Review of King Street
Pilot Project Metrics 

January/ February
Update

MARCH 23, 2018

 

INTRODUCTION
This brief report offers a review of the City of Toronto’s (hereafter City) monitoring of the King
Street Pilot Project. The City has released four updates to date on the status of the Pilot Project.
This review is based on a subset of metrics reported by the City for the month of January and
February 2018.1

BACKGROUND
The City of Toronto initiated a Pilot Project on November 12, 2017 on King Street in downtown
Toronto. The Pilot project was motivated by the City’s desire to improve transit operations along
the King Street, which is the busiest surface transit route operating on a shared right-of-way in
Toronto.
The Pilot Project enforced several restrictions on automobile traffic. All changes and restrictions
were implemented simultaneously. Following is a list of the most relevant interventions.
1. The Pilot Project ran on King Street in a corridor bounded by Bathurst Street in the West
and Jarvis Street in the East (Figure 1).
2. Through automobile traffic was restricted such that except for a couple of intersections,
private automobiles and other commercial vehicles are prevented from driving through
an intersection.
3. No left turns are allowed in the corridor.
4. Automobiles are required to make a right turn at all intersections except a couple where
through traffic is permitted because of heavy pedestrian volumes raise safety concerns
for possible pedestrian collisions with right-tuning vehicles.
5. All parking spots for private automobiles have been eliminated on King Street.
6. Parking exceptions have been made for taxicabs at select locations.
7. Transit stops have been relocated from the near end of the intersection to the far end.
a. Temporary transit stops have been erected at the far end of the intersection. This
requires placing ramps in the curb lane to assist with boarding and alighting from
streetcars.
b. As a result, curb lanes are not available for uninterrupted use by motorized or
non-motorized vehicles.
8. While it was not initially planned, the City of Toronto and the TTC decided to increase
transit passenger capacity by 41% by adding additional streetcars on the King Street
routes.

1

King Street Transit Pilot. January Update and King Street Transit Pilot. February Update.

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 FIGURE 1: A MAP OF THE KING STREET PILOT CORRIDOR

REVIEW OF THE CITY METRICS
In its January and February 2018 updates, the City has reported on transit travel times,
reliability, and ridership, automobile travel times and volumes, and electronic financial
transactions. This report reviews a subset of City’s Metrics and comments on their accuracy and
implications.
Based on the independent assessments of transit travel times before and during the Pilot
Project, we conclude that the City’s reporting of these metrics is accurate and comparable to the
estimates generated independently by academics and others.
We are not able to confirm the veracity of automobile travel times in the Pilot area. Measuring
travel times for automobiles depends upon the methodology and tools used and hence there may
be variation in the estimates depending upon the source of the data.
Whereas we are not able to verify independently the changes in transit ridership estimates,
however based on the anecdotal evidence and spot assessments made during the peak periods
along the transit route, we believe that the City’s assessment of increased transit ridership in the
corridor is accurate and reflective of the ground realities.
We do not have the means to validate metrics reported for financial transactions by the City.
We begin our review by determining the scope and scale of the changes in transit travel times.

TRANSIT TRAVEL TIMES
Since this review is based on the data provided by the City of Toronto, we have therefore
reproduced graphics from the City’s reports to avoid any confusion about the source of the data.
The City reports transit travel times for pre-pilot and during pilot periods. TTC collected the
pre-pilot data from September 21 to October 14, 2017 and later from October 30 to November 4,
2017. The data corresponding to the pilot implementation phase was collected from December
31, 2017 to February 3, 2018, as reported in the January update and from February 4 to March
3, 2018 in the February update. Figure 2 presents the difference in transit travel times before

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 and during the pilot project from January update and Figure 3 presents the same from February
update.

