February 12, 2018
Mr. John Sauger
Executive VP and Chief Nuclear Officer
EnergySolutions
2701 Deborah Avenue
Zion, IL 60099
SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000409/2017001(DNMS) - LA CROSSE BOILING
WATER REACTOR
Dear Mr. Sauger:
On December 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed its
inspection activities at the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) in Genoa, Wisconsin.
The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether decommissioning activities were
conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. On January 11, 2018, the
inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Nowak and other members of your
staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The inspection consisted of an examination of activities at the facility as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commission’s rules and regulations. Areas examined during the inspection
included facility management and control, radiological safety, and confirmatory surveys. Within
these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and
representative records, field observations of activities in progress, and interviews with
personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC identified three Severity Level IV violations of
NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because the
issues were entered into your Corrective Action Program, the NRC is treating these issues as
Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) in accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC's Enforcement
Policy.
No response is required for the NCVs. However, if you contest an NCV, you should provide a
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC
20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the Director, Office of
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, “Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for
Withholding.”

 J. Sauger

-2-

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection. If you have any
questions, please contact Dr. Peter Lee of my staff at 630-829-9870.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael A. Kunowski, Chief
Materials Control, ISFSI, and
Decommissioning Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Docket No. 050-00409
License No. DPR-45
Enclosure:
IR 05000409/2017001 (DNMS)
cc w/encl: LaCrosseSolutions Service List

 J. Sauger

-3-

Letter to John Sauger from Michael Kunowski dated February 12, 2018
SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000409/2017001(DNMS) - LA CROSSE BOILING
WATER REACTOR
DISTRIBUTION w/encl:
Bruce Watson
Marlayna Vaaler
John Giessner
Christine Lipa
Allan Barker
Harral Logaras
Stuart Sheldon
MCID Distribution
ADAMS Accession Number: ML18043B109
OFFICE
NAME
DATE

RIII
PLee:rj
02/12/2018

C RIII
REdwards
02/12/2018

C

RIII
MKunowski
02/12/2018

Official Record Copy

C

 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket No.:

50-409

License No.:

DPR-45

Report No. :

05000409/2017001(DNMS)

Licensee:

LaCrosseSolutions, LLC

Facility:

La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor

Location:

Genoa, Wisconsin

Dates:

April 25, 2017, through December 31, 2017

Inspectors:

Rhex Edwards, Senior Health Physicist
Peter J. Lee, Reactor (Decom) Inspector, Ph.D., CHP
Marlayna Vaaler, Project Manager
James Beavers, Health Physicist

Approved by:

Michael A. Kunowski, Chief
Materials Control, ISFSI, and
Decommissioning Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Enclosure

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor
NRC Inspection Report 05000409/2017001 (DNMS)
This periodic decommissioning inspection covered aspects of facility management and control,
radiological safety, and confirmatory surveys. Active decommissioning was in progress at the
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) site throughout this inspection period and
decommissioning activities are expected to continue through 2018.
Facility Management and Control
•

The inspectors determined that the licensee was adequately controlling decommissioning
activities and radiological work areas. (Section 1.1)

•

The licensee’s management, contractor oversight, and onsite management and review
committees were being conducted and maintained in accordance with the appropriate
regulatory requirements as prescribed by the LACBWR Quality Assurance Program (QAP)
and Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR). The licensee has
established additional oversight and controls for contractor programs to ensure that
activities were being conducted in accordance with the applicable regulatory requirements,
license conditions, and Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD) procedures.
The inspectors determined that the licensee’s process for evaluating the safety impacts
of facility changes and modifications was in compliance with the requirements of
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.59. (Section 1.2)

•

The inspectors determined that the licensee’s corrective actions were adequately
implemented in accordance with its Corrective Action Program (CAP). The licensee’s
auditing and decommissioning safety review programs were being conducted and
maintained in accordance with the appropriate regulatory requirements as prescribed by
the LACBWR QAPD. (Section 1.3)

•

The inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of
10 CFR 50.48(f)(3), “Fire Protection,” for the site’s failure to evaluate whether eliminating
the site’s five fire hydrants reduced the effectiveness of the fire protection program (FPP).
(Section 1.4)

Radiological Safety
•

The inspectors determined that the licensee continued to be effective in controlling
radiation worker personal exposure. (Section 2.1)

•

One SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1) was self-revealed for the site’s failure to implement
the quality assurance program when an inadvertent discharge of contaminated water
occurred to the Mississippi River from the East Baker Water Storage Tank. (Section 2.2)

•

The inspectors determined that the licensee had complied with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for shipments of
radioactive waste. (Section 2.3)

2

 Confirmatory Survey
•

The inspectors identified one SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501, “General,” for the licensee’s
failure to perform all of the surveys of the subsurface that may be necessary for the
licensee to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1402, “Radiological Criteria for Unrestricted
Use.” The inspectors determined that the licensee had properly remediated and performed
final status surveys (FSSs) of the waste gas tank vault and sub-foundation soils of the pipe
tunnel, reactor plant/generator plant common area, stack, and warehouse areas. After
additional remediation, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had also properly
performed FSSs of the waste treatment building (WTB) area. (Section 3.1)

3

 Report Details1
Summary of Plant Activities
During the inspection period, active decommissioning work was ongoing at the site and
consisted of demolition of the stack, turbine building, WTB, waste gas tank vault, and the
common area of the reactor and turbine buildings. In addition, contaminated piping and
internal components were being dismantled and removed from the reactor building.
1.0

Facility Management and Control

1.1

Decommissioning Performance and Status Review at Permanently Shut Down
Reactors (Inspection Procedure (IP 71801))

a.

Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted plant tours to assess field conditions and decommissioning
activities and to ensure that radioactively contaminated areas were being controlled.

b.

Observations and Findings
The licensee maintained the work areas with adequate shielding and enclosures with
high efficiency particulate air filter (HEPA) exhaust systems to minimize worker doses.
Work areas were observed to be adequately controlled, postings and boundaries were
appropriate, and workers were wearing respirators as required. Appropriate protective
clothing was being worn and workers followed established procedures.

c.

Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the licensee was adequately controlling
decommissioning activities and radiological work areas.

1.2
a.

Safety Reviews, Design Changes and Modifications (IP 37801)
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the organization, composition, and controls implemented for
each of the LACBWR management review committees to ensure that the licensee was
maintaining effective oversight of decommissioning activities. The inspectors also
reviewed the minutes of several Health and Safety Excellence Team (HSET) meetings
and discussed the Independent Management Assessment (IMA) and management
observation programs (MOP) with licensee staff.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s safety review processes, procedures, and
training to verify that the safety review program was effective at contributing to the
protection of public health and safety and the environment. Additionally, the inspectors
reviewed selected design changes and facility modifications to determine if changes,
tests, experiments, and modifications were effectively conducted, managed, and

1

NOTE: A list of acronyms used in the report is included at the end of the report.

4

 controlled during plant decommissioning. This inspection verified that decommissioning
activities were being implemented in accordance with the requirements of
10 CFR 50.59, 10 CFR 50.71, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. In addition, the
inspectors discussed the implementation and effectiveness of the design control
and safety review programs with LACBWR personnel.
b.

Observations and Findings
The inspectors noted that the licensee discontinued the Safety Review Committee
(SRC) and the Operation Review Committee (ORC) in recognition of the fact that a
limited number of important to safety and/or radiological items would require safety
reviews at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) or during the
remaining decontamination and dismantlement activities at the LACBWR site. These
committees were replaced by the IMA process and the Qualified Technical Reviewer
(QTR) process, respectively, changes which were approved by the NRC during its
review of the LACBWR QAPD, Revision 2. Specifically, the IMA process continued to
meet the requirement in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for
Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, Criterion II, “Quality Assurance
Program,” that the licensee regularly review the status and adequacy of the quality
assurance program. In addition, the responsibilities of the QTR encompassed the
functions previously performed by the ORC and were consistent with the scope of
activities at a permanently defueled facility in an advanced stage of decommissioning.
The inspectors reviewed LACBWR Job Aid No. LC-JA-01, “Management Observation
Program,” Revision 0, which was a program established to prevent incidents and
injuries through the monitoring, trending, behavioral management, and identification of
error precursors. The MOP provided a process whereby employees at all levels
regularly visit work areas, observe work practices and conditions, and discuss job
safety and other aspect of the work with other employees. While not directly related to
implementation of the quality assurance program because of its applicability to
industrial safety practices, use of the MOP allowed for a review of the quality and
effectiveness of work preparation, policies, and practices, as well as their
implementation. The inspectors also reviewed the agenda and minutes for several
HSET meetings. The HSET was a committee established by EnergySolutions to review
matters which may have a bearing on industrial, nuclear, or radiological safety during
decommissioning and/or waste transportation and storage at any facilities managed by
EnergySolutions.
As a result of these reviews, the inspectors concluded that, in general, the licensee was
appropriately implementing the various oversight processes outlined by the IMA, QTR,
MOP, and/or HSET, and leveraging its oversight of onsite contractors, to ensure that all
conditions that could impact the safety or quality of decommissioning activities at
LACBWR were being addressed in a manner commensurate with their potential impact
on the overall project.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s 10 CFR 50.59 program, as implemented by
Procedure No. LC-RA-PR-001, “Regulatory Reviews,” Revision 2. The inspectors
compared this procedure with the NRC-endorsed industry method for complying with
the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, “Guidelines for
10 CFR 50.59 Implementation,” Revision 1, dated November 2000. The inspectors
determined that the procedure was adequate to implement the licensee’s commitments
provided in the QAPD. The inspectors determined that the procedure provided
5

 adequate instructions to assure proper implementation, review, and approval of design
changes. The inspectors also verified that when issues were identified during this
process the licensee appropriately documented the issues in the LACBWR CAP.
The inspectors reviewed several 10 CFR 50.59 screenings where licensee personnel
had determined that a full 50.59 evaluation was not necessary and verified that the
conclusions were adequate. Specifically, the regulatory reviews included: (1) revision
of the PSDAR due to elimination of systems and components no longer in use; (2)
replacing the original liquid waste system with a temporary liquid waste system; (3)
revision of mobile liquid waste process system operation procedure; and (4) replacing
the original airborne effluent release and monitoring system with the temporary airborne
effluent monitoring system. The licensee’s 50.59 safety evaluation program also
provided effective periodic training for personnel preparing, reviewing, and approving
the associated safety evaluations. In addition, the program established an adequate
process to assess training effectiveness.
Finally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee’s decommissioning work activities, which
included demolition activities associated with the reactor containment building and the
turbine building foundation. The inspectors confirmed that these activities were
completed in accordance with the licensee’s safety review processes, even when
implemented by contractor personnel.
c.

