Case 7:13-cv-07518-VB Document 1 Filed 10/25/13 Page 1 of 65

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------------------------X
CLIFTON "SKIP" TRAVIS,
13 Civ.

Plaintiff,
-against-

13

ENTERGY ENTERPRISES, INC., ENTERGY
CORPORATION, ENTERGY NUCLEAR
NORTHEAST, ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS,
INC., ENTERGY SERVICES, INC., DANIEL GAGNON,
TIMOTHY REDFEARN, MITCHELL WOOD,
"JOHN DOES 1-10",

()

cv
COMPLAINT

Jury Trial Demanded

Defendants.

----------------------------------------------------------------------X
Plaintiff, CLIFTON "SKIP" TRAVIS, by and through his attorneys, The Bellantoni Law
Firm, PLLC, for his complaint states as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION
1.

This is an action for, inter alia, injunctive relief, compensatory and exemplary

damages and attorney's fees, proximately resulting from defendants' acts of retaliation against
the plaintiff in violation ofthe Energy Reorganization Act of 1978,42 U.S.C. § 5851, et seq., the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161 et
seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA").

JURISDICTION
2.

The Court's jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331. The plaintiff

timely filed a complaint with the United States Secretary of Labor (the "Secretary") for the
corporate defendants' violations of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1978 42 U.S.C. § 5851, et
seq. over one (1) year ago. The Secretary has not issued a final decision within 1 year after the

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filing of plaintiffs complaint; no such delay is due to the bad faith of plaintiff; and the plaintiff
commenced the instant complaint accordingly. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(b)(4).
THE PARTIES

3.

Plaintiff, CLIFTON "SKIP" IRAVIS ("Travis") is a domiciliary of the State of

New York and a resident of the Northern Counties.
4.

Defendant ENTERGY ENTERPRISES, INC. is a publicly held foreign business

corporation that maintains offices in Westchester County, which itself and certain subsidiaries
thereof regularly engage in business in Westchester County, New York.
5.

Defendant ENTERGY CORPORATION is a publicly held foreign business

corporation that maintains offices in Westchester County, which itself and certain subsidiaries
thereof regularly engage in business in Westchester County, New York.
6.

Entergy Corporation is an integrated energy company engaged primarily in

electric power production and retail distribution operations. Entergy owns and operates power
plants with approximately 30,000 megawatts of electric generating capacity, and it is the secondlargest nuclear generator in the United States. The Entergy System has annual revenues of more
than $10 billion and approximately 14,500 employees.
7.

Defendant ENTERGY NUCLEAR NORTHEAST is a subsidiary of Entergy

Corporation that maintains offices at 440 Hamilton Avenue, White Plains, NY 10601 and
regularly engages in business, in Westchester County, New York.
8.

Defendant ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC., alk/a ENTERGY

OPERATIONS, INC. is a foreign business corporation that maintains offices in, and regularly
engages in business in, Westchester County, New York and is, upon information and belief, a
subsidiary of Entergy Enterprises Inc. and/or Entergy Corporation.

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9.

Defendant ENTERGY SERVICES, INC. 1 is a foreign business corporation that

maintains offices in, and regularly engages in business in, Westchester County, New York and is,
upon information and belief, a subsidiary of Entergy Enterprises Inc. and/or Entergy
Corporation.
10.

Defendant DANIEL GAGNON ("Gagnon"), at all times relevant herein, was and

continues to be employed by the Entergy Defendants at Indian Point as the Security Manager.
11.

At all times relevant herein, as the Security Manager, Gagnon is responsible for

the oversight of and training relative to all aspects of the security detail and protocol for Indian
Point and had full decision making authority in connection with security related issues at all
times relevant herein.
12.

At all times relevant herein, Gagnon was supervised by and reported to Pollock

prior to December 2012.
13.

Defendant TIMOTHY REDFEARN ("Redfearn") at all times relevant herein was

employed by the Entergy Defendants at Indian Point as the Security Superintendent prior to
November 2011.
14.

In that position, Redfearn was supervised by and reported to Gagnon.

15.

Defendant MITCHELL WOOD, ("Wood"), was at all times relevant herein was

employed by the Entergy Defendants at Indian Point as the Security Superintendent subsequent
to November 2011, to the present and reported to Daniel Gagnon.
16.

The Indian Point Nuclear Facility ("Indian Point" or "the facility") is a privately

owned nuclear power plant owned and operated by the Entergy corporate Defendants.
17.

At all times relevant to the allegations contained herein, the individual defendants

were acting within the scope oftheir employment.
1

All hereafter referred to collectively as the "Entergy Defendants".

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18.

At all times relevant to the allegations contained herein, the individual defendants

were acting at the direction and instigation of the Entergy Defendants.
19.

At all times relevant to the allegations contained herein, the individual defendants

were acting in furtherance of the business ofthe Entergy Defendants.
20.

At all times relevant to the allegations contained herein, the individual defendants

were acting with the knowledge and permission of the Entergy Defendants.
21.

Entergy is a "licensee" and "employer" subject to the terms, conditions and

requirements of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1978 ("ERA") 42 U.S.C. § 5851, et seq.
22.

During his employment with Entergy, Travis was a qualified employee under the

Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") and was employed for at least 1,250 hours of service with
Entergy during each designated 12-month period.
23.

At all times relevant herein, Entergy was an "employer" and was subject to the

terms ofthe FMLA.
24.

At all times relevant herein, individual defendants Pollock and Gagnon, Redfearn

and/or Wood controlled Travis' ability to exercise his rights under the FMLA.
25.

At all times relevant herein to the FMLA retaliation claim, Gagnon, Redfearn

and/or Wood had the power to terminate employees, supervised and controlled employee work
schedules and conditions of employment; and/or controlled access to overtime pay; and/or
maintained employment records.
26.

Travis was entitled to FMLA Leave in order to care for his minor daughter who

suffered from a serious medical condition for which he timely submitted medical certifications to
the defendants.

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27.

Defendants "JOHN DOES 1-1 0" are Entergy employees yet unidentified who had

decision making authority and participated in the adverse employment decisions negatively
affecting Travis, as detailed herein, including but not limited to violations of federal ERA,
FMLA and COBRA statutes.

"Skip" Travis - Security Background

28.

Travis has extensive experience in the area of facility-based security and personal

protection.
29.

Travis' background, of which Gagnon and the Entergy Defendants were well

aware, includes training with numerous military special operations instructors, Marine Force
Recon, Army Special Forces, Army Rangers and Delta, Navy Seal Teams 2 and 6 (Devgroup),
Special Air Service (British S.A.S.), United States Secret Service, Israeli Special Forces, with a
concentration on protective measures, counter-terrorism, anti-terrorism and threat vulnerability
assessments.
30.

Travis has received training and gained knowledge of the threats posed to the

United States and its citizens, including the nation's nuclear facilities, by terrorist organizations
including Muslim extremists like Al-Qaeda and domestic terrorists.
31.

Travis has taught and studied weapons and defensive tactics for over 25 years.

32.

Travis has received extensive training at, inter alia, the Executive Protection

Institute, Sigarms Academy, Department of Homeland Security, National Rifle Association,
Department of Criminal Justice Services, Smith & Wesson Academy, Insights Training Center,
BSR Incorporated, East Coast Personal Protection and the International Union of Operating
Engineers Training Center.

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33.

Travis is, inter alia, a Certified Firearms Instructor, Certified Law Enforcement

Handgun/Shotgun Instructor, Concealed Handgun Instructor, New York State Armed Guard
Firearms Instructor, a Certified as a Personal Protection Specialist, Certified Tactical Baton
Instructor and is certified in the areas of Advanced Concealed Carry, Advanced Tactics and
Techniques, Advanced Low Light, Management of Aggressive Behavior, Advanced Handgun
Retention and Disarming, Unarmed Self-Defense, Vehicle lED Search Techniques, HAZMAT
Certified, OSHA Certified Disaster Site Worker, Prevention and Response to Suicide Bombings,
Understanding and Planning for School Bomb Incidents, Close Quarters Battle, Advanced
Defensive Handgun Techniques, New York State 47 Hour Armed Security Course.
34.

Travis has utilized his training and expertise, inter alia, providing security for

former governor George Pataki, as a part-time Deputy Sheriff with the Westchester County
Department of Public Safety, as well as with Black Ice Security Services and East Coast Personal
Protection.
35.

Travis was the Security Detail Leader for Executect Special Operations Group

providing protection and security to the law firm of Morrison and Foerster during their
representation of John Walker Lindh (the "American Taliban").

Travis' Employment at Indian Point

36.

Travis first became employed by the Entergy defendants at their Indian Point

facility in 2008.
37.

Prior to his employment at Indian Point, Travis completed and filed with Entergy

an application for employment, to which was attached his resume detailing his prior employment
expenence.

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38.

In or around Spring 2008, Travis was contacted by Gagnon and offered a position

as a nuclear security officer at Indian Point, which position Travis accepted.
39.

Approximately 10 months after being hired to work at Indian point, and in 2009,

Travis was promoted to the position of Security Lieutenant/Alarm Station Operator.
40.

Security Lieutenants/Alarm Station Operators ("Lieutenants" I "Lt.") at Indian

Point are responsible for the oversight of 30+ individuals and the security of the facility's
reactors in the face of a terrorist attack.
41.

Little training is provided by Entergy to the Lieutenants regarding how to handle

the responsibilities or leadership role of a Lt.
42.

The 30 days of "training", consists of running errands, absence from the actual

Base stations the majority of the time, moving refrigerators, microwaves, officers' clothing, from
the warehouse, getting vehicles for errands and the like - no actual security training or
information related to the real world responsibilities of a Lt. is shared with a newly appointed Lt.
43.

After the first 30 days in the Lt. position, an employee is no longer able to return

to his/her prior position as a security officer.
44.

After the 30 day window, when the Lt. can no longer return to the security officer

position, all of the responsibilities ofbecoming a Lt. are thrust upon the new untrained Lt.

Indian Point Nuclear Facility

45.

The main security measures employed by Defendants to ensure the security and

safety of Indian Point are the computerized ARINCS System (detailed below), as well as other
perimeter alarm systems, and the privately employed civilian security personnel ("security
personnel"), of which Travis was, at all relevant times herein, a part.

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46.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is charged with providing

governmental oversight and regulation of, inter alia, Indian Point's use of nuclear materials as
well as the safety and security of the facility.

Confirmed Terrorist Plans to Attack U.S. Nuclear Facilities
47.

In President George W. Bush's January 2002 State of the Union speech, he

confirmed that U.S. forces "found diagrams of American nuclear power plants" in al-Qaeda
materials in Afghanistan.
48.

The Indian Point Nuclear Facility was a target of the 9/11 hijackers.

49.

An al-Qaeda training manual lists nuclear plants as among the best targets for

spreading fear in the United States.
50.

In February 2002, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued an advisory to the

nation's 103 nuclear power plants that terrorists might try to fly hijacked planes into some of
them and eight governors independently ordered the National Guard to protect nuclear reactors
in their states. 2
51.

