(U) Summary Table of Findings CHAPTER 1: RUSSIAN CAMPAIGNS IN EUROPE (U) Finding The Kremlin exploits free or independent media spaces and open democra- cies to conduct active measures in Europe. (U) Finding Russia supports fringe political parties and non-governmental organizations in Europe to further the Kremlin?s agenda while also disparaging or discrediting politicians and groups seen as hostile to Moscow. (U) Finding Russia conducts increasingly aggressive cyber operations against European governments; a tactic that will continue to present a profound threat. (U) Finding Russia targets disaffected European populations and exploits social, politi? cal, and racial divisions in an effort to sow discord, encourage unrest, and incite protests. (U) Finding Russia leverages business and economic ties in Europe to achieve the Krem- lin?s goals, message displea5ure, or in?ict punishment. (U) Finding European governments and media outlets are conducting a variety of activi- ties to combat Russian in?uence campaigns. CHAPTER 2: RUSSIA ATTACKS THE UNITED STATES (U) Finding Russia conducted cyberattacks on U.S. political institutions in 2015-2016. (U) Finding Russian-state actors and third-party intermediaries were responsible for the dissemination of documents and communications stolen from U.S. political organizations. (U) Finding The Russian government used RT to advance its malign in?uence campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. (U) Finding #10: Russian intelligence leveraged social media in an attempt to sow social dis- cord and to undermine the U.S. electoral process. CHAPTER 3: AMERICA REACTS (U) Finding #11: The Federal Bureau of lnvestigation's noti?cation to numerous Russian hacking victims was largely inadequate. (U) Finding #12: Communication between the Department of Homeland Security and state election of?cials was impeded by state of?cials? mistrust of federal government overreach coupled with a unprecedented level of Russian cyber intrusions. (U) Summary Table of Findings (cont) CHAPTER 3: AMERICA REACTS (.CONT.) (U) Finding #13: The joint Of?ce of the Director of National Intelligence and Department of Homeland Security public statement attributing election interference to Russia was ineffec? tive. (U) Finding #14: The Executive Branch?s post-election response was insuf?cient. (U) Finding #15: The majority of the Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on Russia?s election activities employed proper analytic tradecraft. (U) Finding #16: The intelligence Community Assessment judgments on Putin?s strategic intentions did not employ proper analytic tradecraft. (U) Finding #17: The Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an enterprise counterintelli- gence investigation into the Trump campaign after receiving information related to Trump campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos. (U) Finding #18: As part of the enterprise counterintelligence investigation into the Trump campaign, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an individual counterintelligence investigation into Carter Page. (U) Finding #19: The dossier compiled by Christopher Steele formed an essential part of an application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to obtain electronic surveillance on Carter Page. (U) Finding #20: Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted Paul Manafort on several charges, none of which relate to allegations of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Russian government. (U) Finding #21: [classi?ed] (U) Finding #22: General pleaded guilty to making a false statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding his December 2016 conversations with Ambassador Kis? lyak, even though the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents did not detect any deception during interview. (U) Finding #23: Executive Branch of?cials did not notify the Trump campaign that mem- bers of the campaign were assessed to be potential counterintelligence concerns. (U) Finding #24: The February 2018 indictment of the Internet Research Agency and Rus- sian nationals exposes Russian actors and their intent to spread distrust towards the candi- dates and the political system in general. (U) Summary Table of Findings (cont) CHAPTER 4: CAMPAIGN LINKS WITH RUSSIA (U) Finding #25: When asked directly, none of the interviewed witnesses provided evi? dence of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Rus- sian government. (U) Finding #26: The Committee found no evidence that President Trump's pre-campaign business dealings formed the basis for collusion during the campaign. (U) Finding #27: The Republican national security establishment's opposition to candidate Trump created opportunities for two less-experienced individuals with pro-Russia views to serve as campaign advisors: George Papadopoulos and Carter Page. (U) Finding #28: The change in the Republican