ill 1W ica it Cr Reaching T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S © 2017 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom; International Disarmament Institute, Pace University; Article 36. October 2017 The Humanitarian Impact of Drones 1st edition 160 pp Permission is granted for non-commercial reproduction, copying, distribution, and transmission of this publication or parts thereof so long as full credit is given to the organisation and author; the text is not altered, transformed, or built upon; and for any reuse or distribution, these terms are made clear to others. T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Contents 3 Preface 6 Introduction Cover photography: ©2017 Kristie L. Kulp Ray Acheson, Matthew Bolton, and Elizabeth Minor Edited by Ray Acheson, Matthew Bolton, Elizabeth Minor, and Allison Pytlak. Thank you to all authors for their contributions. This publication is supported in part by a grant from the Foundation Open Society Institute in cooperation with the Human Rights Initiative of the Open Society Foundations. Cristof Heyns Impacts 15 1. Humanitarian Harm 24 Country case study: Yemen 29 2. Environmental Harm 35 Country case study: Nigeria 36 3. Psychological Harm 48 4. Harm to Global Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle Taha Yaseen Doug Weir and Elizabeth Minor Joy Onyesoh Radidja Nemar Peace and Security Chris Cole 58 Country case study: Djibouti Ray Acheson 64 Country case study: The Philippines Mitzi Austero and Alfredo Ferrariz Lubang 2 1 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Preface Christof Heyns 68 Transparency Anna Diakun 81 Country case study: United States Rachel Stohl Perspectives 85 6. Human Rights Perspectives Shahzad Akbar 97 Country case study: Yemen Waleed Alhariri 101 7. International Law Perspectives Adriana Edmedes 115 Regional case study: Latin America Hector Guerra 120 127 It is not difficult to understand the appeal of 5. Harm to Governmental Regional case study: Europe Christof Heyns is Professor of Law at the University of Pretoria. He is a member of the UN Human Rights Committee and is a former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summar y, or arbitrar y executions. armed drones to those engaged in war and other violent conflicts. Those using force on behalf of states have long had the aim of subduing their opponents with as little harm to their own forces as possible. In addition, increasingly there are international and other norms that require more precise targeting, sparing those not directly engaged in the conflict. Getting close to the target has traditionally placed one’s own forces in harm’s way. Drones provide an opportunity to bring an “unmanned” weapons platform close to the target, from which force can be launched via remote control. If the platform is destroyed by enemy fire, the cost is measured in money, not in the number of lives of one’s own forces lost. Drones also provide those who use it with the argument that the maneuverability of the Jessica Dorsey platform, in close vicinity to the target, may allow 8. Gendered Perspectives out on the veracity of the second claim, the Ray Acheson argument persists that this may be the case in more precise targeting. Even if the jur y is still the future. The appeal of the first claim, on the 141 150 9. Moral and Ethical Perspectives other hand, is evident. In an age of technology, Peter Asaro drones were bound to happen. 10. Religious Perspectives If a drone were to be used only in isolated cases, Emily Welty there would probably have been few questions asked. It is after all not easy to point out a principled difference between a single missile fired from a F16 flying at the speed of sound, when an on-board pilot presses the button, and the same missile being fired from a loitering drone, with the button being pressed by an operator in another countr y. However, what is 2 3 P R E FAC E T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S at stake is not the isolated use of a few drones, fact that the world is turning to remote controlled This debate thus seems centrally important from by a few countries, but rather a new way use of force. Considerations of the broader the perspective of asking the age-old question: altogether of releasing force; one that will play a humanitarian implications of the remote how do we solve problems? How and when can dominant role in the conflicts of the future, with controlled use of force are thus most apt we resort to the use of force? What is effective, more and more states—and non-state actors— and welcome. also in the long run? Clearly, a world in which those who are far out of harm’s way have a using this technology. It is this evolving use of drones as the weapon platform of the future that The chapters in this in this book do exactly that. button with which they can eliminate someone raises profound questions about the peace and They look at the implications of a world where whom they see as posing a threat half-way security as well as some of the core values of drones are becoming the new normal from the around the world, is ver y different from one the world we live in. perspective of the various societies involved— where such instant ”solutions” are not available, including the gender implications, and also the and different if less dramatic means to achieve I, and others, have argued that drones should psychological implications, from the perspective the same objective have to be found. follow the law, and not the other way around. of those who operate drones and their societies, Drone-using states have argued for a relaxed and those who are on the receiving side. What A thorough discussion of the broader application of norms covering the use of force are the implications for societies on both sides implications of the use of armed drones is also that have developed over centuries—for of the digital divide? Peace and security as well important for other reasons. This includes the example, what is to be considered an “imminent” as the humanitarian framework in which we fact that armed drones are increasingly being attack against which self-defence by a state is operate may be compromised not only because used not only in armed conflict and allowed; when do the more permissive rules of drones make it so much easier for those with counterterrorism operations abroad, but in international humanitarian law (IHL) apply to the this technology to use force, and thus lower the domestic law enforcement contexts as well. use of force; to what extent does human rights threshold for a resort to force, but also when the Moreover, remote controlled release of force is law regulate the use of force outside the scope less obvious fissures in societies are opened up. being replaced by autonomous use of force, of an ongoing armed conflict; and what sort of where computers will take the critical decisions. transparency is required? Force release, that is, is becoming more and more impersonal. We need a much better These are important questions, and warrant the understanding of the early manifestation of this full attention of the international community. But trend—armed drones in armed conflict—than we more than policing the legal boundaries of the currently have to ser ve as a basis to respond to use of force is required to ensure a responsible this broader phenomenon. For all these reasons, response to the challenges presented by drones. this book is a most welcome contribution to a In fact, the debate may to some extent have vital debate. become too legalistic, as if solving the legal aspects is all there is to meeting the challenges presented by drones as a whole. At least of equal importance is the extent to which we fully understand and think through the broader implications of this technological development. Applying legal frameworks to concrete cases ver y easily leads to an exclusive focus on the individual case. Using a legalistic lens only to look at armed drones may thus mean one could miss the wider and cumulative implications of the 4 5 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Introduction those people that are not the target than other states’ actual jurisdiction or officially designated forms of aerial bombing. They point to the zones of armed conflict. The authors of the lowered risk of casualties on the attacking side chapters in this study raise questions about and claim that the ability of drones to loiter over whether this tempts policymakers to use an area for extended periods of time enables a violence in less restrained ways and displaces Humanitarian and human rights norms have more judicious use of force. The discourse that harm away from the attacking state onto the long sought to restrict the exercise of remote suggests that “drone strikes” are somehow a local population in the “target area”. violence. In the last two hundred years, the rapid more humanitarian form of violence than development of weapons technology has enabled traditional warfare has dominated political and This approach to violence is arguably one of the and research on weapons and militarism, which people to kill and maim others at increasing popular discussion, particularly in those main drivers of the development of weapons always includes a gender perspective. distance, both physical and psychological. countries that make extensive use of UAVs. technology. As the most militarised countr y in Her work also includes monitoring and analysing Rifles, artiller y, landmines, aerial bombing, and This discourse is grounded in elite, militarised the world, with over 800 foreign militar y bases missiles all function to reduce the potential for power structures, where capacities for violence and the largest expenditure on weapons and war, human encounter between an assailant and a are bolstered by access to high technology and the United States has engaged in numerous target or victim. the ability (and willingness) to project violence post-Cold War conflicts or other acts of violence far beyond one’s own borders. This discourse that have predominantly required realitively quick 1 Ray Acheson, Matthew Bolton, and Elizabeth Minor Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). She leads WILPF’s advocacy international processes and forums related to disarmament. Matthew Bolton directs the International Disarmament Institute at Pace University in New 2 York City, where he is also associate professor Thoughtful militar y personnel, diplomats, also makes certain assumptions about the domination of targets through aerial of political science. He has ser ved as an advisor lawyers, relief workers, philosophers, inviolability of militar y necessity and inevitability bombardment, long wars of occupation, and theologians, and activists worried that this ability of “collateral damage,” which draws the “covert” special forces “counterrorrism” or Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, to project harm far beyond our own bodies conversation away from the impact of drones “counterinsurgency” operations. Because of this, Arms Trade Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation increases the risks that violence could be less on people’s lives. This study makes clear, the US militar y is a “trend-setter in militar y Treaty and Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty. discriminate, less proportionate, less attuned to however, that reality is less simple than this technologies, to which all others react.”3 the suffering of others. These concerns— convenient narrative. Drones—for sur veillance and war fighting—are to advocacy campaigns conducting advocacy in the UN General Assembly First Committee, Elizabeth Minor is an Advisor at Article 36, a UK-based organisation that works for the currently at the front edge of the development of motivated by norms of humanity and the voices development of new policy and legal standards to of public conscience—have been progressively The technology of the drone is embedded in technologies for violence. These weapons are prevent the unintended, unnecessar y or encoded into international law through treaties conceptual and legal frameworks that work marked abroad by harm to civilians, further unacceptable harm caused by certain weapons. such as the Hague Conventions, Geneva together to stretch in new ways normative increasing fear of and anger towards the US Conventions, International Covenant on Civil and constraints on the use of force. This enables government; within the United States, the use of investigated the methodologies and practices Political Rights, Convention on Certain user states to use the “drone apparatus”— drones is marked by lack of transparency and used by states, international organisations and Conventional Weapons, Antipersonnel Landmine consisting of the weapons system, legitimating accountability, and a growing concern that these civil society to document and record the Ban Treaty, and Convention on Cluster discourse, and associated legal, policy, and weapons may one day be used at home, in casualties of armed conflict and violence. Munitions. They have also undergirded activism, administrative foundations—to kill people particular to suppress internal dissent or protest. academic writing, and various forms of legal presumed to be a threat far from either the She was previously a researcher at Ever y Casualty and Oxford Research Group, where she and political action to curtail, prevent, or stop the spread of tools of violence, as well as violence itself. The emergence of drones—or “unmanned” aerial vehicles (UAVs) —and other remotely-controlled militar y equipment poses new challenges to these humanitarian and human rights norms. Advocates for their use argue that airstrikes undertaken by armed drones cause less harm to 6 While there has been scattered academic, 1 With then President Obama claiming in 2016, for example, that, “I can say with great certainty is that the rate of civilian casualties in any drone operation are far lower than the rate of civilian casualties that occur in conventional war.” See “Remarks by the President in a Conversation on the Supreme Court Nomination,” University of Chicago Law School, 8 April 2016, https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/08/ remarks-president-conversation-supreme-court-nomination. 2 For example, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates declared in an interview with CNN in 2013 that this capability meant that “you can far more easily limit collateral damage with a drone than you can with a bomb, even a precision-guided munition, off an airplane.” See “ Interview with Robert Gates,” State of the Union with Candy Crowley, 10 February 2013, http://edition.cnn. com/TRANSCRIPTS/1302/10/sotu.01.html. activist, legal, policy, and media contestation of the conventional wisdom on drones, this has been fragmented and has not resulted in substantive international policy change. Indeed, those seeking to limit the impact of armed 3 Andrew Lichterman, “Automated warfare, weapons modernization, and nuclear war risk,” Presentation to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, New York, 28 April 2015, http://www. wslfweb.org/docs/Automated-warfare-and-nuclearweapons-4-28-15.pdf. 7 INTRODUCTION T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S drones often end up caught in two discursive Given that the over whelming majority of air boundaries of where the use of certain forms of Currently, the majority of countries developing traps. The explicitly anti-war rhetoric adopted by strikes from drones have been conducted by one violence are generally accepted. This practice armed drones are high income countries, who some campaigners is often dismissed out of countr y—the United States—much of the policy has also been identified with the United also form the largest group of drone possessors hand by government officials, who often refuse conversation so far has been focused on its Kingdom, and with Israel in territories it and users. 9 Within the limited numbers, the lower to hear denunciations of militarism. But if a specific national context. However, the United occupies. Other users have conducted airstrikes a countr y’s income group, the less likely they are narrower critique is made, for example on the States is not the only government using or within their own countries or contested regions, to be using, possessing, or developing armed basis of international humanitarian law, seeking to acquire drones, and evidence including Azerbaijan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, and drones. Looking at the picture by region,10 obfuscation by states leads to technical debates presented in these pages suggests that without Turkey—either in militar y operations, or in western countries similarly make up the largest that marginalises all but those trained in the a collective understanding of the limits that must domestic security activities. The use of drones group of armed drone developers. Countries in esoterica of weapons law. This remains far be put on these technologies, unacceptable by countries to target their own citizens has the Asia-Pacific region are at similar levels of from the realities of those who are most affected activities can be less easily challenged and will thrown this into particularly stark relief for some possession to western countries, followed by by the use of drones. While there have been be replicated. As a result, this study aims to commentators. 6 Eastern European and African countries. Latin many important reports focusing on the provide a more global perspective on drones, American countries are currently absent from the impact of drones on people, they tend to be in suggesting the crucial need for the continued In this context, the acquisition of drones for small circulation academic journals or single development of national conversations in civilian domestic policing also bears development, though are importing drone case studies. countries other than the United States and the consideration within the global landscape of how systems more broadly. 4 picture of armed drone use, possession, and countries in which it has used drones, as drone technology is implicated in harm and This study aims to reframe this conversation well as international policy discussion in problematic trajectories in the use of force. In recent years, in the context of a low level of by collecting in one place a comprehensive, multilateral settings. Though there has been no reported use of international debate on armed drones, more weapons launched from an aerial drone by police states have begun expressing concern about the multi-countr y and multidisciplinar y summar y of the evidence of harm that drones cause. As an Open source data gathered by the New America ser vices, in the United States for example the proliferation of drones, and armed drones in artifact, it draws on the tradition of many Foundation think tank to track the use, use of drones armed with less lethal weapons by particular. There has, at times, been discussion humanitarian and human rights campaigns, going possession, development, and import/export of police has been authorised in one state (North about if and how drones may be accounted for back to the anti-slaver y societies of the 19th drones around the world records that eleven Dakota) and is being considered by others. under arms control standards articuled by the Centur y. It aims to undermine denial—e.g. the countries have used armed drones, and twenty- Police in Dallas used a remote-controlled ground Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). In 2013, a group of claim that “we couldn’t have known” the many eight states currently have armed drone robot to kill a suspected sniper with plastic governmental experts reviewing the potential ways that drones pose a threat to rights and systems. Eight of these countries first used them explosives in 2016.7 Companies are also expansion of the UN Register of Conventional humanity of affected people. As such, it is in the past two years. marketing drones equipped with less lethal Arms, clarified the categor y of aircraft to include weapons for riot control, which have been UAVs. In 2016, the United States issued a 5 focussed less on policy recommendations per se, but rather is intended to ground any policy Examining the pattern of reported use so far, purchased in South Africa, for example. More political declaration supported by 51 states, on debate in a human-centered evidence base. some armed drone deployment has occurred broadly, drone technology is increasingly used the “responsible export and subsequent use” where the user is inter vening in support of for extensive sur veillance both in policing and of “armed or strike-enabled” drones.11 another government or party to an armed conflict other contexts, which is closely tied to the use (such as the United Kingdom in Afghanistan, the of force—with many cases of unarmed drones United States in Iraq, Saudi Arabia in Yemen, the contributing to airstrikes from other platforms, United Arab Emirates in Libya, or Iran in Syria). for example. 4 These include, for example, James Cavallaro, Stephan Sonnenberg, and Sarah Knuckey Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law, Global Justice Clinic, https://law.stanford.edu/publications/living-underdrones-death-injury-and-trauma-to-civilians-from-us-dronepractices-in-pakistan; The civilian impact of drones: unexamined costs, unanswered questions, Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2012, http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The_ Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf; and case study documentation by organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. These and other such reports and references have been cited where relevant throughout this study. 8 8 As mentioned above, the United States has been the major user of drones in other countries to kill people suspected of affiliation with certain groups, for the stated purpose of achieving domestic security objectives—challenging the 5 See New America, ‘World of Drones’, accessed 11 May 2017 https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/world-of-drones/. 6 See for example New America’s World of Drones report:https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/world-of-drones/. 7 Simone McCarthy, ‘What does Dallas’s ‘bomb robot’ mean for the future of policing?’, Christian Science Monitor, https://www. csmonitor.com/USA/USA-Update/2016/0709/What-does-Dallas-sbomb-robot-mean-for-the-future-of-policing . 8 ‘Tear Gassing by Remote Control’, http://remotecontrolproject. org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Tear-Gassing-By-RemoteControl-Report.pdf. 9 According to New America data, using OEDC-DAC country income groups. 10 Using UNGA regional groups for simplicity of grouping countries. 11 The text of the declaration is available in the US State Department archives at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2016/10/262811.htm. 9 INTRODUCTION T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Countries currently in possession of armed drones (New America) The ver y nature of remote controlled warfare is specific to armed drones, and the policies as impacting user and affected communities in a well as risks inherent in the technology that variety of ways, and this study looks at these these might result from, should be drawn out in impacts from a number of critical perspectives this context. How international standards could such as human rights, international law, gender, be developed or clarified on this basis can then and ethics and morality. Given the range of be considered. In order to compel an effective harms, as well as the variety of perspectives international process, how greater engagement from which to analyse these harms, this study amongst a wide range of stakeholders could be aims to: developed is also a key consideration. 1. Refocus the debate about armed drones on Methodology and overview the harm caused to people, disrupting narratives that emphasise the “low The editors of this study have sought human costs” of deploying explosive force contributions from a diverse group of known and from drones; emerging experts from across academia, research and policy groups, and specialists from 2. Shift the burden of proof onto users of armed the field. A process is currently under way to develop more knowledge about who these were inflicted on, elaborated standards. This initiative can be notwithstanding the efforts of civil society considered problematic in several ways: the organisations in this regard. This has been standards contained in the declaration are low; it accompanied by a lack of avenues for assistance is led by the current dominant user of drones, and redress for victims, linked to secrecy and whose activities have raised most concerns; and questionable practices in the use of drones. As primarily tackling proliferation, rather than well as physical injuries, deaths, and the addressing the broader concerns with these destruction of civilian infrastructure, technologies, is not the optimal approach. psychological impacts have also been a key and However, the initiative shows recognition by perhaps unique harm experienced by people states that armed drones pose particular issues, living in areas where drones are operating and and of the specific link between drone represent a near constant, threatening presence. technology and risks of problematic outcomes There also seem to be unique psychological (which, though this is not acknowledged in the harms to drone operators. Furthermore, the use declaration, have been clearly evident in the of armed drones has particular impacts on actions of current possessors and users). Such international and regional peace and security recognition may be helpful to the national and that may differ from challenges raised by other, As you read the evidence presented in this international conversations that are needed on more established weapon systems or modes presents troubling evidence that people in study, we ask you, the reader, to keep in mind this issue. of warfare. communities affected by drone sur veillance and possible policy questions relevant to addressing violence also suffer adverse psychological the harm caused by armed drones. The limits of consequences. Doug Weir of the Toxic Remnants what is acceptable and unacceptable in relation of War Project and Elizabeth Minor of Article 36 to the development and use of these then look beyond immediate human harm to technologies should be considered, from the examine how harm to the environment should be perspective of the harm caused in all the considered in assessing the implications of dimensions in which it is examined—from drones. This angle has rarely been considered in immediate physical impacts to challenges to much depth in the media, policy, or academic global governance. The challenges that are discussion of drones. However, the harms to people, places, and communities at the local, national, and international level should be the focus of any international or national conversations about armed drones. These harms are enumerated and analysed in this study. They include deaths and injuries—and an unacceptable lack of public 10 drones, putting pressure on them to justify their policices and practices; In his preface, Christof Heyns emphasises that the evolving and future use of drones raises 3. Highlight specificities of armed drones as weapons systems—and the conceptual and profound questions about peace, security, our values, and the legal pathways available to us. legal formations that surround them—that pose particular threats to peace and security, The chapters that follow are divided into two rule of law and human rights, humanitarian primar y sections. The first section focuses on protections, gender equality, and the the harms caused by the use of armed drones. environment; and Jack Serle and Jessica Purkiss of The Bureau of Investigative Journalism review the humanitarian 4. Demonstrate the need for global advocacy harm of drone strikes by considering the var ying and policymaking on drones, beyond the estimates of casualties—particularly of specific national contexts of user and civilians—and the current systems of redress. “target” countries. Following this account of physical human harm, Radidja Nemar of the Alkarama Foundation 11 INTRODUCTION T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Drones also cause political harm to local, Interspersed throughout the study’s chapters are national, and global governance. This is a series of case studies that focus on specific considered in a chapter by Chris Cole of Drone national and regional contexts, including Yemen, Wars UK, in which he examines the impact of Nigeria, Djibouti, the Philippines, Latin America, proliferating drone use on international peace Europe, and the United States. Impacts and security. Anna Diakun of the American Civil Liberties Union then argues that the secrecy of Substantive chapters were anonymously the drones program is having deleterious impacts reviewed by experts on facets of the legal, on systems of transparency and accountability, political, policy, and technical dimensions of and on the rule of law. drones. The editors ensured that there was broadly gender equity in the the choice of peer The second section of the study anlyses these reviewers. Authors were required to address the harms from a variety of critical perspectives, critiques of the reviewers in the drafting and including law. Shahzad Akbar of the Foundation revision process. The editors of this study have for Fundamental Rights Pakistan and Reprieve also endeavored to engage in a thorough and argues that drone strikes are threatening crucial rigorous fact-checking and editorial review. human rights protections. Adriana Edmedes of Rights Watch UK considers the various types of liability in international law that could relate different types of assistance states provide to their allies with armed drone programmes. This is followed by Ray Acheson’s consideration of the gendered impact of the policies and practices of drone programmes. She argues that drones should be viewed through a gender perspective to help situate in them in the broader context of militarism and the culture of violence, and highlights ways in which the use of drones can constitute gender-based violence and undermine gender equality. Peter Asaro considers the moral and ethical aspects of drone use, as well as the psychological impact on operators. Emily Welty of Pace University and the World Council of Churches Commission on International Affairs elaborates religious perspectives of faith communities regarding armed drones. 12 13 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S 1. Humanitarian Harm Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle On 29 June 2011, US President Obama’s chief Jessica Purkiss is a reporter on the Bureau’s Covert Drone War team. Before joining the Bureau she was a staff writer and editor for Middle East Monitor. She has also reported from Palestine. Jessica has an MA from Kingston University in human rights and genocide. Jack Serle has been a specialist reporter on the Bureau’s covert drone war team since he joined the Bureau in 2012. He was part of the team that won the Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism in 2013 for its work on drones and the US covert war on terror. He graduated from the University of Edinburgh with a BSc (Hons) in Biological Sciences in 2010 and was awarded an MA in science journalism by City University London the following year. counter terrorism advisor John Brennan stood in front of a packed room in an academic division of John Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. and made a bold assertion. No civilians had been killed in US counter terrorism operations in nearly a year, he said.1 Brennan was answering a question about “targeted killings”, a euphemism for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drone strikes. The strikes were raining down on Pakistan at the time, though officially the administration refused to acknowledge the drone campaign even existed, sticking resolutely to the vague “counter terrorism operations” term. Such operations had not claimed a single innocent life in months due to the “exceptional proficiency and precision”2 of the capabilities America had been able to develop, Brennan claimed. For reporters at the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Brennan’s contention did not ring true. For months, reports that civilians were dying in US drone strikes had been appearing in Pakistani and international media. We felt we needed to create a comprehensive database, to collate details of who had been killed in what location, and how many drone strikes had taken place, in order to open the US counter terrorism programme to proper scrutiny. 1 C-SPAN, Obama Administration Counterterrorism Strategy, C-SPAN, 2011.  Online video, 49:35. https://www.c-span.org/ video/?300266-1/obama-administration-counterterrorism-strategy. 2 14 Ibid. 15 H U M A N I TA R I A N H A R M T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S This has developed into a major effort to Our findings directly challenged Brennan’s monitor the drone war through investigative claims. Yet despite the Bureau’s evidence, US journalism, now in operation for over five years. intelligence sources continued to insist there had been no civilian casualties, with one senior In this chapter, we will provide an over view of the project, its key findings, and the lessons Hussain Jamil al-Qawli (left) holds a photo of his son Salim al-Qawli, 20; and Muhammad al-Qawli holds a photo of his brother Ali al-Qawli, 34. Salim and Ali al-Qawli were killed in a drone strike in al-Masnaah on Januar y 23, 2013. official describing the Bureau’s findings as “wildly inaccurate.”5 learned. We will finish with a summar y of efforts to seek justice and redress for innocent victims The CIA drone program was at its peak during of drone strikes - an area with which civilian this period, reaching an all-time high in casualty recording is closely linked. September 2010. 6 American troop numbers had Tackling the wall of secrecy In our efforts to create a database of strikes, we started by gathering information from as many sources as possible – news stories, social media posts, leaked documents, and reports from nongovernment organisations (NGOs). Ever y time we found a credible report of a drone attack in Pakistan, we logged it, alongside whatever details we could uncover about who it had killed. surged in neighbouring Afghanistan, with a sustained aerial campaign aimed at Afghan insurgents who were using Pakistan’s tribal areas as a base to launch operations against US and Afghan troops across the border.7 Reports of drone strikes were frequently appearing in major US news outlets, and government and intelligence officials were briefing journalists about the strikes. Yet on the record, they would say nothing. We developed a robust methodology in order for In President Obama’s first public comments on our data to be reliable. the drone campaign in Januar y 2012, he By August 2011, we had recorded 116 CIA covert drone strikes in Pakistan between August 2010 and June 2011. 3 We deepened our reporting by carr ying out field investigations, with Bureau researchers visiting the tribal areas of Pakistan addressed the mounting allegations of civilian casualties. He stated, “I want people to understand actually drones have not caused a huge number of civilian casualties, for the most part they have been ver y precise precision © 2013 Letta Taylor/Human Rights Watch By this point in 2012, we had already started rarely go on record when speaking to media recording data on US counter terrorism about drone strikes. In this case, we require ten of them had resulted in civilian casualties, operations in Yemen and Somalia, in addition three different types of named or unnamed killing 45 or more civilians, including six to the earlier information about Pakistan. Yemeni sources – such as government officials, children. This number later increased as more In 2015 we added Afghanistan to our coverage, tribal sources, or eyewitnesses – to report a information came to light. after the US ended its combat operations strike before it is considered by us as confirmed. against the Taliban but continued air strikes and When we cannot achieve this level of certainty, it raids against al-Qaeda, by special is recorded as a possible strike. We also use a operations forces. range for reporting our casualty estimates, as to investigate the strikes. We found that at least strikes against al Qaeda and their affiliates.”8 4 5 Ibid. 6 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, CIA and US military drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present, https://docs.google. com/spreadsheets/d/1NAfjFonM-Tn7fziqiv33HlGt09wg LZDSCP-BQaux51w/edit#gid=694046452. 3 Chris Woods, “US Claims Of No Civilian Deaths Are Untrue,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 18, 2011, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/ stories/2011-07-18/us-claims-of-no-civilian-deaths-are-untrue. 4 Ibid. 16 7 Kate Clark, “Drone Warfare 2: Targeted Killings – a future model for Afghanistan?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 1, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/drone-warfare-2targeted-killings-a-future-model-for-afghanistan/. 8 White House YouTube channel, “Your Interview with the President—2012”, 30 January 2012 https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=eeTj5qMGTAI even within a single report it is not uncommon As the number of countries that we were for there to be contradictor y information on how investigating grew, we tailored our methodology many people were killed or injured. for each one. For example, in order to confirm a US strike in Afghanistan, we require a named Using this methodology, the Bureau has Afghan official to have acknowledged it. In recorded at least 723 air and drone strikes as of Yemen, the climate is different and officials 15 August 2017 across Yemen, Somalia, and 17 H U M A N I TA R I A N H A R M T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Pakistan since the US began conducting strikes In Pakistan, the drone programme slowed almost This was realised in May 2016 when the CIA findings – for instance our figure for civilian in those countries (2002, 2007, and 2004, to a halt with three strikes conducted in 2016. provided intelligence, including imaging deaths was six times higher than theirs. respectively). We have also recorded at least One of these, the strike that killed the leader of intelligence collected by drones, to the US 3,275 strikes in Afghanistan since 2015, when the Afghan Taliban, was conducted by the US militar y who were the agency that moved The director of national intelligence (DNI), who the US became the only countr y known to be militar y, which is not subject to the same shroud for ward with the strike in Pakistan that killed released the figures, has put for ward an flying fast jets and armed drones. As a result of of secrecy as the CIA. This strike, in May 2016, Mullah Mansour, the leader of the Afghan Taliban. explanation for these discrepancies.15 It said all these strikes, we have counted the deaths of was the last for nine months and we felt between 744 and 1,434 civilians. Due to the optimistic that greater transparency could follow. 10 difficulty in gaining access to the precise that the higher numbers recorded by NGOs Paradoxically, while the CIA was responsible for could be attributed to combatants being counted the strikes in Pakistan as well as some of those as non-combatants. As it explained, the location of drone strikes, along with the lack of However, these small steps towards greater in Yemen, the drones were flown and missiles government’s access to multiple sources of official accounts of individual strikes, it is hard to transparency may be short-lived, which fired by US Air Force ser vice men and women. intelligence and its refined post-strike determine whether we are capturing the full continues to make our work necessar y as well US drones recently returned to Pakistan, with methodology enable it to more adequately extent of the civilian death toll. Regardless, the as challenging. For example, it became clear by four strikes reported since Trump came into evaluate the status of a casualty. The DNI strikes we do capture and the details we are Februar y 2017 that US Central Command’s office in Januar y, all of which have been pointed out that the reliance of NGOs on local able to record are important pieces of a puzzle, release of monthly Yemen figures described attributed to the CIA.13 It is not known if the media reports may also skew figures, as they even if not a complete picture. above had been reversed, with a spokesperson same arrangement still applies. are vulnerable to reporting misinformation telling the Bureau that, “there is no current The transparency environment today spread by certain actors. requirement for US Central Command to In Afghanistan, the US has provided the Bureau announce strikes monthly.”11 The US has since with monthly strike totals since the end of 2016, However, the DNI did not mention that NGOs released bulk information on its strikes in Yemen following months of pressure. But these figures and other monitoring bodies have conducted Positively, American counter terrorism operations on an ad-hoc basis, following an upsurge in may not be as reliable as they once would have extensive ground investigations, inter viewing have become somewhat less secretive over time, strikes in recent months, but there is little been. The American fight against various sur vivors and relatives of victims. The US although that trend may be changing. information provided about individual strikes, insurgent groups in Afghanistan is now militar y recently admitted that its investigations making the information difficult to interrogate. conducted almost entirely by air, with US forces into strikes in Iraq and Syria do not include The Wall Street Journal reported in March the taking an advisor y role on the ground. This has similar inter views because the locations, and Trump administration has given senior officials in made civilian casualty tracking and recording people, are inaccessible.16 It is hard to see how the CIA the authority to order drone strikes with much more difficult. CIA officers would have better access to the In Yemen and Somalia, the US Central Command and US Africa Command are the bodies responsible for militar y operations in the two countries. Both began to regularly release information on drone strikes, sometimes with estimates of how many people were killed. At autonomy from the White House and National Security Council.12 tribal agencies in Pakistan, for example.17 As of July 2016, the US began publishing information on strikes outside of areas of active Despite the limitations of the data provided in the end of 2016, US Central Command said it To some extent, the above reverses the sort of hostilities. However, the figures amalgamated 2016, the White House’s publication of figures was implementing a monthly roll-up of strikes in freedom enjoyed by the CIA to conduct drone data from across four countries and over nearly represented a welcome step towards greater Yemen, releasing figures normally on the first operations under President George Bush. seven years.14 The lack of a year-by-year or transparency. It is not clear what the fate of this Friday after the 15th of each month. President Obama had gradually eroded this countr y breakdown, and a total absence of any policy will be under President Trump but current freedom, seeking to improve transparency and detail, makes the figures difficult to interrogate trends are not encouraging for transparency accountability. His ambition was to remove the or draw any conclusions from. Some aspects proponents.  CIA from drone operations, and place also differed significantly from the Bureau’s 9 responsibility with the US Air Force. 9 Major Josh Jacques, Personal communication with Jessica Purkiss, 4 April 2017. 18 10 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 11 Ibid. 12 Gordon Lubold and Shane Harris, “Trump Broadens CIA Powers, Allows Deadly Drone Strikes,” The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-gave-ciapower-to-launch-drone-strikes-1489444374. 15 13 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 14 US Director of National Intelligence, Summary of Information Regarding U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities, July 1, 2016. Ibid. 16 Micah Zenko, “Why is the US Killing so many civilians in Syria and Iraq?” New York Times, 19 June 2017. 17 Airwars, Transcript of Pentagon’s Al Jinah Investigation Media Briefing, June 27, 2017. https://airwars.org/news/ transcript-of-al-jinah-investigation-briefing/. 19 H U M A N I TA R I A N H A R M T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Changing patterns of civilian casualties However, the PPG is policy and not law, and this Justice, compensation and the humanitarian toll on families There are a few known instances of financial Though our data is not a complete record, by administration, which is likely to overhaul the The families of those killed by drones may spend compound in Pakistan’s tribal areas in Januar y tracking civilian casualties over time the Bureau rules, or, as it has been doing already, finding years searching for justice. For example, Bibi 2015. Unknown to those who ordered the has been able to identify and compare different ways to circumvent them. Mamana, a grandmother of nine, was picking strike, two foreign hostages were also on site. has made it vulnerable to shifts in US domestic politics. It is already under review by the Trump phases of the drone war. Overall civilian casualty compensation being paid to victim’s families. US drones launched missiles at an al-Qaeda vegetables when a drone strike killed her. Atiq, figures in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia have In Yemen for example, the Trump administration decreased. This is in part because of the declared three provinces to be areas of active significant decline in civilian deaths in Pakistan. hostilities. 20 This is a technical term used to Operations have slowed in the countr y, but the define areas where the PPG rules do not apply. rate of civilian casualties has also declined. An unprecedented number of strikes have We collected many different parts from the The deaths of Lo Porto and Weinstein first occurred there.    field and put a turban over her body,” he told emerged in April 2015 when President Obama the Times. 26 publically acknowledged they had been Mamana’s son, said he rushed to the scene. “We found her mutilated body a short time after wards. It had been thrown quite a long 21 22 American efforts to prevent civilian casualties An inquir y about whether the near certainty Policy Guidance (PPG) in May 2013 (though principle was still in place in Yemen yielded an The family went to Washington, D.C. in 2013 to details were not released until July 2016). ambiguous response. 23 provide evidence at a congressional briefing. Known as the drone “playbook”, the PPG put certain restrictions on strikes conducted outside “areas of active hostilities”, such as Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan. Under these, for example, the US militar y would need “near certainty” that a strike would result in no civilian deaths in order to conduct it – a standard more stringent than the international laws of war applicable Parts of Somalia have also been declared as areas of active hostilities. 24 There, however, US Africa Command has told the Bureau that even though they have greater flexibility to conduct strikes more quickly, they will still maintain the same level of certainty to minimise civilian casualties. 25 during conflicts.19 aid worker, and fellow aid worker Warren Weinstein, an American citizen. distance away by the blast and it was in pieces. were codified and signed in Obama’s Presidential 18 The strike killed Giovanni Lo Porto, an Italian killed in a US counter terrorism operation. “Nobody has ever told me why my mother was “As President and as Commander-in-Chief, I take full responsibility for all our counter terrorism operations, including the one that targeted that day,” Rafiq ur Rehman, another of inadvertently took the lives of Warren and Mamana’s sons, testified. Giovanni,” he stated. 30 27 While only a handful of congress members attended the session, possibly due to other pressing hearings taking President Obama explained that the existence of place that same day, all reportedly apologised the operation was declassified and disclosed to and expressed their condolences. 28 The briefing the public because “the Weinstein and Lo Porto was the first time the US Congress had come families deser ve to know the truth”. 31 As the face to face with drone strike victims. operation had been carried out under the authority of the highly secretive CIA, such an The publication of the PPG was a response to pressure from the Bureau, and other monitoring groups, as well as the media and NGOs, but would not have been possible if the White House administration had not been receptive to the idea of engaging with outside parties and being more transparent. 18 See: The White House, Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities, May 22, 2013, https:// www.aclu.org/foia-document/presidential-policyguidance?redirect=node/58033 and Fact Sheet: 20 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules,” New York Times, 12 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/12/us/ politics/trump-loosen-counterterrorism-rules.html. 21 Major Audricia Harris, Office of the Secretary of Defence Public Affairs department, Personal communication with Jack Serle, 31 March 2017. 22 Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle, “Unprecedented number of US air and drone strikes hit Yemen,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2 March, 2017. https://www.thebureauinvestigates. com/stories/2017-03-02/unprecedented-number-of-us-drone-andair-strikes-hit-yemen. 23 Christopher Sherwood, Department of Defense spokesman, Personal communication with Jack Serle, April 2017. The White House, The President’s May 23 Speech on Counterterrorism, May 23, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-president-smay-23-speech-counterterrorism. 24 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Eases Combat Rules in Somalia Intended to Protect Civilians,” New York Times, 30 March 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/africa/ trump-is-said-to-ease-combat-rules-in-somalia-designed-to-protectcivilians.html. 19 International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL: Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14. 25 Colonel Mark R. Cheadle, Director, Public Affairs and Communications Synchronization and Sr. Leader Engagement, US Africa Command, Discussion with author, 30 March 2017. 20 While this response seems positive, the family’s admission marked a rare moment of lawyer, Reprieve’s Jen Gibson, stressed that the transparency. apology should have come from the administration. 29 The Obama administration The US response to the deaths was however remained silent. unprecedented in several ways. Lo Porto’s family received over €1 million, the first confirmed example of the US paying relatives of a drone 26 Robin Pagnamenta, “My Dead Mother Wasn’t an Enemy of America. She Was Just an Old Lady,” The Times, 10 November 2012. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/my-dead-mother-wasntan-enemy-of-america-she-was-just-an-old-lady-2n8k3djvr9c. 27 Natasha Lennard, “Nobody Has Ever Told Me Why My Mother Was Targeted That Day,” Salon, 29 October 2013, http://www. salon.com/2013/10/29/nobody_has_ever_told_me_why_my_ mother_was_targeted_that_day/. 28 Shaya Tayefe Mohajer, “Congressmen Apologize for Drones That Killed Pakistani Grandma,” Takepart, 30 October 2013, http://www.takepart.com/article/2013/10/30/congressapologetic-for-drone-strike-killing. 29 Ibid. strike victim. 32 Approximately eighteen months 30 Statement by the President on the Deaths of Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto, The White House, 23 April 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/04/23/statement-president-deaths-warren-weinsteinand-giovanni-lo-porto 31 Ibid. 32 Jack Serle, “US Pays 1M to Italian Couple After Killing Their Son In A Drone Strike,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 16 September 2016 https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/ stories/2016-09-16/us-pays-1m-to-italian-couple-after-killing-theirson-in-a-drone-strike 21 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S H U M A N I TA R I A N H A R M after the strike, the family was permitted civilians. 36 These findings were disputed by have become more challenging and less likely. out there that will make you ‘lose the war’ just a private meeting with US officials to discuss numerous media and human rights organisations Senior militar y officials told the Bureau that from public perception undercutting your what happened, which thought to be the first that had compiled extensive records of the it was much easier to investigate when legitimacy, losing the support of a population, time such a meeting has taken place. 33 incident and about the identities of the victims. 37 they had a large number troops on the ground. losing the support of a nation that you are tr ying to support…” 43 However the legal agreement between the US Despite US doubts over the victim’s identities, One example comes from Iraq. Retired US government and Lo Porto’s parents specified compensation funding for the families was General Arnold Gordon-Bray, who led the 2nd that the money was an “ex-gratia payment”. received in the Central Bank in Sana’a. Journalist Brigade of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division in This means the US government made the Gregor y D. Johnsen said in his investigation into the first months of the invasion of Iraq, recalled Since the Bureau of Investigative Journalism payment voluntarily and accepted no legal the strike that, “Payment by proxy would allow to ProPublica how his team would sometimes began recording data, the environment we work liability or obligation as a result. the US the wiggle room to have it both ways, seek out a victim’s family, or leave cards behind in has altered considerably. American counter counting the dead as militants while paying for after ground operations explaining how people terrorism operations, including drone strikes, them like civilians.”38 could make a claim. 41 Senior militar y officials are less likely to be officially denied. Civilian told the Bureau that in the event of an allegation, casualty rates have been falling. This is, in part, 34 Other than the “ex-gratia” payment made to Lo Porto’s family over the strike in Pakistan, there Conclusions have been reports of the US making payments Both of the US investigations relied on pre-strike they could easily dispatch a patrol to talk to because of the pressure for greater to drone victim’s families in Yemen, via the footage recorded by drones, according to those affected, something they can no longer do. accountability and transparency. However, none Yemeni government, although they remain Johnsen. Although this was a far from perfect system, it of the measures that led to improvements in unconfirmed by the US government. militar y officials have put it, is like looking at it did facilitate a way for those affected to receive accountability have been entrenched in law, and as such they are all susceptible to change.  39 Relying on this, as he and senior through a “soda-straw”, as it often leaves out One example comes from a strike on a wedding an acknowledgement of what had happened and more than it provides. convoy near the town of Radda’ in Yemen’s space to discuss. strike and post-strike footage for civilian Bayda province on 12 December 2013. A convoy casualty (CIVCAS) investigations is standard The US militar y is always at pains to point out problem. In Januar y 2017, the Bureau found itself of eleven vehicles were travelling to the groom’s practice in America’s remote control wars, where that the payments are not compensation but once again in a dispute with the US over village with the bride when they were attacked. the US does not have boots on the ground to form a part of their efforts to express their casualty figures. In this case, it was a commando In a demonstration of their rage, protesters investigate an allegation effectively. condolences to the wounded and victims’ raid in Yemen, hailed by the Trump administration families. The payments are voluntar y and are as “successful”. An investigation that we In Afghanistan, the majority of US troops have part of a militar y strategy, rather than viewed published however showed it killed nine children now withdrawn. Air operations still continue, under the age of thirteen. The Yemeni governor in the region agreed to as a form of redress imposed on the militar y but without a strong militar y presence provide compensation in the form of money and by a court. investigations into possible civilian casualties 40 The reliance on pre- blocked a main road to the provincial capital with the victims’ bodies. 35 guns. Following two reviews, the US reportedly claimed all American investigations subsequently found that all the dead were fighters, rather than “When you have CIVCAS you undercut your 36 Gregory D. Johnsen, “Nothing Says ‘Sorry Our Drones Hit Your Wedding Party’ Like $800,000 And Some Guns”, BuzzFeed, 8 August 2014, https://www.buzzfeed.com/gregorydjohnsen/ wedding-party-drone-strike?utm_term=.emWBB1nvq#.qdzmmRodL. 37 Reprieve, Human Rights Watch and Al Jazeera America compiled extensive records of what happened during and after the strike from interviews with witnesses, survivors, relatives of victims and government officials. See below: 33 Jack Serle, “Sorry for Killing Your Son, CIA Tells Drone Strike Victim’s Family,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 28 October 2016, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/ stories/2016-10-28/sorry-for-killing-your-son-cia-tells-drone-strikevictims-family-during-unprecedented-meeting. 34 Ibid. 35 Human Rights Watch, “The Wedding That Became a Funeral,” Human Rights Watch, February 2014, https://www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/reports/yemen0214_ForUpload.pdf 22 Human Rights Watch, “The Wedding That Became a Funeral,” Human Rights Watch, February 2014, https://www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/reports/yemen0214_ForUpload.pdf. Iona Craig, “What Really Happened When a US Drone Strike Hit a Yemeni Wedding Convoy,” Al Jazeera America, 20 January 2014. http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/ america-tonight-blog/2014/1/17/what-really-happenedwhenausdro nehitayemeniweddingconvoy.html. 38 Johnsen. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. Also taken from interview with Senior Military Official by Jack Serle, US Central Command, Tampa, March 2016. Disputes over casualty figures continue to be a As the new administration’s counter terrorism policy evolves, robust civilian casualty recording legitimacy, you lose the support of the ver y practices will need to be in place to make people you are tr ying to support and tr ying to targeting policy accountable. This is extremely protect,” a senior militar y official told the important to demonstrate the humanitarian Bureau. 42 “If you are viewing the population as impact caused by these weapons. With much the centre of gravity, you are now losing that attention being given to Iraq and Syria, it is more centre of gravity. There is no one target out important than ever to ensure that operations in there that will ‘win the war’ but there’s a target more underreported places like Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan are not forgotten and are subject 41 Cora Currier, “Hearts, Minds and Dollars: Condolence Payments in the Drone Strike Age,” ProPublica, 5 April 2013, https://www.propublica.org/article/hearts-minds-and-dollarscondolence-payments-in-the-drone-strike-age. 42 Senior Military Official, Interview by Jack Serle, US Central Command, Tampa, March 2016. to proper scrutiny. 