Defendants were, at all times relevant to this Complaint, aware of the fact that the

federal law enforcement agencies have declared that Indian Point to be the number one terrorist
target of all nuclear facilities in the United States.

Defendants' Knowledge of the Lack of Security and Safety at Indian Point
52.

Each and every defendant was, at all times relevant herein, aware of the fact that

the Security Department at Indian Point is unable to successfully defend the facility against a
terrorist attack.
2

Council on Foreign Relations, 'Targets for Terrorism" Nuclear Facilities", 2006.

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53.

Travis, other Lieutenants, Security Shift Supervisors ("SSSs") and members of

the Security Training Department voiced their concerns on more than one occasion to
Defendants, including Pollock, Gagnon, Redfearn and the Security Training Department, that the
Indian Point Security Department was wholly inadequate to defend against a terrorist attack.
54.

The defendants' "stock" answer to such complaints was that the NRC's guidelines

and the DBTs that the federal government has instituted are "adequate", "we met the minimum
requirements of the NRC", and "it's never going to happen here".
55.

At all times relevant herein, Travis voiced his concerns to the defendants

regarding the imminent threat to the public's health and safety as a result of, inter alia, the fact
that:
•

the weapons provided by Defendants to security personnel are not adequate to
defend against a terrorist attack;

•

the number of insurgents thought to be involved in a future terrorist attack is
severely underestimated;

•

the personal protective equipment ("PPE") provided for security personnel are
ineffective;

•

the terrorists will most likely be armed with Armor Piercing ammunition, the
caliber of ammunition will be significantly more powerful than the rounds
Defendants assume will be used by terrorists and the use of Rocket Propelled
Grenades ("RPGs") is a reality notwithstanding the response of Defendants,
Gagnon, Redfearn and some within the Security Training Department that
terrorists simply "cannot get their hands on RPGs" ;

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•

the glass that encompasses certain bullet resistant enclosures in which security
personnel are stationed is degraded and will not withstand being fired upon;

•

Security personnel cannot eliminate terrorists at long distance ranges;

•

Security officers commonly remove batteries from the lights in their weapons and
their sighting systems for use them in their own personal electronic devices,
leaving the next shift without adequate lighting;

•

The lights around the BREs actually shine into and on top ofthe BREs, instead of
shedding light on the perimeter's fencing, and more.

"You Fight How You Train"

56.

During his employment, Travis had numerous conversations with Gagnon, the

Security Training Department, Redfearn, and various SSSs and Lts. Where he voiced complaints
regarding the fact that terrorists will attack when it is least advantageous to the facility - rain,
snow, under cover of darkness of night, early morning hours, etc. and Entergy's intentional
refusal to adequately train their security personnel to successfully defend Indian Point against a
terrorist attack.
57.

Defendants' indifference to the safety and security of the facility prevented them

from conducting proper training drills in inclement weather.
58.

During a particular training drill, wherein terrorists were attacking the facility, in

the interest of "safety first" Gagnon and Redfearn choreographed the terrorists' attack, and the
security department's response, in order to rush the completion of the drill before anyone "got
hurt" outside in the rain.
59.

Gagnon would create choreographed force-on-force drill scenarios; for example,

on one occasion, instructed Redfearn to have the "terrorists" run uphill directly toward the
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security officers who were stationed inside of the BREs - into the direct gunfire of the security
officers, who "shot" them like fish in a barrel.
60.

Should any of the security personnel have gotten injured in a slip and fall during

the drill, the incident would be considered a "recordable accident" resulting in a possible OSHA
violation.
61.

A certain number of OSHA violations in any given year could result in, inter alia,

62.

Consequently, the defendants are of the mentality that they need only be prepared

a fine.

for a terrorist attack in perfect weather only when they are "ready".
63.

Defendants are of the mentality that the safety of the security personnel during an

artificial drill takes precedence over training the security personnel to successfully defend against
a true terrorist attack, which could result in death for over 20 million people.
64.

Irrespective of the outcome of the drill - even in cases where there has been total

destruction of the nuclear facility, a complete meltdown of the plant and termination of all
personnel - Gagnon would instruct all of the security personnel to give themselves "a round of
applause because no one got injured" performing the drill.
65.

Defendants' failure to train their security force to defend against a terrorist attack

in inclement weather presented a definitive and specific threat to the safety of the Indian Point
nuclear facility.
66.

Defendants' "choreographing" of force-on-force security drills presented a

definitive and specific threat to the safety of the Indian Point nuclear facility.

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The ARINCS Security System

67.

During the winter of2010 and into February 2011, a new security system that was

one of the systems used to monitor the security of the outside perimeter of the Indian Point
facility was installed at Indian Point called the ARINCS System ("ARINCS" or "the "System").
68.

The ARINCS System had never before been used at the Indian Point facility.

69.

Since November 2010, Travis had been assigned to work the night shift at Indian

Point due to the fact that it aided him in the care of his insulin-dependent diabetic minor
daughter.
70.

The Defendants had previously agreed to Travis' permanently being assigned to

the night shift in connection with his FMLA certification.
71.

At 12:00 a.m. on February 18, 2011, the ARINCS System was scheduled to go

"live" for the first time.
72.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission required Entergy to upgrade their security

system on or before February 18, 2011 or face significant fines.
73.

Indian Point had previously been granted more than one extension as a result of

delays caused by the previous winters' weather conditions.
74.

The ARINCS company objected to the installation of the system because it was

not yet ready to be operational.
75.

Defendants had purchased the "ARINCS-Lite" rather than the "ARINCS-Heavy"

version of the system.
76.

The ARINCS-Lite system was wholly inadequate to operate successfully at a

facility such as Indian Point.

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77.

Prior to its installation, Defendants knew that the ARINCS-Lite system would not

properly function as it was not adequate to meet the needs of the Indian Point facility.
78.

Defendants intentionally disregarded this fact because they were under a deadline

from the NRC to have the system installed and wanted to avoid fines and /or negative "Findings"
by the NRC.
79.

In the weeks prior to the activation of ARINCS, the Security Supervisors were

informed by Security Supervisor Redfearn and Security Manager Gagnon that a simulator would
be provided that was the same system as ARINCS system that the facility would be using now in
use to train on prior to the system "going live" so that they had knowledge of the system and
how to run and operate the system.
80.

Redfearn and Gagnon informed the SSSs and Lts. that a room had been built

inside of Indian Point wherein the training on an ARINCS simulator would take place.
81.

The SSSs and Lts. were also informed by Gagnon and Redfearn that the

ARINCS' technicians would be available to teach them the security System prior to the System
going "live" at 12:00 a.m. on February 18,2011.
82.

The Defendants promised that ARINCS technicians (the "Techs") would be on-

site around-the-clock from the moment that the System went live on February 18, 2011 and for
30 days thereafter.
83.

Defendants promised security personnel, including Travis, that the Techs would

be located in the Base Stations as security personnel operated the system in order to teach,
correct, help security personnel adapt and troubleshoot the ARINCS System.
84.

No Techs were provided in accordance with the Defendants' promises.

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85.

Two (2) nights before the ARINCS System went "live", Defendants provided the

Lieutenants a "familiarization" session - that lasted all of 20-30 minutes - with the ARINC
system.
86.

During that shift, Travis, Lt. Anthony Formato and SSS Joseph Finnigan met with

Security Training Instructor Jim Martorano for "familiarization" with the ARINCS System.
87.

Prior to February 17, 2011, only two (2) Lieutenants had any exposure to the

ARINCs system, having trained for one week at an outside facility, however, even those
Lieutenants were not given "live" training.
88.

During the "familiarization" on February 17, 2011, Martorano attempted to

"instruct" Travis and others - on completely inactive screens, without the benefit of any live
cameras, without any alarms being connected- surmising that, " .. .if. .. this happened ... this is
what that would do."
89.

The "familiarization" lasted approximately 20-30 minutes.

90.

There was no established curriculum, protocol or training or Job Performance

Measures ("JPMs") for security personnel on the ARINCS System.
91.

Travis, Finnigan and Formato each asked Martorano as to how they could go

"live" on a security system when they had not received any training.
92.

Martorano informed them that, in response to his concerns, Gagnon stated point

blank, "I don't want to hear a fucking thing about the fucking training issues. They can fucking
learn it when it goes fucking live on shift. That's it. . .I don't want to hear any fucking more
about it. I don't want to hear about extensions. I don't want to hear a fucking thing. They can
learn it when it goes fucking live on shift. They can get their experience then."

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93.

When Travis complained to Mortarano about the problems with that approach,

Martorano agreed that there is a problem with the fact that there is no training on this monitoring
system; that there was no way to show them what anything on the System actually did or what
they would actually see if and when the System went live.
94.

On February 17, 2011, just hours before the System was to go "live", a meeting

was held wherein Joseph Pollock (Vice President of Operations at Indian Point) and Gagnon
(Security Manager), SSS Finnigan, SSS Jay Kosack, SSS Charlie Johnston, SSS Jose Breban,
SSS Ryan Aguilar, and Nuclear Assurance Director Pat Comoy, among others, were present.
95.

Prior to this meeting, Travis, Lt. Chris Porta, Lt. Bobbie Varas, Lt. Jason Hettler,

Lt. Tom Nicolosi, defendant Redfearn and SSS Jim O'Brien were present and had a conversation
with Pat Comoy.
96.

Comoy asked for Travis by name proceeded to question Travis regarding the

training he had received on ARlNCS.
97.

Travis complained to Conroy that neither he nor the other Lts. had received any

training on the ARINCS system, which fact posed a serious security threat to the public should
there be a terrorist attack, since no one knew how to operate the facility's security system.
98.

That night, Travis was scheduled to work in one of the primary alarm stations

which has as one of its main roles, utilization and monitoring of the ARlNCS System.
99.

Being assigned to that station meant that Travis would be in charge of the

ARINCS system for that entire shift- on the night that the System went live for the first time.
100.

Travis, as with all Lts., would be responsible for diagnosing any problems with

the multiple monitors, multiple alarms, responsible to acknowledge, defend, diagnose and

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alarms, to delegate officers where needed in the event of an attack and to know which alarms
corresponded to which alarm point locations within the facility.
101.

Travis complained to Conroy that the defendants had provided no training to

Travis or any other Lieutenant, with the exception of the two identified above.
102.

Travis informed Conroy and the defendants that he refused to take his post at the

primary alarm station location because in that station, he would be responsible for overseeing
and responding to the ARINCS system alarms, etc., yet he had not been trained to do so.
103.

Travis expressed to the defendants his concerns about the reliability of the System

and the fact that no one had been adequately trained to operate ARJNCS before it went "live".
104.

Conroy questioned Travis in the presence of Redfearn, SSS O'Brien and other

Lts. and SSS about the lack of training on the ARJNCS system in preparation of going live that
night.
105.

Each SSS and Lt. who was present during the conversation with Conroy

confirmed and verified that Defendants had failed to provide the Lieutenants - those responsible
for operating the ARJNCS system- with any training on ARJNCS itself.
106.

