IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA RECEIVED, 7/12/2016 4:17 PM, Jon S. Wheeler, First District Court of Appeal Case No: 1D15-5520; L.T. Case No. 2014-CA-116 ___________________________________ FLORIDA CARRY, INC., and THE SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, vs. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA, JOHN MARKS, NANCY MILLER, ANDREW GILLUM, and GIL ZIFFER, Appellees/Cross-Appellants. _____________________________________ BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES JASON GONZALEZ Florida Bar No. 0146854 Shutts & Bowen LLP 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 804 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (850) 521-0600 – telephone jasongonzalez@shutts.com mpoppell@shutts.com Counsel for Amicus Curiae ROBERT DOWLUT Fla. Bar Pro Hac Vice 121331 9200 Bulls Run Parkway Bethesda, MD 20817 (301) 493-5832 - telephone rdowlut@nrahq.org Counsel for Amicus Curiae Counsel for Amicus Curiae, National Rifle Association TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ................................. 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................. 2 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 4 I. DECISION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY AND FREE SPEECH MAY BE AVOIDED. ............................................................................................ 4 II. FLA. STAT. § 790.33 IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND DOES NOT OFFEND LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE OR FREE SPEECH………………………………………………………………6 A. STATE LEGISLATURE HAS PLENARY AUTHORITY TO ABOLISH LOCAL LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY. .................. 6 B. LEGISLATORS RECEIVE NO SPEECH AND DEBATE PROTECTION FROM U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 6 OR FROM FLA. CONST. ART. I, § 4. ........................................................ 9 1. The U.S. Constitution does not protect Appellees. ............... 10 2. The Florida Constitution does not protect Appellees .......... 11 C. FLA. STAT § 790.33 DOES NOT OFFEND THE FIRST AMENDMENT OR FLA. CONST. ART. I § 4 RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH ......................................................................... 12 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 15 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................................... 16 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases In re Apportionment Law Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 1972 Regular Session, 263 So.2d 797, 807 (Fla. 1972), supplemented, 279 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1973), and supplemented sub nom. In re Apportionment Law, 281 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1973) ................................................................................................................ 13 Apthorp v. Detzner, 162 So.3d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) .......................................... 5 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936)..................................... 5 Baker v. State, 636 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 1994) ............................................................ 12 Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998) ............................................................. 10 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)............................................................. 13 Crist v. Fla. Ass'n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Inc., 978 So.2d 134 (Fla. 2008).............. 7 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ................................................ 1 Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2005) ..................................... 9 Faro v. Corporate Stock Transfer, Inc., 883 So.2d 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) ......... 12 Florida Carry, Inc. v. Univ. N. Florida, 133 So.3d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) .......... 8 Florida House of Representatives v. Expedia, Inc., 85 So. 3d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ..................................................................................................................11, 12 Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1989)............................. 9 In re Holder, 945 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 2006) ................................................................ 5 Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) ....................................................................................................................... 11 iii League of Woman Voters of Fla. v. Fla. House of Rep., 132 So.3d 135 (Fla. 2013) ................................................................................................................ 12 McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) ............................................................ 1 National Fed. Of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) ...................... 8 NRA et. al v. City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).......... 1 P.C.B. Partnership v. City of Largo, 549 So.2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) ................ 9 Santa Rosa County v. Admin. Comm'n, Div. of Admin. Hearings, 661 So.2d 1190 (Fla.1995) ................................................................................................................... 5 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) .................................................................... 13 So. Riverwalk Invs., LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 934 So.2d 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) .......................................................................................................................... 5 Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) ...................................................... 13 Spencer v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 823 So.2d 752 (Fla. 2002) ..................................... 13 State v. Mozo, 655 So.2d 1115 (Fla.1995) ................................................................. 