use Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PagelD.606 Pagelof 15 John P. McCormick, Esq. (SBN 38064) Konrad M. Rasmussen, Esq. (SBN 157030) MCCORMICK MITCHELL 8885 Rio San Diego Drive, Suite 212 San Diego, CA 92108 Telephone: (619) 294-8444 Facsimile: (619) 294?8447 Walter M. oka, Esq. (SBN 94536) Anthony F. Latiolait, Esq. (SBN 132378) Daniel F. McCann, Esq. (SBN 185546) YOKA SMITH, LLP 777 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 4200 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 427-2300 Facsimile: (213) 427?2330 wyoka@yokasmith.com alatiolait@yokasmith.com Attorneys for Defendant, THE GOODYEAR TIRE RUBBER COMPANY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA HAROLD J. PHILLIPS and CASE NO.: 02 CV 1642 (NLS) PHILLIPS, OBJECTIONS OF THE GOODYEAR Plaintiffs, TIRE RUBBER COMPANY TO THE MAGISTRATE ORDER VS- DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO MODIFY THE THE GOODYEAR TIRE RUBBER PROTECTIVE ORDER COMPANY, an Ohio Corporation, and DOES 1 THROUGH X, Inclusive, DEPT: Defendants. JUDGE: Hon. Nita Stormes TO THE HONORABLE COURT AND ALL PARTIES OF RECORD: COMES NOW defendant, THE GOODYEAR TIRE RUBBER COMPANY (hereinafter referred to as ?Goodyear?) and submits these objections to the Magistrate Judge?s Order of 02 CV 1642 (NLS) 'se Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PagelD.607 Page2of 15 January 28, 2008 Denying as Moot Intervenors? Motion to Modify the Court?s Protective Order Entered on June 13, 2003. Goodyear brings the following objections on the grounds that the Magistrate Judge?s order is clearly erroneous in several respects and contrary to established law directly on point. I l. The analysis engaged in by the Magistrate Judge leading to the conclusion that the deposition testimony of Kim Cox was not con?dential under the Protective Order was erroneous in that the intervenors motion sought only to modify the Protective Order and did not request such an analysis. Consequently, Goodyear did not have an opportunity to brief this issue or establish good cause for maintaining the con?dentiality of the deposition evidence. 2. The Magistrate Judge was in error in ?nding a dispute existed as to whether the deposition of Kim Cox was designated as con?dential. 3. The Magistrate Judge was in error in ?nding that the subject matter of Mr. Cox? testimony, Goodyear?s procedure in the handling of a prior property damage claim, was not con?dential under the protective order. This ?nding is contrary to established law in that information concerning a tire manufacturer?s claims review procedures and the processing of consumer complaints is recognized as being con?dential under federal law. See provisions of The TREAD Act 49 CPR. 512 et seq. 4. The Magistrate Judge was in error in ?nding that there is no continuing need to keep Mr. Cox deposition testimony con?dential under the protective order. This ?nding is contrary to established law in that information concerning a tire manufacturer?s claims review procedures and the processing of consumer complaints is recognized as being con?dential under federal law. See provisions of The TREAD Act 49 C.F.R. 512 et seq. 5. The Magistrate failed to properly consider Goodyear?s reliance upon the existing protective order which is a well established basis for not modifying protective orders a?er settlement of litigation. 02 CV 1642 (NLS) 00 A 00 \1 Lse Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PagelD.608 PageBof 15 6. The Magistrate Judge erroneously focused on the distinction between Mr. Cox being 30(b)(6) witness as opposed to a fact witness, when sole consideration should have been the nature of the testimony provided rather than the characterization of the witness. 7. The Magistrate Judge was in error in describing Mr. Cox as having a ?high level position? within Goodyear in the absence of any evidence supporting that conclusion, and in the face of indications directly to the contrary. Accordingly, Goodyear requests that the order of January 28, 2008 issued by the Honorable Nita L. Stormes not be adopted by this court. I. WHERE A MAGISTRATE ORDER IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS OR CONTRARY TO LAW, THE DISTRICT JUDGE SHALL MODIFY THE ORDER OR SET ASIDE THE ERRONEOUS PORTIONS. Rule 72, subdivision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the authority for a party to object to an order issued by a magistrate judge on a nondispositive matter. This subsection ?rrther explains: The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider such objections and shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge?s order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law. (See also 28 U.S.C.A. 636(b)(l)(A) providing authority for the court to reconsider any pretrial matter determined by a magistrate judge where it has been shown that the magistrate judge?s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.) In this matter, as demonstrated more fully below, the January 28, 2008 Order issued by the Honorable Nita Stormes is clearly erroneous in several material respects given the record established by the pleadings and oral argument of the parties. Moreover, the ?nding that the testimony of Mr. Cox was not con?dential in the ?rst instance is contrary to law. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Stormes should be modi?ed. 02 CV 1642 (NLS) (117 Lse Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PagelD.609 Page4of 15 II. THE MAGISTRATE FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF KIM COX WAS NOT CONFIDENTIAL IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD BE SET ASIDE A. The Intervenors Did Not Move to Unseal Testimony or Records Covered by the Protective Order The Intervenors ?led their motion to modify the court?s protective order in order to use the discovery at issue in collateral litigation. (See Magistrate?s Order [Doc. No. 65] page 2, lines 13 to 15). As set forth in Intervenor?s Reply In Support of Their Motion to Modify the Court?s Protective Order [Doc. No.53], the ?Intervenors request that the Court modify its Protective Order to allow them to learn what Mr. Cox said or admitted under oath in his 2003 (Reply at page 2 line 28 to page 3 line 2). The Intervenors did not challenge, and for that reason Goodyear did not brief, the fact that the deposition testimony of Mr. Cox was con?dential. Similarly, the intervenors did not move to unseal matters presumed to fall under the Protective Order and therefore Goodyear did not address, and the magistrate could not have properly considered, factors necessary to determine issues of con?dentiality and sealing. Indeed, the Intervenor?s Motion to Modify the Protective Order [Doc. No. 27] was based upon oltz State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co 331 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) and the ?nding therein, that ?a collateral litigant?s request to the issuing court to modify an otherwise proper protective order so that collateral litigants are not precluded from obtaining relevant material should generally be granted.? (Motion at page 16 lines 3 -5 citing Foltz, supra at 1131-32). That is, the Intervenors request a ?nding that the Cox testimony was not con?dential. Rather the relief requested was to access the court reporter?s notes and deposition exhibits or, alternatively, to depose those in attendance at the Cox deposition ?Without Goodyear re?lsing to allow such discovery by invoking the terms of the Court?s June 13, 2003 Protective Order.? (Intervenor?s Motion to Intervene and Modify the Court?s Protective Order [Doc. No. 27] page 1, line 25 to page 2 lineS) The Magistrate Judge?s ?nding that the testimony was not con?dential addressed an issue not raised by the Intervenors nor briefed by Goodyear. Moreover, Goodyear submits the authority for the Magistrate?s ?nding is misplaced. More speci?cally, the Magistrate Judge cites Foltz at 02 CV 1642 (NLS) Case Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PagelD.610 PageSof 15 1133 for the proposition that the court issuing the protective order ?must in the ?rst instance determine whether the Protective Order should apply to speci?c documents or information under Rule (Order [Doc. No. 65] at page 7 lines 3 to 4). oltz makes no such statement on page 1133 or anywhere else in its Opinion. Rather, the Foltz court explained that in the event of a challenge to a con?dential designation, the Court must require the proponent of continuing con?dential treatment to ?make an actual showing of good cause? oltz at 1131. Here there has been no challenge by the intervenors to the con?dential status of the discovery at issue. Rather, the oltz court noted at page 1133 that in the case of a blanket protective order, such as the one at issue here, a reliance argument, without more, will not justify a refusal to modify. Further, the Foltz court found ?(a)ny legitimate interest in continued secrecy as against the public at large can be accommodated by placing [the collateral litigants] under the same restrictions on use and disclosure contained in the original protective order.? (citing United Nuclear Corp. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F. 2d 1424, 1426 (10 Cir.1990). As to the ?rst point, Goodyear presented evidence not only of reliance but of the fact all parties recognized and treated the testimony of Mr. Cox as con?dential. On the second point, this is precisely what the intervenors sought: to modify the protective order to allow them access to discovery in the Phillips case. Goodyear submits that it has a legitimate interest in the continued con?dentiality of the testimony of Mr. Cox and hereby requests the opportunity to establish good cause for the continued con?dentiality of the deposition evidence. Unlike the intervenors in Foltz who sought, among other things, to unseal certain documents that had been subject to the blanket protective order, no such effort was made by the intervenors here. Therefore, the analysis engaged in by the Magistrate Judge was beyond the scope of the intervenor?s motion and beyond the issues Goodyear anticipated or briefed. B. Evidence Presented Supports