Travis informed Conroy that he refused to be responsible for a security system on

which he had received no training.
107.

Travis informed Conroy that he could not ethically take responsibility for a post

wherein he was responsible for a system he was not trained on, and that if he were forced to take
such a post, he would immediately go to the on-site NRC investigators with his safety and
security concerns.
108.

Travis performed all of his duties in a non-primary alarm station, not the primary

alarm station discussed above, for his entire shift.

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109.

Subsequent to Travis' conversation with Conroy, and at the meeting involving

Joseph Pollock (Vice President of Operations at Indian Point) and Gagnon (Security Manager),
SSS Finnigan, SSS Jay Kosack, SSS Charlie Johnston, SSS Jose Breban, SSS Ryan Aguilar, and
Comoy, among others, Gagnon discussed the concern that existed among the security personnel
that no training on the ARlNCS System had been provided.
110.

Gagnon suggested to Pollock that they request another extension from the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission before switching from the "old system" to ARlNCS or, in the
alternative, that the start date for ARINCS be delayed 3-5 days to secure at least some training on
the System for security personnel.
111.

Pollock became irate with Gagnon and adamantly refused to even request another

extension from the NRC (which, upon information and belief, would have been granted) or to
delay the transition to the ARlNCS System for any amount of time because a delay in the
ARINCS System operations would have cost the Entergy corporate defendants $750,000 per day
in fines from the NRC - another example of Defendants placing profits over the security and
safety of the nuclear facility.
112.

At 12:00 a.m. on February 18, 2011, Indian Point officially transferred the

security monitoring of the Indian Point facility from the "old system" to ARINCS.
113.

Contrary to the actions taken by the Defendants at the Indian Point facility, the

corporate defendants have, at other nuclear facilities owned and run by one or more of the
Entergy defendants, have allowed their old security system to remain in place for several months
and operable while the security personnel trained and became proficient with the new security
system and the old system was gradually phased out.

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114.

Neither of those security-conscious and responsible scenarios was effectuated at

Indian Point in connection with the installation and transition to the ARINCS System.
115.

In fact, the Nuclear Plant Operators ("NPOs") and Reactor Operators ("ROs") at

Indian Point were provided with simulators, which is located in a dedicated simulator room - on
which they train for 2 years before they are allowed access to the "actual" system; whereas the
security personnel were provided with only 30 minutes of "familiarization" on ARINCS without
the use of a simulator.
116.

The NPOs and ROs train their personnel on said simulator to assist them in

become proficient on their system - a luxury of which the security personnel charged with
defending Indian Point from a terrorist attack was deprived by Defendants.
117.

On February 17, 2011 (and until the day he was ultimately terminated), Travis

refused the defendants' numerous requests and threats to sign off on any document that indicated
that he had received adequate training and/or was able to operate ARINCS because:
•

No ARINCS simulator was provided to the security personnel, as had been
promised by the Security Manager (Gagnon) and Security Superintendent
(Redfearn);

•

Defendants provided the Lieutenants no training on the ARINCS System before it
went "live";

•

No handbook, no curriculum and no written protocol has been established at
Indian Point for the ARINCS System or provided to security personnel, including
Travis; and

•

The ARINCS-Lite System failed to function properly and therefore could not
protect the facility against a terrorist attack.
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118.

Travis refused to take responsibility for a System on which he had no training,

refused to sign off on the safety of a System on which he had no training or any experience in
evaluating its safety or success.
119.

Entergy's own protocol, regulations and/or rules, as well as those of the NRC,

dictate that taking responsibility for something in the facility that is not proper or safe is
considered a violation.
120.

In fact, Entergy's own motto, "Safe, Secure and Vital" 3 is completely contrary to

Defendants' demand that Travis sign off on the security and safety of a System that he had no
experience using, on which he had not been trained and that was not able to secure the facility.
121.

On the same night, February 17, 2011, during the aforementioned meeting with

Pollock Gagnon, Finnigan and Redfearn, Conroy asked Finnigan (Security Department employee
for decades) his opinion ofthe training that the security personnel had received on ARINCS.
122.

Finnigan told Conroy, in the presence ofPollock, Gagnon and Redfearn that in his

33 years working in the security department at Indian Point, this was is the first time that he has
felt that the facility was vulnerable and "God forbid we are hit [by terrorists] ... we're in
trouble."
123.

During the same meeting with Pollock, Gagnon, Redfearn and Conroy, instead of

discussing delaying the institution of the ARINCS System or instituting measures to properly
train its security personnel - the very people responsible for securing the facility and ensuring
that they, and the 20 million individuals within the meltdown zone are safe and secure - they
incredulously and shockingly posited, "Hey, what's the worst that can happen ... ?"

3

In fact, Entergy's slogan has been referred to at the Indian Point facility as "Unsafe, Unsecure and Fatal".

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ARINCS Fails the Very First Night it Goes "Live"

124.

On February 18, 2011, within 2 hours of going "live" on ARINCS, the System

crashed 14 times.
125.

ARlNCS locked up, cameras that were supposed to be monitoring the perimeter

of the Indian Point facility (to identify any breaches in the perimeter fences should terrorists
launch an attack) froze up, and the perimeter alarms were rendered inoperable.
126.

On the same night that the System went "live", SSS Jay Kosack walked around

with, and handing out to their security officers, 8x 11 papers maps that depicted where in the
Indian Point facility perimeter the alarm points were.
12 7.

NRC resident Inspector, Paul Cataldo was contacted several times during that

night shift regarding Travis' concerns about going "live" on ARINCS without having been
provided training.
128.

With no ARINCS providing security, Lts. were handing out maps to security

officers and instructing them that if they were called to respond to a specific alarm, they should
use the "map" to learn where on the facility to respond.
129.

For the month of September 2011, there were 167 "total failures" of the ARlNCs

system - the computer System froze, surveillance cameras froze, alarms failed to detect
movement on the perimeter fence, alarms failed to sound, etc.
130.

Between January 2012 until September 2012, the ARJNCS System- the security

system in place to monitor and "protect" the perimeter of the Indian Point facility from terrorist
attacks- has completely CRASHED, shut down and frozen over 11,000 times.
131.

By crashing and freezing, the ARlNCS system is unable to provide security to the

perimeter of the facility, rendering the facility vulnerable and susceptible to a terrorist attack.

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132.

Despite some alterations and upgrades by Entergy to the ARINCS system,

ARINCS continues to fail on a regular basis to the present date.
133.

The ARINCS "Security" System fails on such a regular basis, that the Base

stations at the facility that are responsible for monitoring and responding to ARINCS now
contain what has been termed by Defendants and security personnel as a "Crash Log", on which
security personnel record in each time the ARINCS System fails.
134.

For over three weeks, and because there were not enough Lts. willing to sign off

on the ARINCS system, as well as Defendants' intentional refusal to provide adequate training to
security personnel, Lts. were forced to spend their entire shifts sitting in the Base stations
without any breaks, unable to leave the station for their entire shift because, despite the fact that
they themselves had not received training, there was no one trained and available to take over the
Base station to relieve them.
135.

Other security personnel openly acknowledge, to Defendants and others, that they

have had little to no training on ARINCS but have only signed off on the system out of fear of
losing their jobs and being retaliated against by the defendants.
136.

Security personnel, including Travis, openly acknowledged to Defendants, the

NRC and other outside agencies, that the ARINCS system is not reliable and fails to provide
adequate security to the facility and the community.
13 7.

As a result of the pressure placed on Travis to certify the success and safety of the

failed ARINCS System, among the numerous other safety and security issues detailed herein,
Travis experienced retaliation, discrimination, intimidation and harassment from Defendants.
13 8.

As a result of expressing his concerns internally and to outside agencies and

individuals, regarding the lack of safety measures, lack of training and the failures of the

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ARINCS System at Indian Point, Travis experienced continued retaliation, intimidation and
harassment from the individual defendants and other employees at their direction.
139.

For example, on multiple occasions, SSS James Swart was sent by Defendants to

pressure Travis into signing off on the ARINCS training packet.
140.

Travis informed Swart that he would sign off on ARINCS when he had received

the adequate training to do so.
141.

Defendants' failure to obtain the ARINCS-Heavy presented a definitive and

specific threat to the safety of the Indian Point nuclear facility.
142.

Defendants' failure to utilize the old security system as a back-up to the ARJNCS

presented a definitive and specific threat to the safety of the Indian Point nuclear facility.
143.

Defendants' failure to train their security force on the ARJNCS system prior to its

going "live" presented a definitive and specific threat to the safety of the Indian Point nuclear
facility.
144.

Defendants' failure to have a training protocol train for operation of the ARINCS

system presented a definitive and specific threat to the safety of the Indian Point nuclear facility.
145.

Defendants' utilization of the incompetent ARJNCS system presented a definitive

and specific threat to the safety of the Indian Point nuclear facility.
146.

As a result of Travis' refusal to sign off on the ARINCS training and the system's

performance, defendant Security Superintendent Tim Redfearn and SSS Joseph Finnigan met
with Travis in August 2011 to discuss the above security issues, including the continuing failures
of ARINCS and other safety related concerns Travis had been raising internally.
147.

Gagnon provided Redfearn with full authority to speak in his place as a

representative of Security Department management.

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148.

Travis, Finnigan and Redfearn met for over 4 hours, the details of which

conversation are fully documented.
149.

A standard Entergy Form, the "HPER2" Form (the "Form"), printed off of the

company's website and used by the three individuals at the meeting, was completed.
150.

On their respective copies of the Form, each of the three graded the facility's

performance in multiple categories, including training, security, lack of adequate manpower,
general policy on security at the facility and the like.
151.

Of the dozens of categories, the majority of them were rated as "Failed" by

Security Superintendent Redfearn, SSS Finnigan and Travis.
152.

Also agreed to in writing during this meeting, was the fact that all of Travis'

training on ARINCS would take place during his assigned night shift because of Travis' issues
with caring for his diabetic minor daughter.

Additional Security and Safety Concerns Voiced by Travis

Falsification ofTraining Documents
153.

In addition to raising the safety and security concerns identified above, Travis

also brought forward to the defendants his concerns over the falsification of Security Department
Training logs in 2011.
154.

Defendants knowingly filed and encouraged the filing of forged documents

regarding the number of training hours security personnel have undergone, which training
included the ARINCS system.

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155.

Gagnon and Redfearn have reviewed, signed and approved, along with Security

Training Supervisor, Natalie Friedman, documents they know to contain false information
regarding security personnel's training hours.
156.

Security Lieutenant "R.G." completed a training packet, which was reviewed,

signed and approved by Gagnon, Redfearn and Friedman that indicated he had (impossibly)
performed 60+ hours of Lt. Supervisor Training within one 24-hour period (March 5, 2011) and
five more entries for March 5, 2011 that do not even contain an hourly rate - yet the form
contains the signatures of many other Lts. verifying his hours.
157.