Party platform regarding Ukraine resulted in a stronger position against Russia, not a weaker one, and there is no evidence that Paul Manafort was involved. (U) Finding #29: There is no evidence that Trump associates were involved in the theft or publication of Clinton campaign-related emails, although Trump associates had numerous ill-advised contacts with WikiLeaks. (U) Finding #30: Carter Page did not travel to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the Trump campaign, but the Committee is concerned about his seemingly incomplete accounts of his activity in Moscow. (U) Finding #31: George Papadopoulos? attempts to leverage his Russian contacts to facili- tate meetings between the Trump campaign and Russians was unsuccessful. (U) Finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a June 9, 2016, meeting at Trump Tower where they expected to receive?but did not ultimately ob- tain?derogatory information on candidate Clinton from Russian sources. (U) Finding #33: Donald Trump Jr. brie?y met with a Russian government of?cial at the 2016 National Ri?e Association annual meeting, but the Committee found no evidence that the two discussed the U.S. presidential election. (U) Finding #34: The Committee found no evidence that meetings between Trump associ- ates?including Jeff Sessions?and of?cial representatives of the Russian government? including Ambassador Kislyak?re?ected collusion, coordination, or conspiracy with the Russian government. (U) Summary Table of Findings (cont.) CHAPTER 4: CAMPAIGN LINKS WITH RUSSIA (CONT.) (U) Finding #35: Possible Russian efforts to set up a ?back channel? with Trump associates after the election suggest the absence of collusion during the campaign, since the commu- nication associated with collusion would have rendered such a ?back channel? unneces- sary. (U) Finding #36: Pribr to conducting opposition research targeting candidate Trump?s busi? ness dealings, Fusion GPS conducted research bene?tting Russian interests. (U) Finding #37: The law ?rm Perkins Coie hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton cam? paign and the Democratic National Committee to research candidate Trump?s Russia ties. (U) Finding #38: Christopher Steele claims to have obtained his dossier information second- and third?hand from purported high-placed Russian sources, such as government of?cials with links to the Kremlin and intelligence services. (U) Finding #39: Christopher Steele's information from Russian sources was provided di- rectly to Fusion GPS and Perkins Coie and indirectly to the Clinton campaign. CHAPTER 5: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT LEAKS (U) Finding #40: Leaks of classi?ed information regarding Russian intentions. to sow discord in the U.S. presidential election began prior to the election day?November 8, 2016. (U) Finding #41: Leaks of classi?ed information alleging Russian intentions to help elect candidate Trump increased dramatically after the election day?November 8, 2016. (U) Finding #42: The leaks prior to the classi?ed Intelligence Community Assessment?s pub- lication, particularly leaks occurring after the U.S. presidential election, correlate to speci?c language found in the Intelligence Community Assessment. (U) Finding #43: Continued leaks of classi?ed information have damaged national security and potentially endangered lives. (U) Finding #44: Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, now a CNN nation- al security analyst, provided inconsistent testimony to the Committee about his contacts with the media, including CNN. (U) Summary Table of Recommendations CHAPTER 1: RUSSIAN CAMPAIGNS IN EUROPE (U) Recommendation European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi- nesses, think tanks, and academia should strengthen legal and regulatory environments, promote media pluralism, build professional media associations, and improve the ?nancial sustainability of legitimate news outlets. (U) Recommendation European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi- nesses, think tanks, and academia should implement and encourage multi-pronged, coun- try-wide efforts by both public and private entities to combat Russian prepaganda, tech- nical, and cyber operations. (U) Recommendation European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi- nesses, think tanks, and academia should implement more stringent cyber security practic- es, such as multifactor authentication and of sensitive data, as well as educating workforces on basic cyber security topics and best practices. (U) Recommendation European governments should look to long-term solutions to lessen economic dependence on Russia. CHAPTER 2 3: RUSSIA ATTACKS THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICA REACTS (U) Recommendation Congress should identify options available to the private sector and federal government that would address the social media vulnerabilities exploited by