Case: 1:16-cv-04182 Document #: 224 Filed: 03/28/18 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:3657

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Donaldson Twyman,

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Plaintiff,
v.
S&M Auto Brokers, Saed Ihmoud, and
Mohammed Ihmoud
Defendants.

No. 16 C 4182
Judge Virginia M. Kendall

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is an odometer rollback case that landed in federal court due to a little known federal
statute that federalized the crime of manipulating a car’s odometer in order to protect purchasers
from potential shady practices committed by used car sellers. This small Federal Odometer Act
case began in April of 2016 and burgeoned into an 18-month battle between defense counsel,
Joel Brodsky, and Plaintiff’s counsel over the purchase of a $35,000 used SUV from S&M Auto
Brokers (“S&M”).. The Plaintiff, Donald Twyman alleged that S&M failed to inform him that
the Infiniti SUV had been in a serious accident, had been rebuilt, and the odometer had been
rolled back. After the car drove poorly, Twyman brought it to a local Infiniti dealer who
reviewed the warranty claim history that showed a discrepancy in the odometer readings and that
the car had been in an accident. Twyman filed suit alleging a violation of the FOA and that
S&M committed fraud and violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act when it failed to disclose that the SUV had been damaged in an accident.
Plaintiff’s attorney and Brodsky are no strangers to each other or this type of litigation.
Plaintiff’s attorney filed a complaint that not only accused S&M of violations pertaining to
Twyman’s purchase but also alleged that S&M has “a pattern and practice of selling
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unmerchantable wrecks with substandard repairs and concealing or misrepresenting material
facts.” The Court inquired about the ability to resolve what the Court perceived to be a finite and
discrete case with few issues and Plaintiff’s attorney informed the Court that he would be
seeking punitive damages and that the case was valued at an amount much greater than the value
of the car. Brodsky responded in kind that Plaintiff’s attorney is essentially in the business of
extorting clients like S&M and that he just files these lawsuits over and over when there is no
basis for doing so. And so the battle began.
Now one would think that a federal judge would not hear parties square up so heatedly at
their first appearance before the Court, but unfortunately, that is not always the case. Yet, the
Court has an obligation to protect not only the legal process but also the clients who are
represented by the litigants which is why district court judges have initial status hearings and
question the lawyers about the cost of litigation and the value of an award. Recognizing the
Court’s inherent authority to control those litigation costs, the Court immediately clipped the
wings of the lawyers by refocusing them to the reality of their dispute:
So you can all go and interview all of these people and bills tens of
thousands of dollars to do discovery on the case, and you hire an expert
and pay that expert another 10 or 20 thousand dollars. . . all over a
dispute that has probably much less value than the 56 [thousand] that the
plaintiff has demanded in settlement. So you all need to be lawyers and
recognize that you have clients that have concerns. He’s got a car that he
doesn’t think works well . . .and you’ve got a dealership that is going to
spend an awful lot of money defending it. I think you both need to sit
down at the table and discuss this.
Status hearing 6/30/17.
The Court then limited the discovery period to a period of three months so as not to have
the lawyers expend too much money taking into account Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and the need to

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balance the proportion of the costs of litigation with the value of a potential award in Plaintiff’s
favor.
Shortly thereafter, the parties appeared again. This time to argue over when and where
depositions would take place. Brodsky informed the Court that he would be in Florence, Italy at
his vacation home for one month and sought an extension of time to respond to various motions
and discovery which the Court granted. During this status, Brodsky accused Plaintiff’s counsel
of “recidivist conduct” because “he has filed three other lawsuits” for the same type of claim.
The Court managed to calm the parties down once again and once again instructed the lawyers
talk to each other before filing motions and to allow for lawyers to take vacations. Within days,
the parties were battling about requests to admit which Plaintiff’s counsel filed and noticed to be
heard when Brodsky returned from his vacation and the Court entered its first written warning to
act reasonably and professionally. (Dkt. 35 “The parties should act professionally instead of
antagonistically toward each other and recognize that as officers of the Court they are expected
to treat each other reasonably and professionally.”)
Unfortunately, that first shot across the bow from the Court had little effect on Brodsky
nor did his vacation in Italy. Within days of his return, he filed a motion for protective order
seeking to bar Plaintiff from issuing document subpoenas, and striking Plaintiff’s Third Set of
Interrogatories and, Requests for Production and Requests to Admit because “Plaintiff does not
consider a lawsuit as a way to redress a legitimate grievance by uncovering the truth and
applying the law, but instead considers it to be a profit making, fee generating, enterprise for
attorneys.” (Dkt. 41 at 8.)

