)

;

•

T

2 Ls.13:4111110

Document
Subject: EYES ONLY FO

rt

Tn-NMIoyot

NOV 2005
- DESTRUCTION OF

iR

VIDEO TAPES

ACTION
EYF.SONLY

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.
FOR:

- DESTRUCTION 0

VIDEO TAPES

1. ACTION REQUIRED: FYI
2. PER REF A, ALL 92
VIDEO TAPES WERE DESTROYED ON 09
NOVEMBER. DESTRUCTION ACTIVITY WAS INITIATED AT 0910HRS AND
COMPLETED AT 1230HFtS.
3. FILE:

CABLETYPE:
END OF MESSAG

Document:
Subject: EYES ONLY FORM DDO APPROVAL TO DESTROY
TAPES
-

TOPgr

.2 71

ter oiT1 TRitt 1 / mit

 ISTAACRET4111=7,1M15717a;;;;;*

STAFF 081855EN0V05
TO,

PROM DDO

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY FOR
VIDEO TAPES

- DDO APPROVAL TO DESTROY

TEXT:
1. ACTION REQUIRED:RESPONSE TO REF A.

2• DDO APPROVES REP A REQUEST TO DESTROYDEO TAPES AS
PROPOSED REP A am FOR TEE REASONS CITED TNERZIN(THERE
IS NO
LEGAL OR 010
RENEW TO CONTINUE TO RETAIN TEE TAPES.)
REQUEST THAT
VISE WERWDESTRUCTION RAS SEEN COMPLETED.
APPRECIATE STATION ASSISTANCE.

CAELETYPE:
'END OF MESSAGE

T.......921=ElapielifieiCOVITCP577"-"RN MR

 7

22.
.
2

230zzimettt017117 No

RNI/NR

EZID OF MSS.WM

Document:
Subject: EYES ONLY FO R
VIDEO TAPES

OV 2005
REQUEST APPROVAL TO DESTROY

ACTION

CITE
TO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR:

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY Fa
VIDEO TAPES

- REQUEST APPROVAL TO DESTROY

REF:
TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST APPROVAL FO
THROUGH ON REF ORIGINAL AUTHORITY TO
TAPES.
2. FOR THE REASONS CITED IN REF, THE FACT THAT THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL HAD ADVIS
T REF VIDEO TAPES WERE NO LONGER
REQUIRED
FOR HIS INVESTIGATION AND THE DETERMINATION BY THE OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL THAT THE
CABLE TRAFFIC ACCURATELY
II COI
CTIVITIES RECORDED ON VIDEO TAPE;
AUTHORIZATION FO
• DESTROY
PENDING HQS APPROT
ILL OVERSE
DESTRUCTION OF
VIDEO TAPES.

REQUESTS HQS

. T9LsxgzzhWethsaEmarjt"F----oRN//HR

 292...azoamialltertiti

ORNUMR

DESTRUCTION, A CABLE WILL BE FORWARDED TO HQS NOTING THE DATE/TIME
OF
TH
VIDEO TAPE DESTRUCTION.
•
3. FILE: NONE.

END OF MESSA

Subject Fr. AT1ENTION: O$G Additional Cables Related to
Videotape Destruction

12/202007 10s4 AM

Sublec4 A
Deattuction

Please see below documents from
able to access most. Some are controlled
Others that we have no access to are Owned

Please see three cables In blue
access to those cable. Please provide

..t.11111

0I3

list that

lal;e4.vy se

onet Cables Related to Video**

yesterday. We were
to provide them to you

nt to you below
Thenturi

NOFORN/IMR

06 06 1 4

 TOP

IC)FO. P14 / /MR

uld not find Ihe cable is its searches •

TOP SE

NOFORN//MR

000615
2007-6808-1G001871

       
  