5 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) .......................................................10, 11 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) ................................................................... 13 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 479 (2015) ......................................................................................................................... 7 Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980) ........................................................................................................................ 11 Williams v. State, 402 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) ............................................... 8 iv Constitutional and Statutory Provisions U.S. Const. Amend. I .....................................................................................3, 12, 13 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 6........................................................................................... 3, 10 Fla. Const. Art. I, § 4..........................................................................................10, 12 Fla. Const. Art. I, § 5................................................................................................ 13 Fla. Const. Art. VIII, § 1 ............................................................................................ 6 Fla. Const. Art. VIII, § 1 (a) ...................................................................................... 3 Fla. Const. Art. VIII, § 2 ........................................................................................ 3, 6 Fla. Const. Art. X, § 13 .......................................................................................... 3, 6 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ...................................................................................................... 11 Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) ............................................................................................. 9 Fla. Stat. § 790.33 ..............................................................................1, 2, 6, 9, 12, 13 Fla. Stat. § 790.33 (2)(b) ............................................................................................ 8 Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3).................................................................. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12,13 Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3)(c) ........................................................................................... 10 Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3)(f).............................................................................................. 4 Fla. Stat. § 790.33(33)(f)............................................................................................ 4 Other Authorities Douglas Laycock, Vicious Stereotypes in Polite Society, 8 Const. Commentary 395 (1991) ......................................................................................................................... 1 v INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The National Rifle Association of America (NRA) is the nation’s oldest and largest organization dedicated to defending the fundamental, inalienable constitutional right to keep and bear arms. The NRA was deeply involved in advocating for Fla. Stat. § 790.33, which is the subject of this appeal. The NRA also has been involved in advocating for similar preemption legislation in other states. Furthermore, the NRA participated in the two major 21st century Second Amendment cases: District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), by amicus brief, and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), as a named party in conjoined litigation, NRA et. al v. City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Presently the NRA has almost 300,000 members living in Florida, and tens of thousands of other NRA members visit Florida each year. A decision holding that local units of government may defiantly enact ordinances in violation of Fla. Stat. § 790.33 would expose these NRA members to legal jeopardy and defense costs. There is also the likelihood of public confusion, as uninformed visitors might not know the ordinances are unlawful. Therefore, while the circuit court properly exercised restraint in this case, it is critical that this Court hold that knowing and willful defiance of Fla. Stat. § 790.33 is contrary to law, and that § 790.33(3) is constitutional. 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Appellees Tallahassee et al. and their amici seek a declaration that Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3) is unconstitutional. The statute imposes personal liabilities on public officials for knowingly and willfully enacting preempted ordinances. This Court should decline the request. Courts should not entangle themselves in abstract disagreements and should avoid premature adjudications. Pursuant to the doctrine of judicial restraint, courts routinely decline to address constitutional claims because resolution of those claims is unnecessary for the disposition of a particular case. Under the facts of this case, there are no real-world consequences for the commissioners. They did not enact the two void ordinances. No commissioner has been subjected to personal liability in the past or at the time of this litigation. Future injury is abstract and speculative. Consequently, the legislative immunity doctrine and the free speech issues need not be addressed in this case. However, if this Court is compelled to address the constitutional issues, the appellees are wrong. In seeking to hold the statute unconstitutional, appellees base their arguments in part on the legislative immunity doctrine. However, Florida’s Constitution has no version of the U.S. Constitution’s Art. I, § 6 speech or debate clause. Any such right flows from the common law; in this case it is preempted by § 790.33(3). Appellees also claim that the personal liability 2 provision violates free speech protected by the First Amendment and by Fla. Const. Art. I, §4 by penalizing a vote for particular policy issues. Br of Appellees Tallahassee et al. at 4, 27, 29, 41, 43. Neither argument