"R.G." avers on the OJT Check-Off Verification Sheet that on March 4, 2011, he

spent 22 hours dispatching officers- when each shift only lasts 12 hours.
158.

The training packet logs were signed off by "R.G.", which certified that "R.G."

met his training requirements to be approved as a LTI Alarm Station Operator at the facility,
"R.G." signed on March 4, 2011), Lt. Al Brahimi (March 6, 2011), SSS Jose Breban (March 6,
2011 ), and Director of Security Training Natalie Friedman (March 7, 2011 ), of which Gagnon
and Redfearn were aware and tacitly accepted.
159.

Lt. "T.N.'' was instructed by SSS Breban to simply "copy" the form completed by

"R.G." and submit it as his own in order to satisfy his "security training" requirements, which
Gagnon and Redfearn were aware and tacitly accepted.
160.

Placing security personnel, such as "R.G.", on shift when they have not been

adequately trained places the facility and the public at a significant safety risk.
161.

Defendants' complicit actions in the falsification of training documents presented

a definitive and specific threat to the safety of the Indian Point nuclear facility.

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162.

Placing untrained security personnel on security posts presented a definitive and

specific threat to the safety of the Indian Point nuclear facility.

Refusal of Security Personnel to Defend the Facility

163.

Travis also brought forward to the defendants and outside agencies (of which

defendants were aware) on more than one occasion his concerns that other Security Personnel
have openly admitted on more than one occasion that, if the facility were attacked by terrorists,
they would refuse to fire upon the enemy, refuse to defend the facility and would "jump the
fence" and run home.
164.

Only 1-in-5 security officers at Indian Point Nuclear Facility felt that they could

protect the facility from a terror attack.
165.

Defendants' maintaining the employment of security personnel who openly admit

that if the facility were attacked by terrorists, they would refuse to fire upon the enemy, refuse to
defend the facility and would "jump the fence" and run home presented a definitive and specific
threat to the safety ofthe Indian Point nuclear facility.

Facility's Perimeter Lighting Failures

166.

Defendants are also aware of the complaints made by Travis internally and to the

NRC concerning the failed lighting system in place on the perimeter of the facility in and around
Spring 2011.
167.

Travis informed the NRC and provided them documentation demonstrating that

the lights in and around the protected area perimeter inside of Indian Point failed on a continual
basis.

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168.

During the installation of a concrete roadway for the dry cask (storage of spent

fuel rods), a contractor cut the main line responsible for supplying electricity to the lighting
structure in and around the perimeter and subsequently poured concrete over it.
169.

Rather than repair the break, the Defendants brought in generator-type lighting,

which regularly ran out of fuel resulting in complete darkness and an inability to monitor the
perimeter.
170.

Indian Point security personnel, including Travis, were thus responsible for

providing continuous monitoring and security for a facility that has no lights.
171.

Only when Gagnon and Redfearn learned that an NRC investigator was coming

on site, which was as a direct result of Travis' complaint to the NRC about the lighting failure,
they directed SSS Finnigan to bring in extra light towers from the parking lot to provide lighting
to the perimeter.
172.

Gagnon and Redfearn only corrected the perimeter lighting failure to avoid

discovery of the lighting failure by the NRC.
173.

The "investigator", Santiago, had worked for Entergy for many years and was still

receiving a pension from her position there at the time she was hired as an outside contractor paid by Entergy but approved by the NRC -to investigate the lighting issue.
174.

Santiago interviewed many security personnel about the lighting issue, however,

in her final report to the NRC, she inaccurately reported her discussions with them.
175.

Santiago falsely reported that there were "no problems" with the outside

perimeter lighting at Indian Point.
176.

In October and November 2011, Travis complained to the NRC that Santiago and

the defendants were engaging in a cover-up as evidenced by Santiago's false and inaccurate

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report to the NRC on the lighting issue and her false reporting of the substance of her
conversations with security personnel during her investigation.
177.

The defendants were aware of Travis' complaints to the NRC regarding a cover-

178.

As a result of Travis' complaints, the NRC sent investigators to conduct a further

up.

investigation.
179.

The NRC investigators conducted a second round of interviews with the Lts. in

the Base stations.
180.

The NRC concluded that Santiago had submitted a false report to the NRC.

181.

In November 2011, as a result of Travis' complaints to the NRC about the

defendants and Santiago, the NRC issued Indian Point a "Green Finding" in connection with the
lighting failure.
182.

Even after the NRC's "Green Finding", close to 50% of the perimeter lighting

remained inoperable.
183.

Defendants' failure to provide proper lighting at the perimeter of the Indian point

nuclear facility presented a definitive and specific threat to the safety of the Indian Point nuclear
facility.
184.

Defendants were aware of Travis' persistent outspoken vocalization of the

security and safety failures as same was expressed by Travis both internally to the individual
defendants, and other employees as well as the NRC and other governmental agencies.
185.

Travis contacted numerous government officials including Congresswoman Nita

Lowey, New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo's Office, Congressman Elliot Engel's Office,
members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, agents from the NRC's Office of

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Investigations and the New York Attorney General's Office to inform them of the serious safety
failures and concerns at Indian Point and Defendants' failure to address or cure them, of which
Defendants were aware.
186.

In or around June 2011, Travis, along with Indian Point SSS Jay Kosack and SSS

and others, met with representatives from the New York State Attorney General's Office,
Governor Cuomo's Office and Congresswoman Nita Lowey's office.
187.

At the meeting, Travis discussed the ARJNCS failures detailed above, lighting

Issues and the cover-up engaged in by the defendants, improper storage of nuclear waste
materials, mold infiltration inside of the BRE ducts and the SIMS building (preventing mr
conditioning inside of the BREs causing temperatures exceeding 100 degrees), antiquated DBT
measures and numerous other safety and security issues, including numerous failed and
choreographed Force-on-Force Drills.

Failed Force-on-Force Drills
188.

On October 11, 2011, an NRC "force-on-force" ("FOF") drill was conducted at

Indian Point.
189.

The Drill consisted of a live-time simulated attack on the Indian Point Facility by

a number of "terrorists".
190.

Indian Point security personnel were charged, as they are on a daily basis, with

defending the nuclear facility against this (simulated) attack conducted (during the Drill) by real,
live-time individuals portraying terrorists.
191.

During the Drill, the terrorists used laser-guns, other simulated weapons and

hand-to-hand combative techniques, while attempting to breach the perimeter of the facility,

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detonate bombs, kill employees, with the goal of causing devastation via a nuclear meltdown
and/or explosion.
192.

Indian Point security personnel, in attempting to defend against such an attack,

depend on the ARINCS System which is supposed to provide them with the ability to monitor
the perimeter via closed-circuit cameras, perimeter alarms, security alarms noting the location of
any breach, and the like.
193.

Without the ability to monitor the perimeter through the use of security cameras

and monitors, without the use of alarms, security personnel cannot effectively identify whether
there has been any breach and, if so, where the breach has taken place and the current location of
the terrorists on site.
194.

Immediately prior to the Drill, as was a regular occurrence by now, ARINCS

crashed - there was no security system monitoring the perimeter, no alarms could be signaled
and no cameras were monitoring the perimeter.
195.

Gagnon and Redfearn were present on site and instructed SSS Finnigan to engage

in "drill artificiality" since they were unable to rely on an actual security system.
196.

"Drill artificiality" is a term used by Gagnon and Redfearn, and upon information

and belief, internally by the Entergy Defendants.
197.

"Drill artificiality" meant that even though real individuals acting as terrorists

were trying to take over the nuclear facility, the Base Station Lts. and operators would be
specifically instructed as to which zones were being hit by the terrorists -- as Gagnon stated, "as
if the system was actually working".
198.

In reality, if actual terrorists were invading the Indian point nuclear facility and

ARINCS had crashed, as it had during the Drill, no one would be "instructing" the Base Stations

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as to where the terrorists were located because no one would know their location (thanks to the
failed ARINCS System) -until it was too late.
199.

SSS Finnigan was adamant that no "artificiality" take place and that the Drill

continue in accordance with the failed security that the facility was faced with because, as he
explained to Gagnon (who had no security or military experience prior to becoming employed at
Entergy) and Redfearn (who had no prior security experience), that is what the security
personnel would be facing if an actual terrorist occurred.
200.

Security personnel would not know that any specific zone or perimeter location

was being attacked because the security system had crashed - again.
201.

The Drill on October 11, 2011 went forward "real time" with no "artificiality".

202.

All of the "terrorists" successfully breached the perimeter of Indian Point and the

identified "target sets" located inside of Indian Point and, if the drill had been "real", would have
succeeded in causing a total nuclear meltdown.
203.

Not one terrorist was killed by any security personnel during the October 2011

204.

The "terrorists" were successful in causing so much "destruction" to Indian Point

Drill.

that Gagnon and Redfearn terminated the Drill before it was concluded and any additional
"destruction" could be done.
205.

Travis raised concerns internally to the defendants and others within the Security

Department over the consistent inability of the facility to defend against a terrorist attack,
including the October 2011 FOF Drill.

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206.

The scenario that was realized during the Drill is exactly the scenario that Travis

had laid out for, and warned Defendants about, in discussions with Gagnon, Redfearn, Pollock,
many other security personnel at Indian Point, the NRC and outside agencies and individuals.
207.

Travis continuously informed the defendants and others within and outside of

Entergy and Indian Point during all times relevant herein, the terrorists only have to be right once
but the Security at Indian Point security needs to be right 100% of the time; it is a matter of
"when" not "if' a terrorist attack will take place at Indian Point.
209.

On October 15, 2011, Thivierge contacted Travis at home, at Gagnon's direction,

to set up a meeting between Gagnon and Travis for Monday, October 17, 2011 at 8:00a.m.
210.

Gagnon's wanted to meet with Travis to discuss the issues about which Travis

had concerns regarding the lack of training on ARINCS, the failures of ARINCS, the lack of
adequate manpower and security training and the failed terrorist Drill days before.
211.

Gagnon was aware of the complaints Travis made internally and to outside

agencies about ARINCS and the lack of adequate security and understaffing that existed at
Indian Point.
212.

Gagnon wanted to meet with Travis because Travis would not sign off on the

security of the ARINCS System and wanted to know what it would take for Travis to finally
certify its safety.
213.

Gagnon wanted Travis to tell him what he needed to be up to speed on ARINCS

so that he (Travis) would finally sign off on the System.
214.

Gagnon instructed Training Instructor Martorano to meet with Travis prior to the

meeting to assess what ARINCS training had been provided to the LTs.

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215.

Travis provided Martorano with information about all of the tools that the security

personnel required for proper training on ARINCS.
216.

Martorano informed Travis that no time limit would be placed on his training on

the System.
217.

Travis informed Martorano that he (and the other security personnel) needed,

inter alia, actual "Live time" on the System, instruction on the simulator that they were promised
by Gagnon and Redfearn would be available, and instruction from ARINCS Technicians
("T echs ").
218.

Defendants promised that ARINCS Technicians would be available pnor to,

during and for 30 days after the System went "live" to provide instruction and be available onsite around-the-clock in the Base Stations to "troubleshoot" any problems with the System or
training and assist the Lts. in adapting to the System.
219.