the Presumption of Con?dentiality As noted above, the intervenors did n_ot challenge the understanding that the deposition testimony of Mr. Cox was con?dential. Indeed, the Magistrate?s ?nding that the parties ?tacitly 02 CV 1642 (NLS) 'tse Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PagelD.611 Page6of 15 assumed that Cox?s testimony is presently protected as ?con?dential information? under the June 13, 2003 Protective Order? (January 28, 2008 Order at page 7 lines 7-8; emphasis added) is an understatement of the ?rst order. Not only did the parties tacitly assume the deposition testimony was con?dential, they expressly con?rmed the con?dential nature of the testimony and of the physical deposition transcript. Accordingly, there can be little doubt that the testimony was presumed by all to not only be con?dential but falling within the protections of the protective order. First, the language of the protective order itself [Doc. No. 22] covers the very testimony at issue. More speci?cally, section 1. paragraph A de?nes ?con?dential information? as including information which contains trade secrets and proprietary matters including methodology and evaluation ?which any party believes in good faith pertains to its trade or business and has independent value from not being generally known and not being readily asceratinable by other persons who may obtain economic value from its disclosure or use. In addition, such information is not normally revealed to others except in con?dence and is not revealed to others in the party?s trade or business and is of a type that the party has made efforts to maintain as secret.? When the Magistrate inquired about trade secret treatment of claims information at the January 11, hearing, it was explained that Goodyear, like other tire manufacturers, takes great efforts to maintain its claims information, including processing guidelines, customer complaints and adjustment information as con?dential. Goodyear?s counsel, Walter Yoka, spoke at length about the nature of this speci?c con?dential information and the efforts tire companies go to in order to maintain this competitive information con?dential. This discussion was unrefuted. Signi?cantly, the Department of Transportation?s National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration (NHTSA) has determined that reports and data relating to warranty claim information, data related to ?eld reports, including dealer reports and data and reports relating to consumer complaints is to be maintained as con?dential and would cause substantial competitive harm if released. 49 C.F.R. 512.3(c) and Appendix to 49 C.F.R. Part 512. Further, paragraph 3 of the Protective Order speci?cally explains, in relevant part: Deposition testimony relating to or discussing Goodyear?s con?dential information shall be protected under the ORDER and the transcript of such testimony shall be marked with the Con?dential legend of 02 cv 1642 (NLS) 'ise Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PagelD.612 Page7of 15 Paragraph 1. The transcripts of such deposition testimony shall be treated the same under this ORDER as other documents Goodyear marks as con?dential. Accordingly, the deposition testimony was presumptively con?dential. C. It is Undisputed that Goodyear and the Phillips Attorneys Considered the Testimony Con?dential The Magistrate Judge erroneously found a ?dispute? as to whether the deposition was designated and treated as con?dential. Goodyear submits there was no such dispute and that the key undisputed facts point to a clear understanding by all concerned that testimony was designated and treated as con?dential. In his Declaration, Goodyear?s counsel John McCormick af?rmatively states ?(b)ecause Mr. Cox was being deposed regarding Goodyear?s con?dential information relating to its handling and evaluation of a property claim, the deposition was declared to fall within the protections of the Protective Order, and Plaintiffs? counsel, Mr. Ricciardulli, agreed to this designation and did not challenge it.? [Doc. No. 26, Exhibit No competent evidence has been provided ot challenge this fact. Similarly, Mr. Ricciardulli acknowledged that the transcript was in fact con?dential a?_er the deposition was concluded. In this regard, Tim Casey, lead counsel for the intervenors stated in his af?davit under penalty of perjury his understanding from Mr. Ricciardulli that Mr. Ricciardulli ?agreed to seal the deposition? of Mr. Cox. [Doc. No. 26, Exhibit paragraph This statement has gone unchallenged. Mr. Casey?s af?davit makes it clear that Mr. Ricciardulli told him that the deposition of Mr. Cox had been sealed under the Protective Order. In fact, Mr. Casey also notes that Mr. Ricciardulli declined Mr. Casey?s request to provide documents from the Phillips case citing to the Protective Order and the settlement agreement. [Doc. No. 26, Exhibit paragraphs and Only when later responding to the motion for order to show cause for violating the Protective Order did Mr. Ricciardulli suggest a possible contrary understanding. And even that