43 Ibid. 23 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Country case study: C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: Y E M E N It has been sixteen years since a US drone The US drone programme has not so far For example, these strikes occurred while hovered for the first time in the Yemeni skies eliminated terrorism agencies, nor succeeded civilians were practicing normal daily life and fired a Hellfire missile at a car carr ying even in curbing the territorial sharp expansion activities in their own homes, streets; or a suspected al-Qaeda leader on 3 November and flourishing of radical militancy in the working, playing, shepherding, or driving to 2002 in eastern Yemen. Since then, Yemen countr y. Moreover, these operations have or from their houses. Taha Yaseen is a Yemeni researcher with Mwatana has become a battlefield for expanded US had an adverse impact on civilians, their for Human Rights who has for more than six years drone operations labelled as “a War on Terror.” families and communities, whose injuries have On the evening of 26 September 2014, three Since late 2014, Yemen has been parallelly been left without remedy; their questions children, including two girls, were playing by going through a violent war between forces about the injustice of being victimized remain their own house at 18:00, when a US drone, previously worked as a freelancer on Yemeni related and armed groups loyal to the internationally- unanswered. without warning, fired a missile on a passing conflict and political issues for numerous foreign and recognized government of President Abdrabbuh local news agencies. Mansour Hadi, backed by a Saudi Arabia-led In a joint report by Yemeni Mwatana for house where the children were playing in al- militar y coalition on one hand, and Houthi Human Rights and Open Society Foundation, Khosaf village, al-Hazm District of al-Jawf armed group and forces loyal to former nine case studies were documented that governorate, northeast Yemen. president Ali Abdullah Saleh on the other. included 26 civilian deaths and injuries to an This violence has created one of the worst additional 13 civilians during the period May The strike killed two AQAP suspects instantly, humanitarian crises in the countr y with 2013 until April 2014. 3 We present some of but shrapnel injured the civilian homeowner millions of people facing famine, displacement these findings below to illustrate Orfouj Qaid al-Mar wani, and injured his and diseases. the humanitarian impact of armed drones three children. Yemen 1 mainly contributed to several media, social, and humanitarian and human rights projects at Yemeni and foreign think tanks and organisations. He car on the main road, which is parallel to the in Yemen. Since 2002, hundreds of US drone strikes have been carried out in different parts of Yemen. Approximately 249 confirmed US strikes have been carried out and killed at least 160 civilians in different parts of Yemen. 2 The majority of these have been in the east and the south. They have killed significant numbers of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) senior commanders and operatives. In addition, they have been ver y successful in keeping the US army away from the dangers of direct engagement on the ground. However, dozens of such strikes have been imprecise enough to cause high scores of innocent civilian deaths and injuries. A statement made by the Mwatana Organization for Human Rights in 2017 provided the findings of field research that included evident civilian harm by US drone strikes. 4 These finding contradict the claims from the American government that its drones programme has “high precision” and a “low human cost”. Several documented case studies provide a considerable evidence of how US drone operations in Yemen have led to not only to high scores of civilian deaths and injuries but also constant pains, suffering, and health associated dilemmas. Zeina al-Mar wani, seven years old and injured with shrapnel in the lower part of the spine, pelvis, and right thigh, caused her complete paralysis. Due to the absence of decent health care, Zeina passed away on 10 Januar y 2016. The second child, Moe’ed al-Mar wani, was 12 years old and was injured with shrapnel in his right thigh and testicles. He is still suffering from a fragment left in his right thigh. The third child is Sa’adah al-Mar wani, was five years old. She was injured with shrapnel in her legs. In her testimony, the mother of the three children explained that she was pregnant at the time of the strike that caused her intense stress and fear that put her through severe complications throughout the rest of 24 her pregnancy. 1 “Data of drones war in Yemen,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/ data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2001-2011, 3 November 2002. 3 Waiting for Justice on civilian victims of US drones in Yemen, Mwatana for Human Rights, 19 January 2017, http:// mwatana.org/en/1912017603. 2 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 25 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: Y E M E N She spoke about the conditions of poverty A documentar y film that Mwatana has According to a testimony by a victim’s family These incidents offer a realistic and local they have been living under particularly since produced features a stor y of a US drone member, the Yemeni state paid a total of 15 perspective on the tangible, adverse impact of the children’s father, the only provider for the strike that killed four civilians and injured five million Yemeni riyals (an equivalent of US drones that have not been precise and fail family, passed away three months after the others while they were driving near another $69,809 USD at that time) in addition to 30 to prevent civilian deaths and injuries. They strike. Moe’ed pointed to the absence of car that was carr ying suspected AQAP Kalashnikov guns to be all divided among the were further unable to avoid causing harm to basic ser vices in their area and he added that members in al-Baidha Governorate, central families of the four killed victims. This was property and to the health and living he and other children have been deprived Yemen. Families of the victims spoke with following a tribal arbitration. The entire conditions of those in the affected from being able go to school, as a result of bitterness in the movie about the suffering of amount was spent on covering some of the communities. the current ongoing war in Yemen. their inconsolable losses and questioned the medical expenses needed for treatment of the reason behind targeting them, as they had sur viving injured victims. 5 According to a statement made by former US President Obama on 23 May 2013 6 and the Based on the testimonies of the families’ nothing to do with militants of any kind. The victims, US drones, just like AQAP forces, targeted vehicle was driving behind a Toyota In the documentar y, Ali Abed Rabbo al-Azzani, aftermath White House Fact Sheet 7 targeted have created a constant state of fear that Hilux vehicle that was transporting around 14 who lost his son Yasser in this strike, strikes are only made when there is “…near- accompanies residents of those areas where civilians who were mostly construction expressed the bitterness of loss and the certainty that no civilians will be killed or these strikes took place or drones hover workers in addition to the driver. The distance miser y his son’s death has brought. “What is injured.” In an apparent reference to so-called repeatedly. between the two vehicles was approximately left of my son is a few photographs and a pile signature strikes, based on individuals’ 20 to 30 meters. The workers were driving on of humble clothes,” he said. “My son’s death patterns of behavior, the Fact Sheet asserted al-Hazemya road from their villages in al- has left the family in need as Yasser was the that, “it is not the case that all militar y-aged Sawma’ah district, al-Baidha governorate and family’s breadwinner and was killed on his way males in the vicinity of a target are deemed to were heading to work in al-Baidha city. to work.” be combatants.” Our research however, The incident occurred on 19 April 2014, at Hussein al-Khushum also speaks about the instead, we have found civilians about 6:00. The shrapnel of the missiles hit burden his son’s death has left for him to killed and injured. the civilians’ car and killed four of them: shoulder as he is now responsible for taking Sanad Hussein Nasser al-Khushum (30 years), care of his three grandsons without any Yasser Abed Rabbo al-Azzani (18 years), additional income: “The news of his death Ahmed Saleh Abu Bakr (65 years) and broke our hearts and doubled our sorrows. He Abdullah Nasser Abu Bakr al-Khushu. was killed. Why? Why did they kill my son In an inter view with the child Moe’ed alMar wani, he spoke about the physical pain he still feels due to his injur y, in addition to the continuous anxiety he and other children in their village experience ever y time a drone is heard hovering overhead. Based on our findings, no official investigation has been carried out by any party into this incident nor any redress or remedy has been yet provided for the poor family. has found no US adherence to this policy and Sanad and my cousin Ahmed Saleh Abu Bakr? It also injured another five civilian passengers: My son and my cousin did not belong to any the driver, Nasser Mohammed Nasser (35 organization. My son Sanad was married and years), Abdulrahman Hussein al-Khushum (22 had three children. His main concern was to years whose brother Sanad al-Khushum was secure their future and earn their upkeep,” killed by the same strike, in addition to Najib Hussein explained. Hassan Nayef (35 years), Salem Nasser alKhushum (40 years), and Bassam Ahmed Salem Breim (20 years). 6 Remarks by US President Obama at the National Defense University, 23 May 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defenseuniversity. 7 “Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in 5 Death by Drone: Civilian Harm Caused by U.S. Targeted Killings in Yemen, Open Society Foundation, April 2015, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/death-drone, pp. 44-47. 26 Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,” The White House, 23 May 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/ fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-andprocedures-use-forcecounterterrorism. 27 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S In addition to not having been adequately Neglected communities that are affected by compensated for the harm caused by American drones are rapidly becoming a conducive 2. Environmental Harm airstrikes, sur vivors and victims’ relatives environment for the flourishing of al-Qaeda Doug Weir and Elizabeth Minor confirmed that no investigations have been militants as well as a recruiting source, conducted into the killings and damages. The because militants pander to this desire for US has not so far disclosed any information revenge against Americans. Finally, and most Doug Weir Manages the Toxic Remnants of War regarding these incidents nor the full legal importantly, the extent of inefficacy of US Project, which studies the environmental and basis for undertaking them. It is still unclear for drone program in Yemen has been ver y clearly derived humanitarian consequences of armed many, including the victims, whether drone seen through not only its failure to curb and operations in Yemen comply with international dismantle of terrorism movements, but also the law or not due to a lack of transparency. In armed conflict, and its aftermath, legal protection for the environment is weak, and systems for accountability and environmental conflict and militar y activities. In addition to remediation are largely absent. Those managing the Project, Weir is a Visiting Research protections that do exist have been most Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s unprecedented thriving and territorial expansion clearly articulated in relation to massive levels College London and blogs on conflict and the and establishing of its radical rule in different environment for The Ecologist, New Internationalist, of environmental harm. They primarily focus parts of the countr y. Al-Qaeda’s affiliates are UN Environment, and other platforms. stronger than ever in Yemen, according to a recent report by International Crisis Group. 8 Elizabeth Minor is an Advisor at Article 36, a UK-based organisation that works for the development of new policy and legal standards to prevent the unintended, unnecessar y or on the “natural environment”—without articulating the linkages between environmental quality and the enjoyment of fundamental human rights. However, the risks of the generation of toxic unacceptable harm caused by certain weapons. remnants of war—conflict pollution that She was previously a researcher at Ever y threatens human and ecosystem health—should Casualty and Oxford Research Group, where be an important consideration in taking steps she investigated the methodologies and practices used by states, international organisations and civil society to document and record the casualties of armed conflict and violence. and measures to progressively limit harm in the use of force. During the last decade, there has been a renewed effort to clarify and codify the relationship between environmental obligations stemming from international humanitarian law (IHL), international environmental law, and international human rights law, before, during, and after armed conflicts. The topic is currently under consideration by the International Law Commission, and states have expressed their growing concern over the environmental and derived humanitarian consequences of armed conflict at the UN Environment Assembly.1 8 Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base, International Crisis Group, 2 February 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middleeast-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemens-al-qaeda-expanding-base. 28 1 “Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission, Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts,” International Law Commission, 2017, http://legal.un. org/ilc/guide/8_7.shtml; “UNEP/EA.2/Res.15, Protection of the environment in areas affected by armed conflict,” United Nations Environment Assembly, 2016, https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/ handle/20.500.11822/11189/K1607252_UNEPEA2_RES15E. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 29 E N V I R O N M E N TA L H A R M Obligations to address the environmental legacy T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S • The use of explosive weapons has thecapacity Environmental impacts from the use of explosive weapons relevant concern in the context of airstrikes of pollution from armed conflicts and militar y to generate toxic remnants. One key concern conducted using drones. activities have been proposed by the surrounding armed drones is that these International Law Commission, 2 and have technologies have facilitated the expansion of Airstrikes from armed drones typically use Several widely used munitions that states have recently been articulated in the Treaty on the the types of contexts in which states have explosive weapons. 4 The use of explosive fired from drones present toxicity concerns, Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted in July been willing to use explosive force deployed weapons can produce pollutants that pose risks such as Hellfire missiles and GBU-12 and GBU- 2017. 3 These and other initiatives could support from aircraft. If such trajectories are permitted to human health following their initial impacts, 38 bombs. These contain conventional explosive the advancement of both law and practice with to continue, potential environmental harms risk particularly when these weapons are used in fills that utilise TNT and RDX. Both explosives respect to addressing toxic remnants of war. being seen in a greater variety of contexts; populated areas. 5 are mobile in the environment, meaning that, for example, they can spread from soils into The expansion of the use of armed drones by • The legal standards of armed conflict have been These toxic remnants—the effects of which are groundwater, and are toxic. The metals states to conduct airstrikes both within and applied in these particular uses of force, not well documented—may derive from the dispersed from these munitions are outside of armed conflict has coincided with this though these standards have been widely constituents of munitions or from the environmentally persistent. Where use is intense increased interest in enhancing the protection of argued to be the inappropriate framework. With destruction of buildings and damage to or sustained, evidence suggests that these can the environment in relation to armed conflicts. the low standards of environmental protection infrastructure, such as power, water, and reach sufficient levels to pose a threat to However, ver y little research has been associated with armed conflict, this could also sanitation facilities. Whilst potential toxic civilian health. 8 undertaken into any possible relationship present risks in terms of greater environmental impacts will be greatest where the use of between the use of armed drones and harm from the use of force; and explosive weapons in populated areas has been There may also be specific concerns from novel widespread and sustained,7 even limited use materials that are being used in munitions (such as individual air strikes) can bring risks to deployed from drone platforms. For example, environmental harm. • Given the low standards of environmental 6 Whilst not arguing that the environmental impact protection in armed conflict, it should be health in communities. As such, the Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME) munitions, of armed drones is a central component of the investigated whether drone technology through environmental impacts of explosive force are a the long-term health impacts of which are harms that they cause, this short perspective its unique characteristics could help facilitate unconfirmed, have reportedly been deployed proposes that air strikes conducted from drones the striking of environmentally risky targets from drones. 9 A lack of transparency over the could have environmental implications for during armed conflicts, and contribute to communities, and that these should be harmful practices in this way. considered in any discussions about the further regulation of drones. In addressing the Given the lack of research in this area, this problematic aspects or potentials of armed chapter does not propose definitive conclusions drones as a set of technologies, and current on these points. Rather, it proposes that these trajectories in their use, states should at least are areas where there may be questions and consider that: concerns that states and others should be encouraged to consider, as part of any discussion on the broader picture of harm caused by armed drones. 2 See draft principle 16 in “Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts: Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee,” International Law Commission, 9 August 2016, http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/ english/statements/2016_dc_chairman_statement_peac_9august. pdf&lang=E. 3 See Article 6 in “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” UN General Assembly, 7 July 2017, http://undocs.org/A/ CONF.229/2017/8. 30 4 The humanitarian harm caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas—from deaths and injuries to infrastructure damage and displacement—has been recognised by a number of states, civil society, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the UN Secretary-General among others. States are currently developing an international response to address this issue through a political declaration. See records of international debate collected by the International Network on Explosive Weapons at www.inew.org/acknowledgements. 5 See for example Andrew Garrity, “Conflict rubble: a ubiquitous and under-studied toxic remnant of war,” Toxic Remnants of War Project, 10 July 2014, http://www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/ conflict-rubble-a-ubiquitous-toxic-remnant-of-war. 6 So far most research into the health risks and environmental fate of the residues from explosive weapons has been restricted to domestic training ranges, and may not be representative of their use in populated areas in conflict and other settings. See for example: Koponen, K, “Development of Guidance Values for Explosive Residues;” and Walsh, et al. “Energetics Residues Deposition from Training with Large Caliber Weapon Systems,” in European Conference on Defence and the Environment, Proceedings 2015, http://www.defmin.fi/files/3353/ECDE_ Proceedings_2015.pdf. 7 See for example the UN Environment Programme’s assessment in 2009 of the impact of the Cast Lead offensive in Gaza, which documented dioxins and asbestos in the conflict rubble: “Environmental Assessment of the Areas Disengaged by Israel in the Gaza Strip,” United Nations Environment Programme, 2009, http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Gaza_web.pdf. deployment of advanced weapons by drones limits efforts to study and assess their potential health and environmental risks from a perspective of limiting harm. In populated areas, together with pulverised building materials, particulate matter, combustion products, household chemicals, and electrical components, munitions constituents can also contribute to the creation of complex polluted environments.10 The longer-term impact of these mixed exposures on human health 8 See for example “Lebanon Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment,” United Nations Environment Programme, 2007, http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Lebanon.pdf. 9 Raymond Whitaker, ‘”Tungsten bombs” leave Israel’s victims with mystery wounds,’ Independent, 18 January 2009, http://www. independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/tungsten-bombsleave-israels-victims-with-mystery-wounds-1418910.html. 10 Garrity, above note 5. 31 E N V I R O N M E N TA L H A R M T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Environmentally risky targets The existing thresholds for what constitutes result from the use of explosive force in In addressing drones as a development in widely acknowledged as being both too high, and humanitarian emergencies, and lack of access, conflict—including deaths, injuries, psychological weapons technology, states should consider poorly defined 12 —though the relevant general inadequate environmental data collection, and impacts, and the destruction of homes—have which features of systems could facilitate principles of distinction and proportionality insecurity hamper studies. been documented in novel contexts. This problematic practices or expansions in the use of nevertheless apply in the selection of targets transposition of known impacts in to different force, and how the implications of these could and of weapons, as does the principle of Environmental impacts are important to consider situations could also therefore apply to be contained. If one aspect of this is to consider precaution. Reliably predicting the outcome of in evaluating what the response should be to the environmental harms. In turn, if some current how certain capabilities have enabled expansions strikes on environmentally risky targets requires harms caused by the use of explosive weapons, use of armed drones by states has sought to in the contexts in which certain forms of force advanced knowledge of the design, state, and including in considering what the acceptable redefine where particular sets of laws governing have been used, another may be to consider the contents of the facility, and the ability to reliably limits are for the contexts in which drones can the use of force apply, such as the law of armed potential implications of the enhanced predict the health and environmental be used to conduct airstrikes. conflict, this also has clear implications for the sur veillance capabilities offered by drones for consequences of the damage caused; factors protection of the environment. facilitating attacks on targets whose destruction that will be balanced against the militar y carries particularly severe risks of generating advantage gained from disrupting or destroying it. remains understudied.11 This is due to the fact As a result of this particular pattern of airstrikes that public health responses prioritise acute launched from drones, harms to people known to threats where such use of weapons creates Challenging boundaries in the use of force The specific capabilities offered by certain drones have been used by some states to facilitate an expansion in the range of contexts in which they use explosive force. These states have used drones in a way that pushes at the legal and conceptual boundaries where certain types of violence generally associated with armed conflict are used. The technological features relevant here include the range, persistence, and sur veillance capabilities offered by drones, and the ability to use force without physical risk to the attacker. The interplay between the potentials provided by these characteristics, and problematic patterns in use—particularly the killing of those associated with particular groups across Along with other impacts, potentials for unacceptable environmental harm under IHL are conflict pollution. environmental damage in communities that can While aerial sur veillance data may increase the affect human health therefore bear consideration Numerous target types have the potential to confidence of mission planners, it is unlikely that in evaluating what the acceptable limits on the harm the environment and human health when it would contribute substantially to prior use of armed drones by states should be, and for damaged or destroyed. These include industrial, knowledge of the intrinsic risks within a facility setting standards against the facilitation of petrochemical, or pharmaceutical sites; or the often unpredictable environmental expansions in the contexts where certain types electricity production or distribution networks; outcome of its destruction. Nevertheless, it is of force are used. water treatment and distribution facilities; and conceivable that access to enhanced militar y bases and ammunition storage areas. sur veillance data could encourage the expansion of strikes against such targets, particularly when combined with precision weapons. This potential risk merits further investigation. In the majority of cases, the weak legal provisions protecting the environment in conflict make it unlikely that the consequences of such actions would breach existing thresholds—even where contamination creates persistent localised risks to communities and their environment. borders—provides a basis for international discussion on preventing harm from drones as a specific set of technologies. 11 See for example Manduca P, Naim A, and Signoriello S, “Specific Association of Teratogen and Toxicant Metals in Hair of Newborns with Congenital Birth Defects of Developmentally Premature Birth in a Cohort of Couples with Documented Parental Exposure to Military Attacks: Observational Study at Al Shifa Hospital, Gaza, Palestine,” Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 2014 11:5208-5223. 32 12 “Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict - An Inventory and Analysis of International Law”, United Nations Environment Programme, 2009, http://postconflict.unep.ch/ publications/int_law.pdf. 33 E N V I R O N M E N TA L H A R M The lack of transparency over the use of armed drones in recent conflicts makes it difficult to T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Conclusion Country case study: The Nigerian militar y has asserted a pressing Nigeria and has argued that drones are “necessar y” need for counter-insurgency (COIN) equipment, determine whether access to enhanced The environmental impacts of the use of force in sur veillance data has facilitated the targeting of general, and the use of armed drones in environmentally risky civilian and militar y particular, remain under-documented as a form of infrastructure. It has been reported that drones harm that is relevant to assessing the limits that are being used to some extent in strikes on ISIS might be placed on different weapons Joy Onyesoh is President of the Nigerian Section within an area where there is insurgency but oil operations in Syria and Iraq by the technologies. of the Women’s International League for Peace and also civilians. There is also the danger that Freedom (WILPF Nigeria), and Vice-President of the targeted population might not be “terrorists” in fighting the insurgency. But a key issue is how appropriate it is to launch such attacks international coalition for example,13 but the role WILPF International’s Executive Committee. In 2015, and impact of the use of drones in terms of In considering how state violence should be potentially raising—or reducing—environmental constrained, and the contexts in which certain risks to local populations in these operations is impacts of violence may be considered in Nigeria. The Women’s Situation Room empowers not clear. Recent reports of the use of a small permissible or not, environmental effects with women to take an active role in promoting peace drone to destroy an ammunition dump in Ukraine implications for human health must however be with grenades, which has likely caused extensive factored in—including with respect to armed environmental contamination, are also relevant drones. The lasting environmental impacts and to assessing the picture of use against sensitive long-term risks to human health from the use of industrial targets.14 force must, in turn, be curbed through more robust international rules. In identifying risks and issues, and considering potential restrictions on armed drones, states should also consider therefore whether the technology could help facilitate practices that pose particularly high environmental risks in communities, and seek data on how this and other risks may have played out in practice. Joy was awarded the Nigerian Citizen Responsibility Award for coordinating the Women’s Situation Room or “insurgents”, but might instead be an individual or a group that fits into a specific “terrorist” profile. and stability in their communities, and was convened As a Nigerian, I have a number of additional by the Nigerian Women’s Platform for Peaceful concerns about potential effects of the use of Elections, which was chaired by WILPF Nigeria. drones. These include the potential harms on the environment, human health, and agriculture. Recently, Nigeria became the eighth countr y to The geographical zones of Nigeria (northeast have used armed drones in combat, having and northwest) where most counter-insurgency announced a successful drone strike in its on- operations are taking place are known for their going war against the militant group Boko rich supply of farm crops such as grains and Haram. On 25 Januar y 2015, a photo appeared vegetables, and for animal rearing such as of online at Beegeagle’s Blog appearing to show cattle, sheep, and goats. Drone activities, in a CH-3 UCAV (“unmanned” combat aerial particular their munitions and the munitions vehicle) that crashed upside down near Dumge used against them, may pose a threat to public village in the Mafa District of Borno Province. health within these regions and their sources of Despite damage to the tricycle landing gear livelihood: the cultivation of crops and rearing and upper for ward fuselage, the CH-3 appears of animals. 1 to have crash-landed due to mechanical or control difficulties, as reported on the news. In Overall, the use of armed drones in Nigeria for the video released of the attack, there was a domestic “counter-insurgency” operations is large blast, and the Nigerian Air Force claims it troubling in the global context. Questions about hit a logistics base belonging to Boko Haram, the validity of armed drone use in such possibly an ammunition storehouse. 2 contexts have yet to be answered. In addition, the potential effects of such use on civilians 1 13 See for example, “RAF Tornados launch first strikes against Isis in Syria”, The Times, 3 December 2015, https://www.thetimes. co.uk/article/raf-tornados-launch-first-strikes-against-isis-in-syriarqpqq2qd88m. Attacks have frequently been carried out by the coalition on facilities for extraction, processing, and transportation—see coalition daily reports archived by Airwars at https://airwars.org/daily-reports. 14 David Hambling, “Small Russian Drones Do Massive Damage With Grenade Weapons,” Warrior, 18 July 2017. 34 See Beegeagle’s Blog, https://beegeagle.wordpress.com. 2 See “Nigeria becomes eighth country to use armed drones in combat,” Vanguard, 3 November 2016, http://www.vanguardngr. com/2016/11/nigeria-becomes-eighth-country-use-armeddrones-combat/; Kelsey D. Atherton, “Watch Nigeria’s First Confirmed Drone Strike - Against Boko Haram,” Popular Science, 3 February 2016, http://www.popsci.com/watchnigerias-first-confirmed-drone-strike; and Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “Did An Armed Chinese-Made Drone Just Crash in Nigeria?” Popular Science, 28 January 2015 http://www.popsci. com/did-armed-chinese-made-drone-just-crash-nigeria. and communities poses dangers that have not yet been addressed. 35 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S 3. Psychological Harm Radidja Nemar A civilian in Pakistan described drone operations Radidja Nemar leads Alkarama’s work and strategy on the Maghreb and Nile regions. She is currently finishing her PhD on the interplay between as amounting to a “slap in the dark”.1 This image is emblematic of a feeling of betrayal and Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law during treacher y that is perceived by the civilians living post-conflict transitional periods, for which she in areas where drone operations are carried out. undertook visiting research stints at Oxford and Yale Law School as a Fulbright Scholar. For a large swath of population in Yemen, living under a sky that has become a constant source Editors’ note: This is a shortened version of the of trauma is an ever yday reality. The sky in the report published by Alkarama in Februar y 2015. Yemeni countr yside, or the United States (US) It omits the section on legal implications as well as drones’ playground, regularly inflicts violence tables, charts, and annexes. The full-length version without any warning or reason on people that are is available online at http://www.alkarama.org/en/ already vulnerable to both poverty and conflict. documents/yemen-alkaramas-report-2015traumatising-skies-us-drone-operations-and-posttraumatic. US drone attacks have thus emerged to shape the perceptions, fears, and life choices of a large proportion of the Yemeni population. In turn, this “drone generation”—which is inevitably viewing the skies as a medium of death—is suffering tremendously from mental stresses that also culminate into physical distress. The repercussions of drone operations on civilians living in areas where the skies are a source of trauma, especially those who have not directly lost a relative or loved one to a drone strike, has not been given due consideration within policy or academic debates. ©2015 Alkarama Foundation. Nevertheless, the concern over the potential The combination of unclear legal and policy psychological impact of drones has been shared mechanisms around drone operations and by human rights and humanitarian organisations technology closely intersects with the such as the Office of the United Nations High perpetuation of post-traumatic stress disorder Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (PTSD) among Yemeni civilians living under 2 and the International Committee of the drones. A complete dearth of institutional Red Cross (ICRC), which have expressed mechanisms with regard to regulation, concern about the lack of measurement of the accountability, and retribution has ser ved to consequences of the constant presence of perpetuate loss of civilian lives, trauma, and drones on mental health. disruption of ever yday activities. Strongly 3 addressing these shortcomings will be instrumental, not only for delivering justice to 2 On 22 September 2014, Flavia Pansieri, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights raised the issue of the effects of drone operations on civilian populations, including the psychological effects. See: “Human Rights Council Holds Panel On Remotely Piloted Aircraft Or Armed Drones In Counterterrorism And Military Operations,” United Nations Press Release, 22 September 2014, http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media. nsf/%28httpNewsByYear_en%29/ BCE56ED914A46D40C1257D5B0038393F?OpenDocument. 1 Robert Greenwald, UNMANNED: America’s Drone Wars, Documentary film, Culver City: Brave New Films, 2013. 36 already vulnerable people, but also for ameliorating their lives in a countr y experiencing instances of violence on numerous fronts. 3 Peter Mauer, “The use of armed drones must comply with laws,” International Committee of the Red Cross, 10 May 2013, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/ interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm. 37 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S P SYC H O LO G I C A L H A R M This chapter, and the full version of this study, Yemen is located amidst two regional AQAP has been responsible for numerous Although, the US have never declared war on takes on the difficult task of shedding some light heavyweights, Saudi Arabia and Iran, which attacks in the region, including against the US Yemen, the threat posed by AQAP has been on the mental state of civilians who attempt to have been pushing to further their influence over presence in the countr y while remaining engaged used to justify a dramatic increase in air and lead their lives under the murmurs of drones. In Sana’a. In 2004, fighting began in the northwest in fierce fighting with both the Houthis and drone strikes under the Obama administration.11 doing so, this study presents the findings from a of the countr y between the government and Yemeni government forces, the latter being The London-based Bureau of Investigative sur vey conducted by Alkarama in the Yemeni the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia minority, leading to considered by AQAP, as a US proxy. Journalism estimates that between 2002 and countr yside that assesses the prevalence of six rounds of fighting between 2004 and 2010. PTSD among civilian populations. What makes Neither party has respected the different peace In addition, since 2015 Saudi Arabia has led a strikes in Yemen, killing 362 to 531 people, agreements over the years. The rebels have coalition of nine African and Middle Eastern including 64 to 83 civilians, among which 7 have account people who have lost their loved ones accused Saudi Arabia for supporting the Yemeni countries supporting the Yemeni government in been children. The Bureau also estimates to drone attacks as well as those who are simply government, while the government has accused the civil war. This militar y inter vention has possible extra drone strikes ranging between 101 living under the traumatic skies. Iran of meddling in its internal matters. 5 primarily consisted of bombing campaigns to 120, having killed 345 to 553 people, of which against the Houthis, which has resulted in a 26 to 68 were civilians, including 6 to 11 By September 2014, the Houthis started to humanitarian catastrophe. The aerial children.12 Yemen’s ties with the United States exert their strength over the Yemeni government bombardment of populated areas has resulted in were reinforced under the Obama administration. by taking control of key sites in Sana’a and massive civilian deaths and injuries, as well as The Yemeni government has given US forces a demanding the reversal of government policies, destruction of civilian infrastructure leading to free rein to participate in militar y operations over especially with regard to fuel subsidies. 6 Most famine and the world’s largest cholera outbreak. 9 large areas, without any checks and balances this study particularly unique is that it takes into Political background In 1990, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and the Arab Republic of Yemen (North Yemen) were formally unified as the Republic of Yemen, despite the fact that hostilities between the North and South had existed for nearly two decades amidst Cold War politics and ideological oppositions. Soon after the formal unification, a Southern secessionist movement was born, leading to a brief civil war in 1994. The South was quickly subdued and the Northern government based in Sana’a exerted 4 8 2014 there have been 71 to 83 confirmed drone recently, Yemen was pushed into a civil war when the Houthis seized the capital, leading Against the backdrop of decades of political President Hadi to flee the capital. Although the instability, the Yemeni economy has also main battleground remains between the Houthi suffered considerably. The World Bank indicates forces and those loyal to the President, both that Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the President Hadi and the Houthis also face al- Arab world. Poverty, which was already in the Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP).7 rise prior to the latest political crisis, has further on the use of force. Drone operations have, in turn, emerged as the “go-to method” for US militar y operations.13 increased from 42% of the population in 2009 its control over the whole countr y. to 54.5% in 2012. Additionally, not only has Yemen one of the highest population growth rates in the world, but it is also one of the most food insecure countries with scarce water resources.10 8 “Yemen’s AQAP Says Houthis Will Pay for Push into Country,” Reuters, 21 November 2014, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/11/21/us-yemen-qaeda-warningidUSKCN0J518B20141121. 6 “Houthis Clash with Police at Yemen’s Airport” Al Jazeera, 11 November 2014 9 See for example “Yemen: The world’s largest humanitarian crisis,” Al Jazeera, 3 July 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2017/07/yemen-world-largest-humanitariancrisis-170703130224623.html; Cassady Rosenblum, “Yemen is a humanitarian catastrophe. U.S. officials don’t want you to know why,” Los Angeles Times, 3 August 2017, http://www.latimes.com/ opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-yemen-war-crimes-20170803-story.html; and Pamela Falk, “Cholera crisis hits grim threshold in Yemen,” CBS News, 14 August 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ cholera-crisis-yemen-world-health-organization. 7 “Yemen Crisis: Who Is Fighting Whom?” BBC News, 26 March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middleeast-29319423. 10 “Yemen Overview,” World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/ en/country/yemen/overview#1. 4 “Yemen Profile”, BBC, 4 October 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-middle-east-1470495. 5 “Yemen’s Hadi Accuses Iran Of Supporting Secessionists,” Al-Monitor, 5 October 2012, http:// www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/10/the-yemeni-presidentiran-is-sup.html 38 11 Gregory Johnsen, “Resetting US Policy Toward Yemen,” Council on Foreign Relations, 27 September 2011, http://www.cfr. org/yemen/resetting-us-policytowardyemen/p26026. 12 “Drone Wars: The Full Data,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/ stories/2017-01-01/drone-wars-the-full-data. 13 Vivian Salama, “Death From Above: How American Drone Strikes Are Devastating Yemen,” Rolling Stone Magazine, 14 April 2014, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/deathfromabove-how-american-drone-strikes-are-devastating-yemen20140414#ixzz3GEFtACru. 39 P SYC H O LO G I C A L H A R M T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S The Alkarama civilian PTSD screening study in Yemen Methodology In order to take for ward our earlier (2012–2013) From July to September 2014, Alkarama research on the impact of the US drone attacks conducted a study to assess the level of PTSD in Yemen on the civilian population,14 as well as among the civilian population living in Yemeni on their legal implications, we decided to sur vey villages where US drones are operational. a sample of individuals who live in Yemeni villages where drone operations are being For this purpose, our field researchers sur veyed carried out by the US. 100 adults from different age groups, among whom 50 are women and 50 are men, along with Our goal was to understand whether or not 27 children, among whom 13 are girls and 14 are civilians living under drones exhibit symptoms boys, who were selected randomly in two of PTSD similar to those who have directly lost villages. In order to keep the respondents as a family member as a result of drone strikes. A well as our researchers out of harms way, we Stanford-NYU report has qualitatively taken up have anonymised ever yone throughout this study. a similar endeavour to highlight trauma among those “living under drones” in Pakistan.15 The sur vey to conduct the PTSD screening is based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Our belief, which finds an empirical grounding in this study, is that the simple fact of living under drones has psychological consequences that are no different from those caused by the loss of a relative in a strike. In this sense, we are tr ying to show that the fear of being killed or having a relative killed by a drone at any moment and without knowing the reasons that might cause such a death is of such intensity that it can lead to PTSD. The intensity of the suffering is such that we believe it amounts to cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment of civilians. of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association.16 We designed the screening in such a way that the panel chosen represented an equal number of men and women, from different age categories, and inclusive of individuals who have suffered the loss of a relative in a drone attack and those individuals who have not. Furthermore, we designed a separate sur vey for the PTSD screening of children in order to take into account the peculiar way children develop different symptoms.17 For both adults and children, the PTSD sur vey included a preliminar y introduction in order to ensure that the respondents clearly knew what a drone and a drone attack were, as well as to ascertain that they were aware of drones operating in their region. Our study was thus 14 “The United States’ War on Yemen—Drone Attacks,” Report Submitted to the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terror, Alkarama , 3 June 2013, http://en.alkarama. org/yemen/1335-yemen-the-united-states-war-on-yemen-droneattacks. 15 Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford University and Global Justice Clinic at New York University, September 2012, http:// chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Living-Under-Drones.pdf. 40 designed to highlight the direct link between the trauma arising from living under drones to PTSD. This study presents the findings separately for adults and children, even if all respondents show The sur veys were first translated from English common patterns of PTSD symptoms. A specific into Arabic and were conducted in Arabic by focus is also directed towards understanding the Alkarama’s research team in Yemen. They were effects on the most vulnerable people. We carried out in the villages of Qawl (in the believe that, in order to fully comprehend the district of Jahana, region of Sana’a) and Al Sirin suffering of a victim of inhumane and degrading (in the district of Sanhan, region of Sana’a). treatment, it is also important to take into Both villages are situated in the southeast of account subjective elements such as the Sana’a and are in regions where drone particular vulnerabilities of some of the victims operations are carried out by the United States and the cultural specificities of Yemeni society. against alleged al-Qaeda militants. The questions asked as part of the PTSD sur vey Findings were closed-ended, thereby implying that the Our findings reveal that, among adults, PTSD is respondent was asked a question, which could extremely prevalent, with 72 respondents only be answered with either ‘Yes’, ‘No’, or ‘Not displaying many of its symptoms, 27 Giving an Answer’. The last section of the respondents deemed as likely to have PTSD, and screening, however, was left open-ended for the only one respondent showing a few symptoms. inter viewer to assess the respondent’s link between his/her PTSD and drone attacks based We found the following common patterns of on their personal interaction, while also providing symptoms among all respondents regardless of space for the inter viewer to add further age, gender, or whether or not they lost an obser vations and for the inter viewee to express immediate family member as a consequence of a her/himself. The comments by the inter viewers, drone strike: which often also included testimonies by the respondents included in this section, enabled us to collect valuable qualitative data in addition to the quantitative data collected from the PTSD questionnaire. The sur vey questionnaires for both adults and children are available in the Annexes contained in the full-length version of this report, for further reference. • Constant anxiety; • Constant fear to be killed or to have a relative killed by a drone attack; • Sleep-related troubles, including insomnia, nightmares and enuresis for children; • Deep emotional distress, especially when drone operations resume; • Depression and sadness; • Anger and frustration towards the Yemeni and US governments; 16 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994). • Feelings of detachment from the ordinar y world; 17 See Foa, E.B., Johnson, K.M., Feeny, N.C., & Treadwell, K.R.H, “The child PTSD symptom scale (CPSS): A preliminary examination of its psychometric properties,” Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 30, 2001, pp. 376–384. • Feelings of being not worthy of protection or and attention from the government. 41 P SYC H O LO G I C A L H A R M T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Civilians who witnessed drone attacks on the reported being haunted by the horrifying image The answer to this question is further reinstated as the perpetrators of violence that creates this ground are experiencing constant fear and of their relatives’ bodies and remains and by a similar trend in the answers to the question suffering in their lives. insomnia. Even civilians who do not have emphasised their fear of being killed in the same around whether they had upsetting thoughts or casualties in their families express trauma way. The fear is increased by the lack of images about drones that came into their heads It is important to note that the children who had syndromes in their daily lives. Comments understanding of the reasons why their relatives when they did not want them to. 87% of the lost a family member have PTSD deriving from underlying a “desire for revenge” are common, were killed, making them unable to prevent such children respondent answered positively to the both the fact that they lost a loved one as well especially among men. During the day, the a fate for themselves or their loved ones. Most questions. Girls are more affected and the as due to the fear that a drone attack might sounds of aerial vehicles make them stop their of them are now also providing for the wife and percentage is extremely high regardless of strike again and kill another member of their daily activities, while at night, they suffer from children of their deceased relatives. This adds to age or situation, as well between those that family. For example, the son of one the victims insomnia.18 A recurring pattern is the feeling of the psychological pressure and anxiety, given are family members of victims, and those that of a drone attack, nine-year-old Taha, is suffering disregard for their human dignity by both the US the extreme poverty in these communities that are not. tremendously and sleeps only in the lap of his and the Yemeni government. further heightens vulnerabilities and economic pressures. The constant fear of being targeted or having a older brother. He is constantly scared of losing Sadness and depression is also assessed by the his brother, too. Eleven-year-old Muad, who lost lack of interest children show in activities that his father to a drone attack in Januar y 2013 in relative targeted can also be seen in answers to The fact that none of the victims’ families are they used to enjoy. When asked whether they the village of Khawlan, is experiencing serious questions asking if the respondent is feeling being heard by the authorities, Yemeni or are having much less interest in doing things speech problems due to the trauma. mostly “on guard” or whether he/she has an American, nor being offered any form of redress they used to do, the answers are a striking yes exaggerated startled response to a sudden or explanation, is leading to a rise in anger for 85% of them. noise. This highlights the constant state of among male respondents. Depression and tension that is present in the lives of the sadness is rampant as well as the feeling of “not Sadness and depression are combined with other the question regarding feelings of irritability or population. being treated like human beings.” Among the symptoms, especially anxiety. The anticipation of having fits of anger. Although the figures drop victims’ families, the knowledge that drone another attack creates a recurrent sense of fear significantly for boys who have not lost a family Eighty per cent of adults answered positively to operations are about to resume ser ves as a that is but furthered by anxiety. It is thus no member, they stay ver y high for girls and for all Question 25: ”Do you feel “on guard” most of constant reminder about the loss of their surprise that answers to the question, “Are you the other categories. the time—i.e. being “super alert” or watchful?” relatives, and perpetuates their feelings of afraid that a drone attack might harm you, or Similarly, 75% of adults answered yes to hopelessness, anger, and sadness, as well as your family, or your community?” highlight that Among girls, the prevalence of anxiety, stress, Question 26: “Do you have an exaggerated fear of losing other members of their family. 20 96% of the children feel this way. and sadness is generally higher. Those who lost 19 We also obser ved that boys who had lost a family member are more likely to answer yes to a family member—like twelve-year-old Imen, who startled response most of the time?” Effects on children In general, the feeling of fear is further lost her mother, and twelve-year-old Yosra, who exacerbated among children when they hear lost her father, both in a drone attack in 2013— The study found that children, too, are expressing sounds that resemble the buzzing of drones. 74% stopped the enjoyable activities that they used Victims’ families are particularly vulnerable to severe sadness and fear when they hear sounds of of children respondents say that they are jumpy to engage in, such as playing outdoors. 22 PTSD. They show symptoms that are both aircrafts or drones, or when they hear news that or easily startled when someone walks behind Thirteen-year-old Saqra, who lost her uncle, caused by the way their loved ones died as well drone operations are about to resume in the region. them or when they walk in the street and/or hear stopped painting and is constantly afraid of as by the fear of losing another relative in the More than half (51%) of the children screened said any sudden sound. losing her brother and father. Girls who have not same way. The majority of men inter viewed that drones got in the way of their general Specificity of victims’ families 18 More symptoms were reported. For example, Ahmed a young farmer who hadn’t lost a family member to drone attacks, says that he cannot stay in the kitchen because of the sound emitted by the fridge in the kitchen. It makes him particularly anxious because it gives him the feeling that there is a drone above him. Other respondents complained of increased blood pressure when they hear that drone operations are resuming in the region or after hearing about a drone attack. 19 See Chart 12, Annex C in the full-length report available online. 42 21 lost a family member tend to ask if the same happiness in the two weeks preceding the We also discovered a worrisome trend among thing will happen to their relatives and are screening. When we asked the children if they were boys who often talk about strong feelings of constantly worried about their fates. feeling upset—i.e. scared, angry, sad, guilty—when anger, hatred, and a desire for revenge against they think or hear about drones, the answers were those responsible for the drone attacks. They almost all positive, especially among girls, 100% of clearly identify the US and Yemeni governments whom answered yes. 20 Vivian Salama, “Death From Above,” op. cit. 21 This symptom is particularly prevalent amongst women and girls. 22 Chart 6 in Annex C of the full report shows the prevalence of this symptom especially amongst children and women. 43 P SYC H O LO G I C A L H A R M T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S In addition, we have numerous children from where no social care is provided. Drone attacks Finally, it is important to highlight certain unusual not an individual has lost a family member to a both victims’ families and families who have not targeting male members of the society thus have effects that were reported by other studies. drone attack, simply because trauma has lost a relative, who suffer from enuresis, a strong repercussion on the lives of women in There have been reports of women miscarr ying become per vasive in a society living constantly especially when they hear that a drone attack these areas. as a direct consequence of a fear arising from under the fear of drones. One of the causes of drones. Rumours that drones are able to see this fear is the complete lack of understanding, take place. Such manifestations of fear are Women tend to show higher levels of fear of inside the houses and watch women have also due to the absence of transparency in the drone bound to have long-term psychological and losing a child or another relative. 100% of spread, leading some of them to live under the policy, as to what might trigger a drone attack, physical effects on these children. women who have not lost a relative answer yes constant fear that, even inside their homes, they who may be targeted, and when. to the question, “Are you afraid that a drone are watched by male US soldiers, 23 hence In the community of Qawla (district of Jahanah, attack might harm you, your family, or your affecting their behavioural patterns as they The most vulnerable people in the Yemeni in the region of Sana’a), the death of a teacher community?” Women respondents also reported believe they have lost all their privacy. Overall, society, namely women as well as children, are killed by a drone strike had a particularly strong in the comments section that they increasingly women and girls show higher positive results as particularly at risk of suffering from severe effect on the children of the school where the feared social gatherings, including wedding one can see in the overall charts contained in psychological issues. When children start to fear teacher used to give class. A strong desire for celebrations, thereby further inhibiting their Annex C in the full study. For example, 100% of going to school and worr y about playing outside revenge now animates many children, especially movements in the public sphere. Some women who lost relatives and 95% of those who because drones might cause death, the growth boys, who associate it with a feeling of hatred specifically noted that they “avoided making too have not reported being easily startled. In the of a psychologically healthy society that is and anger. Some of the boys have lost interest much noise” and “staying for too long in a large same vein, women and girls in both categories capable of reducing existing conflicts is under in school. One of the students of the deceased group” when participating in local functions or have higher results when in it comes to sleeping serious jeopardy. Filled with anxiety, fear, teacher even said that he lost interest in celebrations, for fear that it might trigger a drone problems. 