IN THE CHANCERY COURT FOR KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Plaintiff, ?3:5 ?23 v. No. 194873-1 if: 79 E) KNOX COUNTY RETIREMENT AND g3, PENSION BOARD, and 2 CS LISA BIGWOOD, ROBERT CALDWELL, JAMES PRITCHARD, RENEE RICKER, BENEFICIARY 0F DENNIS RICKER, STELLA L. CATLETT, J. DAVID YOKLEY, and GREGORY A. GASS, Defendants. MOTION TO DISMISS IN THE ALTERNATIVE DISQUALIFY THE KNOX COUNTY LAW OFFICE, CURRENT COUNSEL, AND ANYONE WHO HAS COMMUNICATED WITH THE KNOX COUNTY LAW OFFICE OR CURRENT COUNSEL REGARDING REPRESENTATION OF KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE IN THIS MATTER Defendant, Knox County Retirement and Pension Board (?Defendant?), by and through counsel, and moves this Honorable Court pursuant to rules 9.01, 1202(7) and (8) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss this action and/or in the alternative moves the Court for an Order disqualifying Keith H. Burroughs, Jonathan D. Reed, Melissa B. Carrasco, and any other member of the law ?rm of Egerton, McAfee, Armistead Davis, RC. (?Plaintist Counsel?), the Knox County Law Director, Richard B. the Chief Deputy Law Director, David Buuck, the Deputy County Law Director, David Wigler, the other members of the Knox County Law Director?s of?ce, and any attorneys who have communicated with with the Knox County Law Director?s Of?ce or Plaintiff Counsel regarding representation of Knox County, Tennessee, from representing the putative Plaintiff in this case. The grounds for this Motion are as follows: A. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 9.01 and 12.02(8) Plaintiff lacks the capacity to sue in this matter. The Knox County Charter states that elected or appointed of?cer or employee of the County shall employ any other attorney to represent the County or any officer, board, or member of the Commission unless he/she shall ?rst be authorized and empowered to do so by resolution of the Commission.? Charter of Knox County, Tennessee, Article Section As is set forth in the Complaint, Plaintiff Counsel have filed this action on behalf of Knox County Tennessee. See First Amended Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Certiorari and Judicial Review (?Complaint?). Further, Plaintiff?s Counsel has signed the veri?cation of the Complaint certifying the truth of the statements of the complaint as a representative/Witness of Knox County. See Complaint, p. 30. The duly elected Law Director for Knox County is Richard B. Plaintiff?s Counsel is not the Knox County Law Director (?Law Director?), nor is there any evidence contained within the record that Plaintiff?s Counsel is an employee of the Director. . Further, there is nothing contained within the Complaint evidencing any resolution by the Knox County Commission authorizing Plaintiff?s Counsel to represent Knox County nor evidencing any authorization to speak on behalf of Knox County as its agent or representative. The act of Plaintiff?s Counsel in signing the verification statement on behalf of Knox County instead of obtaining the 'signature of a representative of Knox County government with ?rsthand knowledge of such matters is further evidence of the lack of authorization for such actions. As such, Plaintiff Counsel is not qualified to file suit on behalf of Knox County. While it is true that the Knox County Charter states that ?the Law Director shall have authority, within the budget approved by the County Commission for this purpose, to hire outside counsel when, in the judgment of the Law Director, such is necessary for the fulfillment of his/her duties under the Section,? there is nothing contained within the record evidencing either the hiring of Plaintiff?s Counsel or the necessity for such. Charter of Knox County, Tennessee, Article Section 3.0803). Additionally, even if the Law Director did hire Plaintiff? Counsel, the Law Director himself does not have the capacity to sue in this matter. The Knox County Charter de?nes the duty of the Law Director as ?to execute and administer all of the legal affairs of the County. . .and to advise and counsel County of?cials and the Commission on all legal matters a?eeting their respective offices.? Charter of Knox County, Tennessee, Article Section (Emphasis added). There is nothing contained within the Knox County Charter which gives the Law Director the ability to make decisions as the entity ?Knox County,? it merely defines the Law Director?s role as representative counsel for said entity. Further, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 1.2 states ?a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carryout the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter.? Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 1.2. There are no resolutions of the Knox County Commission authorizing this suit on behalf of Knox County, there are no resolutions of the Knox County Commission authorizing the Law Director to hire Plaintiff?s Counsel to bring this suit on behalf of Knox County, there are no resolutions of the Knox County Commission authorizing Plaintiffs Counsel to speaker make veri?ed statements as anger-gent of Knox County, and there are no meeting minutes from any Knox County Commission meeting Where any of these issues were discussed. Without the authority granted by the Knox County Commission, the Law Director is acting outside of the Knox County Charter, as well as Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 1.2, in bringing this action and therefore lacks the capacity to sue. Even if Plaintiff Counsel was in fact hired by the Law Director, the Law Director cannot pass to Plaintist Counsel authority which it itself lacks. B. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(7) The Complaint fails to join necessary parties as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. 1. All current participants and retirees in the UOPP are necessary parties because they have an interest relating to the subject matter of this action and the disposition of this action may impair or impede their ability to protect that interest. In this suit, Plaintiff Counsel is asking the Court to make a ?nding declaring that leave, including accrued leave cashout in calculation of retirement bene?ts, under the Uniformed Of?cers Pension Plan is unlawful and ultra vires. See Complaint, p. 28, 1] 2. Plaintiff?s Counsel further asks the Court to require Retiree Defendants to be required to repay any overpayments of pension bene?ts under the UOPP. See Complaint, p. 29, 11 7. However, if Plaintiff?s Counsel?s allegations are found to be correct, the reach of that ?nding would not be limited solely to the Retiree Defendants named by Plaintiff?s Counsel. If Plaintiff Counsel?s allegations are found to be correct, then Defendant would have a ?duciary duty to recover payments from all retired participants and bene?ciaries in the UOPP. Further, not only does this affect past payments, but it also affects current participants in their emplOyinent decisions, contribution decisions, and bene?ts. In Johnson v. Rat. Program Plan for Emples., No.: 3:05?cva588, 2007 US. Dist. LEXIS 14595 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 27, 2007), Judge 'Varlan upheld the actions of a retirement plan ?duciary in recouping erroneously paid retirement bene?ts from a plan participant. The court noted that the Restatement cf Trusts (Second) 250 provides that a trustee has made a payment out of trust property to one of several bene?ciaries to which the bene?ciary was not entitled, his bene?cial interest is subject to a charge for the repayment Id. at *20. The court held that in a particular case, the plan ?duciary ?must balance the impact of overpayments upon plan bene?ciaries at large against the equitable treatment of the individuals from whom overpayments are sought.? Id. at W18-19. The court further held that if the ?duciary's decision was rational, and not arbitrary and capricious, its decision must be upheld. Id. at 18. In Sheward v. Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC, No. 2010 US. Dist. LEXIS 19696 (ED. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2010), Judge Phillips held that a retirement plan ?duciary was obligated to recover overpayments mistakenly made: Failure to correct the error and recover the overpayments would have violated ?duciary duty to act on behalf of the trust and in the interests of the remaining participants and bene?ciaries. Id. at *17. See also City of Minneapolis 1). Minneapolis Police Relief 800 165, 178 (Minn. App. 2011) (sustaining trial court's order to Association to recoup overpaid bene?ts from its members because-the recipients ?do not have a right to overpayment of pension bene?ts?). The Restatement and cases such as those cited above are consistent with Tennessee statutes. Tenn. Code Ann. 8?36?116 expressly provides that it is ?the intent of the general assembly. . .to collect amounts that have been overpaid in error to members or bene?ciaries. . The statute further provides that recovery of overpayments I can be waived only in limited circumstances. The above authorities make clear that if Plaintiff Counsel?s theory is correct, the Board could have a ?duciary duty to recover what Plaintiff?s Counsel contends are illegal overpayments to UOPP participants. Because of the potential ?nancial risk to the participants if Plaintiff?s Counsel were to succeed in convincing the Court that the alleged overpayments were improper, plan participants must be afforded the ?ability to protect that interest" under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 19.1. Tennessee Case law requires mandatory joinder under similar circumstances. See, e. 5 Huntsville Utility District of Scott Cnty. v. General Trust Co., 839 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), where the court held thatutility customers and bond holders were necessary parties to a suit challenging the manner in which the utility board members were elected. The court held that the customers were necessary parties because ?utility districts exist and operate for the bene?t of their customers? and the issue was whether they had "a personal stake in the outcome of the Id. at 400-01. Similarly, in this case the UOPP exists and operates for the bene?t of the plan participants, both current and retiree. Current and retiree participants of the UOPP clearly have a ?stake in the outcome? of this case where the Court is asked to hold that retirement payments to them are illegal and that could if the Plaintiffs Counsel?s theory were correct result in efforts to reduce and recoup participant bene?ts. See also City of Knoxville v. City of Knoxville Pension Bel, No. 