has merit, and neither argument need be addressed. Florida’s legislature has constitutional authority to create municipalities, to abolish them, or to limit their powers. Fla. Const. Art. VIII, § 2. Florida’s legislature also has the authority to create, to abolish, or to change counties by law. Fla. Const. Art. VIII, § 1 (a). The legislature has the authority to waive sovereign immunity from lawsuits. Fla. Const. Art. X, § 13. Consequently, whatever local level legislative immunity purports to exist may be abolished. City commissioners are not prevented by the preemption statute from speaking and voting on legislative matters by § 790.33(3). City commissioners simply may not violate the preemption statute knowingly and willfully without exposing themselves to personal liability. ARGUMENT I. DECISION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY AND FREE SPEECH MAY BE AVOIDED. Appellees Tallahassee et al.’s counter claim argues for (1) a finding of absolute legislative immunity; (2) voiding the personal liability provision of Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3), and (3) a finding that Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3) violates the right to free speech. Br at 47. The circuit court chose not to address those issues; instead it 3 ruled only that Appellees did not enact or enforce any regulations within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3). This Court can follow suit. The Circuit Court of Leon County Final Summary Judgment, at page 13 of 15, dated November 3, 2015, specifically held the following: The Court now finds that the individual Defendants are not and could not be subject to the penalty provisions of sec. 790.33(3) because: (I) the Defendant Commissioners refused to vote on the request to repeal the two challenged provisions and "tabled" the requested repeal by the Plaintiffs; (2) the challenged ordinances were re-published during the time the named commissioners were in office; and (3) the individual Defendants were not on the City Commission at the time the two challenged ordinances were initially enacted; [sic] Based on the Court's findings set out above the individual Defendants in this case are not subject to the challenged penalty provisions because there has been no enactment or adoption of a new ordinance relating to the regulation of firearms that they voted to enact or adopt. Also, the individual Defendants are not subject to the challenged penalty provisions because they refused to repeal the challenged ordinances, nor is the continued republication of ordinances enacted years before the enactment of sec.790.33(3)(f), F.S., a "promulgation" as that term is used in sec.790.33(33)(f), F.S. [sic] Therefore, because the Court finds they are not subject to the penalty provisions the individual Defendants have no case in controversy upon which the Court needs to address. 4 The constitutional avoidance doctrine stems from the principle of judicial restraint, under which Florida courts “avoid considering a constitutional question when the case can be decided on non-constitutional grounds.” In re Holder, 945 So.2d 1130, 1133 (Fla. 2006) (citing State v. Mozo, 655 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Fla.1995)); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter”). Therefore, if the Court finds that Appellees are not liable under § 790.33(3) it should save the constitutional issues for another day. The circuit court properly exercised the cardinal principle of judicial restraint in this case, and should only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. So. Riverwalk Invs., LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 934 So.2d 620, 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). No such abuse occurred where the court declined to issue “what amounts to an advisory opinion at the instance of parties who show merely the possibility of legal injury on the basis of a hypothetical state of facts which have not arisen and are only contingent, uncertain, [and] rest in the future.” See Apthorp v. Detzner, 162 So.3d 236, 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), citing Santa Rosa County v. Admin. Comm'n, Div. of Admin. Hearings, 661 So.2d 1190, 1193 (Fla.1995) (emphasis in original; internal quotations omitted). 5 Never in Florida has any local legislator been subjected to personal liability under Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3). There was no injury in the past; there was no injury when the complaint was filed, and any future injury is abstract and speculative. There was no abuse of discretion by the circuit court. Thus, in this case the Court can avoid addressing the constitutional issues by using the cardinal principle of judicial restraint, namely, that if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more. However, if this Court is compelled to address the constitutional issues, it should find that § 790.33(3) is constitutional. II. FLA. STAT. § 790.33 IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND DOES NOT OFFEND THE LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE OR FREE SPEECH. A. THE STATE LEGISLATURE HAS PLENARY AUTHORITY TO ABOLISH LOCAL LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY. Florida’s Constitution grants the Florida legislature plenary powers to limit a municipality’s powers and even to abolish a municipality. Hence, the state legislature has the plenary power to govern local government and to waive immunity for local government and its commissioners. Fla. Const. Art. VIII, § 1, § 2, Art. X, § 13. The statutory enactment of personal liability for the knowing and willful violation of the preemption statute, Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3), is a legitimate exercise of state legislative powers over a municipality under the Florida Constitution. 