24 depression, anger, and frustration, both the receiving an education due to the anger he was attack. happened or rumours that an attack is about to feeling following his teacher’s death. For example, Fatima, aged 40, married and Lastly, children, like adults, display a high level mother of five, reported that even sounds of joy of sleep related troubles such as insomnia or and celebrations were causing an exaggerated nightmares. While the majority of the children startle reaction among women during festivities. show symptoms of sleep-related troubles (67% It was also noted that mothers of teenage boys of them), the girls in particular are most affected are particularly afraid that their children will be by nightmares, insomnia, and enuresis. targeted or killed, as it has been the policy to target males that are of combat age. Atiqa, a Effects on women Effects on women should be understood in the particular social and economic system that 55-year-old mother of three who rarely steps out of her home, said that whenever she heard of a young and old are craving for justice and in some Conclusions and recommendations This study’s objective was to shed light on the heavy cost paid by the most vulnerable people living under drones in Yemen. These civilians, who are already grappling with extreme poverty and famine, and are exposed to insecurities from diverse armed groups, are being further traumatised from the skies by a much more powerful actor. drone attack in the area, her blood pressure cases for revenge against those they identify as responsible for their suffering. An entire generation living in a constant state of uncertainty and unpredictability, with no recourse to justice or redress, and marked by a sense of powerlessness to plan a secure future of respect and dignity, is being lost under traumatising skies. These immediate consequences of drone operations, especially if they are not addressed urgently, will most certainly contribute towards long-term political, social, and economic instability in the region. problems became more severe, forcing her to The findings of this study are reflective of the stay in bed for several days. severity of the costs that civilians have to Furthermore, the asymmetr y and inequality of forcibly cope within their daily lives. An are expected to rely solely on their husbands or power that marks the strength of US drone over whelming majority of adult respondents are other men in the family for protection, as well as operations around vulnerable civilians is seen to be suffering from numerous drone- supporting the children. Becoming a single compounded by a complete absence of any inflicted symptoms of PTSD, which are even mother easily exacerbates social vulnerability in administrative or judicial mechanisms, nationally more prevalent amongst children. The situation such a setting. or internationally, that can protect these civilians has transcended the question about whether or or provide them with any kind of redress. The defines the Yemeni countr yside. Here, nearly all married women are stay-at-home mothers who Furthermore, women’s economic vulnerability is further amplified as a consequence of losing the family’s sole breadwinner, the man, in a countr y 44 legal implications of drone attacks, both in 23 Ibid. 24 See Charts 1, 2, 3, 9 and 12 in Annex C found in the fulllength report available online. international and national legal frameworks, have been profound as drone attacks continue to 45 P SYC H O LO G I C A L H A R M proliferate with minimal regulation, transparency, T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Recommendations for the US government: suffering from trauma due to drone operations accountability, and retribution. A “legal blackhole” has engulfed all aspects of drone • We recommend to the US government to operations, while the international humanitarian publish and explain in full transparency its legal law (IHL) and human rights law are increasingly standards and institutional processes for being overlooked. conducting drone strikes and targeted killings and take into account due process of law This most certainly is a failure of the international guarantee for both US and non-US nationals; community in containing a weapon and process of warfare that has underhandedly been causing • That it also clarify its method of counting severe harm to civilian populations. Moreover, civilian casualties and explain how the method the ver y nature of drone technology and the is consistent with IHL standards; peculiar landscape of warfare it invariably creates have not been engaged with adequately in legal and ethical contexts. The low political cost of drone operations for powerful countries is met on the other side by the constant suffering of a population towards whom none can be hold responsible. For those who believe that fundamental rights of individuals are universal, a fundamental moral question needs to be raised: are we not equal with regard to our protection from this form of militar y action? • Assist in providing psychological care to those Recommendations for the international community: through technical and financial assistance; and • We request that the debate on legal and • Stop drone attacks in Yemen and in all other territories and favour alternative means to ethical issues raised by the use of drones takes centre stage and receives more attention; “counterterrorism” by putting at the core of its policy respect for the rights and dignity of • That more pressure be placed on the US people affected by both terrorism and government as well as other states to counterterrorism. revise policies and practices surrounding drone strikes; Recommendations for the Yemeni government: • That international mechanisms for regulating • Where factual disputes exist about the threat • We request the Yemeni government to demand and making drone strikes accountable be levels regarding past drone strikes, we request an immediate end to drone strikes within its discussed and developed at the earliest within the US government to release the relevant territories and to hold itself accountable the United Nations human rights mechanisms; details and explain why a particular threat was for violations committed with its consent and considered as imminent triggering the right to to its population; • That greater attention be placed on aspects self-defence; • To ensure that civilians affected by drone • Clarify the condition used to assess the validity of express sovereign’s consent or the inability strikes directly or indirectly have provisions of psychological impacts and loss of life due to drone strikes among civilians. for redress within the domestic system; and unwillingness of those sovereigns to suppress a legitimate threat for all past, current and future operations; • To ensure that the rights of the civilians are protected in regions where drones are operated; and • Engage with the ethical issues, the blowback, and the negative consequences of the drone • To address the psychological consequences policy, including for the United States’ own of drone operations and push the US interests, as the impact of drones on civilians government to implement the recommendations has created strong feelings of resentment mentioned above. towards the US and its allies in the region, notably by providing families of victims with a right to effective remedy and compensation; • Introduce institutional mechanisms which allows full accountability and retribution for violations associated with the use of drone; • Acknowledge the consequence of this policy on affected populations and provide full reparation and apologies to these people; 46 47 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S 4. Harm to Global Peace and Security Chris Cole The primar y focus of the debate about the impact Chris Cole is founder of Drone Wars UK, which was established in 2010 to undertake research, education, and campaigning on the use of armed of armed drones has been their use for extrajudicial killing outside of the battlefield: drones. He is author of Convenient Killing: Armed targeted killing, as it has become more widely Drones and the PlayStation Mentality (2010) and known. Almost since they were first deployed, Drone Wars: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Out of armed drones have been used by the United Control (2016) and the convenor of the Drones Campaign Network. He lives in Oxford with his wife, Virginia and their three children. States in particular but also more recently by Israel and the United Kingdom to “find, fix, and finish” those deemed to be a threat to national security. However, the aim of this chapter is to look beyond the issue of targeted killing and to argue that armed drones per se are a danger to global peace and security. While the policy of using armed drones to carry out targeted killings beyond the battlefield is rightly an issue of serious concern, the wider impact of the technology itself also needs to be addressed. Drones combine various pre-existing technologies to form a new and radically different way of launching armed force—one with virtual impunity. The impact of this new weapon system, enabling so-called risk-free war, on the political-military decision making process in times of crisis, as well as on long term military policy, needs to be carefully examined. It is the advent of the remotecontrolled armed drone that has enabled the huge expansion of targeted killing over the past decade. There is growing evidence that the existence of this new form of war making and its impact on policymakers is lowering the threshold for the use of armed force, transferring the risk of warfare from combatants to civilians, and increasingly disconnecting the public from the human impact of armed combat. 48 Are drones different? traditional piloted aircraft. Armed remote Although some insist that armed unmanned capability, much prized by militar y planners. This drones are in effect no different from other new capability, coming at a time when we have militar y aircraft and therefore the technology seen a real decline in public appetite for militar y itself cannot be at issue, there are two ver y inter vention, is having an important impact, both real and important differences. Firstly and on the way armed conflict is being initiated, as most obviously, armed drones can be operated well as the way it is being fought. remotely, sometimes over ver y great distances, via satellite links. Drone advocates routinely insist that remoteness is nothing new, often referring to the fact that soldiers attacked from a distance using the longbow or trebuchet (a roman catapult) in the distant past. To suggest, however, that there is little ethical or militar y difference between the distance given through use of a longbow, and that hyper-remoteness given through use of an armed drone controlled from the other side of the globe, is akin to suggesting that smart phones are little different from carrier pigeons. Separate, but linked to the ability of armed drones be operated remotely, is the issue of persistence is a new and important strategic Lowering the threshold for use of armed force The primar y way that drones are impacting peace and security is the way they appear to be lowering the threshold for use of force, both in terms of resorting to the use of force (ad bellum) and the use of force during armed conflict (in bello). Linked with this is the way the presentation of drone warfare as precise and “risk-free” is rehabilitating warfare as a normal and legitimate means of solving political and security problems. Drones and the resort to force persistence. Due to the lack of crew on board, In modern democracies, politicians understand drones can remain airborne far longer than a that there is a political cost to launching militar y piloted aircraft. Typically a fast-jet can fly for inter vention overseas. Whatever the arguments around eight hours before the crew become about whether a particular inter vention is fatigued. Armed drones fly far longer, currently justified under international law, time and time around 20 hours, by simply changing the crew on again, polling has shown that the public do not the ground. The length of time that armed drones like to see young ser vice men and women sent can stay aloft, watching and waiting before overseas returning in wheelchairs or coffins.1 striking at “targets of opportunity,” is increasing The potential political impact of TV footage all the time. It is this ability to be persistent, in showing grieving families awaiting the funeral combination with hyper-remoteness, which corteges of those killed in foreign wars is a makes armed drones different from other armed definite restraint on political leaders weighing up militar y aircraft. the option of a possible militar y inter vention. So, there are ver y real and important differences between armed unmanned systems like the Reaper and Predator—never mind the much more advanced armed drones that are beginning to make their way off the drawing board—and 1 Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, “America’s Tolerance for Casualties, 1950–2006,” in Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 23–66. See also Joel Faulkner Rogers, “Report on British attitudes to defence, security and the armed forces,” YouGov, 25 October 2014, https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/10/25/report-britishattitudes-defence-security-and-arme. 49 H A R M TO G LO B A L P E AC E A N D S EC U R I T Y T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Take away that potential cost, however, by using While campaigners have been making this types of force. 6 The results show, say Walsh and The Stimson Center puts it, “the availability of armed unmanned systems and it makes it much argument for some time, as the use of armed Schulzke, “that participants are more willing to lethal UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] easier for political leaders to opt to use lethal drones has grown, establishment voices, too, support the use of force when it involves drone technologies has enabled US policies that likely militar y force. Recognising this, British militar y are now recognising the dangers of the strikes.” They go on: would not have been adopted in the absence of planners circulated a discussion document on technology itself. General Stanley McChr ystal, how to avoid “casualty aversion,” as it is known, for example, former commander of US and Drones lower inhibitions against initiating by using a strategy of lowering the profile of NATO forces in Afghanistan, told a conference in armed conflicts as many critics of this The British use of armed drones in Syria in 2014 repatriation ceremonies, as well as using armed London in 2015 that he believes the capabilities technology have predicted. Respondents were and 2015 also shows how drones are lowering drones, mercenaries, and special forces. 2 of drones make them more palatable to militar y consistently more likely to favor the use of UAVs the threshold for the resort of the use of armed decision-makers and “lower the threshold” for over ground forces in each of the experiments, force. In September 2014, following a request for The availability of armed drones, it appears, lethal force. 3 Towards the end of his presidency, regardless of the objectives being pursued. help from the Iraqi government, British MPs pushes political leaders away from engaging in Barack Obama, too, seemed to accept this when They were also more willing to initiate conflicts debated a government motion to authorise the the often difficult and long-term work of solving he told CNN, “It became so easy to use them using drones than piloted aircraft… use of armed force against ISIS strictly within the root causes of conflicts through diplomatic without thinking through all the ramifications.”4 and political means, towards a quick, short-term Even the UK Ministr y of Defence seems to have “fix” of “taking out the bad guys”. UAVs.”9 7 the borders of Iraq. MPs approved the motion The US use of armed drones to attack al-Qaeda and strikes in Iraq began almost immediately. in Pakistan in recent years is often cited as an Within six weeks, however, British drones were example of how this is happening in practice. crossing the border into Syria, with intelligence According to The Bureau of Investigative gathered by the British drones used by the US- Journalism (TBIJ) there have been over 420 US led oalition forces to undertake strikes in Syria.10 Increased use [of remote and automated airstrikes in Pakistan (up to the end of 2016), When questioned by the media about legal systems] in combat and support functions will all carried out by armed drones. Pakistan has authorisation for such missions, the Prime reduce the risk to military personnel and publicly condemned the strikes on numerous Minister’s official spokesman said it was thereby potentially change the threshold for occasions but does not attempt to shoot down because the flights did not amount to militar y the use of force. Fewer casualties may lower the drones for fear of causing all-out war with action. He stated, “The prime minister and political risk and any public reticence for a the US (although there are reports that indicate government have made clear that we would military response… some officials within the Pakistan administration return to parliament for a separate decision if we secretly supported the strikes, at least for were proposing to take militar y action. This is some time. 8 ) about intelligence gathering.”11 academics James Igor Walsh and Marcus The US has never risked piloted aircraft to Despite these claims it is difficult to understand Schulzke sur veyed 3000 individuals on their undertake these strikes, relying wholly on armed how armed militar y flights over a sovereign perception of the use of force when drones were drones. While it is hard to prove, it is difficult to countr y do not amount to “militar y action”. used in comparison to the deployment of other imagine the US would have undertaken so many Flights by Russian militar y aircraft that come incursions and strikes without the availability of near, but not within, UK air space incur a strong come to this conclusion, stating in a recent policy document, Future Operating Environment 2035: 5 In a 2015 empirical study into the public perception of the use of armed drones, this technology. As respected US think tank, 2 Ben Quinn, “Mod study sets out how to sell wars to the public,” The Guardian, 26 September 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/ uk-news/2013/sep/26/mod-study-sell-wars-public. Note original discussion paper has been removed from MoD website. 50 3 Richard Norton-Taylor and Alice Ross, “RAF base may be legitimate target for Isis, says ex-Nato commander,” The Guardian, 25 November 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/ nov/25/raf-base-may-be-legitimate-target-isis-ex-nato-commander. 6 James Igoe Walsh and Marcus Schulzke, The Ethics of Drone Strikes: Does Reducing The Cost of Conflict Encourage War? US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2015, https://ssi. armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1289. 4 Nicole Gaouette, “Obama on the future of terrorism after bin Laden raid,” CNN, 3 May 2016, http://edition.cnn. com/2016/05/02/politics/obama-terror-doctrine-bin-laden-raid. 7 5 Strategic Trends Programme: Future Operating Environment 2035, Ministry of Defence, August 2015, pp. 31–32, https://www. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/607612/20150731-FOE_35_Final_v29-VH.pdf. Ibid. p. 25. 8 Greg Miller and Bob Woodward, “Secret memos reveal explicit nature of US, Pakistan agreement on drones,” The Washington Post, 26 April 2010, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ national-security/top-pakistani-leaders-secretly-backed-cia-dronecampaign-secret-documents-show/2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html?utm_term=.f6d2a9409e35. 9 Recommendations and Report of The Task Force on US Drone Policy, The Stimson Center, April 2015, https://www.stimson.org/ sites/default/files/file-attachments/recommendations_and_report_ of_the_task_force_on_us_drone_policy_second_edition.pdf. 10 Rowena Mason, “UK to fly military drones over Syria,” The Guardian, 21 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2014/oct/21/uk-to-fly-military-drones-over-syria. See also FCO response to PQ from Andrew Rosindell MP, 23 February 2015, http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/writtenquestions-answers-statements/written-question/ Commons/2015-02-11/224326. 11 Ibid. 51 H A R M TO G LO B A L P E AC E A N D S EC U R I T Y T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S response from UK government. Without a UN The overall question here is whether these While it seems true the drone pilots appear consequences of strikes against individuals they resolution or a request from the Syrian militar y inter ventions, both the campaign of US to have little leeway to launch strikes kill. While not wanting to dismiss these findings, government, any militar y operation by the UK airstrikes against Al Qaeda and others in independently, the only publicly available US official studies show that in fact the level of within Syria is contentious at best.12 While drone Pakistan, and UK operations and strikes against militar y investigation into a drone operation in PTSD among drone crews is around half that of advocates often insist that armed drones are no ISIS in Syria prior to the December 2015 vote, which multiple civilians were killed found that the the general population of the United States. 20 different from other aircraft, it is ver y difficult to would have occurred without the availability of Predator drone crew had “a propensity towards Drone crews are facing high levels of stress and believe that the UK would have sent piloted armed drone systems. It seems extremely kinetic operations” (in non-militar y speak: they burnout, but this may be more related to the high aircraft into Syria in this way, as the operational unlikely in both cases and thus it seems the were gung-ho to launch a strike).16 In addition, workload and long hours they are required to and political risk was far too great. technology itself is enabling an expansion reports of so-called “double-tap” strikes, work owing to increasing use of armed drones. 21 of warfare. and statements from former drone pilots, provide From mid-2015, UK militar y officials began arguing that it was “illogical” and even “immoral” that UK forces could not undertake airstrikes Drones and the use of force within armed conflict against ISIS in Syria as well as Iraq. In August some insight into the possibility that such a mind-set may exist among drone crews. 17 Brandon Br yant, a former US drone pilot turned whistle-blower has said: 2015, UK drones operating in Syria Questions around whether drones are lowering controversially undertook the targeted killing of the threshold for use of force within a situation One guy I knew tattooed a Hellfire missile on his Cardiff-born Reyaad Khan.13 The fact that British of armed conflict (in bello) are harder to answer ribs for every shot he took. Another tattooed drones were already flying missions in Syria, and without much more transparency. Former UN the word “Infidel” around his neck. I mean had already launched one strike and assisted Special Rapporteur Philip Alston talked of the there were some real, honest-to-god psychos in with others, was used in part to leverage support possibility of a “PlayStation Mentality” where, that program who wanted nothing more than to by the public and MPs for wider militar y action due to the physical and psychological distance kill people on the ground.18 in Syria. A government motion to extend from the target, drone operators and crew may UK militar y action from Iraq into Syria was perceive strike operations as a kind of video subsequently tabled and passed in game.14 ”We have to impress upon them that December 2015. they are not just shooting electrons, they’re killing people,” Major Sam Morgan, a trainer of Predator drone pilots told the Boston Globe in 2005.15 Drone advocates insist this proposition denigrates the professionalism of ser ving militar y officers, ignores the fact there is a chain of command overseeing strikes, and overlooks the number of drone pilots suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as 12 See for example: Jennifer Daskat, Ashley Deeks, and Ryan Goodman, “Strikes in Syria: The International Law Framework” Just Security, 24 September 2014, https://www.justsecurity. org/15479/strikes-syria-international-law-framework-daskal-deeksgoodman; and Louise Arimatsu and Michael Schmitt, “The legal basis for the war against Isis remains contentious,” The Guardian, 6 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2014/oct/06/legal-basis-war-isis-syria-islamicstatehttp://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/06/ legal-basis-war-isis-syria-islamic-state. 13 “Cardiff jihadist Reyaad Khan, 21, killed by RAF drone,” BBC News, 7 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukwales-34176790. 52 evidence that drone pilots are far from “videogame warriors”. 14 Charlie Savage, “UN Report Highly Critical of US Drone Attacks”, New York Times, 2 June 2010, www.nytimes. com/2010/06/03/world/03drones.html. 15 Bryan Bender, “Attacking Iraq, from a Nev. Computer,” The Boston Globe, 3 April 2005, http://archive.boston.com/news/ world/middleeast/articles/2005/04/03/attacking_iraq_from_a_nev_ computer. It is crucial to remember that concerns about whether drones are lowing the threshold for force within an armed conflict is not a question of whether drone operators are “psychos”. That is a misrepresentation of the concern and a misunderstanding of both drone and wider militar y operations. The drone crew—pilot and sensor operator—are at one end of a long chain of command. All of those in the decision-making process—militar y commanders, defence officials, intelligence analysts, “counterterrorism” officers, Others former drone pilots, however, tell a policymakers, etc.—are engaged in the decision different stor y. One argued, “Drone operators to launch a lethal attack. It’s important to are licensed pilots. We are not terminators remember that remote “unmanned” warfare may rampaging across the countr yside like war’s be engendering a “propensity to use kinetic a video game. We are not heartless; we are force” all along that kill-chain, not just at the not brainless. And we do not like to make “sharp end”. mistakes.”19 Far from being gung-ho warriors, drone supporters argue, drone crews are suffering PTSD, as they are required to monitor the 16 David S. Cloud, “Anatomy of an Afghan war tragedy,” LA Times, 10 April 2011, articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/10/world/ la-fg-afghanistan-drone-20110410. 17 Chris Woods, “Bureau investigation finds fresh evidence of CIA drone strikes on rescuers,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 1 August 2013, https://www.thebureauinvestigates. com/2013/08/01/bureau-investigation-finds-fresh-evidence-of-ciadrone-strikes-on-rescuers. 18 Vegas Tenold, “The Untold Casualties of the Drone War.” Rolling Stone, 18 February 2016, www.rollingstone.com/politics/ news/the-untold-casualties-of-the-drone-war-20160218. 19 T. Mark McCurley, “I Was a Drone Warrior for 11 Years. I Regret Nothing,” Politico, 18 October 2015, www.politico.com/ magazine/story/2015/10/drone-pilot-book-213263. 20 Agata Blaszczak-Boxe, “Drone Pilots Suffer PTSD Just Like Those in Combat,” Live Science, 20 August, 2014, www. livescience.com/47475-drone-operators-develop-ptsd. html#sthash.7k3pIvmK.dpuf. 21 Christopher Drew and Dave Phillips, “As Stress Drives Off Drone Operators, Air Force Must Cut Flights,” New York Times, 16 June 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/us/as-stress-drivesoff-drone-operators-air-force-must-cut-flights.html. 53 H A R M TO G LO B A L P E AC E A N D S EC U R I T Y T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Much more information about how drones are The term “precision” does not imply, as one However, data gathered by casualty recording training camp in Libya appears to have killed two being used on a day-to-day basis is needed in might assume, accuracy. Instead, the word organisations and the few journalists covering Serbian diplomats being held there. Both sites, it order to assess the impact of armed remote precision exclusively pertains to a discriminate this issue show that there are of course civilian should be noted, had prolonged and persistent technology on the decision to launch a strike. targeting process.... By using a word that casualties. In Pakistan, where US airstrikes were obser vation by drones prior to the strikes, Unfortunately, secrecy prevails and pretty much has such specific meaning in the mind of exclusively carried out by drones, The Bureau of undermining the notion that such persistence all that tends to be released are rather bland most civilians, it is easy to see how a gap in Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) reports between can enable precision and eliminate civilian statements, often from anonymous sources, understanding and expectations has been 420 –960 civilians killed in just over 400 drone casualties. 28 reporting the elimination of “terrorist suspects”. fostered. 23 strikes—although the civilian casualty rate, along There is a crucial need for much more transparency about the decision-making process in the day-to-day use of armed drones. The problem of “precision” When militar y spokespeople describe an aircraft or drone as undertaking a “precision strike” it tends to get reinterpreted both in the media and in the minds of the public as being an “accurate” Another important aspect in relation to the strike, a misunderstanding that the militar y seem lowering of the threshold for the use of force to have little interest in correcting. is the constant presentation of drone warfare as “precision” warfare. This precision narrative The persistent presentation of drone strikes as underlies much of the support for the use of “precise” and “pinpoint accurate” in this way has armed drones both within the political and serious implications for the understanding of the militar y command establishment, but also by the actual impact of war. Due to the nature of general public. today’s militar y inter ventions, few people have access to first-hand accounts of the impact on While most people would understand “precision” the ground. Even media reports from these to mean “accuracy,” it is ver y important to locations are extremely rare. 24 This creates in be aware that when the militar y use the term the minds of many the idea that drone strikes “precision strike,” they are not referring to the accuracy of a strike. Rather, they are pointing to are clean, safe and victimless. War, it seems, is no longer the hell it once was. a process of bringing a wide system of assets to bear to enable the strike to take place. 22 with the number of strikes, has plummeted since The notion that they enable civilian-casualty free 2012 following an increasing international strikes is not only engendering support for the outcr y. 25 use of armed drones amongst the public but also amongst militar y commanders and politicians Far from being able to sit above “the fog of war” who are now able to expand the battlefield to and launch “pinpoint accurate” attacks as include areas which would previously have been advocates argue, the human rights organisation, off-limits. As Professor Michael Schmitt notes in Reprieve, found that US drone strikes in Yemen his article on precision strike and international and Pakistan killed 1147 unknown people in humanitarian law for the International Committee multiple strikes targeting just 41 named of the Red Cross: individuals. Next door in Afghanistan, US militar y analyst Larr y Lewis found that in the 12 months Greater precision enables targets to be from mid-2011 to mid-2012, armed drones attacked that previously were off-limits due to caused 10 times more civilian casualties than likely excessive collateral damage or incidental strikes by “manned” fighter aircraft. injury. This is particularly true with regard to Unfortunately, we cannot examine this data, urban and dual-use targets. To the extent that as it remains classified. 26 such attacks are seldom free of collateral damage and incidental injury, opening On occasion it becomes ver y clear that all the additional targets to attack results in a net victims of drone strikes are not enemy increase in potential harm to the civilian combatants. In Januar y 2015, a US drone strike population. 29 in Pakistan killed American development expert Lt. Colonel Jill Long of the USAF explains: Warren Weinstein and Italian aid worker Giovanni Lo Porto, who were being held hostage at the site of the strike. 27 In Februar y 2016, a US airstrike involving drones and F-15s on an ISIS 25 “Get the data: Drone Wars,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/ projects/drones. 23 Lt Col. Jill A. Long, “The Problem with “Precision: Managing Expectations for Air Power,” MA Thesis, 2012, http://www.dtic. mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA589415. 22 See “Precision Engagement” in Vision 2020, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000, http://www.pipr.co.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2014/07/jv2020-2.pdf, 54 24 For rare media report from on the ground of impact of US drone/special forces raid see Iona Craig, “Death in Al Ghayil,” The Intercept, 9 March 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/03/09/ women-and-children-in-yemeni-village-recall-horror-of-trumpshighly-successful-seal-raid. 26 “You Never Die Twice, Multiple Kills in the US Drone Program,” Reprieve, November 2014, www.reprieve.org.uk/ press/2014_11_25_us_drone_strikes_kill_28_each_target; Spencer Ackerman, “US drone strikes more deadly to Afghan civilians than manned aircraft – adviser,” The Guardian, 2 July 2013, www. theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/02/us-drone-strikes-afghancivilians. 27 Zeke J Miller, “Obama Apologizes to Families of al-Qaeda Hostages Killed in US Drone Strike,” Time, 23 April 2015, http:// time.com/3832781/warren-weinstein-giovanni-lo-porto-drone. 28 Sharif Abdel Kouddous, “Evidence mounts that US airstrike on ISIS in Libya killed Serbian diplomats,” The Intercept, 16 March, 2016, https://theintercept. com/2016/03/16/u-s-airstrike-on-isis-in-libya-killed-serbiandiplomats. 29 Michael N. Schmitt, “Precision attack and international humanitarian law,” International Review of the Red Cross 87, September 2005, pp. 445–466, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ files/other/irrc_859_schmitt.pdf. 55 H A R M TO G LO B A L P E AC E A N D S EC U R I T Y While it is beyond question that precision weapons are more accurate than their unguided T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S The problem of proliferation analysts and campaigners alike agree that The ver y existence of drones means that the use they need to be much stronger than presently of lethal force is being contemplated and put into predecessors, the idea that such weapons hit While the majority of attention on armed drones proposed—and draw in China and other effect in ways that did not happen before the their target accurately ever y time unless there is has focused on US use (and to some extent on exporters—if there is to be any realistic chance development of such technology. Above all, it a human-induced error is merely the stuff of UK and Israeli use), growing proliferation of of stemming the tide of cross border drone must be remembered that we are still only at the Hollywood. In the way that the precision these systems has meant that a number of other strikes. beginnings of the drone war era. The Predator narrative is both opening up previous off-limits countries have acquired or developed armed civilian areas to aerial bombardment, and, at the drones and are beginning to regularly use them same time making warfare more acceptable, the to launch strikes. Most of these “second wave” precision narrative may be leading to an increase countries have acquired their armed drones from in civilian casualties. China, but some, like Turkey and Iran, have successfully developed their own. The important issue here is whether inter vention 34 Drones: Damaging peace and security by eroding hard won limits on warfare and Reaper drones currently in operation are fairly unsophisticated prototypes of future drones that are slowly but surely making their way from the drawing board to the skies. This chapter has tried to describe some of the It is right that that the policy of using armed ways in which “unmanned” weapons technology drones to undertake targeted killing outside using armed drones is transferring the risk of It is highly likely that other countries will acquire is lowering the threshold for the use of armed international law norms is strongly challenged by armed conflict onto civilians. Over the past the technology and begin launching drone strikes force. Through enabling militar y inter vention human rights advocates. But attention must also over the next few years. Some commentators without “boots on the ground” and therefore be paid to the how the technology itself is also western society sees armed forces personnel. insist that armed drone proliferation will not be a drastically reducing the political risk, drones undermining those norms and is impacting on Increasingly, the lives of “western” soldiers are problem, arguing that for smaller countries, the allow political leaders to bypass the restraint of peace and security around the globe. much more highly valued than the lives of technical and financial barriers to operating such a casualty averse and war-war y population. civilians in a conflict zone. The desire to protect systems are prohibitive. 31 However, a short decade we have seen a growing change in how “our boys” for domestic political reasons is sur vey by Drone Wars UK identified in leading to the use of remote armed systems, December 2016 that four of the new wave of which may be more risky for civilians on the users (United Arab Emirates [UAE], Saudi Arabia, ground. Such risk-transfer, as Christian Enemark Iran, and Turkey) had already launched cross puts it, is totally “contrar y to the spirit of jus in border strikes on at least six occasions (UAE in bello discrimination”. 30 While it is right that all Yemen and Libya; Saudi in Yemen; Iran in Syria must be done to lessen the risk to for ser vice and Iraq; and Turkey in Iraq). 32 The implications personnel, the principle that combatants should for global peace and security of multiple nations endure a greater risk than civilians during an using armed drones to launch cross border armed conflict appears to be being eroded. strikes is ver y serious. While there are embr yonic moves by international community to develop controls over the proliferation and use of armed drones, 33 31 Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “So what if Iranian drones did strike Syria? We are not entering a dark age of robotic warfare,” The Washington Post, 4 April 2016, https://www.washingtonpost. com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/04/so-what-if-iraniandrones-did-strike-syria-we-are-not-entering-a-dark-age-of-roboticwarfare/?utm_term=.ae7cbf550049. 30 Christian Enemark, “Drones, Risk, and Perpetual Force,” Ethics and International Affairs 28:3, 2014, pp. 365–381, http:// cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/26329/Enemark_ drones_EIA_2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 56 32 Chris Cole, “Drone strikes spread as proliferation surges,” Drone Wars UK, 6 December 2016, https://dronewars. net/2016/12/06/drone-strikes-spread-as-proliferation-surges. 33 Mohammad Zargham, “U.S., other countries issue declaration on export, use of armed drones,” Reuters, 5 October 2016, http:// www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-drones-idUSKCN1252IG. We are also beginning to see the way that armed drones are having an impact on the wider debate about how to achieve peace in our insecure world. In a 2015 op-ed for The Wall Street Journal, for example, US academic Amy Zegart argues that drones should be used not just for targeted Killing but for “targeted hurting”: Lethal drones may make possible a new form of high-tech coercion: targeted hurting. Targeted terrorist-killing operations are designed to take an enemy off the battlefield. Targeted hurting could be designed to change any enemy’s behavior—by destroying selectively the family members, friends, associates, villages or capabilities that the enemy holds most dear. 35 34 Rachel Stohl, “New Draft on Drone Export Rules ‘More Problematic’ Than Original,” Defense News, 29 September 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/articles/new-draft-on-drone-exportrules-more-problematic-than-original. 35 Amy Zegart, “The Coming Revolution of Drone Warfare”, The Wall Street Journal, 18 March 2015, https://cisac.fsi.stanford. edu/sites/default/files/amy_zegart-_the_coming_r._of_drone_ warfare_-_wsj.pdf. 57 C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: D J I B O U T I T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Country case study: The militar y attraction has in part to do with Djibouti ships passing through the Suez Canal to A crashed US drone in Djibouti. antipiracy efforts off the coast of Somalia. All Europe or to the Indian Ocean need to sail through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Twenty Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical thousand ships and 20 percent of global Will, the disarmament programme of the Women’s exports travel this route ever y year. 2 International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). She leads WILPF’s advocacy and research on weapons and militarism, which always includes a gender perspective. Her work also includes Beyond that, however, Djibouti is critical for geostrategic militar y operations in the post- monitoring and analysing international processes 9/11 world. Djibouti sits between East Africa and forums related to disarmament. and the Arabian Peninsula, allowing aircraft stationed there to reach Somalia or Yemen in Editors’ note: This case study is based on a larger publication written by Ray Acheson to be published by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom in September 2017, titled Remote warfare and sexual violence in Djibouti. minutes. Many of the foreign militaries operating in Djibouti participate in operations against al-Shabaab in Somalia or al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen—either directly through drone strikes or by training Djiboutian and other East African militaries. 3 US special forces use their base in Djibouti for operations against Boko Haram, the Lord’s “Djibouti is a countr y of less than 900,000 people that would not register significantly in the global consciousness except for its strategic location in East Africa, at the mouth Resistance Army, and Daesh, and as a launching pad for drone strikes. 4 US drones in Djibouti of the Red Sea and the rest of the Persian Gulf,” writes investigative journalist Tim Mak “This is not an outpost in the middle of Photo from a declassified Accident Investigation Board when it comes to power projection.”5 It has personnel and US Department of Defense become an instrumental location in the US-led contractors. The base also employs about “global war on terror”. 1,100 local and third-countr y workers.7 The US Navy operates a base at Camp The operations of Camp Lemonnier are of The Daily Beast.1 A small, hot, dr y countr y nowhere that is of marginal interest,” US Lemonnier, near the Djibouti-Ambouli shrouded in secrecy. Some is known from with high levels of poverty, it has made officials have said about Djibouti. “This is a International Airport. It is a former French unclassified and also leaked classified its claim to fame by virtue of its location, ver y important location in terms of US Foreign Legion outpost and was previously documents and investigative reporting. attracting the militaries of some of the most interests, in terms of freedom of navigation, used as a CIA “black site” where terrorism powerful countries in the world. The United States, China, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Italy have or are constructing militar y bases in the countr y. Russia, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom also have troops operating out of Djibouti. 1 Tim Mak, “Inside The Tiny Police State With Seven Armies,” The Daily Beast, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/ longforms/2015/djibouti/inside-the-tiny-police-state-withseven-armies.html. 58 2 Ben Ho Wan Beng, “The Strategic Attractions of Djibouti,” The National Interest, 18 March 2016, http://nationalinterest. org/blog/the-buzz/the-strategic-attractions-djibouti-15533. 3 “U.S. and Djibouti Launch Binational Forum of Cooperation,” US Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, 2 March 2015, http://www. state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/03/238107.htm; David Styan, Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horn’s Strategic Hub, Chatham House, April 2013, https://www.chathamhouse.org/ sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0413bp_ djibouti.pdf, pp. 4, 9. 4 Katrina Manson, “Jostling for Djibouti,” FT Magazine, 1 April 2016, http://www.ft.com/ cms/s/2/8c33eefc-f6c1-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132.html. “Virtually the entire 500-acre camp is suspects were detained without charges and dedicated to counterterrorism,” reported allegedly tortured. 6 It is currently home to Craig Whitlock of The Washington Post in about 4,000 US and allied militar y and civilian 2012, “making it the only installation of its kind in the Pentagon’s global network of 5 Craig Murphy, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. 6 “Secret prisons: Obama’s order to close ‘black sites’,” The Guardian, 22 January 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2009/jan/23/secret-prisons-closure-obama-cia; Jason Leopold, “Senate report set to reveal Djibouti as CIA ‘black site’,” Al Jazeera America, 2 May 2014, http://america. aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/2/djibouti-senate-cia.html. bases.” 8 7 “Camp Lemmonier, Djibouti,” Commander, Navy Installations Command, http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/ cnreurafswa/installations/camp_lemonnier_djibouti.html. 8 Craig Whitlock, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. 59 C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: D J I B O U T I T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Among other things, the US Joint Special thermal imaging devices, radar, cameras, and The Washington Post reported in 2012 that did allow China to take up residency, perhaps Operations Command (JSOC) is responsible communications.12 the unit designed a uniform patch emblazoned because China was already financing several with a skull, crossbones, and the nickname major infrastructure projects related to ports, for the operation of US drone strikes in the region. The Washington Post reported in 2012 Camp Lemonnier was known as “the busiest orders to find, track, or kill people that the US Predator drone base outside the Afghan war government has designated terrorists were zone.”13 Documents leaked to The Intercept Based on an internal US Department of increasingly delivered to Camp Lemonnier. in 2015 indicated that at the time, the base Defense report from 2013 obtained by The Meanwhile, nearly two-thirds of the Djiboutian Originally, the Pentagon described Lemonnier operated ten MQ-1 Predators and four MQ-9 Intercept, Camp Lemmonier also housed “six population lives in poverty and half the labour as temporar y, but it has “hardened into the Reapers.14 However, the Predator drones U-28As—a single-engine aircraft that force is unemployed. 21 Djibouti’s GDP U.S. militar y’s first permanent drone war have reportedly since been removed from conducts sur veillance for special operations (purchasing power parity) in 2015 was base.” 9 Djibouti, after more than 100 missions in forces—and two P-3 Orions, a four-engine estimated at $3.094 billion, ranked 186 out of Yemen and Somalia. turboprop aircraft originally developed for 230 countries. 22 Twenty-three per cent of the maritime patrols but since repurposed for use population lives below the poverty line. The 15 After six drones armed with Hellfire missiles “East Africa Air Pirates”.18 airports, and railways, worth about $9 billion. 20 crashed, one only 1.5 kilometres from Djibouti From Chabelley, investigative journalist Nick over African countries.” The report also countr y has few natural resources or City, the US moved its drones to Chabelley Turse found, US drone missions cover indicates eight F-15E Strike Eagles, fighter industr y. 23 airfield in 2013, about 10 kilometres away “Yemen, southwest Saudi Arabia, a large jets that are faster and more heavily armed from the main base.10 While this was thought swath of Somalia, and parts of Ethiopia and than drones. “By August 2012” explains Nick to be temporar y, in June 2015 the US made a southern Egypt.”16 The drones are flown via Turse, “an average of 16 drones and four satellite link by pilots at Creech Air Force fighter jets were taking off or landing there Base in Nevada and Cannon Air Force Base in each day.”19 “long-term implementing arrangement” with Djibouti to establish Chabelley as an “enduring” base, allocating $7.6 million to construct a new perimeter fence around the New Mexico.17 They are maintained and system,” a suite of integrated sensors, 9 Craig Whitlock, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. 10 Nick Turse, “The stealth expansion of a secret U.S. drone base in Africa,” The Intercept, 21 October 2015, https:// theintercept.com/2015/10/21/stealth-expansion-of-secret-usdrone-base-in-africa; Craig Whitlock, “Chaos in tower, danger in skies at base in Africa,” The Washington Post, 30 April 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/miscues-at-us-counterterrorism-base-put-aircraft-indanger-documents-show/2015/04/30/39038d5a-e9bb-11e49a6a-c1ab95a0600b_story.html; Craig Whitlock, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ national-security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secretoperations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd105ff056538b7c_story.html. 11 Letter to Committee of Appropriations from the Undersecretary of Defense, 25 June 2015, http://comptroller. defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/execution/reprogramming/ fy2015/milcon/15-10_MC_May_2015_Request.pdf. 60 Within this context of high levels of militarism Apart from the direct and significant and poverty, respect for human rights is also humanitarian impact of drone strikes launched a major issue in Djibouti. The President, who 12 “USAF boosts security of AFRICOM’s AOR with TASS installation,” airforce-technology.com, 1 May 2014, http:// www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsusaf-boosts-securityof-africoms-aor-with-tass-installation-4256028. from Djibouti into neighbouring countries, was recently elected for a fourth-term in there are indirect but equally serious elections considered corrupt by most human repercussions stemming from the existence of rights groups, actively suppresses freedom 13 Craig Murphy, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. the bases that also warrant consideration. of speech and dissent. 24 In addition, the launched in Djibouti by an Air Force squadron. base.11 The US Air Force also reportedly installed a “tactical automated security Militarism and human rights abuses, including sexual violence and exploitation A militarist rentier economy 14 Nick Turse, “The stealth expansion of a secret U.S. drone base in Africa,” The Intercept, 21 October 2015, https:// theintercept.com/2015/10/21/stealth-expansion-of-secret-usdrone-base-in-africa The foreign militar y bases pull in at least $300 15 Joseph Trevithick, “Why the US Air Force Pulled Its Predator Drones from a Secret Base in Africa,” Motherboard, 4 December 2015, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/why-theus-air-force-pulled-its-predator-drones-from-a-secret-base-inafrica. upset relations with the numerous western 16 Nick Turse, “The stealth expansion of a secret U.S. drone base in Africa,” The Intercept, 21 October 2015, https:// theintercept.com/2015/10/21/stealth-expansion-of-secret-usdrone-base-in-africa 18 Craig Murphy, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. 17 Craig Murphy, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. million annually in lease fees. The government recently turned away Russia, worried it would countries that are already tenants—though it 19 Nick Turse, “Target Africa: The U.S. military’s expanding footprint in East Africa and the Arabian peninsula,” The Intercept, 15 October 2015, https://theintercept.com/dronepapers/target-africa. countr y’s family laws discriminate against 20 “China ‘negotiates military base’ in Djibouti,” AlJazeera, 9 May 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ africa/2015/05/150509084913175.html. 21 Katrina Manson, “Jostling for Djibouti,” FT Magazine, 1 April 2016, http://www.ft.com/ cms/s/2/8c33eefc-f6c1-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132.html. 22 “Country comparison: GDP (purchasing power parity),” The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 22 July 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2001rank.html#dj. 23 “Africa: Djibouti,” The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 22 July 2016, https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/dj.html. 24 “Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh wins fourth term,” BBC, 9 April 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-35995628. 61 C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: D J I B O U T I T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S women and in some cases facilitate children. 28 At the same time, the US levels of misogyny of which such companies Histor y has shown that foreign militar y bases, gender-based violence, such as female government has failed to enforce its own laws are capable. For example, DynCorp, which regardless of the nature of their operations, genital mutilation. prohibiting its soldiers or contractors from has provided support for US militar y undermine human rights, increase geopolitical buying sex or facilitating trafficking. operations for 50 years, failed to hold its tensions, and facilitate sexual violence. The employees accountable when they were symbiotic economic and political relationship engaged in illicit trafficking, sexual between the foreign militar y powers and the The government has also continued to fail to effectively combat human trafficking and sexual violence. 25 “Power without vulnerability” About 100,000 men, enslavement, and rape of women in post- “host” countr y in this context seems to be a women, and children from Eritrea, Ethiopia, The culture of impunity around trafficking and and Somalia transit through Djibouti each year, sexual exploitation when militaries are most heading to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, or involved is nothing new. But this sense of Both the special forces and private own soldiers or by their host government. It is other Middle Eastern countries. Since March power without vulnerability, in the case of mercenaries have an air of invulnerability and a chokepoint of violence against local 2015, Djiboutians, Yemenis, and others have Djibouti, is in some ways matched by the type impunity. So too do some of their missions populations, particularly women. This mode of also fled Yemen via Djibouti. 26 These people of militar y operations carried out there. launched from Djibouti, such as those militarism is damaging to local people, local involving armed drones. Air Force official The emphasis on special operations, economies, and as Vine has argued, “they’ve David Deptula has stated, “The real particularly out of the US base, is critical. The helped lock us inside a permanently advantage of unmanned aerial systems is that US special forces are among the US militar y’s militarized society that has made all of us— they allow you to project power without most male-dominated units. According to a ever yone on this planet—less secure.” 33 projecting vulnerability.” Pentagon-sponsored sur vey by the RAND of armed drones is not yet known to be Corporation, 85 per cent of men oppose increasing rates of sexual violence by militar y integrating women into special forces units. 29 personnel or within the militar y. Many factors are fleeing poverty, drought, war, or repression, looking for better opportunities abroad. However, these migrants and refugees are at grave risk of trafficking, forced labour, sexual exploitation and abuse, and forced prostitution. The foreign militar y presence in Djibouti exacerbates these risks, providing a steady market in particular for “prostitutes”—women, girls, and boys who are forced to sell their bodies due to poverty or who are trafficked for sex. Similarly, private militar y and security companies—personnel from which constitute a high proportion of those on the US base in Djibouti—tend to intensify gender inequalities compared to public militaries, many of which The government as consistently failed to are in the process of “integrating” men and prosecute traffickers, operationalise its women into combat roles. Women are a national action plan to combat trafficking, or minority in private armies and, because they to identify or provide protection for trafficking are private, there are far fewer gender equity victims. 27 It also has poor practices regarding guidelines. 30 There have been glimpses of the those it arrests for prostitution, including 25 “Djibouti: Tier 3,” 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, US Department of State, June 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/ rls/tiprpt/2016/index.htm. 26 “Djibouti,” Humanitarian Compendium, International Organization for Migration, last updated 3 March 2016, http:// humanitariancompendium.iom.int/djibouti/2016. 27 “Djibouti: Tier 3,” 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, US Department of State, June 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/ rls/tiprpt/2016/index.htm, pp. 155–156. 62 conflict Bosnia. 31 deterrent to any of the governments involved to confront the human rights abuses by their 32 The expanding use on militar y bases facilitate or even condone sexual violence. The histor y of US militar y bases around the world clearly show the threat posed to women and girls by the institutionalisation of women’s sexual objectification by militar y systems and personnel. In Djibouti, this threat may be reinforced by the further dehumanisation of warfare and the perceived “emasculation” of soldiers through the growing use of armed drones to kill remotely, where at the same time the sense of “power without vulnerability” 28 Sanne Terlingen, “Fear and loathing in Djibouti,” OneWorld, 2 December 2015, http://longreads.oneworld.nl/en/Djibouti_ trafficking; “Djibouti,” 2014 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, US Department of Labor, 2014, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/djibouti. 29 Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. special forces not ready to integrate women, report finds,” The Washington Times, 15 February 2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/ feb/15/us-special-forces-not-ready-to-integrate-women-rep. 30 Maya Eichler, “Miltarized Masculinities in International Relations,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume XXI, Issue I, Fall/Winter 2014. is enhanced. (See Chapter 8 on gender perspectives for more details.) 31 Ed Vulliamy, “Has the UN learned lessons of Bosnian sex slavery revealed in Rachel Weisz film?,” The Guardian, 14 January 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/ jan/15/bosnia-sex-trafficking-whistleblower. 32 David Patrikarakos, “Eyes in the sky: the legal and philosophical implications drone warfare,” NewStatesmen, 25 June 2015, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/06/ eyes-sky-legal-and-philosophical-implications-drone-warfare. 33 David Vine, “The United States Probably Has More Foreign Military Bases Than Any Other People, Nation, or Empire In History,” The Nation, 14 September 2015, https:// www.thenation.com/article/the-united-states-probably-hasmore-foreign-military-bases-than-any-other-people-nation-orempire-in-history. 63 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: T H E P H I L I P P I N E S Country case study: The use of armed—and unarmed—“unmanned” In Mamasapano, Maguindanao on 25 Januar y The AFP made several statements Philippines aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones remains a 2015 a militar y operation that targeted known emphasizing the use of UAVs for intelligence complex issue in the Philippines. Recent terrorists affiliated with the Jemaah Islamiyah and reconnaissance operations, and asserting militar y operations, which have resulted in Zulkifli Abdhir (also known as Mar wan) and that there was no use of armed UAVs in the deaths and compromised the ongoing peace Abdul Basit Usman, resulted in the death of countr y. In Februar y 2015, the AFP through its Mitzi Austero is the Programmes Manager process with the armed group the Moro 44 Special Action Forces of the Philippine spokesperson reportedly stated that its of Nonviolence International Southeast Asia, Islamic Liberation Front in the southern part of National Police and 18 civilians. After this primar y interest in using UAVs was related to focusing on the peace education and  humanitarian the countr y, have brought this issue in to the armed clash, the Philippine government humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR), national spotlight. authorities were questioned during Senate which was echoed by the Department of hearings on the use of UAVs and the role of National Defense. 