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 866 (Tenn. App. Dec. 14, 2012). In that case, the City argued that the Pension Board's actions would cost the City a large sum of money in the form of additional retirement income for the plan participants. The court held that the City?s argument caused the participants to ?clearly have an interest in, and, are directly impacted by, the judgment of the Trial Court.? Id. at *16. They therefore had standing to appeal. The Huntsville Utility District court'als'o held that the bond holders'were necessary parties, beCause if the plaintiffs contention resulted in ?a substantial impairment of - contract, then the other party to that contract [the bondholders] must be joined.? Huntsville Utility District, 839 at 403. Plaintiff" Counsel's interpretation of the UOPP would constitute ?a substantial impairment of [the UOPP participant?s] contract.? Id. They therefore are necessary parties to this action. It is for these reasons that'all current and retiree members of the UOPP are necessary parties and . must be joined in this action under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. 2. Failure to join all UOPP participants is fatal to Plaintiff?s claim. Under Tenn. Code Ann. when seeking declaratory judgment, ?all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceedings.? Tenn. Code Ann. 29-14?107. Tennessee Courts have found that the Declaratory Judgment Act, Tenn. Code Ann 29-14?101 'et seq., ?imposes stricter requirements than those imposed generally by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure requiring the joinder of indispensable parties in all types of cases.? immins v. Lindsey, 310 834, 839 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). The Court has further found that ?[t]he non-joinder of necessary parties is fatal on the question of justiciability, which, in a suit for a declaratory judgment, is a necessary condition of judicial relief.? Huntsville, 839 at 400 (citing Wright v. Nashville Gas Heating C0. 194 459, 461 (Tenn. 1946)). In Huntsville, the Court stated that if a ?nding was reached, ?bondholders who were not parties to the litigation would not be bound by the courts? decision.? Huntsville, 839 at 403 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. 29?14407). This created a situation where the bondholders could ?le additional suits, which could result in inconsistent court rulings and unnecessary duplicative litigation. Thus, according to the Court, ?[t]he interest of judicial economy dictate[d] that the bondholders be made parties so these issues can be resolved once and for all. For this reason, Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure requires joinder of the bondholders. Huntsville, 839 404. For the reasons outlined above, all current and retiree members of the UOPP are necessary parties. As a necessary party, any current or retiree members of the UOPP not joined in this matter would not be bound by this Court?s decision. As in Huntsville, the existence of necessary parties not bound by the litigation creates the possibility of future cases, inconsistent rulings, and unnecessary duplicative litigation. The failure to join all current and retiree members of the UOPP in this matter is therefore fatal to Plaintiff 5 action and therefore, the action must be dismissed. C. Plaintiff?s Counsel must be disquali?ed due to con?ict of interest. This case is a companion and mirror to a case ?led in Knox County Circuit Court, Knox Cnty. v. WiZZiam Mason, at 011., Docket No. 1?435?17 (?Circuit Court Matter?). The Circuit Court Matter is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Large portions of the facts recited in the Complaint for the Circuit Court Matter are identical to the facts in the Complaint for this matter with many of the other facts being substantially similar in nature.1 Due to the interrelation of the two matters as well as the identical factual nexus, the analysis of Plaintiff Counsel?s con?ict in this matter requires a review of the con?ict of the Knox County Law Director in the Circuit Court Matter. The Law Director ?led the Circuit Court Matter. However, the Law Director and his of?ce have a con?ict of interest that precludes their representation of both Knox County and the Defendant in the Circuit Court Matter.2 Absent informed, written consent, the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct forbid an attorney from representing one client in a matter adverse to a former client when the matter inyolves the same or a substantially. related subject matter and the present client?s interests are materially adverse to the former client. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 1.9. The-Law Director previously represented the Defendant in connection with a suit brought against the Defendant by Sgt. Gass The issues in that suit were substantially related to those in this one, the proper 1 The similarities are such that the Complaint in this matter contains many irrelevant and unrelated-facts dealing with a fraudulent concealment allegation in the Circuit Court Matter. 