ARINCs Techs provided limited instruction for two (2) of the four (4) security

220.

Travis, along with others, was not on either of the teams who had exposure to the

221.

The other two security teams, one of which Travis was a member, were never

teams.

Techs.

exposed to training with the Techs.
222.

The Techs did not return to provide additional training, troubleshooting or the

223.

Martorano documented his conversation with Travis, including the needs of the

like.

security personnel/Lts. and stated that he would incorporate it into a plan and forward same
Security Manager Gagnon.

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224.

Martorano promised Travis, "We'll get you the training you need and all of the

Lts. the training they need."
225.

Since November 2010, Travis had been scheduled permanently to work on the

night shift to accommodate his FMLA needs related to his insulin-dependent daughter, of which
Gagnon and Redfearn were fully aware.
226.

Because of Travis' FMLA requirements, all training that Travis was to receive on

ARJNCS was to take place during the night shift.
227.

Travis was scheduled to train on ARJNCS during the day shift on October 17,

2011 - immediately after his meeting with Gagnon; however, future training was to take place
during his regularly scheduled night shift.
228.

Travis had already trained on ARJNCS during various nightshifts with several

other Lts. such as (SME) Jim Barry, (SME) Ollie Kramer, Bobby Varas, Patricia Manuel, Chris
Porta, Al Brahimi, Stefan Dennis, Anthony Formato and Michael Blakely.
229.

When Travis arrived, Gagnon was meeting privately with Redfearn, Thivierge,

and O'Brien.
230.

Travis met with Gagnon, Redfearn, Thivierge, and Jim O'Brien.

231.

Gagnon proceeded to create a very intimidating atmosphere including banging his

hand on the table and pointing his finger at Travis' face, raising his voice and yelling, "This is
fucking bullshit. .. what the fuck is going on with the training? .. .If you think you have the
biggest dick in the room, I could have fucked you up and made problems for you long before
today ... "
232.

Gagnon's threatening statements and actions added to the hostile, intimidating

and threatening atmosphere and were only motivated by Travis' refusal to sign off on a System

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that was a proven failure and on which he (and most others) had no proper training and Travis'
complaints both internally and to outside agencies and individuals regarding safety and security
ISSUeS.

233.

Gagnon's threats and intimidation were intended to stop Travis from complaining

further about ARINCS and were in retaliation for voicing other safety and security complaints.
234.

Gagnon directed Travis, "Starting today, you are going to go fucking train with

(Lt. Jason) Hettler today and tomorrow, Blakely Wednesday and Thursday and then by Friday
you're going to fucking sign off [on ARINCS]. That's it, I don't want to hear anymore of this
fucking bull shit."
235.

The ruse of a "safety concern" meeting to address complaints and security

training was nothing more than a retaliatory, threatening and intimidating "do it or else" ambush
by Gagnon.
236.

Martorano, Delamater, O'Brien and Chris Porta agreed openly to Travis that a

time limit cannot be placed on training on ARINCS because there is no curriculum or training
manual for ARINCS -there was no training "plan".
23 7.

Training on the prior system consisted of 6 months of training before a Lt. would

sign off on his proficiency on the old security system.
238.

After Gagnon's rant, Travis, in the presence of Redfearn, reminded Gagnon of the

August 2011 meeting between Redfearn, Travis and Finnigan where Security Superintendent
Redfearn acknowledged the security personnel did not receive training on the ARINCS system.
239.

Redfearn also acknowledged this fact in front of Gagnon.

240.

Travis also reminded Gagnon that, it was known and agreed to by Gagnon, all of

his training would take place during the night shift due to family issues.

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241.

Gagnon responded, "Listen, I don't g1ve a fuck, I'm the fucking Security

Manager."
242.

In retaliation for Travis' complaints about the safety of Indian point, including the

lack of training on the ARINCS system, Gagnon ordered Travis to work days- starting that very
day- despite the fact that Gagnon was fully aware that the night shift assignment was mandatory
due to Travis' FMLA requirements.
243.

The requirement by Gagnon that Travis be reassigned to train during the day shift

was in direct contravention to the formal agreement reached during the August 2011 meeting
between Redfearn, Travis and Finnigan.
244.

Gagnon informed Travis, "You're gonna train today with Hettler, You're gonna

train tomorrow with Hettler and by fucking Friday you're gonna sign off (on ARINCS)."
245.

Travis reminded Gagnon that he had FMLA issues regarding other members of

his family to no avail.
246.

Redfearn congratulated Travis for standing up to Gagnon and for telling the truth

regarding the lack of training on ARINCS.
247.

Thivierge told Travis that it was "long overdue" and that there is "no recourse

[against Gagnon] because he is the Security Manager".
248.
ARINCS

Travis proceeded to train with Lt. Hettler, however, 10 minutes into the training -

crashed in the presence of the

Lt.

who

was

present and

assigned to

oversee/manage/respond to ARINCS alarms, etc.
249.

The Lt., "A.B." was unable to clear the System, unable to "unfreeze" the cameras

though he tried several times.

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250.

Travis observed that Lt. "A.B.", the station operator at the controls of the security

system (ARINCS), had no idea how to operate it and could not fix the problem.
251.

The ARINCS System was eventually rebooted, but crashed again.

252.

By the end of the shift at 3, on his first day of "training", Travis went home with

no additional knowledge because ARINCS crashed and could not be revived.
253.

Travis was informed that night that Gagnon assigned him to train on ARINCS

everyday for the next 2 weeks - on the day shift.
254.

Gagnon maliciously assigned Travis to the day shift knowing that due to family

health considerations (FMLA) he could not work days, yet Gagnon was heard stating, "I don't
fucking care- put him on days."
255.

In November 2011, as a result of not being able to care for a family member

because he was retaliated against by Gagnon by assigning him to the day shift, Travis was forced
to take FMLA leave on a daily basis- without receiving any pay.
256.

Gagnon's decision to assign Travis to the day shift was in retaliation his having

vocalized and identified the flaws, weaknesses and failures in Indian Point's security department
protocol, hardware, software, general equipment and training, as detailed herein.
257.

Gagnon was fully aware that Travis could have trained with Jim Barry during his

regularly scheduled night shift.
258.

Thivierge thereafter informed Travis that Gagnon had scheduled Travis for, yet

another 2 weeks on the day shift- a total of four weeks.
259.

Thivierge informed Travis, "Your [family] situation was brought to [Gagnon's]

attention and he doesn't give a fuck- you're going to days."

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260.

Gagnon was fully aware that Travis was required to be home during the day to

take care of his daughter yet he intentionally and knowingly increased Travis' anxiety, stress and
pressure by, inter alia, assigning him to the day shift in an effort to pressure Travis into falsely
signing off on the safety of ARINCS and to stop complaining about the safety failures at Indian
Point.

Gagnon Instructs Travis' Supervisor to Downgrade His Performance Evaluation
261.

In further retaliation for Travis' refusal to sign off on the unsafe, proven failure of

a security system, ARINCS, in and around early November 2011, Gagnon instructed SSS
Finnigan to reduce Travis' performance evaluation grade based on Travis' refusal to sign off on
the safety of ARINCS.
262.

Gagnon instructed Finnigan to downgrade Travis to Level 3 from the Level 2

Grading Finnigan had already given Travis.
263.

Finnigan informed Gagnon that Travis is "equal to or better than any other Lt. I

have" and that he does not judge Travis "on the fact that he brought up safety and training
concerns." but on his performance when he's on shift as a Lt.
264.

Gagnon responded by sending Finnigan an email on or around November 14,

2011 again questioning Finnigan's evaluation of Travis.
265.

Finnigan responded that Travis' refusal to assume a post on which he and others

were not properly trained is "not a performance issue".
266.

Defendants have retaliated against other security employees (Jason Hettler, Jay

Kosack, Jose Breban and Joseph Finnigan - all security personnel who have complained to the

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NRC and various other external agencies and organizations about the safety and security failures
and issues) by adversely placing them in the Performance Improvement Program (PIP).
267.

In fact, upon information and belief, Finnigan's PIP "plan" included a "muzzle

clause" provision wherein he is prevented from disagreeing with or questioning Gagnon's views
or decisions about anything, including safety issues, or he will be deemed in violation of his PIP
Plan.

Travis Takes Voluntary Leave of Absence in November 2011
268.

Defendants have created an intimidating, retaliatory and hostile atmosphere

within Indian Point.
269.

Security Lts. "M.R.", "C.P." and "P.M." have suffered the physical manifestations

of extreme emotional distress as a result of Defendants' conduct and the conditions they promote
and allow to exist at Indian Point as detailed herein including, inter alia, vomiting on a regular
basis on the way to work and the requirement that they take personal leave.
270.

As a result of the defendants' retaliation, intimidation and harassment, the

pressure being placed on Travis to certify the safety of an unsafe security system, failure of the
defendants to give the security department (including Travis) adequate training on the System,
the apathy the defendants possessed regarding toward the lack of adequate security at Indian
Point - a nuclear power plant - the pressure of knowing that the responsibility he has as a Lt. to
maintain and ensure the safety of the 20 million individuals who live and work in the "Meltdown
Zone" of Indian Point, Travis experienced severe anxiety, stress, pressure that was having an
effect on his physical health and well-being and had caused a breakdown of his marriage and
family.

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271.

Prior to taking a voluntary leave of absence, in November 2011, Travis spoke

with Wayne Griffin ("Griffin"), Access Control Manager, about taking a leave of absence under
the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) and EMAX.
272.

Griffin assured Travis once he was cleared, by a therapist of his choosing, to

return to work he would be restored to the security clearance that he had before he took a leave
of absence.
273.

Travis took a voluntary leave of absence beginning on November 2011.

Defendants' Retaliatory Refusal to Return Travis to His Position at Indian Point
274.

In March 2012, Travis was fully cleared by his therapist to return to his position

as a Lt. at Indian Point.
275.

In March 2012, Travis' treating physician informed the defendants in writing that

Travis was cleared to return to work with no restrictions.
276.

Historically at Indian Point, once an employee is "cleared" by their treating

physician to return to work at Indian Point, the employee is immediately recertified and, within a
short amount of time, returned to the position and clearance they enjoyed prior to taking leave.
277.

Indian Point security department employees have taken leave- voluntarily or not

-for such issues as drug use on the job, failing on-site urinalysis tests for the presence of illegal
narcotics, arrests for domestic violence, criminal convictions including DWI, and other serious
personal and psychological problems and have been immediately cleared to return to site upon
approval from their clinicians.
278.

Travis had no history of insubordination, no write-ups, and no negative

performance issues during his employment with Entergy.

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279.

Despite the history at Indian Point of other security personnel being returned to

their respective positions upon their having been cleared by their clinicians, and despite the
promise from Griffin that Travis would be immediately returned to his position and security
clearance, Travis was not returned to work after being cleared by his clinician at the direction of
the defendants.
280.

