IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION JOSEPH BERRIOS, in his of?cial capacity as Assessor of Cook County, Illinois, and JOHN K. NORRIS, Plaintiffs, No. 18 CH 1102 V. COOK COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, and COOK COUNTY BOARD OF ETHICS, Defendants. 93213.13 The plaintiffs in this case challenge a Cook County (?County?) ordinance imposing - campaign contribution limits on those who sought ?of?cial action by the County within the preceding four years. ?The matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment, expedited at the request of the parties. For the reasons that follow, summary judgment 13 entered in favor of the defendants. Undisputed Facts Joseph Berrios ,(?Berrios? or the ?Assessor?) is the elected Assessor of the County and currently a candidate for reelection. His primary election opponent is a ?self-funding candidate? as de?ned by the Illinois Election Code, having contributed more than $800,000 to his own campaign committee. John K. Norris (?Norris?) is not a resident of the County, but over the last . four years has appeared before the Assessor and Cook County Board of Review representing clients who claim their properties are overassessed for real estate taxation purposes. The Cook County Board of Commissioners (?Cook County Board?) is the governing board and legislative body of the County. The Cook County Board of Ethics (?Ethics Board?) 1s a ?ve-member board- appointed by the President of the Cook County Board 1n accordance with section 2- 591 of the County?s Ethics Ordinance. The Ethics Ordinance sections 2- -585(b) and 2- 602(d) of the County 5 Ethics Ordinance (?Ethics Ordinance?) provide 1n relevant part: No person . . . who has sought of?cial action by the County Within the preceding four years, . . . shall make contributions in an aggregate amount exceeding $750.00 [emphasis added]: . (1) To any candidate for County of?ce or elected County of?cial during a single candidacy; or (2) To any elected of?cial of the government of the County during any nonelection year of his or her term. (3) To any local, state, or federal political committee that is established in support of, a speci?c candidate for County of?ce or an elected County of?cial. The combined effect of these provisions is intended to permit total contribution up to, but not exceeding, 500. 00 1n a year in which a candidacy occurs. A year, for purposes of this Section, is from January 1 to December 31 of each year. Any candidate for any County of?ce or any current elected of?cial in Cook County government shall return contributions found in excess of the limitations set forth in this Section within 30 days of noti?cation ?'om the Board of Ethics. Failure to return contributions within 30 days shall be a violation of this Section and subject to ?nes under Section 2-602. - - The Board may impose a ?ne of up to $1,000.00 per offense on any person, including of?cials or candidates, found by the Board to have - knowingly violated any provision of this article other than Section 2-574 or 2? 583, to have knowingly furnished false or misleading information to the Board or to have failed to cooperate with an investigation under this article. The words ?Of?cial action? in section 2-585(b) of the Ethics Ordinance are not de?ned, but the Ethics Board has interpreted them to include attorneys and law ?rms who have appeared before the Cook County Assessor and Board of Review in a quasi-judicial proceeding requesting relief on behalf of their property tax clients. Norris and numerous other prOperty tax lawyers who appear before the Assessor and Board of Review have each contributed more than $750 to Berrios? reelection campaign. In July of 2017, the Ethics Board sent Berrios Notices of Excess Contributions, one as chair of his campaign committee and another as chair of the 31St Ward Democratic Organization (?31St Ward?). Berrios and 31St Ward have re?lsed to return the excess contributions. Consequently, the Ethics Board imposed a ?ne of 000 per violation, totaling $41,000. Discussion The plaintiffs argue that the campaign contribution limits in the Ethics Ordinance exceed the County?s home rule powers; con?ict with the contribution limits in the Election Code; employ vague language and, therefore, violate their due process rights; are not narrowly tailored to address the County?s interest in preventing corruption and its appearance and, therefore, Violate the First Amendment; violate?public policy; and are otherwise unenforceable. Each argument is addressed in turn. 1) As a threshold matter, the plaintiffs argue that the County lacks home rule authority to enact any campaign ?nance restrictions. The County is a home rule unit under the 1970 Illinois Constitution, and ?may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its I government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate "for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.? Ill; Const. Art. VII, (1970). The plaintiffs rely largely on City of Chicago v. Stabhub, Inc, 2011 IL 111127. However, the court there acknowledged that the framers of the Illinois Constitution intended for the courts to have a very narrow role in restricting home rule authority under the Illinois Constitution. Id. at it 23. Additionally, the court held that the judiciary was to ?nd certain matters ?off-limits to local government control only'where the state has avital interest and a traditionally exclusive role.? Id. at 1[ 25 (emphasis added.) The plaintiffs point to Article 111, Section 4 of the Illinois Constitution, which states that the ?