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11/101200507:25 PM

To: Dusty FoggcM1111•111
cc:
Subject: short backgrounder - part 2

Dusty - ok - on the Zabaydah tapes - - I am no longer feeling comfortable. While I understand Jose's
'decision' (and believe the tapes were bad new I was just told by Rizzo that
DID NOT concur on
the cable - it was never discussed with him (this is perhaps worse news, in that we may have improperly'
destro
00
ad something). in fact, it is unclear now whether the XI
did as well. Cable was apparently drafted
by
and released by Jose; they are only two names on it so I am told by Rizzo. Either= lied to
Jose a ut 'clearing' with
Ka (my bet) or Jose misstated the facts. (It is not without relevanCe
that =figured prominently in the tapes asilliwas in charge oflair at the time and clearly would
want the tapes destroyed.) Rizzo Is clearly upset, because he was on the hook to notify Harslet Mier's of
the status of the tapes because It was she who had asked to be advised before any action was taken
Apparently, Rizzo coifed Harriet this afternoon and she was Mg
he said was actually unusual for
her. Rizzo does not think this Is likely to Just go away. Rizzo haswhich
advised
of this latest 'wrinkle.'
Sounds like we will regroup on Monday.

aBeRST.Hter
2007-6808-10000075

 Attachment classified as above. Classification of transmittal
document (when_ separated from attachment): artietrr

11/10/2005 05:48 PM

To: Dusty Fogg
cc:
Subject: short backgrounder
.

Dusty - at both the DO update and right after the G 77 the issue oft° Abu.Zubaydah tapes were
discussed. You may recall these concern the tepes'which were made during his interrogations et
and being held by the
of that country. It was recommended to provlous.D0 menagement.tha .th
?,611tapesbdoyTh
was after the . had reviewed theni and deemed that transcripts were an
ecuratO./eriection of Whafhappenedand the were no longer nee.dad..frOmffielrperapective
for whatever reason Itseema,,preyieus . Ft V ked
someone (nft) downtown and as a resultvot cold feet @Ad dict. not order:thertt.dotarOYOri dutrerit
not wanting. - ismartty to continue .be custodian oftbesethirige was
.Sand lo .a 'oetjt,e
asking for guidance Re did So. Guidancej obisent
- cleared by id, 000 and
told ihim to
destroy. , tie did so. Ririe found out today this had occurred as was upset.- apparently
because he had
not been consulterelf there was another reason .1-le raised at DO update but was calmed' (only
slightly) when toldellillihadepproved J880 raised with'Porter and myself and
after G-7 and
explained that he aoselleit It was extremely important to destroy thetapea and that
.there
was any heat
he would take It (PG laughed and.seld thayaotuelly, it would be he, Ki
k:who would take the: heat)
however; agreed wittritie decision. As Joao said, the heat from deetoying is nothing compered to what it
would be if the tapes ever gotinto public domain- nesaid
that out of context they would make us -look
terrible; it would: be !devastating to as: All in the
agreed but noted thatweneeded to find CO Rizzds
concern and whether ft was substantive or jail being 'left out.' Jose was going to purtue this. 'Believe
this is end
-

°fit, but Incase it comes up, you heed the background:II

"A`-i#CFSLIcifk-

000

..4 0
20 7-8 08-lG0 0 74

  

 

 

 

 

SEC12E2111rjahweRti71117.-

To
cc
bcc
Subject Fw: Video Tapes

Below is the infonnation for the cable granting approval to destroy the
DERECTO
Document Date: 08 NOV 2005
File Number
- No clue about this file number, searched i
returns.
Subject: EYES ONLY FOR
1)1)0 APPROVAL TO DESTROY
TAPES

SECRET/

E0

//MR

00080S
2007-8808-IG007352

  

 

 

 

 

 

Subject Re: Fw: Potential Statement-Videotapes Story

First, and most obvious, Jay Bybee's 1 Aug 2002 memo to John Rizzo stated, in

part, "Moreover, yau have also orally informed us that although some of these
techniques may be used with more than once, that repetition will not be
substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectivenesS after several
repetitions." (p. 2) and again, "You have indicated that these acts will not be used
with substantial repetition, so that there is no possibility that severe physical pain
could arise from such repetition." (p. 11). The DIG review determined that Abu
Zubaydah was subjected t•
aterboaid sessions consistint of at least 83
separate exposures
assured us that he gave regu ar up a <tes to DoJ (i.e., John Y
at OLC) ; during this time frame, and DoJ was aware of the real numbers, but we
were never able to verify this with DoJ, as INY management at the time elected
not to interview witnesses outside the building. In addition to the - disparity in
numbers, the method of water application as recorded on the tapes was at odds
with the Bybee opinion.

