(5) Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012623 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012630 ClAAct ClAAct I From: Sent: Friday, July 06, 2012 3:27 PM - To: :l@gmail.com' Subject: FW: Response - Boko Haram Sending to your personal accountjust to make sure you receive this. Best, Todd Emmi: Sent: Friday, July 06, 2012 12:38 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan' Cc: 'media@ucia.gov' Subject: Response Boko Haram Hi Siobhan, Please find below some additional perspective on Boko Haram. I do hope this is helpful. All the best, Todd Off the record, Boko Haram is an amorphous violent Jihadist extremist group. There?s little indication it?s a broad-based insurgency and its nihilistic tendencies probably put a fairly low ceiling on its membership. The fluidity of the group suggests even Boko's leaders probably don't have a firm grip on its size. There may be a thOUSand militants give or take a few hundred, but this is a ballpark figure at best. The group is clearly a security threat. Nonetheless, it?s broader significance may be that it?s making pre-existing fault lines in Nigerian society even worse. Continuing off the record, the pace of Operations has clearly accelerated during the last six months so it?s fair to say the group is on the upswing. Boko exploits economic distress, of which there is plenty in northern Nigeria, so it?s also a pretty safe bet'the group is adding some recruits. However, grievances against the government don?t necessarily translate into support for Boko, which seems to be deeply unpopular even in northern Nigeria. I wouldn?t steer you off your information that the Nigerians have been clumsy in trying to counter Boko, but they?ve also had some recent successes against the leadership. Still off the record, Boko?s relationship with AQIM is well-known and well-established. AQIM provides some money, weapons, and training. It stands to reason this aid has given Boko a boost, but the group is pretty industrious and probably isn't dependent on its cousin for survival. By the way, l'd steer you off you figure for AQIM guys in Mali, which is way too high. Comparatively, Boko?s ties to al?Shabaab are more ad hoc and at a lower level. Boko?s leaders have clearly stated their aspirations to be part of the global Jihadist movement. So, while some connection to A0 core can't be ruled out, there really isn't a lot of clarity on what this might look like. Todd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ClAAct a) .g um 0" (b)(3)ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012630 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012631 . From: Gorman, Siobhanwsj.com] Sent: Friday, July 06, 2012 3:43 PM To: Cc: Media Subject: RE: Response - Boko Haram Hi Todd, Thank you. i appreciate the help. When you say: So, while some connection to AQ core can?t be ruled out, there really isn?t a lot of clarity on what this might look like. Does that mean that what I was told about communications between UBL and other AG senior leaders and members of Boko is not accurate? Guidance on this section of my note, in particular, would be much appreciated because we obviously don?t want to print anything that isn't accurate. We?re told members of Boko Haram have communicated with top al Qaeda leaders, including at least one communication with Osama bin Laden in 2009. Documents recovered from bin Laden's compound showed multiple communications with bin Laden and senior leaders. More recently, the larger concern for US. officials has been the group?s g'rowing ties to al Qaeda?s North African affiliate, al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb. Boko Haram has trained in recent months with AQIM in Mali to hone techniques for using improvised explosive devices. Boko Haram has also been in communication with al Qaeda?s Yemen branch. Any other indicators of connections between Boko and A0 and their strength? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (w [maith t@ucia.gov Sent: Friday, July 06, 2012 12:38 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Response - Boko Haram Hi Siobhan, Please find below some additional perspective on Boko Haram. I do hope this is helpful. All the best, Todd Off the record, Boko Haram is an amorphous violent Jihadist extremist group. There's little indication it?s a broad?based insurgency and its nihilistic tendencies probably put a fairly low ceiling on its membership. The fluidity of the group suggests even Boko's leaders probably don't have a firm grip on its size. There may be a thousand militants give or take a. few hundred, but this is a ballpark figure at best. The group is clearly a security threat. Nonetheless, it?s broader significance may be that it?s making pre-existing fault lines?in Nigerian society even worse. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012631 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012631 Continuing off the record, the pace of operations has clearly accelerated during the last six months so it?s fair to say the group is on the upswing. Boko exploits economic distress, of which there is plenty in northern Nigeria, so it?s also a pretty safe bet the group is adding some recruits. However, grievances against the government don't necessarily translate into support for Boko, which seems to be deeply unpopular even in northern Nigeria. i wouldn?t steer you off your information that the Nigerians have been clumsy in trying to counter Boko, but they?ve also had some recent successes against the leadership. Still off the record, Boko?s relationship with AQIM is well?known and well-established. AQIM provides some money, weapons, and training. It stands to reason this aid has given Boko a boost, but the group is pretty industrious and probably isn?t dependent on its cousin for survival. By the way, I'd steer you off you figure for AQIM guys in Mali, which is Way too high. Comparatively, Boko?s ties to aI-Shabaab are more ad hoc and at a lower level. Boko?s leaders have clearly stated their aspirations to be part of the global Jihadist movement. 50, while some connection to A0 core can?t be ruled out, there really isn't a lot of clarity on what this might look like. Tedd D. Ebitz Media Spokesperson 3 CIA Office of Public Affairs ucia.ov ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012631 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012633 From: Sent: Monday, July 16, 2 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan'; Cc: Media Subject: RE: Kenya IRGC Plot Hey Siobhan, Off the record, sorry we can?t help you on the RDX. Our perspective is the IC's perspective expressed in the statement. Perhaps I could restate it as a of?cial?? Would that help? How about On background as a of?cial?: "As the world saw with the Saudi Ambassador assassination plot last year?~and it is even clearer today?the Iranians are willing to entertain attacks against the interests of the US or its allies.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs - 6 Eucragov From: Gorman, Siobhan [mailto: @wsj.com] Sent: Monday, July 16, 2012 11: To: . Cc: la Subject: RE: Kenya IRGC Plot Thanks. Is it possible to get your perspective on background on how the Kenyan plot ?ts in with a string of similar incidents dating back to the Saudi ambassador plot last year? And on the more forward-looking questions, is there anything you can provide on background or off the record regarding: Any sense of what happened to the Iranian guy whoprovided the Any idea where the other 85kg of RDX might be, or is that something the US is trying to track? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 From: @uciagov [mailtol puciagow Sent: '-rI ay, uly 13, 2012 6:24 To: Gorman, SiobhaCMgg Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Kenya IRGC Plot Siobhan, Off the record, this is interestingand generally on track. i?d check your dates and consult with the AP story on this episode, which dates this to mid?to?Iate June, not early July. We?re not going to able to offer anything on who gave the Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012633 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012633 tip. 0n the broader issue of what this means regarding the IRGC, I'd mention what Clapper said publicly at the threat hearing in January and the IC has been saying since the Saudi Ambassador plot last year. In short, Iran's desire to put itself in a position to push back as necessary against international pressure?real or perceived?"has made them more willing to explore contingency planning forthis sort of activity. Whether this Kenya episode was for an imminent attack or contingency is unclear. Something is up with the DNI page that has the testimony so I?ve pasted in the relevant language below. May be useful to remind your readers the IC has warned of this activity. testimony atapdf The Threat from Iran The 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States shows that some Iranian of?cials?probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei?have changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived US actions that threaten the regime. We are also concerned about Iranian plotting against US or allied interests overseas. A 0 Iran?s willingness to sponsor future attacks in the United States or against our interests abroad probably will be shaped by Tehran?s evaluation of the costs it bears for the plot against the Ambassador as well as Iranian leader?s perceptions of US threats against the regime. Have a great weekend! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs @uciagov (W3) From: Gorman, Siobhan [maiito @wsjcom] Sent: Friday, July 13, 2012 3:50 T01: Subject: Kenya IRGC Plot Hi Guys, A second CT in Africa request heading your way, but this one is the IRCG plot in Kenya that was recently broken up. We're working on a story about how that plot was broken up. We?ve talked with Kenyan internal security folks on the record about it and want to make sure we also reflect the US. perspective and paint an accurate picture of what happened. We're told the following: In the first week of July, the Kenyans got a tip from other intelligence services (U.S. was implied, but we?d like to confirm with you) that two Iranians were on a terrorist mission in Kenya. They landed at the airport in Nairobi, posing as tourists, and booked a ticket to Mombasa. Upon arrival in Mombasa, they had a Land Cruiser and went to the Mombasa port, where they met an Iranian guy on an Iranian ship to get chemicals for their attack. They went to a nearby golf course and dug a hole and put the chemicals in it. They went back to Nairobi and booked a hotel there, and the Kenyans monitored them. Later, the Kenyans discovered they had booked flights back to Tehran and arrested the men. One of the men who had worked as a diplomat volunteered the information on the plot and took Kenyan of?cials to the golf course and dug up 15Kg of RDX. The man said he didn?t want to harm Kenyans and was only tasked with delivering Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012633 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012633 the chemicals to others who would carry out the attacks. The Kenyans believe there was a total of 100kg of so 85kg are still unaccounted for. guidance you can provide on the accuracy of the above would be helpful. In addition, is there any additional information from the US. side you can provide about any of the following: How it became clear that the IRGC was pursuing yet another plot? Is this part of a larger IRGC campaign that reflects a stepping up of terrorist activity? How did the cooperative efforts work with the Kenyans? Any sense of what happened to the Iranian guy who provided the Any idea where the other 85kg of RDX might be, or is that something the US is trying to track? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862?9234 (W): Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012633 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012634 I From: Gorman, Siobhan @wsj.com] Sent: Monda Jul 16, To: '8 Subject: RE: Jamal Thanks. That helps. i really appreciate it. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 From::mgg [mailtol buciaoov] Sent: Monday, July 16, 2012 1:30 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan (bxg) Cc: mm Subject: RE: Jamal Siobhan, Off the record, he is clearly attempting to parlay extremist bona fides from before he was imprisoned, and while he was in jail, to form a network now that he?s out. Hope this helps, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Of?ce of Public Affairs Euciagov From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Monday, July 16, 2012 11: (W6) WE Cc: Media Subject: RE: Jamal Thank you. appreciate the guidance. One thing that wasn?t clear to me was whether he was on the radar before he was released from jail or whether this is a more recent thing. Can you give me a sense?off the record is fine, i just want to make sure I am not making incorrect assumptions?of whether he's developed his network more recently and whether it has a name or if it?s just a network associated with him? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012634 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012634 The Wail Street Journal. (202) 862?9234 ?All: From::m9g [maiito ucia. ov Sent: Friday, July 13, 2012 6:21 To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Wm Subject: RE: Jamal Siobhan, Off the record, I wouldn?t steer you off of what you've heard here. He's on the radar screen and has aspirations to become an A0 affiliate. I'm going to refrain from providing any background comments on this guy directly, so that we don?t contribute to his PR campaign. To help you out with bio details, you may want to check in with your folks in the region on his history with Egyptian extremist groups such as EIJ. 0n background as a of?ciai?: "No one is under the illusion that the Arab Spring means the end of violent extremism. Some individuals will continue to foilow ai-Qaeda?s example and look to exploit pockets of instability wherever they can find them. However, the bad guys aiso have a complex environment to navigate, and they?ve struggled at times to adapt to the tremendous change in the region.? Take care! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson Office of Public Affaa?xs) @uciagov From: Gorman, Siobhan rm Sent: Thursday, July 12, 2012 4:16 PM To: Subject: Jamal Hey Preston, This is the guy I mentioned: Muhammad Jamal Abu Ahmad. I was told he?s often referred to by folks on the US. side as Jamal. There are probably multiple spellings of his name, but this was the one i was provided. He was described to me as someone of concern to the US. i believe he?s Egyptian, but he has set up training camps for his network in surrounding countries like Libya and probably Sudan. He was released from Egyptian custody a year ago, I assume as part of the large prisoner release. I was told he has some type of relationship with al Qaeda and probably aspires for his network to become a formal affiliate. i would be grateful for any context you can provide about the guy?whether he is on your radar screen, what the nature of his network is, whether it's significant, and any biographicai info you might have. As I mentioned, he seems to be the poster child for the kinds of issues that the US. and other countries face with the instability that has followed the Arab Spring. Most of the folks I have spoken with about this have said that it shows that while in the long term, the Arab Spring is likely to be beneficial to US. national security interests (and presumably others? as well), in the short term, the instability also creates opportunities for individuals like Jamal to gain momentum. Thanks, Siobhan 'Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012634 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012634 Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012634 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012638 ClAAct - ClAAct From: Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2012 4:32 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan' Subject: RE: Jamal Thank you! PM he in touch soon. Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan [mailto??wsicom] Sent: Thursday, August 09, 201 . To: Cc: Media Su Ject: RE: Jamal Thanks very much. Yes, please digest and give me a ring. I realize there?s a lot there. Timing is a bit flexible. was thinking it would be in the next few weeks, but they may want me to do it faster because of the recent attacks. Siobhan Gorman intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Jon I (202) 862-9234 Fromm [mailto @uciagov] Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2012 4:13 To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc @ucia.gov; Media@ucia.gov su E: Jamal Hi Siobhan, As there is a fair amount to digest here, maybe the best way to proceed is for me to go through what you?ve sent and then give you a call. Does that sound good? Atso, could you give me a sense as to when you are looking to move forward with your story? Thanks and best, Todd From: Gorman, Siobhan [mailto ws'.com 6 Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2012 3:57 PM To - Cc: . :Jamal Hi Todd, I?ll ring you in a bit to follow up, but just so you have the info in one place, I?ve gathered some more details on Mohammed Jamal Abu Ahmad and wanted to see how they jibe with what you have. I also have a broader question of how concerned the U.S. is about the potential for these ex-prisoners to set up extremist operations, especially when they have more freedom of movement in an Egypt, where the government is now bifurcated and its ability to maintain security is being called into question with the recent attacks in the Sinai. A few specific questions:- 2 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012638 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012638 1) Can you clarify why Jamal was imprisoned? Who decided to release him from prison and why? 2) it also sounds like Jamal was released from prison around the time that Zawahri's brother was released (the first time) in March 2011, and I was wondering if there are indications that the two know each other and whether there is concern they might find common cause together. 3) i understand he?s very close to a guy by the name of Murjan Salim, a jihadist leader with ties to Ayman al- Zawahiri. Have you come across that connection and what would the significance of the connection to Salim be? In addition, I?ve collected the following details that i wanted to run past you for guidance: i have a little more granularity on his seeking to be an A0 affiliate. was told that he recently petitioned Ayman al? Zawahiri to become a formal al Qaeda affiliate, and the US. has intercepted messages indicating that. I?m told he?s believed to be involved in active terrorist plotting as he assembles training camps in neighboring Libya for suicide bombers, using funding from AQAP. He?s also used AQAP and possibly AQIM smuggling routes. He's training suicide bombers for suicide bombers for attacks in Egypt and possibly in Europe. Former associates say that he?s not interested in attacking the us. directly but would go after countries where the U5. is an ?occupier,? or has a military presence. In terms of Jamal?s background, he's a native of Cairo?s Shobra neighborhood and estimated to be about 45 years old. A college graduate, he moved to Afghanistan in the late 19805 to train fighters in jihadist camps. He became the head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad's operational wing in the 19905, when he developed a personal relationship with Ayman Zawahiri. A hard?liner, he rejected some internal EU proposals to cease attacks because he ruled out negotiating with Egyptian security services. He was detained by Egyptian authorities in 2000 and was freed last year as part of a the large wave of prisoners released after the revolution. He?s been on the U.S. radar screen for probably the last six to 12 months, since he was released from jail. US. officials have tied Mr. Ahmad to another al Qaeda associate in Egypt, Abu Abdel Rahman, who may have been captured. As he builds his network, At these camps, they? re training, so he?s believed to be involved in active plotting and planning, but it's not clear whether he has been inVOlved in attacks at this point. I know there are a bunch of details here,'so that?s why I wanted to put them in one place for your reference. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman intelligence Correspondent (bxe) The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (all: Fromm [mailto @ucia.gov] Sent: Friday, July 13, 2012 6:21 To: German, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Jamal Siobhan, Off the record, i wouldn't steer you off of what you?ve heard here. He?s on the radar screen and has aspirations to become an AQ affiliate. l?m going to refrain from providing any background comments on this guy directly, so that we don?t contribute to his PR campaign. To help you out with bio details, you may want to check in with your folks in the region on his history with Egyptian extremist groups such as EIJ. On background as a of?cial": Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012638 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012638 "No one is under the illusion that the Arab Spring means the end of violent extremism. Some individuals wiil continue to follow al-Qaeda?s example and look to exploit pockets of instability wherever they can find them. However, the bad guys also have a complex environment to navigate, and they?ve struggled at times to adapt to the tremendous change in the region.? Take care! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson n?FFirn n?F DH Affairs @uciagov ClAAct From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Thursday, July 12, 2012 4:16 PM To: Subject: Jamal ClAAct Hey Preston, This is the guy I mentioned: Muhammad Jamal Abu Ahmad. was told he?s often referred to by folks on the US. side as Jamal. There are probably multiple spellings of his name, but this was the one was provided. He was described to me as someone of concern to the US. I believe he?s Egyptian, but he has set up training camps for his network in surrounding countries like Libya and probably Sudan. He was released from Egyptian custody a year ago, i assume as part of the large prisoner release. was told he has some type of relationship with al Qaeda and probably aspires for his network to become a formal affiliate. I would be grateful for any context you can provide about the guy?whether he is on your radar screen, what the nature of his network is, whether it's significant, and any biographical info you might have. As i mentioned, he seems to be the poster child for the kinds of issues that the US. and other countries face with the - instability that has followed the Arab Spring. Most of the folks I have spoken with about this have said that it shows that while in the long term, the Arab Spring is likely to be beneficial to US. national security interests (and presumably others? as well), in the short term, the instability also creates opportunities for individuals like Jamal to gain momentum. Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NWI, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012638 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012642 From: Gorman, Siobhar$?wsjcom1 Sent: Wednesday,?July To: Subject: esponses - Assad/Iran and the Gulf (bxs) Thanks very much. i appreciate this and your guidance on the many, many other queries today. Siobhan Gorman - Intelligence Correspondent (b (6) The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 (wi meClw [mailto @ucia.gov Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2012 6:42 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov - Subject: Responses - Assad/Iran and the Gul Hi Siobhan, Please find below, on Preston?s behalf, a response to your earlier queries. Off the record, sorry we?re not getting into the various rumors on Assad at this time, many of which are unconfirmed. On your second question, without commenting on whether there is any inteiligence on this issue, it seems plausible that astute observers can easily envision a scenario in which an Iran?under significant pressure from the West with a key ally (Syria) focused internally?might look at its options to push back. Draft legislation in the Majles, for example, reported in lran?s own press clearly suggests that Iran may be considering a more confrontational approach in the Straits. It is a conceivable scenario that Tehran might consider options?overt or covert?to close the Straits. Closure of the straits would be a low probability event (but one with high'impact). We don?t have an issue with your conclusion, but we do have an issue if this story is keyed to US intelligence. There are ways to discuss this without pointing the finger at alleged intelligence. if you do key the story to US intelligence, we'd like you to note that declined to comment on the existence of any reported intelligence. On background as a of?ciai?: "The lranian Parliament has already made noises about closing the Straits in response to increasing international pressure and sanctions. So it wouldn?t be surprising to anyone if the Iranian regime was weighing a list of possible . responses in the Gulf. This doesn?t mean they would do something, as there are significant costs the Iranians would have to consider, but this is something to keep an on.? Preston Goison Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ClAAot Duciagov ClAAot Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012642 (bxs) Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012643 From: Gorman, Siobhan @wsj.com] Sent: ClAAot Cc: Media Subject: Re: Responses - Assad/Iran and the Gulf Hi Todd and Preston, Thanks again for the iran analysis. It's realiy useful. To that point, is there any way to use some of the following on background? Don't need to quote it. Paraphrasing would be fine, if that's easier for you. Astute observers can easily envision a scenario in which an lran?under signi?cant pressure from the West with a key ally (Syria) focused internally?might look at its options to push back. it is a conceivable scenario that Tehran might consider options?overt or covert?to close the Straits. Closure of the straits would be a low probability event (but one with high impact). Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862?9234 Fromm ClAAot Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2012 06:41 PM I To: German, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Responses - Assad/Iran and the Gulf Hi Siobhan, Please find below, on Preston?s behalf, a response to your earlier queries. Off the record, sorry we?re not getting into the various rumors on Assad at this time, many of which are unconfirmed. On your second question, without commenting on whether there is any intelligence on this issue, it seems plausible that astute observers can easily envision a scenario in which an iran?under significant pressure from the West with a key ally (Syria) focused internally?might look at its options to push back. Draft legislation in the Majles, for example, reported in Iran?s own press clearly suggests that Iran may be considering a more confrontational approach in the Straits. It is a conceivable scenario that Tehranmight consider options?overt or covert?to close the Straits. Closure of the straits would be a low probability event (but one with high impact). We don't have an issue with your conclusion, but we do have an issue if this story is keyed to US intelligence. There are ways to discuss this without pointing the ?nger at alleged inteliigence. If you do key the story to US intelligence, we'd like you to note that CIA declined to comment on the existence of any reported intelligence. On background as a of?cial?: he Iranian Parliament has already made noises about closing the Straits in response to increasing international pressure and sanctions. So it wouldn?t be surprising to anyone if the Iranian regime was weighing a iist of possible Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012643 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012643 responses in the Gulf. This doesn?t mean they would do something, as there are significant costs the Iranians would have to consider, but this is something to keep an on.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ?Jucia.gov Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012643 (bxs) Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012646 From: Gorman, Siobhan @wsj.com] Sent: Thursda July 19, 2012 6:00 PM To: Subject: Fie: Fie: ClAAct Thank you. It looks like the story is now holding. But i'll seek to adjust the wording in accord with the below. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 [mailto @ucia.gov] Sent: urs ay, July 19, 2012 .. . . . To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Re: Siobhan, Off the record yes, in the context of the story, we believe it would still lead to misinterpretation. It would be more accurate to say something like this: the CIA is using its skilis and networks to work with opposition elements to understand the ground truth in Syria, officials said. Preston Goison Media Spokesperson . (bxg) CIA Of?ce of Public Affairs ucia.ov (bxa) From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Thursday, July 19, 2012 5: To Cc: Subject: Re: (bxs) 0k, it looks like a version of that sentence is getting added back in, saying: The CIA has started providing some intelligence directly to elements of the rebel force, officials said. Is this accurate and not trending toward misinterpretation? Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wali Street Journal. . (202) 862-9234 (wi Fromm [mailtq? @ucia.gov Sent: Thursday, July 19, 2012 0 ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012646 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012646 To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Siobhan, Off the record, that?s best for everyone. To be frank, in the context of the article, the sentence would have trended the reader towards misinterpretation anyway. On the Iran query, I'm sorry, that portion needs to stay off the record. Please use the background already provided. Thanks! Preston Golson Media ?Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ClAAot From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Thursday, July 19, 2012 3:21 PM To Su . ClAAot Regarding the hands-on characterization, it appears that is now getting dropped from the story for space reasons, so don?t worry about it. Just let me know about the_lran query, and mightjust be able to leave you alone for the balance of the day. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 862-9234 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012646 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012655 From: Sent: Thursday, August 02, 2012 5:39 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan'; 'Entous, Adam' Cc: Media Subject: Background comment on Zahir/Petraeus meeting Siobhan, Adam The following comment is being provided on background, attributable to a "senior US of?cial?: "The discussions today between General Zahir and Director Petraeus were substantive, professional, and productive. The talks provided an opportunity to discuss a number of proposals for how we can enhance our joint efforts against terrorism. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to work together to counter the terrorist presence in the region that threatens both US and Pakistani national security.? Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012655 . Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C66012664 From: Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 6:26 PM To: 'Gorman, Siobhan' Cc: Media Subject: Iran-related query on Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Siobhan, Off the record, we appretiate you asking, but we?re not offering US perspectives on this issue. Feel free to report we declined comment. Thanks! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 5:05 PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media - Subject: RE: Iran-related query on Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Hi Preston, I realize sometimes it feels like stories and requests just won?t go away. i inquired awhile back on Fakhrizadeh (per the exchange below). My colleague working on this story said that he is being pressed by his editor to get a clearer U.S. perspective on the IAEA report that said Fakhrizadeh opened a research of?ce called SPND last year. The speci?c question is whether the U5. agrees with the IAEA reports findings, including that the office is doing work related to nuclear weapons. I A Any chance we could get some sort of US. perspective on the report? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Jo . . (202) 862-9234 (w megmol [mailto auciagov] Sent: on ay, June 25, 2012 5:3: PM To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Iran-related query on Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012664 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012664 Yes Siobhan, to round out our conversation, you can report that we declined to comment. Have a good evening! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ?uciagov From: Gorman, Siobhan [minim] Sent: Monday, June 25, 2012 4. To: ClAAct CC: I'lcum Subject: RE: Iran-related query on Mohsen Fakhrizadeh OK, thank you. Should I say CIA declined to comment? Appreciate the point about characterizing the assessment of the program. My colleague noted that a Reuters story in March also talked about the intercepts, which he has confirmed it independently. I pasted it below. SPECIAL shows Iran nuclear threat not imminent 2976 words 23 March 2012 . . . .. . . ., . ., . . i. LBA English 2012 Reuters Limited iv 3 (PDF version US. and allies agree Iran does not have atomic bomb US. says no new secret facility detected Electronic intercepts key to con?dence in assessment By Tabassurn Zakaria and Mark Hosenball WASHINGTON, March 23 (Reuters) - The United States, European allies and even Israel generally agree on three things about Iran's nuclear program: Tehran does not have a bomb, has not decided to build one, and is probably years- away from having a deliverable nuclear warhead. Those conclusions, drawn from extensive interviews with current and former US. and European officials with access to intelligence on Iran, contrast starkly with the heated debate surrounding a possible Israeli strike on Tehran's nuclear facilities. "They're keeping the soup warm but they are not cooking it," a US. administration of?cial said. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012664 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012664 Reuters has learned that in late 2006 or early 2007, US. intelligence intercepted telephone and email communications in which Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a leading figure in Iran's nuclear program, and other scientists complained that the weaponization program had been stopped. That led to a bombshell conclusion in a controversial 2007 National Intelligence Estimate: American spy agencies had "high confidence" that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003. Siobhan Gorman Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. (202) 862-9234 I Fromm [mailtoi l@ucia.gov Sent: Monday, June 25, 2012 3:23 PM - To: Gorman, Siobhan Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Iran?related query on Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Hey Siobhan, Off the record, we?re not going to be able to offer much on the below. Without con?rming anything, we?d ask that as you write the story you consider the possible harm done by discussing what communications or content the US or its allies may or may not have collected. You will ?nd information on Fakhrizadeh in the IAEA BOG report. l-Report-Iranpdf Continuing off the record, I?d point you to the Annual Threat Hearing language. While the NIE says the Iranians stopped building a nuclear weapon, it also said they continued to develop capabilities that would keep them in a position to do so if the decision is made. So your characterization of ?frozen? requires nuance, which is found both in the declassi?ed NIE and the latest threat hearing. testimony ata.pdf WMD Threats: Iran and North Korea We assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. Please keep in touch on this. Take care, PrestOn Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Of?ce of Public Affairs we From: Gorman, Siobhan Sent: Monday, June 25, 2012 10:57 AM Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012664 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06012664 To, Subject: Iran-related query on Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Hi Guys, A colleague of mine is working on a story on a story about the apparent renewed efforts of top Iranian scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. There are some facts in the story that I wanted to seek your guidance on, as well as a few broader questions. On the following, if you can provide guidance on accuracy from the US perspective: On Fakhrizaheh?s activities related to SPND (Farsi for the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research), we?re toldi Fakhrizadeh was leading Iran's alleged nuclear weapons research when Tehran reportedly froze much of the program?s funding in 2003. The IAEA believes Mr. Fakhrizadeh secretly opened SPND in early 2011 and that elements of Iran?s nuclear weapons research, which they thought were shelved in 2003, may be taking place there. The SPND hosts six directorates that include research labs for metallurgy, chemistry, and explosives testing. The organization reports directly to the IRGC and has links to Iranian trading firms and universities that also are allegedly involved in Iran?s nuclear program. On Fakhrizaheh's past exploits related to the 2007 NIE, we're told: In 2005, U.S. spy agencies intercepted Mr. Fakhrizadeh's phone and email communications, complaining that Iran's government had supposedly cut off funding for his work two years earlier. These intercepts became a central element the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate conclusion that Tehran had frozen its attempts to build atomic weapons. The activities of the SPND are one factor causing the U.S. and allied intelligence agencies to reassess the 2007 NIE. In terms of specific questions, we're wondering: 1.) Does the U.S. share the position that Mr. Fakhrizadeh remains active working on nuclear weapons- related research through organization the 2.) Do the activities challenge the 2007 3.) Does the 2007 NIE still stand, meaning that the US believes Iran?s atomic weapons program remains frozen since 2003? 4.) As detailed above, we're told that intercepts of Fakhrizadeh's emails and phone calls formed an important part of the NIE. Is that accurate? Thanks, Siobhan Siobhan German Intelligence Correspondent The Wall Street Journal. 1025 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006012664 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013353 From: Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 5:41 PM To: 'Dilanian, Ken' Cc: 'media@ucia.gov' Subject: Device Points From a senior US official: "The recovery of the device was a team sport. It is another example of outstanding international counterterrorism cooperation. "We disrupted this plot well before it was ever a threat to the United States.? is the responsible group here. We believe AQAP produced the device, and we believe it was intended to be used by a suicide bomber on an aircraft.? "The device and the plot are consistent with what we know about plans, intentions, and capabilities. They remain committed to striking targets in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the Homeland, and Europe. And AQAP is probably feeling pressure to conduct a successful attack to, from their perspective, avenge the deaths of Bin Ladin and Aulaqi." 'f It is our assessment that the threat form AQAP is growing due to the territorial gains the group made during the political standoff in Yemen that lasted from early 2011 until this past February. Those territorial gains have allowed the group to establish additional training camps.? "The device is in the hands of the FBI and it is being thoroughly examined.? "We are confident that the study of the device will yield valuable insights that will aid us in adapting security practices and counterterrorism operations here and abroad.? "The device has the hallmarks of previous AQAP bombs that the group used in the failed assassination attempt on Saudi security official Mohammed Bin Nayif and that it used in the failed 2009 Christmas Day bombing. The device, like those earlier devices, is non-metallic.? "While similar, a preliminary review of this devicershows that it has some significant differences from the device used in the Christmas day attack. It is clear that AQAP is revamping its bomb techniques to try to avoid the causes of the failure of the 2009 device.? Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013353 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013358 From: Dilanian, Ke Iatimescom] (bxa) 'Sent: Wednesda May 16. 2012 11:01 AM To: EV cc: Media Subject: - RE: yemen Given the imperfect nature of our knowledge, what I sent below is all we?re teiling readers. I understand the term "operating on the ground? to suggest personnel physically in these locations for some period of time. Whether they sleep there, etc, we re not getting into. From:mu_ci_a? [mailto: ihucia.gov Sent: nesday, May 16, 2012 10:47 A To: Dilanian, Ken Cc: 5?bject: RE: yemen Ken, Off the record, can you be more precise in what your source means by saying our people have been operating on the ground? What does that mean to you now? The descriptions of activities in the past have been incorrect, but I?m curious to understand what the source is insinuating now. Thanks! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (bxs) ucia. ov From: Dilanian, Ken [mailto @latimes.com] . Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2012 10:37 AM Tot: Subject: yemen Preston, I have a story teed up for tomorrow on US forces supporting the offensive in southern Yemen. as part of that, we?re going to report what a source told us about CIA operatives and contractors operating on the ground in Yemen. I know you have denied this in the past off the record, but I?d like to put that on background so i can get it in the story. Our source is very solid, and we feel comfortable with what we are saying. Here?s how it will be worded: The development marks a new phase in the U.S. effort to deal with what officials say is a growing threat from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and to help the Yemeni government regain control of southern provinces that have fallen under militant control. It comes as the U.S. has stepped up drone strikes against militants in Yemen, an effort that has included CIA operatives and U.S. contractors gathering intelligence in remote tribal areas, according to a source with knowledge of the covert operation. According to a source with knowledge of the operation, teams of CIA of?cers and U.S. contractors have been operating on the ground in Yemen for some time, hunting al Qaeda militants and developing intelligence that has led to a series of successful drone strikes. They have recruited tribal militants to provide security, the source said. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013358 Thanks. Ken Dilanian National Security Correspondent Los Angeles Times Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013358 o:(202) 824 8326 Twitter: @KenDilanianLAT Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013358 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013358 I I Dilanian Ken at'me . rom: I s.com Sent: Wednesday, W53 PM ?mm 2? (bxs) c: la Subject: RE: yemen - . Thanks, Preston. Fromm [mailto 1@ucia.gov Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2012 . To: Dilanian, Ken Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: yemen Hey Ken, Off the record, the actions on Tuesday were conducted by the Yemenis, not the US. The press realizes the Yemenis have I their own Air Force right? On your other question, we appreciate you being careful with how you cast this, but your source is still leaving an incorrect impression there are Agency guys are running around the rural areas of Yemen, kicking down doors, and paying off tribal Chieftains, We realize your knowledge is imperfect?which to me seems all the reason not to engage in a source?s general comments about what classi?ed operations might look like. On background as a of?cial? ?It would be helpful if people would stop speculating?in this case inaccurately?"about what intelligence operations aimed at defending American lives from AQAP plots might look like in Yemen.? in addition you can report the CIA declined comment. Thanks! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (as, From: Dilanian, Ken [maith Platimescoml Sent: Wednesday, May 16, . Tm: Cc: Media Subject: RE: yemen . Also, are you able to say on background whether these were fact US strikes? May 15 (CNN) -- Two suspected US. drone strikes killed seven al Qaeda militants and eight civilians in the southern part of Yemen on Tuesday, three Yemeni security officials said. it was the latest of several US. strikes in Yemen, which is home to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, described by U.S. officials as the al Qaeda affiliate that poses the most serious threat to the United States. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013358 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013358 At least seven civilians were injured in the Tuesday strikes, the officials said. Fromm [mailto l@ucia.gov] Sent: ay, May 16, 2012 10:47 AM To: Dilanian, Ken Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: yemen Ken, Off the record, can you be more precise in what your source means by saying our people have'been operating on the ground? What does that mean to you now? The descriptions of activities in the past have been incorrect, but I?m curious to understand what the source is insinuating now. Thanks! Preston Goison Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ucia. ov From: Dilanian, Ken [mailtd @latimescoml Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2012 10:37 AM To: Subject: yemen Preston, I have a story teed up for tomorrow on US forces supporting the offensive in southern Yemen. as part of that, we?re going to report what a source told us about CIA operatives and contractors operating on the ground in Yemen. I know you have denied this in the past off the record, but I?d like to put that on background so I can get it in the story. Our source is very solid, and we feel comfortable with what we are saying. Here's how it will be worded: The development marks a new phase in the U.S. effort to deal with what officials say is a growing threat from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and to help the Yemeni government regain control of southern provinces that have fallen under militant control. It comes as the U.S. has stepped up drone strikes against militants in Yemen, an effort that has included CIA operatives and U.S. contractors gathering intelligence in remote tribal areas, according to a source with knowledge of the covert operation. According to a source with knowledge of the operation, teams of CIA officers and U.S. contractors have been operating on the ground in Yemen for some time, hunting al Qaeda militants and developing intelligence that has led to a series of successful drone strikes. They have recruited tribal militants to provide security, the source said. Thanks. Ken Dilanian National Security Correspondent Los Angeles Times o:(202) 824 8328i Twitter: @KenDilanianLAT Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013358 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013435 ClAAct ClAAct . . From: Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 11:04 AM To: David Ignatius Cc: Media Subject: . Pakistan CT Ops David, Off the record, we wanted to ensure you had the context we shared with Karen and Greg the other day on this weekend?s activity in Pakistan. 0n background, according to "a senior US official": The compound?~a long-abandoned school in Miram Shah-?was well known as a staging and planning area for al-Qaeda, Haqqanis, and other terrorists. Operatives there were preparing explosives for use in attacks in Afghanistan, like the high-profile attacks in Kabul earlier this week. Only individuals working directly on the explosives were killed or injured in this action, which we know with certainty helped protect Afghan and American iives. Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ClAAot Euciagov ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013435 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013479 From: Goldman, Adam @ap.org] Sent: April 5, 2012 5: 5 PM To: Subject: Re: Chat in an hour? Thanks for all your help. Let me know if you folks want to get lunch next week. Original Message From: Bucia.gov\ @ucia.gov] Sent: Thursday, April 65, 2612 65:42 PM To: Goldman, Adam Cc: Media?ucia.gov Subject: RE: Chat in an hour? (bxg) Hey Adam, Off the record, you are correct Vinas appeared masked in a video with Abu Yahya. To my knowledge Vinas never met Rauf. -This may be a garble for other Western operatives he met, who were themselves linked to Rauf. It wouldn't surprise me that Vinas heard of Rauf. Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs From: Goldman, Adam Sent: Tuesday, April 63, 2612 7:66 PM To: Subject: Re: Chat in an hour? Thanks Preston. Right, Pakistani police picked him up with help of agency, which located him. I don't know much about Abdullah Azzam other than he was an A0 recruiter and is very dead. Apparently he had a hand in Vinas' recruitment. Can you confirm if Vinas was in fact in that 2668 video with al-Libi? Let's touch base late tomorrow or Wednesday? Is that enough time? Adam Original Message From: :?u?im Sent: Tuesday, April 63, 2612 66:57 PM To: Goldman, Adam Cc: Mggig@ugig;ggy Subject: RE: Chat in an hour? Adam, Off the record, I want to spend one more day double checking my research and tracking down the right people with the historical knowledge on this issue. You are absolutely right; Vinas Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013479 I Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013479 had an knowledge of all the people and places he went. Also, as we discussed, it was great "connecting the dots? work that identified Vinas was training in the FATA. In terms of his arrest, it was actually Pakistani police who picked him up. Lastly, do you have a little more detail on the description of Abdullah Azzam? Do you have a nationality? I want to be certain we're talking about the same person. Thanks! I can confirm on background as a official": --Vinas met with Shaykh Sa'id al-Masri, Abu Yahya al?Libi and Atiyah abd Al-Rahman on a few occasions in addition to many other mid and low-level al-Qaeda operatives. --Vinas' information was important to develop a picture of what life is like for foreign operatives in the FATA. Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (W3) From: Goldman, Adam [mailto: @ap.org] Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 10:13 AM SubJec Chat in an hour? I'll call about 1p.m. 1. A masked-Vinas appeared in a 2098 propaganda video with Abu Yahya al?Libi. 2. Vinas met Rashid Rauf in Waziristan, the Pakistani British AQ operative who perished after something fell from sky. He also met Abdullah Azzam, an AQ recruiter, who was later killed. 3. The CIA found Vinas in Pakistan after "connecting the dots" and the led the Pakistanis to him. One of the initial tips was jihadist chatter about an "Ameriki" who had "frostbite." 4. I am told it took months for the CIA to piece together Vinas' identity while he was doing his thing in afpak. 5. Vinas has an extraordinary memory. His info led to strikes that killed Rauf and Azzam. Message-?-?- From: @ucia.gov [mailto bucia.g0v] Sent: Tuesday, April 63, 2612 9:48 AM :3 To: Goldman, Adam Cc @__g_ucia- 0v Subject: RE: Chat in an hour? ClAAct Adam, I probably need a little more time this morning to clear through a series of meetings. Right after lunch would be better. Can you help me out with a Sense of the specific questions? I've done some reading, but I'm not sure what exactly will come in handy for what you are writing about. Thanksl Preston Golson _Media Spokesperson Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013479 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013479 CIA Office of Public Affairs .g 3 CIAA t' uc1a From: Goldman, Adam [mailtoz hap.org] Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2612 9:38 AM Tm: Subject: Chat in an hour? Adam The information contained in this communication is intended for the use of the designated recipients named above. If the reader of this communication is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error, and that any review, dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify The Associated Press immediately by telephone at +1-212-621-1898 and delete this email. Thank you. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013479 Approved {g?glease 2017/05/17 006013488 From: Dilanian, Ken??la?mescow Sent: une 05, 201 :17 PM To: Subject: RE: Abu Yahya gracias. meqpuciagov [mailtol buciagov] Sent: Tues ay, June 05, 2012 1:09 PM To: Dilanian, Ken Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Abu Yahya The following is on background and may be attributed to a official?: "Abu Yahya was among al-Qaeda?s most experienced and versatile leaders operational trainer and Central Shura head and played a critical role in the group's planning against the West, providing oversight of the external operations efforts.? - "Zawahiri will be hard-pressed to find any one person who can readily step into Abu Yahya?s shoes in addition to his gravitas as a longstanding member of leadership, Abu Yahya's religious credentials gave him the authority to issue fatwas, operational approvals, and guidance to the core group in Pakistan and regional af?liates. There is no one who even comes close in terms of replacing the expertise AQ has just lost.? - You may say that a US official confirmed Abu Yahya?s death. Preston Golson Media Spokesperson (bxs) CIA Office of Public Affairs ClAAct @uciagov Approved for Release: 006013488 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013488 From: Dilanian, KenS? latimes.com] Sent: une 05, 2012 1:18 PM To: Subject; RE: Abu Yahya' can you call me when you have a moment? 202 824 8328 From: @ucia.gov [mailtoz @ucia.gov] Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 1:09 PM To: Dilanian, Ken 7 Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Abu Yahya The following is on background and may be attributed to a official?: "Abu Yahya was among al-Qaeda's most experienced and versatile leaders operational trainer and Central Shura head - and played a critical role in the group?s planning against the West, providing oversight of the external operations efforts." "Zawahiri will be hard-pressed to ?nd any one person who can readily step into Abu Yahya?s shoes in addition to his gravitas as a longstanding member of leadership, Abu Yahya's religious credentials gave him the authority to issue fatwas, operational approvals, and guidance to the core group in Pakistan and regional af?liates. There is no one who even comes close in terms of replacing the expertise AQ has just lost." You may say that a US of?cial con?rmed Abu Yahya's death. Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Of?Ce of Public Affairs Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013488 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013488 From: Dilanian, Ken @Iatimes.com] Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 2:02 PM To: Subject: RE: Abu Yahya ClAAct is it accurate to say that pakistan?s air force continues to allow us drones to fly over is air space? From: SW [mailto: @ucia.gov] Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 1:4u PM To: Dilanian, Ken Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Abu Yahya Ken, Off the record, as I mentioned the casualty reports out of Pakistan are wildly inaccurate?they should be saying three explosions, three days, three people. You can. say a official? described the numbers as ?less than a handful?. Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013488 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013488 ClAAct From: Dilanian, Ken:@ latimes.com] Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 5:03 PM To: Subject: RE: Abu Yahya three including him, right? From: @ucia.gov [mailtoz @ucia.gov t:T ,2121:4 PM en uesday une 05 0 0 (bxs) To: Dilanian, Ken Cc: We! Subject: Abu Yahya (bxs) Ken, Off the record, as I mentioned the casualty reports out of Pakistan are wildly inaccurate?they should be saying three explosions, three days, three people. You can say a official" described the numbers as "less than a handful?. Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs @uciagov ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/95/17 006013488 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013492 From: Dilanian, Ken latimes.com] Sent: Wednesda ,June 06, 2012 1:11 PM To: Subject: RE: AQ Core Status 3 thankyou. ClAAct From::@mg [mailtozl @uciagovl Sent: Wednesday, June 06, 2012 1:11 PM To: Dilanian, Ken Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: AQ Core Status Ken, On background as a of?cial": "Ever since the death of Bin Laden, the A0 core we?ve known since 9/11 is the closest it has ever been to a tipping point. This does not mean the group is dead or the threat is gone, but core al-Qaeda in Pakistan is on life support, and its chances of recovery are more daunting when they lose a guy like Abu Yahya.? "After 9/11, the presence of Bin Laden?along with most of al?Qaeda?s founding members?win Pakistan gave the core leaders a depth of experience and standing with their allies. Now, with most of their well-known figures out of the picture, it will be hard for al-Qaeda's core to maintain its role as the example for its af?liates to follow.? ?It would be a mistake for anyone to conclude there is no one on the bench. It?s a thinning bench, but there are still bad guys, with bad aspirations in al-Qaeda?s core group in Pakistan. However, these individuals are not as capable and don't have the profile or following in the Wider extremist movement that Abu Yahya or his predecessor Abu Atiyah had. "Undoubtedly, some al-Qaeda members will be tapped to try to backfill Abu Yahya?s responsibilities, but in the days that follow, the succession won't be obvious either to them or Zawahiri.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Of?ce of Public Affairs (bxs) ucia. ov Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013492 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013494 From: Sent: Wednesday, June 06, 2012 4:20 PM To: 'Dilanian, Ken' Cc: Media Subject: RE: this is what i mean Off the funny funny. - Have a good day, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson Office of Public Affairs @ucia.gov A From: Dilanian, Ken [mailto: @Iatimes.com] Se Wed" sday, June 06, 2012 4:15 PM . Cc: Media Subject: RE: this is whati mean Thanks. Hey, you forgot to include a fink to the video. Please re-send. From @ucia.gov [mailto @ucia.gov] Sent: nesday, June 06, 2012 4:14 PM T0: Dilanian, Ken Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: this is what i mean Ken, Off the record, I could make a statement about what this story says about the news business, but I'll only offer the following: . 0n background as a ?us counterterrorism of?cial": "When you understand the enemy, have in-depth intelligence, and advanced observation capabilities, you can tell who is a combatant and who isn't with a fair degree of certainty. Extraordinary care is taken to focus on the protection of noncombatants who may be nearby. No technology is spared in the pursuit of precision.? Continuing on background you can say from a official? that the high casualty numbers being reported are "wildly inflated and downright wrong.? Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Of?ce of Pubiic Affairs ucia.0v Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013494 Ap?rgyed for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013494 From: Dilanian, Ken [mailtd blatimesxom] Sent: Wednesday, June 06, 2012 3:48 PM To . Subject: this is ?what i mean (bxs) today?s story states as fact, ?At least 14 people are thought to have been killed alongside him.? Pentagon chief Panetta defends Pakistan drone strikes US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta has backed the use of drones to target militants in Pakistan, two days after a missile strike reportedly killed al-Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al- Libi. Mr Panetta said the US had made it ?very clear that we are going to continue to? defend ourselves". He made the comments while attending a conference in neighbouring India. On Tuesday, Pakistan summoned the US deputy ambassador to reiterate its "serious concern" about drone strikes. There have been eight US drone strikes in the past two? weeks despite Islamabad's demands for them to be stopped. Pakistan says the-drone attacks fuel anti-US sentiment and claim civilian casualties along with militants. The US insists the strikes are effective. *Our sovereignty' US officials say Abu Yahya al-Libi died when two missiles struck a suspected militant compound early on Monday in Hesokhel, a village to the east of Mira?nshah, the main town of the North Waziristan tribal area. - At least 14 people are thought to have been killed alongside him. Ken Dilanian National Security Correspondent Los Angeles Times o:(202) 824 8328i Twitter: @KenDilanianLAT Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013494 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013494 From: Sent: urs ay, une 07, 2012 11:02 AM To: 'Dilanian, Ken' Cc: Media Subject: RE: more, please Ken, Off the record, as I'm sure you?ve anticipated, we can?t help you with thesequestions. You have our background response on the matter. Thanks for trying though, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (W6) From: Dilanian, Ken [mailto @latimes.com] Sent: Thursday, June 07, 2 12 9:52 AM To Su more, please Preston, in the spirit of the conversation we were having yesterday, and in light of Shane?s story today, i want to appeal once more for more details about the al, Libi strikes. They fired three times over three days. At what? What were they seeing? Were the other two targets militants, even though al Libi wasn?t hit? They finally got him at sunrise, I read. How did they know he was alone? Did they have a fleet of Predators up there? Was the shot taken from Langley? Was Obama personally involved in the decision or informed pre?strike? Has he or anyone outside CIA seen the video? Ken Ken Dilanian National Security Correspondent Los Angeles TI o:(2o2) 824 8328 Twitter: @KenDilanIan Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013494 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013496 - From: Dilanian, Ken @latimes.com] (W6) Sent: Tuesda ,June 4 PM TO: Subject: RE: Abu Yahya P, just to be clear from what you said the below: It means that these numbers taken from media reports on New America?s site are all wrong, correct? 2012 24. June 14, 2012 Location: Miran Shah, North waziristan Militant Leaders: Unknown Militants Killed: 3 I Others Killed: Unknown Source: AFP, Aliazeera, PakTribune Assumed Target: Building 23. June 13, 2012 Location: Isha, North Waziristan Militant Leaders: Unknown Militants Killed: 3?4 Others killed: Unknown Source: Q, M, Assumed Target: Vehicle 22. June 4, 2012 Location: Hassokhel, North Waziristan Militant Leaders: Unknown Militants Killed: 15 Others killed: Unknown Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013496 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013496 Source: Reuters, NYT, AB, BBC, AFP, CNN Assumed target: Compound (Unclear) From::kc?mQ [mailto l@ucia.gov] Sent: Tues ay, June 05, 2012 1. To: Dilanian, Ken Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Abu Yahya Ken, Off the record, as I mentioned the casualty reports out of Pakistan are wildly inaccurate?they should be saying three explosions, three days, three people. You can say a official? described the numbers as ?less than a handful?. Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs - SW Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013496 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013525 From: Dilanian, KenlatimeS-Com] Sent: Tuesda July 03, 2012 7:04 PM To: i CIA/let Subject: Re: Harassment Story l-n-I?Iw Ken, Off the record, thank you for approaching us with your story on harassment. This is an issue the Agency takes very seriously, and we are con?dent you understand that harassment is a human issue, not simply an Agency issue. The Agency?s record on this issue is pretty good, but until there are no claims of harassment, we won?t be satis?ed. The following quotes may be treated as if you were interviewing the Agency spokesperson on the record. If you need to paraphrase, we?d appreciate the opportunity to review so that we can see the context. We would ask that the ?rst quote below be used in full. ?The CIA strives to be a welcoming workplace where every employee is treated with dignity and respect. We have long held a policy of zero tolerance for harassment of any form, and the overwhelming majority of Agency of?cers adhere to this standard of professionalism. When inappropriate behavior occurs, it is handled with the utmost seriousness. We will not allow harassment to devalue the men and women who sacri?ce so much for our mission.? Some historical perspective and additional detail, also on the record: ?The Agency conducted anonymous surveys in 2009 and 2011 of employees serving in war zones to capture perceptions on a wide range of issues including job satisfaction, training, working conditions, etc.? ?The results were generally positive on most issues. Agency leadership was concerned, however, that although responses related to alleged harassment did not worsen since 2009, they hadn?t improved.? ?The majority of alleged incidents cited in the survey consisted of remarks or jokes of a sexual nature. Survey results suggested harassment of a more physical nature may also have occurred, but was not reported. In cases where inappropriate behavior was reported to the Of?ce of Equal Employment Opportunity (OEEO) and con?rmed, individuals were disciplined.? ?The surveys were anonymous, so where there hasn?t been a speci?c OEEO complaint, harassment is hard to verify. The vast majority of Agency employees do not report experiencing sexual harassment. However, even one incident is too many. Agency leadership has reaf?rmed its zero tolerance policy for all forms of harassment and is putting in place additional measures?to improve awareness, monitoring, accountability, and training?to address harassment in war zones. These measure include: A personal message from the Director to the workforce reaf?rming the zero tolerance policy and laying out his expectation that these issues will be addressed and eliminated. -- Over the next several months, the Agency?s Associate Deputy Director will lead a team of senior of?cers to the war zones to hold mandatory meetings with managers and employees. -- The Director has appointed a seasoned EEO counselor and investigator with a track record of reducing incidents of harassment to serve as a single point of contact for harassment issues in the war zones. EEO training, which Agency employees already take regularly, will also be incorporated more robustly into war zone readiness training. -- We will canvass our of?cers more frequently-win surveys and in one?on-one exit interviews-?to spot trends sooner. Have a great Fourth! Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013525 Preston Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013525 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013525 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013527 I From: Dilanian, Sent: Wednesday, July 04, 2012 9:26 AM To: Cc: Media Subject: Re: Harassment Story luau-din. Inn-? message?-?-- Ken, Off the record, Preston passed along that you had a follow on question on the survey. Please cc: media on any reply as we've given Preston a break from his bb for the next few days. We?ve been very forthcoming in trying to address your questions--there isn't much more we can offer. Please say that CIA declined to de?ne the locations for the survey. Thanks, and hope you enjoy the 4th! Original Message 3 From: Se t: Tuesday. July 03, 2012 06:57 PM (WES) To Cc. Media Subject: Harassment Story Ken, 1 Off the record, thank you for approaching us with your story on harassment. This is an issue the Agency takes very seriously, and we are con?dent you understand that harassment is a human issue, not simply an Agency issue. The Agency?s record on this issue is pretty good, but until there are no claims of harassment, we won?t be satis?ed. The following quotes may be treated as if you were interviewing the Agency spokesperson on the record. If you need to paraphrase, we?d appreciate the opportunity to review so that we can see the context. We would ask that the ?rst quote below be used in full. ?The CIA strives to be a welcoming workplace where every employee is treated with dignity and respect. We have long held a policy of zero tolerance for harassment of any form, and the overwhelming majority of Agency of?cers adhere to this standard of professionalism. When inappropriate behavior occurs, it is handled with the utmost seriousness. We will not allow harassment to .devalue the men and women who sacri?ce so much for our mission.? Some historical perspective and additional detail, also on the record: ?The Agency conducted anonymous surveys in 2009 and 2011 of employees serving in war zones to capture perceptions on a wide range of issues including job satisfaction, training, working conditions, etc.? ?The results were generally positive on most issues. Agency leadership was concerned, however, that although responses related to alleged harassment did not worsen since 2009, they hadn?t improved.? ?The majority of alleged incidents cited in the survey consisted of remarks or jokes of a sexual nature. Survey results suggested harassment of a more physical nature may also have occurred, but was not reported. In cases where inappropriate behavior was reported to the Of?ce of Equal Employment Opportunity (OEEO) and con?rmed, individuals were disciplined.? ?The surveys were anonymous, so where there hasn?t been a speci?c OEEO complaint, harassment is hard to verify. The vast majority of Agency employees do not report experiencing sexual harassment. However, even one incident is too many. Agency Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013527 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013527 leadership has reaf?rmed its zero tolerance policy for all forms of harassment and is putting in place additional measures?to improve awareness, monitoring, accountability, and training?to address harassment in war zones. These measure include: A personal message from the Director to the workforce reaf?rming the zero tolerance policy and laying cut his expectation that these issues will be addressed and eliminated. Over the next several months, the Agency?s Associate Deputy Director will lead a team of senior of?cers to the war zones to hold mandatory meetings with managers and employees. -- The Director has appointed a seasoned EEO counselor and investigator with a track record of reducing incidents of harassment to serve as a single point of contact for harassment issues in the war zones. -- EEO training, which Agency employees already take regularly, will also be incorporated more robustly into war zone readiness training. -- We will canvass our of?cers more frequently?in surveys and in one-on-one exit interviews?"to spot trends sooner. Have a great Fourth! Preston Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013527 (W3) Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013542 From: Sent: Tuesday, July 24, 2012 5:07 PM To: 'Dilanian, Ken? Cc: Media Subject: RE: syria -- la times Hey Ken, Off the record, after much consideration internally, we?ve decided not to engage in a backvand?forth with folks who have very little insight into the decisions made in this building. We?ve given our view and laid out amore nuanced perspective you could pursue and will probably address in some elements of your story. This won?t be the first time people accuse us falsely of risk aversion and it certainly won?t be the last. We're just going to keep doing ourjobs. Our officers take responsible risks every day to improve the security of the US and its interests. They'll keep doing this no matter what critical sources say in your paper or others. Please accept my apology for keeping you hanging all day. That was never my intention. Please feel free to report we declined comment. Thanks. Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (bxs) euaagov From: Dilanian, Ken [mailto @latimes.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 24, 2012 12:11 PM 22% (bxs) Subject: RE: syria -- Ia times i think we?re conflating two separate parts of my story herethe ground in Syria. The Post reported that and i don?t hear you denying it. The second issue is the reason. Some people have told me risk aversion. If you dispute that, please send me something I can use. Of course it also has to do with the embassy being evacuated, as i will say in the piece, but a source of mine questioned why there was no stay behind plan, and why agency officers couidn?t go in with trusted rebels, as journalists have done in recent weeks. Others have also mentioned that it may have to do with restrictions imposed by the Turks and the Lebanese regarding their border. If that is the case please let me know. But the larger and more important issue I?d iike you to address is this: "We should be on the ground with bucket loads of money renting the opposition groups that we need to steer this in the direction that benefits the United States,? said a former CIA officer who spent years in the Middle East. "We?re not, and good officers are extremely frustrated.? ClAAct meg?g?g [mailto: @ucia.gov Sent: ues ay, July 24, 2012 12:0/ PM To: Dilanian, Ken Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: syria -- la times Appreciate your patience Ken, Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013542 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013542 Off the record, I apologize for the abruptness of my email yesterday. I had to make it clear that there are major accuracy problems with the approach you laid out below. While, not surprisingly we won't be able to get into the details about what is going on, we?d ask that you consider Joby and Greg?s story in the Post this morning before you go fonrvard: . . in-s ria-conflict-us-stru les-to-fill-intelli ence- storv.htm . We are not endorsing the story, or vouching for it. it does show, however, that there is another view of the various rumors and claims. To be frank, we believe a nuanced View that takes into account the real complexities of the situation in Syria is far more reasonable starting point (again, we aren't vouching for where that story ended) than the clich? of a risk averse CIA. That the same CIA that advocated and led the riskiest raid in recent memory (Abbottabad), was the ?rst into Afghanistan, and has had officers serving in multiple war zones for over a decade, is risk averse seems implausible. That argument is routinely perpetuated, at every opportunity, by people who have been out of the game for some time and have 3 dated perspective. Continuing off the record, you know as well as anyone, before the Agency undertakes activities such as suggested below, there is a sequencing that must take place. With a situation this fluid and so many unknowns, there are a lot of things that need to happen?sometimes in a very speci?c and legally?dictated manner?before anyone can pick up steam. There are nearly three hundred armed opposition groups in Syria. These groups are only now reaching a level of organization and sophistication where they can even begin to think about having meaningful relationships with anyone and there has been much progress in recent weeks identifying who best to work with. The idea your critics mention about splashing around cash is naive and at best irresponsible. When you have 300 groups to collect on, embedding with a local group here or there would gain you a limited perspective?like looking at a broad issue through a soda straw. Off the record, we think you?re grossly oversimplifying an exceedingly complex issue. [think if you step back for a minute, and look at this broader perspective, your story won't be just another platform for people peddling nostalgia about the good ole days that never really existed before and aren?t the reality in today?s world. This issue has absolutely nothing to do with risk aversion. If you still intend to go forward with your story, we have a strongly worded comment to refute the misguided assertions in your piece. Hope this helps, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ucia. ov From: Dilanian, Ken [mailtd blatimescomI Sent: Tuesday, July 24, 2012 11:16 AM C2: Media Subject: RE: syria Ia times [can't wait forever over here. From: @ucia.gov [mailtoi buciagovl Sent: II ucauay, 24, 2012 9:57 AM To: Dilanian, Ken Cc: Media@ucia.gov (bxs) Subject: RE: syria la times Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013542 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013542 Morning Ken, Off the record, please hold. We will be gettinglback to you shortly. I think when you hear what we have to say you?ll agree. Thanks! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs From: Dilanian, Ken [mailtd l@latimes.com Sent: Tuesday, July 24, 2012 9:23 AM To: Subject: RE: syria la times Given the post, we're looking to put something up on the web quickly. So please respond asap. Ken Dilanian Los Angeles Times 202 824 8328 inal uc a.qov" ucia.gov> To: Ianian, en" - Iatimes.com>, "Media@ucia.oov? Sent: Mon, Jul 23, 2012 22:56:44 Subject: RE: syria -- Ia times Ken, Off the record, we?ll engage on this tomorrow, but in short, there's a lot wrong here. Talk to you tomorrow, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson ClAAct Office of Pubiic Affairs From: Dilanian, Ken [mailto: blatimes.com Sent: Monday, July 23, 2012 6:41 PM To: Media Subject: syria -- la times Hi, guys, I am working on a story about Syria that I am aiming for Wednesday?s newspaper, and hoping you will engage. I?m preparing to report that according to my sources the CIA has little if any presence on the ground in Syria because agency leaders are unwilling to risk the death or capture of American officers. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013542 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013542 I'm going to say that until recently, the CIA has left face to face contacts with Syrian rebels largely to Turkish, Qatari, Saudi and other intelligence services who are willing to put operatives into Syria. CIA officers in recent weeks have met with Syrian opposition leaders in Turkey near the Syrian border, officials said, they communicate by secure links with paid assets inside Syria. But the CIA has have largely avoided entering Syria or traveling to the front lines of the conflict. CIA personnel at the U.S. embassy in Damascus left the country when the facility was evacuated in February because of security concerns, officials said. Critics in my story will call it a missed opportunity that will leave the U.S. in a difficult position if Assad falls. "We should be on the ground with bucket loads of money renting the opposition groups that we need to steer this in the direction that benefits the United States,? said a former CIA officer who spent years in the Middle East. "We?re not, and good officers are extremely frustrated." Andrew Tabler, Syria expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank, agreed, adding, "What are we going to do--just allow the Turks the Qataris and the Saudis to have relations with opposition groups, and we not have direct relations? That doesn?t make any sense. Those countries don?t always have our interests at heart." I?m going to point out that several journalists have embedded with rebel groups in Syria, living and traveling with them for several days. But the CIA as a' rule has been unwilling to let its officers do that, said current and former officials with knowledge of the situation who would not be quoted talking about covert intelligence gathering. Officials say CIA leaders fear a climate of hyper sensitivity to U.S. casualties, citing the criticism leveled at the CIA after 7 officers were killed by a double agent?turned-suicide bomber in KhostlAfghanistan in December 2009. CIA officers were forced to leave Libya during that country?s rebellion, when the US. embassy in Tripoli was closed in February 2011. Libya-based CIA operatives decamped to a five-star hotel in Dubai, according to a former CIA officer who ran into them there. Several months later, however, CIA operatives returned to Libya by traveling to Benghazi, home to the headquarters of the Libyan rebels. They then began coordinating with opposition fighters who, with the help of a NATO bombing campaign, ousted dictator Muamar Kadafy. ln Syria, the rebels have no geographic base, and have seized territory sporadically. Syria?s military and police are arguably more sophisticated than Libya?s. There is no international military campaign to help the rebels. It's a far riskier climate for American spies seeking to infiltrate the country. But "it?s a manageable risk,? the former CIA officer said. "You have to be willing to send your people into harms? way and the agency?s value to the president is being the 9-11 service. We should be going in and living with opposition fighters. I?ve been contacted by a number of my Syrian friends who would take us in there if we wanted to go.? Understand this is sensitive and there is a limit to what you can say, but I want to give you every opportunity. Thanks a lot. Best, Ken Dilanian Subject: RE: CT Story Scott, Off the record, we're still thinking about how much we want to engage several of the other questions. Besides helping you clarify what a combatant is, and explaining further the need for and process of this method?which we have below-- we?ve dealt many of the other questions several times with others and the conversation can get rather circular. As you mentioned in your Maddow review, "even the highest estimates of civilian casualties in Pakistan are miniscule compared with what would result from a conventional war.? 50, if you don?t mind me asking a rhetorical question, what are we debating? As we discussed before, the focus has been on very narrow issues, and I do understand the questions. However, the continued focus on these minor points of difference obscures the most salient point that the President?s desire to defend the US while limiting civilian casualties is being done ably with the most advanced and humane capabilities the use can muster. I'm sure we?ll get to some of your other questions, but we?re probably not going to dwell on some of them. i think our comments so far really get at the heart of your story about Obama CT policy, so that?s why we decided to start there. l'm really looking forward to my vacation, even if this means putting down the NYT for a few days! We can talk more next week or, if you need anything in the meantime, please let my colleagues know. Take care! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013609 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013609 Ema-322 From: Shane, Scott Sent: Tuesda April 17, 2012 6:39 PM Tend Subject: Re: CT Story Sadly we will not pubiish until you are back. Stili have a ways to go. To clarify: Should I expect any more speci?c answers to my written questions, or is this it? And is there a chance we will get an interview with Director Petraeus, DD Morrell or GC Preston? Thanks and have a great vacation unbothered by the NYT Scott Scott Shane New York Times Washington bureau 202-862-0305 :?onytimescom From: ucia.gov Sent: Tues ay, April 17, 2012 06:27 PM To: Shane, Scott Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: CT Story Scott, When you do reply please send to media@ucia.gov so your query reaches the team. Starting tomorrow I will be on vacation until next Tuesday and away from email. What is the latest on your timeline? Take ca re, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Pubiic Affairs From: Shane, Scott Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 4:03 PM Tm? Subject: Re: CT Story Thanks, Preston. I'll study this and get back to you soon. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013609 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013609 Scott Scott Shane New York Times Washington bureau 202-862?0305 From: :lJciagov [mailto @ucia.gov] Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 03. (mm To: Shane, Scott Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: CT Story ClAAct Scott, Off the record, here are some top-line points that focus on the area many people who write about this subject overlook. For one, people often forget why this effort was deemed necessary. If you recall, news reporting from the 2007-2008 time frame, including stories from your colleagues detailed a resurgent A0. planning attacks against US interests from the FATA Faced with that challenge, beginning in 2008 and intensifying with the Obama Administration in 2009 we've been able to halt, and reverse the threat from AQ's core leadership. The tactics vs. strategy, long-term question you raised is pertinent, but you can?t get to phase two if you don?t succeed at'phase one?which was rooting AQ out of its safehaven. We're closer than we?ve ever been, but the job isn?t finished yet. Continuing off the record, to set the record straight, there is a background point properly laying out who is a combatant. It is the activities, patterns, and overall intelligence mosaic that determine who is a combatant or noncombatant. 0n background as a "senior US counterterrorism of?cial": "It's hard to argue against the effectiveness of the program, especially considering the need to stop an al-Qaeda organization that was rooted in the tribal areas planning attacks. By any measure, these operations have been extremely successful at taking terrorists and terror leaders off the battle?eld with a high level of precision and a very low level of noncombatant casualties. Since mid-January 2010, nearly 70 senior aI-Qaeda figures and militant leaders are no longer plotting to kill Americans as a result of these efforts." ?The seamless integration of intelligence collection, analysis, and technology, backed by the complete confidence of the Administration and Congress has resulted in a precise counterterrorism effort that has left al?Qaeda more vulnerable than it has been since 9/11." "When you understand the enemy, have in-depth intelligence and advanced observation capabilities, you can tell who is a combatant and who isn't with a fair degree of certainty. It's really pretty simple; the fact is terrorists conduct activities that clearly distinguish them from people who aren't the enemy. If you aren't certain, you wait until you can make a determination one way or the other." Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013609 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013609 "Al-Qaeda is an insular, paranoid organization that doesn't letjust anyone in their presence. Innocent neighbors don't hitchhike rides in the back of trucks headed for the border full of terrorists with guns and bombs." ?The people working to find OBL had been working hard before 2009 and frankly have been working hard to find Zawahiri and others since then. Attention and support from the?President on down kept the focus on the goal, and when the time came to pursue a tangible lead, the leadership, resources, and experience were there to capitalize on the opening. In addition, years of successfully connecting the dots to find elusive terrorists?whether in the intensified CT campaign in the FATA or through military and intelligence collaboration in Iraq and Afghanistan?gave every confidence in the methods that ultimately brought about Bin Laden?s end.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (bxs) Em Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013609 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013611 From: Shane, Scott nytimes.com] (W6) Sent: Tuesda A ill 2 12 7:38 PM .. To: . Subject: e: tory PS -- clearly I have to watch what I write in reviews! That is a hugely important point, but it does not negate all other questions. This is a new military technology being used ina new way, and everything about it is worthy of serious scrutiny. And as I may have said, a very senior WH official told us near-zero collateral deaths is the president's demand for the program. It would be odd not to ask about it. But forget about all this for a Scott Shane New York Times Washington bureau A 202-862-0305 :Emytimescom Fromi @ucia.gov [mailtd @uciagov] Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 07:24 PM (bxs) To: Shane, Scott Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: CT Story - Scott, Off the record, we?re still thinking about how much we want to engage several of the other questions. Besides helping you clarify what a combatant is, and explaining further the need for and process of this method?which we have below-- we?ve dealt many of the other questions several times with others and the conversation can get rather circular. As you mentioned in your Maddow review, "even the highest estimates of civilian casualties in Pakistan are miniscule compared with what would result from a conventional war.? 50, if you don?t mind me asking a rhetorical question, what are we debating? As we discussed before, the focus has been on veryvnarrow issues, and do understand the questions. However, the continued focus on these minor points of difference obscures the most salient point that the President?s desire to defend the US while limiting civiliancasualties is being done ably with the most advanced and humane capabilities the U56 can muster. I'm sure we'll get to some of your other questions, but we?re probably not going to dwell on some of them. i think our comments so far really get at the heart of your story about Obama CT policy, so that? 5 why we decided to start there. I?m really looking forward to my vacation, even if this means putting down the NYT for a few days! We can talk more next week or, if you need anything in the meantime, please let my colleagues know. Take care! 1 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013611 - Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013611 Preston Golson . Media Spokesperson Of?ce of Public Affairs (W3) From: Shane, Scott Sent: Tuesda r, April 17, 2012 6:39 PM T04 Su Ject: Re: CT Story Sadly we wili not publish until you are back. Still have a ways to go. To clarify: Should I expect any more specific answers to my written questions, or is this it? And is there a chance we will get an interview with Director Petraeus, DD Morrell or GC Preston? Thanks and have a great vacation unbothered by the NYT Scott Scott Shane New York Times Washington bureau 202-862-0305 1 :k?lnytimescom Fromi:1cia.gov [mailtdj@ucia.gov] (bxs) Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 06:27 PM To: Shane, Scott Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: CT Story Scott, When you do repiy please send to media@ucia.gov so your query reaches the team. Starting tomorrow I will be on vacation until next Tuesday and away from email. What is the latest on your timeline? Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs ClAAct @uciagov ClAAot From: Shane, Scott Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 4:03 PM Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013611 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013611 mg ClAAct Subject: Re: CT Story Thanks, Preston. l'il study this and get back to you soon. Scott Scott Shane New York Times Washington bureau 202?862-0305 @nytimes.com From::l.lcia.gov [mailto: @ucia.gov] (bxs) CIAALI Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 03W To: Shane, Scott Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: CT Story Scott, Off the record, here are some top-line points that focus on the area many people who write about this subject overlook. For one, people often forget why this effort was deemed necessary. If you recall, news reporting from the 2007-2008 time frame, including storiesfrom your colleagues detailed a resurgent AQ planning attacks against US interests from the FATA 2007 02 19 world asia 19intel.html r=2&oref=slo in& a ewanted=all Faced with that challenge, beginning in 2008 and intensifying with the Obama Administration in 2009 we've been able to halt, and reverse the threat from AQ's core leadership. The tactics vs. strategy, long-term question you raised is pertinent, but you can't get to phase two if you don?t succeed at phase one?which was rooting AC1 out of its safehaven. We're closer than we?ve ever been, but-the job isn?t finished yet. 3 3 Continuing off the record, to set the record straight, there is a background point properly laying out who is a combatant. It is the activities, patterns, and overall intelligence mosaic that determine who is a combatant or noncombatant. On background as a "senior US counterterrorism of?cial": "It's hard to argue against the effectiveness of the program, especially considering the need to stop an al-Qaeda organization that was rooted in'the tribal areas planning attacks. By any measure, these operations have been extremely successful at taking terrorists and terror leaders off the battle?eld with a high level of precision and a very low level of noncombatant casualties. Since mid-January 2010, nearly 70 senior al-Qaeda figures and militant leaders are no longer plotting to kill Americans as a result of these efforts." "The seamless integration of intelligence collection, analysis, and technology, backed by the complete confidence of the Administration and Congress has resulted in a precise counterterrorism effort that has left al-Qaeda more vulnerable than it has been since 9/11." Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013611 "When you understand the enemy, have in-depth intelligence and advanced observation capabilities, you can tell who is a combatant and who isn't with a fair degree of certainty. It's really pretty simple; the fact is terrorists conduct activities that clearly distinguish them from people who aren't the enemy. If you aren't certain, you wait until you can make a determination one way or the other." "Al?Qaeda is an insular, paranoid organization that doesn't letjust anyone in their presence. Innocent neighbors don't hitchhike rides in the back of trucks headed for the border full of terrorists with guns and bombs." "The people working to find OBL had been working hard before 2009 and frankly have been working hard to find Zawahiri and others since then. Attention and support from the President on down kept the focus on the goal, and when the time came to pursue a tangible lead, the leadership, resources, and experience were there to capitalize on the opening. In addition, years of successfully connecting the dots to find elusive terrorists?whether in the intensified CT campaign in the FATA or through military andintelligence collaboration in Iraq and Afghanistan?gave every confidence in the methods that ultimately brought about Bin Laden?s end.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (bxs) Sm ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013611 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013615 . From: Shane, Sco nytimes.com] Sent: Saturdav. 12 10:54 PM To: Subject: He: Fact?Checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent Will check on deadline thanks much Scott Shane New York Times Washington bureau 262-862-8305 1 1@nytimes . coin Original Message From: Pcia.gov Sent: a ur ay, April 28, 2012 PM To: Shane, Scott Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent Off the record, one thing to clarify, I can't promise we'll meet Declan's deadline. It just may be too tough to meet such a compressed timeline on this complex issue. Could this hold until Monday if needed? Thanks! Ori inal Message From: Sent: a ur ay, April 28, 2012 08:26 PM (t0(6) To: :hytimesmom' :hytimes.com> Cc: Media Subject: Re: Fact?checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent Off the record, we will definitely weigh in some Fashion because we are concerned about the consequences for Afridi of the Pakistani version of events. Thanks, Preston 1 Original Message 7 t3 6 From: Shane, Scott [mailtoz nytimes.com] Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2 AM To: Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013615 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013615 Thanks Preston. Well, I'd say early afternoon would be his realistic deadline, though changes could obviously be made till evening our time. If there were a solid promise of very significant cooperation, and it can't be done by deadline, conceivable that editors might consider holding till Tues paper. But at the moment plan is to go up on Web Sunday night. Crazy times, I to add to the weekend load! Scott Scott Shane New York Times Washington bureau 202-862-0305 ?:P@nytimes . com Original Message - [mailtot ;@ucia.gov] Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2912 10:15 AM . To: Shane, Scott; Media@ucia.gov Subject: Re: Fact-checking an Afridi story -- quite urgent Thanks Scott for the call, we got the email. Off the record, it is going to take a little bit of time to review these questions. When is Declan's cutoff time? I presume sometime on Sunday morning? 7 Original Message From: Shane, Scott (t0(6) Sent: Saturday, April 28 :50 AM To: Media; Shane, Scott nytimes.com> Subject: Fact-checking an A ridi story quite urgent Hi Folks My Islamabad colleague Declan Walsh is writing, for Monday or Tuesday's NYT, a long story on Dr. Afridi and his role before UBL raid. He asked me to seek comment, confirmation or correction on his reporting before final edit. Apologies for the short notice but this has just come together and obviously editors want it to run by the anniversary. In view of the above, I'm sending the below very detailed summary of the facts as Declan understands them. It would be great either to get a written point by point set of comments or for someone to talk to Declan by phone or in person and go over all of this. We gre?tly appreciate your consideration. I'm on cell to discuss -- Declan is at (t0(6) ytimes.com. Many thanks. (t0(6) Scott BACKGROUND: Stateside trip: Afridi visited the United States in 2007 (and maybe in 2009 too) with his wife, apparently on some sort of medical conference jaunt. Was he a regular visitor to the Did that bring him in touch with intelligence folks? American wife: A senior ISI official and several friends say that Afridi's schoolteacher wife, Imrana Ghafoor, is a US citizen (or, most likely a-dual national). True? Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013615 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013615- Checkered past: Afridi had a very checkered past, having faced multiple allegations of corruption, professional malpractise and sexual harrassment. He was fired from his job as agency surgeon general (chief medical officer) in Khyber tribal agency six months before the operation, following official complaints from a nurse who alleged he had sexually assaulted her on the job. He was reinstated as agency surgeon general just a couple of weeks before May 2. Was the CIA aware of this background? Did it make any difference to the operation, for better or worse? ABBOTTABAD OPERATION -- The ISI says Afridi was in contact with a CIA handler named Peter, and was brought to the US embassy hidden in the back of a car in order to meet his handlers. True? UN equipment used in CIA op: In interviews in Khyber we have established that Afridi used polio vaccination kits funded by the United Nations to carry out the first round of phoney Hepatitis vaccinations in Abbotabad in March 2611. Was the agency aware of this? Would itk have mattered to them? Save the Children link: A senior US official says that Afridi's wife told ISI interrogators that her husband claimed to be working for the charity Save the Children (US) at the time he was doing the vaccination campaign. The 151, however, goes even further: it claims that Afridi had actually persuaded Save the Children to fund the vaccination program (without their knowing its true purpose), and that he even went to the extent of giving Save the Children fake invoices to keep the pretense going. Subsequently, according to aid agency sources, two senior managers at Save the Children one Irish, one Pakistani - were put on the Pakistani government's Exit Control List, preventing them from leaving Pakistan. The US and British embassies have been involved with the SC case and helped make representations stressing their innocence with the Pakistanis. Can you confirm? The phone call: US official say that Afridi didn't manage to get DNA from the OBL house, something that Pakistanis generally agree with. True? The Pakistanis also claim that, in order to confirm the identities of the people inside the house, he was given a phone number. A week or so before the raid, Afridi got one of the nurses employed on the vaccination program to ring that number, and the courier, Abu Ahmed a1 Kuwaiti came on the line. The 151 claims the CIA used voice recognition software to confirm Kuwaiti's presence. A second version of the story has it that Kuwaiti passed the phone-to bin Laden's wife, Khairee, who came on the line. Can you confirm or debunk?. Payment: Different Pakistani sources say he was paid between $16,666 and $26,666 for his part in the operation. Any comment on figures? AFTERMATH Efforts to spring him free. What efforts has the US government/CIA made to have Afridi released? What do the Pakistanis privately say about the case? Is there any chance of a deal? And if not, won't that have implications for others' willingness to help the US in the future? Leon Panetta: I was very surprised to hear Director Panetta's comment in the 66 Minutes interview last January where he admitted Afridi was a CIA operative and appealed to the Pakistanis to let him go. Did Panetta put