[l]aws governing voter registration and conduct of elections shall be general and uniform? throughout the state. Ill. Const. Art. ?4 (1970). But that provision does not place campaign ?nance and its relationship to corruptiOn within the state?s exclusive control. Rather, it ?is concerned with registration and the mechanical procedures for holding elections,? notlevery conceivable matter that bears'on elections generally. Boytor v. Aurora, 81 Ill. 2d 308, 315 (1980) (recognizing home rule unit?s power to hold non-partisan elections); see also otter: v. State Bd. ofEZectz'ons, 79 Ill. 2d 288, 294-95 (1980) (?the uniformity provision refers to the mechanics of voter registration, residency requirements, and other election and voting procedures?). As the defendants correctly point out, the conduct of electiOns refers to how citizens can vote, where they can vote, and when they can vote. Campaign contribution limits, on the other hand, relate to campaign ?nance, a subject that is not constrained by the uniformity! provision. Local governmental units, therefore, may enact their own laws governing campaign ?nance for local elections so long as they do not touch on voter registration or the mechanical procedures for holding elections. - Although the in?uence of campaign contributions in' corrupting candidates and elected - of?cials is a vital state?wide interest, Article section 4 limits the State?s exclusive role to voter registration and mechanical procedures for holdingelections. Moreover, as the Illinois Supreme Court recently observed in a case involving alleged misconduct in the Assessor?s Of?ce, the issue of real and perceived political corruption ?is local in nature.? Blanchard v. Barrios, 2016 IL 120.315, 1] 33. This is a logical extension of the view that ?all p01itics is local,? a phrase commonly associated with- Thomas ?Tip? O?Neill, 47th Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. Because home rule powers are to be liberally construed, and because the issue of the ?relationship between campaign ?nance and quid pro quo corruption and its appearance is essentially local in nature, the County has home rule authority to limit campaign contributions for elected County of?ces. 2) The plaintiffs next argue that the Ethics Ordinance is at odds with Section of the Election Code, which lifts campaign contribution limits in races with self-funding candidates. 10 ILCS But the plaintiffs expressly disavow that ?there is any preemption (express or implied) here.? Pls. ReSp. Br., p. 14. In any case, there is no con?ictbetween the Ethics Ordinance and Section The plaintiffs contend that because one of the Assessor?s 3 . opponents is a ?self?funded? candidate, Berrios is exempt from any campaign contribution limits. But the express language of Section 5/9- 8. 5(h) only exempts opponents of self-funded candidates from? any contribution limit imposed by subsection [emphasis added]. Therefore, the ?cap- busting? provision in the Election Code, by its own terms, does not apply to the contribution limits under the Ethics Ordinance. 3) Next, the plaintiffsargue that the Ethics Ordinance is vague on its face because ?of?cial action by the County? could include a plethora of ministerial rather than discretionary actions, such as the issuance of a marriage license or picnic permit, among others. The plaintiffs, therefore, claim that the unde?ned words ?of?cial action? do not give fair notice of what 13 prohibited, or provide a standard that restricts the possibility of discriminatory enforcement. Even under the heightened scrutiny of First Amendment claims, however, an ordinance need not be perfectly clear nor offer ?precise guidance? in order to survive a vagueness challenge. Wilson - v. County of Cook, 2012 IL 1 12026, 1123. Vagueness must ?permeate the text of such a law? for it to be void for vagueness. Id. Here, there is no doubt that when Norris appears before the Assessor and Board of Review challenging his clients? property tax assessments he seeks of?cial action by the County within the meaning of the Ethics Ordinance. Because any ambiguity about the meaning of the words ?of?cial action? exists only at the hypothetical fringes of interpretation, it cannot be said to permeate the text of the Ethics Ordinance. 4) The plaintiffs next argue that the Ethics Ordinance imposes too great of a burden on a donor?s free speech rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. In determining whether the Ethics Ordinance survives the Assessor?s First Amendment challenge, the Court IS mindful that the County need not employ the narrowest means to meet its interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption and its appearance. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1456-1457 (2014) still- require a ?t that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served, . . . that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired obj ective.?) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The plaintiffs complain that the Ethics Ordinance casts too wide a net because a donor who has sought ?of?cial action by the County? in the past four years may contribute no more than $75 0 to any candidate for county of?ce or any elected county of?cial, even though the donor may have only sought of?cial action by the County from a single elected County of?cial. However, the Assessor fails to appreciate that although the County elects a number of its of?cials, they all serve the interests of a single unit of government. See Illinois Const, Art VII, Sec. 4. When viewed through that lens, there can be little doubt that the Ethics Ordinance 1s narrowly tailored to meet the County 5 interest in rooting out guidpro quo corruption and its appearance at the county government level. - The context .of this case proves the point. The property tax system is administered by a 1 The County Concedes that the Ethics Ordinance?s contribution caps do not apply to the State?s Attorney or Court Clerk because they are state of?cers. See Ingemunson v. Hedges, 133 Ill. 2d 364, 369 (1990) (?State's Attorneys are State of?cers under the language of the constitution, county officers?); Drury County of McLean 89 Ill. 2d 417, 424 (1982) (?We conclude that the clerk of the circuit court is a nonjudicial member of the judicial branch of State government and not a county officer. number of elected county of?cials. The County Board, through its elected representatives, enacts ordinances respecting the County?s own pr0perty tax levy; the Assessor values pr0perty throughout the County for purposes of property taxation; the County Clerk establishes the tax rates needed to support tax levies for the various taxing bodies throughout the County in accordance with the Assessor certi?ed valuations; and the County Treasurer collects property taxes and distributes those tax revenues to the various taxing bodies, including the County. To say that the Ethics Ordinance IS not narrowly tailored disregards that numerous elected County of?cials work together to administer the real property tax system on behalf of the County, even if the Assessor?s role may be outsized. Thus, to avoid the appearance of quidpro qua corruption, the County could reasonably limit the amount of money that a donor who has sought of?cial action by the County may contribute to any candidate for County of?ce or any elected County of?cial. The Assessor?s recent dispute with the County?s Inspector General exposes the fault in the plaintiffs? argument. In BZanchard v. Barrios, 2016 IL 120315, Berrios argued that the County did not have home rule authority to grant the County?s Of?ce of Inspector General power to subpoena his of?ce in connection with an investigation of alleged wrongdoing by one of his employees. In determining that the ordinance pertained. to the County?s government and affairs for purposes of its home rule authority, the court explained: [I]t is' clear that Cook County has an interest in discovering and averting corruption, fraud, waste, mismanagement, unlawful political discrimination or - misconduct in all county of?ces. The Assessor's of?ce is ?mded through an annual budgetary allocation of Cook County funds authorized by a Board I . resolution. As the manager of county funds and business, the Board is accountable to the public for the overall operation of county government. Preserving the integrity and ef?cient operation of its of?ces is a charge that lies with the county and the Board, as manager of all county business. The 1G Ordinance provides the county with the means of addressing pessible corruption, fraud,'and Other speci?ed types 'of malfeasance within its of?ces. 2 At argument, the plaintiffs acknowledged the role of these elected county of?cials in the County?s administration of the real property tax system. Public understanding of how the property tax system is administered and the role that various County elected of?cials play in relation thereto, however, may not be so informed. In the classic 1980 movie, he Blues Brothers, Jake and Elwood Blues take it upon themselves to save the Catholic orphanage where they were raised from an impending property tax sale. They raise the money and lead law enforcement authorities on an epic car chase through Chicago and across Daley Center plaza to the Cook County Assessor?s of?ce, where they pay the orphanage 5 property taxes just in time to avoid the tax sale. The movie features a cameo appearance by Steven Spielberg, who plays the part of the clerk' 1n the Assessor?s of?ce who accepts the tax payment. In real life, of course, tax payments are made to the Cook County Treasurer (to say nothing of the fact that an orphanage run by a religious institution would likely be exempt from real property taxes), but this mistake, or exercise in poetic license, highlights the common understanding that the interests of the County are served by numerous elected county of?cials. Thus, when determining whether the Ethics Ordinance is narrowly tailored to address quidpro quo corruption and its appearance in'County government, it would be folly to narrowly focus on any one elected County of?cial.