  . . ..
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Subject Trip Report

FYI, Attached is your very fine summa
summa table was =ubs

-

63/17/09 TCG 8417

 TO

(OIG) staff
condudted interr0 ation

that the
Interrogations, including the application of enhanced
interrogation techniques (EITs), were in compliance with
applicable statutes and De•artment of Justice legal
opinions.
intended to interview all
had assisted
related to
uppor ing an in
ro•ation field o•eratio .

e ate. to t e medical effects of techn•es and

 .r

re.in arced the need to ha
o the interrogation process.
the EIT methods employed, including the waterhoard,
posed no real threat, to the ohysi7 ,11
detainees,

ET/

  

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

Summary of Abu Zubaydah Waterboard Exposures

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

...es.mullatstrPOITrir-tR
Subject

De

ng on Disposition of AZ Tapes

From the Desk of
We have set up a meeting for 1340 hours on Friday 10 Jan to discuss the disposition of the AZ tapes. In
advance of that meeting, request CTC draft a short paper for the ea that will describe our proposed plan

of action. The paper will need to lay out Our dedsiou to move toward with the destruction of the tapes,
and our plan to ensure that both the Hill and NSC will support this dedsion. If I can have
COB Thum, I will by to get it to the OCI to read in advance of the meeting. Many thanksi

• qsecant 1/14R

000871

  

 

I

.41.1.14.1..1.1to

TVG-JCOV4C6133074294610
-31

Timeline Regarding Destruction of Abu Zubaydab Videotapes

30 November 2002

kt9.) CX3C attor-nr
Videotapes=

9 January 2003

OGC attorney drafts MFR concluding that the cable traffic
accurately described the interrogation methods employed and that
the methods conform to the applicable legal and policy guidance.

eview the

1 April 2004:

1 I May 2004
4 November 2005

GC attends meeting at the White House and is
iugton and Gonzales not to destroy the tapes.(NFIO.

dIll

PEI
AtODDOr ues
rafts language
to be included in a cable fro
equesting DDO a
val to
destroy the tapes.ECT
sen•the language t• d
the ODDO It
ce, as well as OGC for approval. The plan .was
fo
o cut and paste the text into a cable and send it
to HQs for approval.
ti

• S November 2005
destroy e tap
8 November 2005 cPS
of tapes.
10 November 2005 (ZS'
gotten
language

ends cable requesting approval to •
D150 releases cable authorizing the destruction

onsaying he has
concutence on the
r the cable. e alto Says that he understand

05/0i/08 TCG 133074

 / 4(W-1-Lib .
TCG4000F4C6133074294611

going to call
than email it to him.

with the language for the cable rather

S./

([Si
receives the note and replies that the
exchange with
has already taken place. He phoned the
language t •
sent the cable. He notes that DDO
already approved the destruction of the tapes.
.
•
(TS
AGC learns that the tapes were destroyed and
contacts DCIA Chief of Staff. AGC notes that DNI and Harriet
Miers as recently as a few months ago opposed the idea of
destroying the tapes. He states they need to be notified of the
destruction as well as others.

moip—seererr

•

/20321116

• 05/01/08 TCG 133075

  

 

--T-ef'SteRET

1. Provide background on your assignment to CTC and responsibilities related to
interrogations.

2. Provide history of interrogation program from your perspective including legal
authorities and approval of use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EIT)
including any parameters for Eff use.

3. What interrogation methods were employed a

4. How were the interrogation methods used at

5.

eviewed and vetted?

What was the process for ensuring compliance with the DOJ opinion?

peration including management
6 What were your impressions of th•
of the facility, care of the detainees, and methods used by the interrogators?

7. Were there an

8. What is e background related to the decision to videotape interrogations

9. What are your views regarding whether the tapes should be destroyed?

10. What was the rational for transferring responsibility for interrogations from

11. What interrogation methods were employed

1e)
1G. IlVW

Were LUG •-.-

-

OgiltiOn MULIIVUJ IISGu

eval;a1 .174,44

and upttizri?

 1.

•

TOP-SECRET

13. What was the process for ensuring compliance with the DOJ opinion?
14. What were your impressions of the
operation including management of
the facility, care of the detainees, and methods used by the interrogators?
15. Are there an
16. Were you aware that the "Hard Takedown" technique was use
17
18.
19. What interrogation methods were employed
20. How were the interrogation methods used

eviewed and vetted?