2 In the Circuit Court Matter, the Knox County Law Director ?led the action both on behalf of Knox County governinent as well as the Knox County Retirement and Pension Board (as involuntary plaintiff) claiming to represent both entities, whereas in this matter the lawsuit has been ?led against the Knox County Retirement and Pension Board. 8 interpretation of the Uniformed Of?cers Pension Plan and the propriety of UOPP bene?ts based on leave cashout payments. In the Circuit Court Matter, the Law Director has taken a position adverse to the Defendant. The Law Director has accused it of engaging in conduct that is unlawful and ultra vires. Exhibit A, 11 11 158, 173, 226, 227, 358. He has accused the Defendant of breaching its fiduciary duty. Id. 11 11 120; 126. Because the Law Director is taking a position adverse to his former client in a substantially related matter, his representation in the Circuit Court Matter, as well as in this matter, is in violation of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 1.9. In addition, all members of his of?ce and any other attorneys with whom he has consulted regarding representation of Knox County, Tennessee in this case are disquali?ed from participating in this matter. See Manning v. Fort Deposit Bank, 619 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) attorney will be disquali?ed if the subject matter of the present suit is ?substantially related? to the work done for the former client?); Mile v. Crane, No. 66, 1987 Term. App. LEXIS 3179, at *10 (Ct. App. Apr. 10, 1987) (?It has long been ?rmly established, both in the Canons of Professional Ethics and by judicial opinions, that attorneys cannot represent con?icting interests or undertake to discharge inconsistent duties. When an attorney has once been engaged and received the con?dences of his client, he cannot enter the services of those Whose interests are adverse to that of his client or former client?). The impropriety of the Law Director?s role in the Circuit Court Matter is highlighted by the fact that his actions in ?ling Exhibit A potentially breached the attorney client privilege that belongs to the Defendant. In Outpost Solar, LLC v. Henry, Henry Underwood, P. C, No. 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 841 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2016), the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that where a plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action sought to defeat a statute of limitations defense by relying upon the discovery rule, it waived the attorney- client privilege. In the Circuit Court Matter, the Complaint prepared by the Law Director alleges that the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations. Exhibit A, 11 11 257-60. By invoking the discovery rule in an effort to toll the statute of limitations, the Law Director has potentially violated the attorney?client privilege, which belongs to the Defendant. The Defendant has not agreed to waive the attorney-client privilege, so the Law Director?s actions constitute an unauthorized breach of that privilege. In addition, Defendants request the opportunity to present additional materials for the Court?s in camera consideration in connection with the Law Director?s and his staff?s additional violations of the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine in the discovery served by the Law Director with his Complaint. The Defendant cannot discuss those matters in this publicly-?led Motion because to do so would potentially violate the Defendant?s attorney-client privilege, which the Defendant has not agreed to waive. The Law Director?s con?ict has other dimensions. He has claimed that the Defendant has acted illegally and fraudulently and has caused it to be sued, based upon information acquired while representing the Pension Board. Based upon Exhibit A, the Law Director?s con?ict of interest became apparent during his representation of the Defendant in the Gass litigation, when the Law Director allegedly first learned that Knox County had allegedly been damaged by the allegedly illegal actions by Defendant. Exhibit A, 259. At that point, the Law Director knew that there was a con?ict of interest between his client, Defendant, and his other client, Knox County. The Gass litigation and the information referenced in violation of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 1.9 are referenced in this matter as well. The Law Director acknowledged his con?ict in this matter in a statement he made during a Knox County Commission work session on March 19, 2018. During that meeting, the Law Director stated ?