2 disarmament programs in Southeast Asia. She has done research on conventional weapons and arms trade in the region for various publications. Prior to joining NISEA, she worked as a Program Associate The use of UAVs was first admitted in public the US militar y in these operations. The with Conciliation Resources’ Philippines Program in 2013, when the Armed Forces of the General public opinion towards the use of and was also a researcher for book projects hearing was shown live in public, and one of Philippines (AFP) confirmed that it had used the biggest questions was the role of the UAVs was formed during the public hearings, UAVs in a militar y operation in Zamboanga United States in the operations and about the with the emerging views that: (1) UAVs are City. On 9 September 2013, a faction of the technology used during the operations that effective for intelligence gathering; and (2) the Alfredo Ferrariz Lubang is the Regional Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) enabled an operation at night. use of UAVs could shift from intelligence Representative of Nonviolence International in Asia. attempted to raise the flag of the self- Concurrently, he is the National Coordinator of the proclaimed Bangsamoro Republik at During the public hearings in the Senate after that UAVs are effective intelligence gathering Zamboanga City Hall. An armed clash erupted the Mamasapano incident, the PNP and the tools has also gained traction in the recent universities in the region in the area of peace and between the MNLF group and the AFP and AFP were asked to explain the role of UAVs in years because of the claims of China and the conflict studies, humanitarian disarmament and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The their operations. They were also questioned Philippines on the same islands in the South international humanitarian law.  He is mostly based MNLF took hostages and the resulting on the issue of foreign inter vention in the China Sea or West Philippine Sea. 3 in Cotabato City implementing a peace agreement standoff degenerated into urban warfare, internal affairs of the Philippines as a Proponents of the use of UAVs have where parts of the city were destroyed due to sovereign state and in particular the role of established the perspective that in the case of use of explosive weapons. Based on the United States, as it was also alleged that intelligence gathering and sur veillance, the newspaper reports in December 2013, the the US militar y provided the Philippine militar y intelligence provided with UAV militar y admitted to the use of “unmanned National Police assistance in intelligence assistance is more reliable. aerial systems” during the crisis, which gathering for the operation, which resulted in occurred from 9 September 2013 until the 62 deaths. focusing on the peace processes in the Philippines, and peasantr y in the Philippines. Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines. He is a peace education trainer and has taught in various between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippine government. gathering to tactical use. The emerging view militar y declared the end of the militar y operations on 28 September 2013. The AFPoperated UAVs were later displayed in public at Camp Aguinaldo.1 1 Frances Mangosing, “PH Army displays drones to public,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13 December 2013, http://newsinfo. inquirer.net/549269/ph-army-displays-drones-topublic#ixzz4exAJfgHg. 64 2 Alden M. Monzon, “Philippines places emphasis on drones’ search and rescue, not military, capabilities,” Business World, 19 February 2015, http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?s ection=Nation&title=philippines-places-emphasis-ondrones&8217-search-and-rescue-not-militarycapabilities&id=102969. 3 Andrea Shalal and Emily Stephenson, “Philippines eyes US spy drones,” Reuters, 18 February 2017, http://news.abs-cbn. com/focus/02/18/15/afp-philippines-eyes-us-spy-drones. 65 C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: T H E P H I L I P P I N E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S However, there are questions and concerns the AFP’s capabilities to conduct intelligence Crucial in this debate is the government policy One of the major considerations against using about who has access to the intelligence data collection, mission planning, and on no collateral damage. Currently, the armed UAVs is that the Philippines has no gathered and what the role of foreign reconnaissance operations. government has repeatedly stated that it only capacity to operate and maintain armed UAVs, uses unarmed UAVs for intelligence and and they will entail a big cost for the AFP. The inter vention is in these operations, specifically that of the United States. During the The equipment transfer and continued bilateral sur veillance and for humanitarian and disaster Philippines will have to rely on the assistance Mamasapano incident, the Philippines did not training efforts demonstrate the commitment relief operations. However, the ongoing of the United States to obtain armed UAVs possess equipment such as UAVs with the between the Philippines and U.S. to work militar y operations against the Abu Sayyaf 6 and to develop capacity for their use and capacity to operate during nighttime, and the towards safer communities and the group, which vowed allegiance to ISIS— maintenance, which will imply heavy reliance PNP or the AFP had no skills to execute the eradication of global terror networks. though many analysts consider that they are on US help. This will, in turn, have ISIS-inspired not ISIS-directed—could change implications for the role of foreign inter vention this policy. The AFP is actively pursuing the in national affairs. intelligence gathering with the use of the 5 There is an ongoing push to sway the technologically advanced UAVs. Philippines’ government’s position in favour of The US government recently delivered UAVs using armed UAVs within the Philippines due including a RQ-11B Raven to the Philippines, to several factors: (1) lobbying from to help with “counterterrorism” efforts that manufacturers; (2) threats from terrorism; and both countries have agreed on in the past. (3) the rise of extremism in the Philippines. 4 terrorist group Abu Sayyaf in several islands. The government may be pushed to shift its A further concern in the development of this position on no collateral damage to minimum technology and capacity is the chance that collateral damage, and when this shift in non-state armed groups will also have access policy happens, the likelihood of buying and to and develop their own capacity for armed using armed UAVs in the areas affected by UAVs. There will be an increased risk of the terrorist groups who are also kidnapping diversion, and an added burden on the foreign nationals will be high. government to prevent technology and skill The Philippines and the United States have an These factors are helping to push for the use ongoing bilateral agreement in place since the of armed UAVs because these platforms are late 1990s called the US Visiting Forces perceived as ensuring fewer human casualties Agreement (VFA). The VFA allows US troops for the AFP/PNP forces, and because there is in the Philippines for a temporar y stay in the perceived a tactical advantage in their use for The militar y is not adept at urban warfare and countr y to conduct militar y exercises and surgical operations in the island areas where has been employing open battlefield tactics in training. Technical assistance and training is a kidnapping and extremism is growing. urban settings, as seen in the cases of transfer to non-state armed groups. big component of this agreement. According Marawi City and Zamboanga City described to the US Embassy’s official website: above. The long, drawn out armed confrontations have cost many lives and led In addition to the small-arms transfer, the U.S. to the destruction of infrastructure and government provided a Raven unmanned resources for the government and civilians aerial vehicle system through the grant alike. Armed drones are seen as more counterterrorism program. As part of the accurate and discriminate, so this weighs in grant, and in addition to the three unmanned favour of their use. The United States has aerial vehicles included in the Raven system, offered this technology, but the Philippines Philippine ser vice members received training has recently refused the use of it.7 in the United States on its operations and maintenance. The Raven is a hand-launched 6 Maria A. Ressa, “Experts warn PH: Don’t underestimate ISIS,” Rappler, 13 January 2016, http://www.rappler.com/ nation/118850-experts-warn-ph-not-to-underestimate-isis. unmanned aerial vehicle that will increase 4 Dana Sioson, “US delivers new counter-terrorism weapons to Philippine forces,” Asian Journal, 2 February 2017, http:// asianjournal.com/news/us-delivers-new-counterterrorismweapons-to-philippine-forces. 66 5 US Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Delivers Counterterrorism Equipment to the Philippine Army and Marine Corps,” 1 February 2017 https://ph.usembassy.gov/usmilitary-delivers-counterterrorism-equipment-philippine-armymarine-corps. 7 See “Military official: We don’t need US drones, we can finish Marawi conflict alone,” GMA News Online, 9 August 2017, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/ nation/621303/military-official-we-don-t-need-us-drones-wecan-finish-marawi-conflict-alone/story; and Jose Cielito Reganit, “Treaty prohibits US airstrikes in PH soil – Palace,” Republic of the Philippines Philippine News Agency, http://www.pna.gov. ph/articles/1005352. 67 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S 5. Harm to Governmental Transparency This lack of transparency prevents the victims and their families from obtaining any semblance of accountability, and foments anger and fear Anna Diakun Anna Diakun is the Nadine Strossen fellow in the ACLU’s National Security Project, where she works on issues related to the government’s targeted Introduction Since the US government started its targeted killing program, sur veillance, and discrimination killing programme, it has sought to keep the against racial and religious minorities. She is a programme officially secret, even as top graduate of Yale College, Central European government officials proclaimed it to be lawful, University, and Yale Law School. Prior to joining the effective, and strategic. This “official secrecy” is ACLU, Ms. Diakun ser ved as a law clerk to the Hon. Allyson K. Duncan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The stakes: why the fight for transparency matters among communities in targeted regions. It also For years, the US condemned other countries undermines democratic legitimacy and the rule of that carried out lethal strikes outside recognised law, because still-secret legal justifications for armed conflict. But beginning in the mid-2000s, and consequences of this lethal force mean that both Republican and Democratic administrations the public is unable to independently assess the nevertheless embraced a programme of just merits and legality of this deeply controversial these kinds of strikes. 3 The US government programme. Greater transparency is critical to sought to hide from the public—domestically and ensuring that US policies and practices comport abroad—its legal justifications, who it was killing, with international and domestic legal standards, and why—all in the name of national security. and that the US government is held accountable Although there may certainly be operational when they do not. details that the US government could legitimately withhold, the government’s secrecy entirely at odds with foundational principles of Years of litigation and pressure on the US democracy, and, of course, the often-devastating claims are sweeping by any reasonable measure. government have gradually illuminated the human consequences of these lethal strikes are Furthermore, concealing this information has far- contours of the targeted killing programme, anything but secret for communities subjected reaching negative consequences: this lack of including through the disclosure of policy to them. The United States has killed at least transparency hides the human costs of the constraints the Obama administration imposed hundreds of civilians, many of them children. targeted killing programme and undermines the on strikes and the procedures governing Human rights organizations and journalists have rule of law. decision-making. But despite several hard-fought documented the deaths of entire families, the victories for transparency, the public still lacks Greater disclosure of information would help destruction of homes, and widespread distrust many critical details about the programme. prevent abuses, facilitate democratic of the US government abroad. But government Importantly, the continuing force of the publicly accountability, and increase the legitimacy of US officials have refused to acknowledge basic released policy constraints—limited though they action abroad. Yet the US government not only details about its targeted killing programme (and, are—is uncertain: these Obama-era rules are fails to affirmatively release complete for a time, even the programme’s ver y existence). nonbinding and the Trump administration can information about its targeted killing programme, easily withdraw them. As the US government’s it attempts to stymie the work of non-profit and reliance on remote lethal force abroad only media organisations that use the US Freedom of continues to grow, persistent pressure is as Information Act to obtain documents critical to critical as ever to achieving accountability understanding the legal justifications for and the and transparency. consequences of the programme. The 1 2 government’s efforts to block access to this information disfigure the adversarial system and add an additional hurdle on the path to transparency. 1 See, e.g., The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic & Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2012, pp. 24-25, 46, http://www. law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rightsinstitute/files/The%20Civilian%20Impact%20of%20Drones.pdf. 68 2 Hina Shamsi, “Trump Is Considering Expanding Killing Powers Abroad. The Consequences for Civilians will Be Disastrous,” ACLU Speak Freely Blog, 15 March 2017, https://www.aclu.org/blog/ speak-freely/trump-considering-expanding-killing-powers-abroadconsequences-civilians-will-be. 3 Andrea Prasow, “The Year of Living More Dangerously: Obama’s Drone Speech Was a Sham,” Human Rights Watch, 24 May 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/24/year-livingmore-dangerously-obamas-drone-speech-was-sham. 69 H A R M TO G OV E R N M E N TA L T R A N S PA R E N CY T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S The human costs of the targeted killing programme Since President George W. Bush ordered the communities, noting the consequences beyond Media organisations and human rights groups indicate that the Trump administration is civilian injur y and death—including “the painted a far grimmer picture, reporting figures increasing the use of drones in its interruption of education, the undermining of ranging from 200 to almost 1,000 civilians killed religious and cultural practices and the in that same time period.17 Although the “counterterrorism” activities abroad. 9 first drone strikes abroad, the targeted killing programme has grown into a prominent component of US national security policy. Under President Obama, the United States carried out an estimated 542 such strikes. 4 The human costs have been extensive: according to one estimate, these strikes together killed around 4,000 people, including more than 300 civilians. Yemen 7 and three in Pakistan. 8 Early signs 5 Other tallies put the number of civilian deaths much higher: according to The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, between 384 and 807 civilians died in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen as a result of 563 strikes, most of which were drone strikes. 6 (See chapter one for further details and statistics). reluctance to assist the victims of drone strikes government claimed that it took media and non- Distilling the consequences to mere numbers, for fear of being caught in secondar y strikes.” governmental organisation reports into account though, masks the terrible consequences that The Council adopted a resolution calling on all when formulating its tally, it asserted that the these strikes have. In December 2013, for states “to ensure transparency in their records” discrepancy could be explained by the US example, a US drone launched missiles on a relating to the use of armed drones and “to government’s access to information “that is wedding procession that was transporting the conduct prompt, independent, and impartial generally unavailable” to outside groups.18 bride to the hometown of the groom.10 Human investigations whenever there are indications The government was essentially arguing that the Rights Watch reported that “some, if not all” of of a violation to international law caused by their public should credit US government tallies over the twelve men killed and the many more injured use.” those of independent reporters and researchers Trump’s administration are just as troubling: from Januar y to July 2017, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported that US drone strikes killed between thirty-three and forty civilians in 5 Micah Zenko, “Obama’s Final Drone Strike Data,” Council on Foreign Relations, 20 January 2017, http://blogs.cfr.org/ zenko/2017/01/20/obamas-final-drone-strike-data. 6 Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle, “Obama’s Covert Drone War in Numbers: Ten Times More Strikes Than Bush,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 17 January 2017, https://www. thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-17/obamas-covertdrone-war-in-numbers-ten-times-more-strikes-than-bush. 70 on the basis of trust alone. these reverberate beyond the immediate victims: Despite these calls for transparency—and one report documented that fear of drone strikes indeed, a pledge from President Obama himself This secrecy surrounding who the US caused community members to avoid meeting in to make lethal targeting “more transparent to the government has killed and why has prevented groups, parents to keep their children out of American people and the world”—the US affected communities from obtaining official school, and family members to not attend government has failed to deliver.15 The acknowledgment of deaths and injuries or other funerals. government’s disclosures and unofficial leaks forms of public accountability. The government about the programme consistently downplay the has failed to adequately investigate credible harms to civilians while repeating assertions that allegations of civilian deaths, and when it does In 2014, the United Nations Human Rights cannot be independently tested about legality carr y out investigations, the full results are Council expressed concern over the use of and strategic effectiveness. Although the US concealed. Although the UN Human Rights armed drones on children, families, and government has, on occasion, admitted that Committee has specifically advised the United specific strikes have resulted in civilian deaths, States to “[p]rovide victims or their families with its official civilian death count is typically lower an effective remedy where there has been a than the counts of journalists and independent violation, including adequate compensation,”19 organisations. For example, in July 2016, the public acknowledgment of responsibility for US government announced that it had killed specific deaths and compensation for families is between 64 and 116 “non-combatants” in the rare exception, rather than the norm. (See chapter three on psychological harms for more examples and details.) 7 “Strikes in Yemen,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/ charts?show_casualties=1&show_injuries=1&show_strikes=1&locat ion=yemen&from=2017-1-1&to=now (last accessed 11 August 2017). 4 Micah Zenko, “The (Not-So) Peaceful Transition of Power: Trump’s Drone Strikes Outpace Obama,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2017, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2017/03/02/ the-not-so-peaceful-transition-of-power; Micah Zenko, “Obama’s embrace of Drone Strikes Will Be a Lasting Legacy,” New York Times, 12 January 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/ roomfordebate/2016/01/12/reflecting-on-obamas-presidency/ obamas-embrace-of-drone-strikes-will-be-a-lasting-legacy (last updated 3 April 2017).  14 were civilians.11 The effects of strikes such as 12 The figures from the early months of President 13 8 “Strikes in Pakistan,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/ charts?show_casualties=1&show_injuries=1&show_ strikes=1&location=pakistan&from=2017-1-1&to=now (last accessed 11 August 2017). 9 Murtaza Hussain, “U.S. Has Only Acknowledged a Fifth of it Lethal Strikes, New Study Finds,” The Intercept, 13 June 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/06/13/drone-strikes-columbia-lawhuman-rights-yemen. 10 Letta Tayler, “A Wedding That Became a Funeral,” Human Rights Watch, 19 February 2014, https://www.hrw.org/ report/2014/02/19/wedding-became-funeral/us-drone-attackmarriage-procession-yemen. 11 Ibid. 12 Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From U.S. Drone Practices in Pakistan, Stanford Law School International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic & NYU School of Law Global Justice Clinic, 12 September 2012, Available at http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Living-UnderDrones.pdf. “counterterrorism strikes” between 20 Januar y 2009 and 31 December 2015.16 In April 2015, for example, President Obama apologised for a drone strike that killed an American and an Italian citizen. He explained that 13 The full text of the resolution is available at http://www.un. org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/25/L.32. 14 Ibid. 15 Matthew Spurlock, “Obama Promised Transparency on Drones, But We’re Still in the Dark,” ACLU Speak Freely Blog, 16 March 2015, https://www.aclu.org/blog/obama-promisedtransparency-drones-were-still-dark. 16 “Summary of Information Regarding U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 1 July 2016, https://www.dni.gov/files/ documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/ DNIReleaseCTStrikesOutsideAreasofActiveHostilities.PDF. when he learned what had happened, he “directed that the existence of this operation be 17 Ibid. at 2. 18 Ibid. 19 UN Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America,” at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/04, 23 April 2014. 71 H A R M TO G OV E R N M E N TA L T R A N S PA R E N CY T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Impact of the lack of transparency on the rule of law In addition to the devastating toll that the targeting killing programme wreaks on victims, their families, and their communities, the per vasive secrecy surrounding it undermines democratic accountability and the rule of law. According to the UN Human Rights Committee, “transparency and accountability ... are ... essential for the promotion and protection of human rights.”24 Yet, as the Committee points out, the US targeted killing programme is marked by “the lack of transparency regarding the criteria for drone strikes, including the legal justification for specific attacks, and the lack of accountability for the loss of life resulting from such attacks.”25 A man walks past a graffiti, denouncing strikes by U.S. drones in Yemen, painted on a wall in Sanaa November 13, 2014. Transparency in this area would help promote the rule of law in a number of ways. First, transparency acts to prevent abuses of © REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah authority. 26 If officials know that each operation declassified and disclosed publicly.”20 compensation from the US government, much will face public scrutiny, they will be more likely He did so, he said, because those “families less public acknowledgment of responsibility. to strictly adhere to (and document their deser ve to know the truth.”21 President Obama compliance with) the laws and safeguards in ordered a “full review” of the operation and the In short, President Obama’s acknowledgement of place, such as those requiring a “near certainty” US government offered the families financial the deaths of Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo that non-combatants will not be injured or killed compensation. 22 While this particular step Porto ser ved to highlight that the Obama in the operation. 27 toward public accountability was undoubtedly administration’s vision of transparency and positive, it stood in stark contrast to the accountability for drone strikes did not apply Second, transparency is necessar y for government’s typical response to deaths of non- equally to all civilians. For example, although democratic accountability. The public, both in the Western victims in Yemen and elsewhere. US credible reports indicate that a US drone killed United States and abroad, needs information to strikes have killed hundreds of Pakistani and twelve members of a Yemeni wedding party in Yemeni civilians, but their families rarely receive 2013 and that the US government compensated the victims’ families, 23 the US government has never publicly acknowledged responsibility for 20 “Statement by the President on the Deaths of Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto,” White House, 23 April 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/04/23/statement-president-deaths-warren-weinsteinand-giovanni-lo-porto. 21 the strike nor offered an explanation for it. Ibid. 22 Ibid.; Peter Baker, “Obama Apologizes After Drone Kills American and Italian Held by Al Qaeda,” New York Times, 23 April 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/2-qaedahostages-were-accidentally-killed-in-us-raid-white-house-says.html. 72 23 Lucy Draper, “The Wedding that Became a Funeral: U.S. Still Silent One Year on from Deadly Yemen Drone Strike,” Newsweek, 12 December 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/wedding-becamefuneral-us-still-silent-one-year-deadly-yemen-drone-strike-291403. 24 UN Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression” at ¶ 3, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011. judge the government’s claimed assertions of legality and wisdom in using lethal force abroad. Under international law, lethal force may only be used outside recognised armed conflict as a last resort in response to an imminent threat, when non-lethal means are unavailable. Under the US Constitution, both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments provide safeguards similar to those found in human rights law. Unless there is a truly imminent threat, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the deprivation of life and the use of excessive force in effecting seizures. In the absence of such an imminent threat, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires—at the ver y least—fair notice and an opportunity to be heard before such action is taken. The targeted killing programme operates far from any traditional battlefields and likely violates both international and domestic law. But because the US government has not disclosed the full legal and policy standards governing it, an informed and robust public debate about the merits of the programme has been impossible, creating “an accountability vacuum.”28 As it stands, the public must primarily rely on the US government’s selective disclosures, which are often self-ser ving and designed to shape public opinion on the government’s terms alone. When the public is only privy to partial, biased, and at times incorrect information, it is unable to ser ve as a check on its representatives—a critical element of representative democracy. Finally, greater transparency may help the United States reclaim some of the legitimacy and moral 25 UN Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America” at ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/04, 23 April 2014. authority it has lost with unsupportable claims of 26 Out of the Shadows: Recommendations to Advance Transparency in the Use of Lethal Force, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic & Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, June 2017, https://www.outoftheshadowsreport.com.. public accountability. For example, the US 27 Ibid. The 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance, which describes the policy constraints put in place by the Obama administration, is available in PDF form at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/ field_document/presidential_policy_guidance.pdf. authority to kill in secrecy and with virtually no 28 Navi Pillay, “Pillay Briefs Security Council on Protection of Civilians on Anniversary of Baghdad Bombing,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 19 August 2013, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. aspx?NewsID=13642&LangID=E. 73 H A R M TO G OV E R N M E N TA L T R A N S PA R E N CY T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S government’s drone programme in Pakistan has executive branch secrecy—and, often, excessive the request of the government, the ACLU was Some detail the government’s legal reasoning for years been one of the government’s worst judicial deference to those secrecy claims. not aware that it had prevailed on this issue. supporting its claimed authority to target US When the government appealed that ruling, it citizens abroad, and one—the “Presidential keep secrets. Despite regular and detailed news reports of US strikes there, current and former Transparency litigation suffers from a redacted from its briefs any reference to the Policy Guidance” (“PPG”)—describes the US officials’ statements about the programme, fundamental challenge: the US government often subject of the appeal, leaving the ACLU in the executive branch’s approval process for targeted and a district court ruling that apparently agreed argues that its records are so secret that it dark about the ruling at issue, the reasoning for killings outside areas of active hostilities. that this information has indeed been officially cannot even disclose the reasons for keeping it, and the government’s arguments for vacating acknowledged, 30 the government still goes to those records secret. In responding to FOIA that ruling. 33 This secrecy creates problems not extraordinar y lengths to maintain in court, to the lawsuits, the government frequently informs the just for the plaintiffs, but for the courts as well. public, and to the international community that plaintiffs that relevant documents exist, but then When facts and legal arguments are withheld gives a cursor y explanation of why it believes it The ACLU submitted its first FOIA request this programme is secret. Such claims of from a party, this hinders the party’s ability to concerning the targeted killing programme in secrecy—when the programme is anything but— can keep that information secret. When plaintiffs respond, depriving courts of the full benefits of Januar y 2010. Specifically, the ACLU requested costs the United States legitimacy with the US are not informed of the US government’s full the adversarial process. records pertaining to who the US government public and abroad. As one report remarked, arguments for keeping documents secret, they 29 are hard-pressed to argue that those arguments Coupled with the deference courts often give to degree of transparency, [they] send a meaningful are incorrect. This purported need for secrecy the US government’s own assessment of when signal to foreign publics that the U.S. is disfigures the adversarial legal process, violating national security requires secrecy, this committed to human dignity and human life.”31 principles of openness and fairness that are characteristic of transparency litigation poses a Conversely, the failure to do so sets a dangerous embedded in the FOIA and in the judicial branch significant challenge for plaintiffs seeking precedent for other countries, further as a whole. disclosure and accountability. This problem is perpetuated when even the Targeted killing transparency litigation and Obama administration disclosures “where [investigations] are conducted with a undermining the rule of law. The unique challenges of the legal fight for transparency Given the significant costs of the secrecy surrounding the targeted killing programme, nonprofit organisations and media outlets have turned to the courts to tr y to gain access to this information. Litigants suing for information about the targeted killing programme under the US Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) have had critically important successes, but still face an uphill battle and hurdles imposed by excessive 29 Anna Diakun, “The Drone Program in Pakistan Is One of the Government’s Worst-Kept Secrets,” ACLU Speak Freely Blog, 18 July 2017, https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/drone-programpakistan-one-governments-worst-kept-secrets. 30 The ACLU’s Second Circuit brief explaining why it appears that a federal district court held this fact to be acknowledged is available at https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/aclu-v-doj-briefplaintiffs-appellees. 31 The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic & Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2012, http://www.law.columbia. edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/ The%20Civilian%20Impact%20of%20Drones.pdf. 74 judicial opinions deciding these cases are redacted, such that the court may rule for or against the plaintiff without the plaintiff knowing why. Plaintiffs must decide whether to appeal Despite the challenges inherent in transparency without knowing why the court rejected their litigation, much of what the public does know arguments or the ultimate basis for the court’s about the US government’s targeted killing reasoning. Even when the court rules against the programme and its legal justifications is a result government and holds that a particular fact or of years-long FOIA litigation by the ACLU, document may not remain secret, plaintiffs may the New York Times, and other groups. still not get the information they seek. If the US These lawsuits have had var ying degrees of government appeals, its briefs may be riddled success, with some resulting in the release of with redacted section headings, redacted topic critical documents and others being denied in sentences, redacted lists, and entirely redacted their entirety. pages. 32 As an extreme example, in one of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)’s recent targeted killing FOIA lawsuits, the ACLU prevailed on a certain issue before the district court. But because this ruling was redacted at 32 See, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ, 844 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2016). The government’s brief in this case is available at https://www.aclu. org/sites/default/files/field_document/105._govt_cross-appeal_ brief_2016.06.06.pdf. The ACLU’s FOIA lawsuits have sought legal and Overcoming the US government’s refusal to acknowledge the programme in court may target; how the government determined that these individuals should be placed on the “kill list”; what efforts the government made to minimise civilian injur y and death before carr ying out a strike; where these drone strikes occurred; and which agencies were involved in executing targeted killings. 34 Even though the US government had disclosed some information—both officially and through strategic leaks—the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) denied the request in full. 35 It asserted that it was unable to either confirm or deny even whether it had an “intelligence interest” in the targeted killing programme. This exemplified the hypocrisy of the government’s stance on the issue: when it ser ved the government’s purposes, it would disclose information about the programme or coordinate unofficial leaks. All the while, it would claim in court that the programme was so secret that to even acknowledge its existence would put the national security of the United States at risk. policy memoranda, statistics, and other information concerning the targeted killing programme, and the government has been forced to disclose a few significant documents. 34 The ACLU’s 13 January 2009 FOIA request on predator drone strikes is available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/ field_document/2010-1-13-PredatorDroneFOIARequest.pdf. 33 The ACLU’s brief responding to the government’s secrecy in the 2017 Second Circuit case ACLU v. DOJ is available at https:// www.aclu.org/legal-document/aclu-v-doj-brief-plaintiffs-appellees. 35 The CIA’s memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment on the basis of its Glomar response is available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/15__ cia_s_motion_for_summary_judgment_10_01_10.pdf. 75 H A R M TO G OV E R N M E N TA L T R A N S PA R E N CY T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S The federal appeals court in Washington, DC, Khan in Yemen. 41 Just weeks later, another US after careful and extensive consideration, I saw through the US government’s attempt to drone strike killed Anwar al-Aulaqi’s son, find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in have it both ways. sixteen-year-old US citizen Abdulrahman. 36 In a victor y for transparency, 42 Later Presidential Policy Guidance which I cannot solve a problem because of While these cases were pending, the Obama the court held that given the many public that month, in October 2011, the ACLU contradictory constraints and rules—a veritable administration took initial steps toward statements by senior administration officials submitted a FOIA request seeking records Catch-22. I can find no way around the thicket transparency and accountability, likely in concerning the nature of the targeted killing pertaining to the legal basis, factual basis, and of laws and precedents that effectively allow preparation for the possibility that a Republican programme, the CIA’s refusal to confirm or deny actual process by which the US government the Executive Branch of our Government to candidate could win the 2012 Presidential even an intelligence interest was unreasonable targeted and killed these three Americans. proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions election. 49 The administration began to develop that seem on their face incompatible with our the “Presidential Policy Guidance,” or “PPG,” a In Februar y 2012, when the government Constitution and laws, while keeping the document that sets out the law and policy that agencies once again refused to disclose reasons for their conclusion a secret. 45 the US government must follow when it carries and unwarranted. The court wrote that the CIA’s arguments in favor of secrecy asked the court “to give their imprimatur to a fiction of deniability that no reasonable person would regard as information, the ACLU sued, as did the New York plausible.”37 In light of this, the Court ordered Times. (Their cases were almost immediately On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals released a fact sheet describing the document in the CIA to produce a list of all of its documents consolidated.) The district court ruled against reversed the district court’s decision, resulting in 2013, but refused to disclose the entire that addressed the information sought through the ACLU and the New York Times, while a major victor y for transparency. 46 The court document even after President Obama the FOIA request, and to explain why it chose to nonetheless expressing frustration that the ordered the release of a redacted version of a personally pointed to it to defend the targeted withhold these documents. 38 government was seemingly not required to 41-page July 2010 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) killing programme. 51 release any additional information under FOIA. 43 memorandum (the “Barron Memorandum”), But this victor y only went so far. After several The court pointed out that the targeted killings which analyzed the legality of the proposed Later that year, the ACLU filed a FOIA request more years of litigation, the appeals court “seem on their face incompatible with our lethal strike operation against Anwar al-Aulaqi. 47 seeking, among other information, all records out targeted killings. 50 The administration ultimately held that the CIA had demonstrated Constitution and laws,” but lamented that it This document is the most in-depth legal analysis pertaining to the US government’s process for that it had properly withheld its records and that could find no basis to compel the US yet released about the government’s claimed designating individuals or groups for targeted government officials had not officially government to explain the killings’ legality. 44 authority to target US citizens abroad, but much killing. 52 The ACLU specifically sought the PPG, acknowledged any of the information within As the district court explained: was still missing. 48 Significantly, throughout the arguing that if the government was going to Barron Memorandum, the author—who President publicly describe and rely on this document, the This Court is constrained by law, and under the Obama later nominated to become a federal PPG must be disclosed. law, I can only conclude that the Government appellate judge—conditions important legal has not violated FOIA by refusing to turn over While the ACLU’s first case was still in its early conclusions on “the facts represented to” the the documents sought in the FOIA requests, and stages, the ACLU filed a separate FOIA request OLC by other departments of the executive so cannot be compelled by this court of law to seeking information concerning the legal and branch. Because the discussion of those facts is explain in detail the reasons why its actions do factual bases for the killing of three US redacted, it is impossible for the public to not violate the Constitution and laws of the citizens. 40 In September 2011, a drone strike evaluate whether the killing of al-Aulaqi meets United States. The Alice-in-Wonderland nature killed US citizens Anwar al-Aulaqi and Samir the legal standards described in the memo. of this pronouncement is not lost on me; but Moreover, key terms in the memo are undefined, those records. 39 The legal basis for killing US citizens 41 Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth, “Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen,” New York Times, 30 September 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/ middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html. 36 ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 37 Ibid. at 431. 38 Ibid. at 432. 39 ACLU v. CIA, 640 F. App’x 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 40 A PDF version of the ACLU’s 19 October 2011 FOIA request is available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/awlaki_foia_ final_2011_10_19.pdf. 76 42 Craig Whitlock, “U.S. Airstrike that Killed American Teen in Yemen Raises Legal, Ethical Questions,” Washington Post, 22 October 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-airstrike-that-killed-american-teen-in-yemen-raiseslegal-ethical-questions/2011/10/20/gIQAdvUY7L_story.html?utm_ term=.634f71a2dc35. 43 New York Times v. DOJ, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 44 Ibid. at 515-16. so it is not even clear what exactly the legal standards are and how they operate in practice. 45 Ibid. at 516-17. 46 New York Times v. DOJ, 756 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2014). 47 Ibid. at 124. 48 Brett Max Kaufman, “Five Takeaways from the Newly Released Drone Memo,” ACLU Speak Freely Blog, 23 June 2014, https://www. aclu.org/blog/five-takeaways-newly-released-drone-memo. The government refused, so the ACLU again sued. During the course of this lawsuit, the government abandoned extremely broad claims of executive privilege and released the PPG, along with four Defense Department 49 Scott Shane, “Election Spurred a Move to Codify U.S. Drone Policy,” New York Times, 24 November 2012, http://www.nytimes. com/2012/11/25/world/white-house-presses-for-drone-rule-book. html. 50 Brett Max Kaufman, “Court Considers Releasing Key Documents Governing Secretive Targeted Killing Program,” ACLU Speak Freely Blog, 26 February 2016, https://www.aclu.org/blog/ speak-freely/court-considers-releasing-key-documents-governingsecretive-targeted-killing. 51 “Obama’s Speech on Drone Policy,” New York Times, 23 May 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/ transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-drone-policy.html. 52 The ACLU’s 15 October 2013 FOIA request is available at https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/aclu-v-doj-recordscasualties-targeted-killing-program-foia-foia-request. 77 H A R M TO G OV E R N M E N TA L T R A N S PA R E N CY T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S documents. 53 These documents, although Similarly, in the Report on Associated Forces, In July 2016, President Obama signed an considerably from the estimates of human rights partially redacted, revealed further details about the government redacted information that Executive Order on “United States Policy on Pre- organisations and journalists. These figures were how the targeted killing programme operates, apparently indicates sources of legal authority and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian thus difficult to take seriously, and were only an including information about the policy standards on which the government is relying in addition Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use empty gesture toward transparency. concerning the use of force outside areas of to the AUMF in carr ying out the targeted of Force.” active hostilities. One document, the “Report on killing programme. Order was to “maintain and promote best Despite the flaws, the Executive Order was an practices that reduce the likelihood of civilian advance. While much more needs to be done, Associated Forces,” contains the government’s 59 The stated purpose of this Executive assessment of the groups against which the Notably, much of this redacted information casualties, take appropriate steps when such the Trump administration appears headed in United States asserts it is at war. 54 The report relates to the US government’s legal casualties occur, and draw lessons from [the exactly the wrong direction. The Obama explains the US government’s view of the legal justifications for the targeted killing programme— government’s] operations to further enhance the administration’s figures expressly excluded difference between groups that are “associated meaning that while government officials freely protection of civilians.”60 forces” of al-Qaida, against which the assert publicly that the programme is lawful, the government claims it may use lethal force under government at the same time refuses to back up Although several of the commitments enshrined and Syria were not counted, but deaths in the 2001 Authorization for Use of Militar y Force those broad assertions with its actual legal in the Executive Order are positive developments countries like Yemen and Somalia were counted (AUMF), and groups that are merely “affiliates” analysis. This refusal to disclose the rules by toward transparency and accountability, it is and at least minimally acknowledged. 63 Since or “adherents” of al-Qaida, against which the which the government is purportedly playing unclear what effect that they will actually have. taking office, President Trump has “temporarily” government thinks it may not. undermines the legitimacy of the US government For example, the Executive Order instructs the designated parts of Yemen and Somalia as areas and its actions abroad and prevents the public “civilian casualties” in “areas of active hostilities,” meaning that civilian deaths in Afghanistan, Iraq, “relevant agencies” to “review or investigate of active hostilities, 64 meaning that the But significant information was missing from from holding the government accountable when incidents involving civilian casualties”61 —a step administration could plausibly exclude from the these documents, hidden behind redactions or it violates those rules. for which civil society organisations have long Executive Order-mandated tally any civilian advocated. But ver y little information has been deaths from bombing campaigns in those areas. omitted entirely. For example, while the PPG The Obama administration attempts to entrench its policies released to the public. What’s more, the information that is released often conflicts with More substantively, the Obama administration feasible,” nowhere does the government explain After the courts ordered the Obama the independent assessments of outside groups. likely hoped it would entrench policy safeguards how “feasibility” is assessed. 55 And another administration to release policy and legal Investigations carried out in such a manner do such as the requirement that there be “near document, a so-called “Report on Process,” memoranda, it made a public showing of taking little to foster accountability, provide justice for certainty” that non-combatants will not be victims, or strengthen the rule of law. injured or killed before approving a strike. But states that “[l]ethal action should be taken . . . only when capture of an individual is not states that to be eligible for targeting, “the “steps” toward transparency. 58 These efforts proposed target [must] pose a continuing, sought to institutionalize the administration’s imminent threat to U.S. persons.”56 The policies and practices—and asserted document’s discussion of the “imminence” safeguards—before the next administration took standard merely repeats the vague office. These attempts were incomplete, considerations that had been laid out in prior however, and often had the effect of public speeches, without providing any sense of emphasising the administration’s secrecy even what this standard means in practice. 57 as it heralded its own transparency. Moreover, it 53 “U.S. Releases Drone Strike ‘Playbook’ in Response to ACLU Lawsuit,” ACLU Press Release, 6 August 2016, https://www.aclu. org/news/us-releases-drone-strike-playbook-response-aclu-lawsuit. made clear just how precarious its steps were in terms of setting a lasting transparency policy 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 78 Similarly, the Executive Order committed the matter of policy rather than law, it left the door government to releasing an unclassified open for the Trump administration to sweep in summar y each year of the number of US with its own interpretations of loose policies and government strikes outside areas of active standards or to circumvent them altogether. This hostilities and “assessments of combatant and threatens to undo the victories for transparency non-combatant deaths resulting from those that have been won over the past few years and strikes.” make democratic accountability even more 62 As described above, however, the government’s official statistics varied difficult to achieve. with respect to targeted killing. 54 This document is available at https://www.aclu.org/foiadocument/report-associated-forces-0. 55 Brett Max Kaufman, “Details Abound in Drone ‘Playbook’— Except for the Ones That Really Matter Most,” ACLU Speak Freely Blog, 8 August 2016, https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/ details-abound-drone-playbook-except-ones-really-matter-most. because it articulated safeguards mostly as a 59 E.O. 13732, “United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force,” 1 July 2016, https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/ executive-order-united-states-policy-pre-and-post-strike-measures. 58 Toby Shepard, “Obama’s New Drone Policy Is a Step Forward for Transparency,” Open Society Foundations, 15 July 2016, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/obama-s-newdrone-policy-step-forward-transparency. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. at 1. 64 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules, New York Times, 12 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/12/us/ politics/trump-loosen-counterterrorism-rules.html; Bonnie Kristian, “Trump’s dangerous Expansion of Executive War Powers,” Politico, 3 April 2017, http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/04/ trumps-dangerous-expansion-of-executive-war-powers-000387. 79 H A R M TO G OV E R N M E N TA L T R A N S PA R E N CY Conclusion The lack of transparency surrounding the use of drones in targeted killing programmes has undermined the rule of law and caused significant harms to civilian populations. Even though the United States has carried out T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Country case study: The United States hundreds of lethal drone strikes, resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths, the public still does not have enough information to meaningfully debate whether this use of lethal force is legal or wise. As the United States expands its use and From a use standpoint, the Trump administration has increased the use of armed drones, averaging one drone strike ever y 1.5 days versus ever y 5.4 days during the Obama administration, according to data compiled by the Council on Foreign Relations. 2 These strikes have occurred in a growing number of Rachel Stohl is a Senior Associate with theaters. The Trump administration has also Stimson’s Managing Across Boundaries Initiative demonstrated a willingness to increase the and directs the Conventional Defense Program. number of places in which drones can be used Her areas of expertise focus on issues relating to the international arms trade, including drones, with relatively fewer restraints. Previously, reliance on drones, the risk of officials acting small arms and light weapons, and children in these areas only included Afghanistan, Iraq, with impunity and overstepping their bounds of armed conflict. and Syria, but may now include certain provinces in Yemen and Somalia as well. authority continues to grow. Moving for ward, transparency will be as critical as ever in Although a comprehensive US drone policy preventing abuses from occurring and in has yet to be developed, President Trump’s holding the government accountable when approach to drone export and use is coming abuses do occur. into focus. In short, the Trump administration seems intent on undoing many of the policies, procedures, and restraints put in place by the Obama administration. Current US drone policy rests on policies established during the Obama administration, perhaps most notably a 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) 1 that: • Outlines parameters of drone use in counterterrorism operations; • Establishes a standard of “near certainty” that no civilians will be injured or killed in counterterrorism strikes; and Reports also indicate that the Trump administration has reestablished Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) authority to conduct lethal strikes, perhaps reflecting an inclination toward a more hands-on CIA role in Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and other areas where counter terrorism operations are priorities. 3 In addition, the Trump administration seems to be on track to rescind or relax certain standards for drone strikes as detailed in the 2013 PPG including the necessity for targets to pose a “continuing and imminent threat” and for there to be “near certainty” that no civilians be injured or killed in a given strike. Such relaxation could put civilians at heightened risk should the threshold for conducting lethal strikes be lowered. • Establishes a standard that targets of drone strikes must pose a “continuing and imminent threat.” 1 US Department of Justice, Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities, 22 May 2013, https:// www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/procedures_for_approving_ direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/download. 80 2 Micah Zenko, “The (Not-So) Peaceful Transition of Power: Trump’s Drone Strikes Outpace Obama,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/not-sopeaceful-transition-power-trumps-drone-strikes-outpace-obama. 3 Gordon Lubold and Shane Harris, “Trump broadens CIA Powers, Allows Deadly Drone Strikes,” The Wall Street Journal, 13 March 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumpgave-cia-power-to-launch-drone-strikes-1489444374. 81 C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: U N I T E D S TAT E S Less than a year into the Trump administration, we are seeing an acceptance of greater civilian casualties – and risk to civilians – and T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Perspectives a lower threshold for lethal strikes. As a result, the United States could see greater opposition to its drone programme by partners and allies, as well as countries targeted by American strikes. The Trump administration does seem to be committed to the Obama-era effort of developing global norms and standards however. The October 2016 launch of the Joint Declaration for the export and subsequent use of armed or strike-enabled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) established a process for the future development of these global norms. 4 The Trump administration decided in June 2016 that the United States would remain a co-leader of this process and engaged in its development. The Trump administration’s current actions on US drone policy, however, could undermine its leadership on multilateral efforts to develop international standards to guide drone transfer and use. Governments will question American motivations if US actions are in direct contravention of the proposed global framework that it is pushing simultaneously. 4 US Department of State, Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), October 28, 2016, https://2009-2017. state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/262811.htm 82 83 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S 6. Human Rights Perspectives Shahzad Akbar Shahzad Akbar is a human rights law yer based in Islamabad where he leads the Foundation for Fundamental Rights, a pro-bono law firm that has represented over 100 civilian victims of drone “In Pakistan, things fall out of the sky all the time.”1 The above statement was made by Per vez strikes in Pakistan since 2010. His work focuses on Musharraf, the former president of Pakistan challenging human rights abuses such as rendition, as a response to the first use of a drone by enforced disappearances, and opposing the death the CIA, to target and kill Nek Muhammad. penalty in Pakistan. He is also a Legal Fellow with Reprieve-UK. In 1993, Muhammad was recruited to fight alongside the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan’s civil war against Ahmed Shah Massoud’s Northern Alliance after the Soviet exit from the countr y. Muhammad was known to be the “host” for al-Qaeda operatives, who found shelter in the mountainous regions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. 2 However, he continuously denied the existence of any “terrorists” living in the secluded rough terrain areas. In 2004, Muhammad entered, and conveniently broke a peace deal with, the Pakistani government for a ceasefire on attacks on Pakistani soil that evidently infuriated the government. Soon after, through a back-door agreement with the US’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Muhammad was targeted by a Predator drone and a Hellfire missile, that severed his left leg and left hand, leading to an instantaneous death. 3 This was the first time a drone strike was used in Pakistan. 1 Mark Mazzetti, “A True Pashtun”, The Way of The Knife, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2013), p.109. 84 2 Ibid, p.108. 3 Ibid, p. 108-110. 