Conclusions
The licensee’s management, contractor oversight, and onsite management and review
committees were being conducted and maintained in accordance with the appropriate
regulatory requirements as prescribed by the LACBWR QAP and PSDAR. The
licensee has established additional oversight and controls for contractor programs to
ensure that activities were being conducted in accordance with the applicable
regulatory requirements, license conditions, and QAPD procedures. The inspectors
determined that the licensee’s process for evaluating the safety impacts of facility
changes and modifications was in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

1.3
a.

Self-Assessment, Auditing, and Corrective Actions (IP 40801)
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed and discussed with licensee management the policies and
implementing procedures that govern the CAP to verify compliance with the applicable
regulatory requirements and decommissioning documents. Specifically, the inspectors
reviewed a sample of Condition Reports (CRs), and verified that the CRs provided
adequate documentation and description of conditions adverse to quality, as well as
specifying the cause of these conditions and the corrective actions taken. The
inspectors also verified that contractor personnel submitted CRs and proposed
corrective actions, as applicable, and that the licensee adequately assessed
deficiencies identified or reported by contractors and entered them into the CAP.
The inspectors reviewed the LACBWR policies and implementing procedures that
govern the implementation of the internal auditing program to verify compliance with the
requirements in the QAPD and PSDAR, and to ensure that significant decommissioning
activities were independently and effectively reviewed. The inspectors evaluated the
effectiveness of licensee controls in identifying, resolving, and preventing issues that
6

 degrade safety or the quality of decommissioning. These controls include selfassessment, audits, corrective actions, and root and apparent cause evaluations. The
inspectors reviewed a sample of audit reports and self-assessments to evaluate
compliance with the licensee’s program and technical requirements. In addition, the
inspectors reviewed the disposition of corrective actions to resolve deficiencies
identified by audit findings for adequacy and timeliness. Furthermore, the inspectors
discussed the implementation and effectiveness of the audit and safety review
programs with LACBWR personnel.
b.

Observations and Findings
The licensee’s corrective actions were appropriately focused in both scope and level of
detail. The licensee initiated appropriate corrective actions in a timely manner to
resolve findings. Additionally, the inspectors conducted numerous discussions with
LACBWR personnel, including licensing engineers, quality assurance personnel, and
audit representatives, to verify that licensee and contractor personnel were aware of the
corrective action process, recognize when and how to use the process, and understand
the outcomes that can result from a CR. The inspectors concluded that all of the
LACBWR and contractor personnel interviewed had adequate knowledge of the
LACBWR CAP.
The inspectors specifically reviewed the corrective actions for an overflow of the berm
around the East Baker Water Storage Tank (ES-LCR-2017-0012) that caused an
inadvertent release to a storm drain (Unresolved Item (URI) 05000495/2016). Based
on the review of the corrective actions to prevent future unplanned releases from the
temporary holding tank, the inspectors did not have a safety concern with the operation
of the temporary holding tank for the liquid waste prior to discharge to the Mississippi
River through the filtration system (see Section 2.2).
The inspectors also reviewed the action plan (LC-2017-0090) associated with ES-LCR2017-0073 and discussed with the licensee the extent of condition as it related to
remediating the sub-foundation soils of the turbine building. The inspectors determined
that since the problems in the WTB remedial excavation work (see Section 3.1), the
licensee made significant improvements to prevent subsurface contamination during
remedial excavation.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of internal assessments and surveillances to
evaluate the implementation of the LACBWR audit program and verified that the
licensee had prepared and approved plans, with forms, that identify the assessment
scope, focus, and applicable criteria before the initiation of the assessment or
surveillance activity. The inspectors confirmed that the assessment reports contained a
review of the relevant decommissioning activities and associated documentation.
Specifically, the assessment forms were used to verify multiple areas, including the
environmental program, procedures, emergency response, external dosimetry, nuclear
materials accountability program, and air sampling for occupational workers. For
assessments or surveillances that resulted in findings, the inspectors verified that the
licensee had established a plan for corrective action, that the Corrective Action Review
Board (CARB) had reviewed and approved the corrective action, and then verified its
satisfactory completion and proper documentation.
The inspectors verified that the LACBWR QAPD and associated procedures provided
guidance for the indoctrination and training of auditors, lead auditors, and survey team
7

 members. The inspectors reviewed a sample of the training and qualification records of
the LACBWR auditors, lead auditors, and survey team members and confirmed that
auditing personnel had completed all required training and maintained qualification and
certification in accordance with the licensee’s policies and procedures. The inspectors
also verified that audit and survey teams were sufficiently qualified to evaluate areas
within the scope of the audit and that members of the CARB had the necessary
knowledge and experience in areas important to decommissioning.
Finally, the inspectors noted that as a result of ongoing self-assessments and other
oversight activities at the LACBWR site, the licensee implemented Procedure No.
LC-QA-PN-001, “Final Status Survey Quality Assurance Project Plan,” Revision 1, and
Procedure No. LC-FS-PR-002, “Final Status Survey Package Development,”
Revision 1. These procedures pertained to the decommissioning project activities
performed by the licensee and its subcontractors for the duration of the project
associated with the development and implementation of the LACBWR License
Termination Plan (LTP), including the historical site assessment, site characterization,
demonstration of compliance with license termination criteria, and FSS design. These
procedures were intended to ensure the adequacy, accuracy, and reproducibility of the
data being developed and used during the FSS process. The procedures stated that
effective implementation of radiological survey operations would be verified through
audit and surveillance activities, including self-assessments, and corrective actions
would be prescribed, implemented, and verified in the event any deficiencies were
identified.
c.

Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the licensee’s corrective actions were adequately
implemented in accordance with its CAP. The licensee’s auditing and decommissioning
safety review programs were being conducted and maintained in accordance with the
appropriate regulatory requirements as prescribed by the LACBWR QAPD.

1.4
a.

Maintenance and Surveillance (IP 62801)
Inspection Scope
The inspectors toured the site as well as reviewed records and procedures to assess
the proper operation of the radioactive liquid waste temporary system for discharging to
the Mississippi River and the HEPA exhaust system used during reactor building
demolition to limit radioactive material released to the atmosphere. Additionally, the
inspectors reviewed the site’s implementation of the FPP and conducted tours to verify
compliance with the program.

b.

Observations and Findings
With exception to the issue described in Section 2.2 of this report, the inspectors
concluded that the effluent releases from the temporary liquid waste discharge system
and HEPA exhaust system, used during reactor building demolition, were properly
maintained to satisfy the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).
In general, the inspectors found that the site maintained adequate fire protection
controls in accordance with the FPP. However, the inspectors identified a SL IV NCV of
8

 10 CFR 50.48(f)(3), “Fire Protection,” for the site’s failure to evaluate whether
eliminating the five site fire hydrants reduced the effectiveness of the FPP.
During the week of October 2, 2017, on a tour of the site, the inspectors became aware
that LACBWR’s five onsite fire hydrants were no longer available for fire protection
purposes and had not been available since June 14, 2017, when a leak occurred on the
High Pressure Service Water system. The original issue of the leak was documented in
the CAP in June as CR-2017-0036 and the site had implemented compensatory actions
in accordance with LC-FP-PN-001, “Fire Protection Program (FPP)”, Revision 0, which
states in section 4.5.6, “If the operability or capacity of the HPSW system has been
affected, notify the Genoa Fire Department of such to ensure that their Tanker Pumper
responds in the event of a fire. The Genoa Fire Department has the ability to use the
Mississippi River as a water source.” As of the October 2017 inspection, the licensee
had intended to make the compensatory actions permanent.
To the inspectors, the permanent abandonment of the onsite fire hydrants and the
permanent use of the offsite Genoa fire department to use the Mississippi River as the
primary water source to fight fires represented a possible reduction in the effectiveness
of the fire protection program which the licensee had not evaluated, and consequently
was a violation of 10 CFR 50.48(f)(3). The inspectors determined that the violation was
of more than minor significance because, if left uncorrected, the deficiency could lead to
a more significant safety concern in the event of an actual fire. Additionally, the
deficiency affects the 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1)(ii), “Fire Protection,” objectives to “rapidly
detect, control, and extinguish those fires that do occur and that could result in a
radiological hazard.”
Consistent with the guidance in Section 1.2.6.D of the NRC Enforcement Manual, if a
violation does not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy Violation Examples, it
should be assigned a severity level: (1) commensurate with its safety significance; and
(2) informed by similar violations addressed in the Violation Examples. The issue was
not found to match any of the Enforcement Policy Violation Examples; however, the
issue was screened as having very low safety significance, SL IV, since other
equipment was available at the site and the Genoa Fire Department was capable of
using the Mississippi River as a water source during this timeframe to extinguish any
potential fires.
10 CFR 50.48(f)(3), “Fire Protection,” states, in part, that the “licensee may make
changes to the fire protection program without NRC approval if these changes do not
reduce the effectiveness of the fire protection program.” Contrary to the above, from
June 14 to October 2, 2017, the licensee made a change to the fire protection program
without NRC approval but did not evaluate if these changes reduced the effectiveness
of the fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee eliminated the use of five
onsite fire hydrants and the High Pressure Service Water system for fighting onsite fires
and instead relied on the use of an offsite fire department to pump water from the
nearby Mississippi River to fight fires. The licensee placed this issue into the CAP as
CR-2018-0004 and approved a fire protection evaluation for the change on October 9,
2017. This violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the
NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000409/2017001-01, Failure to Evaluate Fire
Protection Program Changes)

9

 c.

Conclusions
The inspectors identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.48(f)(3), “Fire Protection,” for the
site’s failure to evaluate whether eliminating the site’s five fire hydrants reduced the
effectiveness of the FPP.

2.0

Radiological Safety

2.1

Occupational Radiation Exposure (IP 83750)

a.

Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed work instructions, As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable
(ALARA) pre-job reviews, and radiation work permits (RWPs) associated with the
decontamination of facilities to meet the contamination verification survey (CVS) limits
for future open air demolition. The inspectors reviewed the characterization surveys of
contaminated piping and system components conducted prior to removal to determine
the need for respirator protection and the adequacy of RWPs. The inspectors reviewed
the external exposure records and the air sampling results to evaluate the internal
exposures. The inspectors also interviewed various licensee health physics staff and
supervisors.

b.

