To Be Argued By:

CHARLES D. TOBIN
(admitted pro hac vice)
Time Requested: 15 Minutes

 

?end Hark ?upreme annrt

APPELLATE DEPARTMENT

 

WILLIAM J. DOCKET No.
PlaintiffRespondent, 2017-05359

?against?

MICHAEL N. KLAR,
Defendant.

 

GIZMODO MEDIA GROUP, LLC,
Intervenor-Appellant,

MAUREEN MCPHILMY,
Intervenor?Respondent.

 

REPLY BRIEF FOR INTERVENOR-APPELLANT

 

GIZMODO MEDIA GROUPCHRISTINE N. WALZ :15 3:7 77
HOLLAND KNIGHT LLP 55:3 g1 y)
31 West 52nd Street 27:: ?o it
New York, New York 10019 ff 5 - 
(212) 513-3200 53:? ?7 "77

5; :7

Co-Counsel:

CHARLES D. OBIN
(admitted pro hac vice)

BALLARD SPAHR LLP

1909 Street, NW, 12th Floor

Washington, DC 20006?1157

(202) 661-2218

Attorneys for Intervenor-Appellant
Gizmodo Media Group, LLC

 

 

Nassau County Clerk?s Index No. 608441/ 16

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
................................................

ii

............................................

1

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

I.

THE ISSUANCE OF THE BLANKET SEALING ORDER IS
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

A. Mr. O’Reilly Mischaracterizes the Governing Legal
Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

B. The Trial Court’s Failure To Conduct The Required
Analysis Is An Abuse of Discretion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

II. NEITHER NEW YORK PUBLIC POLICY NOR THE MERE
REFERENCES TO MINOR CHILDREN IN THE
DOCUMENTS OVERCOMES THE PRESUMPTION OF
PUBLIC ACCESS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

A. Generalized Public Policy Concerns Do Not Justify
The Broad Sealing Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

B. Any Harm To Third-Parties Due to Disclosure Is
Speculative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

III. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE
PROCEEDINGS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

i

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE(S)

Cases
Applehead Pictures LLC v. Perelman,
80 A.D.3d 181 (1st Dep’t. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

Associated Press v. Bell,
70 N.Y.2d 32 (1987)

....................................................

3

City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co.,
486 U.S. 750 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

Danco Labs, Ltd. v. Chem. Works of Gedeon Richter, Ltd.,
274 A.D.2d 1 (1st Dep’t. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5
Jensen v. Jensen,
103 Misc. 2d 49 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980)

...........................

8

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

L.K. Sta. Grp., LLC v. Quantek Media, LLC,
20 Misc. 3d 1142(A), 2008 WL 4172655
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga,
435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

Maxim, Inc. v. Feifer,
145 A.D.3d 516 (1st Dep’t. 2016)

.....................................

Mook v. Matthews,
52 Misc. 2d 265 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1966)

5

...........................

8

Mosallem v. Berenson,
76 A.D.3d 345 (1st Dep’t. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

Murdock v. Com. of Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

ii

 PAGE(S)

People v. Grosso,
281 A.D.2d 986 (4th Dep’t. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II),
478 U.S. 1 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Matter of Skutch Music Publ., Inc. (Diaz),
No. 2013-2913, 2015 WL 223608 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2015)

10

......

9

.........

11

In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig.,
263 A.D.2d 417 (1st Dep’t. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

Weber v. Multimedia Entm’t, Inc.,
No. 97 CIV. 0682 (PKL), 1998 WL 2550 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)

Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

Regulations
22 NYCRR § 202.5

........................................................

22 NYCRR § 216.1

..........................................................