85 H U M A N R I G H T S P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S At the time, Muhammad’s death seemed to be presumed that the admitted and true figures on called back from; there is no devastation These civilians may be people who happen to an exception, a mere derogation from the normal the accuracy of this strategy will never be experienced by family members who will not be in the garb similar to that of the “enemy”. rule, a nuisance of an ally to the terrorists who publicly known. Succinctly put, there is no risk of have to anticipate that their loved ones are However, there have been instances of drone had to be dealt with, but since then attacks by harm for the one controlling the drone but all is risking their lives while on duty; and strikes where there is no room for mistaken drones have become a daily practice. Hundreds at risk for the ones on the ground. In an predominately, no loss to American lives. This identity; the elderly, women and children have of innocent civilians have fallen victim to this alternative view, while a drone pilot may be suggests that the use of drones instead of been unlawfully and cruelly targeted. new era weapon of warfare, which has alarmingly physically safe from harm and injur y, it has been humans can create the perception of a costless become the preferred choice of weapon of the claimed that despite being removed from the real war. The primar y reason for this is that these Since 2004, according to the London-based US and its allies in their “War on Terror”. battlefield, drone operators have higher chances strikes occur away from American eyes. Bureau of Investigative Journalism, between of developing post-traumatic stress disorder. 4 Journalists typically cannot enter areas where 424 and 966 civilians primarily in the FATA have drone strikes take place, and ver y few videos or fallen victim to the wrath of the American “War It has been claimed that the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or in more common parlance, This perception of a costless war is further photographs are available to the public, which in on Terror” with complete impunity. 8 The whirring the drone, fulfills a checklist of three P’s for perpetuated by the fact that waging a war with turn isolates Americans from the destruction sound generated by a drone, and the a successful strike: precision, precaution and drones comes at no human costs to the United these strikes can cause. psychological effect of the near constant planning. But in reality there is one factor that States. As the New York Times columnist Roger takes precedence over all others: safety. In this Cohen stated, going to war can become difficult new era of warfare, a member of the CIA or the to distinguish from going to work. Without men US militar y sits thousands of miles away safely and women coming home in coffins, the in a room, watching a screen through which American public is less likely to object to war. a drone’s cameras allow that person to see The costless war is not subject to the political One of the key targeted regions of US drone Similarly, the joint Stanford-New York University checks and accountability that are characteristic strikes has been the Federally Administered study, Living under Drones, has described the intended target it just takes the push of a button of waging war in a democratic society. Extending Tribal Areas, or FATA, which make up Pakistan’s waves of fear that a local population feels from to lock on to the “enemy” and kill them. Just like this argument to its logical extreme, a costless northwestern boundar y with Afghanistan. FATA, the constant presence of drones and the extent war could potentially lead to an increased a legacy of the colonial era in the subcontinent, to which this fear has started to interrupt normal willingness to use force, essentially invalidating is a significantly underdeveloped area in economic, political, and social life in these the premise of the democratic peace theor y. comparison with the rest of Pakistan. There is countries.10 “virtual” surroundings, and when he sees his that, the enemy’s body is shredded to pieces and a battle of “War on Terror” is won. It sounds safe and it sounds simple—lock on to the target and push a button, just like a video game, and then go home, have dinner with your family and ask them how their day was. It almost seems surreal that it can be this easy. Some would suggest that costless is the appropriate word; costless in more ways than the standard monetar y implication. But what if you target the wrong person? What if the person targeted is 5 6 day, he is blown to pieces along with the rest of his family within the safety of his own home? There are few checks and balances within the drone warfare strategy; either you got the ‘bad guy’ or you just targeted civilians. The CIA has not disclosed any facts or figures and it is 86 studied. The journalist David Rohde described the effect of hearing drones above him for hours at a stretch and called them a “potent unner ving symbol of unchecked American power.”9 7 no well-established infrastructure, hospitals, The lack of attention paid to the legal concerns schools, or recreation facilities, and adherence and civilian casualties surrounding the CIA’s to custom, tradition and religion is of optimum drone program underlies the indifference of the importance. As the area is disconnected from American public toward drone warfare. This is the rest of Pakistan’s more settled areas in a due to multiple reasons that all work in the plethora of ways, it would be apt to assert favour of a drone-use strategy; for example, that FATA is a vulnerable area, and its there is no debate over militar y expenditure and vulnerability has in turn shaped it into a victim of where the American troops should go or be profound ignorance and the senseless killing of innocent civilians. returning home from a shift of chromite mining and as he sits with his family to talk about his The Federally Administered Tribal Areas—where “things fall out of the sky” presence on a wider population, has been 4 Rebecca Hawkes, “Post-traumatic stress disorder is higher in drone operators”, The Telegraph, 30 May 2015, http://www. telegraph.co.uk/culture/hay-festival/11639746/Post-traumaticstress-disorder-is-higher-in-drone-operators.html. 5 Roger Cohen, “Of fruit flies and drones”, New York Times, 12 November 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/ opinion/13iht-edcohen.html. 6 Andrew Callam, “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles”, Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, International Affairs Review, Winter 2010, 10 May 2017. 8 7 To date FATA has been targeted in at least 425 drone strikes, see the ‘Strikes in Pakistan’ database from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, available at https://www. thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/charts?show_ casualties=1&show_injuries=1&show_ strikes=1&location=pakistan&from=2004-1-1&to=now. Ibid. 9 David Rohde, “The Drone War”, Reuters Magazine, 17 January 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/davos-reutersmagazinedronewar-idAFL1E8CHCXX20120117. 10 Michael J. Boyle, “The Legal and Ethical Implications of Drone Warfare”, The International Journal of Human Rights 2015, Taylor & Francis, 10 May 2017, pp. 116-117, http://www.tandfonline.com/ doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2014.991210?src=recsys. 87 H U M A N R I G H T S P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Humanity - an aspect absent from drone strike dialogue were considered as accurate, exclusively taking As various commentators have pointed out,11 it misleading picture of the real effects of drones. is the humanitarian side of the debate about As Daniel Brunstetter and Arturo Jimenez drone attacks that is most often absent in public Bacardi point out, the principle of proportionality discourse. The dialogue in policy circles often is difficult to measure when the psychological becomes focused on strategic and policy issues consequences of drones are added into the of the “war on terror” —whether drones are equation. The majority of the discourse has helpful in fighting terrorists, or whether they can revolved around a narrow calculation of be manufactured more cheaply and used more proportionality, which measures only civilian efficiently. The concerns being made by deaths in comparison the militar y gains international human rights organizations gets lost associated with a strike, and engages in a form in a befuddling interpretation of the language of of “proportionality relativism”.12 international law. For example, whether the CIA, the Taliban, or a more recent target, the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), are lawful combatants; or whether the killings were proportionate. Including the aforementioned, there are many questions and no plausible answers in the drone strike dialogue. Furthermore, there is blatant ignorance in both policy and legal circles with regard to the human rights implications of drone strikes. Seldom is the issue perceived from the victim’s perspective. It is as if, in a world governed by strategic imperatives and international law, the human stories simply do not matter. With regard to whether the strikes are proportionate or not, it should be considered that the psychological effect that the deployment of drones has on the affected populations could result in a violation of the fundamental criterion of proportionality. In his article, Michael J. Boyle explains that the US administration has employed a narrow calculation of proportionality, focusing exclusively on the body count associated with drones. Hence, even if the 11 See Madiha Tahir , “The Business of Haunting,” Wounds of Waziristan, 2 September 2013, http://woundsofwaziristan.com/ business-of-haunting/; and T. Gregory, “Drones, Targeted Killings, and the Limitations of International Law”, International Political Sociology 9, 2015, pp. 197-212. 88 number of civilian casualties reported by the CIA The anti-drone attacks in Pakistan protest against the US government that took place in Hong Kong on 2012.7.8. into account only the body count paints a Women, children, and the elderly: justifiable “collateral damage”? By focusing on a small number of victims, one can deduce how egregious the covert drone strike strategy is. For example, Sadaullah, 15, was a student in the village of Machi Khel, Mir Ali, North Waziristan, Pakistan. On 7 September 2009, two drones were obser ved hovering over the village throughout the day. This prompted fear and anger amongst the villagers, who viewed the drones’ presence as a threat and an interference with their religious obser vations of the holy month of Ramadan. In the evening, Sadaullah and his family, including grandfathers, uncles, and cousins, gathered at his grandfather’s house to celebrate the breaking of their fast. Upon the ritual breaking of the fast, the family stepped outside into the courtyard to offer Maghrib, the evening prayer. Sadaullah joined the prayer late, as he had been ser ving the guests. As his family members finished their prayers, they returned into the main room of the house. Sadaullah and his elder cousin Ajman Ullah were the last to finish their prayers. As they were about to re12 Boyle. © Yu Pong, 2012 enter the house from the courtyard, the two Justice and redress are important for the victims drones fired their missiles at the building. of drone strikes. Justice may begin with an Sadaullah was hit by the debris that fell from the acknowledgment of the strikes’ existence, but roof and was knocked unconscious. for redress, immediate steps for compensation of such victims ought to be taken. He woke up in a hospital in Peshawar. Both his legs had been amputated, and he had lost the To cite another example, Kareem Khan, who now use of one eye due to flying shrapnel. A number resides in Islamabad was a permanent resident of his family members had been killed in the of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. His blasts: Mautullah Jan, his uncle, who had been in family lives in the village of Machi khel, Mir Ali, a wheelchair for a decade and his cousins; North Waziristan, Pakistan, in his ancestral Kadaan ullah Jan and Sabir-ud-Din. house. On 31 December 2009, at approximately 13 21:00, his home was attacked with missiles fired Sadaullah died in 2013 due to an infection that from a Predator drone. Three people inside the developed from the wounds on his amputated house were killed, and severely damaged Khan’s legs caused by the wooden legs he was forced house.14 The three killed were Asif Iqbal, to use because he could not afford prosthetics. Kareem’s brother and a secondar y school teacher at a local public school; Zahin Ullah 13 Stanford University, Living under Drones 91, https://law. stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/ publication/313671/doc/slspublic/Stanford_NYU_LIVING_UNDER_ DRONES.pdf. The author conducted additional interviews with the victims, which have also been utilised as a resource. Khan, Kareem’s son, a government employee 14 Case study: Kareem Khan, Reprieve, http://www.reprieve.org. uk/case-study/kareem-khan/. 89 H U M A N R I G H T S P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S working at the Government Girls Public School devastation that has befallen upon the residents know the true number of civilian casualties. At claimed by the Bureau of Investigative Mira Khan Kot; and Khaliq Dad, a mason who of FATA. least 172 of those killed were children. Over a Journalism. Currently, the New America thousand more have been injured and have lost Foundation’s statistics state that the total was working on construction of the village mosque, and was staying with Khan’s family For many years, there had been no their property or livelihoods. 20 It has been casualties of which pertain to civilians stand in the house. None of the victims were acknowledgement of these civilian deaths by the claimed that for ever y militant killed, at least 10 between 245 and 303 persons. However, it is involved in any terrorist activity or with any United States but finally in July 2016 the Obama to 15 civilians are killed. A comprehensive imperative to note that those deaths of those terrorist organizations. administration reluctantly released a vague investigation by the Bureau for Investigative attributed to an “unknown” status in the area estimate of civilian deaths from 2009 to 2015. Journalism found that only 12 per cent of those amount up to 211 to 328 additional deaths. 25 On 24 October 2012, Momina Bibi, aged 67, was The estimate was between 64 and 116 persons, killed in Pakistan by drones over the past ten working in a field in the village of Tappi, North however, these figures encompassed a holistic years were militants. As stated above, al-Qaeda Moreover, a 2013 report submitted to the UN Waziristan, collecting vegetables when she was view of civilian victims of drone strikes in members— the original intended targets of the General Assembly by Ben Emmerson, the struck by a drone missile which killed her and multiple countries and not Pakistan specifically. drone program— constituted only four percent of Special Rapporteur on Counter Terrorism and also the family’s livestock. A second drone Moreover, these figures are in stark contrast to those killed. 22 Human Rights, with the help of the Pakistani strike soon followed the first and left her body in the findings of organizations such as the Bureau pieces. Momina Bibi is described by her son, of Investigative Journalism that collect data It seems that civilians are not just “collateral casualties to be similar to those provided by the Rafiq ur Rehman and her grandchildren as the regarding drone strike victims. damage” but in fact account for the Bureau of Investigative Journalism: life and light of their household and the organizer of the festive events in the family. She was killed in front of her grandchildren; Safdar ur Rehman, aged 3, Asma Bibi, aged 5, Naima Bibi, aged 7, Nabila Bibi, aged 8, Samad ur Rehman, aged 12, Zubair ur Rehman, aged 13 and Kaleem ur Rehman, aged 17, who were playing in the field near her.15 16 Drones accuracy claims and statistics – a paradox According to estimates by independent sources and at the time of writing, there have been at least 425 drone attacks within the sovereign territor y of Pakistan, 370 of which were authorized by US President Obama. 17 These On 17 March 2011, residents of Datta Khel, drone strikes, over the two presidencies of North Waziristan, Pakistan participated in a jirga, George Bush and Barack Obama, killed, extra- which is the Pashtun word for “grand council”. judicially and illegally, between 2,501 and 4,003 The purpose of such mass meetings is to provide people. a forum for the tribal elders to resolve dispute confirmed to be civilians. and arrive at collective decisions. The jirga in number is far higher than these figures but the this instance was for the resolution of a chromite difficulty in accessing the areas where the drone mine dispute. As the meeting was under way a strikes are being carried out to conduct drone fired a missile at the group, killing independent investigations and the covert nature approximately fifty people. Among those killed of the drone program makes it impossible to was Malik Hajji Babat. Previously, Malik Hajji Babat had ser ved as a police officer and was the primar y earner in the family. After his demise, his family continues to face difficulties in day to day living and expenses. These victims and their stories are only a handful of the havoc and 15 Case study: Momina Bibi, Reprieve, http://rightsadvocacy. org/client_stories.html#. 90 18 Of these, between 424 and 966 were 19 FFR believes the real 16 Karen Deyoung and Greg Miller, “White House releases its count of civilian deaths in counterterrorism operations under Obama”, The Washington Post, 1 July 2016, https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-releasesits-count-of-civilian-deaths-in-counterterrorism-operations-underobama/2016/07/01/3196aa1e-3fa2-11e6-80bc-d06711fd2125_ story.html. 17 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, CIA and US military drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present, see above, note 2. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 21 government, found the statistics of civilian over whelming proportion of drone strikes victims. 23 According to a report conducted by a [...] Government records showed that there had London-based human rights charity, Reprieve, in been at least 2,200 deaths caused by such killing one targeted militant at least 128 people strikes and that, in addition, at least 600 were killed. 24 However, what really belittles the people had suffered serious injuries. Officials concept of human rights is not just the lack of pointed out that efforts to identify the exact investigative journalism conducted into the number of deceased (and therefore to establish thousands of civilian casualties but the empty the exact number of civilian deaths) were claims of minimal civilian casualties coming from hampered by security concerns and by the White House and the CIA. In a contrasting topographical and institutional obstacles to view, the New America Foundation proposes effective and prompt investigation on the civilian casualties to be much less than those ground by officials working on behalf of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas secretariat, 20 Ibid. 21 D. Byman, “Do targeted killings work?” Brookings Institute, 14 July 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/research/ opinions/2009/07/14-targeted-killings-byman; and “US Drone strikes in Pakistan claiming many civilian victims, says campaigner”, The Guardian, 17 July 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2011/jul/17/us-drone-strikes-pakistan-waziristan. 22 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Covert War on Terror”, at http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/ projects/drones/drones-graphs/. 23 Spencer Ackerman, “41 men targeted but 1,147 people killed: US drone strikes – the facts on the ground”, The Guardian, 24 November 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/ nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147. 24 You Never Die Twice: Multiple Killings in the US drone program, Reprieve, 14 November 2014, http://www.reprieve.org/ wp-content/uploads/2014_11_24_PUB-You-Never-Die-TwiceMultiple-Kills-in-the-US-Drone-Program-1.pdf. Note that here we refer to specific research concerning targeted killing, that follows a different methodology than other research on militant-civilian killing ratios referred to later in this chapter. as well as by the cultural tradition of Pashtun tribes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of burying their dead as soon as possible. Nonetheless, the Special Rapporteur was informed that the Government was able to confirm that at least 400 civilians had been killed as a result of remotely piloted aircraft strikes and a further 200 individuals were regarded as probable non-combatants. 25 Statistics provided by the New America Foundation website, available at: https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/americascounterterrorism-wars/pakistan/. 91 H U M A N R I G H T S P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Selective compensation: Pakistani victims do not qualify 1,449 Pakistani civilians were killed between Another victim, Kareem Khan, visited German, Despite the international community’s drone strikes. This finding was based on physical Dutch and British parliaments and met with recognition of the plight of civilian victims of verification by the civil administration authorities members of the European Parliament to brief these atrocities, the perpetrator of these drone of North and South Waziristan Agencies on them about the damage inflicted by drone strikes strikes, the US, offers only a deafening silence. orders of the Court. in Pakistan. All these efforts finally yielded fruit; It took a ver y long time for the US to admit that they managed to have an impact on specific it had been conducting the drone program and to The PHC gave clear directions to the segments of the international community. date it has not recognized any deaths of Government of Pakistan to protect the citizens of Pakistani civilians. Pakistan from any future drone strikes by Officials indicated that, owing to For this, Momina Bibi’s grandchildren, Nabila underreporting and obstacles to effective Rahman and Zubair ur Rahman travelled to the investigation, those figures were likely to be an United States and spoke with congressmen. underestimate. 26 Campaigns against unlawful targeted killings by the most underprivileged On 9 and 10 December 2010, Sada ullah, aged 15, Faheem Qureshi, aged 14, and Saddam 2008 and 2012 while a “negligible” number of al-Qaeda operatives have been killed by the Hussein, aged 13, traveled hundreds of miles The first response to these efforts came from from their native villages in North Waziristan two American universities: Stanford University In stark comparison to his response on the or even shooting down the drones. This case Agency, FATA, to protest outside the Parliament and New York University. They issued a detailed deaths of Pakistan civilians, President Obama was filed on behalf of the civilian victims of the in Islamabad against the atrocities committed by report on the impact of drone strikes in Pakistan apologized for the deaths by drone of two March 2012 jirga strike that killed over forty the CIA’s drone program. 27 This was their first titled, Living under Drones. western hostages in 2015 and not only tribal elders and tribesmen who had gathered in trip to the capital and they were accompanied by report, other international human rights groups recognized his mistake but also offered both a public place to resolve a mining dispute at least a dozen victims who had lost loved ones also raised their voices. The efforts of victims families his full support and compensation. He between two tribes, as described earlier in this to drone strikes. This was a long way from home. were also vindicated in a judgment of the also promised a full investigation to determine article. Yet these brave Waziris decided to register their Peshawar High Court, the cause of such a mistake. protest and seek justice from their government declared these strikes unlawful and a war crime. and from the most powerful nation, the United The UN Special Rapporteur on Counter It is this selective approach which sends the the Pakistani government to primarily protect the States. This was the first occasion in Pakistan Terrorism and Human Rights, too, recognized the wrong message to Faheem, Saddam and right to life of its citizens against any foreign since the beginning of drone strikes in 2004 that high proportion of civilian harm and the lack of Saadullah, Nabila Bibi, Zubair ur Rehman and power. Following the decision, the Pakistani civilian victims had publicly protested against redress for victims. 30 In 2014, the UN Human other Pakistani victims of drone strikes. Does government kept dragging its feet until the these unlawful extrajudicial killings and Rights Council convened a special session on one need to be from the west to be publicly petitioner went to the court again. This time it demanded justice and redress. drone strikes in Pakistan that recognized the acknowledged as a human being worthy of an was to indict the Prime Minister for contempt of alarming proportion of civilian harm and called apology, or for one’s family to receive court for not implementing a clear direction of on member states to address the issue of civilian compensation for the unlawful death of their the High Court. These actions taken by the victims. innocent loved ones? victims, coupled with advocacy and public The civilian victims’ campaign against unlawful drone strikes in Pakistan struggled to gain attention in Pakistan and internationally. The 29 28 Following this which unequivocally petitioning for their rights at international forums 31 The decision itself is a declarator y order, asking Legal challenges on home ground protestors sought to highlight a daunting aspect of drone strikes: that the drone strikes are not conducted with the precision or accuracy that On 11 May 2013, in its judgment titled, the US and its CIA claimed to be a hallmark of “Foundation for Fundamental Rights vs. Federation of Pakistan & Four others”, 32 the the technology. 28 International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and Global Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law), Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan (September 2012). 26 Ben Emmerson, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, 10 March 2014, UN Doc. A/ HRC/25/59. 29 Peshawar High Court, Judgement Sheet, Writ Petition No. 1551-P/2012, 11 April 2013, https://www.peshawarhighcourt.gov. pk/image_bank/Mr_Justice_Dost_Muhammad_Khan/wp1551-12. pdf. 27 “Drone victims stage sit-in outside Parliament”, Pakistan Today, 11 December 2010, https://www.pakistantoday.com. pk/2010/12/11/drone-victims-stage-sit-in-outside-parliament/ 30 Report of the special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, 18 September 2013. 92 Peshawar High Court (PHC) found that up to campaigning by political parties and civil society in 2014, finally brought down the frequency of drone strikes on Pakistani soil. However, the issue of accountability and redress remains unresolved. In 2014 the Islamabad High Court, on petition of civilian drone victim Kareem Khan, ordered 31 Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “US to pay €1m to family of Italian aid worker killed in drone strike”, The Guardian, 13 July 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/16/us-to-pay1m-euros-family-italian-giovanni-lo-porto-drone-strike. 32 Alice Ross, “Pakistani court rules US drone strikes are illegal”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 9 May 2013, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2013-05-09/ pakistani-court-rules-cia-drone-strikes-are-illegal. Islamabad police to initiate criminal proceedings against the CIA station chief in Islamabad and against other CIA officials involved in drone strikes. This decree from the High Court vindicated the argument of victims of drone 93 H U M A N R I G H T S P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Conclusion strikes in Pakistan that drone strikes in Pakistan The US did not officially recognize its drone question that remains unanswered is, who are are illegal and those involved in such killings program until 2012. Before then it was referred the local assets on ground? Tribal animosity or could be held accountable for homicide. to as the “alleged drone program”. To date the fear of pointing out the real targets might impose The US has adopted an approach to combat the US has not publicly declared who has been killed more of a threat than pointing out some enemy without ever setting foot on enemy Despite these efforts, the drones physically apart from those rare occasions when a irrelevant civilian or low-level militants who do territor y. This has kept US troops safe and remain in the skies over FATA, and their prominent militant the victim. According to one not meet the necessar y threshold. It is believed minimized US militar y budgets but FATA’s presence is felt by locals always. In recent years, report that there might have been some cooperation residents have had to change their lifestyle in the CIA unofficially claimed to have abandoned ratio is that for ever y militant killed, 30 civilians between Pakistani intelligence (ISI) and the CIA order to protect themselves from falling victim to the most troubling types of strikes, such as are killed. in the past. Does it still continue, or has it drone strikes. Dispute settlements through local ceased to exist since 2009? jirgas have been minimized; children refuse to 35 and judicial findings in PHC 36 a rough signature strikes and double tap strikes but recent events show this assertion to be false. One significant reason for secrecy around drone The killing of two western civilian hostages strikes is apparent from the outset: the lack of To further highlight the vulnerability of mountains to extract chromite and earn their early 2015 is one example of continuity of the intelligence and the fact that the United States intelligence in remote territories such as FATA, living in fear; and the constant whirring sound of same old practice of signature strikes where itself does not have any idea who they are killing. in April 2011 in Afghanistan—where the US/ the drones has caused unrest and fear amongst targets are selected on basis of their “pattern Jonathan Landay, a well-known American NATO are on the ground and can have access to all factions of FATA’s society. There is a of life”. journalist writing for McClatchy reviewed the better intelligence than in Waziristan—two ubiquitous pipe dream for ever y day to be a CIA’s leaked data on drone strikes carried out American soldiers were killed by a drone after cloudy day because drones do not fly on such between 2010 and 2011. 37 His most important being mistaken for Taliban fighters by US days. 40 finding was that more than half of the people troops. 38 Another such occurrence took place in killed were not al-Qaeda but assessed to be September 2010, when the intended Recently, there have been increasing murmurs in associates, probably Afghans, by the CIA. Only assassination of Muhammad Amin, the then- the parliament of merging FATA with the province six top al-Qaeda leaders were killed, among the Taliban deputy governor of Takhar province, went of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Politicians and more than eight hundred drone casualties that awr y and instead killed someone named Zabet lawmakers alike believe that merging FATA with year. Furthermore, the CIA has no on-the-ground Amanullah, who was out campaigning in the province will end FATA’s isolation from the human intelligence in Waziristan. parliamentar y elections. Nine of his fellow 33 in Ambiguities surrounding secrecy of the “only game in town” 34 As previously stated, one prominent issue that remains with drone strikes inside Pakistan pertains to secrecy. We never hear the names or identities of those targeted, or the extent of someone’s purported involvement in militant/ terrorist activity; instead we hear merely play outdoors; chromite workers travel to the election workers were also killed in the strike. rest of Pakistan, and so far, a five-year plan has 39 been introduced. A question that remains numbers and figures of the “bad guys” that have The little information the CIA gathers is through been killed. It seems that the citizens of Pakistan unanswered is: what will this mean for the local spies who are reporting in return for large are expected to idly sit, wait, and watch as the people of FATA? There is wide media coverage sums of money and are thus hardly reliable or push of a button continues to authorize another of the development aid package that is going to credible informants. There are hardly any extrajudicial killing in FATA, which not only be used for the region, which will in turn enable (technical) intercepts in Waziristan as there is no violates the ver y extent of its legal system but better infrastructure, road networks, opening of mobile phone ser vice or access to the internet. completely disregards due process and banks, and new schools. There is no debate on Landlines are operated by the Pakistan militar y, undermines the sovereignty of Pakistan as a whether Pakistan’s sovereignty as a countr y will which listens to each and ever y conversation of nation. be taken more seriously when FATA is no longer the locals but the “bad guys” are well informed of this practice of phone sur veillance. Another 33 See “US hostage deaths: Western captives held by al-Qaeda were killed in US counter-terrorism operation, says White House”, Independent, 23 April 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ world/americas/warren-weinstein-and-giovanni-lo-porto-westernhostages-held-by-al-qaeda-were-killed-in-us-counter-10198909. html. 36 34 Statement by former CIA Director Leon Panetta to the Pacific Council on International Policy in Los Angeles; and Gardner, Lloyd, Killing Machine: The American Presidency in the Age of Drone Warfare, p. 133. 37 “Obama’s drone war kills ‘others,’ not just al Qaida leaders”, McClatchy, 9 April 2013, available at http://www.mcclatchydc. com/2013/04/09/188062/obamas-drone-war-kills-others.html#. Ue4Vm43I1RY. 94 35 Spencer Ackerman, “41 men targeted but 1,147 people killed: US drone strikes – the facts on the ground”, The Guardian, 24 November 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/ nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147 Ross. an underdeveloped and deserted part of the 38 “Two US soldiers killed in friendly-fire drone attack in Afghanistan,” The Guardian, 11 April 2011, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/us-soldiers-killed-in-droneattack. While this occurred in Hemland Province, Afghanistan, it underscores the dubious nature of the intelligence relied upon by the US to carry out these strikes. 39 “How lawyers sign off on drone attacks”, The Guardian, 15 June 2011, available at https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/15/drone-attacks-obamaadministration; ‘The Takhar attack: Targeted killings and the parallel worlds of US intelligence and Afghanistan,’ Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 2011, available at http://aan-afghanistan. com/uploads/20110511KClark_Takhar-attack_final.pdf. countr y. 40 Karen McVeigh, “Drone strikes: tears in Congress as Pakistani family tells of mother’s death”, The Guardian, 29 October 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/pakistanfamily-drone-victim-testimony-congress. 95 H U M A N R I G H T S P E R S P EC T I V E S It is also pertinent to note that, with such alarming statistics of civilian casualties and the T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Experts have backed the claim that the “collateral damage” of these attacks creates more time it takes for US officials to more militants than they eliminate. According to acknowledge their errors, resentment will grow Andrew Exum and David Kilcullen of the Center within the victims, their families and the society for New American Security, the drone campaign of FATA. It should not be forgotten that the has created a siege mentality among Pakistani pukhtoons value their self-dignity and integrity civilians. They further add, “While violent Country case study: Yemen Missile strikes from remotely piloted “unmanned” aircraft, or “drones,” have become a defining symbol of the United States for most Yemenis. If the United States has built a school in Yemen, most Yemenis Waleed Alhariri heads the US office of the Sana’a don’t know about it; if the United States has Center for Strategic Studies (SCSS) in New York built a hospital in Yemen, most Yemenis don’t ver y highly and they have suffered in silence for extremists may be unpopular, for a frightened many years. Just as FATA’s geographic location population they seem less ominous than a is delicate in nature, so is the status of its faceless enemy that wages war from afar and people. It is imperative that the US re-evaluates often kills more civilians than militants.” policy and research think tank that provides new families, and homes of their countr yfolk blown the merits of drone warfare as part of its The drone program has been counter-productive approaches to understanding Yemen and the apart in drone strikes. With Yemen having counter-terrorism strategy. Retired US Army in the region and if the loss of innocent civilian surrounding region, through balanced perspectives, been central to the US “War on Terror” and general, Stanley McChr ystal aptly recognized victims is not acknowledged by the US the risk factor attributed to the misuse of drones government, the costless war may solidify 2002, the first thought that a generation of when he stated: popular support of Islamic militants and may Yemenis now have when they think of the prevent success in the FATA region. United States is that of fier y death raining “To the United States, a drone strike seems to City and is a fellow-in-residence at Columbia Law School’s Human Rights Institute.The Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies (SCSS) is an independent in-depth studies and expert analysis. know this either; but what almost ever y Yemeni has heard about are the children, an early testing site for militar y drones since down from the sky. have ver y little risk and ver y little pain. At the receiving end, it feels like war. Americans have To this day, drones are a frequent visitor in got to understand that. If we were to use our the skies over Yemen, officially on the hunt for technological capabilities carelessly—I don’t members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula think we do, but there’s always the danger that (AQAP) and its affiliate, Ansar al-Sharia. you will—then we should not be upset when However, ever yone on the ground knows that someone responds with their equivalent, which anyone can be a target of these weapons, is a suicide bomb in Central Park, because that’s which have shown the ability to strike with what they can respond with.” 41 incredible precision and destruction, but which also often leave those who pick through the rubble demanding to know why their loved ones were obliterated. The nature of the US drone programme, coupled with issues of secrecy and a cooperative response from the Yemeni government, have created the situation described above. A deeply problematic feature of the US drone programme overall are its “signature strikes,” whereby the decision to undertake a strike is based on a potential target’s patterns of behavior. These are obser ved from cameras in the sky, rather than hard intelligence gathered on the 41 Chris Woods, Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars, p. 285. 96 97 C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: Y E M E N T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Saleh Mohsen al-Amari of Yakla shows photos of nephew Shaif Abdullah Mohsen Mabkhut al-`Amri (left) and cousin Saleh Mes`ad Abdullah al-`Amri, who were killed in a US drone strike outside Rad `a, Yemen, on December 12, 2013. interconnected historical context and the In Januar y 2017, the US government released socio-political, tribal, security and economic its casualty figures for 2016. Between dynamics in Yemen through which AQAP has Januar y 2009 and December 2016, the US risen—they fired missiles into this social government said its airstrikes, including fabric, oblivious to the long-term fallout. drones, killed between 2,867 and 3,138 people in places far from traditional Another contentious aspect of the US drone battlefields, specifically Pakistan, Somalia, programme is the high level of its secrecy, and Yemen. It claims that between 65 and 117 which leaves the ordinar y US citizen and were “non-combatants.”4 The US taxpayer unaware of the specifics and government’s figures and estimates are effectiveness of the drone program. significantly lower, however, than those (See Chapter 5 on Harm to Governmental gathered by independent organizations, Transparency for more details.) US including those that use on-the-ground, fact- mainstream media has little information on finding missions to calculate casualty drones sourced from places other than the figures. 5 US militar y itself. Among the reasons for the © 2013 Human Rights Watch deliberately scant amount of available Nonetheless, these efforts were steps toward information may be the drone programme’s transparency, though they came ver y late and questionable legality under international law, were ver y limited in definition and application. in particular the employment of extra-judicial The current US administration, under lethal measures outside of active and President Trump, has more recently, however, declared war zones—such as Yemen was prior made signs that it is against both increased to the September 2014 civil war. transparency and heavily in favour of ground. Local and international human rights While the drones have killed thousands of groups have documented many cases of AQAP leaders and members, the drones have people with no relation to extremist groups also actually created far more extremists It is noteworthy that the US had not frequency of strikes has increased during being targeted, or killed because they were seeking revenge. Drones might best be acknowledged civilian deaths due to drone President Trump’s first few months in office, within too close a proximity to a targeted described as a self-defeating tool that creates strikes until shortly before former US far outpacing his predecessor. person. These innocent casualties have the problem it is meant to counter. Today President Obama left office. In July 2016, come to signify, for many Yemenis, US AQAP has become “arguably more powerful, President Obama issued Executive Order ruthlessness and has resulted in general fear resource-rich, entrenched, and operating with 13732 regarding “United States Policy on Pre- and public anger, which facilitates the more institutional flexibility and adaptive and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian propaganda used as a recruiting tool for capacity than ever before,” according a recent Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the AQAP in many affected communities. Sana’a Center report. The report further Use of Force,” acknowledging that there have says that, “The use of militar y force alone will indeed been civilian casualties in strikes, and almost certainly fail to defeat AQAP.” This is citing future steps to minimise casualties and because both the drone programme and acknowledge harm. 1 2 1 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will”, New York Times, 29 May 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamasleadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html. 2 Out of the Shadows: Recommendations to Advance Transparency in the Use of Lethal Force, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic and Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, June 2017, https://www.outoftheshadowsreport.com. 98 3 similarly blunt and violent counter-terrorism tactics not only overlook the complex and 3 Farea Al-Muslimi and Adam Baron, “The Limits of US Military Power in Yemen: Why al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula continues to thrive”, 27 March 2017, http:// sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/86. increasing drone strikes in Yemen. The 4 “Summary of Information Regarding US Counter terrorism strikes outside areas of active hostilities”, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2016, https://www.dni.gov/ files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/ DNI+Release+on+CT+Strikes+Outside+Areas+of+Active+ Hostilities.PDF. 5 Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic and Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies. 99 C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: Y E M E N 7. International Law Perspectives However, there is also culpability on the side Thus, in the 15 years in which the US has of the Yemeni government. Both its former deployed militar y drones in Yemen, there have and current presidents had reportedly been hundreds of civilian deaths, untold sanctioned American use of drones in their suffering endured by the injured and loved countr y, with the US government stating so ones of the victims. This has deeply marred officially in December 2016. 6 In return the the image of the United States in the eyes of Adriana Edmeades is the Legal and Policy US had helped arm and train special militar y Yemenis and enables recruitment for AQAP. Director of Rights Watch (UK). She has over five counterterrorism units, headed by the former At the same time US policy surrounding years’ professional experience in international Yemeni president’s son, Ahmad Ali Saleh, and drones has helped a repressive regime helped develop a strong security and repress its people, and then a corrupt regime intelligence apparatus. This then happened to Adriana Edmeades human rights law research, advocacy, and litigation, Introduction The prevalence of the use of armed drones in contemporar y warfare has been accompanied with significant experience in the field in Turkey, by a considerable body of concerned political Uganda, Ghana, and Northern Ireland. Adriana has remained corrupt. And despite the thousands and legal commentar y.1 The ability to conduct been responsible for litigation in the European Court be the same security apparatus the Yemeni of members of AQAP the drones have killed, of Human Rights, the UK Supreme Court and Court a worldwide campaign of strikes, with minimal regime used to crackdown on political the group today has never been so flush with opponents, activists, and civil society arms and loyalists. workers that questioned the conduct of the Yemeni state or policies of foreign governments in Yemen. After the 2011 uprising that ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh, transitional President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi continued to allow US drones in Yemen’s airspace. This seemed a clear attempt on Hadi’s part to increase his political and security-related importance in the “War on Terror” in the eyes of his US ally, and to alleviate foreign pressure to address the rampant corruption and ineptitude of his administration—factors that ultimately undermined his legitimacy with a large swath of the Yemeni public and helped precipitate the current civil war. of Appeal, as well as submissions before immediate risk to ser ving personnel, has parliamentar y committees and the UN human fundamentally disrupted the calculus of risk rights mechanisms. and strategic reward associated with militar y inter vention. Their deployment from command centres housed far from the relevant militar y theatre has proved irresistible. The United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia among others, have followed the lead of America and Israel, with the result that there is a now almost global campaign of drone warfare. Much recent scholarship has considered the challenges posed by the contemporar y use of drones, including whether domestic human rights law applies extra-territorially to the use of drones, what legal regime applies (international humanitarian law (IHL) or international human rights law, or a combination of the two), and, if IHL does apply, what is the threshold for its application. Questions have also been raised about whether international law yet recognises a doctrine of anticipator y self-defence, and, if it does, how this would apply to the use of drones. An issue that has come into sharp focus recently, 6 Marty Lederman, “President Obama’s Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding and Limiting the Use of Military Force [UPDATED],” Just Security, 5 December 2016, https:// www.justsecurity.org/35239/president-obamas-report-legalpolicy-frameworks-guiding-united-states-military-force-relatednational-security-operations. 100 1 See, for instance: Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, and Thompson Chengeta, “The International Law Framework Regulating the Use of Armed Drones,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65(4) (2016): 791-827; and Michael J Boyle, “The Legal and Ethical Implications of Drone Warfare,” International Journal of Human Rights 19(2) (2015), pp. 105-126. 101 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S I N T E R N AT I O N A L L AW P E R S P EC T I V E S following recent speeches by the British and This chapter sets out the various modes of Australian Attorney-Generals, is whether strikes liability in international law, which may attach to undertaken in anticipator y self-defence must different types of assistance states may provide respond to imminent threats or whether the to allies with armed drone programmes criterion of imminence has been abandoned. Protesting for drone victims in Chicago. 17 May 2012 Participation in drone programmes While those legal issues concern the conduct of the state, which deploys a drone, there is the Allied states may lend assistance and additional issue of how we regulate other states participation in the programmes of states providing assistance to the state using drones. operating armed drones in a variety of ways. Assistance may be rendered by, variously: the First, state security and intelligence ser vices provision of locational intelligence on targets; may provide intelligence to drone-operating providing access to landing sites and other states, with that intelligence used in the drone logistical support for drone sorties; as well as programme. Second, allied states may allow their the manufacture, sale and ser vicing of drone territories to be used by drone-operating states hardware and software. That aspect of the to house command centres or landing/launching contemporar y use of drones is especially facilities. Third, states may manufacture and pernicious. By involving a multitude of states in export drone components and ser vices to allies, the support and facilitation of armed strikes, which deploy the technology. Obviously, it is states that are motivated to increase the use of lawful for one state to assist another in pursuing drones stimulate the development and a course of action, which is lawful. But where, as decentralization of necessar y technical and set out below, there are serious questions as to practical skill. The result is the dilution of the lawfulness of the actions of states operating domestic political and legal control over armed drones in certain contexts (such as the US using drone programmes, since necessar y constituent drones outside of Iraq), the states that provide elements of drone programmes are increasingly matters of diffuse or shared responsibility. But while diffusion of control presents challenges to regulation and oversight, it presents new opportunities for those seeking to take steps to restrict unlawful uses of drones. States assisting in or facilitating unlawful armed drone activities that are carried out by other states may well be subject to liability for complicity – or equivalent modes of responsibility – which may (depending upon domestic constitutional and public law arrangements) be actionable before domestic courts. assisted being internationally wrongful – that is, ASR relating to the liability of one state for being in breach of international law. The question assisting another are: (a) responsibility for aiding assistance face potential liabilities themselves. as to how the conduct of armed drone strikes or assisting another state in knowledge of the programmes may violate international law is circumstances of the unlawful act, as set out in The responsibility of one state for the acts beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to Article 16; and (b) responsibility for rendering aid committed by another are not set out in the UN say that armed drone programmes operated by or assistance in maintaining a situation by which Charter or expressly specified in any other the United States to which other countries lend another state commits a serious breach and/or treaty: they are instead matters of customar y assistance raise a series of concerns with failure to cooperate to bring such a breach to an international law. Much of customar y respect to their compliance with the law of self- end, as set out in Articles 40 and 41. international law in the area of state defence (since strikes occur against targets responsibility is summarized and encapsulated in other than those which currently threaten an the International Law Commission’s (ILC) imminent armed attack) and their compliance Articles on the Responsibility of States for with the conditions of proportionality and Internationally Wrongful Acts (known universally discrimination between civilian and militar y as the Articles on State Responsibility, or targets (crucial considerations in both IHL and ‘ASR’). 2 As is obvious from their title, these rules international human rights law). of State responsibility rely, as a condition precedent, on the conduct, which is being 2 United Nations General Assembly, UNGA Resolution No 56/83 on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 28 January 2002, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83 (ASR). 102 © Debra Sweet While not yet formally agreed as a treaty, it is generally agreed that the key provisions of the ASR reflect customar y international law binding Article 16 of the ASR provides that: “A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and upon all states. The significant provisions of the 103 I N T E R N AT I O N A L L AW P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.” Article 16 enjoys wide acceptance as reflecting Second, that the assistance provided by the With regard to the first question, the decision of genocide requires not only the carr ying out of state as a matter of fact contributes to the the International Court of Justice in the Bosnian the immediate intentional acts of, inter alia, commission of the unlawful act to the requisite Genocide case is instructive. In that case, killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, degree; 8 and Article 16 was considered and applied to the and/or forced sterilization, but also that, in doing customar y international law. The International alleged complicity of the Federal Republic of so, the perpetrator acts in pursuit of a general Court of Justice affirmed this in the Bosnia Third, that the contemplated act “must be such Yugoslavia (FRY) in the commission of genocide objective of intending “to destroy, in whole or in Genocide decision. The rule has also been that it would have been wrongful had it been by Republika Srpska forces. The Court applied part, a national ethnical, racial, or religious taken to reflect customar y international law by committed by the assisting state itself.” Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility group, as such.”13 Against that exacting by analogy in order to determine the meaning of standard, a finding of liability for aiding and 3 the World Trade Organization Panel and the 9 4 Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. 5 The United Kingdom government has also consistently stated that it considers Article 16 to reflect customar y international law binding on the UK. 6 The rule of responsibility under Article 16 entails three main conditions (drawn from the wording of the Article itself, together with the ILC’s Commentar y on it). Those conditions are: First, that the assisting state, when it provides assistance, has “knowledge of the Exploring the three conditions: knowledge The interpretation of the knowledge requirement is not straightfor ward. The question has been explored by a range of leading international law academics,10 and recently discussed at length in the November 2016 research paper published by Chatham House.11 There are three key questions: Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R, 31 May 1999, [9.42]-[9.43]. 5 Order of the German Second Senate in the constitutional complaint of Mr. Al-M, 5 November 2003, 2 BVerfG 1506/03, [47]. 6 Her Majesty’s Government, “Allegations of UK Complicity in Torture: The Government Reply to the Twenty-Third Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights,” Cm774, 2; and House of Lords, House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, “The Government’s policy on the use of drones for targeted killing: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2015-2016,” Fourth Report of Session 2016-17 (HL Paper 49, HC 747) (19 October 2016), 17. 7 ASR, Article 16(a); and International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries” Yearbook of the International law Commission II(2) [2001] (‘ILC Commentary’), ILC Commentary on Article 16, [4]. 104 the majority of the International Court of Justice held that, while the FRY knew that the Republika The Court considered that liability, on the basis Srpska intended to carr y out massacres, the of Article 16, requires that the state providing evidence did not establish that the FRY was aid or assistance “acted knowingly, that is to say, aware that the Republika Srpska held the in particular, was aware of the specific intent additional mens rea condition of intending, by (dolus specialis) of the principal perpetrator. If those massacres, to destroy a group “as such.” that condition is not fulfilled, that is sufficient to exclude categorization as complicity.”(emphasis But it is crucial to bear in mind that ver y few added). internationally wrongful acts require specific • Second, what the degree of knowledge the have more than a hunch or speculative opinion intent: the vast majority of breaches of public as to what the assisted party is about to do. international law which might be entailed by a assisting state must have; and 12 Essentially, the assisting party must state conducting a drone strike do not require • Third, whether there is a separate requirement It is important to clarify that the characterisation proof of the state’s motivation as well as their that the assisting state must have intended to of the assisted state’s conduct as internationally factual conduct.14 Accordingly, the facts that an facilitate the wrongful act. wrongful is an objective matter: there is neither assisting state must know in most cases are any requirement of prior determination to that purely matters of objective circumstance: what effect by a court, nor any requirement that the the assisted state is doing, or plans to do. 3 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) ICJ Rep (2007) 42 (‘Bosnia Genocide case’), p. 420. 4 World Trade Organization dispute settlement, TurkeyRestrictions on Imports of Textile and Genocide Convention. assisting will be necessarily difficult to achieve: • First, what the assisting state must know; circumstances of the internationally wrongful act” carried out by the assisted state;7 “complicity in genocide” under Article III(e) of the assisting state must subjectively appreciate that the conduct of the assisted state is wrongful. What is required is that the assisting state has 8 This requirement does not appear expressly within the text of Article 16. It is set out within the ILC Commentary on Article 16, [5] and [10]. 9 knowledge, to the required degree, of the facts, which constitute the elements of the assisted state’s wrongful conduct. ASR, Article 16(b); and ILC Commentary on Article 16, [4]. 10 James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Vaughan Lowe, “Responsibility for the Conduct of Other States” Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi [Japanese Journal of International Law and Diplomacy] 101 (2002) 1; Miles Jackson, State Complicity in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Helmut Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Vladyslav Lanovoy, Complicity and its Limits in the Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016). 11 Harriet Moynihan, “Aiding and Assisting: Changes in Armed Conflict and Counterterrorism,” Chatham House Research Paper, November 2016. Importantly, the pertinent facts will depend upon the nature of the assisted state’s conduct. The Bosnia Genocide case is an extreme example, since the underlying wrongful conduct of the Republika Srpska was the war crime of genocide, which is a crime of specific intent. As set out in the Genocide Convention, the commission of 12 Bosnia Genocide case, [420]. 