was equivocal. Mr. Ricciardulli did not refute the statement that he agreed that the deposition of Mr. Cox was covered 02 CV 1642 (NLS) Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PagelD.613 PageBof 15 by the Protective Order. Rather, Mr. Ricciardulli stated that he does not recall any such discussion. This ?evidence? does not amount to equipoise but clearly weighs in favor of a ?nding that the testimony was considered to be con?dential. Finally, it was established that documents for the deposition of Mr. Cox would not be produced until the Protective Order was in place. [Doc. No. 48, Declaration of John McCormick paragraph Given that the content of the documents produced for use in the deposition were treated as con?dential, it follows that the testimony related to the documents was covered by the Protective Order. (Protective Order, Section 1, paragraph paragraph 3) In summary, ample evidence was presented by Goodyear and unrefuted by the intervenors that the deposition of Mr. Cox was con?dential under the Protective Order and was understood by the parties to be con?dential under the Protective Order. For the Magistrate Judge to conclude otherwise is contrary to the evidence presented and is clearly erroneous. D. The Subiect Matter of Mr. Cox Deposition is Presumptivelv Con?dential: Pursuant to the provisions of the TREAD Act, set forth at 49 C.F.R. 512 et seq., the National Highway Traf?c Safety Administration considers automotive and tire manufacturer claims information, including reports and data relating to warranty claim information, data related to ?eld reports, including dealer reports and data and reports relating to consumer complaints to be presumptively con?dential and the type of information that would cause substantial competitive harm if released. In this regard, 49 C.F.R. 512.3(c) de?nes con?dential information as follows: ?Con?dential business information means trade secrets or commercial or ?nancial information that is privileged or con?dential, as described in 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). (1) A trade secret is a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort. 02 CV 1642 (NLS) Case Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PagelD.614 Pagegof 15 (2) Commercial or ?nancial information is considered con?dential if it has not been publicly disclosed and: If the information was required to be submitted and its release is likely to impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future, or is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained; or (ii) if the information was voluntarily submitted and is the kind of information that is customarily not released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained. Appendix to 49 C.F.R. Part 512 speci?cally ?nds that automotive and tire manufacturer claims data and information is ?con?dential business information?. The Chief Counsel has determined that the following information required to be submitted to the agency under 49 CFR 579, subpart C, will cause substantial competitive harm and will impair the government's ability to obtain this information in the ?iture if released: (1) Reports and data relating to warranty claim information; (2) Reports and data relating to ?eld reports, including dealer reports and hard copy reports; (3) Reports and data relating to consumer complaints; and (4) Lists of common green identi?ers. (Appendix to Part 512-- Early Warning Reporting Class Deterrhinations) As noted above, the trade secret content of Mr. Cox deposition was at a minimum tacitly assumed in the brie?ng of intervenors? motion. When discussed at the hearing on January 11, Goodyear explained the con?dential nature of consumer claims information which was at the heart of Mr. Cox testimony. Signi?cantly, the Magistrate?s order found that this type of claim information was the subject of Mr. Cox testimony and was akin to manufacturer ?records? falling 02 cv 1642 (NLS) se Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PageID.615 Page 10 of 15 under regulations. However, the Magistrate overlooked the fact that NHTSA recognizes the trade secret nature of such ?records? and explicitly provides manufacturers with con?dential treatment of the same. Accordingly, the ?nding that Mr. Cox, was a witness produced to speci?cally discuss the handling of a consumer claim and the ?nding that such testimony was not entitled to trade secret protection, or that Goodyear should not be given the opportunity to establish the same as trade secret is inconsistent, contrary to law and constitutes error. E. The Court Failed to Properly Consider Goodyear?s Reliance Upon the Existing Protective Order The Magistrate failed to properly consider and give weight to Goodyear?s reliance upon the protective order. To undo the provisions of the protective order four years after Goodyear had acted in conformity with the order and in the absence of any objection to Goodyear?s conduct under the protective order is manifestly unfair to Goodyear. Goodyear had a right to believe from the outset, that con?dential materials