Observations and Findings
The radiological planning of the health physics staff pre-job meeting provided adequate
radiation protection coverage, and the ALARA reviews were effective in minimizing
unnecessary doses. All licensee personnel were knowledgeable about the hazards of
the evolutions being performed and the proper radiation protection protocols for any
radiological incidents. The personnel exposures were well below 10 CFR Part 20 limits.
During 2017, site radiation workers received a total external exposure of 6422 mrem.
The highest annual dose total for any one individual was 461 mem.
Based on the review of air sampling results and a respirator protection factor (PF) of
1000, the inspectors concluded that the workers received insignificant internal
exposures.

c.

Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the licensee continued to be effective in controlling
radiation worker personal exposure.

2.2
a.

Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring (IP 84750)
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensee’s activities to effectively control, monitor, and
quantify releases of radioactive materials in liquid and particulate forms to the
environment. The inspectors observed and reviewed the results of the CVS of the
WTB, turbine building, piping and ventilation tunnels, the common area of reactor and
turbine buildings, and the waste gas tank vault. The inspectors reviewed the operating
10

 instruction for the reactor containment HEPA ventilation system, and evaluated the
HEPA ventilation systems during the demolition of internal components of the reactor
building and the representative air sampling of effluent release.
b.

Observations and Findings
The licensee set up continuous air sampling stations around the boundary of the
radiological controlled area during demolition. The CVS results met the open air
demolition limits as stated in the LTP. Based on the review of the air sampling results,
the inspector determined that no radionuclides were identified except naturally
occurring radionuclides.
The HEPA intakes were located on the eastern wall of the reactor building. There were
two HEPA banks, each equipped with four HEPA units, which provided airflow of
approximately 16,000 cubic feet per minute. This airflow provided about one air change
per hour for the reactor building and the adjoined tent. The HEPA ventilation system
had maintained adequate negative pressure during demolition activities in the reactor
building and the waste loadout in the tent. During demolition, the licensee performed
hourly checks of the HEPA pre-filter differential pressure (DP) and daily checks of the
HEPA DP to ensure timely replacement of the filter to reduce the filter loading and
maintain the proper flow. Currently, the air sampling of the HEPA exhaust had not
shown any detectable licensed material. The minimum detectable concentration
sensitivity of the analysis equipment was well below 10 CFR Part 20 limits.
The inspectors also reviewed liquid effluent discharges and the details of
URI 05000409/2016002, “Inadvertent Release to Storm Drain.” The URI describes the
unintentional discharge of contaminated water from the East Baker Water Storage Tank
to the Mississippi River that occurred on February 23, 2017. The URI was opened to
track the issue as the discharge occurred at the closure of the last inspection period.
The inadvertent release was reported to the NRC in Event Number 52575 and is also
tracked in the Nuclear Material Events Database as Item Number 170122. As
described in the Event Notification, a hose inadvertently left in-place from a previous
pumping activity siphoned the contents of the East Baker Water Storage Tank into the
berm around the tank which ultimately overflowed onto the ground and into a storm
water drain leading to the Mississippi River. Upon further review, one SL IV NCV of
10 CFR 50.54(a)(1) was self-revealed for the site’s failure to implement the quality
assurance program.
Section 1.1 of Appendix C of the NRC-approved QAPD, Revision 29, states “written
procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the Plant
decommissioning activities referenced below and in Section 2.0.” Section 1.1.3 lists the
Radiation Protection Program implementation and Section 2.2 lists the ODCM. As such
the QAPD establishes that the ODCM shall be implemented in accordance with written
procedures. At the site, the ODCM was procedure LC-RP-PG-005.
Section 4.2.2e of LC-RP-PG-005, Revision 3, states that “prior to discharge,
representative sample(s) will be analyzed after the liquid effluent has been processed
through an appropriate filtration and demineralizer system.” Failing to sample and
analyze the water from the berm of the East Baker Water Storage Tank prior to the
inadvertent discharge is contrary to the requirements of the ODCM and subsequently a
violation of 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1) for failing to follow the quality assurance program.
11

 The inspectors determined that the violation was more than minor using Inspection
Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, example 6.e. This example was similar in
that the water in the East Baker Water Storage Tank, after sampling, had detectable
levels of radionuclides above background and was inadvertently released to an
uncontrolled area.
Consistent with the guidance in Section 1.2.6.D of the NRC Enforcement Manual, if a
violation does not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy Violation Examples, it
should be assigned a severity level: (1) commensurate with its safety significance; and
(2) informed by similar violations addressed in the Violation Examples. The inspectors
concluded that the significance of the violation was a SL IV as it was similar to
Enforcement Policy example 6.7.d.4 in that the licensee failed to perform a required test
prior to discharge. The violation was determined to not be of higher significance based
on a dose assessment to the general public using the site’s ODCM methodology. The
doses to the organ and whole body were estimated to be 1.05 x 10-2 and 5.72 x 10-3
mrem, respectively, which were well below the limits stated in Appendix I of 10 CFR
Part 50.
10 CFR 50.54(a)(1), “Conditions of License,” states, in part, that “each nuclear power
plant or fuel reprocessing plant licensee subject to the quality assurance criteria in
appendix B of this part shall implement, under §50.34(b)(6)(ii) or §52.79 of this chapter,
the quality assurance program described or referenced in the safety analysis report,
including changes to that report.” Contrary to the above, on February 23, 2017, the
licensee failed to implement the quality assurance program requirement to implement
the ODCM which requires sampling liquid effluents prior to discharge.
Upon identification that the discharge occurred, the licensee took steps to stop the
discharge, including removing the hose that was siphoning the contents of the tank into
the berm. The licensee then promptly accessed the storm water drains to collect
samples and blocked the drainage pipe to stop any further discharges to the Mississippi
River. The remaining water in the storm drain was pumped back to the East Baker
Water Storage Tank and the site commenced surveys to quantify the extent of the
contamination. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as CR-2017-0012.
Additional corrective actions included relocating the East Baker Water Storage Tank
from the vicinity of storm drains and the development of job aids and work instructions
to assist in pumping activities. Additionally, the ODCM and the procedures controlling
discharges were reviewed to ensure there were no procedural weaknesses. Because
this issue was of very low safety significance (SL IV) and was entered into the CAP, this
violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement
Policy. URI 05000409/2016002, “Inadvertent Release to Storm Drain,” is closed.
(NCV 05000409/2017001-02, Inadvertent Release to Storm Drain)
c.