13 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951), 78 UNTS 277, Article II. The definition is rehearsed in Article 2(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 955, 8 November 1994, UN Doc. S/RES/955, Annex, Article 2(2). 14 James Crawford, “Second Report on State Responsibility,” 51st Session of the International Law Commission, 1999, UN Doc. A/CN.4/498, p. 50. 105 I N T E R N AT I O N A L L AW P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S As to the second question, namely, the degree evidence … [I]f a state has not made enquiries article 16 makes it clear that no state may be made by United States government of knowledge required, it appears that in the face of credible evidence of present or liable on a strict liability basis purely because representatives including Prof Harold Koh constructive knowledge is not sufficient as a future illegality, it may be held to have turned a assistance rendered to another state has been, (Legal Advisor to the Department of State, matter of international law. During the blind eye.” 18 for instance, unexpectedly diverted to wrongful 2009-2013) and John Brennan (Deputy National or prohibited ends. Security Advisor for Homeland Security and negotiations on the text of article 16, the 21 Netherlands specifically suggested that the Turning to the third question, the separate article should provide for responsibility where a criterion of the assisting state’s intention, it is Accordingly, the intention requirement chiefly Director of the CIA, 2013-Januar y 2017), 24 state “knows or should have known the worth noting that the text of article 16 itself functions to avoid a state being fixed with a range of key issues affecting lawfulness circumstances of the internationally wrongful does not include any explicit requirement of liability in circumstances where it cannot be held are clear. act,” intention. However, the ILC Commentar y on to have consciously supported or facilitated the by the members of the ILC. In the absence of article 16 states that the aid or assistance must actions taken by the state to which it provides First, the United States remains committed to custom, specific guidance in the ASR, or be given “with a view to facilitating the assistance. But that does not mean that the the “Bush doctrine” of pre-emptive strikes, relevant case law, the dominant view of eminent commission of that [wrongful] act, and must intention requirement may be used by states as rather than only strikes against imminent threats. academics is that article 16 requires a more actually do so.” a means to shield themselves from liability in But any use of force purportedly in self-defence stringent degree of knowledge. this requirement as limiting the application of the circumstances where they are fully aware of the must obser ve the limiting criterion that it be an rule “to those cases where the aid or assistance use to which their assistance will be put and of action that requires, in the long-standing Clearly, actual knowledge of the relevant facts given is clearly linked to the subsequent the actions the receiving state will take, but formulation of the agreement between the would be sufficient. In this regard, leading wrongful conduct” and then notes that a state where the assisting state subjectively does not United States and Great Britain in 1838-1842 as academics argue that “near certainty” or will not be responsible for aid or assistance consider that the course of action amounts to an to the legal principles governing the seizure and internationally wrongful conduct. destruction of the vessel Caroline, “necessity of 15 however that suggestion was not adopted “practical certainty” of the facts is sufficient to determine actual knowledge. 16 There is also 19 Counterterrorism, 2009-2013, subsequently The ILC Commentar y explains “unless the relevant State organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate the self-defence, instant, over whelming, leaving no While the specific details of individual drone choice of means, and no moment for strikes are typically not released, arguably there deliberation.”25 This formulation has traditionally The question of what suffices to make out the is sufficient detail publicly available regarding been termed the criterion of imminence, and assisting state’s intent in this context must be the general operation of, for instance, the United demands that action in self-defence is lawful treated with some care. What is required is that States’ drone programme to fix any state only where it responds to pressing temporal deliberate effort by the assisting State to avoid the assisting state intends to provide the means providing assistance to the United States with necessity in light of an imminent armed attack. knowledge of illegality on the part of the State by which the perpetrator may realize its own the requisite level of knowledge of certain key A drone strike taken ‘pre-emptively’ against a being assisted, in the face of credible evidence intent to commit an unlawful act. There is no problematic aspects of that programme. From suspected terrorist who is involved only in a of present or future illegality …where the additional requirement that the assisting state the reports of international non-governmental preliminar y planning stage of action violates this evidence stems from credible and readily must itself share the assisted state’s intent. organisations (NGOs), principle and will not be lawful under the available sources, such as court judgments, Were it other wise, as Judge Bennouna obser ved Nations Special Rapporteurs, 23 and statements reports from fact-finding commissions, or in his declaration in dissent in the Bosnia independent monitors on the ground, it is Genocide case, that “would be tantamount to reasonable to maintain that a state cannot equating an accomplice with a co-principal,” escape responsibility under Article 16 by an illogical outcome if any distinction between deliberately avoiding knowledge of such primar y liability and assisting liability for an strong support for a “willful blindness” standard occurrence of the wrongful conduct.” in the absence of actual knowledge itself. 17 As the Chatham House research paper argues: “(Willful blindness) might be defined as a 20 16 Moynihan, Research Paper, [39]; Jackson, State Complicity, pp. 160-162. 17 See: Lowe, “Responsibility,” 10; and Jackson, State Complicity, pp. 60-162. 106 The ILC’s reference in the Commentar y on 18 Moynihan, Research Paper, p. 14. 19 ILC Commentary on Article 16, [5]. 20 Bosnia Genocide, Declaration of Judge Bennouna, p. 359, p. 361. two separate United international legal doctrine of self-defence. The official United States position in favour of internationally wrongful act is to be obser ved. 15 Statement of the Netherlands, Yearbook of the International Law Commission II(1) [2001] 52; and see Crawford, State Responsibility, p. 406. 22 21 See the example given by Bernhard Graefrath of aid being directed towards unlawful ends which, although foreseeable, are specifically prohibited by the aid-providing state as a condition of the grant: Bernhard Graefrath, “Complicity in the Law of International Responsibility”, Revue Belge de Droit International 2, 1996, p. 371, p. 373; and the discussion of the same in Crawford, State Responsibility, pp. 407-408. pre-emptive action clearly carries with it, therefore, the risk of drones being used in circumstances outside the lawful bounds of selfdefence. 22 Amnesty International, Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, October 2013. 23 Ben Emmerson, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, 10 March 2014, UN Doc. A/ HRC/25/59; and Cristof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, 1 April 2014, UN Doc. A/HRC/26/36. 24 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2008) pp. 7-20. 25 British and Foreign State Papers, 1840-1841, 1857, Vol 29, p. 1129. 107 I N T E R N AT I O N A L L AW P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S In the absence of justification pursuant to the and that civilian impacts must be proportionate doctrine of self-defence, the use of drones by to the militar y gain of any use of force. the United States overseas could be lawful Considering the three factors: intent Articles 40 and 41 apply to “the international responsibility that is entailed by a serious The final element of the test requires that a state breach by a state of an obligation arising under a where the states in whose territories they are Against this factual backdrop, it is clear that providing assistance may only be liable at preemptor y norm of general international law.”29 deployed have provided consent for their use. while the use of armed drones by the United international law where the wrongful act And article 40(2) establishes that: The governments of Pakistan, Yemen, and States may in theor y be lawful, in practice its committed with its assistance is an act, which Somalia all originally provided consent to the armed drone programme, especially when would have been wrongful if committed by the inter vention of the United States. But the justified as a “pre-emptive” strike, or a strike in assisting state directly. Thus if, for example, the preemptory norm] is serious if it involves a consent of Pakistan has since been withdrawn, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, or against ISIS in United Kingdom assists the United States in gross or systematic failure by the responsible and given the fragility of government control in Syria, is ver y likely unlawful. That information is breaching an obligation that the United States state to fulfil the obligation.” both Yemen and Somalia, the consent of those public, and states providing assistance to the owes to Canada by virtue of a bilateral treaty regimes does not provide a firm basis for the United States where such drone strikes occur between those two countries, the United Within that defined scope of “serious” – that is lawfulness of the United States’ inter vention must be taken to know the position. Kingdom does not incur responsibility pursuant to say, “gross or systemic” – breaches of jus to the Article 16 rule, since the United Kingdom cogens or preemptor y norms, article 41 is not itself bound by the provisions of that provides, inter alia, that: there by way of armed drone strikes. 26 States that assist the deployment of drones in Pakistan, Considering the three factors: material contribution Yemen, and Somalia must be taken to know that bilateral treaty. In the context of the provision of such strikes are unlikely to be lawful on the basis The second criterion of a factual contribution to assistance for United States drone strikes, the of international consent. the unlawful act is relatively straightfor ward. relevant provisions of international law binding While the ILC Commentar y is not uniform in its upon the United States (namely the prohibition The final basis upon which the use of armed references to the level of contribution required, on the use of force exception where justified by drones overseas may be rendered lawful is if most academics agree on a minimum threshold consent or self-defence, and the IHL protections specific authorization for the use of force has of at least material contribution. 27 on civilians) bind the United Kingdom and other States offering assistance just as directly. been provided pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. But UN Security Council Resolution Looking at the example of the United Kingdom’s 2249 (2015) on ISIS is not a resolution made involvement in the United States programme, the pursuant to Chapter VII and does not purport to location intelligence provided by the UK’s GCHQ authorise the use of force in Syria, whether by spy agency, and other intelligence provided and way of armed drone or other wise. Accordingly, relayed from basis located within the UK (but states assisting the United States must be aware operated by the United States) may well be that the United States’ deployment of armed directly used in United States’ drone strikes. drones against ISIS in Syria also lacks specific That would clearly meet the requisite level of UN authorization. material contribution. “A breach of [an obligation arising under a 30 “2. No state shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of Article 40, nor render air or assistance in maintaining that situation.” 31 As to the status of this rule, like article 16 above, there is considerable support for the conclusion that this rule of international responsibility also reflects customar y international law. Responsibility under articles 40 and 41 of the ASR The International Court of Justice, in its Article 16 sets out a general rule of principle that, in light of “the character and the responsibility that applies in all circumstances of importance of the rights and obligations internationally wrongful conduct, however involved” in that case, “all states are under an serious. Articles 40 and 41 of the ASR, on the obligation not to recognize the illegal situation” other hand, provide a more narrowly-focused and “are also under an obligation not to render rule which applies only in circumstances where aid or assistance in maintaining the situation Further, the range of reports from NGOs and the jus cogens (or “preemptor y”) norms of created by such construction.”32 While not UN makes it clear that the United States’ international law are concerned. Accordingly, referring to Articles 40 and 41 by number, the programme of drone use carries with it an some academics have termed Articles 40 and 41 Court’s judgment clearly endorses the rule set excessive civilian toll, which calls into question as providing for “aggravated responsibility” at out in those articles as the correct statement of compliance with the key international the international level. 28 international law. The UK House of Lords humanitarian law standards that weapons must distinguish between militar y and civilian targets, 26 See Max Byrne, “Consent and the Use of Force: An Examination of “Intervention by Invitation” as a Basis for US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen,” Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, 2016, p. 97. 108 27 James Crawford, “Second Report,” [180]-[182] and [188]; and Lowe, “Responsibility,” p. 5. 28 Aust, Complicity, Chapter 7, 319-375. Palestine Wall advisor y opinion, affirmed the 29 ASR, Article 40(1). 30 ASR, Article 40(2). 31 ASR, Article 41(1)-(2). 32 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Rep (2004) 136, [159]. 109 I N T E R N AT I O N A L L AW P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S referred to article 41 in its decision in A and prohibition on the use of force. 37 The ILC, others v Secretary of State for the Home elsewhere in its Commentar y on the ASR, Department (No 2), The second key consideration in approaching the from either “recognis[ing] as lawful a situation rule of “aggravated responsibility” under Articles created by a serious breach’ or ‘render[ing] aid lists the prohibitions on “genocide, slaver y, 40 and 41 of the ASR is the meaning of the or assistance in maintaining the situation [of any Cassazione also relied upon articles 40 and 41, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity specific criteria of “systematic” or “gross” serious breach].” 45 in that case explicitly, in its decision in Ferrini v and torture”39 as jus cogens norms, together breaches. The ILC Commentar y provides the Federal Republic of Germany, with the “right to self-determination” following guidance: 33 while the Italian Corte di 34 as did the 40 38 also to which With respect to the first circumstance – recognition, the ILC Commentar y explains that Federal Constitution Court of Germany in a should be added the basic rules of IHL, which decision relating to claims for compensation were termed “intransgressible” in character by arising from expropriations in the Soviet zone in the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear have to be carried out in an organised and the international community as a whole” not only 1945-1949. 35 Weapons advisor y opinion. 41 Further, as the ILC deliberate way. In contrast, the term “gross” refers to “formal recognition of these situations, has obser ved, that list “may not be exhaustive” refers to the intensity of the violation or its but also prohibits acts which would imply such The rule set out in articles 40 and 41 refers to and does not prevent the emergence of new effects; it denotes violations of a flagrant recognition.” 46 That rule is supported by clear jus cogens or preemptor y norms of international rules of international law generally accepted nature, amounting to a direct and outright state practice at the international level, such as law. Those terms denote, as the Vienna by states as having a jus cogens character. 42 assault on the values protected by the rule. the non-recognition by states of the Japanese Convention on the Law of Treaties sets out, a At present, the rules relevant to drone strikes The terms are not of course mutually exclusive; annexation of Manchuria in 1931, the Iraqi rule of international law which is “accepted and are the prohibition on the use of force and the serious breaches will usually be both annexation of Kuwait in 1990, and the unlawful recognized by the international community of basic rules of IHL. systematic and gross. Factors which may actions of the racist Rhodesian and South states as a whole as a norm from which no establish the seriousness of a violation would African governments in the 1960s and 1970s. 47 derogation is permitted and which can be include the intent to violate the norm; the modified only by a subsequent norm of general scope and number of individual violations; and With respect to the second circumstance – international law having the same character.”36 the gravity of their consequences for the aid or assistance in maintenance – the ILC victims.” 43 Commentar y explains: “To be regarded as systematic, a violation would this “obligation of collective non-recognition by A number of features of this rule of state “This goes beyond the provisions dealing with responsibility need to be considered. The first is Importantly, while the intent of a state to violate the range of jus cogens or preemptor y norms a preemptor y norm is a relevant factor in the aid or assistance in the commission of an potentially relevant to the actions of the states in assessment of whether a particular violation will internationally wrongful act, which are covered conducting drone strikes. The foremost example be “gross” enlivening the “aggravated by article 16. It deals with conduct “after the of such a norm, as the International Court of responsibility” regime under articles 40 and 41, fact” which assists the responsible state in Justice recognized in the Nicaragua case, is the what is clear is that intent is not a necessar y maintaining a situation [of serious breach]. precondition to liability in ever y case. The It extends beyond the commission of the rationale for this appears to be that, while a serious breach itself to the maintenance of limiting factor such as an intention to assist may the situation created by that breach, and it 33 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221 (HL), 263 (Lord Bingham). 34 English translation available in: Ferrini v Repubblica Federale di Germania, Decision No. 5044/04 (2004) 128 ILR 658. 35 Cases No. 2 BvR 955/00, 1038/01, Decision of 26 October 2004. A partial English translation is available in: United Nations Secretary General, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Comments and Information Received from Governments (9 March 2007), UN Doc. A/62/63,[33]-[40]. 36 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, Article 53. 110 37 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) (Merits) ICJ Rep 14 (‘Nicaragua case’), [190]; see also ILC Commentary on Article 40, [4]. be acceptable in article 16 where violations applies whether or not the breach itself is other than gross violations are at issue, the a continuing one.” 48 38 ILC Commentary on article 26, [5]. demands a higher degree of vigilance on the part 39 See also the discussion at: ILC Commentary on article 40, [5]. of all states. 44 Against the background of the 40 See, for example, the recognition of the right by the International Court of Justice in: Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Rep (2010) 403, [79] and [82]; and Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia) ICJ Rep (1995) 90, [29]. more serious subject matter of articles 40 and 41 subject matter to which articles 40 and 41 are directed, article 41 clarifies the type of conduct which is prohibited. The most relevant aspects are in article 41(2), which prohibits any state 45 ASR, article 41(2). 46 ILC Commentary on article 41, [5]. 41 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Rep (1996) 226, [79]. 43 ILC Commentary on article 40, [8]. 47 ILC Commentary on article 41, [6]-[9]. 42 44 See: Aust, above n 86, pp. 341-342. 48 ILC Commentary on article 41, [11]. ILC Commentary on article 40, [6]. 111 I N T E R N AT I O N A L L AW P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S As the Joint Committee on Human Rights used by that other state for perpetrating an act state. 54 Further, as a species of aggression, the international law – be it via landing rights at their obser ved in the context of the receipt by the of aggression against a third state.” provision of territor y only gives rise to liability airfields or approved access through their United Kingdom of information gained through status of the rule, while the fact that it is under this rule if the other state launches from airspace – may well be judged complicit in the torture by other states, “aid or assistance” contained in a resolution of the General that territor y an act of aggression (that is, an act international crime of aggression provided after the fact of a breach may take Assembly provides a meaningful indication of its in violation of the prohibition on the use of force), many forms. In that context, even passive receipt international acceptance, that is not conclusive rather than simply any act which breaches of that information “creates a market for the from the perspective of customar y international international law. Conclusion: the implications of state exposure to risk information produced by torture”, thus law. Eminent academics have argued that the encouraging the maintenance of the situation in contents of key aspects of the General The other crucial ingredient of liability under this The scope of legal liability for unlawful actions which other states carr y out torture. 49 Assembly definition of aggression reflect rule is that the complicit state must have occurring in the context of armed drone 50 As to the customar y law, 51 and the International Court of “placed” the territor y at the disposal of the other programmes operated by particular states, On the recognition front, actions by states such Justice in the Nicaragua case has certainly state. The territor y being “at the disposal” of the notably the United States, is thus potentially as failing to recall, in protest, embedded agents, specifically endorsed another sub-article of the other state clearly conveys that the receiving ver y wide indeed. States consciously providing failing to cut off ongoing co-operation definition (Article 3(g) on what constitutes as state has the power to act for its own purposes intelligence to the United States, for instance, in on that section of territor y, as is the case with the knowledge of the legal concerns raised by a arrangements, and failing to deny landing rights “armed attack”) as doing so. 52 Moreover, the full to drone programme air force assets would likely General Assembly definition – including liability the analogous situation of state organs or large proportion of strikes under the programme violate the principle of non-recognition. In for allowing territor y to be used by other states officials being temporarily “placed at the (those occurring pre-emptively, or in Pakistan, respect of aid or assistance, a state keeping in for aggressive purposes – has now been disposal” of other states. 55 But the use of Yemen, Somalia, and against ISIS); states place information-sharing or other agreements adopted as the standard for the crime of construction “which it has placed” demonstrates continuing to co-operate and recognize those which mean that another state which uses aggression for the purposes of the International that the complicit state must have actively programmes even after breaches of international drones unlawfully is not put to the task of Criminal Court. 53 decided to afford that assistance: it will not be law; and states allowing their territor y to be sufficient if, for instance, a part of a state’s implicated in such drone strikes all face the looking elsewhere for co-operation would likely qualify as assistance sufficient to ground liability In contrast to the more complex elements of the territor y is used in a clandestine fashion by prospect of being themselves held liable under under articles 40 and 41 ASR. rules on responsibility set out in the ASR, the another state. 56 the international rules of complicity. That greater Responsibility through complicity in aggression In addition to the provisions of the ASR, which are of general application to a variety of different violations of international law, there is a specific scope of potential wrongdoing presents real principle of liability for complicity in aggression where territor y is placed at another state’s The provision of territor y by one state to another opportunities for those seeking to disrupt such disposal is relatively straightfor ward. The rule is in breach of this rule has occurred previously. In drone programmes to bring strategic litigation, only enlivened where physical territor y is 1986, the United Kingdom (in marked contrast to which targets not the states actually launching provided, and where that territor y is at least France and Spain) permitted the United States unlawful strikes, but any of the states, which under the effective control of the providing to fly airstrikes against Libya from United unlawfully facilitate the same. This approach, of Kingdom onshore airbases. The United Nations targeting the concerning actions of a particular additional rule of international law which General Assembly condemned the airstrikes, state indirectly, by focusing on the actions of provides that a state must not allow its territor y although the relevant resolution did not explicitly those that enable that state, has had some mention the United Kingdom’s role in them. 57 support previously. In R (Zagorski) v Secretary In the same way, any states providing approval of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, 58 and access for their territor y to be placed at the the UK’s export of an ingredient used in lethal disposal of a drone programme which breaches injections overseas was challenged as a means to be used as the launching pad for acts of aggression by other states. This rule is codified 50 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the definition of aggression, 1974, article 3(f). in article 3(f) of the United Nations General 51 Jackson, State Complicity, p. 143. Assembly’s resolution on the Definition of 52 Nicaragua case, [195]. Aggression, which provides that “[t]he action of 53 The original Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court did not include a definition of aggression. The decision to adopt the General Assembly definition was finally agreed at the 2010 Kampala Review Conference, which provided that the Court would be entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once thirty States ratified the amended definition, and the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC Statute decided to allow jurisdiction to be exercised. The thirtieth State ratification occurred on 26 June 2016 with the ratification by Palestine of the Kampala amendments, but the Assembly is yet to decide that jurisdiction may be exercised. a state in allowing its territor y, which it has placed at the disposal of another state, to be 49 Her Majesty’s Government, “Allegations of UK Complicity,” [42]. See also: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Assessing Damage, Urging Action, 2009, p. 85. 112 of disrupting capital punishment in the United 54 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 8th edition, ed. James Crawford, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 105. 55 States; and, in early 2017, Rights Watch (UK), together with Amnesty International and Human See: ASR, article 6; and ILC Commentary to article 6, [1]-[9]. 56 Jackson, State Complicity, p. 141. 57 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 41/38 (20 November 1986), UN Doc. A/RES/41/38. 58 [2011] HRLR 6; Case of Zagorski and Baze v Secretary of State for Innovation, Business and Skills, [2010] EWHC 3110 (Admin). 113 I N T E R N AT I O N A L L AW P E R S P EC T I V E S Rights Watch, challenged the UK’s complicity, by means of the rules of state responsibility at international law, in the unlawful conduct of Saudi Arabia in the Yemen conflict on the basis of the UK’s export of militar y materiel. 59 States throughout the world that are not T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Regional case study: Latin America Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 3 Latin American militar y and police institutions are using unarmed drones, especially for sur veillance missions in border areas, territorial waters, for crowd control and particularly, in anti-narcotics operations. 4 Israel and United States remain the main operating armed drone programmes are becoming increasingly drawn into this highly Hector Guerra is an international relations suppliers, although there are locally problematic innovation in modern warfare, which analyst, and policy and advocacy practitioner in the developed militar y and police drones, like raises considerable legal and humanitarian fields of humanitarian disarmament and human rights Argentina’s Lipán M3 drone; Colombia’s concerns. At the same time that a greater worldwide involvement increases shared expertise and facilitates operations with global reach, it also exposes many more states to multilateralism. He collaborates with global civil society networks in diplomatic processes including on the Arms Trade Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. that complicit states may be challenged within Ehécatl; or Uruguay’s Charrúa UAV. 5 “Non-lethal” armed drones are in their early stages of development, but following a clear potential legal liability for their complicity in the international drone framework. For, it is clear Navigator X2; Ecuador’s Fenix; Mexico’s S4 Introduction their domestic courts for their own breaches of While no countr y in Latin America currently international law as assistants to wrongdoing possesses armed unmanned aerial vehicles (subject to domestic legal rules as to the (UAVs), or armed drones,1 there are justiciability of international law). Those seeking conditions that could hasten their advent in new means by which to slow the spread of the region. Is the appearance of armed drones armed drone programmes would be well advised desirable? Is it inevitable? How would they to consider this strategy of targeting complicity be acquired and used? Drone technology is as a means of cutting off the effectiveness of rapidly evolving, leading to increased levels of current and future drone programmes. efficiency, versatility, and affordability. path towards a potential expansion in design for different uses in law-enforcement activities. 6 These are types of UAVs that could easily become attractive for police and militar y institutions in Latin America, and become the first types of armed UAVs in the region. This could add to the existing global controversy regarding the production, trade and use of “non-lethal” law enforcement equipment and weapons, globally, and in the region, which is already affected by countless of cases of abuse by such devices.7 The region has seen a general expansion in the presence of unarmed drones for private, commercial, and governmental uses. 2 They are deemed legitimate and are widely sought, There are even emerging producers such as 3 Rachel Glickhouse, “Explainer: Drones in Latin America,” Council of the Americas, 19 April 2017,https://www.as-coa. org/articles/explainer-drones-latin-america. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 4 Glickhouse. 5 Ibid. thus making the region an important market. 1 Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Alyssa Sims, Albert Ford, Christopher Mellon, “World of Drones: Examining the Proliferation, Development, and Use of Armed drones,” accessed 1 May 2017,https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/ world-of-drones/. 59 R (Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation, and Skills. 114 2 W. Alejandro Sanchez, “COHA Report: Drones in Latin America,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 12 January 2014, http://www.coha.org/coha-report-drones-in-latin-america/. 6 Bart Engberts and Edo Gillissen, “Policing from Above: Drone Use by the Police,” in The Future of Drone Use: Opportunities and Threats from Ethical and Legal Perspectives, ed. Bart Custers. Information and Technologies series, IT & LAW 27 (The Hague: Springer), p. 103. 7 Amnesty International and Omega Foundation, The Human Rights Impact of Less Lethal Weapons and other Law Enforcement Equipment, (London: Amnesty International, 2015), pp. 3-4. 115 R EG I O N A L C A S E S T U DY: L AT I N A M E R I C A Factors that could drive proliferation There are a variety of economic, technical, T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Conditions for regulation and normative development producers to design, produce and sell them— effectiveness is another factor to be perhaps through joint ventures with considered, vis-à-vis conventional alternatives. companies from Israel, United States, Iran, or Do the Latin American security institutions even China and Russia. have the necessar y financial resources to Given the potential for the proliferation of embark on armed drone operations? armed drones in Latin America, this is the political, human rights and security factors that could drive the research and Another accelerating aspect to consider is the development, production, acquisition and use deployment of US sur veillance drones in joint Another factor is the recognition of the human and institutional controls; deepen research on of armed drones in the region. anti-narcotics operations with the cost of armed drones. Latin American media risks and advantages; build capacity alongside governments of Colombia, Dominican and governments and intra- and extra-regional cooperation, Governments in countries affected by drug Republic and Mexico. armed drones in targeted killings since the with a robust participation of civil society. cartels and the so-called “War on Drugs” joint operations will replicated throughout the start of these operations in Asia and Africa in Indeed, this must occur at the moment when (such as Mexico), and by civil war (Colombia), region or even that US drones in operation 2002. There has been awareness about their the debate remains open regarding the have resorted to “high-value targeted over Latin America could become armed. human rights and humanitarian consequences, appropriate legal framework to govern drone and on the need to address this matter to use. 20 12 It is possible that such killings”. Should this sort of operation 8 moment to establish and consolidate legal 17 have reacted to the use of persist, be escalated, or replicated by other Security, technical and market conditions thus prevent further use in extrajudicial countries, chances are that militar y or police exist for lethal armed drones to be adopted in executions.18 organisations could begin calling for the Latin America; nonetheless, there are political adoption and use of armed drones in targeted and financial conditions which could delay The current public security situation is killings. If —following the steps of other non- such presence. complex as it is, in a context of growing state actors 9 —organized crime and insurgent organizations resorted to armed drones, this would likely prompt states to also acquire them. Countries like Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru 10 are already using Israeli-made Heron and Hermes drones for sur veillance purposes, which are known to have been armed and used in combat operations outside the region.11 These aircraft could potentially be refurbished as strikecapable UAVs. Even if militar y institutions choose not to acquire them, there may be interest from police forces to resort to less/ non-lethal models. If market opportunities for armed drones’ transfers expand, the possibility would open for Latin American 8 Andrew Cockburn, Kill Chain: Drones and the Rise of HighTech Assassins, (London: Verso, 2016), pp. 93-108. 9 10 Bergen et al. Ibid. 11 Human Rights Watch, Precisely Wrong: Civilians Killed by Israeli Drone-Launched Missiles (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2009), p. 11. 116 Factors constraining proliferation On the other hand, there are economic, human rights and humanitarian implications that could constrain any immediate drive for armed violence related to the militarization of law enforcement and a wave of human rights violations by the police and the militar y— including torture, forced disappearances and extrajudicial executions.19 from a “panacea”.14 They are only as efficient as the intelligence gathered that forms the basis of their deployment.15 There are many voices questioning their effectiveness in precision strikes.16 Given the equipment, infrastructure, and labour involved, cost12 Glickhouse. 13 Kenneth Watkin, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries: Controlling the Use of Force in Contemporary Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 282-283. 14 Watkin, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries, p. 284. 15 Wim Zwijnenburg and Zorah Blok, “Victims of Drone Warfare: Stretching the Boundaries of Conflict; Ethics and Remote Control Warfare,” in ed. Bart Custers, The Future of Drone Use: Opportunities and Threats from Ethical and Legal Perspectives (The Hague: Springer, 2016), p. 214. 16 Ibid, p. 212. lagging. 21 Exceptions exist, notably Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, where regulations focus on the right to privacy and air-traffic security. 22 However, there are no references to armed drones in these laws. It is worth noting that the countries, whose police and militar y institutions are using drones, have as a minimum, sets of laws, armed drones. While sur veillance and armed drones have been useful tools,13 they are far Generally, national UAV laws are still 17 Bolivia, http://www.embajadadebolivia.eu/es/noticias/ la-embajada-de-bolivia-en-ba-lgica-expresa-su-solidaridad-conel-pueblo-hermano-de-cuba ; Costa Rica, http://presidencia. go.cr/blog-presidencia/2015/10/discursoonu2015/ ; Cuba, http://www.minrex.gob.cu/es/intervencion-del-delegado-decuba-juan-antonio-quintanilla-roman-durante-el-debate-generaldel-tema ; Ecuador, http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/ecuadorparticipa-en-segundo-ciclo-de-examen-periodico-universal-deestados-unidos-de-america/; Venezuela, http://www.eltiempo. com.ec/noticias/mundo/5/316809/venezuela-vuelve-asuspender-el-dialogo-con-estados-unidos. 18 On 9 November 2013, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights organized a thematic hearing on use of drones and its impact on human rights in the Americas, at the request of the Torcuato di Tella University; the International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School; and the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice & Human Rights (RFK Center), http://hrbrief.org/hearings/use-of-drones-andits-impact-on-human-rights-in-the-americas/, accessed 7 August 2017. 19 Jonathan D. Rosen and Hanna S. Kassab, “Introduction” in Fragile States in the Americas, ed. Jonathan D. Rosen and Hanna S. Kassab (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017), pp. xi-xvi. rules or protocols on the use of force by law 20 Watkin, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries, p. 281. 21 Marguerite Cawley, “Drone Use in Latin America. Dangers and Opportunities”, InSight Crime, 2014, accessed 1 May 2017.https://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/drone-usein-latin-america-dangers-and-opportunities. 22 Timothy Ravich, “A Comparative Global Analysis of Drone Laws: Best Practices and Policies”, in The Future of Drone Use: Opportunities and Threats from Ethical and Legal Perspectives, ed. Bart Custers. Information and Technologies series, IT & LAW 27 (The Hague: Springer, 2016), pp. 312, 313, 316. 117 R EG I O N A L C A S E S T U DY: L AT I N A M E R I C A T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S enforcement agents. 23 In close connection to All the countries of the region are also states Any development on disarmament, non- It has shown less than a friendly approach this, is a prohibition on torture. All the parties to all Geneva Conventions and at least proliferation, and arms control does not come towards its southern neighbour 31 and countries from the region are states parties to to its Protocol I, 25 whose Article 36 regulates in isolation. Latin America will be a sounding chances are that Washington’s attention will the Convention against Torture and other the acquisition and new use of means or board and actor in any multilateral process to remain an extension of its wars on terror and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or methods of warfare. This means that in control or regulate drones, especially if any on drugs. 32 There is also the possibility of an Punishment. 24 considering the integration of armed drones initiatives come from the United States. extension of a global geopolitical into their arsenals, these countries must make What will be the effect of Washington’s call confrontation with China, Iran, and Russia if sure the legal means and methods of warfare for a global control on international transfers these countries escalate their presence in the are respected. This will come at a moment of armed drones to start a multilateral Caribbean basin. when there are serious doubts as to the process resulting in a Code of Conduct? legality of the use of armed drones. 26 This initiative was launched in 2016 through The Latin American region has shown the Joint Declaration for the Export and leadership and norm entrepreneurship in The membership of the Latin American States Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled previous disarmament and arms control in the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is paramount UAVs and was endorsed by Argentina, Chile, processes on nuclear weapons, landmines, in regulating eventual armed drone transfers— Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 29 cluster munitions, and the arms trade. 23 Examples of these laws, protocols and regulations are: Argentina, “Regulación y Control del Uso Policial de la Coerción y la Fuerza en Argentina”, accessed 1 May 2017,http://escuelasuperior.com.ar/instituto/wp-content/ uploads/2015/06/Regulacion_y_control.pdf; Brazil, “Diretrizes sobre o Uso da Força pelos Agentes de Segurança Pública”, accessed 1 May 2017, http://download.rj.gov.br/ documentos/10112/1188889/DLFE-54510.pdf/ portaria4226usodaforca.pdf; Chile, “Protocolos para el Mantenimiento del Orden Público”, accessed 1 May 2017,http://deptoddhh.carabineros.cl/assets/protocolos_ mantenimiento_del_orden_publico.pdf; Colombia, “Reglamento del uso de la fuerza y el empleo de elementos, dispositivos, municiones y armas no letales, en la Policía Nacional” accessed 1 May 2017,http://www.policia.edu.co/documentos/ normatividad_2016/reglamentos/Reglamento%20para%20 el%20uso%20de%20la%20fuerza%20y%20el%20empleo%20 de%20elementos%20dispositivos,%20municiones%20y%20 armas.pdf Ecuador, “Reglamento de uso legal, adecuado y proporcional de la fuerza para la policía nacional”, accessed 1 May 2017,https://www.eempn.gob.ec/documentos_2014/ reglamusofuerza.pdf; Mexico, “Manual del uso de la fuerza, de aplicación común a las tres fuerzas armadas”, accessed 1 May 2017 https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle. php?codigo=5346857&fecha=30/05/2014 Paraguay, “Manual del uso de la fuerza de la policía nacional”, https://www.scribd. com/doc/56475126/Manual-de-Uso-de-la-Fuerza-de-la-PoliciaNacional-del-Paraguay; Peru, “Decreto legislativo que regula el uso de la fuerza por parte de la policía nacional”, https://www. slideshare.net/armandoreyesmendoza/decreto-legislativo-queregula-el-uso-de-la-fuerza-por-parte-de-lapolicia-nacional-delperdl-1186; Uruguay, “Ley de procedimiento policial”, http:// unasev.gub.uy/wps/wcm/connect/unasev/7f1623a5-6da6492f-b4f1-86679c330808Normativa+de+Tr%C3%A1nsito+y+S eguridad+Vial_Compilado2016. pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=7f1623a56da6-492f-b4f1-86679c330808; Venezuela, “Normas y Principios para el Uso Progresivo y Diferenciado de la Fuerza Policial por parte de los funcionarios y las funcionarias de los Cuerpos de Policía en sus diversos ámbitos político territoriales”. Accessed 1 May 2017 https:// aldiavenezuela.microjuris.com/2010/03/22/normas-yprincipios-para-el-uso-progresivo-y-diferenciado-de-la-fuerzapolicial-por-parte-de-los-funcionarios-y-las-funcionarias-de-loscuerpos-de-policia-en-sus-diversos-ambitos-politico-territoriale/. 24 “Committee Against Torture”, accessed 1 May 2017, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cat/pages/catindex.aspx. 118 28 Perhaps that pool of expertise and including transit and transhipment. Only 11 countries of the region are states parties to It is left to be seen what will be the continuity commitment could ser ve as a resource to the ATT, which include drone producers given to the Global Control, an Obama drive the control of armed drones in the Argentina, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and initiative, by the new US Administration region and beyond. But Latin American states, Uruguay, as well as Costa Rica, Dominican under President Trump, and as a civil society, academia, and media must take Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, consequence, whether there will be this window of opportunity to discuss and act Panama. 27 continuous and additional support by the on a regulation or ban of armed drones before Latin American nations. use of the weapons is entrenched by militar y Development of and compliance with the and police, and export by arms manufacturers. discussed legal regulations should ser ve as This requires due consideration at a time when an initial framework—along with progress in the Trump Administration will not pay more international aviation law—to prevent eventual attention to Latin America than the Obama armed drones from being used in violation of presidency. 30 IHL and IHRL standards and principles, or from falling in the hands of end users, in or outside the region, involved in crimes against humanity, genocide or war crimes. 25 International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2013, (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2013), pp. 610-611. 28 Chris Cole, “A New International Control Regime on Armed Drones Led by the US? What is Going on?”, Drone Wars UK, accessed 1 May 2017, https://www.dronewars. net/2016/09/02/a-new-international-control-regime-on-armeddrones-led-by-the-us-what-is-going-on/. 26 Laurie Calhoun, We Kill Because We Can. From Soldiering to Assassination in the Drone Age, (London: Zed Books, 2015), pp. 306-307. 29 US Department of State, “Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)”, accessed 19 April 2017 https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/262811. htm. 31 Alexander Main, “Ce qui attend l’Amerique latine“, Le Monde Diplomatique, No 754, January 2017, pp 8-9. 27 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, “Table of States Parties of the ATT”, last updated 1 May 2017.https:// s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ Table-of-States-parties-April-10-2017.pdf. 30 Ted Galen Carpenter, “The Obama Administration’s Foreign Policy Challenges in the Americas” in Fragile States in the Americas, ed. Jonathan D. Rosen and Hanna S. Kassab (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017), p. 274, p. 279. 32 Eric L. Golnick, “United States Defense Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean”, in Fragile States in the Americas, ed. Jonathan D. Rosen and Hanna S. Kassab (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017), p. 317. 119 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S R EG I O N A L C A S E S T U DY: E U R O P E Regional case study: overall cost in comparison to other platforms, Additionally, there are concerns that drone related technology, a strict interpretation of Europe the ability to loiter over targets for long periods strikes increase recruitment for terrorist and adherence to the relevant legal of time, to strike particular targets and to not organisations, concerns about related framework for the context of any particular place service members in harm’s way. As Chris effects that the use of armed drones has on use of armed drones is in the strategic Cole notes in Chapter 4 on ‘Harm to global long-term militar y strategy, and the continued interest of all states. It is especially so for peace and security’ these perceptions and risk and reality of the proliferation of armed those states touting the importance of factors are harmful in that they contribute to drones. relevant international legal principles and their Jessica Dorsey is a law yer specializing in international humanitarian law and international human rights law. She is also a Project Officer in the Humanitarian Disarmament department at the 5 6 unbridled commitment to the rule of law and lowering the threshold for policymakers to approve the use of force.2 These issues make this ever more urgent a fundamental freedoms, such as Member and advocacy related to the controversial use and In a 2015 publication, the United Kingdom’s topic demanding comprehensive address by States of the European Union. acquisition of armed drones;  the Coordinator of Ministry of Defense acknowledged that the states around the world. Because of the Dutch NGO PA X, where she carries out research the European Forum on Armed Drones; and an Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism—The Hague, where her research “increased use [of remote and automated systems] in combat and support functions will focuses mainly on issues related to foreign fighters reduce the risk to military personnel and thereby and countering violent extremism. potentially change the threshold for the use of force. Fewer casualties may lower political risk As the contributions in this publication articulate, recent years have seen a steep increase in the use of extraterritorial force coupled with a large number of civilians having been killed, seriously injured or traumatized by drone strikes within and outside of recognized areas of armed conflict.1 Much critique is (rightly) aimed at the United States (US) as the de facto leader in carr ying out drone strikes all over the world. However, the US is not the only active drone user. Worr yingly, several European countries may not be far behind the US in terms of the acquisition of drones and drone-related technology—and may not be far from the US in their application of standards for the use of drones. Compared to other weapons systems, advocates consider drones to have inherent advantages, such as the perceived lower 1 Resolution of 27 February 2014 on the use of armed drones, (2014/2567 (RSP), European Parliament, 2014, accessed on 26 May 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-20140172+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 120 and any public reticence for a military response.”3 It is this impact on decisions regarding the use of lethal force, especially outside of armed conflict, and the current use of armed drones in a way that challenges relevant legal standards,4 that make the use of these technologies problematic. 2 Micah Zenko, ‘Meet the Press Transcript’, NBC News, 26 April 2015, accessed on 26 May 2017 http://www.nbcnews. com/meet-the-press/meet-press-transcript-april-262015-n350661. 3 UK Ministry of Defence, Strategic Trends Programme: Future Operating Environment 2035, 15 December 2015, 31-2, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/607612/20150731-FOE_35_Final_v29-VH. pdf. 4 James Igoe Walsh and Marcus Schulzke, The Ethics of Drone Strikes: Does Reducing the Cost of Conflict Encourage War?, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2015, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1289.pdf; Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, A/68/382, 13 September 2013, para 17, https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/ uploads/2013/10/UN-Special-Rapporteur-Extrajudicial-ChristofHeyns-Report-Drones.pdf; Chris Cole, “Drones do ‘lower threshold for use of lethal force’ academic study finds,” DroneWars UK, 12 February 2016, https://dronewars. net/2016/02/12/drones-do-lower-threshold-for-use-of-lethalforce-academic-study-finds/; Jelena Pejic, “Extraterritorial targeting by means of armed drones: Some legal implications,” International Review of the Red Cross, 96(893), 3, 7 May 2015, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/jelena-pejicextraterritorial-targeting-means-armed-drones-some-legalimplications. existence of counterproductive consequences This case study briefly outlines the state of that may arise from misusing armed drones or affairs in European countries with regard to the acquisition and use of armed drones, 5 Hassan Abbas, “How Drones Create More Terrorists,” The Atlantic, 23 August 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2013/08/how-drones-create-moreterrorists/278743/; Ed Picklington and Ewen MacAskill, “Obama’s drone war a ‘recruitment tool’ for Isis, say US Air Force whistleblowers,” The Guardian, 18 November 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/18/obamadrone-war-isis-recruitment-tool-air-force-whistleblowers. 6 Wim Zwijnenburg and Cor Oudes,, Does Unmanned Make Unacceptable?, PAX Report, 2015, 18-22, http://www. ikvpaxchristi.nl/media/files/does-u-make-ulowspreads_0.pdf; Report on Government’s policy on use of drones for targeted killing, UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2016, paragraph 1.36, accessed on 10 February 2017, https://www. publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/ jtrights/574/574.pdf; Drones and targeted killings: the need to uphold human rights and international law, Reply to REC 2069 (2015), Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 8 December 2015, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/XrefXML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=22301&lang=en; Anthony Dworkin, Europe’s New Counter-Terror Wars, European Council on Foreign Relations 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ ECFR192_-_EUROPES_NEW_COUNTER-TERROR_WARS_ FINAL.pdf; Larry Friese., Nic Jenzen-Jones and Michael Smallwood, Emerging Unmanned Threats: The use of commercially-available armed UAVs by non-state actors, Armament Research Services, February 2016, http://www. paxvoorvrede.nl/media/files/pax-ares-special-report-no-2emerging-unmanned-threats.pdf; Nils Melzer, Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare, European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Directorate B, Policy Department, 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/ join/2013/410220/EXPO-DROI_ET(2013)410220_EN.pdf; Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “ISIS used an armed drone to kill two Kurdish fighters and wound French troops, report says,” Washington Post, 11 October 2016, https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/10/11/isisused-an-armed-drone-to-kill-two-kurdish-fighters-and-woundfrench-troops-report-says/?utm_term=.6eb5349a7a7a; Eric Schmitt, “Papers Offer a Peek at ISIS’ Drones, Lethal and Largely Off-the-Shelf,” New York Times, 31 January 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/world/middleeast/ isis-drone-documents.html?_r=0. highlights recent efforts made by European institutions to discuss their regulation, and finally describes the work of civil society organizations in the European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD), to contribute a perspective on engagement in Europe with respect to armed drones. State of affairs on drones in European countries 7 At the time of writing, the United Kingdom (UK) is the only European countr y to have and use armed drones. However, many questions remain about how these drones are being deployed, against whom, and the legal 7 For more, see, Srdjan Cvijic and Lisa Klingenberg, “Armed drones policy in the EU: the growing need for clarity,” in Litigating Drone Strikes: Challenging the Global Network of Remote Killing, European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, May 2017, pp. 28-55, https://www.ecchr.eu/en/ documents/publications/articles/litigating-drone-strikes-engneu.html; Chris Cole, “European use of military drones expanding,” DroneWars UK, 19 July 2016, https://dronewars. net/2016/07/19/european-use-of-military-drones-expanding/; and Jessica Dorsey and Christophe Paulussen, Towards a European Position on Armed Drones and Targeted Killing: Surveying EU Counter-Terrorism Perspectives, International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague Research paper, April 2015, https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-DorseyPaulussen-Towards-A-European-Position-On-Armed-DronesAnd-Targeted-Killing-Surveying-EU-CounterterrorismPerspectives.pdf. 121 R EG I O N A L C A S E S T U DY: E U R O P E T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S framework governing their use, given that United States and its drone programme.11 integral issues such as invoking self-defence This sheds light on how France interprets its as a justification, using a similar standard to legal authority when it comes to using lethal the US’ expansive notion of imminence, and force, including with armed drones, and is a the expansive geographical interpretation major cause for concern. about where force could be used sparked public debate in the UK. Several attempts by Italy also possesses Reaper and Predator civil society to obtain more clarity on the drones, but they are unarmed pending policy and framework have been met with less budgetar y confirmation to allow for them to than satisfactor y answers. 8 At the time of be equipped with Hellfire missiles. Currently, writing, litigation against the UK is ongoing in Italy uses the drones it has in sur veillance order to obtain more clarification on the UK’s missions. Italy also hosts US drone perspective, with civil society actors seeking operations led out of Sigonella Air Force Base to keep the UK from hiding behind a national- in Sicily, which has given rise to controversy security rationale in order to shroud its drone over the past year. Litigation efforts are programme in secrecy. 9 under way to elucidate more information about this agreement.12 France currently has a fleet of Reaper and Harfang drones that are being deployed for Germany has been using unarmed Heron ground troop support and sur veillance sur veillance drones in operations in purposes in certain operations in Africa, and Afghanistan, and has recently ordered a new is slated to receive additions to its fleet in fleet that will reportedly “be ordered directly © The European Parliament 2019. At the time of writing, France is only with ammunition.”13 Additionally, Germany is leading on the process to build a European constraints. At the time of writing, the Dutch drone (medium altitude long endurance government has yet to be formed after March remotely piloted system, MALE RPS), joined 2017 elections but it is likely that when that by Italy, Spain, and France, planned to be happens in late 2017, the Dutch will likely operational by 2025. move to acquire and arm the Reapers, using its drone fleet in a sur veillance capacity.10 However, reports as recent as Januar y 2017 show that the French government has performed targeted killings— though not using drones—via the operation “homo” (short for homicide), some of which were carried out through French special forces and some reportedly outsourced to the 8 See, for example, Report on Government’s policy on use of drones for targeted killing, UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights, accessed 1 August 2017, https://publications. parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtrights/574/574.pdf. 9 See, e.g., “Rights Watch (UK) taking UK to court over refusal to disclose legal basis for targeted killings,” Rights Watch UK, 20 July 2017, http://www.rwuk.org/rights-watchuk-taking-uk-government-to-court-over-refusal-to-disclose-legalbasis-for-targeted-killings. 