produced in discovery in this matter would be used only for this case and would not become the subject of dispute in future litigation. Indeed, had Goodyear foreseen the instant controversy and the undoing of the protective order as contemplated by the Magistrate Judge, it certainly would have sought additional and/or different protections from the Court and guided its actions accordingly. A party?s reliance upon the existing provisions of the protective order was recently dealt within the Missouri Supreme Court case of Ford Motor Company v. Manners, 239 583 (MO. 2007), holding that the trial court abused its discretion in vacating a non-sharing protective order. The Court reasoned that defendant Ford?s ?reliance on the non-sharing protective order was manifest.? Id. at 588. The plaintiffs argued, as the intervenors do here, that changing or vacating the protective order would avoid duplicative discovery. Id. The Court declared that ?the discovery process is primarily designed to facilitate an orderly and ef?cient resolution of individual lawsuits, not to provide a national database.? Id. at 589. The Court rejected plaintiffs? arguments by observing that ?failure to respect the production of documents subject to protective orders would 10 02 CV 1642 (NLS) Calse Document78 Filed 02/22/08 PagelD.616 Page 11 of 15 hinder, not ?irther, the goal [of conducting discovery in the most practical and cost-ef?cient way possible]. If parties could not rely upon the protective orders and agreements, during and after the trial process, all productions of sensitive material would require litigation to this Court.? Id. The evidence presented to the Magistrate on the motion to intervene establishes that the protective order in this matter was properly utilized to ?facilitate an orderly and ef?cient resolution? of this individual lawsuit. Goodyear?s conduct with respect to the protective order, within the context of the Phillips lawsuit, was in no way improper. The return or disposal of con?dential materials produced in discovery is contemplated by the Protective Order itself. Goodyear relied upon its protections in producing documents in this case, in allowing its employee to be deposed on con?dential topics, and in working with Mr. Ricciardulli regarding the handling the disposition of con?dential materials following settlement. Goodyear was reasonably entitled to rely upon the Protective Order to assume that the con?dential discovery materials were only for use in the Phillips? case and that once the case was over those materials were not required for any other purpose. To hold Goodyear to a standard of conduct inconsistent with Goodyear?s proper reliance on the protective order is erroneous and should be not followed. ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD SHOULD BE SUSTAINED AND THE ORDER SHOULD BE MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY. A. The Court?s Inquiry Into and Findings Regarding the Status of Kim Cox as a Witness Were in Error. There is No Evidence in the Record That Kim Cox was a ?High Level? Employee of Goodyear and Such an Inquiry is Irrelevant to Determining Whether the Content of the Deposition is Entitled to Protection In her order, Judge Stormes asserted: ?Goodyear argued that any statements made by Cox during his deposition concerning the G159 tire?s performance would have included proprietary information because of his high level position within the company and his base of knowledge concerning Goodyear products.? (Order [Doc No. 65] at page 11 lines 4-7). The Magistrate Judge 1 1 02 cv 1642 (NLS) se Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PageID.617 Page 12 of 15 also focused on whether Mr. Cox was a fact witness or truly a 30(b)(6) witness to testify on behalf of Goodyear. In truth, these considerations are distinctions without a difference as it is the 99.1% of the testimony rather that the title attached to the witness that brings his testimony within the parameters of the Protective Order. Pursuant to the corporation must designate one or more ?of?cers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf? . . . (emphasis added). In this case Mr. Cox was the witness produced and his production by the company does not z'pso facto make him a ?high level employee.? In fact, Goodyear never described Mr. Cox as holding a ?high level position? within the company in its brie?ng papers or during oral argument. Indeed, Mr. Ricciardulli?s counsel Mr. Goldstein acknowledged the level of Mr. Cox position by referring to Mr. Cox as an ?underling?. (Transcript of January 11, 2008 hearing at page 19, line5-8). This characterization of Mr. Cox was apparently created in an attempt to imply that as a low level employee, Mr. Cox could not have information that could be considered as con?dential or proprietary. In truth, Mr. Cox was indeed simply an employee of Goodyear?s claims department who happened to be the one who handled the previous claim of the Phillips?. Despite the fact that he does not hold a high-level position, Mr. Cox?s capacity as a claims department