Domestic Relations Law § 235

6-8, 10

...............................................

iii

7
6, 8

 Intervenor-Appellant Gizmodo Media Group, LLC (“Gizmodo Media
Group”) respectfully submits this reply brief in support of its appeal requesting
public access to the judicial documents and proceedings before the trial court.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Mr. O’Reilly’s Opposition fails to identify any compelling, non-speculative
reason to support the trial court’s entry of the broad May 2, 2017 order (the “Sealing
Order”), which has entirely sealed nearly all of the records in this case. Instead, Mr.
O’Reilly summarily asserts that the Sealing Order was within the court’s “broad
discretion to control its own records.” (O’Reilly Brief at 6).
Mr. O’Reilly ignores that a court’s discretion to seal records, however, is
limited by well-established law, which requires the trial judge to engage in a
document-by-document and fact-by-fact analysis before determining whether a
sealing order is warranted. And, even where the court finds that sealing is warranted,
the law requires that it narrowly craft a sealing order to protect only the most
sensitive and confidential information.
Mr. O’Reilly simply waves away these legal requirements. And, in essence,
he asks this Court to elevate judicial “discretion” above the public’s presumptive
right of access and to ignore the heavy burden required to overcome the right of
access. The law requires more.

1

 To overcome the heavy burden required to restrict the right of access, Mr.
O’Reilly must identify a compelling, non-speculative interest in confidentiality to
support the trial court’s entry of the Sealing Order and demonstrate that the Sealing
Order is only as narrow as necessary to protect that interest. He did not meet this
burden before the trial court below, and he further fails to identify any justification
now in his Opposition. Accordingly, without compelling justification, the Sealing
Order was improvidently granted and should be lifted.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ISSUANCE OF THE BLANKET SEALING ORDER IS AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Mr. O’Reilly contends that the trial court had “broad discretion to control its

own records” (O’Reilly Brief at 6.) and that Gizmodo Media Group failed to identify
a “compelling public interest” that would override Mr. O’Reilly’s interests in
maintaining blanket confidentiality over his matrimonial litigation filings and
“related documents.” (O’Reilly Brief at 2.)

Those arguments turn the legal

principles governing public access on their heads in two ways: first, Mr. O'Reilly
incorrectly argues that Gizmodo Media Group had the burden to show why the court
records should be public; and second, he wrongly contends that the trial court has
unrestricted discretion to limit access to court records. These arguments are both
contrary to law.

2

 A.

Mr. O’Reilly Mischaracterizes the Governing Legal Framework.

First, Mr. O’Reilly wrongly suggests that Gizmodo Media Group bears the
entire burden in this proceeding. (O’Reilly Brief at 15-16.) But, New York law
establishes that the party seeking closure – rather than the party seeking access – has
the burden of establishing that closure is necessary. Mosallem v. Berenson, 76
A.D.3d 345, 348-49 (1st Dep’t. 2010) (judicial records are presumptively open, and
the party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of demonstrating “good
cause” – i.e., compelling circumstances to justify restricting public access.) Because
of this heavy presumption in favor of openness, Gizmodo Media Group is not
required to show why disclosure is warranted. Instead, it is Mr. O’Reilly who must
establish that sealing is necessary to protect some compelling interest and that the
sealing is only as narrow as necessary to protect that interest. See Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1986); Associated
Press v. Bell, 70 N.Y.2d 32, 39 (1987) (requiring specific findings demonstrating a
substantial probability of harm to a compelling interest and a showing that
reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect that interest).
Second, Mr. O’Reilly incorrectly argues that trial courts have unfettered
discretion to seal documents submitted to the court in litigation. (O’Reilly Brief at
6.) In fact, the First Amendment and New York law constrain a court’s discretion
to seal court documents. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14-15; Associated

3

 Press v. Bell, 70 N.Y.2d at 39; Danco Labs, Ltd. v. Chem. Works of Gedeon Richter,
Ltd., 274 A.D.2d 1, 7, 8 (1st Dep’t. 2000) (requiring disclosure with appropriate
redaction tailored to compelling needs rather than broad sealing order); People v.
Grosso, 281 A.D.2d 986, 987 (4th Dep’t. 2001) (“[b]efore closing the courtroom,
the court must conduct a careful inquiry to ensure that there are compelling reasons
for doing so and articulate those reasons on the record.”).
Under this well-established precedent, a trial court may seal a document only
after it identifies a compelling interest sufficient to override the public right of access
to court records, finds that there is a substantial probability that public disclosure of
the document would harm that compelling interest, explores alternatives to entirely
sealing the document, and then tailors any sealing order so that only the potentially
harmful information is sealed. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14-15.
B.