21. What was the process for ensuring compliance with the DOJ opinion?
22. What were your impressions of the
peration including management of
the facility, care of detainees, and met o s used by the interrogators?
23. Are there an
24. Were you aware of the specific EIT used on Nashiri?
25. What were your communications with the interrogation teams a

26. When did you first become aware o

27. Provide background
2

 28. What is your working relationship wit

29. What are your responsibilities related to the screening process for people going to
the field?

30. What policies and procedures have been provided for interrogations?

31. What controls are in place to prevent future problems?
32. How can the interrogation program be improved?
33. What training is now being provided?

3

  

 

 

'TOP--esesaw

•
THE

CIA
INTERROGATION

•
ABU • ZUBAYDAH
March 2001

—1101*-643e7;

Jan. 2003

00

97

2007-88084G010443
0002,4

 it

•

CIA interrocation Techniques: Abu Zubayda...
-test Abu Zubavdahs Terrorist Activities
• Abu Zubaydah was born a Palestinian and now holds Saudi
citizenship. He was a senior lieutenant to Bin. Ladin.
• At the time of his capture in Pakistan, he was heavily
involved in al Qa'ida's operational planning, and had
previously been an external liaison and logistics
coordinator.
• Taking him out of circulation has hurt al-Qa'ida
operations' in. key nodes and helped disrupt a number of
ongoing plots.
40,414014.- */PAuriee at Time of Capture
• Abu Zubaydah was hit • t o bullets durin the
arrestin. ose ation.

•
• Abu Zubaydah was provided adequate and appropriate
medical care.
• The medical treatment the Agency provided to Abu
Zubaydah saved his life. He should, now be considered
healthy, other than some leg and knee pain.
'Highlights from Reporting by Abu Zubaydah

•

Information from Abu Zubaydah-who was captured in late
March-led to the capture of other operatives, and
continues to provide some of our most valuable insights
into the inner workings of al-Qa'ida. Over time, he
hoomma. wirr= wil14nn 1-n relmituraFP An Many

issues :

and his extensive familiarity with other al-Qa'ida
terrorists and their methodologies daily helps us
identify ways to exploit other detainees and to assess
the credibility of reporting from a variety of sources.

00298
TOP CECRAWA

/449.74:44h4714a

2007-81308-)G010444
11/1419),r..

 Trir-,5efierf-/

-

• Abu Zubaydah identified Jose Padilla and Binyam
Muhammad as al-Qa'ida operatives who had plans to
detonate a uranium-topped "dirty bomb" in either
Washington, DC, or New York City. Both have been
captured.
• In additiOn, Abu Zudbaydah in
erator in
''a•a

2002 Abu Zubaydah had . been the
• As of mid-Dec
disseminated countersource of over
terrorism inte igence repor s

•

•

Tor

CECTIET/

 421e/' Interroaation Techniques used on Abu Zubavdah
The Agency used both routine and enhanced interrogation
techniques against Abu Zubaydah.

•

After consulting with the NSC and DOJ, CTC
originally approved 24-48 hours of sleep deprivation.
3

00300
/
2007-8808-IG010446

00027;

 -9€#P—OBeftWNM1111111=1.111MIMe0eRNO/4K+-

In April 2002, CTC
learned that due to a
misunderstanding that time frame had been exceeded.
• However, CTC
advised that since the process did not
have adverse medical effects or result in hallucination
(thereby disrupting profoundly Abu Zubaydah's senses or
personality) it was within legal parameters.
6 After first using routine interrogation techniques, the
interrogation team concluded that Abu Zubaydah.
continued to withhold critical threat information,
including the identities of al Qaida pperatives in the
US, that in order to elicit those identities the use of
more aggressive techniques was required and that the
use of those techniques would not engender lasting,ana

severe mental or physical harm.
• Abu Zubaydah has employed a host of resistance'
techniques. He is the author of a seminal al Qaida
manual on resistance to interrogation methods.
• The Agency sought and rece'ved Department of Justic
• II

,•-011

r-*._ 1_1 „_

" 1 •

• Specific interrogation team members may request prior
approval from Headquarters to employ any or all of the
enhanced techniques.
• Where a specifia time period was allowed for a
particular technique, a timekeeper was used to ensure
that the techniques was only employed within the
timeframes authorized.
• Agendy employees engaged in the interrogation are
complemented by expert personnel who possess extensive
experience, gained within the Department of Defense, on
the- psychological and physical methods of interrogation
(SERE) and the resistance techniques employed as
countermeasures to such interrogation. These expert
medical personnel were present throughout the
interrocrations.