10 Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, “A Perspective on France,” Center for a New American Security, 2016, http:// drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-france. 122 11 See Srdjan Cvijic and Lisa Klingenberg, “Armed drones policy in the EU: the growing need for clarity,” in European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, Litigating Drone Strikes: Challenging the Global Network of Remote Killing, May 2017, https://www.ecchr.eu/en/documents/publications/ articles/litigating-drone-strikes-eng-neu.html, footnotes 36-39, specifically, cf “Comment Hollande autorise ‘léxécution ciblée’de terroristes”, Le Monde, 4 January 2017, http://www. lemonde.fr/societe/article/2017/01/04/comment-hollandeautorise-l-execution-ciblee-de-terroristes_5057421_3224.html. 12 Adam Entous and Missy Ryan, “U.S. has secretly expanded its secret global network of drone bases to North Africa,” The Washington Post, 26 October 2016, https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-has-secretlyexpanded-its-global-network-of-drone-bases-to-northafrica/2016/10/26/ff19633c-9b7d-11e6-9980-50913d68eacb_ story.html?utm_term=.e52535705f75. 13 Srdjan Cvijic and Lisa Klingenberg, “Armed drones policy in the EU: the growing need for clarity,” in European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, Litigating Drone Strikes: Challenging the Global Network of Remote Killing, May 2017, https://www.ecchr.eu/en/documents/publications/articles/ litigating-drone-strikes-eng-neu.html, footnote 52, cf “Die bewaffneten Drohnen kommen”, Spiegel Online, 31 March 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehrursula--von-der-leyen-laesst-kampfdrohnenentwickeln-a-1026373.html. European Parliament discusses drone policy. 14 It also hosts US drone operations out of Ramstein Air Force Base, according to statements from a number of the subject of ongoing litigation. politicians as well as the armed forces.16 15 Civil society has voiced concern about the The Netherlands received the green light from lack of clarity regarding the legal framework, the US to purchase four Reaper drones, but whether drones will be armed and where and has yet to go through with the next steps of how the drones will be used in Dutch the acquisition phase due to budgetar y operations,17 and will continue to monitor the 14 See Dassault Aviation, “European MALE RPAS (medium altitude long endurance remotely piloted system) Programme takes off, ”accessed on 1 August 2017, https://www.dassaultaviation.com/en/group/press/press-kits/european-male-rpasmedium-altitude-long-endurance-remotely-piloted-aircraftsystem-programme-takes-off. 15 European Litigating Drone Strikes: Challenging the Global Network of Remote Killing, Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, May 2017, https://www.ecchr.eu/en/ documents/publications/articles/litigating-drone-strikes-engneu.html. situation as necessar y. 16 Jessica Dorsey, “Wat wil Hennis echt met de Reaper drone?” NRC Handelsblad, 9 May 2017, https://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2017/05/09/wat-wil-hennis-nu-echt-met-de-reaper8754175-a1557852. 17 Jessica Dorsey, “Wat wil Hennis echt met de Reaperdrone?” NRC Handelsblad, 9 May 2017, https://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2017/05/09/wat-wil-hennis-nu-echt-met-de-reaper8754175-a1557852. 123 R EG I O N A L C A S E S T U DY: E U R O P E T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S It has been reported that Spain will acquire foreign policy subcommittees of the EP rule of law, human rights, and fundamental Armed Drones (EFAD). As stated in its Call to four Reaper drones from the US, with two (Human Rights and Security and Defense) freedoms. The proposed elements are in line Action, EFAD “is a civil society network of arriving as soon as 2017, and all acquisitions held a hearing on the use of drones and the with objectives advanced by the 2016 EU Global organisations working to promote human rights, to be in place before Januar y 2019. fight against terrorism in June 2016, focusing Strategy and are largely based on elements respect for the rule of law, disarmament and Switzerland is also awaiting deliver y of six on the grave impact that drones have on found in the 2014 resolution in addition to conflict prevention.” The Forum was “formed to Hermes 900 drones to be delivered by 2020 human rights. 21 In September 2016, all 28 existing international standards and challenge the growing global use of armed and Poland has plans to acquire approximately national parliaments of the EU called upon recommendations at the EU and United Nations drones and to address key concerns regarding 60 drones to be stationed at a dedicated base the EU High Representative Federica (UN) levels their deployment and proliferation, through in the northwest of the countr y. So far, plans Mogherini and EU member states to “work for these countries’ drone fleets only include towards common guidelines for the use of sur veillance and reconnaissance missions. armed drones.” 18 Recent initiatives by European institutions European Parliament In 2014, the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution on the use of armed drones, expressing concern over the use of such technology outside the applicable legal framework.19 It called for a common European position on using of armed drones, for European Union (EU) member states to oppose extrajudicial targeted killings, and for more transparency and accountability in the use of armed drones. Following the 2014 resolution, in April 2016, the EP adopted another resolution that reiterated its grave concern over the use of armed drones “outside the international legal framework” and insisted on the adoption of an EU common position. 20 Additionally, the two 18 Chris Cole, “European use of military drones expanding,” DroneWars UK, 19 July 2016, https://dronewars. net/2016/07/19/european-use-of-military-drones-expanding. 19 Resolution of 27 February 2014 on the use of armed drones, (2014/2567 (RSP)), European Parliament, 2014, http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP// NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2014-0172+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 20 Resolution of 28 April 2016 on attacks on hospitals and schools as violations of international humanitarian law, (2016/2662 RSP), European Parliament, 2016, http://www. europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&r eference=P8-TA-2016-0201. 124 engaging with governments, European Council of Europe 22 In 2015, after several debates on the matter, the institutions and civil society, and by promoting political and public debate.” 25 The five areas EFAD focuses its advocacy on are as follows: In June 2017, the Human Rights subcommittee Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of of the EP published “Towards an EU Common Europe unanimously adopted a resolution on 27 position on the use of armed drones,”23 January 2015 recognising several legal issues written by the present author. This publication that member and observer states still needed to proposes relevant elements for a legal and address with respect to the use of armed policy framework outlining the contours of a drones. These included national sovereignty, common position on the use of armed drones. human rights concerns, and the problematic The main principles of the document elucidate broadening of international humanitarian law principles on requirements for member states principles. The resolution called for member and with respect to transparency, accountability observer states to establish clear procedures mechanisms and processes, export controls that respected the limits under international law and restrictions on assistance provided to on targeted killing, including investigating deaths other states, and urges member states to take caused by drones and openly publishing up such proposals at national levels for procedures related to targeting.24 The EFAD member organisations undertake this work inclusion in relevant policy and legislation in Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in several ways, including through lobbying and order to reflect the EU’s commitment to the remains seized of the matter. advocacy efforts pertaining to the five action 21 “Joint SEDE/DROI public hearing on ‘The use of drones and the fight against terrorism - the impact on human rights’,” European Parliament, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ committees/en/droi/events-hearings. html?id=20160623CHE00021. European civil society engagement There is a robust network of civil society actors within Europe and beyond working on several issues related to armed drones. 22 “Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy, 2-4 September 2016, Bratislava, Final Conclusions,” European Council, 2016, http://www.nrsr.sk/web/Dynamic/ Download.aspx?DocID=429373. One such network is the European Forum on 23 Jessica Dorsey, “Towards an EU common position on the use of armed drones,” European Parliament DirectorateGeneral for External Policies, June 2017, http://www.europarl. europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578032/EXPO_ STU(2017)578032_EN.pdf. See also “Subcommittee on Human Rights Workshop: Towards a European common position on the use of armed drones?” European Parliament, 22 March 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/ video?event=20170322-1500-COMMITTEE-DROI. 24 Resolution 2051 (2015): Drones and targeted killings: the need to uphold human rights and international law, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 2015, http:// semantic-pace.net/tools/pdf. aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbncve G1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHIuYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD 0yMTc0NiZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZ S5uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYvWFJlZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERG LnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTIxNzQ2. articulate clear policies on the use of armed and surveillance drones that echo standards already prescribed by international law; prevent complicity in unlawful drone strikes; ensure transparency through information sharing and providing timely public information; establish accountability, ensuring the rights of drone strike victims are upheld; and finally, control proliferation by strengthening arms exports regimes and encouraging more open discussion about stricter control of transfers of drones and drone-related technology. points outlined above, carrying out research, engaging with relevant states and non-state actors, undertaking strategic litigation efforts, and hosting workshops and conferences to provide more opportunities for dialogue with policy makers and legislators at the at the national, European, and UN levels. EFAD also engages with transatlantic and global partner organisations on related initiatives. 25 “Call to Action,” European Forum on Armed Drones, 2016, https://www.paxvoorvrede.nl/media/files/efad-call-toaction.pdf. 125 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Civil society engagement on armed drones is such as liberty, democracy, the universality and more vital now than ever—both in Europe and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental beyond. European countries are generally more freedoms, the rule of law, preserving peace opaque in many respects than even the US. and strengthening international security in 26 Calls by civil society organizations for more accordance with the UN Charter, and respect for transparency are largely met with a resounding principles of international law.30 8. Gendered Perspectives Ray Acheson Writing in the mid-20th centur y, the philosopher Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women’s silence. This is particularly concerning as International League for Peace and Freedom reticence with respect to these issues can give Recent developments that have seen shifting the impression of European states’ implicit geopolitical dynamics due to the posturing of consent to controversial uses of armed drones. the US and Russia, alongside the changing This may in turn lend such activities more undercurrents within NATO and other alliances, monitoring and analysing international processes legitimacy.27 As the author Paulussen point out: offer European countries and institutions a and forums related to disarmament. “In theory, this lack of public discourse even chance to take a stand and recommit to the could lead to the formation of customary norms, fundamental freedoms that form the basis of ‘as evidence of a general practice accepted as the European identity. One way this could be law’…[and a]bstention of protest could also done is through mechanisms that regulate the assist in the process of law-making.” 28 use of armed drones. However, time is running out to take any kind of leading role or moral Conclusion high-ground that stays true to the fundamental Fundamental rights are at the very core of the European identity. The EU’s 2016 Global Strategy serves as a reminder that the EU is tasked with “promot[ing] a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core.” 29 This echoes the objectives of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, which include adhering to values 26 Jessica Dorsey and Christophe Paulussen, Towards a European Position on Armed Drones and Targeted Killing: Surveying EU Counter-Terrorism Perspectives, International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague Research paper, April 2015, https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-DorseyPaulussen-Towards-A-European-Position-On-Armed-DronesAnd-Targeted-Killing-Surveying-EU-CounterterrorismPerspectives.pdf. 27 Anthony Dworkin, “Drones and Targeted Killing: Defining a European Position,” European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, July 2013, 2, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_ DRONES_BRIEF.pdf; Art. 38, para. 1 (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 28 rights Europe purports to uphold, before drone technology has proliferated and the standards of use are far afield from the notions of international law we know today. If various European countries continue their general silence with respect to armed drones, or if they begin to follow the controversial lead of the US, they risk being complicit actors in the erosion of the international legal principles and fundamental rights and freedoms upon which the European identity is built. Civil society engagement, through the EFAD network and beyond, is 126 technology and means of warfare, rather than (WILPF). She leads WILPF’s advocacy and research the ends pursued by armed violence. She argued on weapons and militarism, which always includes a that to understand the consequences of war one gender perspective. Her work also includes needs to take apart the mechanism of the militar y struggle and analyse the social relations it implies under given technical, economic, and social conditions.1 One consistently underexplored aspect of social relations in the context of weapons and war is gender. This chapter, building on the work undertaken by feminist activists and scholars in the context of the women, peace, and security field as well as those looking at gender and militarism and gender and technology more broadly, seeks to examine the gendered implications of the use of armed drones. How do armed drones, as a specific technology, perpetuate gender essentialisms, including violent, militarised masculinities? How, in turn, does the development of this form of mechanised violence affect masculinities? How are drones used to commit acts of genderbased violence? a crucial element in engaging governments This chapter first discusses how genders, in on these issues in order to reiterate their particular hegemonic norms of “militarised commitment to the rule of law and to lessen the masculinity,” are constructed. It then briefly human impact of drone strikes. examines the relationship between gender and militar y technology, turning to armed drones as a particularly poignant study in how weapons can both reinforce and simultaneously undermine Jessica Dorsey and Christophe Paulussen, above note 7. 29 “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy,” European Union, 2016, https://europa.eu/ globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs_ review_web.pdf. Simone Weil encouraged the examination of hegemonic gender norms, and what implications 30 Ramses Wessels, The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), p. 59 et seq. 1 Simone Weil, Formative Writings, 1929–1941 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987): 174. 127 G E N D E R E D P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S this has for gender-based violence, gender transgendered, transsexual, and other sexed between gender identities and hegemonic norms debates, popular culture, and family relations. 8 essentialisms, and gender equality. people are different ages, races, ethnicities, within and between genders. “Hegemonic This process also takes place through the religions, and sexualities; are differently abled; masculinity” is a “particular idealized image of marketing of war and weapons culture through It is important to examine drones through a have different political views and socioeconomic masculinity in relation to which images of toys, stories, films, and social norms. In the gendered lens not merely as an academic statuses; and have vastly different experiences femininity and other masculinities are United States, for example, “video game and exercise but as a means to making specific in the world, in societies, communities, and at marginalized and subordinated.” In many cultures film industries both take money from companies policy recommendations. Understanding the home. Yet this is rarely recognised by gender today, hegemonic masculinity is represented by that make firearms to feature their products” gendered context and implications of drones is stereotypes, expectations, and norms. 2 a heterosexual man who is independent, risk- and then the militar y uses these games and useful for developing more cogent, taking, aggressive, rational, physically tough, films for recruitment. “These extreme examples comprehensive responses to their use and courageous, and unemotional. intersect with the ever yday, mundane lessons development—just as a gendered lens is useful for understanding militarism more broadly. An examination of the gendered aspects of armed drones does not imply that other means of warfare are more acceptable, or that policies such as targeted killings are acceptable by other means. Instead, an investigation of the ways in which gender constructions motivate or are in turn impacted by the use of armed drones can help policymakers, militar y operators, and activists confront the unique challenges that armed drones pose to peace, security, and gender equality as well as the relationship between these challenges and militarism more broadly. Gender analysis should not be a footnote. It offers specific tools that can help unpack or understand more fully the ways drones are perceived by users and victims; the physical and psychological responses to the use of armed drones; and the situational context of drones in terms of militar y technology as well as gender relations. The construction of gender Gender does not refer to biological sex, but rather to socially constructed ideas that attribute meaning to and differentiate between sexes. Questions of gender do not exclusively concern women, but all sexes and sexual and gender identities. It is also important to recognise that individuals within a certain sexed or gendered group are not homogeneous. Women, men, 128 Gender is a process constructed by human societies. Ideas about gender can change over time. Socially constructed understandings of gender affect perceptions of social roles, behaviour, and identity, and have implications for relations between people. Gender is, in principle, about social organisation. It “structures social relationships and upholds and 6 about the importance of being ‘real men’ As the process of constructing gender is based that boys and men receive from the media and on differentiation, people other than their peers, parents, coaches, and more.”9 heterosexual men are considered to be dependent, risk-averse, passive, irrational, weak, timid, and emotional. The militar y, scholars have argued, plays a primar y role in shaping images of masculinity in Violent and militarised masculinities the larger society,10 to the point where “the expectations with these actions, they not This “hegemonic masculinity” is also associated have linked the development of militarised only reinforce the gender essentialisms built with the capacity, willingness, and propensity for masculinities with the development of the nation- up by socities and cultures, but they also violence. Boys come to learn—through parenting, state, arguing that the sur vival of the state relies contribute to the establishment and media, and schooling—to define themselves as on its ability to consolidate the men, money, and reinforcement of power relations between men through violence. The norms of hegemonic machines required for war. “Citizenship rights, gender categories. masculinities—toughness, strength, bravado— most notably the right to political participation,” teach boys to excercise dominance through became linked with bearing arms and violent Power relations, as Michel Foucault explained in violent acts and rely upon violence as a form of masculinity. “In the nineteenth centur y, the 1977, are embedded in processes of communication. conscript militar y became the central state reproduces rules and patterns of expectation.”3 As individuals act out gender norms and fulfill 4 7 categorisation and differentiation. In terms of 5 gender, these processes produce a hierarchy Boys and men are in particular socialised into militarised gender identities—and women and 2 The fact that there are differences of class, race, culture, ability, etc. between women and between men and between others adds complexity to this analysis, but it does not make a gender perspective theoretically unimportant or politically irrelevant. “In virtually every culture,” notes Sandra Harding, “gender difference is a pivotal way in which humans identify themselves as persons, organize social relations, and symbolize meaningful natural and social events and processes.” See Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986): 18. 3 Franck Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy,” Gender, Work and Organization 3, no. 3 (1996): 130. 4 Judith Lorberg, Paradoxes of Gender (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994): 6. 5 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York, Vintage Books, 1977). girls and others are socialised to support such identities. Militarised masculinities are produced dominant adult male role model could largely be the product of the militar y.”11 Some historians institution establishing and sustaining militaristic gender ideologies, that is, ideals of women as weak, in need of protection, passive and peaceful, and men as rational, war prone and in various sites, including through the policies of states, security discourses, education, media 6 Franck Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity”; Maya Eichler, “Miltarized Masculinities in International Relations,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume XXI, Issue I (Fall/Winter 2014); R.W. Connell, Masculinities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 7 Soraya Chemaly, “Why Won’t We Talk About Violence and Masculinity in America?, Ms. Magazine, 17 December 2012, http://msmagazine.com/blog/2012/12/17/why-wont-we-talkabout-violence-and-masculinity-in-america. 8 Eichler, “Militarized Masculinities in International Relations”, op. cit. 9 Lisa Wade, “Tough Guise 2: The ongoing crisis of violent masculinity,” The Society Pages, 15 October 2013, http:// thesocietypages.org/socimages/2013/10/15/tough-guise-2-anew-film-on-the-ongoing-crisis-of-violent-masculinity. 10 Michael S. Kimmel and Michael A. Messner, Men’s Lives (New York: Macmillan, 1989): 176-83; David H. J. Morgan, “Theater of War: Combat, the Military, and Masculinities,” in Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman (eds.) Theorizing Masculinities (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994). 11 William Arkin and Lynne Dobrofsky, “Military socialization and masculinity,” Journal of Social Issues, 34,1 (1978): 151–168. 129 G E N D E R E D P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S No drones protest in San Diego, organized by Code Pink. practice and institution,” argues Kimberly This brings us to armed drones. These weapons Hutchings. are literally gendered by their fuller name, 16 At the same time, “war plays a special role in anchoring the concept of masculinity, providing a fixed reference point culture of militarised masculinities and for any negotiation or renegotiation of what ... masculinised technological development, these hegemonic masculinity may mean.” tools of violence and of war have specific The standards of conduct or ways of being that characteristics that simultaneously reinforce and are adopted by men that value and conform to undermine hegemonic gender norms. This in turn the hegemonic masculinity are consistent with has implications for the notion of men as the standards and ways of those engaged in war. expendable and vulnerable, as predators and 17 Gender and military technology They are also consistent with the technological means created to conduct warfare. Gender relations are “materialised in technology”, through which the meaning and character of masculinity and femininity are further developed “through their enrolment and embeddedness in protectors, and poses serious challenges for breaking down gender essentialisms or achieving gender equality in a broader context. “Projecting power without vulnerability” The ability to project “distance influence without projecting vulnerability in the same ratio has working machines,” argues scholar Judy favoured the development of aerospace Wajcman. capabilities resting firmly in the ever-evolving 18 © 2013 Steve Rhodes, “unmanned aerial vehicles”. In the context of a Wajcman argues that the ver y definition of technology is cast in terms of “male foundation of modern technology,” wrote Major activities”—activities associated with the General Charles D. Link of the US Air Force in hegemonic masculinity. The traditional 2001. 20 The quest for “deploying militar y force conception of technology, in this regard, is regardless of frontiers” and “extending imperial industrial machiner y and militar y weapons—tools power from the center over the world that of work and war. constitutions its peripher y” 21 long precedes the aggressive.”12 Primacy in the militar y was, institutions. The practices of militar y institutions and still is, awarded to “toughness, skilled use engage actively in the processes of of violence, presumption of an enemy, male differentiating and “othering” that reinforces the camaraderie, submerging one’s emotions, and ideal of masculinity and gendered hierarchies. discipline (being disciplined and demanding it For example, there is a tradition in the militar y of of others).” reser ving the labels associated with femininity Because of this, technology and gender have has found a solution to this challenge in the 13 armed drone. But the militar y seems to believe it for the “other”. Many militaries insult a potential The dominant form of militarised masculinity is become interlinked in terms of the process of or defeated army by calling him a woman; armed drone. As US Air Force official David not universal—it can be crafted to ser ve their development and their use. Technological recruits in training that do not keep up are Deptula stated, “The real advantage of peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, or combat products bear their creators’ mark, argues subject to gendered insults: they are called girls unmanned aerial systems is that they allow you roles; it can var y based on nationality; and it can Sandra Harding. If technology is developed and and pussies by their instructors. to project power without projecting vulnerability.” utilised primarily by men operating within a 15 var y when wielded in domestic and foreign operations.14 But these militarised masculinities The ideals of the hegemonic masculinity “provide are embedded within the institutions of violence a framework through which war can be rendered and perpetuate that culture beyond these both intelligible and acceptable as a social 12 Saskia Stachowitsch, “Military Privatization and the Remasculinization of the State: Making the Link Between the Outsourcing of Military Security and Gendered State Transformations,” International Relations, 27(I) 74–94: 78. 15 Ibid.; Penny Strange, It’ll Make a Man of You: Feminist View of the Arms Race (Nottingham: Five Leaves Publications, 1983). As Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity,” p. 134, argues, integrating women in military isn’t going to “dilute the tough image associated with the ideology of masculinity.” They are often seen as having been cut a break by being “allowed” in without having to go through the same rigorous training as men. 13 Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990): 150. 14 Ibid. 130 framework of militarised masculinity, their Drones have an ethos of invulnerability to them. creations will be instilled with their framework of They enable their operators to strike targets far thought, knowledge, language, and interpretation.19 away at a moment’s notice without any warning. In the 1980s, Donna Haraway described what 16 Kimberly Hutchings, “Making Sense of Masculinities and War,” Men and Masculinities, vol. 10, no. 4, June 2008, 389–404, p. 389. 17 she called the “god-trick” of Western scientific epistemologies—the illusion of the panopticon, Ibid., p. 390. 18 Judy Wajcman, “Feminist theories of technologies,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 2009, p. 2. 20 Charles D. Link, “Maturing Aerospace Power,” Air and Space Power Journal, 4 September 2001. 19 21 Sandra Harding, op. cit. Chamayou, p. 12. 131 G E N D E R E D P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S the ability “to see ever ywhere from a underpinned with cultural dispositions that disembodied position of ‘nowhere’ as an determine what is seen and how it is seen. generally.” 25 integral component of histories of militarism, 29 Furthermore, they are seeking to The imager y of rape and nonconsensual activities “emasculate” those they have determined are is not an aberration. A culture of sexual “enemies” in a racist, sexist, and sexualised violence—and subsequent immunity—is part of capitalism, colonialism, and male supremacy.”22 Despite this, the US militar y and others using approach to armed violence. The “Sky Raper” the culture of dominance and invulnerability that More recently, Lauren Wilcox has described how drones continue to project the god-like qualities represents the “white Western phallic is ingrained within the militar y’s purposeful this “is seemingly perfected in the weaponized of drones—including their invulnerability and power” enforcing power and masculinity over development of violent masculinities and a drone, with its global sur veillance capacities and omnipotence. “Ever ywhere and nowhere,” Ian purported efficiency and accuracy in Shaw warns, “drones have become sovereign targeting weapons.” tools of life and death, and are coming to a sky This can perhaps become particularly true in female soldiers are often subject to sexual near you.”26 Armed drones “have become so relation to the use of armed drones in countries assault. In 2012, an estimated 26,000 US In reality, drones have proven to be neither as prolific that they are now a standard part of U.S. without the “host” government’s consent. A militar y personnel were sexually assaulted by efficient or accurate as their users may like their militar y culture,” write investigative journalists 2013 US Justice Department white paper their colleagues. Women, at the time making up publics to believe. The tools and procedures Jeremy Scahill and Glenn Greenwald. declared that a drone strike can proceed “with 15 percent of US active-duty forces, were used for determining targets for “signature of this is that they are often given nicknames. the consent of the host nation’s government or disproportionately attacked. The 2013 strikes”—attacks based on “producing packages One of these, according to a former Joint Strike after a determination that the host nation is documentar y film The Invisible War revealed that of information that become icons for killable Operating Command (JSOC) drone operator unable or unwilling to suppress the threat.” a female soldier in a combat zone is more likely bodies on the basis of behavior analysis and a inter viewed by The Intercept, is “Sky Raper”. He Academic Lorraine Bayard de Volo argues that to be raped by a fellow soldier than killed by logic of preemption”—have resulted in hundreds said it is called this “because it killed a lot of this “demasculizes” the governments of host enemy fire. 33 In 2015, the UN Human Rights of civilian casualties in drone strikes. Documents people.”28 The nickname goes beyond that given nations, which are “unable to protect their own Council’s Universal Periodic Review panel urged leaked to The Intercept in 2015 show how to a tool for killing, however. It perpetuates the borders against penetration by U.S. drones.” the US militar y to take action to prevent sexual “signature strikes” are conducted on the basis of culture of domination that, as argued earlier, She also says it suggests the United States is violence, ensure prosecution of offenders, and “intelligence” collected from video feeds, email, is a key component of the development of the “self-appointed patriarch” and that “nations offer redress for victims. 34 However, as the most social media, spy planes, and mobile phones. militarised masculinities. It also reinforces the that do not consent are rendered, in effect, recent Department of Defense report has shown, The “intelligence” is analysed for patterns institutionalisation of rape as a tool of war. legally incapable of consent.” 75 per cent of those who have been sexually 23 through the use of algorithms. This process is 27 One sign “By nicknaming a drone ‘Sky Raper’ operators— “the other”. “warrior ethos,” as described above. One 30 immediate consequence of this culture is that 31 32 It would also seem to suggest that the US government could assaulted in the militar y lack the confidence in unique to drone strikes. 24 (Part of this process, who are actors of the State—own the use of decide to bomb in such countries without their the militar y justice system to even report the as will be seen below, is gendered.) rape for domination and to defeat a target, while government’s—which sounds ver y much like an crimes against them. 35 simultaneously participating in the normalization allegor y for rape. This process is not immune to interpretation, of rape as a larger systemic issue,” argues bias, or mistakes by those using the information researcher Erin Corbett. “Not only are operators Of course such actions are not necessarily to determine targets for drone strikes. As Kyle suggesting that it is appropriate to use rape as a unique to armed drones. Other weapons can and weapon against individuals in a time of war, they have been used to “penetrate” borders without to be used by men in ways that allegedly confirm are also making light of sexual violence more consent. However, such practices seem to have their own manhood and simultaneously preser ve reached the level of official policy with the use of the masculinized atmosphere in certain armed drones. institutional spaces.”36 Grayson explains, targeted killings, including with drones, depend on the identification and sur veillance of a target, but these processes are 22 Lauren Wilcox, “Embodying algorithmic war: Gender, race, and the posthuman in drone warfare.” Security Dialogue, 48, no. 1, p. 13, describing Donna Haraway, “Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective,” Feminist Studies 14(3): 575–599. 23 Lauren Wilcox, op. cit. p. 13. 24 For details of these processes, see Cora Currier, “The kill chain: the lethal bureaucracy behind Obama’s drone war,” The Intercept, 15 October 2015, https://theintercept.com/dronepapers/the-kill-chain. 132 Cynthia Enloe connects this violence by male 25 Kyle Grayson, “Six These on Targeted Killings,” Politics 32(2): 120–128. 26 Ian Shaw, “Intervention – From Baseworld to Droneworld,” AntipodeFoundation.org, 14 August 2012, https:// antipodefoundation.org/2012/08/14/intervention-from-baseworldto-droneworld. 27 Jeremy Scahill and Glenn Greenwald, “The NSA’s secret role in the U.S. assassination program,” The Intercept, 10 February 2014, https://theintercept.com/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/. 28 Ibid. soldiers toward women inside the militar y to “the masculinized idea that women are property 33 29 Erin Corbett, “On Nicknaming Predators,” The Feminist Wire, 22 June 2015, http://www.thefeministwire.com/2015/06/onnicknaming-predators/. 30 Jasbir K. Puar and Amit Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots,” Social Text 20, no. 3 (2002): 137. See http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/films/invisible-war. 34 Jenna McLaughlin, “The US Military’s Sexual-Assault Problem Is So Bad the UN Is Getting Involved,” Mother Jones, 14 May 2015, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/05/un-humanrights-council-us-military-do-better-victims-sexual-violence. 31 Lorraine Bayard de Volo, op. cit., p. 63. 35 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, Fiscal Year 2015, Department of Defense, 2 May 2016, http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY15_Annual/FY15_ Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault_in_the_Military.pdf. 32 Ibid. 36 Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: 156. 133 G E N D E R E D P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S There is a direct relationship between sexual technologies of war that undermine the ethos interception system are not stereotypically There are reports of high levels of stress and violence in the militar y and nicknaming a drone that sustains such masculinities raises significant male leaders.” even post-traumatic stress disorder amongst “Sky Raper”: this is about violent masculinities 40 questions for the gendered hierarchies upon drone pilots. The psychological injuries suffered which the militar y relies. If machines come to The alternative to accepting “feminization” is to by drone operators “often revolve around undermine the masculinity of its operator, is the change the goal posts altogether. Some media gendered and raced associations of guilt and operator being “feminised”? reports, based on the language of militar y innocence of drone victims,” argues Bayard de officials, have come to laud technical proficiency Volo. 45 Killing “women and children” is Undertaking a gendered discourse analysis of as a warrior skill. In terms of cyber security, ostensibly avoided and, as some operator inter views with drone pilots, PhD candidate soldiers are described as “cyber warriors” by transcripts demonstrated, acknowledgement of Lindsay Murch found that one drone pilot’s claim their commander; technical prowess is elevated However, the projection that drones are such deaths is also avoided. 46 to “emotional disturbance”—which ran counter to a militaristic skill. Meanwhile, “Profiles in invulnerable does not necessarily imply that to the expected narrative for him as a man sources like Wired reinforce the connection However, such psychological harms may now be those who operate them are. In contrast, the operating in a militar y capacity—was causing between technical prowess and masculinity seen as a “badge of honour” and a mark of supposed invulnerability of drones is based on him to consider “getting out of” the role. through featuring pictures of the new ‘geek masculine courage: while drone pilots are not the dislocation of their operators from danger. He claimed, “he just wanted to be a ‘hero’ warriors’ in militar y gear, posing next to the risking their physical bodies in combat, they are The user is protected by distance from the and that the role of drone pilot was not enabling weapons which they pilot remotely, along with risking their mental health. “This would be a subjects it is targeting with the drone. This him to reach this goal.” Murch suggests this statistics about their kill ratios.” specific form of braver y,” writes Chamayou, separates the “warrior” from war, the body from could be construed as a sense that he was the battlefield. This has important implications being “feminised”. 38 dominating and directing the conduct of soldiers—invulnerable warriors, immune from prosecution for rape and war crimes—on and off the battlefield. “Emasculating” the warrior for militarised masculinities. “One of the troubles with unmanned aerial 41 “defined no longer by the exposure of one’s This requires a switch in ethic—from one of self- physical vulnerability to enemy violence, but sacrifice to one of self-preser vation. What was exposure of one’s psychic vulnerability to the once considered cowardice must now been seen effects created by one’s own destructiveness.”47 Mechanising warfare and protecting the soldier vehicles is literally the peril of becoming as courage. 42 The notion that killing someone from risk of bodily harm seems to be in ‘unmanned’ in ever y sense of the term,” argues remotely involves a kind of braver y, even without In World War I, both physical and psychic contradiction to the ethos of militarised Chamayou. “That also is why those Air Force any risk to oneself, requires this switch. It vulnerabilities played a role in anti-war activism. masculinity. Engaging an “enemy” from a officers initially put up such resistance to the requires an argument that this act itself has a Jane Addams, founder of the Women’s distance to which he or she cannot respond is general adoption of the drones. Obviously the cost. “One has to make an effort to force International League for Peace and Freedom, like shooting someone in the back. It is the drones threatened their own employment, their oneself to overcome one’s original repugnance spoke about the nightmares of soldiers in which antithesis of methods of warfare that celebrate professional qualifications, and their institutional at doing it and seeing it and, perhaps above all, they relived killing on the battlefield, or acts of braver y, courage, and sacrifice. position, but the threat was also to their own seeing oneself do it,” explains Chamayou. resistance against “the horror of killing”. But as “The attempt to eradicate all direct reciprocity in any exposure to hostile violence transforms not only the material conduct of armed violence technically, tactically, and psychically, but also the traditional principles of a militar y ethos 43 virility, which was largely associated with the Chamayou remarks, “this theme of soldiers as This appears to lend to the psychological strain victims of the violence they were forced to “media portrayals of the new ‘technogeek warrior’ on drone operators now being seen amongst US commit,” which was once a criticism of the have noted that the men who command systems militar y personnel. “These seemingly omnipotent institutions that made them do so, “is now being like Israel’s Iron Dome mobile anti-rocket killers who cannot be killed are vulnerable to recycled, in a modified form, in order to promote psychological injur y,” writes Bayard de Volo. 44 the legitimization of dronized homicide.” Rather taking of risks.” 39 Mar y Manjikian suggests that officially based on braver y and a sense of than drawing attention to soldiers’ “psychic sacrifice,” argues Chamayou. “Judged by the yardstick of such classical categories, a drone looks like the weapon of cowards.”37 The tension between the preser vation of militarised masculinities and the development of 37 Chamayou, p. 88. 134 wounds” in order to critique the militar y, 38 Lindsay Murch, “Sex and gender in drone pilot interviews,” Security Dilemmas, 27 January 2015, https://securitydilemmas. wordpress.com/2015/01/27/sex-and-gender-in-drone-pilotinterviews. 39 Chamayou, op. cit., p. 100. Also see Frank Sauer and Niklas Schörnig, “Killer drones: The ‘silver bullet’ of democratic warfare?” Security Dialogue 43 (4): 363–380 and Mary Manjikian, “Becoming Unmanned: The gendering of lethal autonomous warfare technology,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 16 (1): 48–65. 40 Mary Manjikian, op. cit., pp. 52–53. 41 Mary Manjikian, op. cit., p. 53. 42 Chamayou, op. cit., p. 101. 43 Chamayou, op. cit., p. 102. 44 Lorraine Bayard de Volo, “Unmanned? Gender Recalibrations and the Rise of Drone Warfare,” Politics & Gender, 12 (2016), p. 52. “nowadays it ser ves to bestow upon this 45 Lorraine Bayard de Volo, op. cit., p. 52. 46 Lauren Wilcox, op. cit.; Lorraine Bayard de Volo, op. cit., pp. 67–69. 47 Chamayou, op. cit., p. 103. 135 G E N D E R E D P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S unilateral form of violence an ethico-heroic aura This aspect of the warrior ethos of hegemonic violence and physical domination over others basis of their sex then this constitutes a that could not other wise be procured.” masculinity—unemotional, detached, serious, portrayed as weaker. form of gender based violence (GBV). 54 Hierarchy is fundamental to militar y training. Beyond the immediate moral and legal problems “cowardice” of hiding behind a machine to kill, Teaching human beings to kill other human of such an approach, the use of sex as a signifier directed and guided by the norms of masculinity armed drones can also “project a predator y beings “requires dehumanizing others by of identity in targeting or analysing strikes that are already embedded in the culture. masculinity, a powerful and abusive machine that promoting the belief that another human is contributes problematically to reinforcing gender Lindsay Murch’s analysis of drone pilot emasculates targeted men.”50 To some extent, somehow a ‘lesser’ creature,” Cynthia Enloe essentialisms, in particular notions of women as inter views found that showing emotion in the this goes against the masculine “protector” role explains. “One of the central forms of passive and weak. The construction of a “weaker face of these “psychic wounds” was, not the US militar y in particular has projected dehumanization promoted by militar y training and sex” in “need” of protection is not just about surprisingly, coded as feminine and associated throughout histor y. However, in the case of the culture of daily life in the militar y has been women being physically weaker but also socially with instability. “No one talked about it. No one armed drones, the association of the technology the supposed inferiority of women—that women weaker—it suggests that it is worse if women talked about how they felt after anything. It was with predators and grim reapers may be what is are less than men.” are killed than men. This in turn produces a like an unspoken agreement that you wouldn’t necessar y to maintain the violent, militarised talk about your experiences,” said one pilot. masculinities that are relied upon to conduct war. Another inter viewee denied any emotional It also, as Bayard de Volo points out, “invites response but referred to “seriousness” in and legitimates a masculine response.”51 undertaking any lethal action. “The tone of the Affected populations, viewing the perpetrators of inter viewee is staunchly masculine,” writes drone strikes as a predator y male, are Murch, “relying heavily on the rational (there are incentivized to adopt the masculine protector no emotional calls for revenge against targets or role in their communities, to fight back against tenderness in reflecting on the target’s children), the aggressor. 48 rational—is protected. Furthermore, at the same But while this emerging form of “braver y” reinforces traditional masculinities, it is also time that operators seem to struggle with the 48 Chamayou, op. cit., pp. 104–105. 49 Murch, “Sex and gender in drone pilot interviews,” op. cit. 136 This leads not only to violence against women in of men. 55 the militar y, as described above, but also to gender-based violence more broadly, targeting The idea that women are weaker and thus women but also men or others who do not deser ving of special protection in wartime due to properly exhibit hegemonic masculinity. Of “inherent vulnerabilities”56 is to an extent embedded within international humanitarian law armed drones, however, is that militarised (IHL). The Geneva Conventions evidence an masculinities also lead to acts of gender-based androcentric approach such that where they violence in which men are targeted in so-called address women specifically they tend to frame Subordination and expendability signature strikes just for being men. them as objects needing “protection,” rather The maintenance and perpetuation of militarised While drone strikes are not necessarily targeting note that in all circumstances “women shall be masculinities is key to the maintenance of individuals solely because they are men of a treated with all the regard due to their sex”58 militarism. “The ideology of hegemonic certain age, those executing the strikes appear and state that women should “be especially masculinity (and the various hierarchical to be using sex as a signifier of identity for the protected against any attack on their honour, in discriminations it permits) is presented as purpose of assessing whether or not a subject is particular against rape, enforced prostitution or underpinning the kinds of value systems, targeted, and/or whether a strike is allowed (i.e. divisions of labor, institutions, and subjectivities taking into account the sex of others in the that sustain war as a practice,” writes Kimberly vicinity of the strike), and/or to determine the Hutchings. 52 But part of what is necessar y to impact of a strike subsequently. The sex of the sustain war as a practice is the killing of human subject is not the motivation for the attack, but it 54 For more on the relationship between drones and genderbased violence, see Ray Acheson and Richard Moyes, Sex and drone strikes: gender and identity in targeting and casualty recording, Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and Article 36, October 2014. beings. Turning men into warfighters requires is being used as one proxy for another identity— 55 breaking down their sense of ethics and morals militant—which in turn provides the motivation. If and building up a violent masculinity that is people are targeted, or considered to be lacking in empathy and glorifies strength as militants when proximate to other targets, on the 56 R. Charli Carpenter, “Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups: Gender, Strategic Frames and the Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 2, June 2005, p. 308. (masculine both on the basis of being active and acting as a warrior/soldier in killing).”49 widespread acceptance of relative expendability interest to this study on the gendered impacts of referring to the rules of engagement and laws of armed conflict as a means of justifying killing 53 50 Lorraine Bayard de Volo, op. cit., p. 65. 51 Ibid. 52 Kimberly Hutchings, “Making Sense of Masculinities and War,” op. cit., p. 393. than as actors. 57 For example, the Conventions Acheson and Moyes, Sex and drone strikes, op. cit. 57 Women and explosive weapons, Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, February 2014. 53 Cynthia Enloe, “Beyond ‘Rambo’: Women and the Varieties of Militarized Masculinity,” Women and the Military System, edited by Eva Isaakson (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), pp. 71–93. 58 Article 12, C.I and C.II, Article 14, C.III; F. Krill, The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law (1985), International Review of the Red Cross, No. 249, http://www.icrc. org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jmfj.htm 137 G E N D E R E D P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S any form of indecent assault.” 59 Pregnant the vulnerability of men in the immediate term, longer recognizable as human remains?” 65 case of drone operators it is rendered manifest women also receive particular protection, exacerbating other “gender-based vulnerabilities While this may be true of any act of war, with and permanent as a result of the superimposition wherein “maternity cases and pregnant women, that adult civilian males face, including risks of any weapon or technology, the unique ways in of two worlds separated at ever y count. The who refrain from any act of hostility, shall enjoy forced recruitment, arbitrar y detention, and which signals intelligence is used to disembody drone operators are in a sense both in the rear the same general protection as that accorded to summar y execution.” the target before that person is physically and at the front, caught up in two ver y different the sick and wounded.” of violent masculinities—men are treated as disembodied by the strike is significant. It points moral worlds that pull their lives this way and Michelle Jar vis note in their publication Women, expendable by an opposing force and by their to an increasing remoteness and abstraction of that. They epitomize the contradiction of Armed Conflict and International Law that nearly own societies, which can lead to increased violence, an execution of human beings by societies at war outside by living inside as half of the 42 specific provisions relating to militarisation of men in affected populations on machines that, as autonomy and the use of though they are at peace. Only they are in both women in the Geneva Convention and the the understanding that they need to “protect” algorithms are increased in the development and worlds, exactly at the hinge of the contradiction, Additional Protocols deal with women only as their communities by engaging in violence. operation of weapons, is likely to lead to pulled asunder between the two poles. They live increasing civilian casualties and also to the out the duplicity of the moral regime of so-called The phenomenon also reproduces the power further erosion of the sense of value of human democratic states that are also imperial militar y The framing of women in IHL as vulnerable and in asymmetries and gendered hierarchies that life when it pertains to “the other”. powers. 67 need of protection reproduces the idea that underpin many acts of gender-based violence against women and others. More broadly, it The “erasure of human suffering in war,” as This contradiction described by Chamayou in men are not. It runs the risk of turning “women reinforces established gender hierarchies that Gregor y puts it, which is an element throughout relation to drone operators is significant—but and children” into a proxy for “civilian” and are recognised to work against the histor y in official accounts of conflict, is arguably when gender is taken into account, it is only one establishment and sustainment of a more enhanced with the violence perpetrated with of the contradictions armed drones create. The equitable society. Framing women as weak armed drones. Drawing on the work of Cavarero, contradiction between drone operators as where women constitute a high ratio of and in need of protection continues to enable he suggests that the destruction of the body combatants, sex is used “as a shortcut to their exclusion from authoritative social and caused by armed drones “is morally significant also a contradiction between drones as tools distinction” between civilians and combatants. 63 political roles. because it targets the ver y individuality of the that “emasculate” their users whilst reinforcing 60 Judith Gardam and 64 It also reinforces notions expectant or nursing mothers. 61 “women and children” are “innocent” while adult “obfuscating the existence of men in the civilian population,” notes Charli Carpenter. 62 Even “warriors” and as “cowards” is another; there is human being, reducing them— quite literally—to the militarised masculinity of their victims, or as Furthermore, marking certain populations as mounds of flesh and bone.” Of course, other tools that project a “predator y” masculinity threats simply because they are men of a certain airstrikes or missile strikes can cause the same whilst triggering a local “protectorate” Thus the establishment and reinforcement of age in a certain location or exhibiting behaviour devastation. But when coupled with the masculinity. Either way, armed drones victimise violent masculinities is really in no one’s interest. deemed by algorithms to be suspicious has remoteness of the operator, the “cowardly” and make vulnerable men and hegemonic Associating maleness with violence increases implications for the normalisation and abstraction method of warfare described above, a moral or masculinities. All of this has practical of violence. As Thomas Gregor y explores, it ethical perspective on armed drones may implications for war and peace, for violence and ignores the people that are affected—their suggest a particularly repugnant character of security, and for gender equality. The culture of bodies and their embodied experiences. He asks, this violence. armed drones, embedded within the technology This ser ves to reinforce men’s expendability and makes them more vulnerable to attack. 59 Art. 27; C. IV; Art. 75 and 76, P.I.; F. Krill, Ibid. Describing rape and enforced prostitution as attacks on women’s honour, rather than on their physical integrity or freedom or agency, is extremely problematic. The perception of women’s sexuality as a symbol of honour belongs to patriarchal cultures and is the very reason why rape and enforced prostitution are so common during armed conflict. 60 66 “What happens to the bodies of those who are targeted by drones? What do their experiences Conclusion tell us about the limitations of language for thinking about the pain and suffering caused in Men at war need to forge for themselves a 61 H. Durham & K. O’Byrne, “The dialogue of difference: gender perspective on international humanitarian law,” International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 92 Number 877, March 2010. war? What does it mean when violence special moral world in which, unlike in the civilian overshoots the more elementar y goal of taking a world, killing is a virtue, not something 62 R. Charli Carpenter, 2005, op. cit., pp. 303–304. Carpenter cites examples from literature and photographs of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and humanitarian aid organisations to demonstrate the ubiquitous nature of gendered references to civilians. life, dedicating itself to destroying the body as prohibited. There is always a latent contradiction body, so that the remains of the victims are no between these normative regimes, but in the Art. 8; AP. I ; F. Krill, Ibid. 63 R. Charli Carpenter, “Recognizing Gender-Based Violence Against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations,” Security Dialogue vol. 37, no. 1, March 2006, pp. 89–90. 138 and its use, and within the broader norms of militarism and militar y practice, creates new challenges for preventing violence, protecting civilians, and breaking down gender essentialisms or discrimination. 65 Thomas Gregory, “Drones, Targeted Killings, and the Limitations of International Law,” International Political Sociology 2015, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 207. 64 R. Charli Carpenter, 2005, op. cit., p. 296. 66 Ibid., p. 208. 67 Chamayou, op. cit., p. 121. 