The Trial Court’s Failure To Conduct The Required Analysis Is
An Abuse of Discretion.

Mr. O’Reilly contends – without basis – that the trial court “undertook a
detailed review of whether good cause was established with regard to each document
requested to be sealed.” (O’Reilly Brief at 8.) Mr. O’Reilly’s assertion is belied by
the record which shows that the trial court conducted only a cursory analysis rather
than carefully scrutinizing the documents at issue, as the law requires.

4

 Indeed, in tort cases, like this one, it is well-established that courts must
engage in a document-by-document and fact-by-fact analysis before determining
whether a party has advanced compelling grounds to warrant entry of a sealing order.
See Maxim, Inc. v. Feifer, 145 A.D.3d 516, 518 (1st Dep't. 2016) (“We recognize
that it may be easier for the parties and the motion court to seal an entire court record,
rather than make a determination on a document by document basis about sealing,
but administrative convenience is not a compelling reason to justify sealing.”); In re
World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 263 A.D.2d 417, 419 (1st Dep't. 1999) (court
conducted “exhaustive and detailed line by line analysis of all of the documents”);
L.K. Sta. Grp., LLC v. Quantek Media, LLC, 20 Misc. 3d 1142(A), 2008 WL
4172655, at *2, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Aug. 7, 2008) (noting that defendants' failure to
address specific documents was fatal to request to seal). Moreover, even where the
court finds the circumstances compelling, it must narrowly craft a sealing order to
protect only the most sensitive and confidential information. Danco Labs, Ltd. v.
Chem. Works of Gedeon Richter, Ltd., 274 A.D.2d at 6 (1st Dep’t. 2000).
Here, the defendant, Mr. Klar, submitted nearly 1000 pages of records in
support of his motion to dismiss and requested that he be permitted to file them
publicly. (See R. at 73.) Mr. O’Reilly opposed Mr. Klar’s request to file his motion
and the supporting documents publicly, and Mr. O’Reilly also separately moved to
have all records filed in the proceeding sealed. (See R. at 25-36.) In response to Mr.

5

 O’Reilly’s motion, the trial court issued the Sealing Order, which contains no
specific analysis supporting the sealing and does nothing more than describe the
documents’ contents in the most general terms. (See R. at 8-11.) In all, the trial court
spent less than four pages discussing nearly 1000 pages of records.
Then, in an entirely conclusory fashion, the trial court directed that 19 of the
22 exhibits be sealed on the basis that either (1) they have a “close connection to the
[O’Reilly/McPhilmy] matrimonial action” and, therefore, should be sealed under
Rule 202.5(e)(1)(v) and Domestic Relations Law § 235; or (2) that the documents
were legal decisions “captioned under anonymity” and thus, “unmasking the parties
thereto would defeat the purpose behind that designation.” (R. at 8-11.)
Simply put, despite O’Reilly’s claims that the Sealing Order demonstrated a
“detailed review” of the documents, the Sealing Order on its face is deficient and
reflects that the trial court did not engage in the kind of analysis required to properly
seal court records. The entry of the Sealing Order was, therefore, an abuse of the
trial court’s discretion and should be reversed and vacated.

6

 II.

NEITHER NEW YORK PUBLIC POLICY NOR THE MERE
REFERENCES TO MINOR CHILDREN IN THE DOCUMENTS
OVERCOMES THE PRESUMPTION OF PUBLIC ACCESS.
Mr. O’Reilly advances two “justifications” in support of the trial court’s

decision to seal the vast majority of the filings in this tort case. Neither constitutes
the compelling circumstances that would establish good cause for the broad Sealing
Order in this case.
A.

Generalized Public Policy Concerns Do Not Justify The Broad
Sealing Order.

First, Mr. O’Reilly makes the vague claim that “New York public policy”
supports the entry of the Sealing Order. He appears to be arguing that since New
York law protects the privacy interests of parties involved in matrimonial
proceedings, that alone can provide the “good cause” required to seal the records in
any civil case that is related to the matrimonial proceeding. (O’Reilly Brief at 1.)
This argument overstates the protections that New York law provides for privacy
interests in civil cases related to marriage or divorce proceedings.
In fact, New York court rules are designed to ensure that there is continued
public access to civil court records and proceedings and that access to only the most
confidential information is restricted. See 22 NYCRR § 202.5; 22 NYCRR § 216.1.
The rules themselves set out the balance between transparency and protection of
sensitive information.