FIGURE 2: STREETCAR TRAVEL TIME COMPARISONS FOR THE PILOT CORRIDOR (JANUARY
UPDATE)
Source: City of Toronto

FIGURE 3: STREETCAR TRAVEL TIME COMPARISONS FOR THE PILOT CORRIDOR (FEBRUARY
UPDATE)
Source: City of Toronto

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 The data are reported for the morning peak hours from 7 AM to 10 AM and the
afternoon/evening peak hours from 4 PM to 7 PM. The average travel time from Bathurst to
Jarvis on King Streetcar during morning rush hours was 15.3 minutes before the
implementation of the Pilot Project. However, the average travel time inched slightly upwards to
15.5 minutes in January and 15.9 minutes in February during the implementation phase.
For westbound transit commutes from Jarvis to Bathurst, the pre-pilot average travel time was
15.2 minutes that reduced by less than a minute to 14.5 minutes in January but increased to 15.2
minutes during the implementation of the Pilot Project. Therefore, based on the data reported
by the City of Toronto, for the morning hours one does not see any meaningful change in
average transit travel times because of the Pilot Project.
In comparison, the afternoon/evening peak hour transit travel times on King Street corridor
demonstrate a greater decline. The average transit travel time from Bathurst to Jarvis declined
from 18.9 minutes to 16.5 minutes in January and 16.6 minutes in February. Similarly, the
westbound average travel times declined from 19 minutes to 16.6 minutes in both January and
February. Thus, one could see that the corridor average travel times declined by more than two
minutes for the afternoon/evening peak hours.
Another key difference in transit travel times between morning hours and afternoon hours is
that the longest duration commutes in the afternoon peak periods declined from 25 minutes in
the eastbound direction to 20 minutes for both January and February. Thus, one could see that
the real difference in transit travel times is essentially the reduction in very congested commutes
in the afternoon peak periods.
We hypothesize that the complete elimination of on-street parking in the corridor, which was
permitted for limited hours during the day before implementation of the pilot project, is partly
responsible for higher travel time savings during the afternoon peak periods. Even though
parking regulations restricted on-street parking in the evening peak hours, it is possible that
vehicles remained parked beyond the permissible hours.
Hence, the lack of any significant difference in the average transit travel times in the morning
peak periods and the presence of higher travel time savings in the afternoon peak periods
suggest to us that the difference in travel times is influenced more by parking restrictions than
by through traffic restrictions.

FULL-ROUTE TRAVEL TIMES
The full route for the King streetcar runs from Dundas West Station to Broadview Station. The
City reported a two-minute decline in average travel times for eastbound trips for the entire
route in the morning peak hours in January. However, the average travel time was slightly
higher for the entire route for westbound trips in the morning peak hours. Similar trends were
evident for comparison with February data.

In comparison, average travel times for the entire route were faster by five minutes on average
in the afternoon peak hours in January. The February transit travel times showed a significant
reduction in travel time gains such that the average travel times were three minutes faster in
February. Hence the afternoon/evening peak travel times were shorter by transit in January for
the entire route than they were in February.

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 We would like to point out that the odds of one travelling from Dundas West Station (on the
subway line) to Broadview Station (on the subway line) on the King Street route are highly
unlikely given the significantly faster travel times offered by the direct subway service for the
same origin and destination pair. Still, the metrics reported by the City indicate no meaningful
difference in average travel times during the morning peak hours along the entire route. The
noticeable decline (albeit small in relative terms given the duration of the entire trip) in average
transit travel times is mostly for the afternoon/evening peak hours.

SOCIAL MEDIA HYPE ABOUT FASTER TRANSIT COMMUTES
Whereas one sees only moderate travel time savings reported by the City of Toronto, the social
media, especially Twitter, was abuzz with unfounded claims of much higher travel time savings.
Some transit enthusiasts and other proponents of the Pilot Project made unfounded claims
about travel time savings in the corridor of 13 minutes or higher.
Independent evaluation of transit travel times by academics as well as the numbers reported by
the City suggests that the social media chatter about travel time savings resulting from the King
Street Pilot Project was highly misleading and lacked facts and data.

FIGURE 4: SOCIAL MEDIA CLAIMS OF TRANSIT TRAVEL TIME SAVINGS

TRANSIT RIDERSHIP
The City reported a large increase in streetcar ridership during the initial implementation of the
Pilot Project. For the morning peak period, transit ridership reported an increase of 25% for
eastbound streetcars at Spadina Avenue. Similarly, transit ridership was up by 27% in the
afternoon/evening peak periods for westbound service at University Avenue. For the entire day
and the full route, King streetcar ridership was up by 16%. The February update did not include
updated ridership stats.

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 FIGURE 5: TRANSIT RIDERSHIP INCREASED POST PILOT (JANUARY UPDATE)
The media coverage of the increase in streetcar ridership attributes it to the King Street Pilot
Project. On the face of it, the argument may appear to hold. However, it is missing an important
test that would help one establish the causal relationship between the implementation of the
Pilot Project and the change in transit ridership.
If the increase in streetcar ridership resulted without any change in transit capacity before and
during the Project, one would attribute a stronger relationship between the Pilot and the
subsequent increase in transit ridership. However, the change is equally enabled by a significant
increase in the passenger carrying capacity made possible by the introduction of additional
streetcars along the route.

MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The passenger carrying capacity of 2,047 passengers per hour on the King streetcar routes
before the pilot got a significant boost to a higher passenger carrying capacity of 2892
passengers per hour during the Pilot. The 41% increase in passenger carrying capacity was made
possible, in part, by the improved streetcar operations that resulted from the Pilot Project.
However, to establish a causal relationship between the Pilot Project and the increase in transit
ridership, one would have to observe the impact of an increase in transit capacity before the
Pilot Project was implemented.
The standard practice of identifying a counterfactual is therefore missing in the King Street Pilot
Project. The counterfactual would have addressed the argument that an increase in transit
ridership could have realized by increasing the passenger capacity by 40% before the Pilot
project.
We therefore recognize the missed opportunity of a stronger evidence that supports the linkage
between transit ridership and the Pilot Project.

AUTOMOBILE TRAVEL TIMES AND VOLUMES
The January update was the first time the City reported on automobile travel times and
volumes. City data revealed that automobile traffic volumes on King Street in the corridor
plummeted post-implementation. For instance, in the morning peak hours, eastbound
automobile traffic at King and Bathurst declined from 1450 vehicles to just 100 vehicles (Figure

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 6). Similar reductions in automobile traffic volumes were observed at other intersections along
King Street in the morning and evening peak hours. Furthermore, the data released for traffic
volumes on King Street in February are quite similar to the one reported for January.
It is quite possible that some of the pre-Pilot King Street automobile traffic diverted to other
streets that run parallel to King Street. Therefore, Adelaide and Wellington are expected to have
accommodated some of the diverted traffic along with other streets.
At the same time, one expects a diversion to other modes of travel. For discretionary trips where
the destination could be substituted by other locations, one would also expect some loss in
traffic volumes where commuters would have chosen destinations located elsewhere.

FIGURE 6: AUTOMOBILE TRAFFIC VOLUMES ON KING STREET IN THE PILOT CORRIDOR
(JANUARY UPDATE)
A review of traffic volumes on other streets near the King Street corridor presents some
interesting findings. The post-implementation travel times appear to have increased only
slightly in January from the levels observed before the implementation of the pilot project
(Figure 7). For instance, the average travel time eastbound from Bathurst to Jarvis Street in the
morning peak hours along Dundas Street appears to have increased by 0.5 minutes after the
implementation of the Pilot Project.
These numbers suggest that the decline in the throughput capacity on King Street did not have a
major adverse impact on travel times on neighbouring streets that seem to have absorbed the
diverted automobile traffic.
However, results that are even more surprising emerge when one reviews the difference in
average travel times for automobiles in the afternoon/evening peak hours. The City data reveals
that average travel times post-implementation declined in the downtown core for evening peak
hours. This may lead some to conclude that reducing automobile throughput capacity in the
downtown core has resulted in faster commutes. Such conclusions will be premature if not
entirely misleading.

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 FIGURE 7: AUTOMOBILE TRAVEL TIMES IN THE DOWNTOWN CORE (JANUARY UPDATE)

COMPARING APPLES AND ORANGES
We believe that automobile travel time and volume data reported by the City is premature
because post-implementation data were collected at a time when attendance in downtown
Toronto and traffic volumes were significantly lower than their regular levels.
The City collected pre-implementation automobile data from September 21 to October 14, 2017
and from October 30 to November 8, 2017. However, the post-implementation data was
collected from January 1 to 18, 2018. If the automobile travel times were averaged for the first
three weeks of travel in January, the resulting mean values should be significantly lower than
their values expected in February or March.
Given that the first few weeks of January are characterized by thin attendance because of
employees being on extended vacation, traffic volumes are expected to be significantly lower.
Similarly, institutes of higher learning in downtown Toronto including the University of
Toronto, Ryerson University, and George Brown College were closed for approximately the first
10 days of January.
We expected to see traffic volumes and automobile travel times for February to present a
significantly different picture than the one presented in the January update. However, the
automobile travel times reported in the February update presented similar results. That is, one
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 sees not much difference in automobile travel times before the start of the Pilot and in February.
The only noticeable difference is the average automobile travel time observed for westbound
traffic evening peak hours on Front Street that showed a decline for January but an increase of
2.7 minutes relative to post-period travel time.
Since travel time data for automobiles could be collected from a variety of sources using a
variety of techniques, we can only speak about these estimates once the City shares how
additional details about average travel times were recorded. A preferred option is to have
independent estimates of average travel times for private automobiles.