139 G E N D E R E D P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S These problems are not insignificant or It could also include an understanding that the inconsequential. The gendered tensions, predator y, aggressive nature of armed drones contradictions, and oppressions that manifest operated without consent and resulting in civilian through the use of armed drones need to be part casualties, psychological harm, and destruction of the core understandings and considerations in of civilian infrastructure will result in a militarised determining policies and practices for arms masculine response from affected communities. control and disarmament in relation to these Such an understanding should have significant weapons. Understanding how drones are implications for curtailing at least some policies perceived in a gendered way by their operators around the use of armed drones that exacerbate and their victims is crucial to developing policies 9. Moral and Ethical Perspectives Peter Asaro Dr. Peter Asaro is a philosopher of science, technology and media. His work examines artificial intelligence and robotics as a form of digital media, In general, morality does not have much to say about new technologies, unless their use impinges upon principles that have a long held importance. This appears to be the case with this response, such as using armed drones and the ways in which technology mediates social relations and shapes our experience of the world. drones. Armed drones share similarities to that can help break the cycle of violence. outside of armed conflict or not sufficiently His current research focuses on the social, cultural, protecting against civilian causalities or of the political, legal and ethical dimensions of militar y guided missiles and torpedoes, which have been For example, acknowledging that current policies—which enable the use of armed drones open-ended overhead sur veillance. Similarly, without consent in host countries or in ways that understanding how “signature” strikes can be studies. He has written widely-cited papers on lethal World War II. However, the use of armed drones undermine the dignity and value of human lives— acts of gender-based violence, and the robotics from the perspective of just war theor y and in recent armed conflicts, particularly in the have gendered motivations as well as impacts on reverberating effects this has on gender equality human rights. Middle East and Central Asia, have cast these gender equality and on peace and security in other areas, could help change policies around technologies in a new light. In part this is tied to suggests that a more holistic approach to the targeted killings with the use of armed drones or the complex moral facets of the armed conflicts legal, political, operational, and moral questions other weapon systems. in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, around drones is necessar y. This could include robotics and UAV drones, from a perspective that combines media theor y with science and technology used in warfare for more than a centur y. Armed remote control planes have been in use since Somalia, and Yemen. It is also tied to the investigations into the psychological harm These are some of policy implications that could of operators that contains an assessment of come from a systematic gender assessment of whether these harms are produced by the armed drones; there are more possibilities. Such conflict between the “emasculation” caused work is important from a legal, political, and In the context of this recent histor y, much of the by “cowardice” or the inflation of a “predator y operational standpoint, for those that want to focus on the use of drones stems from the masculinity”—which may have serious continue to use armed drones to achieve militar y policies and tactics developed by both Israel and implications, among other things, for objectives. It is also important for those that the United States for “targeted killing”. Targeted interpersonal relations when the operator want to end the use of armed drones or that killing involves seeking out specific individuals leaves the base. want to address the problems of militarism and for their role in militar y or terrorist operations violent masculinities more broadly. and launching a “precision” militar y attack on changing nature of warfare, particularly in occupied territories and against non-state actors. that person, often (but not always) from a drone.1 Targeted killing raises numerous issues on its own, and while drones enable this strategy, the final attack could also come from a traditional plane or other source. Still, the novelty of this practice, its technological complexity, and the powerful cultural image of the drone itself, has led to a great deal of public attention and concern other the use of drones in recent years. But targeted killing is not identical 1 Gregoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone (New York: The New Press, 2015). 140 141 M O R A L A N D E T H I C A L P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S to drones, nor is it only the application of them The morality of warfare is challenging to most deemed acceptable in warfare for militar y attack, and whether it is justified given the that raises moral concerns. moral theories. According to most moral professionals. The modern restatement of just purpose of the attack, and whether it presents a theories, the use of violent and lethal force is war theor y was written by Michael Walzer in disproportionate risk of harm to non-combatants. This chapter will consider the main moral permissible (if at all) only under certain 1977, 2 and while the finer points of the theor y responses to armed drones, particularly from exceptional circumstances, such as in self- are still debated by philosophers, the general In general, just war theor y does not really scholarly publications. While the article cannot defence, the defence of another person, or, principles are well established. consider the morality of any particular weapon. speak for all ethicists, it provides some of the more debatably, in order to achieve a higher prominent moral and ethical concerns that have moral good or humanitarian benefit. Most moral Just war theor y divides war into three temporal weapon (is the target of an attack justified?), and been raised. Given the magnitude and scope of theor y considers the moral judgement and stages named in Latin terms, and considers each the expected effects of the use of the weapon concerns over drones, and the sheer amount actions of individuals, while warfare is often morally independent (though this is also (does it pose disproportionate risks to non- written about them, no comprehensive review is viewed as a collective action, or individual debated). 3 Jus ad bellum concerns whether it is combatants?). The use of certain weapons has feasible. Instead, this assessment focuses on actions towards the common defence of a just or moral to go to war, jus in bello concerns been deemed immoral, and in some cases also the main themes, perspectives, and arguments society. Most moral traditions have their roots in the morality of how war is fought, while jus post illegal, because their use necessarily fails to presented to date. The research has been religion and theology while modern moral bellum concerns the morality of how a war is conform to the principles of distinction and confined to materials written in English. theories generally seek to reach the same moral ended (including terms of surrender, armistice, proportionality. Thus, because landmines and conclusions on purely rational arguments that do reparations, and reconciliation). Most of the just cluster munitions have uncontrolled and deadly not depend on religious belief or faith. In war theor y literature focuses on jus in bello, but effects on civilians during and long after European philosophy there is a long tradition of there are important debates on when conflicts, they have been deemed indiscriminate considering the morality of warfare initiated by humanitarian concerns, rather than strict self- by nature. Similarly, the effects of fragmentar y St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, which is defence, justify militar y inter vention, as well as a and incendiar y bullets, and permanently based in Christian theological justification of growing literature on just resolutions of violent blinding lasers are disproportionate to their warfare and called just war theor y. (See Chapter conflicts and ensuring long-term peace. The militar y advantages (in legal terms they 10 for further investigation of religious moral consideration of jus in bello relies on two cause “unnecessar y suffering and superfluous perspectives on drones.) Asian philosophers fundamental moral principles: the principle of injur y to combatants”), while chemical, have also considered the morality of warfare distinction and the principle of proportionality. biological, and nuclear weapons are both (such as in the Mahabharata), but primarily in The principle of distinction holds that enemy indiscriminate and disproportionate. All of these terms of warrior duty (such as in the Bhagavad combatants are morally liable to be killed, while weapons have been prohibited through Gita) or leadership (such as in the writings of civilians and non-combatants are not liable to be international agreements. Confucius) and strategy (such as in The Methods intentionally killed, and there is a moral duty to of the Sima and Sun Tzu’s Art of War). make this distinction and to avoid harming non- The morality of warfare and weapons The use of any weapon, or the use of any object as a weapon, raises moral considerations. In general, morality prohibits causing harm to others, and even threatening such harm. When discussing morality, it is necessar y to reflect upon the question of what moral theor y and whose morality should be considered. While philosophers usually restrict their considerations to a preferred moral theor y, there are serious disputes about which theor y should be preferred. We will not attempt to resolve such issues here, but rather will address the main moral theories that have the greatest influence in shaping law and policy. In addition to moral philosophy, we will also consider moral psychology. Morality shapes human judgment and behaviour in powerful ways that are only approximated by formal moral theories. Yet, we can study such moral behaviour and its psychological consequences empirically. The impact of psychological states such as sympathy, empathy, and guilt can thus be considered through this lens, without assuming the primacy of any particular moral theor y. 142 Morality concerns the decision to use the combatants. It is morally permissible in some It is important to note the different notions of “weapon” in discussions about drones. They have This chapter will focus on the Western moral cases to kill civilians and non-combatants, but been developed and used in recent years, tradition of just war theor y, and how it views only unintentionally or as an undesired (even if particularly by the Israeli and US militaries, as drones and remote operated weapons. Much of foreseeable) consequence of attacking a remotely operated weapons platforms. That is to the international humanitarian law (IHL) legitimate militar y target. This is the long say, militaries view the “weapon” as a system framework that came into effect after the debated Doctrine of Double-Effect (wherein the that can include not just the final projectile, Second World War—including the United intended effect is on enemy combatants, and the munition, or energy release, but also the Nations, the Geneva Conventions, and the legal undesired effect is on civilians). The principle of launching system, the transport and deliver y precedents of the Nuremberg tribunals—have proportionality considers the magnitude of an platform, and even the maintenance, logistical, and intelligence support networks necessar y to their conceptual roots in just war theor y. This is the underlying moral basis of the legal framework that governs international armed conflict and that informs the training of what is 2 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 3 Jeff McMahan, “The Sources and Status of Just War Principles,” Journal of Military Ethics 6(2), 2007, pp. 91–106. execute an attack with the system. Accordingly, it is best to consider all weapons as “weapons systems,” and to also consider the human 143 M O R A L A N D E T H I C A L P E R S P EC T I V E S operators, their training, their situational awareness, and the larger command and control structure around them as significant elements of the weapons system. Thus, a weapons system might be as simple as soldier and gun, within a traditional militar y command and control hierarchy. Or a weapons system might be far more complex, such as a remotely operated drone firing a steerable missile, launched from a remote logistical support base, monitored and controlled from thousands of miles away by a small team of operators, through a network of satellite, ground and radio communications networks, supported by remote intelligence analysts and databases, operating within command structures that may switch between major militar y commands, joint force structures, covert and traditional militar y operations, or even between command hierarchies of coalition and treaty partner nations. The armed drones of most moral concern have been those operating towards the more complex end of this spectrum. As we will see below, the T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Drones and just war theory When we look at drones through the lens of just war theor y, we can consider a variety of moral questions. In terms of jus ad bellum, the justification of going to war, the use of drones raises the question of whether they lower the thresholds of going to war. 4 That is, if we accept the view that remotely operated weapons greatly reduce the physical risks to the combatants who operate them, then this should reduce the political risks for leaders to start a war. If true, this is what philosophers and economists call a “moral hazard”–a situation in which one can systematically avoid negative consequences for one’s actions, thus eliminating the normal disincentives for taking those actions. The argument is that drones provide a “risk free” form of warfare, or militar y inter vention, and as such make warfare more likely. Assuming that making warfare more likely is bad, then one could argue that drones have a negative effect on the moral reasoning and actions of political leaders by making it easier for them to go to war. complexity of the weapon system itself, and it’s likely that other types of forces and weapons will weapons, rather than the much riskier use of become involved in the conflict, thus putting ground forces, may be such a case. Of course, combatants at risk. drones are not unique in offering reduced risks. Many weapons that give a decisive militar y The second empirical claim is that lowering the advantage could be argued to reduce such risks, risk to combatants makes war more likely, or along with militar y superiority in general. might make it easier for political leaders to Moreover, just war theor y does not require choose militar y action over other diplomatic combatants to put themselves at risk in order to options. This claim appears to have significant be morally justified in killing enemy combatants, evidential support from the United States’ use of nor is there any requirement to avoid radical drones for targeted killings, particularly in asymmetries in militar y strength. So while it may Pakistan and Yemen. Because Pakistan and be true that armed drones and other remote- Yemen are allies of the United States, and do not operated weapons make it easier for politicians wish to have a large US militar y presence in their to go to war, it still matters whether or not those territor y, it is politically difficult to launch a full- wars are moral. scale militar y operation in these areas. While suspected enemies could be attacked with traditional aircraft or special forces operations, Jus in bello and the moral predators debate those carr y significant risks of pilots or commandos being killed or captured. In this case, Once at war, there are various questions to ask drones provide a means for militar y attacks with regarding the jus in bello morality of the use of reduced risks, and so we have seen their drones and remotely operated weapons. One increased use in this manner. Such way of approaching the question of the morality considerations may or may not weigh on the of a particular weapon or means and method of politicians who actually make the decisions to warfare is to consider whether its use is in use militar y force. principle better or worse than other weapons, or distributed, compartmentalised, and mediated There are several problems with this line of structure, lends itself to a set of moral concerns argument, however. First, this argument depends that cannot be easily reduced to a single element on two significant empirical claims, which may or The other assumption behind the argument that an assumption that an attack is morally of the larger whole. may not be true. The first empirical claim is that drones make armed conflict more likely is that justifiable, and that the target of the attack is drones reduce the physical risks to combatants such conflicts are morally wrong, or that the use morally and legally justified, we can greatly Given this over view of the morality of weapons in warfare. While this seems easy to argue for of armed force should be an option of last resort. constrain the number of moral factors involved in and warfare, and just war theor y, we turn to the the remote operators of drones, it is not But according to jus ad bellum there are morally choosing one weapon over another with which to question of whether the use of drones as a necessarily true. Remote operators could still be justifiable reasons to become involved in armed attack the target. weapon, or as a weapons platform, raises any attacked at their remote locations, by traditional conflict, namely self-defence, defence of an ally, unique moral questions, or challenges our militar y means or by guerilla or terrorist tactics. or to inter vene to avert a humanitarian crisis, Assuming that the war is justified, and the attack standard understanding of the justified use Moreover, once a war is started, it may escalate genocide, or crimes against humanity. If a is made by one combatant against a legitimate of weapons. That is, what special moral or expand, and it may not be easily contained to government is deciding whether to inter vene to enemy combatant, the main moral criteria to considerations are raised by the use of a single means of warfare, or a constrained aid an ally who is under attack, or to inter vene targeting and attack are discrimination, armed drones? geographic area. As such, it quickly becomes for humanitarian reasons, then the reduced risks proportionality, and militar y necessity. of that inter vention would be good. Arguably, the Discrimination concerns whether the attack will ability of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation discriminate between combatants and non- (NATO) forces to inter vene on behalf of Libyan combatants. Proportionality concerns whether rebels using remote operated and long range the nature and magnitude of the attack is 4 Peter Asaro, “How Just Could a Robot War Be?” in Adam Briggle, Katinka Waelbers and Philip A. E. Brey (eds.), Current Issues in Computing And Philosophy (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press, 2008), pp. 50–64. 144 means and methods of warfare. If we start from 145 M O R A L A N D E T H I C A L P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S justified, as well as the magnitude of risk posed Remotely operated drones are not themselves It would seem at first look that any weapon Within US use of drones for targeted killing, to non-combatants and civilian infrastructures is forbidden under any such moral or legal rules— system that improved decision making and there are two types of targeting: personality warranted. Militar y necessity concerns the they are not intrinsically or by their nature precision in attack would be morally preferable, strikes against a known person and signature strategic value of a target, the risks of failing to indiscriminate or disproportionate, while like in general. Presumably fostering better informed strikes targeting people or groups based on attack it, and figures into the proportionality many weapons they could be used and considered decisions leads to better behaviour obser ved through the sensors of the calculation that weighs the value of eliminating a indiscriminately or disproportionately. Insofar as decisions. Allowing more time for determining drone as hostile or suspicious. Determining target against the risks to non-combatants. they deploy weapons or munitions that are when to strike a target also presumably allows which behaviours seen on aerial video constitute considered morally and legally legitimate in other for choosing times that reduce the risks of hostile activities can be challenging, particularly When militar y commanders and their contexts, there is no prima facie reason to think civilian impacts. Using smaller munitions with in cases where the targets are not actively subordinates are selecting militar y objectives that this might be problematic. more accurate targeting ought to reduce civilian engaged in fighting or clearly conducting militar y impacts compared to larger munitions with less operations. Similarly, there are various cases control. where farmers working their land, or fixing a 5 and strategies, the choice of a particular weapon features as only one element of the overall Insofar as drones and remote operated weapons determination. While certain weapons may be enhance the discrimination and proportionality of unilaterally forbidden on legal or moral grounds, attacks compared to other weapons platforms, it As with other empirical claims, whether the use as combatants planting a roadside bomb. such as chemical or biological weapons, there is could even be argued that they are morally of drones actually provides more time for The “soda straw effect” of looking at a zoomed great discretion in the selection of the best superior or desirable weapons. Indeed, it has deliberation processes in practice depends on in image can cause operators to misunderstand tactics and weapons to achieve an effect or been argued that remotely operated drones how they are actually used—it is not a necessar y a larger overall scene. This phenomenon has objective. Within the militar y, there will be permit both the use of smaller and more feature of their use. Insofar as they are actually been blamed to some mistaken “friendly-fire” strategic decisions as to which weapons precisely-guided munitions (thus reducing used in a manner that provides this additional incidents with drones. platforms and assets are available and capable of unintended civilian harms and collateral damage) time for deliberation, there are further empirical achieving the desired results—such as whether and permit more information gathering and questions of whether that time is actually used Related to the limits of drone sur veillance for to launch a long-range guided missile, or use a longer deliberation on whether to attack a given and used effectively, and if it actually results in making moral decisions, it has been argued that target. Strawser argues that these two factors improved targeting decisions that reduce the the extreme remoteness of drone operators, and munition. At a tactical level there is makes the use of drones morally superior to impacts of attacks on civilians overall. It has the consequent moral and emotional distance weaponeering—the job of selecting an other weapon systems, and even argues that if been argued that the use of precision guided- from their targets poses its own kind of moral appropriate weapon or munition to achieve the so we may have a moral obligation to use such munitions has actually resulted in longer problem. It is to this we now turn. desired effect—determining the size of the bomb weapons. 6 targeting lists because they greatly reduce the “manned” or “unmanned” platform to deliver a ditch, have appeared to drone operators to drop from an aircraft to destroy a target, or cost of bombing any given target. So while the how to steer a missile to direct its blast effects risks to civilians from any particular attack might away from vulnerable civilians. There are explicit be reduced, the total number of attacks might and implicit moral elements to all of these increase enough to result in a greater overall risk strategic and tactical decisions insofar as they all to civilians. involve questions of discrimination, There are also significant concerns over whether proportionality, and militar y necessity. the kind of aerial sur veillance offered by drones is appropriate or sufficient to accurately identify legitimate targets. Traditionally, the selection of 5 Indeed, the U.S. military determined that no additional Article 36 review of armed Predator drones was necessary as the both the unarmed versions of the Predator and the Hellfire missiles with which it was being armed had already been reviewed and approved. See Noel Sharkey, “Killing Made Easy: From Joysticks to Politics,” In Sibylle Scheipers and Hew Strachan (eds.), The Changing Character of War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 6 B. J. Stawser, “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles,” Journal of Military Ethics 9 (4), 2010. 146 bombing targets rests on a variety of intelligence sources. Because drones are essentially sur veillance platforms carr ying weapons, there may be a tendency to rely solely upon the drone’s sensors to determine targets, which may result in distortion or bias in targeting. 147 M O R A L A N D E T H I C A L P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Drones and moral psychology Militar y psychologist Lt. Col. Dave Grossman Some have argued that drone operators might In addition to PTSD, there is growing interest in spent many years studying new recruits in basic become “playstation warriors”. This implies on the related, though distinct, phenomena of moral Beyond the morality of using a drone, one can training and their willingness to kill the enemy in the one hand that drone operators are not true injur y. While the psychological diagnosis of ask how the use of drones and remotely combat. Grossman published an often warriors, located so far away from the battlefield PTSD is generally framed in terms of the direct operated weapons impacts the psychology of reproduced graph of the willingness of and not taking the risks of those on the ground. experience of a significant bodily trauma, moral drone operators, and what moral consequences combatants to kill based on physical distance. And on the other hand this implies that drone injur y focuses on the psychological impacts on this might have. The literature on drones has According to this graph, it is psychologically operators engage in warfare through a soldiers who violate their own morality.10 focused on two key issues of the psychological easier to kill from great distances, such as with videogame-like interface, and as such treat their While a soldier might experience PTSD after impacts on a drone operator. One issue is long-range missiles or artiller y, somewhat more work as they would a videogame—trivializing the seeing their best friend killed beside them, whether the physical distance of drone operators difficult with mid-range weapons such as guns, killing and destruction they might do as if it were another soldier might experience a moral injur y from their targets implies a moral and and hardest to kill in close range with knives or merely a game. Studies of the effects of from mistakenly killing a civilian. The realization psychological distance. Closely related to this is in hand-to-hand combat. The empirical data to engaging in videogame violence on real world of one’s own morally wrongful actions can carr y whether the videogame-like nature of drone back up this graph is lacking, but it carries a aggression and violence have shown only weak a heavy psychological weight beyond simple operations leads operators to treat drone powerful intuitive force as it seems to most effects on behaviour. Moreover, most people guilt, and can undermine one’s sense of identity, operations like a game, or whether the mediation people to be much easier to “pull the trigger” of are quite capable of distinguishing reality from a of self-worth, and disrupt personal and of obser ving people through the cameras of a a weapon if one cannot directly see the potential game, and disciplined professional drone professional relationships. While psychologists drone tends to dehumanise the people obser ved. victims of one’s attack. operators do not take their combat duties lightly. debate the appropriate diagnostic criteria for 7 8 both PTSD and moral injur y, it is clear that drone The other issue concerns the psychological health of drone operators themselves, and According to moral psychology, our reluctance Recent studies of drone operators have found operators along with other combatants, whether they can experience combat trauma to cause pain and suffering to others is related evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder experience psychological effects from the remotely, and whether they are susceptible to to our ability to sympathise and empathise (PTSD). While at slightly lower levels than most morality of their choices and actions—effects post-traumatic stress and moral injuries. with others. To the extent that we distance combat militar y personnel, they are somewhat that can remain for a lifetime and sometimes ourselves physically and emotionally from higher that non-combat militar y personnel. This require professional treatment. people, the easier it is for us to take actions that suggests that drone operators do experience harm them. As drones allow a vast physical combat trauma despite their physical distance distance between operators and victims, it from the battlefield, and despite not being has been argued that there must be a similar subject to personal bodily risk themselves. This moral distance. also suggests that the technological mediation of 9 drones is sufficient to communicate the trauma of combat. 8 Craig A. Anderson, “Violent Video Games: Myths, Facts, and Unanswered Questions,” American Psychological Association Science Briefs, 2003. 7 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1995). 148 9 Wayne Chapelle et al., “Symptoms of Psychological Distress and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in United States Air Force ‘Drone’ Operators,” Military Medicine 179, 63 (8), pp. 63-70; Wayne Chapelle et al, “An Analysis of Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms in United States Air Force Drone Operators,” Journal of Anxiety Disorders 28, 2014, pp. 480-487. 10 Maguen, Shira, and Brett Litz,“Moral Injury in Veterans of War,” PTSD Research Quarterly, Vol 23 (1), 2012, pp. 1-6; The Moral Injury Project. (n.d.) “What Is Moral Injury,” http:// moralinjuryproject.syr.edu/about-moral-injury/. 149 T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S 10. Religious Perspectives No drones protest at General Atomic CEO Neal Blue’s house in San Diego, organized by Code Pink. Emily Welty Religious actors, both as individuals and in an Dr. Emily Welty is the Director of Peace and Justice Studies in the Dyson College of Arts and Sciences at Pace University in New York City. She organisational capacity, have been important voices in the emerging critique of drone warfare. teaches classes about nonviolent social movements, These voices are not always respected in policy humanitarian aid, reconciliation, transitional justice, debates, especially in those spheres dominated and peacebuilding and the arts. She currently ser ves by militar y and political elites. In broadening the as the Main Representative of the International Peace Research Association to the United Nations and as the Vice Moderator of the World Council of Churches Commission on International Affairs. discourse on armed drones, the moral and ethical questions of religious communities has the potential to enrich an often narrow discussion which tends to focus on the strategic value of remote warfare. Religious traditions have a long histor y of advocating for the dignity of the human being and valuing the precious worth of each individual life even in the face of utilitarian arguments. This chapter examines the responses of religious communities to the increasing use of armed drones in conflict and analyses the objections that have been raised in Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Ongoing discernment about the morality of armed drones have taken place in interfaith as well as ecumenical settings and have been the subject of position papers and policy recommendations at the national/ denominational level. © 2013 Steve Rhodes, Methodology one of their demographic markers.1 This chapter therefore has used statements by religious This chapter contains an over view of the groups as its primar y analytical focus. This particular objections of religious individuals, research has been confined to materials written bodies, and organisations to the use of drones in in English, which means that most of the armed conflict. Not all individuals within any one organisational responses come from religious of these faith traditions would claim to share constituencies responding to drone use by the these objections to armed drones and many United States and the United Kingdom. individuals or organisations may even support their use. However, I was unable to find any religious organisation that had issued a statement supporting the use of armed drones, so this review necessarily contrasts the more subtle differences within the objections to drone warfare. The Pew Research Center, which has conducted “Just war” or “just peace” frameworks Traditionally, religious responses to the ethics of war and limiting the use of violence have been framed by the just war tradition, a theoretical framework that suggests that killing in the context of war may be ethically permissible if some of the most comprehensive polling about US demographics and opinions about drone strikes, has not used religion or religiosity as 150 1 “Public Continues to Back US Drone Attacks” Pew Research Center, February 2015, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/5/2015/05/5-28-15-Foreign-Policy-release. pdf 151 R E L I G I O U S P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S certain conditions have been met, including The “just peace” paradigm moves from focusing Applying the just peace framework to the issue The statement calls on all governments to be legitimacy of the target, proportionality of the on exclusive concepts of national security to an of armed drones means understanding that transparent about their participation in the response, legitimacy of the body using force, understanding of shared human security, which drones not only fail to resolve root causes of development, acquisition, and use of armed morality of the objective, and limitations on the includes economic security, ecological security, conflict but also destroy the planet, erode trust drones, while highlighting the particular harm to innocent life. This tradition is rooted in social justice, and human rights. As between communities, and create both responsibility that the US government should the early religious writings of Saint Augustine conceptualised by the Ecumenical Call to Just irreparable physical and moral harm in have to the innocent civilian victims of armed and Thomas Aquinas and in the more recent Peace: individuals. This framework insists that only drone strikes in Pakistan. approaches that further the requirements of reflections of theologians like Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr. For many years, this Just Peace might be comprehended as a represented the official position of the Catholic collective and dynamic yet grounded process of Church. When sur veying the plethora of freeing human beings from fear and want, of responses on armed drone warfare, this is one overcoming enmity, discrimination and of the predominant frameworks employed. In this oppression, and of establishing conditions for context, drone warfare as currently carried out is just relationships that privilege the experience The World Council of Churches (WCC) issued an religious impetus that forms the basis of their viewed as immoral because of the lack of of the most vulnerable and respect the integrity Executive Committee statement on armed work together is the idea that people of faith transparency in selecting targets and the number of creation. drones in 2014, denouncing drone strikes as should respond to the increasing use of drones of innocent people who have been executed by drone strikes. Drones do not represent a last resort and in the case of usage in Somalia and Yemen, for example, are being used in places where war has not been formally declared. Just war theor y might also suggest that the likelihood for success is low given that many people believe the use of armed drones is actually ser ving as a recruitment strategy for terrorism in communities that feel terrorised by drones. 2 Ecumenical and interfaith responses to armed drones Within the US context, there is an Interfaith Working Group on Drone Warfare, which meets regularly in Washington, DC and highlights the moral and religious concerns of people of faith about armed drones. The central moral and “counter-productive,” causing the “loss of in war. This framework is rooted in the Jewish concept innocent civilian lives” and having “human rights of shalom, a conception of peace that goes and humanitarian implications”. 4 The WCC In 2015, the Working Group hosted an Interfaith beyond the absence of war and defines peace as statement centered its critique of armed drones Conference on Drone Warfare at Princeton including a broad sense of welfare and well- around the fact that they deny human beings the Theological Seminar y, which was attended by being of individuals, communities, creation, and basic right to life. The statement notes, 150 faith leaders from a range of religious traditions. The outcome document of the G-d. Theologian Fernando Enns writes, The right to life is a moral principle based on conference calls on the United States to The simultaneous reality of being safe and the belief that a human being has the right to immediately halt all targeted drone strikes as experiencing an open space for self- live and, in particular, should not to be unjustly well as to acknowledge and take responsibility development within a community are the killed by another human being. It is also our for previous strikes and their impacts on civilian preconditions for building cultures of peace…. firm belief that the measures taken by any victims. The statement specifically calls for the Just peace cannot be established or State threatening the life and dignity of the repeal of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of experienced apart from people of other faiths. human person cannot be justified. In this Militar y Force and limitations on the authority of Today all theological reflection and concrete context, the use of extraterritorial force within the Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Special action takes place in the context of plural another State’s territory and sovereignty Operations Command, and all other government societies and increasing globalization of all cannot be justified when it threatens the life of contractors that might authorise the use of areas of life. innocent people. We believe the sanctity of life armed drones. The group authored a letter to and  the biblical message call us to protect the President Obama emphasising the opposition of right to life; deliver those who are drawn toward faith leaders and in early 2017, the group death, and hold back those stumbling to the published a joint letter to the Trump transition slaughter (Proverbs 24:11). team outlining the concerns and opposition 3 2 “An Ecumenical Call to Just Peace,” World Council of Churches, 2011. 3 Fernando Enns, “Towards an Ecumenical Theology of Just Peace,” in Just Peace: ecumenical, intercultural and interdisciplinary perspectives edited by Fernando Enns and Annette Mosher (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2013). 152 justice are capable of creating true peace. 5 of 21 different religious groups to the use of 4 “Statement on the use of drones and denial of the right to life,” World Council of Churches Executive Committee, 12 February 2014, https://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/ executive-committee/geneva-february-2014/statement-on-the-useof-drones-and-denial-of-the-right-to-life. 5 armed drones. Ibid. 153 R E L I G I O U S P E R S P EC T I V E S Materials produced by the group for study and T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S denounce all forms of violence—a position that reflection draw on the just peace tradition as their several of the signatories, particularly the primar y moral framework. While the groups historic peace church traditions would prefer. shares some of the same objections to drone Christian responses to drone warfare Also in 2014, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops presented a range of religious and moral reser vations about drone warfare to Drawing on the just war tradition, the Catholic national security advisors and members of usage as many human rights groups (e.g. One of the religious questions that drives the Church, while not calling of a cessation of their Congress about “imminence of the threat, extrajudicial killings authorised in non-transparent group’s common vision is whether acceptance of use, often raises questions about armed drone discrimination, proportionality and probability of processes, civilian deaths, covert operations), drones represents a problematic contortion of use. Archbishop Silvano Tomasi, the Holy See’s success.”9 they also have an objection not as frequently what it means to be human. The recognition that permanent representative to the United Nations voiced by other sectors, but which reflects their many of the same people who authorised the in Geneva, in testimony before the UN in 2014 The United Methodist Church adopted a shared moral values. They frame their concern in use of torture have also authorised the use of noted: resolution in 2012 calling for “an immediate end this way: drones represents a worr ying trend in the to drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan” erosion of respect for human dignity. In a Decisions over life and death are uniquely and “independent investigations into all such As faith leaders, we are deeply concerned that document outlining the group’s common vision, difficult decisions, a heavy responsibility for a bombings to account for civilian casualties.”10 by distancing people from kill decisions, drones they agree to be guided by the question, “what human being, and one fraught with challenges. lower the political and psychological costs of kind of people are we becoming as a Yet it is a decision for which a person, capable In 2014, the Advisor y Committee on Social killing…. As drone technology advances and society?”—a quer y that reflects their religious of moral reasoning, is uniquely suited. An Witness Policy of the Presbyterian Church, USA drones (and other pieces of military hardware) concerns. They note, automated system, pre-programmed to respond issued a report entitled Drones, War and to given data inputs, ultimately relies on its Surveillance, which assessed the ethnical become increasingly autonomous, humans, even at the operator level, may end up largely The question helps us to focus in on the kinds programming rather than on an innate capacity implications of militar y drones and reflected an removed from what becomes a mechanized of habits we are perpetuating and developing, to tell right from wrong. Thus any trend toward ongoing debate in the Presbyterian Church. The process of killing. We believe strongly that while as well as relates to the deeper issue of greater automation of warfare should be report identifies seven different key ethical drones lower the political and psychological spiritual formation. Examples given were moral treated with great caution…In this context of issues that should influence Christian reflection costs of killing, they do not lower the moral injury, lowering participatory process, dehumanised warfare with remotely-operated on armed drones: just cause, last resort, costs. We believe that those who order, increasing fear in communities, increasing the weapons and low risk on one side, a key ethical legitimate authority, intent and likelihood of authorize, or operate the remote killing of automatization (de-humanization) in engaging question thus is whether this lowers the success, conduct of war, protection of civilians, targeted people in a far off land ought to conflict, lowering empathy, lowering sense of threshold of conflict, making it seem more and moral harm to soldiers.11 These themes wrestle with the moral consequences of that dignity in the other, lowers key virtues, attractive to enter into war. Considering this largely echo traditional debate about just war decision every bit as much as a commander who increases vice of arrogance…. question with the near inevitability in modern criteria within Christian ethics. has just ordered his or her troops into battle. Killing should not be an abstraction to those who are ultimately responsible for it. 6 7 When one compares the interfaith and ecumenical statements to denominational warfare of massive civilian casualties should give pause. 8 statements, it becomes clear that stronger This objection reflects the human-centered approaches rooted in the just peace tradition are orientation of all religious traditions—the more likely to be adopted when religious groups insistence that human life is precious and that the come together to speak with one voice rather decision to end human life should only be than speaking individually. undertaken with gravity and deep deliberation. This statement is striking because it also represents common ground between radically different orientations to violence from different faith communities, as the statement does not 6 “Recommendations for the Next Administration,” Interfaith Working Group on Drone Warfare, January 2017, https://www. interfaithdronenetwork.org/action/public-policy.html. 154 7 Interfaith Working Group on Drone Warfare, “Leading with a JustPeace Approach” July 2015, Available: https://www. interfaithdronenetwork.org/images/docs/ DronesWorkingGroupJPAgreements4web.pdf 8 Statement by H.E. Archbishop Silvano M. Tomasi, Permanent Representative of the Holy See to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva at the Annual Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), 14 November 2013, http:// reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/ MSP-2013/Statements/14Nov_HolySee.pdf. 9 “Background on Armed Drones,” Office of International Justice and Peace- US Conference of Catholic Bishops, January 2014, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/ war-and-peace/upload/background-on-armed-drones-2014-01.pdf. 10 “Seeking Peace in Afghanistan.” Resolution 6128, UMC Book of Resolutions, 2012. 11 Drones, War and Surveillance, The Advisory Committee on Social Witness Policy, 2014, https://www.interfaithdronenetwork. org/images/docs/drones,_war_and_surveillance.pdf. 155 R E L I G I O U S P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S A resolution adopted by the Presbyterian When this resolution was discussed by Other organisations such as Pax Christi The 2013 Annual Conference of the Church of General Assembly in 2014 does not outright delegates later, it was usually described as International have taken a more clearly just the Brethren, one of the historic peace churches, condemn armed drones but rather urges further calling for more transparency regarding drone peace approach to armed drones. The issued a resolution against drone warfare. The study by the Church, further legislation use and criticising secrecy in the US militar y’s organisation’s statement on armed drones statement frames opposition to drones against governing the oversight of drones by Congress, use of armed drones, not calling for the outright highlights the ongoing terror that hovering the church’s larger opposition to all forms of further evaluation of international law limiting the ban on their use or denouncing the civilian drones have caused communities, resulting in lethal force and violence however, it specifically use of drones by the legal community, and deaths they cause. The official Presbyterian further judicial review of targeted killings of News Ser vice and Office of the General suspected terrorists. There is a call for the Assembly said that the Assembly “declared its outright prohibition of the use of fully opposition to targeted killings by drones unless school and tribal dispute-resolution efforts.”17 Drone warfare embodies the fundamental autonomous drones but not for armed drone use due process is followed” (emphasis added).15 Pax Christi’s opposition to armed drones is problems that covert warfare entails. The generally. The statement does not concentrate This reinforces the just war framework that based in its concern about the rule of law as well process for determining who is targeted by on the civilian casualties or psychological trauma suggests that it is not the drone usage per se as its fundamental faith commitments to drones, and why, is decided by a small group of caused by drone strikes except to say that the that presents a moral/religious problem for the preser ving human life. The statement highlights government officials who are not accountable Church “opposes in principle the targeted killing Church, but rather the procedure by which they the way that remote killings “lower the threshold to Congress or the American people for their or assassination of suspects these weapons are being deployed. for resorting to violent force to resolve complex actions… Concealment of covert activities conflicts” and emphasises that “killing by remote generates confusion, results in the deaths of However, the statement also identifies the ways control is deeply offensive to Pax Christi’s belief countless targeted people and bystanders, and that drone operators suffer from post-traumatic in active nonviolence that is committed to taking undermines international law and The General Assembly’s 2014 Peace Breakfast stress disorder (PTSD) and indicates that this on violence rather than inflicting it on others.” cooperation.19 featured a speech by Medea Benjamin, who had represents a form of “moral harm” that stems Pax Christi International also expresses addressed the topic of armed drones as part of from their awareness that “they have done concerns about “the invasion of privacy using a “militar y-industrial-congressional-security something immoral and violated something drone technology for human sur veillance, complex”.13 During the debate on the resolution, sacred,” which results in a “sense of moral including civilian purposes such as law one person paraphrased Luke 9, asking, “Do you discontinuity”.16 This objection is rooted in a just enforcement or border control”.18 want us to send killer drones from heaven to peace rather than the just war framework that immediately cease all use of armed drones both destroy them?” However, another delegate and seems most regularly employed by the domestically and abroad as well as commit to former Air Force member dismissed the Presbyterian Church, USA. greater transparency and accountability about facilitate and grieves the deaths these weapons facilitate.”12 “tremendous anxiety and psychological trauma among civilian communities” as well as identifies the evil of “covert warfare” as particularly problematic in this case: “disrupted essential community activities such as In addition to calling for more careful study of the issue and continual prayers for peace, the Brethren statement asks that members call upon both the US President and Congress to statement as “naïve” and obser ved, “for the secret kill lists and the decision-making church to say ‘no’ to drones shows that civilians processes around drone deployment. don’t understand how the militar y works.”14 12 Pat Cole, “Assembly asks government to follow due process when drones are used,” Presbyterian Church USA, 21 June 2014, http://www.pcusa.org/news/2014/6/21/assembly-asksgovernment-follow-due-process-when-d. 13 “Excerpt from Medea Benjamin’s Speech at the 2014 Peace Breakfast,” Presbyterian Peace Fellowship, 15 September 2014, http://presbypeacefellowship.org/content/excerpt-medeabenjamins-speech-2014-peace-breakfast#.WJz4E1fbc28. 14 Jana Blazek, “Assembly passes resolutions on Cuba and drones,” Presbyterian Outlook, 21 June 2014. https://presoutlook.org/2014/06/assembly-passes-resolutions-cuba-drones. 156 15 Jerry Van Marter, The Assembly in Brief, General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (USA), 2014, http://images. acswebnetworks.com/1/2494/PCUSAassemblyinbrief.pdf. 16 Advisory Committee on the Social Witness Policy of the General Assembly Mission Council of the Presbyterian Church, USA, Drones, War and Surveillance. Louisville, KY: Office of the General Assembly, 2014. 17 “Military Applications of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS): Statement of Pax Christi International on Drones,” Pax Christi International, 28 November 2012, http:// interfaithdronenetwork.org/images/docs/PCI%20on%20drones. pdf. 18 Ibid. 19 “Resolution Against Drone Warfare,” Church of the Brethren Resolution, 2013, http://www.brethren.org/ac/ statements/2013resolutionagainstdronewarfare.html. 157 R E L I G I O U S P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Jewish responses to drone warfare Professor of rabbinics and bioethics Rabbi Ar yeh Some of the Jewish response has been shaped law) while obser ving, “so long as a plausible One of the most complicated aspects to by fellow Muslims. This untenable position of by the role drone warfare has played in the state argument exists for the legality of drone warfare, examining armed drones from a distinctively shifting the burden of denouncement onto these of Israel. Drones were used as early as the 1982 Jewish law would avoid ruling on it so as to avoid religious framework is that drone strikes communities places them in a difficult position to Lebanon War and continue to be a part of an excessive entanglement of religion with themselves have been used in a way that denounce or even publicly debate the ethics of Israel’s approach to security. To that end, the politics.” Ultimately, Klapper argues, forefronts religion. For example, the US use of drone use as to do so places them in an even Klapper examined the Jewish response to armed drones in the context of existing halakha (Jewish Muslim responses to armed drones In a time of increased Islamophobia, Muslim communities are under increasing pressure to speak out against terrorism and acts of violence armed drones has largely targeted Muslim more charged position of critiquing what the US highest level of government. A landmark Israeli I see no Jewish reason to object intrinsically to people. The literature responding to these has used as a central tactic in the War on Terror. Supreme Court decision on targeted killing warfare by remotely piloted vehicle. However, I attacks does not take drone strikes as their own To publicly criticise drone use is to risk being provided ethical foundation for Israeli Defense see reasonable arguments for believing that the entity but rather as one part in a much more framed at best as unpatriotic and at worst as Forces (IDF) drone operators, which allowed availability of drones makes certain forms of troubling overall pattern of Islamophobia in the dangerous or sympathetic to terrorism. usage if three ethical markers were met: problematic policy choices more likely, and that so-called War on Terror. There are not many legitimate target, based on verifiable evidence, in the absence of proactive regulation, drone Muslim scholars or Muslim organisations writing Therefore, there are Muslim leaders who have with independent oversight. 20 warfare will have more pernicious consequences in a way that chiefly connects Islam and a signed interfaith declarations against drone as the technology becomes more widely prohibition against the use of armed drones. usage but there is little public work in the form available. Instead, the broader argument that Islamophobia of statements or publications by Muslim shapes the entire context of the conflict and organisations independently of such group response is more common. Scholars weighing in proclamations. For example, while Dr. Sayyid on the use of armed drones and using religion as Syeed of the Islamic Society of North America a framework scaffold their research in one of (ISNA) signed the 2017 statement to the Trump two ways: either examining the roots of transition team and a 2016 letter to President Islamophobia in the United States and Europe or Obama urging the cessation of armed drone use, as positioning themselves as experts on ISNA as an organization has not issued a policy religious militancy. There is a need for more statement on the issue. ethics of drone use have been debated at the Debate in the Jewish community about armed 21 drones has often referenced larger debates about limitations on the use of force generally as Rabbi Shmuly Yanklowitz writes about the role of well as the interface between Judaism and privacy in Jewish law and its relationship to international law. However, in the absence of sur veillance drones by obser ving that there are clear international law on drone use, much of the relevant pieces of halakha that prohibit damage debate has relied on arguments about the caused by watching someone else and damage practicality and ethics of drone deployment as caused by listening. He references hezek re’ iah harm mitigation (e.g. preventing terrorism or as a prohibition against visual sur veillance and reducing combat fatalities). hezek shemiyah as a prohibition against aural sur veillance. 22 While individual Jewish leaders have come out strongly against the use of armed drones or scholars to examine how Muslims are responding theologically and sociologically from a position of faith beyond the obvious impacts of trauma and loss in affected communities. signed interfaith statements against drone attacks, there do not seem to be institutional responses to armed drones from Jewish organisations or communities. 20 Rob Eshman, “The Torah of Drones: examining the complex morality of drone warfare,” Jewish Journal, 6 November 2013, http://jewishjournal.com/news/nation/123974. 158 21 Rabbi Aryeh Klapper, “What Judaism Says About Drones,” 5 March 2013, http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-andpolitics/125905/what-judaism-says-about-drones. 22 Rabbi Shmuly Yanklowitz, The Soul of Jewish Social Justice (Jerusalem: Urim Publications, 2014). 159 R E L I G I O U S P E R S P EC T I V E S T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S Buddhist and Hindu responses to armed drones Conclusion There are ver y few published reflections efficiency, cost effectiveness, or efficacy of on armed drones from a Buddhist or Hindu drones from a militar y or political standpoint, perspective and no formal statements by this chapter has reviewed how drones might be organisations either denouncing or supporting evaluated from a religious standpoint. While it is them. From a Buddhist standpoint, all killing possible to engage different moral frameworks represents an infraction of the religious code to reflect on the inherent right or wrong of drone against taking life so perhaps it is not surprising usage, it seems that most religious traditions that Buddhists may not feel a need to take that have taken a position on armed drones particular stands on ever y form of lethal have opposed them. However, there has also technology. However, since some people take been silence from many religious sectors and the position that armed drones reduce casualties groups on this issue. It is likely that as drone in war (at least from the side of those operating usage increases, discussions in sectors outside the drones) it does seem that more religious of militar y circles will also increase, which will reflection is warranted here. likely spur increased discernment and reflection Beyond the pragmatic calculations of the among religious thinkers and theologians. Such Zen Roshi Norman Fischer opens up this line of inquir y asking, deep mindfulness and moral reckoning about these weapons should be a hallmark of our times. Are they good or evil? Do they kill innocent civilians? Yes they do. But even when they don’t, are they targeting the right people? Who are the “right people”? If someone is forced, by social pressure and the threat of murder, to harbor a so-called terrorist, or even to commit so-called terrorist acts, is such a person worthy of being targeted? Is anyone? And who decides? On what basis? 23 These questions seem to reflect the questions raised above about the morality of drones. 23 Norman Fischer, “The Problem of Evil,” Lion’s Roar, 17 April 2017, https://www.lionsroar.com/the-problem-of-evil. 160 161 3.. {Art-C 'i r: 1.5. 'le36 IE Art I I 1? Work toward greatness.