Conclusions
One SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1) was self-revealed for the site’s failure to
implement the quality assurance program when an inadvertent discharge of
contaminated water occurred to the Mississippi River from the East Baker Water
Storage Tank.

12

 2.3
a.

Transportation of Radioactive Materials (IP 86750)
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed radioactive waste shipping documents for selected shipments
and conducted interviews of the responsible individual to ensure compliance with NRC
and U.S. DOT regulations.

b.

Observations and Findings
The licensee shipped the waste generated from demolishing the stack and turbine
building, and removed and shipped insulation, metal sheeting, and piping from the
reactor building. This material was sent to the disposal site in Clive, Utah. All the
wastes were NRC Class A waste and a DOT Type A quantity of Low Specific Activity
(LSA)-II material.
The licensee’s shipping manifests showed that personnel packaged, labeled, and
marked each shipping container according to the DOT and 10 CFR Part 71
transportation requirements. The licensee verified that the results of radiation and
removable contamination levels were within applicable limits. The waste manifest
included all required information.

c.

Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the licensee had complied with NRC and DOT
regulations for shipments of radioactive waste.

3.0

Confirmatory Surveys

3.1

Final Status Surveys at Permanently Shutdown Reactors (IP 83801)

a.

Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the licensee conduct FSSs and reviewed the sample results of
sub-foundation soils of the WTB, pipe tunnel, reactor plant/generator plant common
area, and stack. The inspectors also conducted verification surveys of the waste gas
tank vault and warehouse subsoil excavation areas. The inspectors verified the
calibration of the on-site germanium-lithium (Ge(Li)) and high purity germanium
detectors used to analyze the soil samples.

b.

Observations and Findings
The licensee conducted 100% walk-over scans and collected biased and systematic
soil samples in accordance with the FSS plan. Prior to the verification surveys
conducted by the inspectors, the licensee’s FSS sample results were well below the
operational Derived Concentration Guideline Levels (DCGLs), which were set at 25% of
the base DCGLs (55 picoCuriesi/gram (pCi/g) of Cs-137, 12 pCi/g of Co-60) from the
LTP.
The inspectors conducted surface scans of the waste gas tank vault and identified only
one elevated area near the sump; however, the average concentration of the elevated
area was below the DCGL stated in the LTP. The inspectors conducted surface scans
13

 on warehouse 1, 2, and 3 subsoil excavation areas and no readings could be
distinguished from background. The scan minimum detectable concentration (MDC)
was 12.5% of the DCGL of Cs-137 stated in the LTP, well below the operational DCGL.
The inspectors reviewed the sampling results from the licensee’s FSS and only
naturally occurring radionuclides were identified.
During a verification survey south of the WTB basement foundation cap on
September 12, 2017, NRC inspectors identified elevated readings in an area where,
after further surveying by the licensee and excavation, unexpected higher levels of
residual contamination on soil and concrete debris were identified. During the initial
survey by the inspectors, the elevated area, of about 30 square feet, had contact
readings that ranged from approximately 10 to 20K (K, thousand) counts per minute
(cpm). The background, with a 2”x2” NaI (sodium iodide) detector, was about 10K cpm.
A soil sample collected at the 20K cpm location contained 13.3 pCi/g of Cs-137 and
0.16 pCi/g of Co-60. Since the Cs-137 concentration was close to the operational
DCGL, the licensee decided to remediate (by removing soil for disposal) the elevated
area. As licensee staff removed soil, licensee personnel identified additional hot spots
exceeding 20K cpm. Soil removal continued until readings of the excavated area were
background. The highest reading among the hot spots subsequently identified by the
licensee, following the initial survey by the inspectors, was about 1.4 million cpm and
the associated concentrations of Cs-137, Co-60, and Am-241 were about 210, 24, and
2.6 pCi/g, respectively. The licensee eventually excavated some concrete debris and
approximately 70 cubic yards of additional soil of which about 4 to 5 cubic yards
exceeded the operational DCGL. After completion of the excavation, the licensee
performed 100% walk over scans at the excavation area and took 3 one–meter-depth
core samples at the boundary of the excavation. The inspectors observed the
walk-over scan and verified the results did not exceed the background radiation level.
The inspectors also observed the core samplings and verified all samples contained
less than 0.2 pCi/g of Cs-137. At this time, the inspectors determined that the licensee
had adequately remediated the sub- foundation soil and the licensee proceeded to
backfill the excavation areas.
The licensee subsequently concluded, after an inquiry on October 4, 2017, from the
NRC inspectors about a delay by the licensee of entering the September 12th issue into
the site CAP, that the unexpected contaminated soil and concrete debris occurred
because an equipment operator inadvertently had not removed all concrete/foundation
material during the original demolition of the WTB foundation and this oversight was not
noticed because of intermittent radiation protection coverage during the removal of the
foundation. After the licensee entered the issue into the CAP and completed its
investigation, it took extensive corrective action, including the short-term stoppage of all
demolition and FSS activities, revisions of procedures, and discussions with demolition
and radiation protection staff. Because the additional excavation on September 12,
invalidated some previous soil samples, the licensee also subsequently conducted
Geo-probing of 15 new systematic locations for soil samples in the WTB FSS soil
excavation area. All the samples collected beneath the excavation areas contained
only naturally occurring radionuclides.
Based on these observations, the inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 20.1501,
“General,” for the licensee’s failure to perform necessary surveys during the demolition
of the WTB foundation that may be necessary for the licensee to ensure compliance
with 10 CFR 20.1402, “Radiological Criteria for Unrestricted Use,” which requires that
the residual radioactivity that is distinguishable from background radiation result in the
14