IMPACT OF TRAFFIC VOLUMES ON LOCAL
BUSINESSES
Several local businesses that rely on automobile and foot traffic, such as restaurants, have
complained of a significant drop in business. If the City data for travel times and traffic volumes
were to be believed, it provides implicit evidence in support of the claims of a drop in revenue.
The January update by the City shows that traffic volumes on King Street have plummeted.
Furthermore, travel times in the post-implementation phase on adjacent streets have also
reduced, which could be a proxy for less intensive commerce at the street level along the
corridor. The City also mentioned a 7% to 12% overall reduction in traffic volume on streets in
the vicinity of King Street, which would support the assertion of less intensive commerce taking
place post-implementation.

TOP DOWN VERSUS BOTTOM UP APPROACH
The City of Toronto adopted a top-down approach in implementing the King Street pilot project.
Such an approach leads to empirical constraints that prevent establishing the causality of the
interventions with the observed outcomes. Furthermore, a top-down approach often results in a
greater resistance from community stakeholders who are adversely impacted by such
interventions.
In a recent research paper, researchers from Australia presented their analysis of top-down and
bottom-up approaches as they related to interventions in the extensive tram network in
Melbourne.2 The researchers concluded that bottom-up approaches were preferable to top-down
approaches for a variety of reasons including a greater participation and support from
stakeholders in the community.
For the King Street Pilot project, a bottom-up approach would have likely elicited greater
support from the community and at the same time assisted in establishing causal relationships
between the interventions and the outcomes.
For instance, instead of implementing all interventions at the same time, the City could have
incrementally implemented interventions to determine which intervention had the greatest
impact on improving transit throughput capacity and the lowest adverse impact on local

Reynolds, J., Currie, G., Rose, G., & Cumming, A. (2018). Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up Perspectives on
Streetcar Priority. Retrieved from https://trid.trb.org/view/1497266.
2

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 businesses. As an example, we suggest the following incremental schedule for interventions for
the King Street Pilot.
1. In the first step, restrict all left turns along King Street starting from Bathurst to Jarvis
Street.
2. Reduce off-street parking charges near and along the corridor.
3. Eliminate half of the on-street parking allowed in the pre-pilot phase.
4. Eliminate later the remaining half of the pre-pilot on-street parking.
5. Require private automobiles to make right turns at most intersections between Bathurst
and Jarvis Street.
a. Permit commercial vehicles, including taxicabs, to continue travelling through
intersections.
6. Require all non-transit and ambulatory response vehicles to turn right on most
intersections in the corridor.
Such an approach would have allowed the City to determine which of the above listed
interventions had the greatest impact on reducing average transit travel times in the King Street
corridor. If for instance the data revealed that most gains in average transit travel times were
realized by restricting left turns and reducing on-street parking, the need for further restrictions
could have been mitigated.

CONCLUSIONS
Based on the review of data presented by the City, we conclude that the average transit travel
time savings are modest at best. Furthermore, one fails to see any meaningful improvement in
average transit travel times in the morning peak hours. One does observe slight improvements
in average transit travel times in the afternoon/evening peak hours. Furthermore, City’s postimplementation average transit travel time savings are much smaller in magnitude than the
ones reported in social media.
The automobile travel times reported by the City for January are for a period that is not
representative of travel activity in the downtown Toronto core. One expected to see a different
trend in automobile travel times and volumes for subsequent months. However, the updated
automobile travel times for February on east-west arterials in the corridor reported similar
travel times as the ones seen in January. We recommend independent evaluation of automobile
travel times in the corridor to validate City’s auto travel times and volumes.
The increase in transit ridership in the post-implementation phase is a direct result of the
increase in transit capacity where the passenger carrying capacity increased by 41%. Given that
the TTC did not test the impact of an increase in transit capacity in the pre-implementation
phase, one cannot readily establish a causal relationship between an increase in transit ridership
and the King Street pilot project. A preferred approach for the City would have been to compare
the impact of an increase in transit carrying capacity in the pre-implementation phase with the
same in the post-implementation phase.
The decline in average automobile travel times in the post-implementation phase on streets
running parallel to King Street suggest a decline in traffic volumes, which could serve as a proxy
for reduce commercial activity along the corridor.

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