the Russian government. (U) Recommendation Congress should consider updating the Foreign Intelligence Sur- veillance Act to cover malicious international cyber actors. (U) Recommendation The Federal Bureau of Investigation should improve cyberattack victim noti?cation. (U) Recommendation Threats identi?ed by the Intelligence Community to state and lo- cal elections infrastructure should be immediately briefed to appropriate state and local of?cials. When threats are identi?ed, the federal government should conduct an expedit- ed declassi?cation review to ensure that the threat information can reach all necessary state and local of?cials in a timely manner. (U) Recommendation The Secretary of Homeland Security should provide certain desig- nated state and local election of?cials appropriate security clearances to enable those of?- cials to respond to election-related threats. (U) Summary Table of Recommendations (cont.) CHAPTER 2 8: 3: RUSSIA ATTACKS THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICA REACTS (CONT.) (U) Recommendation #10: Signi?cant threats to U.S. elections identified by the Intelligence Community, including cyberattacks directed at political organizations, should be immedi- ately reported to the Congressional intelligence committees. (U) Recommendation #11: Congress should encourage the adoption of National Institute of Standards and Technology cyber security standards, such as those adopted by the Elections Assistance Commission, by providing federal resources to state and local governments to facilitate such adoption. Funds should be tied to the adoption and certi?cation of elections systems to appropriate standards. (U) Recommendation #12: Congress should consider additional funding for the National Institute of Standards and Technology to enable better outreach to state and local govern- ments. (U) Recommendation #13: Congress should consider a one-time grant to state and local election agencies to conduct a risk assessment of those agencies? computer systems. (U) Recommendation #14: Congress should consider strengthening the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to ensure that both statewide voter registration and tabulation systems are better protected from foreign cyber threats. (U) Recommendation #15: The Department of Homeland Security should provide the own- er or operator of any electronic election infrastructure affected by any signi?cant foreign cyber intrusion with a brie?ng and include steps that may be taken to mitigate such intru- sions. (U) Recommendation #16: State and local governments should be encouraged to establish redundancies that are not dependent on current elections infrastructure, such as a mecha- nism that retains individual vote records, ensuring the integrity of the vote in the event of a compromise of voting infrastructure due to a foreign cyberattack. An example of such a redundancy is a contemporaneously created paper record re?ecting the voter?s selections. (U) Recommendation #17: While it is important to implement lessons learned from the Ex- ecutive Branch?s response, Congress should not hamper the Executive Branch?s ability to use discretion in responding to a particular foreign threat. (U) Recommendation #18: Congress should consider repealing the Logan Act. CHAPTER 2 8: 3: RUSSIA ATTACKS THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICA IREACTS (CONT.) (U) Recommendation #19: All U.S. presidential campaigns should receive unclassi?ed coun- terintelligence brie?ngs at an appropriate time prior to a nomination convention. (U) Recommendation #20: When consistent with national security, the Intelligence Com- munity should immediately inform U.S. presidential candidates when it discovers a legiti- mate counterintelligence threat to the campaign, and notify Congress. (U) Recommendation #21: Both houses of Congress should consider requiring all staff to receive an annual counterintelligence awareness brie?ng. CHAPTER 4: CAMPAIGN LINKS TO RUSSIA (U) Recommendation #22: Political campaigns and law enforcement should ensure that their counterintelligence defenses apprOpriately account for the role of cut-outs and inter- mediaries. (U) Recommendation #23: Congress should consider amending current campaign ?nance laws to further increase transparency regarding services provided by foreign persons or entities. CHAPTER 5: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT LEAKS (U) Recommendation #24: Each component of the Intelligence Community should update its guidance regarding media contacts to ensure the guidance applies to every employee, including senior of?cials. (U) Recommendation #25: Congress should consider legislation to increase the penalties for unauthorized disclosures of classi?ed information. (U) Recommendation #26: The Executive Branch should consider instituting mandatory pol- ygraphs for all non?con?rmed political appointees that have top secret clearances.