 Total Effective Dose Equivalent to an average member of the critical group that does
not exceed 25 mrem per year and that the residual radioactivity has been reduced to
levels that are ALARA. The inspectors determined that the violation of 10 CFR 20.1501
was of more than minor significance because it was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E,
example 6.e, in that, after additional excavation of the survey unit, additional and
unexpected hot spots were identified that exceeded background—1.4 million cpm
compared to a 10K cpm background. Additionally, had the NRC inspectors not
performed verification surveys, it is likely that the area would have been backfilled
without further remediation, and the NRC inspectors needed to prompt the licensee to
enter the issue into the CAP.
Consistent with the guidance in Section 1.2.6.D of the NRC Enforcement Manual, if a
violation does not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy Violation Examples, it
should be assigned a severity level: (1) commensurate with its safety significance; and
(2) informed by similar violations addressed in the Violation Examples. The inspectors
did not find an example in the NRC’s enforcement guidance that was similar to this
issue. However, the inspectors concluded that the concern was not of higher
significance given that a DCGL was not exceeded; therefore, the issue screened as
SL IV.
10 CFR 20.1501, “General,” requires, in part, that each licensee make or cause to be
made, surveys of areas, including the subsurface that may be necessary for the
licensee to comply with the regulations in this part. Survey means an evaluation of the
radiological conditions and potential hazards incident to the products, use, transfer,
release, disposal, or presence of radioactive material or other sources of radiation.
Contrary to the above, prior to September 12, 2017, the licensee did not make surveys
to assure that the radiological criteria for unrestricted release and ALARA requirements
of 10 CFR 20.1402 were met when contaminated soil and concrete was inadvertently
left during excavation of the WTB foundation and surveys failed to identify the condition.
The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as CR-2017-073 and created an action
plan to improve the remedial excavation works of the turbine building, diesel generator
building, and reactor plant/generator plant area sump. Because this issue was of very
low safety significance (SL IV) and was entered into the CAP, this violation is being
treated as an NCV, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
(NCV 05000409/2017001-03, Inadequate Surveys of WTB Foundation)
c.

Conclusions
The inspectors identified one SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501, “General,” for the
licensee’s failure to perform necessary surveys of the subsurface that may be
necessary for the licensee to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1402, “Radiological
Criteria for Unrestricted Use.” The inspectors determined that the licensee had properly
remediated and performed FSSs of the waste gas tank vault and sub-foundation soils of
the pipe tunnel, reactor plant/generator plant common area, stack, and warehouse
areas. After additional remediation, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had also
properly performed FSSs of the WTB area.

15

 4.0

Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Nowak on January 11, 2018.
The licensee did not identify any of the documents or processes reviewed by the
inspector as proprietary.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

16

 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
*J. Nowak, Director LaCrosseSolutions
*J. Ashley, Licensing Engineer
*J. Jacobsen, Radiation Protection Manager
*C. Olson, ISFSI Manager
*G. Peterschmidt, Radiation Safety Supervisor
J. Spaide, D&D Manager
G. Tulley, Health and Safety Manager
J. Webb, FSS Supervisor
*J. Werner, QA Manager
*S. Zoller, FSS Manager
* Indicates present at exit meeting
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37801
IP 40801
IP 62801
IP 71801
IP 83750
IP 83801
IP 84750
IP 86750

Safety Reviews, Design Changes and Modifications
Self-Assessment, Auditing, and Corrective Actions
Maintenance and Surveillance
Decommissioning Performance and Status Review
Occupational Radiation Exposure
Final Status Surveys at Permanently Shutdown Reactors
Effluent and Environmental Monitoring
Transportation of Radioactive Materials
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened
05000409/2017001-01

Type
NCV

05000409/2017001-02
05000409/2017001-03

NCV
NCV

Closed
05000409/2017001-01

Type
NCV

05000409/2017001-02
05000409/2017001-03

NCV
NCV

05000409/2016002

URI

Summary
Failure to Evaluate Fire Protection
Program Changes
Inadvertent Release to Storm Drain
Inadequate Surveys of WTB
Foundation
Summary
Failure to Evaluate Fire Protection
Program Changes
Inadvertent Release to Storm Drain
Inadequate Surveys of WTB
Foundation
Inadvertent Release to Storm Drain