that out there intentionally? Inside the CIA, was this public admission considered unusual? Was it seen as furthering or hindering Afridi's cause? Aid agency blowback: In general terms, there's been a lot of criticism from western aid workers about the vaccination scheme, saying it has brought much unwelcome attention from the 151 in the past year, and endangered their humanitarian work. Despite the huge success of Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013615 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013615 the overall mission, are there any regrets inside the CIA about this aspect of the operation, or any changes in rules or guidelines for cover? Capture by 151: One thing I can't really figure out: after May 2 Afridi continued with life as normal, and didn't skip Pakistan. One of his colleagues says that he had a Saudi visa for performing Hajj in his passport, so he clearly had an option. why didn't he leave? Did he think he would get away with it? And how, in the end, did the ISI figure out what he had been doing? - Possible compromise: Pakistani officials in Peshawar tell us that Afridi may now be charged under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which is the operative law in the tribal belt, instead of under the civil code. This effectively means that he could skirt treason charges, which carry the death penalty and instead be incarcerated under the opaque tribal belt legal system. This would, in theory,-make it easier for Pakistan to have Afridi quietly released a few years hence, and traded with the US at an opportune moment. OTHER - Bin Laden's buddies: Stepping back from the small detail of the Afridi story, what's striking is that the Pakistanis put a lot of effort into catching the man who helped catch OBL but what have they done to roll up the network of people who helped OBL when he was on the run? In this story - - Bin Laden's youngest wife said she changed house seven times in six months in Karachi in 2002. Has the ISI rounded up any of these people? Scott Shane New York Times Washington bureau - 262-862-0365 (t0(6) Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013615 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013618 . Rapp From: - Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 11:55 AM To: 'Shane,Sco? Cc: Meme Subject: RE: Visit today Thanks Scott. Will see what we can do on the new parts at the last minute. This discussion is planned, as you know, for OFF THE RECORD. t) 6 From: Shane, Scott Sent: Mondaz, April 30, 2012 11:37 AM To: Subject: Re: Visit today Hi just got this updated list of questions for CIA (biggest change is that Save the Children talked to us). Thanks much. Ten Questions Family background Is Afridi?s wife Imrana Ghafoor, an American citizen or a dual national? Does that have any bearing on his case? Is there any record of his trips to the United States in 2007 and/or 2009? Vaccination campaign: It?s been reported there were three rounds of Hep vaccinations in Abbottabad: mid-March, early April and late April. True? Capture by ISI: Why didn?t Afridi skip Pakistan after May 2? Did he have a US visa in his passport? How did the ISI figure out what he had been doing? Panetta: Were Panetta's comments to 60 MinUtes in January part of a strategy of getting Afridi out. What effect have they_had? Humanitarian cover: While we know that Afridi worked under the cover of a phony vaccination campaign, our reporting suggests he also sheltered under the brand name of reputable major aid organizations. Colleagues at his hospital in Khyber Agency say that he used refrigerated boxes donated by Rotary International - intended use in World Health Organization polio vaccination campaigns to carry out the Hepatitis campaign in Abbottabad. Moreover, he told the ISI and the Abbottabad Commission that he believed he was actually working for Save the Children instead of the CIA. As a result of this, aid workers say they suffered restrictions to important humanitarian work in the past year including visa denials, limited movement and delays in shipping relief aid. Does the CIA regret using humanitarian aid as cover for this operation? Save the Children: Save the Children?s Pakistan director, David Wright, has told us on-record that Afridi has made a barrage of damaging allegations against the NGO during ISI interrogations that have badly compromised his operations in Pakistan. According to Wright, Afridi claims to have been introduced to CIA personnel through a senior Save the Children official in Islamabad in 2008. He also says that Save the Children inadvertently approved the Abbottabad vaccination campaign in 2011. Among the consequences for Save the Children, Wright says that he hasn?t 1 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013618 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013618 been able to leave Pakistan since last October, and that a senior staff member was on the Pakistan government?s Exit Control List until a couple of weeks ago. Any comment? Checkered past: Our research suggests that Afridi had a very checkered past, with multiple allegations of corruption, professional malpractice and sexual harassment. He was fired from his job as agency surgeon general (chief medical officer) in Khyber tribal agency six months before the Abbottabad operation as a result of complaints by nurse who said he sexually assaulted her. He was reinstated to his job on April 13, three weeks before the Abbottabad raid. Was the CIA aware of this background? Did it make any difference to the operation, for better or worse? CIA contacts: The ISI says Afridi was in contact with a CIA handler named Peter. They say he was brought to meetings in the US embassy hidden in the back of a car. They say he was paid between $16,660 and $26,666 for his services. True? The ISI The ISI has gone on publicity offensive recently telling foreign journalist that it played a hitherto unacknowledged role in locating bin Laden. Is this true? And has the ISI rounded up any of the people who helped Bin Laden (and his family) stay on the run for a decade? The phone call: US official say that Afridi didn't manage to get DNA from the OBL house, something that Pakistanis generally agree with. True? The Pakistanis also claim that, in . order to confirm that the.courier, Abu Ahmed A1 Kuwaiti, was inside the house, the CIA got Afridi to call a phone number that was eventually patched through the Kuwaiti. The ISI claims the CIA used voice recognition software to confirm Kuwaiti?s presence. A second version of the story, given by the retired Pakistani brigadier Shaukat Qadir, has it that Kuwaiti passed the phone to bin Laden's wife, Khairee. Is there any truth in this? Efforts to spring him free: What has the US government/CIA done to secure his release? Is it important to set an example for other foreign nationals assisting the agency who may get in trouble? Possible compromise: Pakistani officials in Peshawar tell us that Afridi may now be charged under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, allowing him to skirt treason charges. Is this true? Lastly: Did Afridi?s work contribute anything to the capture of Scott Shane New York Times Washington bureau Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013618 roved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013618 Original Message . (b)C3)cn;Mth Sent: Monday, April 30, 2612 11:11 AM To: Shane, Scott Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Visit today Scott, 'Preston forwarded me your note. I'll be meeting with you and Michael at 12:15 today. Off the record, I think Michael will be focusing on the Afridi questions you provided, and the broader CT program will probably be off the table, though I recognize you will still ask. Please leave your cell phone and any recording devices in your car. See you in an hour! From: Shane, Scott [mailtonytimes.com] Sent: Monday, April 36, 2612 8:35 AM To: Rapp;E Subject: Visit today Hi and Preston -- Looking forward to my 12:15 pm visit today to Michael Morrell on the Afridi issue. If he is willing, when we finish going over the questions raised by Declan's reporting, I'd like to see whether he might be willing to discuss the bigger story on the Obama CT record. You have the questions I sent a while ago, some of which Preston ,addressed in a statement. But some remain outstanding. I'd like to make a pitch to him that providing more info will be good for the agency. One new wrinkle that I mentioned to Preston is that we have received a very detailed account of the process by which names get added to the DOD kill-or-capture list, while we have no such detail for the agency list. I'd like to add at least a little detail to support the agency's contention that it is careful, thorough, and fair in handling these novel and irrevocable decisions. Thanks much for the quick response on Declan's story. Please give me a shout on cell below if anything comes up this morning. best Scott Scott Shane New York Times Washington bureau 202-862-0305 nytimes.com Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013618 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013620 Rapp From: ClAAot Sent: ril 30, 2012 3:57 PM To: Shane, Scott Cc: la Subject: RE: CT Story Scott, Off the record and as discussed in the hall today, the typo below is mine - with apologies and was meant to be January 2009. On back round as a "senior US counterterrorism official": "it's hard to argue against the effectiveness of the program, especially considering the need to stop an al-Qaeda organization that was rooted in the tribal areas planning attacks. By any measure, these operations have been extremely successful at taking terrorists and terror leaders off the battlefield with a high level of precision and a very low level of noncombatant casualties. Since mid-January 2009, nearly 70 senior al-Qaeda figures and militant leaders are no IOnger plotting to kill Americans as a result ofthese efforts." From: PRESTBG Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 3:49 PM To: Shane, Scott Cc: Media Subject: CT Story Scott, Off the record, here are some top-line points that focus on the area many people who write about this subject overlook. For one, people often forget why this effort was deemed necessary. If you recall, news reporting from the 2007-2008 time frame, including stories from your colleagues detailed a resurgent AQ planning attacks against US interests from the FATA imes.com 2007 02 19 world asia 19intel.htm r=2&oref=slo in& a ewanted=al Faced with that challenge, beginning in 2008 and intensifying with the Obama Administration in 2009 we've been able to halt, and reverse the threat from AQ's core leadership. The tactics vs. strategy, long-term question you raised is pertinent, but you can?t get to phase two if you don't succeed at phase one?which was rooting AQ out of its safehaven. We?re closer than we've ever been, but the job isn?t ?nished yet. Continuing off the record, to set the record straight, there is a background point properly laying out who is a combatant. It is the activities, patterns, and overall intelligence mosaic that determine who is a combatant or noncombatant. - On background as a ?senior US counterterrorism of?cial": "It's hard to argue against the effectiveness of the program, especially considering the need to stop an al?Qaeda organization that was rooted in the tribal areas planning attacks. By any measure, these operations have been extremely successful at taking terrorists and terror leaders off the battle?eld with a high level of precision and a very low level of noncombatant casualties. Since mid-January 2010, nearly 70 senior al-Qaeda figures and militant leaders are no longer plotting to kill Americans as a result of these efforts." Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013620 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013620 "The seamless integration of intelligence collection, analysis, and technology, backed by the complete confidence of the Administration and Congress has resulted in a precise counterterrorism effort that has left al-Qaeda more vulnerable than it has been since 9/11.? "When you understand the enemy, have in?depth intelligence and advanced observation capabilities, you can tell who is a combatant and who isn't with a fair degree of certainty. It?s really pretty simple; the fact is terrorists conduct activities that clearly distinguish them from people who aren't the enemy. If you aren't certain, you wait until you can make a determination one way or the other." "Al-Qaeda is an insular, paranoid organization that doesn't letjust anyone in their presence. Innocent neighbors don't hitchhike rides in the back of trucks headed for the border full of terrorists with guns and bombs." "The people working to find OBL had been working hard before 2009 and frankly have been working hard to find Zawahiri and others since then. Attention and support from the President on down kept the focus on the goal, and when the time came to pursue a tangible lead, the leadership, resources, and experience were there to capitalize on the Opening. In addition, years of successfully connecting the dots to find elusive terrOrists?whether in the intensified CT campaign in the FATA or through military and intelligence collaboration in Iraq and Afghanistan?gave every confidence in the methods that ultimately brought about Bin Laden?s end.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Of?ce of Public Affair - (bis) :Mgm Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013620 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013621 Rapp From: ClAAct Sent: on ay, \pril 30, 2012 6:31 PM To: 'Shane, Scott' Cc: Media Subject: RE: Feinstein, Levin Statement on CiA's Coercive Interrogation Techniques Scott, Off the record, we assume it is well-known that CIA cooperated with the SSCI investigation. As you predicted ?piease note that CIA declined to comment on the below. Thanks ClAAct From: Shane, Scott Sent: Monda April 30, 2012 5:39 PM 70:: Subject: FW: Feinstein, Levin Statement on CIA's Coercive Interrogation Techniques Here you go. Thanks for your patience. I am causing you all kinds of trouble today. Will send the background requests - later Scott Shane New York Times Washington Bureau 202-862-0305 office nytimescom (6) From: Feinstein Press Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 2:09 PM Subject: Feinstein, Levin Statement on Coercive Interrogation Techniques Sim-$151331. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013621 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013621 For Immediate Release Contact: Brian Weiss (Feinstein), 202-224-9629 April 30, 2012 Feinstein, Levin Statement on Coercive Interrogation Techniques Washington?Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D- Calif.) and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) released the following statement regarding claims by former CIA Deputy Director of Operations Jose Rodriguez about the effectiveness of the coercive interrogation techniques: ?We are deeply troubled by the claims of the former Deputy Director of Operations Jose Rodriguez regarding the effectiveness of the coercive interrogation techniques. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will soon complete a comprehensive review of the former Detention and Interrogation Program. Committee staff has reviewed more than 6 million pages of records and the Committee?s ?nal report, which we expect to exceed 5000 pages, will provide a detailed, factual description of how interrogation techniques were used, the conditions under which detainees were held, and the intelligence that was or wasn?t gained from the program. Statements made by Mr. Rodriguez and other former senior government of?cials about the role of the CIA interrogation program in locating Usama bin Laden (UBL) are inconsistent with CIA records. We are disappointed that Mr. Rodriguez and others, who left government positions prior to the UBL operation and are not privy to all of the intelligence that led to the raid, continue to insist that the so?called ?enhanced interrogation techniques? used many years ago were a central component of our success. This view is misguided and misinformed. The roots of the UBL operation stretch back nearly a decade and involve hundreds, perhaps thousands, of intelligence professionals who worked non-stop to connect and analyze many fragments of information, eventually leading the United States to Usama bin Laden?s location in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The suggestion that the operation was carried out based on information gained through the harsh treatment of CIA detainees is not only inaccurate, it trivializes the work of individuals across multiple U.S. agencies that led to UBL and the eventual operation. We are also troubled by Mr. Rodriguez?s statements justifying the destruction of video tapes documenting the use of coercive interrogation techniques as ?just getting rid of some ugly visuals.? His decision to order the destruction of the tapes was in violation of instructions from CIA and White House lawyers, illustrates a blatant disregard for the law, and unnecessarily caused damage to the reputation. Further, it?s worth repeating, as discussed in the Senate Armed Services Committee?s 2008 report, the SERE techniques used in the interrogation program were never intended to be used by US. interrogators. Rather, the techniques which are based on Communist Chinese interrogation techniques used during the Korean War to 2 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013621 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013621 elicit false confessions were developed to expose US. soldiers to the abusive treatment they might be subjected to if captured by our enemies. An overwhelming number of experts agree, the SERE techniques are not an effective means to illicit accurate information. Misinformation Relating to the UBL Operation Statement of Jose Rodriguez, former CIA Deputy Director for Operations, Time Magazine, May 4, 2011: ?Information provided by detainees] KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libbi about bin Laden's courier was the lead information that eventually led to the location of [bin Laden?s] compound and the operation that led to his death.? This statement is wrong. The original lead infOrmation had no connection to CIA detainees. The CIA had signi?cant intelligence on the courier that- was collected from a variety of classi?ed sources. While the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used against KSM and al-Libbi, the pair provided false and misleading information during their time in CIA custody. This information will be detailed in the Intelligence Committee?s report; Statement of Michael Hayden, former CIA Director, Scott Hennen Show, May 3, 2011: ?[W]hat we got, the original lead information - and frankly it was incomplete identity information on the couriers - began with information from CIA detainees at the black sites.? This statement is wrong. The original information had no connection to CIA detainees. The CIA had signi?cant intelligence on the courier that was collected from a - variety of classi?ed sources. This information will be detailed in the Intelligence Committee?s report. Statement of Michael Mukasey, former Attorney General, Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2011: ?Consider how the intelligence that led to bin Laden came to hand. It began with a disclosure from Khalid Shiekh Mohammed (KSM) who broke like a dam under the pressure of harsh interrogation techniques that included waterboarding. He loosed a torrent of information - including eventually the name of a trusted courier of bin Laden Another of those gathered up later in this harvest, Abu Faraj al-Libi, also was subjected to certain of these harsh techniques and disclosed further details about bin Laden's couriers that helped last weekend's achievement.? This statement is wrong. There is nothing in CIA intelligence records to corroborate this statement. Other press reports have suggested that a third CIA detainee subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques provided signi?cant information on the courier and his relationship with al-Qa'ida. While this third detainee did provide relevant information, he did so the day before he was interrogated by the CIA using their coercive 3 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013621 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013621 interrogation techniques. This information will be detailed in the Intelligence Committee?s report. The Facts: CIA did not ?rst learn about the existence of the UBL courier from detainees subjected to coercive interrogation techniques. Nor did the agency discover the courier's identity from detainees subjected to coercive techniques. No detainee reported on the courier?s full name or speci?c whereabouts, and no detainee identi?ed the compound in which UBL was hidden. Instead, the CIA learned of the existence of the courier, his true name and location through means unrelated to the CIA detention and interrogation program. Information to support this operation was obtained from a wide variety of intelligence sources and methods. CIA of?cers and their colleagues throughout the Intelligence Community sifted through massive amounts of information, identi?ed possible leads, tracked them down, and made considered judgments based on all of the available intelligence. The CIA detainee who provided the most signi?cant information about the courier provided the information prior to being subjected to coercive interrogation techniques. The three detainees subj ected to waterboardin provided no new information about the courier. In fact, the CIA detainees who were subjected to coercive techniques downplayed the courier's signi?cance, with some of those detainees denying they knew him at all, in the face of signi?cant evidence to the contrary. Detainees whom the CIA believed to have information on location provided no locational information, even after signi?cant use of the CIA's coercive interrogation techniques.? Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013621 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013631 From: . - Sent: Thursday, March 01, 2012 5:07 PM To: 'Dilanian, Ken' Subject: RE: Help Has Arrived! lam looking forward to working with you, Ken. Kind regards, Todd From: Dilanian, Ken [mailto . Sent: Thursday, March 01, I To: f?vnfhia i Pann Cc: Subject: RE: Help Has Arrived! Hooray! Glad to have you guys. Ken Dilanian National Security Correspondent Los Angeles Times 824 8328 Twitter: @KenDilanianLAT From: :l?ggx [Maire Much. 0v] ClAAot - Sent: Thursday, March 01, 2012 4:50 PM mm . grimy ucra ov ucra ov ov elp Has Arrived! Colleagues in the media: I'm happy to announce two new additions to our media relations team at CIA. (You have no doubt noticed that we have been short?handed for a while, and we appreciate your forbearance.) We hope to arrange a get-together for you all to meet them in person sometime this spring. John and Todd below are joining Preston,E and me as spokespersons. Please include all of us?or use our new group address, mediaQucia.gov?on your emails to us. Off the record, here is a little more background on our new officers: John R. is the new chief of the media relations branch, a post that's been vacant for a while. A manager of John has also worked for the Deputy Director of CIA. Before joining the Agency in 2005, he built and managed a television station in Lebanon that broadcast to a potential audience of 12 million people. He also served as the Chief Operating Officer of the Interface Media Group in Washington, D.C.,Iand the General Manager of the Northeast Radio Network in New York state. John holds a BA from University of Pittsburgh and has studied at Stanford University and the Pedagogical Institute in Moscow. Todd Ebitz joins the staff as a media spokesperson. Todd?s-15-year Agency career has focused on producing and managing political analysis on various regions, including most recentiy the Middle East. He holds a Master's from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and was a Fulbright scholar. Regards, Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013631 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013631 L. Rapp Director of Public Affairs Central Intelligence Agency ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013631 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013634 ClAAct From: Dilanian, Ken$ Iatimes.com] Sent: rc :48 AM To: . Subject: RE: what can you tell me about this? OK, thanks. And you wouldn?t put out disinformation on this would you? If it was true and you didn?t want to confirm it you?d say, "No comment?? ask only because covert operations are supposed to be deniable, right? Fromm [mailto @uciagovl Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2012 11:47 AM (W3) To: Dilanian, Ken Subject: RE: what can you tell me about this? Ken, Off the record, no US personnel (CIA or otherwise) were killed in the attack. I?d steer you in the direction of the Yemeni of?cial account in Reuters last Friday. Here?s what it says: Yemeni security official in Aden, speaking on condition of anonymity, said a gunman fired on a U.S. security team involved in training Yemeni security forces on Thursday, but that the shots had hit their armoured vehicle without injuring anyone.? I can, on background, as a official? confirm that no US personnel were killed and this Yemeni security official account is basically correct. Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs I From: Dilanian, Ken [maiito @latimes.com Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2012 11:41 AM T01: ClAAct Subject: what can you tell me about this? are here: Home World Top News Al-Qaida claims responsibility for killing U.S. intelligence officer $0 E-mail Xinhua, March 3, 2012 Adjust font size: The Yemen-based al-Qaida wing said Friday that it had killed a U.S. intelligence officer in the southern port city of Aden. "Our brave fighters opened fire at a team of U.S. intelligence officers in the southern city of Aden on Thursday, killing a CIA officer," the al?Qaida said in a text message received by Xinhua. "We killed the officer after we monitored him and made sure that he was cooperating with the Sanaa government in the war against terrorism," the message said. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013634 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013634 The group did not gave more details about the attack or elaborate how it conducted the operation against the US. team. A close source to the al-Qaida militants told to Xinhua that we. saw a team of US. senior officers patrolling in the al-Mulla district in downtown Aden in a small military car." -"The officers' car came under attacks, which also injured a number of them," the source said. On Thursday, a Yemeni security official told Xinhua that a brigade of Yemen's special forces were dispatched from Sanaa to Aden for an anti-terror training course conducted by a US. security team. He said on condition of anonymity that the Yemeni special forces were preparing to engage next month in battles against al- Qaida militants in the neighboring restive province of Abyan. The Yemeni government has given the militants ultimatum to quit captured cites in Abyan. Taking advantage of one-year anti-government protests, the resurgent al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), known locally as Ansar al-Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law), has taken control of several cities across the restive southern provinces. The Yemeni government forces have been battling the AQAP militants in the south, leaving hundreds of people killed and thousands displaced. Ken Dilanian National Security Correspondent Los Angeles Times o:(202) 824 8328i (W6) Twitter: @KenDilanianLAT Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013634 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013641 ClAAct From: Dilanian, Sent: Wednesda March 14, 2012 12:45 PM To: Subject: RE: syria nuclear material? (bxg) Thanks. Last time i checked, you guys believed the CBW program was securely guarded by the regime. Still true? Sent: We nes ay, March 14, 2012 12:43 PM To: Dilanian, Ken Cc: Media@ucia.gov (bxs) Subject: RE: syria nuclear material? ClAAct Ken, Off the record, the U56 asked these questions and conducted a thorough analysis of Syria?s nuclear aspirations. Syria's CBW program is of far more concern. Cheers, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (mm mm (bxs) From: Dilanian, Ken [mailto @latimescom] Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2012 11:05 AM To: Subject: syria nuclear material? (bxs) Preston, Fred Fleitz raises some reasonable questions here, but the last line can't be truebackground whether you guys believe, and with what confidence level, that Syria has nuclear material? Ken ?In the eyes of some in the press, that was that. The threat was gone. But that?s not necessarily the case,? said Fleitz. ?This reactor reportedly was close to operations, which raises the question: Where are the fuel rods for this reactor? Now, it?s possible that North Korea was going to ship these fuel rods to Syria. However, it?s also very likely that Syria was building-a fuel fabrication building somewhere in the country to keep this reactor fueled. Also, since this reactor was likely for plutonium for weapons, there would have to be buildings to process that plutonium, to reprocess and extract the plutonium and then make it into weapons fuel.'Where are those buildings? What technology does Syria have that other powers could possibly exploit or terrorist groups could exploit?? The United States, said Fleitz has never bothered to ask these questions, or tried to answer them. iPTIibio released births: clA?irL'thio?i 9f s15; 1.. The Secret Threat from Syria?s Nuclear Weapons Proqram March 14, 2012 Security Middle East and North Africa The United States must start thinking about how to secure Syria?s nuclear program and to locate the missing uranium and nuclear weapons-?related technology of the program before they can ?nd their~way Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013641 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013641 into the hands of the Iranians or terrorist groups, LIGNET managing editor Fred Fleitz said in an interview this week. ?If Assad thinks he?s in danger, he just may decide to transfer some technology, or maybe some uranium, to Iran,? Fleitz said of the syrian president, who has earned international opprobrium for his brutal crackdown on the opposition. ?When we think about a post-Assad Syria, we shouldn?t be overlooking this,? said Fleitz. Fleitz, a long-time senior analyst with the CIA and senior staffer on the House Intelligence Committee until the spring of 2011, said there are many outstanding questions about Syria's nuclear program that date to the Bush administration. Most of what is known about Syria?s nuclear program came to light in reports of Israel?s 2007 strike on the al- Kibar nuclear reactor in the Syrian desert about 20 miles outside the town of Deir el-Zor. The reactor, which was reportedly close to being operational, was destroyed by Israeli air strikes on September 6, 2007.?We know since this reactor wasn't near any cities and didn't have any infrastructure to produce power, this was not a reactor that was built for peaceful purposes,? Fleitz told journalist John Bachman. his was a reactor that was built to make plutonium for weapons.? In 2008, a U.S. intelligence briefing revealed that the al-Kibar reactor was buiit by North Korea, and was almost identical to one in Yongbon, North Korea, that is used to produce plutonium for North Korea's nuclear weapons. The briefing also revealed that the reactor was very close to being operational. But Fleitz says this isn't the end of the story -- Syria's nuclear program still poses a threat, especially if the Assad government falls and the country descends into chaos. ?in the eyes of some in the press, that was that. The threat was gone. But that?s not necessarily the case," said Fleitz. ?This reactor reportedly was close to operations, which raises the question: Where are the fuel rods for this reactor? Now, it?s possible that North Korea was going to ship these fuel rods to Syria. However, it?s also very likely that Syria was building a fuel fabrication building somewhere in the country to keep this reactor fueled. Also, since this reactor was likely for plutonium for weapons, there would have to be buildings to process that plutonium, to reprocess and extract the plutonium and then make it into weapons fuel. Where are those buildings? What technology does Syria have that other powers could possibly exploit or terrorist groups could exploit?? The United States, said Fleitz has never bothered to ask these questions, or tried to answer them. ?Iran is running out of uranium, for enrichment, and it?s been looking all over the world for sources for uranium -- supposedly for its power program, but most experts believe is for its weapons program. If there isan amount of uranium in Syria that Syria had amassed for its al-Kibar reactor, Iran?s going to want it. And i think that?s something that, in addition to worrying about Syria's chemical and biological weapons program, the United States has to think about Syria?s nuclear weapons program and all the associated infrastructure and buildings and materials and uranium that had built up for this program. I think this is a serious threa Many experts believe the al-Kibar reactor couldn't have been put together without Iranian assistance, and that it may have in fact been an Iranian project, the manifestation of Iran?s attempt to pursue plutonium for use as fuel in nuclear weapons. Fleitz says there?s a ?strong likelihood? that Iran and Syria were indeed collaborating on al-Kibar, building the facility ?where the world wouldn?t be watching, in the middle of the Syrian desert.? Chemical weapons The Bush administration had repeatedly charged that Syria had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, basing this on U.S. intelligence reports. These weapons, says Fleitz, would ?pose a significant threat? if they were to fall into the wrong hands. ?In all likelihood they are well guarded and well protected,? said Fleitz, and dismissed media speculation about the weapons being used on invading troops as unlikely. ?Now in terms of falling into the hands of terrorist groups, that is a real worry. The worry that militia groups could seize these weapons, such as militias in Libya did after that conflict, is a real concern." Fred Fleitz Managing Editor, Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013641 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013641 202-250-4287 Ken Dilanian National security Correspondent Los Angeles TI o:(202) 324 832W Twitter: @KenDilanianLAT Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013641 (bxs) Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013647 b6 (X) From: Dilanian, Kelatimes.com] Sent: Wednesda March 21, 2012 7:05 PM To: Subject: . - :yemen (bxs) Thanks, Preston. Ken Dilanian Los Angeles Times 202 624 8328 . (bxs) A Froml liciaoov" ucia.oov> To: "Dilanian, Ken' llatimes.com> Cc: "Media@ucia.gov" Sent: Wed, Mar 21, 2012 21 :17:41 Subject: RE: yemen Ken, On background as a of?cial": has two main goals: to attack the West and solidify a safehaven and extremist state in Yemen. Because of the political unrest in 2011, they had more succeSs at the latter. AQAP will try to use any space it can get to plan external attacks.? goal is to use insurgent and terrorist attacks to challenge the Yemeni Government's effort to roll back the group's territorial gains in 2011. The challenge for Sana is to halt and reverse progress.? "Ansar al?Sharia is a front AQAP uses locally in Yemen to avoid the negative branding that comes with the al?Qaeda name. AQAP needs the cooperation of the southern tribes and they? ll try to obtain it through offering some incentives, but with a heavy dose of intimidation, and coercion.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (we) SW From: Dilanian, Ken [mailto @latimes.com I Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 11:45 AM T04: Subject: yemen Preston, sorry to hit you with two today, but I am also working on something about Yemen. The US. military has stepped up strikes in recent weeks, even as it pushed a plan to reorganize the Yemeni military to that it is better suited to dislodge AQAP and Ansar al Sharia from the towns they have seized in the south. Can we chat later about some of this? Ken Dilanian National Security Correspondent Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013647 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013647 Los Angeles Times o:(202) 824 8328 (W5) Twitter: @KenDilanIanLAT Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013647 Approved for Release': 2017/05/17 C06013647 3 0 (W6) From: Dilanian, Ken atimes.com] Sent: arc 2:09 PM To: Subject: :yemen the FATA, right, I was thinking about that. thanks. From cia. cia. ov Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2012 12:09 PM To: Dilanian, Ken Subject: RE: yemen ClAAct Hey Ken, Off the record, it would be an overstatement to say Yemen has been the largest AQ safehaven since 9/ 11. For one, none of present safehavens is a fair comparison to pre-9/ 11 Afghanistan, which was a safehaven in the most accurate sense. In Afghanistan, AQ was largely untouched for years. Since 9/11 the FATA?uprior to the stepping up of CT operations there?was the truest safehaven in terms of density of A0 operatives, training and external plotting. i don?t think anyone would say that Yemen has reached that level. Hope this helps for context, feel free to call. Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Of?ce of Public Affairs ClAAct 0" ClAAct From: Dilanian, Kenl latimes.coml Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2012 10:27 AM a To Subject: RE: yemen question: do you think it would be accurate to say that southern yemen right now is the largest safe haven for al qaeda since pre 9-11 Afghanistan? just looking for guidance here, not the cia?s of?cial view. From: cia. ov cia. ov Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 5:18 PM To: Dilanian, Ken Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: yemen Ken, On background as a of?cial?: has two main goals: to attack the West and solidify a safehaven and extremist state in Yemen. Because of the political unrest in 2011, they had more success at the latter. AQAP will try to use any space it can get to plan external attacks.? Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013647 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013647 goal is to use insurgent and terrorist attacks to challenge the Yemeni Government?s effort to roll back the group?s territorial gains in 2011. The challenge for Sana is to halt and reverse AQAP's progress." ?Ansar al?Sharia is a front AQAP uses locally in Yemen to avoid the negative branding that comes with the al?Qaeda name. AQAP needs the cooperation of the southern tribes and they? l try to obtain it through offering some incentives, but with a heavy dose of intimidation, and coercion.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs Emmy From: Dilanian, Kenl latimes.coml Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 11:45 AM To: Sub] yemen Preston, sorry to hit you with two today, but I am also working on something about Yemen. The military has stepped up strikes in recent weeks, even as it pushed a plan to reorganize the Yemeni military to that it is better suited to dislodge AQAP and Ansar al Sharia from the towns they have seized in the south. Can we chat later about some of this? Ken Dilanian National Security Correspondent Los Angeles Times (bxa) o:(202) 824 3328\ Twitter: @KenDilanianLAT Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013647 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013671 From: Sent: Monday, ay 07, 2012 8:22 PM To: 'Shane, Scott' Subject: RE: AQAP Bomb Plot Great. You're welcome. Todd From: Shane, Scott Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 8:22 PM Tm; Subject: Re: AQAP Bomb Plot Just got it! Thanks Scott Shane New York Times Washington bureau 2028620305 :Elnytimescom From:lucia.gov [mailtogbuciagov] Sent: Monday, May 07, 2012 0 To: Shane, Scott Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: AQAP Bomb Plot Hi Scott, Please ?nd our comments and some statements from other agencies and the WH below. Best, Todd From a senior US of?cial: ?The recovery of the device was a team sport. It is another example of outstanding international counterterrorism cooperation. ?We disrupted this plot well before it was ever a threat to the United States.? is the responsible group here. We believe AQAP produced the device, and we believe it was intended to be used by a suicide bomber on an aircraft.? ?The device and the plot are consistent with what we know about plans, intentions, and capabilities. They remain committed to striking targets in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the Homeland, and Europe. And AQAP is probably feeling pressure to conduct a successful attack to, from their perspective, avenge the deaths of Bin Ladin and Aulaqi.? Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013671 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013671 ?It is our assessment that the threat form AQAP is growing due to the territorial gains the group made during the political standoff in Yemen that lasted from early 2011 until this past February. Those territorial gains have allowed the group to establish additional training camps.? ?The device is in the hands of the FBI and it is being thoroughly examined.? ?We are con?dent that the study of the device will yield valuable insights that will aid us in adapting security practices and counterterrorism operations here and abroad.? ?The device has the hallmarks of previous AQAP bombs that the group used in the failed assassination attempt on Saudi security of?cial Mohammed Bin Nayif and that it used in the failed 2009 Christmas Day bombing. The device, like those earlier devices, is non-metallic.? ?While similar, a preliminary review of this device shows that it has some signi?cant differences from the device used in the Christmas day attack. It is clear that AQAP is revamping its bomb techniques to try to avoid the causes of the failure of the 2009 device.? For your convenience: DHS Statement: ?We have no specific, credible information regarding an active terrorist plot against the US. at this time, although we continue to monitor efforts by aI-Qa?ida and its affiliates to carry out terrorist attacks, both in the Homeland and abroad. Since this demonstrates our adversaries? interest in targeting the aviation sector, DHS continues, at the direction of the President, to employ a risk-based, layered approach to ensure the security of the traveling public. These layers include threat and vulnerability analysis, prescreening and screening of passengers, using the best available technology, random searches at airports, federal air marshal coverage and additional security measures both seen and unseen. DHS will continue to work with our federal, state, local, international and private sector partners to identify potential threats and take appropriate protective measures. As always, we encourage law enforcement and security officials, as well as the general public, to maintain vigilance and report suspicious activity to the appropriate authorities." ?Matt Chandler, DHS Spokesman FBI statement: ?As a result of close cooperation with our security and intelligence partners overseas, an improvised explosive device designed to carry out a terrorist attack has been seized abroad. The FBI currently has possession of the and is conducting technical and forensics analysis on it. Initial exploitation indicates that the device is very similar to IEDs that have been used previously by al-Qa?ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in-attempted terrorist attacks, including against aircraft and for targeted assassinations. The device never presented a threat to public safety, and the US. Government is working closely with international partners to address associated concerns with the device. We refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, including the Transportation Security Administration, regarding'ongoing security measures to safeguard the American people and the traveling public.? -FBI Statement WH COMMENT: ?The President was first informed about the plot in April by his Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Adviser John Brennan, and he has received regular updates and briefings as needed from his national security team. While the President was assured that the device did not pose a threat to the public, he directed the Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement and intelligence agencies to take whatever steps necessary to guard against this type of attack. The disruption of this plot underscores the necessity of remaining vigilant against terrorism here and abroad. The President thanks all intelligence and counterterrorism professionals involved for their outstanding work and for serving with the extraordinary skill and commitment that their enormous responsibilities demand.? ?Caitlin Hayden, Deputy NSC Spokesperson Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013671 Approved for Release: ?201 7/05/17 006013675 ClAAot . From: Shane, Scott: nytimes.com] . Sent: Tuesda May 22, 2012 5:54 PM To: Subject: Re: Obama CT Policy Thanks very much, Preston. Will study this tonight. Best Scott Scott Shane New York Times Washington bureau zoz-sszosos ClAAct @nytimescom From muciagov :luciagov] Sent: ues ay, May 22, 2012 05:49 PM To: Shane, Scott Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: Obama CT Policy Scott, Off the record, here's a recap of what we?ve already provided for your story on Obama's CT campaign with a few additional answers/information included. As we discussed, regarding your main inquiry about squaring with criticism from unnamed senior officials, we?ve provided considerable counterpoint - which should allow you to inform your readers of both sides of the argument. On your questions on process, you now have a series of on the record speeches from Brennan, the AG, and our own General Counsel at your disposal to add to the rigor behind the U56 decision making process. It would be a mistake to insinuate that because we won?t talk about a classified process, that somehow means there is no process. It would be a mistake, "especially, to do this in light of all the efforts US officials have made to inject more understanding into the public domain. Please keep us posted on the'progress of your story. On background as a ?senior US counterterrorism official:" "It?s hard to argue against the effectiveness of the program, especially considering the need to stop an a ~Qaeda organization that was rooted in the tribal areas planning attacks. By any measure, these operations have been extremely successful at taking terrorist and terror leaders off the battle?eld with a high level of precision and very low level of noncombatant casualties. Since mid-January 2009, nearly 70 senior al-Qaeda figures and militant leaders are no longer plotting to kill Americans as a result of these efforts.? Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013675 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013675 "The seamless integration of intelligence collection, analysis, and technology, backed by the complete con?dence of the Administration and Congress, has resulted in a precise counterterrorism effort that has left al-Qaeda more vulnerable than it has been since 9/11.? ?When you understand the enemy, have in-depth intelligence, and advanced observation capabilities, you can tell who is a combatant and who isn't with a fair degree of certainty. It?s really pretty simple; that fact is terrorists conduct activities that clearly distinguish them from people who aren?t the enemy. If you aren?t certain, you don?t take action. "Al-Qaeda is an insular, paranoid organization?innocent neighbors don?t hitchhike rides in the back of trucks headed for the border full of terrorists with guns and bombs." "Information retrieved from Osama Bin Laden?s Abbottabad compound indicated that he and other al-Qaeda leaders beiieved these operations have been taking a real toll on the terrorist group. Bin Laden and his subordinates were focused on evading these sustained and aggressive operations.? In reference to your guestion on the hunt for OBL the following is on background as a "senior US counterterrorism "The people working to ?nd OBL had been working hard before 2009 and frankly have been working hard to find Zawahiri and others since then. Attention and supportfrom the President on down kept the focus on the goal, and when the time came to pursue a tangible lead, the leadership, resources, and experience were there to capitalize on the opening. In addition, years of successfully connecting the dots to ?nd elusive terrorists?whether in the intensi?ed CT campaign in the FATA, or through military and intelligence collaboration in Iraq and Afghanistan?gave everyone confidence in the methods that ultimately brought about Bin Laden's end.? In reference to your guestion on change in munitionsI we will not discuss tacticsI but you can use the following on background from a ?senior US counterterrorism of?cial?: ?The technology is pushed to its limits to ensure actions are accurate as possible. There hasn?t been a military effort in modern warfare more sensitive to limiting collateral damage. Period." In resgonse to your Question on whether Bin Laden wanted to change AQ's name the following is on background from a ?senior US counterterrorism of?cial?: "It's absolutely true there were signs Bin Laden considered changing al-Qaeda?s name. He was frustrated that the group's cache was dwindling among Muslims and he was anxious the US had convinced the world that the war is with al- Qaeda, not a religion. Bin Laden and his subordinates also shared concerns that attacks by aI?Qaeda in Iraq against Muslims therehad hurt al?Qaeda?s appeal. Changing the name?something that clearly didn't happen-vwas an option Bin Laden wanted his deputies to consider.? Per your previous queries, to help you with your list of CT successes, here is a list of notable AG and key militant ally high value targets taken off the battle?eld in the Af-Pak theater since January 2009. You can report the following fact without attribution. These have all been con?rmed in press reporting. . . Osama Bin Laden Abu Atiyah Abd aI?Rahman (former AQ Shaykh Sa'id al?Masri (former AQ Saleh al-Somali (AQ external operations planner) Al-Sa'idi al-Masri aka Ishanullah (Chief of A0 Afghanistan paramilitary operations, veteran trainer) Abu Hamza al-Jawfi (Veteran AQ commander) 7 Abu Hafs al-Shahri (AC1 operations planner responsible for coordination with Pakistani militants) Ahmed Sayfullah (AQ paramilitary commander, .Son of the Blind Shaykh) Abu Miqdad al?Masri (AQ planner) ApprOVed for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013675 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013675 ?Abd al-Rahman aI-Yemeni (AQ planner) Aslam Awan (AQ external operations planner) Younis al?Mauritani (Captured AQ external operations planner) Umar Patek'(Senior official in SE Asia A0. affiliate captured in Pakistan) Baitullah Mahsud (Key Pakistani militant ally and operational planner) llyas Kashmiri (Key Pakistani militant ally and operational planner) Badr Mansoor (Key Pakistani militant ally and operational planner) Tahir Yuldashev (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan emir) Halim Ullah (Commander Nazir Subcommander) Janbaz Zadran (Key Haqqani Subcommander, planned attacks on Coalition forces) Lastly I?d remind you of previous background comments we?ve shared with you on this subject. This one is available to you on background from a senior counterterrorism of?cial": "Extraordinary care is taken in the course of these operations to ensure precision and to focus on the protection of noncombatants who may be nearby. Eyes are on the target before, during, and after an action. Targets are chose on the basis of intelligence and observations built over time. Operations have been aborted when innocents?women, children, or any individual or group who are neither assessed to be terrorists nor strongly believed to be involved in supporting militants?have wandered into a legitimate target area at the last minute. Potential targets are reviewed, through, among other things, the prism of the laws of war, including concepts like necessity, proportionality, and the absolute minimization of loss to innocent life and property. And this is against an enemy who treats all those things with complete contempt.? Hope this helps, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson . CIA Office of Public Affairs ?ucia?ov ClAAct Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013675 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013686 From: Goldman, AdanSporg] (W6) Sent: Monday, April 09, 2012 6:23 PM To: ClAAct Subject: e: at In an hour? Thanks. Original Message Sent: Monday, April 69, 2612 66:68 PM To; Goldman, Adam Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Chat in an hour? Adam, 0n background as a official?: "Vinas is believed to have appeared masked in a video with Abu Yahya.? Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs UCla --?--0rigina1 I (t0(6) From: Goldman, Adam [mailtoj Eap.org] 'Sent: Monda April 69, 261 7 Wm . Subjec Chat in an hour? Do you have a minute? -?-?-Original . [mailto: bucia.gov] Sent: Thursday, April 65, 2619 To: Goldman, Adam Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Chat in an hour? Hey Adam, Off the record, you are correct Vinas appeared masked in a video with Abu Yahya. To my knowledge Vinas never met Rauf. This may be a garble for other Western operatives he met, who were themselves linked to Rauf. It wouldn't surprise me that Vinas heard of Rauf. Take care, Preston Golson Media Spokesperson Approved for ReleaEe: 2017/05/17 006013686 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013686 CIA Office of Public Affairs ucia-gov . . From: Goldman, Adam Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2612 7:06 PM To: Subjec e: Chat in an hour? Thanks Preston. Right, Pakistani police picked him up with help of agency, which located him. I don't know much about Abdullah Azzam other than he was an AQ recruiter and is very dead. Apparently he had a hand in Vinas' recruitment. Can you confirm if Vinas was in fact in that 2608 video with al-Libi? Let's touch base late tomorrow or Wednesday? Is that enough time? Adam Ori inal Message FromiTgaPcia.gov Sent: ues ay, April 03,?2612 66:57 PM To: Goldman, Adam Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Chat in an hour? Adam, Off the record, I want to spend one more day double checking my research and tracking down the right people with the historical knowledge on this issue. You are absolutely right; Vinas had an knowledge of all the people and places he went. Also, as we discussed, it was great "connecting the dots? work that identified Vinas was training in the FATA. In terms of his arrest, it was actually Pakistani police who picked him up. Lastly, do you have a little more detail on the description of Abdullah Azzam? Do you have a nationality? I want to be certain we're talking about the same person. Thanks! I can confirm on background as a official?: --Vinas met with Shaykh Sa'id al-Masri, Abu Yahya al-Libi and Atiyah abd Al-Rahman on a few occasions in addition to many other mid and low-level al-Qaeda operatives. --Vinas' information was important to develop a picture of what life is like for foreign operatives in the FATA. Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Of?ce of {Tubllc E??uciagov From: Goldman, Adam [mailto: @ap.org] (t0(6) Sent: Tuesday, April 93, 2012 19:13 AM To: Subject: RE: Chat in an hour? Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013686 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013686 I'll call about 1p.m. 1. A masked-Vinas appeared in a 2068 propaganda video with Abu Yahya al-Libi. 2. Vinas met Rashid Rauf in Naziristan, the Pakistani British AQ operative who perished after something fell from sky. He also met Abdullah Azzam, an AQ recruiter, who was later killed. 3. The CIA found Vinas in Pakistan after "connecting the dots" and the led the Pakistanis to him. One of the initial tips was jihadist chatter about an "Ameriki" who had "frostbite." 4. I am told it took months for the CIA to piece together Vinas' identity while he was doing his thing in afpak. 5. Vinas has an extraordinary memory. His info led to strikes that killed Rauf and Azzam. Message-En (bxs) Fromi @ucia.gov mai toi ucia.gov Sent: Tues ay, April 83, 2612 9:48 AM To: Goldman, Adam Cc: Subjec Chat in an hour? Adam, I probably need a little more time this morning to clear through a series of meetings. Right after lunch would be better. Can you help me out with a sense of the specific questions? I've done some reading, but I'm not sure what exactly will come in handy for what you are rwriting about. Thanks! Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs Muciagov (t0(5) From: Goldman, Adam [mailtoap.org] Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2612 9:38 AM Subject: at in an hour? Adam The information contained in this communication is intended for the use of the designated recipients named above. If the reader of this communication is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error, and that any review, dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify The Associated Press immediately by telephone at +1-212-621?1898 and delete this email. Thank you. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013686 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013690 - 6 From: Goldman, AdamSapbrg] Sent: Wednesday, .April 25, 2012 4:46 PM Subject: RE: Greetings Thanks. I'll get keep in touch with you on al-Asiri. There is also a different guy named Abu Ibrahim, whose real name is Husayn Muhammed al-Umari. He's also a master bomb maker. He's on the Rewards for Justice website. He left Lebanon for Yemen a while ago. Not sure exactly \when. He's living on the coast east of Aden in the Shaqra area. He's got a $5 million bounty on him one of the biggest for terrorists. Is the agency not tracking this guy? He's indicted in the U.S. and is responsible for a spate of bombings. He also killed U.S. soldiers in Iraq. D00 is offering $266,666 for info leading to arrest or capture. I know he's long in the tooth but folks say he's still in the teaching business. Message??-?- From: hcianov [mailtom] Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2612 4:39 PM To: Goldman, Adam Cc: Media@ucia.gov Subject: RE: Greetings Adam, Off the record, as we discussed I can't steer you off of the general outline of what you're hearing. People are concerned about what Asiri is up to in terms of plotting, but that isn't a new concern--his roles in the Christmas Day 2669 attempted bombing and in the cargo plane plot in 2616 are enough to keep the U56 concerned about his demonstrated interest in ?attacking the Nest. I'd ask of course that you keep in contact with us about what details you come across for your story. As we both agreed, none of us would want to see anything inadvertently affect the ability?to stop this dangerous individual. What is the timing for your piece? If something comes up of that nature we'll weigh in with our concerns. 0n the Umari guy that isn't ringing any bells right now. Please let me know if you have any additional details. Are you sure you have the right name? The Rewards for Justice guy isn't the most youthful of bombmakers. He doesn't quite fit AQAP's coveted 26?35 year old demographic. 0n background as a official" "Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri helped plan the Christmas Day attempted bombing of the NWA flight and the cargo plot of 2616. His focus is, and has been, on advancing AQAP's ability to target the west." Preston Golson Media Spokesperson CIA Office of Public Affairs (bxs) (t0(6) From: Goldman, Adam [mailto: @ap.org] Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2612 7:36 AM To: Subject: Greetings Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013690 Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013690 We shud chat when have a minute. We're hearing about aqap activity that has USG spun up and Ibrahim al-asiri is back on agency's radar after laying low in months following awlaki's demise. Adam The information contained in this communication is intended for the use of the designated recipients named above. If the reader of this communication is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error, and that any review, dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify The Associated Press immediately by telephone at +1-212-621?1898 and delete this email. Thank you. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 C06013690 A r0 ed for Release: 2017/05/17 006013704 (DAD) From: Goldman, Sent: Wednesda August 08, 2012 3:29 PM To: Subject: there? Adam Sent from my iPhone The information contained in this communication is intended for the use of the designated recipients named above. If the reader of this communication is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error, and that any review, dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify The Associated Press immediately by telephone at +1-212?621-1898 and delete this email. Thank you. Approved for Release: 2017/05/17 006013704