6 Statutes come clothed with a presumption of constitutionality and must be construed whenever possible to effect a constitutional outcome. Should any doubt exist that an act is in violation of any constitutional provision, the presumption is in favor of constitutionality. To overcome the presumption, the invalidity must appear beyond reasonable doubt, for it must be assumed the legislature intended to enact a valid law. If possible, the act must be construed to avoid unconstitutionality and to remove grave doubts on that score. Crist v. Fla. Ass'n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Inc., 978 So.2d 134, 139 (Fla. 2008); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 479 (2015) (strong presumption in favor of constitutionality of statute). Local governments blatantly disobeyed the preemption law that was designed to provide uniformity throughout the state. Such defiance and resistance prompted the enactment of the penalty provision in the preemption statute, § 790.33(3). The attack on the personal liability portion of the preemption statute is for the express purpose of defiantly enacting null and void local laws despite preemption. Local governments want the penalty provision removed so they can violate the law with impunity. Amici City of Weston and City of Miramar (Amici Br at 4 and 9) candidly and openly wish to enact “local legislation, even if that legislation is purely symbolic and unenforceable.” They wish to defy the law and to force those impacted by their defiance to litigate their 7 defiance time and time again. Such knowing and willful thumbing of the local units of government’s noses at the state preemption statute would rightfully subject a member of the city commission to personal liability. This would be an example of a knowing and willful violation. Such recalcitrance explains why the state legislature chose to impose personal liability. If local governments obeyed the law as is required of ordinary citizens, this lawsuit would be unnecessary. The state legislature expressed a policy and intent in the preemption statute to protect a civil right from deliberate infringement. See Fla. Stat. § 790.33 (2) (b) (policy and intent to protect constitutional rights). That policy and intent should be kept in mind. The right to keep and bear arms is a civil right. See, e.g., National Fed. Of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (“protected civil rights, such as the right to bear arms or vote in elections"); Florida Carry, Inc. v. Univ. N. Florida, 133 So.3d 966, 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (en banc) (Makar, J., concurring); Williams v. State, 402 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (right to arms is a civil right). It is no secret that those who exercise this civil right are subjected to prejudice. Douglas Laycock, Vicious Stereotypes in Polite Society, 8 Const. Commentary 395, 399, 401 (1991). The state legislature took the laudatory step to protect a civil right by enacting Fla. Stat. §790.33. The preemption statute is not the only statute that waives immunity where the misconduct is willful or in bad faith. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) waives immunity 8 for an officer, employee, or agent of the state or any of its subdivisions where the act was in bad faith or with malicious purpose or wanton and willful disregard for a human right. P.C.B. Partnership v. City of Largo, 549 So.2d 738, 740-41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), reminds that immunity does not apply when the act violates a human right and is done maliciously, wantonly, and willfully. Local legislators, like police officers, expose themselves to personal liability when they show deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of others. Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2005) (sheriff’s deputies personally liable for use of excessive force); Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1989) (police officers personally liable for use of excessive force). Consequently, the constitutional claim of Appellees Tallahassee et al. of absolute legislative immunity is without merit. Immunity may be waived and was waived. B. LEGISLATORS RECEIVE NO SPEECH AND DEBATE PROTECTION FROM U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 6 OR FROM FLA. CONST. ART. I, § 4. Appellees claim the personal liability provision (Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3)(c)) is unconstitutional under both the U.S. Constitution and Florida Constitution. Appellees Tallahassee et al. Br 28. They rely on such cases as Bogan v. ScottHarris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998), and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), to 9 support their claim of legislative immunity. Br of Appellees Tallahassee et al. at 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 36, 47, 53, 54. Neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Florida Constitution provides Appellees with legislative immunity, and the legislature has the authority to abrogate any common law immunity that Appellees may have otherwise had. See part II A of this brief. 1. The U.S. Constitution does not protect Appellees. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the speech and debate clause in Article 1, § 6 of the U.S. Constitution “preserved” the common law legislative immunity doctrine. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). However, contrary to the assertions made by the Appellees and their supporting amici, the Court did not rule that the Constitution provides state and local officials with absolute legislative immunity. The Court ruled only that Congress did not intend to abrogate the state constitutional and common law legislative immunity doctrines when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (allowing a civil action for deprivation of rights). Id. The Supreme Court subsequently clarified that the state immunity from liability for speech or debate comes from the common law. “We have also recognized that state legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their legislative acts, an immunity that is similar in origin and rationale to that accorded Congressmen under the Speech or Debate Clause.” Supreme Court of Virginia v. 10 Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732 (1980) (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)); see also Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 404 (1979) (“But the absolute immunity for state legislators recognized in Tenney reflected the Court's interpretation of federal law [42 U.S.C. § 1983]; the decision did not depend on the presence of a speech or debate clause in the constitution of any State, or on any particular set of state rules or procedures available to discipline erring legislators.”). 