representative made him aware of the claims processing practices of Goodyear, certain consumer complaints and certain claims information, all of which Goodyear and other tire companies consider con?dential. The Magistrate?s statement that Mr. Cox was a ?high level? employee is erroneous. Goodyear never represented him to hold a ?high level? position. The Magistrate Judge?s conclusion on this point is wholly unsupported by the record, irrelevant, and improperly creates the impression that Mr. Cox, as a representative of Goodyear, may have had the ability or authority to speak to issues beyond those which were the subject of the Phillips? deposition notice. For these reasons the Magistrate?s ??nding? on this subject should be stricken and not adopted by the court. 12 02 CV 1642 (NLS) Case Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PageID.618 Page 13 of 15 IV. CONCLUSION The evidence in the record establishes that the subject matter of Mr. Cox?s deposition was recognized as being con?dential. In this regard, the conduct of the deposition, including the actions of counsel were consistent with the con?dential nature of the deposition topic, including withholding documents until the Protective Order was in place. Moreover, the treatment of the testimony after the deposition was concluded was consistent with the conclusion by the parties that it was con?dential. The Magistrate?s inquiry into the whether the testimony was con?dential was not an issue before the court and the ?nding that the testimony was not con?dential is clearly p-n erroneous based on the record developed. Therefore, Goodyear respectfully requests that the 11 objections as outlined above be sustained and that the District Court enter an order ?nding: (1) that 12 the deposition of Mr. Cox is con?dential pursuant to the terms of the protective order; (2) that the 13 ?lings referring to Mr. Cox deposition testimony will remain under seal pursuant to the terms of the 14 protective order; and (3) denying the intervenors? Motion to Modify the protective order. 1 5 16 DATED: February 22, 2008 YOKA SMITH, LLP 17 18 BY: F. WALTER M. YOKA 19 ANTHONY F. LATIOLAIT DANIEL F. 20 Attorneys for Defendant, THE GOODYEAR 21 TIRE RUBBER COMPANY 1642 (NLS) Case Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PageID.619 Page 14 of 15 PROOF OF SERVICE PHILLIPS v. GOODYEAR TIRE RUBBER COMPANY UNITED STATES DISCTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Case No.: 02 CV 1642 (NLS) GOOD.31886 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 777 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 4200, Los Angeles, California 90017. On February 22, 2008 I served the foregoing document described as OBJECTIONS OF THE GOODYEAR TIRE RUBBER COMPANY TO THE MAGISTRATE ORDER DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO MODIFY THE PROTECTIVE ORDER on the interested party or parties in this action by placing the original and/or a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope, and addressed as follows: PLEASE SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST (BY MAIL) I deposited such envelope in the mail at Los Angeles, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. (E-FILE). (VIA OVERNIGHT MAIL) I deposited such envelope in the Overnite Express box at Los Angeles, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. (BY FACSIMILE) In addition to regular mail, I sent this document via facsimile, number(s) as listed on the attached mailing list, on (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) Such envelope was delivered by an agent of Document Delivery Service by hand to the of?ce of the addressee. (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. (FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the of?ce of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made. Executed on February 22, 2008, at Los Angeles, California. Salvador Quintero Case Document 78 Filed 02/22/08 PageID.620 Page 15 of 15 PHILLIPS v. GOODYEAR TIRE RUBBER COMPANY UNITED STATES DISCTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Case No.: 02 CV 1642 (NLS) SERVICE LIST By E-File Timothy J. Casey, Esq. SCI-IMJITT, SNECK, SMY TH HERROD, RC. 1221 East Osborn Road, Suite 105 Phoenix, AZ. 85014 Attorneys for the Haleys in Arizona John P. McCormick, Esq. (SBN 38064) Konrad M. Rasmussen, Esq. (SBN 157030) MITCHELL 8885 Rio San Diego Drive, Suite 212 San Diego, CA 92108 Telephone: (619) 294-8444 Facsimile: (619) 294?8447 Attorneys for The Goodyear Tire Rubber Company US. Mail Thomas M. Regan COZEN 501 West Broadway, Suite 1610 San Diego, CA 92101 Tel.: (619) 234-1700 Fax: (619) 234?7831 Attorney for Plaintiffin-Intervention, AMERICAN AND FOREIGN INSURANCE COMPANY Michael Goldstein, Esq. Law Of?ces of Michael Goldstein 120 Birmingham Drive, Suite 200 Cardiff, CA 92007 Tel: (760) 436-1801 Fax: (760) 436-8248 -Attorney for Mr. Ricciardulli in the OS proceeding. Guy Ricciardulli, Esq. 12396 World Trade Drive Suite 202 San Diego, CA 92128 Tel.: (858) 487-8006 Fax: (858) 487-8109 Attorney for Plaintiffs, HAROLD J. AND GE OR G-ANNE PHILLIPS