• It is not and has never been the Agency's intent to
permit Abu Zubaydah to die in the course of
interrogation and 'appropriately trained medical
4
134—seepffiay

0030.1

4

2007-8808-IG010447

 Tor mcnra/

mepeittn,rt-

personnel have been on-site in the event an emergency
medical situation arises.

• DOJ approval for use of the enhanced techniques in
specific instances relies on our representation that
those techniques, when applied by appropriately trained
personnel, should not produce severe mental or physical
pain or suffering.
• Indeed, DOJ concluded that the use of enhanced
techniques carefully applied by appropriate personnel
pursuant to prior Headquarters approval would not have
the "specific intent" to inflict severe mental or
physical pain or suffering,, and therefore would not
violate the law.

••
• For these reasons, we fully document in advance any
decision to employ any enhanced techniques, along with
the criteria that have been employed in making those
decisions.
• The use of enhanced interrogation techniques proved
productive; Abu Zubaydah provided additional useful
information.
• Medical evaluations were conducted on Abu Zubaydah
before and during the interrogations.. In addition, a
psychological profile was conducted on him before the
interrogations began.

•

•

5

00302
Aiffei+14741+1+

000275
2007-88084G010448

  

 

?asg?omfgm

   

. . . .
a A .



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Itelo-59€44:014

-

ide-tap=a
a orney
review interrogation i•eotapes
u Z •ay a an
another detainee to confirm that the cable traffic
accurately described the,interrogation methods employed
and that the methods conformed to the applicable legal
and policy guidance. .
the OGC attorney,
o ha ntitprevlous y een nvolved in this
matter, reviewed the applicable legal and policy
guidance governing the permissible interrogation
and the cable traffic, and interviewed CTC
and
personnel knowledgeable about the matter.
o The attorney
inventoried the
interrogation ma (aria•eo apes, 1.fbook,
noteb o , and psychologist's notesand reviewed the videotapes.
o The attorney- concluded that the cable traffic did
in fact accurately, describe the interrogation
methods-employed and that the methods conformed to
the applicable legal and policy guidance.
o After this review, the General Counsel advised the
DCI that OGC had no objection to the destruction
' of the videotapes,, but strongly recommended that
the new leadership of the committees first be
notified about the existence of.the tapes and the
reasons why the Agency has decided to destroy
them.
`

• Guidelines. CTC
drafted 'Guidelines on
Interrogation Standards' and "Guidelines on Confinement
Conditions for CIA Detainees". The guidelines are
being coordinated. Once approved, all Agency personnel
involved in interrogations or detentions will review
these guidelines and acknowledge in writing that they
have read and understand them.
• Training. .CIA has established an interrogation program
to'train interrogators on techniques cenerallv,
enhanced techniques specifically, facilities, security,
and the approval process.

4443r-W441-046-1.

08

M

2007.8808-1G010450

  

 

 

.
(193? 

5
x.

 





 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

00308

. momma-$010452
00-0283

 

 

 

 

 

00367
000284

200738086010453

 

   

 

 

 

•

-

SteRL•11-

• (3//NP) Abu Zubaydah (AZ) was born a Palestinian and
now holds Saudi citizenship.
• 4644NP4. AZ was - a senior lieutenant to UBL. At the
time of'his capture in Pakistan he was heavily
involved in Al Qa'ida's operational planning, and had
previously been an external liaison and logistics
coordinator.

•

(c/jur) AZ has corroborated intelligence on key Al
Qa'ida planners and facilitators, and has provided •
information on Al Qa'ida's CBRN program and on
individuals associated with that program. *Information
from AZ was instrumental in the capture-near Chicago
of Jose Padilla, a "dirty bomb" plotter, explosives
expert, and terrorist trainer at Qandahar. AZ also
a senior Al Qa'ida o•erator in
ied

•

AZ was hit b two bullets during the arresting
o•eration.

AZ should •e con

some ag and knee pain.

00308
00928
7-8808-1G01

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

00308

2007-8808-3?6010455