7

 Accordingly, under New York law, a relationship between a civil cause of
action and a marriage or divorce alone is insufficient to establish the good cause
required to support a broad sealing order like the one issued here. See Applehead
Pictures LLC v. Perelman, 80 A.D.3d 181, 193 (1st Dep’t. 2010) (upholding trial
court decision not to seal a motion for summary judgment in a civil action that arose
from a confidential separation agreement, even where the motion annexed a
prenuptial agreement, separation agreement, and divorce judgment); Jensen v.
Jensen, 103 Misc. 2d 49, 52 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980) (denying motion to seal exwife’s related civil breach of contract action against defendant ex-husband based
upon their separation agreement); Mook v. Matthews, 52 Misc. 2d 265, 265 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cty. 1966) (denying request to seal action for declaratory judgment, brought
by husband against wife, where action did not fall within scope of Section 235 of
Domestic Relations Law and was not a “matrimonial action”).
Therefore, New York public policy does not, as Mr. O’Reilly contends,
provide a proper basis for the Sealing Order.
B.

Any Harm To Third-Parties Due to Disclosure Is Speculative.

Mr. O’Reilly next claims that his children would be harmed and suffer
“extreme emotional distress” if the public were permitted access to the court records
in this case. But, he offers nothing more than generalized speculation and provides
no specific information or detail as to what that harm would be. Instead, he simply

8

 asserts that “New York courts readily find good cause to seal court records” where
minor children are involved. (See O’Reilly Brief at 12.) However, the only case
that he cites in supports of this argument – Matter of Skutch Music Publ., Inc. (Diaz),
No. 2013-2913, 2015 WL 223608 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Jan. 13, 2015) – directly
contradicts the position advocated by Mr. O’Reilly and instead supports the kind of
targeted and pinpoint redactions requested by the Gizmodo Media Group.
In Diaz, the court considered a request to seal the entire record in a case
involving a minor-child who was a party to music publishing and recording
contracts. The petitioner argued that a sealing order was necessary to avoid the
disclosure of specific financial information contained in the contracts that would
cause harm to the minor-child’s competitive standing in the music industry. The
court found that “special circumstances” existed to support sealing but nonetheless
approved only a “limited sealing of the portions of the record which contain the
infant’s home address and social security number and the financial and business
details in the contracts.” Diaz, 2015 WL 223601, at *2 (emphasis added). Diaz thus
offers no support for Mr. O’Reilly’s argument that sealing the entire record was
necessary to protect his minor children.
In fact, the reasoning of Diaz lays bare the deficiencies of the overly broad
Sealing Order issued in this case. The sealing order in Diaz – which was limited and
redacted only certain portions of the documents – conformed to the requirements of

9

 22 NYCRR § 202.5 and the legal precedent that allows for only narrow redactions
to address specific, non-speculative harms. In contrast, Mr. O’Reilly has provided
the Court with no specific details of the potential harm his children would face, and
the Sealing Order has entirely sealed nearly all of court records in this case without
any targeted redactions.
III.

THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE
PROCEEDINGS.
Mr. O’Reilly also attempts to minimize the public interest in these

proceedings by attacking Gizmodo Media Group’s motives and characterizing the
public’s interest in the proceedings as “mere curiosity.” (O’Reilly Brief at 13-15.)
These arguments denigrate the significance of public oversight of court proceedings
in general and the public interest in this case in particular.
Courts have long recognized that the news media serves as the public’s
representative in monitoring the courts. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980) (recognizing the role of the media as
surrogates for the public); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92
(1975) (“[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources
with which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies
necessarily upon the press to bring him in convenient form the facts of those
operations.”). Despite Mr. O’Reilly’s effort to paint Gizmodo Media Group’s
interest as nothing more than “profit-driven” (O’Reilly Brief at 15), the U.S.
10