From March 2012 until January 2013, Travis contacted Gagnon, Human

Resources, Wayne Griffin, SSS Finnigan, SSS Thivierge and SSS Kosack to inquire when he
would be returned to his position.
281.

Although Travis was receiving his base pay during this time off, he was deprived

of the mandatory overtime received by all Lts., overtime pay (as there was a significant amount
of overtime hours available due to the shortage of security personnel at Indian Point), raises,
seniority and any other monetary and professional advancement.
282.

By keeping Travis "employed" but refusing to return him to site, the defendants

intended to cause him financial ruin, as they had done with other security employees, i.e.,
Lieutenant Jason Hettler whom the defendants kept "employed" but unpaid in retaliation for
Hettler's speaking out about safety and security concerns and/or for utilizing his FMLA leave.
283.

As a result of the defendants' retaliatory refusal to return Travis to work, he fell

behind on his mortgage, credit card bills, and other expenses for which he was responsible
causing significant financial hardship.
284.

The defendants' continued refusal to return Travis to work caused him stress,

anxiety, financial distress and the physical manifestations of these symptoms.

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Travis' June 18, 2012 Meeting with Human Resources Director, Dan Bengyak

285.

In and around early June 2012, Travis contacted Human Resources Director, Dan

Bengyak ("Bengyak") via email in an attempt to get an answer from someone as to when he
would be able to return to work.
286.

On or about June 18, 2012, Travis met with Bengyak for the purpose of

discussing when he could return to work, having been cleared by his treating physician 3 months
pnor.
287.

Travis met with Bengyak for approximately four (4) hours, informing him of the

details contained herein, the numerous instances wherein he identified numerous safety and
security flaws, weaknesses and failures at Indian Point's security protocol, hardware, software
and general equipment; and vocalized the same to Defendants as well as to State and Federal
authorities, as well as the retaliation, harassment and intimidation he was subjected to by
Defendants as a direct result thereof.
288.

Travis expressed, numerous times, as can be heard on the taped recording of the

conversation, his desire to return to work - whether on the day shift as a Lt. or in the Security
Training Department where he was promised by Gagnon years ago he would be assigned.
289.

Bengyak informed Travis that his goal was to "weigh in as third party", that he

was concerned about the discrimination and retaliation Travis had experienced.
290.

Bengyak promised to take what he had learned during his conversation with

Travis and "bubble it up the chain" of command.
291.

Bengyak informed Travis that if he were to return, he would have to sign a

document agreeing to complete training on and sign off on ARINCS within a specified time
frame.

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292.

Travis informed Bengyak that there has never been a training curriculum and no

one else has ever had to adhere to a time frame to complete training line or a deadline by which
to sign off on the system - that he would be the only person to ever have had to sign that type of
document.
293.

Bengyak responded, "Your situation is a unique situation though."

294.

Travis informed Bengyak that the only reason he is "unique" 1s because he

complained about safety.
295.

Bengyak admitted that Travis' rendition of the events detailed herein, "ties in with

information he has received from other sources" prior to speaking with Travis.
296.

Travis informed Bengyak that he is losing money every day that he is not returned

to shift because he is not getting built-in overtime and his regular overtime, smce everyone
receives overtime due to the understaffing at Indian Point.
297.

Travis informed Bengyak that as a result of his worsening financial condition

cause by the defendants' not returning him to work at Indian Point, he is losing his home.
298.

Bengyak admitted that "there are a lot of issues with the (ARINCS) system" and

downplayed its failures because "it's what's in place".
299.

Travis expressed to Bengyak many times during the conversation that he wanted

to return to Entergy, as he should have been returned back in March 2012.
300.

Travis informed Bengyak that he wanted the opportunity to be trained the right

way by someone who actually knows the System.
301.

Bengyak admitted that it would be "beneficial to [Travis] and the company to do

some sort of reactivation [and] get [him] up to speed."

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302.

Bengyak brought up the possibility of a "no-fault/no admission" parting of the

ways and informed Travis that Entergy had shareholders and "resolving things does not always
go as you think it will."
303.

Bengyak further admitted that, "it may end up bad .. [but] it's a business situation

and we want to solve it."
304.

Travis continued to maintain that all he wanted Bengyak to do was bring him

back to work - whether in the Lt. position, with the proper training on ARlNCS, or in the
Security Training Department, as Gagnon had promised years ago.
305.

Not hopeful about the possibility of Defendants agreeing to bring Travis back on-

site, Bengyak informed him, "sometimes you get into a situation where it's easier to agree to
disagree and part ways."
306.

Travis informed Bengyak, "I just want to get back to work."

307.

Bengyak promised Travis that he would call him that Friday, June 22, 2012 to let

him know where they stood with getting Travis access back to the facility.
308.

That Friday, HR Manager Bengyak sent an email to Travis informing him that his

attorney would be contacted by the Entergy Legal Department.

Defendants Unsuccessfully Attempt to Create Pretextual Basis to Terminate Travis

309.

Instead of fulfilling Bengyak's promise to contact Travis and resolve the issue of

returning Travis to the Indian Point site, Defendants attempted to create a pretextual basis for
refusing to return him to his on-site position at Indian point.

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310.

On July 16,2012, Human Resources' Gillian Taylor ("Taylor"), contacted Travis

to schedule a meeting with him - again at a local Diner and off-site despite the fact that several
non-classified buildings were available in which to meet on site.
311.

Taylor brought with her Wayne Griffin, Access Control Manager who, as

discussed above, had (falsely) promised Travis before Travis had taken his voluntary leave of
absence that as soon as his therapist cleared him to return to work, his access would be restored
and he would be back on site.
312.

Taylor had informed Travis that she needed to ask some "follow up" questions in

connection with his return to Indian Point.
313.

The defendants' plan was to attempt to create "good cause" under which they

could fire Travis without legal (and financial) liability - so that it would not appear that they
were firing him in retaliation for his complaints about, inter alia, the safety and security of the
facility.
314.

Taylor attempted to intimidate Travis by questioning him about the information

he had submitted with his employment application.
315.

The defendants' position, as borne out by Taylor during the meeting, was that the

Entergy Employment Application completed by Travis did not include his prior employment
with former Governor George Pataki and other security-related employment.
316.

Travis informed Taylor that along with completing Entergy's standard

Employment Application form, he submitted a detailed resume to the company for their
consideration.

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317.

Travis further informed Taylor that when he attended the interview process, he

delivered to Entergy a second copy of the Employment Application with the detailed resume
annexed thereto.
318.

Travis further informed Taylor that SSS Jay Kosack, who interviewed Travis for

his position at Entergy, had a copy of the detailed resume in his possession during the interview
and that he and Kosack discussed the information contained thereon.
319.

Subsequent to the meeting with Taylor, Kosack was interviewed by the

defendants and/or their agents in connection with Travis' assertion that he had provided the
defendants with a resume during the interview process.
320.

Kosack confirmed everything that Travis told Taylor about his disclosure of his

employment background and submission of his resume during his employment application
process.
321.

Kosack informed the defendants and/or their agents that the information contained

on Travis' resume was discussed at length at a "round table" discussion held, at which Gagnon
was present, immediately after the interview with Travis had occurred.
322.

Even after discovering that they had no grounds to fire Travis, the defendants

persisted in keeping him in "limbo" - refusing to return Travis to the facility and preventing him
from earning mandatory and voluntary overtime.

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Continued Retaliation, Intentional Harassment and Termination of Employment

323.

In September 2012, Travis filed a state complaint in Westchester Supreme Court

alleging state causes of action.
324.

Travis' complaint detailed, inter alia, numerous safety and security violations and

failures at Indian Point.
325.

At the time of the filing of his state complaint, Travis remained employed by

Entergy at Indian Point, though Entergy had not returned Travis to on-site shift work.
326.

Days after filing his state complaint, Travis spoke out to several news television

and print media detailing the security and safety failures at Indian Point, as described herein.
327.

Travis' account of the safety and security failures at Indian Point received local

and national media coverage.
328.
Mitch

In January 11, 2013, Travis was contacted by Entergy Security Superintendent

Woods

("Woods")

(who

replaced

defendant

Timothy

Redfearn

as

Security

Superintendent) via letter inviting Travis to return to shift work at Indian Point.
329.

Travis was excited and relieved to finally return to work and (hopefully) begin to

recover from the financial devastation intentionally caused by Defendants and their unexplained
refusal to return Travis to site after he almost a year after being cleared to return.
330.

On January 29, 2013, Travis returned to the Indian Point facility ready, willing

and able to begin the process of regaining his Security Access to the facility.
331.

On that date, Travis was met by Woods and Access Control Director Wayne

332.

Woods and Griffin presented Travis with a "Re-Entry Agreement" and mandated

Griffin.

that he sign the agreement as a condition to returning to shift work.

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333.

Upon information and belief, Gagnon and the Entergy Defendants directed

Woods and Griffin to require Travis to sign the Re-Entry Agreement before allowing him to
return to work.
334.

Entergy's training and protocol mandates that no employee sign any document

that contains misleading, false or inaccurate information.
335.

Travis, as with all Entergy security department employees, was trained by

Entergy that before signing any document, he should first read understand the document.
336.

Travis, as with all Entergy security department employees, was trained by

Entergy, that he should never sign a document that contains false, misleading, or inaccurate
information.
337.

Woods and Griffin acknowledged and confirmed to Travis that as an Entergy

employee Travis should not sign any document that he felt was inaccurate, misleading or that he
did not understand.
338.

Griffin, Woods, Gagnon and the Entergy Defendants were at all times aware that

Travis was a plaintiff in a state lawsuit against Entergy and the individual Defendants.
339.

Griffin and Woods were at all times aware that Travis was represented by an

attorney.
340.

No Entergy employee, agent or representative discussed with Travis or his

attorneys the existence of a "Re-Entry Agreement" prior to his January 29, 2013 return to Indian
Point or any requirement that he sign such an agreement as a condition to returning to work at
the Indian Point Facility.
341.

Travis requested the opportunity to briefly postpone s1gnmg the "Re-Entry

Agreement" so that his attorney could have the opportunity to review the document.

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342.

At no time did Travis outright refuse to sign the "Re-Entry Agreement".

343.

Woods and Griffin refused to provide Travis with a copy of the "Re-Entry

Agreement".
344.

Woods and Griffin refused to allow Travis to return to shift work at the Indian

Point facility.
345.

The Re-Entry Agreement was intended by Gagnon and the Entergy Defendants to

be used as a basis for Travis' pretextual termination, as they knew that it contained misleading
and false information.
346.

By letter dated February 1, 2013, Travis was informed by Griffin that his

"Unescorted Access Authorization to Entergy Operations nuclear power plants has been denied
until January 30, 2014".
34 7.

The February 1, 2013 letter indicated that the denial of access was based on

Travis' "refusal to accept the terms ofthe [false and misleading] Re-Entry Agreement".
348.

Entergy's denial of Travis' "Unescorted Access Authorization" has the

detrimental effect of preventing Travis from applying to any nuclear power plant located in the
United States for the next five years.
349.