- 5 Id. at 1] 33 (internal citations omitted). Berrios? attempt to compartmentalize his of?ce to avoid the Inspector General?s subpoena in Bianchard is no different than his attempt to compartmentalize his of?Ce to avoid the campaign contribution caps in the Ethics Ordinance. The Of?ce of the Assessor, like other county of?ces, is not a separate unit of government but instead an integral component of county government See id. at 1] 41 (?Nothing in [the Illinois Constitution] indicates that the assessor of Cook County rs on equal footing with the county or the other units of local government speci?ed therein. .,Thus the Assessor's of?ce rs a part of Cook County, the unit of local government from which he 15 elected and for which he and the employees of that of?ce perform theirfunctions and duties?) And so, the County does not violate the First Amendmentwhen it caps a donor?s contributions to all elected County of?cials and candidates for County of?ce after that donor has sought ?of?cial action by the County.? The plaintiffs rely primarily on McCatcheon. There, the Supreme Court stated that few, if any, campaign contributions will inVolve quidpro qao arrangements, making limits on such contributions prOphylactic measures. McCutche-on, 134 at 1458. The County could very well have imposed a campaign contribution limit of $750 foreach elected County of?ce as a prophylactic measure, regardless of whether a donor had sought of?cial action by the County, without violating the First Amendment. See Nixon v. Shrink M0. Gov ?t Pac, 528 US. 377, 3.97 (1999) (?In Buckley Valeo, 424 US. 1 (1976)], we speci?cally rejected the contention that $1,000, or any other amount, was a constitutionalminimum below which legislatures could not regulate. As indicated above, we referred instead to the outer limits of contributiOn regulation by asking whether there was any showing that the limits-were so low as to impede the ability of candidates to? amass the resources necessary for effective advocacy.? Indeed, in all of the principal cases raised by the parties, the campaign contribution limits at issue applied to all. elected of?cials or candidates for of?ce 1n the unit of government whose campaign ?nance law was Challenged. See Nixon, 528 U. S. at 397- 398 (upholding MissOuri? 5 contribution limits for candidates for all state of?ces), McCurcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court had already upheld so-called ?base [contribution] limits? for federal candidates or committees in Federal Election Campaign Act, as amended); BalZ'v. Madigan, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1004,1008 (N. D. 111. 2017) (analyzing Illinois statute that made it ?unlawful for any candidate, political committee, or other person to knowingly accept or receive any contribution? from members of the medical cannabis industry.) And 1n Wagner v. FECCir. 2015), the court upheld a statute that made it unlawful for federal centractors to contribute ?to any political party, committee, or candidate for public of?ce or to any person for any political purpose or use.? [emphasis added.]) Id. at 12-. The Ethics Ordinance allows Norris to contribute to any number of candidates for county of?ce or elected county of?cials, unlike the constitutionally in?rm aggregate caps at issue in 3 In Ball, the court found that the statute banning medical cannabis cultivation centers and dispensaries from making campaign contributions to any political committee was not narrowly tailored. However, that statute was not defective because it applied to more candidates than was permissible. Rather, the statute was struck down because it a) imposed an outright ban on contributions rather than the ?more moderate measure? ?of contribution limits, and b) applied only to the class of donors within the medical cannabis industry, with no explanation of why similar industries were not subject to the same risks of corruption. Ball, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 1016-17. Neither of those problems 1s present in the Ethics Ordinance. McCutcheon. Thus, by impOsing a campaign contribution limit only on those who seek of?cial action by the County (and certain others who are not at isSue here), the Ethics Ordinance is more narrowly tailored than it even need be. 5) The plaintiffs next argue that the Ethics Ordinance IS against public policy because it limits the ability of individuals to retain legal counsel of their choice. Nothing' in the Ethics Ordinance discusses or regulates attorney- -client relationships The Ethics Ordinance does not violate public policy regarding attorney-client relationships. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the Ethics Ordinance is unenforceable because the Ethics Board lacks the authority to hire a private attorney to bring enforcement actions against violators. However, the State?s Attorney is the attorney for both the State and for the County in which she is elected. See, People Manson, 319 Ill. 596, 600 (1925). Indeed, the State?s Attorney represents the Ethics Board in this veryaction. Because the State?s Attorneycan bring enforcement actions on the Ethics Board?s behalf, the Ethics Ordinance is enforceable. IT IS TI-IEREFOREORDERED: Summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs on all counts.