 Supreme Court has made clear that newsgathering efforts are First Amendmentprotected rights for all publishers, profitable or otherwise. See City of Lakewood v.
Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 (1988) (“Of course, the degree of
First Amendment protection is not diminished merely because the newspaper or
speech is sold rather than given away.”); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 502 (1952) (the fact that “books, newspapers, and magazines are published and
sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty
is safeguarded by the First Amendment.”); Murdock v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (“The right to use the press for expressing one’s views is not
to be measured by the protection afforded commercial handbills. It should be
remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of
charge.”).
Indeed, the news media and the public do not need to justify their request for
access – “the presumption of access is based on the need for public monitoring” of
courts, and the “motive [of the person seeking access is] generally . . . irrelevant to
defining the weight accorded the presumption of access.” See Lugosch v. Pyramid
Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir.1995)). Every member of the public, and every
news media outlet, is entitled to equal access to court proceedings in New York. See
Weber v. Multimedia Entm’t, Inc., No. 97 CIV. 0682 (PKL), 1998 WL 2550, at *4

11

 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1998) (in considering litigation arising out of Sally Jessy Raphael
show, court held that “[t]he rights to free expression and a free press extend beyond
some finite, elite set of favored institutions; with respect to their ability to serve as
fora for debates concerning matters of public interest, television talk shows are the
equals of The New York Times in the eyes of the law.”).
In this case, Mr. O’Reilly has accused his ex-wife’s divorce lawyer, who was
not a party to the matrimonial proceedings and who is an officer of the court, of civil
fraud. It is not simply curiosity or a prurient interest for the public to want to
understand whether there is any merit to Mr. O’Reilly’s allegations. Indeed, Mr.
Klar initially tried to file his motion to dismiss publicly and he has supported
Gizmodo Media Group’s motion to intervene to oppose sealing of records and this
appeal. Notably, Mr. Klar has argued that the Sealing Order has left him unable to
fully and publicly respond to Mr. O’Reilly’s serious allegations against him. (See
R. at 144.) (“To grant O’Reilly’s request [to seal] and to reject Gizmodo’s
application to keep these proceedings open such that they may report upon such
proceedings and its outcome would effectively leave O’Reilly’s allegations in place
and not permit the public to know that they were falsely made. Such a lopsided
outcome defies the very definition of fairness, and undoes the fundamental right to
a fair trial which the New York State Constitution and the United States Constitution
guarantee.”); Letter from C. Singer to Clerk of Appellate Division, Second Judicial

12

 Department, dated January 29, 2018 (supporting the arguments made by Gizmodo
Media Group in its opening brief).
There is a substantial public interest in these proceedings, and Mr. O’Reilly
has offered no justification at all, let alone proffered the specific evidence of harm
required to meet his heavy burden to warrant the wholesale sealing of records in this
matter.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Gizmodo Media Group respectfully requests that
this Court (1) reverse and vacate the trial court’s May 2, 2017 Sealing Order, (2)
issue an order directing that all records in O’Reilly v. Klar, including the July 18,
2017 order denying Mr. Klar’s motion to dismiss the Complaint, be unsealed, and
(3) award Gizmodo Media Group the costs and disbursements of this proceeding.
In the alternative, Gizmodo Media Group respectfully requests that this Court
order the trial court to (a) make specific factual findings that demonstrate good cause
or compelling circumstances for the sealing of limited, specified portions of
documents, (b) detail its consideration of the public interest, (c) explain why the
sealing is narrowly tailored, (d) make a showing that reflects that the trial court has
explored and rejected alternatives, (e) unseal the remainder of the records and
proceedings, and (f) award Gizmodo Media Group the costs and disbursements of
this proceeding.

13

 Dated: February 20, 2018
New York, NY

  

1. submitted,

 

Christine N. W312
HOLLAND KNIGHT LLP
31 West 52nd Street

New York, NY 10019

Phone: (212) 513? 3368

(212) 385? 9010

  

 

Charles Tobm/Erdr?/tted pro 72cm vzce)
LLP

1909 Street, NW

12th Floor

Washington, DC 20006?1157

Phone: (202) 661-2218

Fax: (202) 661?2299
tobinc@ba11ardspahr.com

Attorneys for Gizmodo Media Group, LLC

14

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
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