2. The Florida Constitution does not protect Appellees. “The Florida Constitution does not include a version of the Speech or Debate Clause.” Florida House of Representatives v. Expedia, Inc., 85 So. 3d 517, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Instead “the privileges and immunities protecting all public officials…arise from the common law. Id. at 523. But Florida’s legislature may abrogate the common law. Faro v. Corporate Stock Transfer, Inc., 883 So.2d 896, 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); see also Florida House of Representatives v. Expedia, 85 So. 3d at 523-24 (noting that the Court was unaware of any “law abrogating the common law” legislative immunity protection in the matter before the Court). However, that is not the case here. The legislature completely deviated from the common law privilege in enacting § 790.33(3), and clearly showed its intent to abrogate it. See Baker v. State, 636 So. 2d 1342, 1344 (Fla. 1994) (“the legislature 11 has so thoroughly modified the burglary statute that the present statute must be said to completely abrogate and supersede the common law crime of burglary”). Finally, the legislative immunity flowing from the separation of powers is not absolute and applies only to the state legislature. League of Woman Voters of Fla. v. Fla. House of Rep., 132 So.3d 135, 138 (Fla. 2013). C. FLA. STAT. § 790.33 DOES NOT OFFEND THE FIRST AMENDMENT OR FLA. CONST. ART. I, § 4 RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH. Appellees Tallahassee et al. claim that voting is a form of speech because a viewpoint is expressed in a vote and that the preemption statute punishes speech when a local legislator votes for something that is not allowed under the preemption statute. Br at 41, 43. They argue that an entity, in this case Tallahassee, may be fined for violating § 790.33(3), but individual local legislators may not be fined. Br at 45. The act of voting is a form of expression, and it could even be considered symbolic speech. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). However, the right to express one’s views is not suppressed by the preemption statute. City commissioners enjoy broad free speech protection. This right includes inflammatory speech, provided there is no imminent intent to do violence, and even outrageous speech. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Snyder v. 12 Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).1 However, free speech does not encompass a right to abuse of the legal system. See, e.g., Spencer v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 823 So.2d 752, 755-56 (Fla. 2002) (holding that an inmate was not restrained from speaking when he was penalized for the misconduct of filing frivolous lawsuits). The city commissioners continue to enjoy freedom of speech. However, they may not knowingly and willfully violate § 790.33(3) without exposing themselves to personal liability. Recalcitrant behavior, voting included, may expose a local legislator even to contempt of court. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (contempt should be used as a last resort). Local legislators continue to have the right to vote and speak, but local legislators do not have an absolute right to knowingly and willfully violate the law without exposing themselves to personal liability. CONCLUSION This Court should find that under the facts of this case the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. § 790.33 need not be addressed or, if it is addressed, that the statute is constitutional. 1 Amici City of Weston and City of Miramar (Br 4) argue § 790.33 (3) violates the right to petition under First Amendment and Fla. Const. Art. I, §5. It is without merit. The Florida Supreme Court held that “the Constitution contemplates that any person has a right to instruct any and all representatives, whether his own or not.” In re Apportionment Law Senate Joint Resolution No. 1305, 1972 Regular Session, 263 So.2d 797, 807 (Fla. 1972), supplemented, 279 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1973), and supplemented sub nom. In re Apportionment Law, 281 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1973). 13 Respectfully submitted this 12th day of July, 2016. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Jason Gonzalez JASON GONZALEZ Florida Bar No. 0146854 Shutts & Bowen LLP 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 804c Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (850) 521-0600 – telephone jasongonzalez@shutts.com mpoppell@shutts.com ROBERT DOWLUT 9200 Bulls Run Parkway Bethesda, Maryland 20817 (301) 493-5832 – telephone Fla. Pro Hac Vice 121331 rdowlut@nrahq.org Counsel for Amicus Curiae National Rifle Association CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE I HEREBY CERTIFY that this computer-generated brief is prepared in Times New Roman 14-point font and complies with the font requirement of Rule 9.210(a), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure and that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished via e-service to the following this 12th day of June, 2016: Eric J. Friday, Esquire 541 E. Monroe Street, Suite 1 Jacksonville, FL 32202 familylaw@fletchandphillips.com Attorney for Appellants/Cross-Appellees Louis C. Norvell, Assistant City Attorney City of Tallahassee 14 300 South Adams Street, Box A-5 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis.Norvell@talgov.com Attorney for Appellees/Cross-Appellants Mark J. Fagel, Esquire Lauren G. Escher Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 555 Mission Street, Suite 3000 San Francisco, California 94105 mfagel@gibsondunn.com lescher@gibsondunn.com Lesley McKinney, Esquire 13245 Atlantic Boulevard, Suite 4-188 Jacksonville, Florida 32225 gunesq@flagunlaw.com Edward G. Guedes, Esquire Jaime A. Cole, Esquire Adam Schwartzbaum, Esquire Weiss, Serota, Helfman, Cole & Bierman, P.L. 2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 700 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 eguedes@wsh-law.com jcole@wsh-law.com aschartzbaum@wsh-law.com szavala@wsh-law.com msarraff@wsh-law.com imunoz@wsh-law.com Blaine H. Winship, Esquire Office of the Attorney General PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Blaine.Winship@myfloridalegal.com /s/ Jason Gonzalez Jason Gonzalez 15