Entergy and its employees and agents intended that the Re-Entry Agreement

contain false, misleading and inaccurate information knowing and/or having reason to know that
Travis would not sign the Re-Entry Agreement.
350.

The defendants continued their retaliation and harassment of Travis by including

language in the Re-Entry Agreement that required Travis to be reassessed by his treating
clinician despite the fact that Travis had already been "cleared" by his treating clinician to return
to Indian Point shift work almost one year earlier- on March 26, 2012.

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351.

The Entergy defendants and Entergy's employees and agents intentionally created

the above situation in furtherance of their retaliation, harassment and intimidation against Travis.
352.

By presenting Travis with a false and inaccurate Re-Entry Agreement, knowing

and having reason to know that Travis would not sign the document, Entergy, its employees and
agents created entirely false grounds on which to place Travis on a "no-pay" status.
353.

Ultimately, Travis' counsel negotiated a change of the language in the Re-Entry

Agreement demonstrating the fact that the information Entergy included in the Re-Entry
Agreement was, in fact, false and dishonest.
354.

Based on the revised language, Travis signed the revised Re-Agreement, which

was sent to Entergy to facilitate his return to on-site work.
355.

On February 15, 2013, in his continued effort to return to work and regain an

income, Travis provided to Entergy the executed revised version ofthe Re-Entry Agreement.
356.

Included in the letter to Entergy that accompanied the Re-Entry Agreement, was

the communication of Travis' consistent objective of returning to work - that he remained
"ready, willing and able to return to shift work at the Indian Point facility."
357.

Travis was scheduled to return to on-site work at Indian Point on February 26,

358.

On February 25, 2013, Travis' insulin-dependent daughter was having health

2013.

issues that required Travis to remain at home with her.
359.

As a result of his daughter's health difficulties, Travis remained at home with her

on February 26, 2013.
360.

Travis contacted Entergy in order to use his FMLA time in which to care for his

daughter, as he had done throughout his employment with Entergy.

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361.

On February 26, 2013, Entergy sent Travis an email infonning him that if he did

not return to the Indian Point facility on the following day, on February 27, 2013, he faced
termination.
362.

The email also informed Travis that he was ineligible to utilize the FMLA

because he had not accumulated enough work hours in order to qualify to take FMLA time.
363.

Entergy's threat of terminating Travis based on his need to care for his daughter

and their communication that he could no longer use FMLA when emergency care for his
daughter so required, caused Travis extreme anxiety and stress.
364.

As discussed herein, the defendants were well-aware of the fact that Travis was

caring for his insulin-dependent diabetic daughter and had previously utilized the FMLA to care
for her throughout his employment at Entergy.
365.

As a direct result of the defendants' intentional and groundless refusal to return

Travis to work after he had been cleared by his treating clinician in March 2012, the Entergy
defendants prevented and intended to prevent Travis from accruing any "working hours" such
that he no longer qualified for FMLA in order to care for his sick daughter.
366.

The defendants' intentional refusal to return Travis to site was designed to, inter

alia, deprive him of any on-site work hours thus rendering him incapable of utilizing the FMLA
for the benefit of caring for his daughter.
367.

Defendants knowingly refused to return Travis to the Indian Point facility with the

intention of, inter alia, forcing him to voluntarily quit his position with Entergy.
368.

Travis was only precluded from accruing "working hours" as a direct result of the

Defendants' intentional refusal to bring him back on-site after he was cleared by his treating
clinician in March 2012.

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369.

To date, no one, including the defendants, has provided any reason as to why

Travis was not returned to work after he was cleared by his treating clinician in March 2012.
370.

Travis was informed by Entergy, at the direction of Gagnon, that if he did not

return to work on February 27, 2013, he would be terminated.
3 71.

The defendants threatened to terminate Travis in spite of the fact that he had 120

hours of unused vacation time that he could have utilized to care for his insulin dependent minor
daughter for the 1-2 days that she was sick.
372.

On February 27, 2013, as a result of the retaliatory actions continuously engaged

in by the defendants, Travis awoke with excruciating chest pain, difficulty breathing, left arn1,
the side of his face and leg were numb, and he experienced severe vomiting and dizziness.
373.

On that date, as a result of his physical symptoms, Travis went to the hospital for

an examination, which resulted in several tests and the administration of medication.
374.

Travis' blood pressure reached an incredible and above-normal rate of 183/95.

375.

Travis' increased blood pressure resulted from the Entergy defendants' continued

and consistent intentional conduct aimed at causing Travis emotional distress and intentionally
disregarding the substantial likelihood of causing such emotional distress, and the fact that they
have caused Travis substantial emotional distress and the physical manifestations of such
distress.
376.

Travis' pnmary care physician mandated that he not return to work at Indian

Point until he was able to have further testing with a cardiologist specializing in the treatment of
heart-related issues.
377.

Medical certification was provided to Entergy by Travis' doctors informing

Entergy that Travis could not return to work until he was tested and cleared by his doctors.

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3 78.

On March 8, 2013, Travis underwent additional testing on his heart, which

resulted in his cardiologist sending medical documentation to Entergy that Travis was not
medically cleared to return to Entergy.
3 79.

Travis learned that there was a stress-induced tear in his heart that required

additional testing and a procedure to correct the damage to the lower quadrant of his heart.
380.

As a result of his hospitalization and severe physical symptoms directly resulting

from Entergy's retaliation, Travis was placed on bed rest by his cardiologist from March 8, 2013
until additional testing could be completed.
381.

On that same date, Travis' msurance company was contacted to schedule the

medical procedure to resolve Travis' heart condition.
382.

Travis kept Entergy informed of his impending medical testing, his condition and

provided all medical documentation required by Entergy.
383.

Among other documents, on March 8, 2013 Travis' cardiologist faxed to Entergy

a letter indicating that Travis was required to have a comprehensive cardiac evaluation to
determine the extent of Travis' injury to his heart, at which time a further assessment would be
made.
384.

Travis' cardiologist further indicated in his fax to Entergy that Travis was

required to have a cardiac catheter placed in his heart and a CTA (Coronary CT angiography)
performed.
385.

Despite continued and consistent efforts by Travis and his doctors to get

immediate approval for Travis' additional medical testing, Entergy's medical insurance provider
did not provide approval for Travis' mandatory testing until 11 days later- on Tuesday, March
19, 2013 at 11:00 a.m.

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386.

Entergy terminated Travis on March 19, 2013 at 5:00 p.m. -just six (6) hours

after his medical tests were approved by Entergy's medical insurance provider.
387.

At the time of his termination by Entergy, Travis had accumulated 120 hours of

unused vacation time and had 48 hours of sick time remaining.
388.

Entergy, through Mitch Wood, indicated in an email to Travis that its reason for

terminating Travis was the assertion that Entergy was not obligated to provide him with
unlimited medical leave.
389.

Historically, other Entergy employees who were being paid a salary were allowed

to take leave paid time in order to undergo medical procedures for their various heart-related
conditions.
390.

Specifically, "T.N.", "R.V." and "C.P." received pay while undergoing medical

procedures and/or care for certain heart related conditions.
391.

Entergy terminated Travis at a point in time that he was not receiving any pay

from Entergy.
392.

Entergy terminated Travis at a point in time where its Security Department was

severely short-staffed to the point that it was regularly violating federal fatigue rules.
393.

Despite his numerous requests, Travis was also denied the opportunity to apply

for long-term disability benefits, as a result of defendants' intentionally having kept Travis off
site so that he could not have accumulated work hours.
394.

Allowing Travis to obtain the necessary medical treatment before returning to on-

site shift work, which Defendants had inexplicably prevented Travis from doing for close to one
year, would not have cost Entergy any money nor would it have resulted in any detriment to
Entergy.

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395.

Entergy terminated Travis when he could have (and should have) been allowed to

utilize his unused 120 hours of paid vacation time in order to have the medical procedure for his
heart.
396.

Entergy's termination of Travis was in retaliation for his rmsmg security and

safety concerns and for exercising his rights under the FMLA.
397.

Travis' cardiologist scheduled additional medical tests for Wednesday March 20th

at 8:00a.m.
398.

Travis' doctors could not proceed with the testing on that date because the

medications administered to Travis were unsuccessful in reducing Travis' heart rate below 70
bpm at rest (required to be between 50-55 bpm continuously to run the test) as a result of the
significant amount of stress Travis was under.
399.

Travis' medical tests were rescheduled for Friday March 22, 2013 at 8:30a.m.

400.

In preparation for the March 22, 2013 tests, Travis' physicians doubled- and then

quadrupled - his medication in order to reduce his heart rate, however, his heart rate would still
not fall below 70 bpm.
401.

Travis' heart rate and blood pressure would still not decrease to normal levels as a

result of the intentional extreme and outrageous stress and anxiety placed on him by Entergy, as
discussed herein.
402.

As a result of the inability to proceed with the medical tests on March 22, 2013,

Travis' cardiologist made arrangements for a more invasive procedure with the provision to
repair the damage Travis' heart, which testing was scheduled to be on Thursday, April4, 2013.

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403.

On April 3, 2013 - the day before Travis was to have the damage to his heart

repaired - his medical procedure was canceled because his health insurance had been
intentionally terminated by the defendants.
404.

At the time that the defendants intentionally caused Travis' medical insurance to

be canceled, the defendants knew (from medical documentation provided to Entergy by Travis'
cardiologist) that Travis was scheduled for additional medical testing.
405.

The defendants have also refused to repay Travis's 120 hours of unused vacation

time and 48 hours of unused sick time despite numerous request for reimbursement.

Entergy's Lies to the Department of Labor to Intentionally Prevent Travis From
Receiving Unemployment Benefits

406.

As a result of being terminated by Entergy, Travis sought to obtain

Unemployment Benefits from the New York State Department of Labor.
407.

By letter dated April 1, 2013, the Department of Labor informed Travis that

Entergy opposed his application to receive benefits based on Entergy's false statement that
Travis was discharged for "misconduct".
408.

Entergy's own correspondence from Mitch Wood to Travis dated March 19,2013

indicated that he was being terminated because they had no obligation to hold a position open for
him while his medical condition was being assessed.
409.

Entergy falsely reported to the Department of Labor that Travis was terminated

for "misconduct" knowing that the Department of Labor would not issue any monetary benefits
to Travis based on their statement.

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410.

Entergy falsely reported to the Department of Labor that Travis was terminated

for "misconduct" in continuance of their retaliation against him for voicing safety and security
concerns.

Travis' Safety and Security Complaints Are Confirmed by the NRC

411.

In February 2012, approximately one month prior before Travis' clinician

informed Entergy that he was cleared to return to work, Travis' claims against Entergy regarding
the failures of the ARINCS system were confirmed and supported by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, which issued a guilty finding against Entergy and determined that ARINCS
required frequent repetitive corrective action and froze up hundreds of times.
412.

To date, the failures ofthe ARINCS system have not been remedied.

413.