Discussed
None

Attachment

 PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list
does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
- Assessment of the FSS of the Waste Treatment Building Sub-Foundation Excavation;
October 12, 2017
- ES-LCR-2017-0011; Radiation Safety Program Violation
- ES-LCR-2017-0012; Baker Tank Containment Berm Overflow and Release
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0021; Turbine Building Demolition Did Not Occur as Planned
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0022; Penhall Safety Stand Down
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0027; LACBWR FSS Package Review and Corrections
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0031; Some Drawings Provided in LTP to NRC Not Fully Accurate
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0033; Formal Process Controls Should Be Developed for Modifying the
LTP
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0034; Final Status Survey Administrative Controls Need to be Modified
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0036; High Pressure Service Water Line Leak
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0046; Well Water Line Leak
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0047; ANI Letter - Open Air Demolition at LACBWR
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0048; DOT Inspection
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0049; Employee Concerns 2017-02 and 2017-03”
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0051; Changes Made as Listed in Decommissioning Plan Not Evaluated
- ES-LCR-CR-2017-0073; Survey Unit 010-101-C WTB Subfoundation
- ES-LCR-CR-2018-0004; Failure to Perform a Prompt Evaluation of a Degraded Fire
Protection Condition
- GM Memo 2017-01; Summary of LACBWR Suspension of Remediation, Excavation, and
Final Status Survey Work; October 14, 2017
- QA Surveillance Report S-16-002; Fire Protection Program; September 14, 2016
- LC-2017-0090; LACBWR Action Plan; October 18, 2017
- LC-FP-PN-001; LACBWR Station Fire Protection Plan; Revision 0
- LC-FP-PR-001; Monthly Fire Prevention Inspection; Revision 0
- LC-FP-PR-002; Fire Extinguisher Inspection; Revision 0
- LC-FP-PR-005; LACBWR Protocol for Genoa Fire Department Response; Revision 0
- LC-AD-PR-004; Corrective Action Program; Revision 1
- LC-RP-PG-005; Offsite Dose Calculation Manual; Revision 3
- La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Quality Assurance Program Description; Revision 29
- La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Decommissioning Plan and Post-Shutdown
Decommissioning Activities Report; June 2016
- La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Quality Assurance Program Description; Revision 29
- LC-AD-PR-0004; LACBWR Site Restoration Project Corrective Action Program; Revision 1
- LC-QA-PN-001, LACBWR Site Restoration Project Final Status Survey Quality Assurance
Project Plan; Revision 1
- LC-QA-PR-001; LACBWR Site Restoration Project QA Program Implementation; Revision 1
- LC-FS-PR-002; LACBWR Site Restoration Project Work Control Procedure Final Status
Survey Package Development; Revision 1
- LC-RA-PR-001; LACBWR Site Restoration Project Work Control Procedure Regulatory
Reviews; Revision 2
- LC-QA-PR-002; Quality Assessments; Revision
2

 -

QA Audit A-16-01; Implementation of QAPD for ISFSI Subcontractor Role; Revision 1
QA Surveillance Report S-16-003; Oversight of DPC ISFSI Audit; September 27, 2016
QA Surveillance Report S-17-007; Project Training Records; June 12, 2017
QA Surveillance Report S-17-009; Final Status Survey (FSS) and License Termination
Program; June 13, 2017
QA Surveillance Report S-17-011; Selected Decontamination and Demolition Activities;
September 12, 2017
50.82 Decommissioning Impact Evaluation No. 2016-02; Procedure No. D-Plan/PSDAR –
Revision No. June 2016
50.59 Screening No. 2016-003; LACBWR Request for Partial Site Release; Revision 0
50.59 Screening No. 2016-01; Radioactive Material Identification and Control Process;
Revision 0
Report No. LC-RP-PR-0001; ALARA Review – Reactor Building and Associated Tent
Containment Structure; Revision 0
Job Aid No. LC-JA-01; Management Observation Program; Revision 0
Health and Safety Excellence Team Agendas dated May 8, 2017, June 12, 2017, June 19,
2017, July 31, 2017, August 7, 2017, and August 14, 201

3

 INITIALISMS AND ACRONYMS
ADAMS
ALARA
CAP
CARB
CFR
cpm
CR
CVS
DCGL
DOT
DNMS
DP
FPP
FSS
HEPA
HSET
IMA
IMC
ISFSI
K
LACBWR
LTP
LSA
MOP
NCV
NRC
ODCM
ORC
pCi/g
PSDAR
QAPD
QTR
RG
RWP
SL
SRC
URI
WTB

Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable
Corrective Action Program
Corrective Action Review Board
Code of Federal Regulations
Counts per Minute
Condition Report
Contamination Verification Survey
Derived Concentration Guideline Level
Department of Transportation
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Differential Pressure
Fire Protection Program
Final Status Survey
High Efficiency Particulate Air
Health and Safety Excellence Team
Independent Management Assessment
Inspection Manual Chapter
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
Thousand
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor
License Termination Plan
Low Specific Activity
Management Observation Program
Non-Cited Violation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Operation Review Committee
PicoCuries/gram
Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report
Quality Assurance Program Document
Qualified Technical Reviewer
Regulatory Guide
Radiation Work Permit
Severity Level
Safety Review Committee
Unresolved Item
Waste Treatment Building

4