[t]he reason we hired outside counsel is 10 because I represented the Pension Board in the original Gass case and I have no power or authority or guidance over outside counsel3 because I just don?t want to be con?icted in that case.? Knox County Commission Work Session, March 19, 2018 at 93 minutes, 40 seconds, By acknowledging this con?ict, the .Law Director has effectively removed himself, his of?ce, and Plaintiff?s Counsel in this matter from this litigation. in spite of this knowledge, the Law Director did not inform Defendant of his con?ict of interest.4 Nor did he disclose to Defendant that he would take the information he learned while representing it and use it to ?le the Circuit Court Matter, alleging that the Pension Board has engaged in ?false, misleading, fraudulent and unlawfu activity. Nor did he disclose to the Defendant that he would retain outside counsel for the purpose of filing this matter naming the Knox County Pension Board as a ?Defendant? and seeking a declaration that its actions were unlawful. See Complaint. The information presented in this matter could only have been obtained through consultation with the Law Director over information that he obtained through is representation of Defendant in the Gass matter. Because of these con?icts of interest, the Law Director and the attorneyslare in- Violation of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 1.9 and must be disquali?ed in the Circuit Court Matter. Likewise, an attorney cannot consult with outside counsel and share information obtained in Violation of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 1.9 in order to obtain a similar result. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 8.4(a) (?It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to Violate or attempt to 3 The Law Director?s statement regarding his authority over the direction of litigation when disquali?ed due to conflict is in direct con?ict with a statement made by David Wigler, a deputy law director with the Knox County Law Director?s Of?ce during a hearing in the Circuit Court Matter on March 7, 2018. This statement will be addressed later on during this argument. 4 Defendant does not know whether the Law Director advised Knox County of this conflict of interest. Violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.?) (Emphasis added). The information used in Violation of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. Rule 1.9 puts the Law Director and/or his proxy (Plaintiff Counsel) in the position of being on both sides of substantially similar matters using information obtained during representation in a manner directly adverse to its former client.5 For the reasons stated above in both this matter and the Circuit Court Matter, Plaintiff Counsel, the Law Director, and the attorneys in his office must all be disqualified from serving as counsel in this case. While it is true that the Law Director has made the statement that he has ?no power or authority or guidance over outside counsel? in this matter, that statement is in direct conflict with a statement made by David Wigler (?Mn Wigler?)6 during a hearing in in the Circuit Court Matter on March 7, 2018. The transcript of the March 7, 2018 hearing in the Circuit Court Matter (?Transcript?) is attached hereto as Exhibit B. During that hearing, Mr. Wigler stated: So if we were disquali?ed, that just means. that outside counsel would be brought in. Who is the client that they would consult with? Who would control that litigation as the client for Knox County? It would be the law director. There is no way around it in our Charter form of government. Transcript P. 45, Ln. 3?9. This statement is especially concerning becaUse it indicates not only that the Law Director?s of?ce has shared information with Plaintiff?s Counsel, in violation of Tenn. Sup. Ct. 8, Rules 1.9-and 8.4, under theerroneous belief that these rules don?t apply to them,7 but that they will continue to share information with Plaintiff?s Counsel, or any other Counsel appointed in this matter, in Violation of Term. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rules 1.9 and 8.4 under the erroneous 5 Since the ?ling of this action, a nonsuit has been ?led in the Circuit Court Matter. This however does not negate the con?ict, nor preclude the Law Director from re?ling that matter at a later time. 6 David Wigler is a deputy law director in the Knox County Law Director?s of?cer representing Knox County in the Circuit Court Matter. 7 Mr. Wigler makes the argument that the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to him in his capacity as a government attorney during the Circuit Court hearing. See Transcript PP. 45 12 belief that they can continue to use information learned in the representation of their former client against that former client so long as they are acting in the capacity as ?client? in that future matter.3 Because the source of the claims in this matter are derived from information obtained in violation of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 1.9, and the facts used to support the claims in this matter are intertwined with information obtained in violation of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 1.9, any attorney that attempts to continue on in this matter in place of Plaintiffs Counsel will be continuing the breach of privilege. The information obtained in violation of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 1.9 is contained within the Complaint itself. For this?reason, even if the attorneys in this matter are disquali?ed, the matter itself cannot be separated from the violation and it is for that reason that i this matter must be dismissed. D. Plaintiff?s Counsel are Witnesses and must be disquali?ed. Plaintiff?s Counsel has signed the veri?cation in this matter attesting to the truth of the statements contained within the Complaint under penalty of perjury. See Complaint, p. 30. The veri?cation is set up in such a way to indicate that all three of the attorneys acting as Plaintiff?s Counsel in this matter are attesting to the information as any of them could have signed on behalf of all of them, By signing the veri?cation attesting to the truth of the allegations, Plaintiff?s Counsellhas put themselves in the pesition of complaining witnesses in this matter. As complaining witnesses,_P1aintiff? Counsel cannot also serve as counsel cf record. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R.-8, Rule 3.7 prohibits an attorney from serving as an advocate at trial where the lawyer is likely to be called as a witness, absent exceptions not applicable here. As the complaining witnesses in the matter, it is likely that Plaintiff?s Counsel will be called to test the validity of the statements contained within said Complaint, thus making Plaintiff Counsel a 3 Defendant does not agree with Mr. Wigler?s assertion that the law director is the client in this matter for the reasons outlined above as well as arguments outside the scope of this motion. 13 necessary Witness. Further, as the veri?cation is set up as one attorney signing on behalf of all three, it is likely that all three attorneys will be necessary witnesses. Plaintiffs Counsel?s involvement in this litigation is therefore precluded by Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 3 .7 and they must be disquali?ed for this reason. See, 6. g, Fuller v. Crabz?ree, No. M200 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. App. Apr. 16, 2009) (attorney disquali?ed under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 3.7 because he was a fact witness); Carter v. Carter, No. 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 669 (Tenn. App. Oct. 7, 2013) (sustaining court?s decision to disqualify husband/attorney based on circumstances known at the time despite husband ultimately not being called as witness). E. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, this case must be dismissed and/or in the alternative, Plaintiff Counsel, the Knox County Law Director, Richard B. the Chief Deputy Law Director, David Buuck, the Deputy County Law Director, David Wigler, the other members of the Knox County Law Director?s of?ce, and attorneys who have consulted with the Knox County Law Director?s Of?ce or Plaintiffs Counsel regarding representation of Knox County, Tennessee in this matter must be disquali?ed from participating in this case. Additionally, due to their con?ict of interest, Plaintiff counsel, the Knox County Law Director, Richard B. the Chief Deputy Law Director, David Buuck, the Deputy County Law Director, David Wigler, the other members of the Knox County Law Director?s of?ce, and any attorneys who consulted with the Knox County Law Director?s Of?ce or Plaintiffs Counsel regarding representation of Knox County, Tennessee in this matter should not be permitted to communicate or have any contact with any substitute counsel. 14? WHEREFORE, Defendant moves the Court that Defendant?s Motion to Dismiss be granted and/or in the alternative that Plaintiffs Counsel, Keith H. Burroughs, Jonathan D. Reed, Melissa B. Carrasco, and any member of the law ?rm of Egerton, McAfee, Annistead Davis, RC, the Knox County Law Director, Richard B. the Chief Deputy Law Director, David Buuck, the Deputy County Law Director, David Wigler, the other members of the Knox County Law Director?s of?ce, and any attorneys who consulted with the Knox County Law Director?s Of?ce or Plaintiffs Counsel regarding representation of Knox County, Tennessee in this matter be disquali?ed from participating as counsel of record in this case or having any contact and/or communication with any substitute counsel. g? Respectfully submitted this the 5 day of MARCIL. 2018. i, 2 I ings, BPR 013373 . . D. Coleman, BPR 0 7124 arah D. Jarrard, BPR 035197 Owings, Wilson Coleman 900 S. Gay Street, Suite 800 Knoxville, TN 37902 865-522-2717 Phone. 865?522-7929 Fax Charles . Burks, Jr., BPR 000956 Justice, Noel Burks 1816 W. Clinch Avenue Knoxville, Tennessee 37916 865622-4964 Phone 865-546-8525 Fax '15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, John E. Owings, hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing was mailed via US. mail, postage pre?paid to the following: Keith H. Burroughs Jonathan D. Reed Melissa B. Carrasco Egerton, McAfee, Armistead Davis, RC. 900 South Gay Street, 14th Floor Knoxville, TN 37902 Stella Catlett 6735 LaChrista Way Knoxville, TN 3.7921 Robert Caldwell 4907 Shannon Lane Knoxville TN 37918 Steven K. Garrett 838 Barker Road Corryton, TN 37921 Attorney for Renee Kicker, Bene?ciary of Dennis Kicker This the 1% day of M?r?cl?. 16 Gregory Gass 305 Basil?eld Drive, Knoxville, TN 37920 Al Holifield - Holi?eld Janich Rachal errera, PLLC 11907 Kingston Pike, Suite 201 Knoxville, TN 37934 Attorney for Gregory Gass Lisa Bigwood 7449 Cotton Patch Road Corryton, TN 37721 James Pritchard 3715 Locustwood Way Knoxville, TN 37921 J. David Yokley 327 Burris Road Knoxville, TN 37924