At that same time, Travis' claims against Entergy regarding the inadequate

lighting at the Indian Point site were confirmed and supported by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, which issued a guilty finding against Entergy for having inadequate illumination.
414.

At that same time, Travis' claims against Entergy regarding the violations ofthe

federal "Fatigue Rule" were confirmed and supported by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
which issued a guilty finding against Entergy for exceeding the hourly limitations of numerous
security officers in its security force.
415.

To date, the defendants continue to engage in violations of the federal fatigue

416.

As indicated in the complaint filed by former Lieutenant Jason Hettler, in Hettler

rules.

v. Entergy Enterprises, Inc. et al. (13 Civ. 6003 (VB)), Entergy continues to engage in

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falsification of records and documents in order to cover up their violations of the federal fatigue
rules.
417.

Defendants refused to return Travis to on-site work, inter alia, in retaliation for

expressing the safety and security concerns detailed herein.
418.

Defendants refused to return Travis to on-site work, inter alia, because Travis'

expression of those safety and security concerns resulted in Entergy's receipt of adverse findings
by the NRC.
419.

The defendants refused to return Travis to on-site work, inter alia, because

Travis' expression of safety and security concerns would continue if he were returned to site and,
since Entergy had not corrected the safety and security failures, Entergy would continue to
receive adverse findings.
420.

The defendants refused to return Travis to on-site work because he exercised his

rights under the FMLA.

Defendants' History and Culture of Retaliation, Harassment and Intimidation Against
Security Personnel Who Raise Security and Safety Concerns and Against Those Who
Utilize Approved FMLA Leave
421.

Entergy has a culture of retaliation, harassment and intimidation against

individuals who raise security and safety concerns, as detailed in part below.
422.

Entergy has a culture of retaliation, harassment and intimidation against

individuals who utilize approved FMLA leave time, as detailed in part below.

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Jason Hettler

423.

Jason Hettler was a Lieutenant at Indian Point from 2003 until June 2013.

424.

Hettler was regularly certified to take intermittent FMLA leave for his wife who

had a serious medical condition.
425.

Hettler regularly raised concerns to Entergy officials, the defendants, the NRC

and governmental officials, about the lack of security and safety at the Indian Point Nuclear
Facility.
426.

Specifically, Hettler raised concerns about the failures ofthe ARINCS system, the

numerous alarm failures on ARINCS, the lack of training on ARINCS, harassment and
intimidation of employees to falsely "sign off' that they had received actual training on
ARINCS, the falsification of security training documents, the falsification of fatigue rule-related
records and documents, and more.
427.

Hettler was retaliated against and harassed by Gagnon and Thivierage by, inter

alia, having his FMLA leave interfered with, having his evaluations downgraded, minimized
raises and defendants' refusal to promote him, being suspended without pay and constructively
discharged in retaliation for engaging in protected activity under federal and state whistleblower
laws and the FMLA.
428.

As with Travis, the defendants also maliciously and adversely denied Hettler's

Unescorted Access Authorization for no legal reason, which had the effect of precluding Hettler
from applying for employment with any nuclear facility in the United States for the next five (5)
years.
429.

As he did with Travis, Gagnon attempted to intimidate SSS Joseph Finnigan into

downgrading Hettler's performance evaluation in order to place Hettler in the Performance

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Improvement Plan ("PIP) in retaliation for raising safety and security concerns and for utilizing
his approved FMLA time to care for wife.

Joseph Finnigan

430.

Joseph Finnigan ("Finnigan") is employed at Indian Point as a Shift Security

Supervisor ("SSS").
431.

Like Travis and Hettler, Finnigan has raised numerous security and safety

concerns to Entergy officials, including Gagnon and Redfearn.
432.

Specifically, Finnigan voiced concerns to the defendants about inadequate

lighting around the perimeter, the lack of proper training in the Security Department, failures of
the ARINCS system and the lack of training provided on the system and more.
433.

In retaliation for raising safety and security concerns, Gagnon placed Finnigan in

the PIP.
434.

Upon information and belief, Finnigan's PIP plan includes a "muzzle clause"

provision wherein he is prevented from disagreeing with or questioning any of Gagnon's views
or decisions about anything, including safety and security issues, or he will be deemed in
violation of the PIP.
435.

Finnigan also raised concerns internally to Gagnon and others within the Security

Department regarding, inter alia, the FOF Drill artificiality, choreographed FOF Drills, failed
FOF Drills, violations of the security protocol, radio communications issues and more.

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Jay Kosack
436.

Jay Kosack is employed at Indian Point a Shift Operations Supervisor.

437.

As with Travis, Hettler and Finnigan, Kosack has raised numerous security and

safety concerns to Entergy officials, including Gagnon and Wood as well as the NRC and other
governmental agencies and organizations regarding such issues as the lack of lighting around the
perimeter, retaliation and adverse actions taken against individuals (including himself, Hettler
and Travis) for raising security and safety concerns, sleeping and inattentive guards, lack of
proper training generally and on the ARINCS system, ARINCS failures, interference with
FMLA leave, and more.
438.

The Entergy defendants, including Gagnon, have retaliated Kosack by, inter alia,

placing him in the PIP for raising concerns about safety and security failures.
439.

The defendants have also recently eliminated Kosack's position at Indian Point

and slated him for termination citing pretextual "business" reasons for his termination.

Chris Jones
440.

Chris Jones ("Jones"), a former United States Marine, was employed with

Entergy as a Security Officer.
441.

Jones spoke out internally in favor of Travis' state court lawsuit against Entergy

and Gagnon, wherein Travis detailed the security and safety failures at Indian Point, including
the choreographed FOF drills, sleeping guards, inadequate training, etc.
442.

Jones voiced his concerns about the all-too-common incidents of "friendly fire"--

both intentional and unintentional- that occur at Indian point during FOF Drills.

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443.

Jones expressed his concern that the security force was given training no better

than "mall cops" and the mentality within the Security Department at Entergy that plant security
is a "sham".
444.

Jones expressed his opinion that since "friendly fire" incidents are such a regular

occurrence at Indian Point, the Security Department should engage in additional training for
those who unintentionally shoot their fellow employees and discipline for those whose shots
were fired at their fellow officers intentionally.
445.

Each time that the friendly fire issue was brought to Gagnon's attention, whether

by Jones or others within the security force, he would simply ignore the issue.
446.

In retaliation against Jones for speaking out against the friendly fire incidents and

in favor of the state lawsuit filed by Travis, Jones was placed on administrative leave.
44 7.

Jones was informed that he would not be allowed to return to shift until he was

cleared by a clinician.
448.

Jones was "cleared" by the clinician, but was nevertheless terminated by Entergy

in retaliation for supporting Travis' safety and security concerns and speaking out against the
failed Security Department at Indian Point.

Thien Chung

449.

Thien Chung ("Chung") 1s a Lieutenant in the Security Department at Indian

450.

Chung applied for and received approval to take intermittent FMLA leave for a

Point.

close relative who had a serious medical condition.

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451.

Gagnon, Thivierage and the Entergy defendants retaliated against and interfered

with Chung's FMLA leave by adversely reassigning him to work the night shift knowing and
intending that the night shift would interfere with his ability to take care of his relative/take
FMLA leave.

Thomas Nicolosi

452.

Thomas Nicolosi ("Nicolosi") 1s employed by Entergy as a Lieutenant/Alarm

Station Operator.
453.

Nicolosi utilizes leave time under his certified FMLA plan in connection with his

minor daughter's serious medical condition.
454.

Nicolosi has raised concerns regarding safety and security issues regarding many

issues, including the lack of proper training for the security force, failed FOF Drills and
choreographed FOF Drills.
455.

As recent at May 5, 2013 Nicolosi raised his concerns about the failed April2013

FO F Drill run by Santiago and Sanchez, detailed above.
456.

Nicolosi was suspended without pay in August 2013 retaliation for his voicing

concerns about the safety and security failures at Indian Point.
457.

Nicolosi was suspended without pay in August 2013 retaliation for the exercise of

rights under FMLA and for raising safety and security concerns.

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Defendants' COBRA Violations
458.

In spite of numerous requests made by Travis to the defendants prior to April 3,

2013 for information regarding COBRA and the procedures that would allow him to continue his
medical insurance, the defendants intentionally refused to provide Travis with the requisite
information and documentation.
459.

The defendants failed to notify Travis of his COBRA right to continued health

insurance coverage under Defendants' Plan at his own expense.
460.

The defendants failed to provide Travis in a timely manner with a copy of the

Plan after his request.
461.

The defendants failed to notify Travis of his COBRA right to convert his group

health coverage to an individual policy.
462.

The defendants' failed to inform the plan administrator of Travis' separation from

employment and/or Travis' need for information regarding COBRA coverage.
463.

As a result, Travis was terminated from his medical insurance, unable to continue

to rece1ve the medical benefits through his plan and unable to obtain any other medical
msurance.

AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
464.

Repeats and realleges paragraphs "1" through "463" herein.

465.

Defendants are liable to the plaintiff for violations of the Energy Reorganization

Act of 1978, 42 U.S. C. § 5851, et seq.

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AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
466.

Repeats and realleges paragraphs "1" through "465" herein.

467.

Defendants' are liable to the plaintiff for retaliation and interference with the

Family Medical Leave Act.

AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

v

468.

Repeats and realleges paragraphs "1" through "467" herein.

469.

Defendants are liable to the plaintiff for violations of Consolidated Omnibus

Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161 et seq.

AS AND FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
470.

Repeats and realleges paragraphs "1" through "469" herein.

4 71.

Defendants are liable for a breach of contract and/or breach of fiduciary duty.

WHEREFORE a judgment is respectfully demanded:
a.

awarding an injunction to restrain defendants from engagmg m continued

violations of the respective laws detailed herein; and
b.

reinstatement of the plaintiff to the same position that he held before the

retaliatory personnel action, an equivalent position or a promotion; and
c.

reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights; and

d.

compensation for lost wages and overtime, medical insurance, benefits, out-of-

pocket medical related expenses and other remuneration plus interest; and
e.

punitive damages; and

64

 Case 7:13-cv-07518-VB Document 1 Filed 10/25/13 Page 65 of 65

f.

liquidated damages in an amount equal to the entire award of lost wages, benefits,

and other compensation lost as a result of the violations, plus interest as defendants have acted in
bad faith; and
g.

payment by the employer of reasonable costs, disbursements, and attorney's fees;

h.

recovery of the benefits due to the plaintiff under the terms of his plan and

and

enforcement of his rights under the terms of the plan, including the statutory $100 per day from
the date of defendants' failure to adhere to under 29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. (COBRA); and
1.

granting such other and further relief as to the Court seems just and proper.

Dated: October 24, 2013
Scarsdale, New York

THE BELLANTONI LAW FIRM, PLLC
At~rneys for th_e P.l~intiff

(t U_~liilliVll&ci-1,
By:

65

,Amy (3 Bellantoni (AB3061)
2 Overbill Road, Suite 400
Scarsdale, New York 10583
(914) 367-0090
(914) 367-0095 (facsimile)