Brodsky requested that the Court award him reasonable fees for

having to bring the motion. In response, Plaintiff set forth the requests he had made to Brodsky,
all within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all relevant to proving his case, and how Brodsky
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had responded to his email requests by calling Plaintiff’s counsel “an extortionist” who is “really
obsessed” and refusing to comply with Plaintiff’s discovery requests. (Dkt. 45).
Although the nature of the dispute between the parties was limited to a narrow factual
and legal issue, the conduct of Joel Brodsky, soon overshadowed the legal case and became the
focus of numerous court hearings. In the eighteen months since Twyman filed his lawsuit, the
docket includes well over 200 docket entries, nearly three quarters of them attributable to
disputes regarding Brodsky’s behavior defending the suit. The parties filed a number of requests
for sanctions throughout the litigation and the Court admonished Brodsky multiple times to curb
his uncivil and vitriolic conduct.

Finally,

the

Court

conducted

a

hearing

regarding

allegations that Brodsky made against Plaintiff’s expert witness and the Court warned that
sanctions may result if the Court determines that the allegations were frivolous or bought in bad
faith.1 Based on his conduct throughout the course of this lawsuit, and as explained in detail
below, the Court invokes its inherent authority to sanction Brodsky.
BACKGROUND
Throughout the course of the litigation, the Court has observed first-hand Brodsky’s
unprofessional, contemptuous, and antagonistic behavior directed at opposing counsel. These
have included false accusations and inappropriate diatribes in pleadings, where he repeatedly
accused opposing counsel of lying, extortion, attempting to create a false record, and repeatedly

1

Brodsky also moves to strike the binder of exhibits that Plaintiffs submitted to the Court after the hearing alleging
that he did not see them nor did he have a chance to object. Ninety percent of the binder comprises docket entries
and exhibits already on the docket and submitted or discussed during the hearing. A very small amount of unrelated
emails are also presented which simply show a pattern of name-calling, nasty remarks about litigants and a general
obstructionist litigation strategy in other cases. To the extent that some of the pattern was argued in Court to show
that Brodsky’s behavior in this case was not an anomaly, the Court accepts the argument; however, does not rely on
any materials that were not part of this case and the behavior engaged in by Brodsky in this case. In short, the
motion to strike the exhibits is denied in part and granted in part. [212] The emails unrelated to this case are
stricken.

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requested sanctions without any good-faith basis. (See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 67, 106, 138, 151, 155.)
Brodsky also sent numerous vitriolic emails to opposing counsel during the course of the
litigation, including asking opposing counsel “How do you even call yourself a lawyer? You are
an embarrassment to the profession,” and accusing him of being an extortionist and
manufacturing the case.

(See, e.g., Dkt. 166-1).

This pattern of behavior continued at a

deposition of one of Defendants’ experts. There, Brodsky was confrontational and antagonistic
and made numerous speaking objections, improperly instructed the witness not to answer, in
addition to cursing several times on the record (Dkt. 160 at 58:19, 73:21), making several
inappropriate ad hominem attacks against opposing counsel, including calling him a liar (id. at
71:21-22), and accusing counsel of engaging in a criminal enterprise (id. at 122:6-19).
Ironically, in many of his diatribes, Brodsky has accused opposing counsel of overlitigating what he often referred to as a “small-claims” case, yet Brodsky filed a number of
baseless or unnecessary motions himself prolonging the litigation and the costs of litigation.
These include a motion opposing plaintiff’s ministerial motion to correct a typo in his expert’s
report (Dkt. 62); a motion in limine seeking the Court initial review of whether Defendant’s
expert reports were sufficient (Dkt. 96); a frivolous motion to strike Plaintiff’s Rule 56
statement; and a baseless motion to seal a recording of the deposition referenced above in order
for it not to be accessed on the public record. (Dkt. 162).
Of special concern for the Court, however, are allegations Brodsky leveled at Donald
Szczesniak, Plaintiff’s expert witness. In his reply in support of his motion in limine regarding
expert witnesses (Dkt. 102), Brodsky leveled charges against Szczesniak for allegedly
fabricating an expert report in an unrelated matter involving Diane Weinberger. Two and a half
weeks later, Brodsky filed another motion regarding Szczesniak, this time asserting that

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Szczesniak had damaged Weinberger’s fence. (Dkt. 108.) That motion also raised a number of
alleged unrelated civil judgments against Szczesniak, relating to his auto repair business. (Id. at
3.)

The motion also accused Szczesniak of sending Brodsky an anonymous facsimile

transmission of a newspaper article in an “attempt to intimidate the Defendants [sic] attorney
from further searching into his background.” (Id.) This motion sought an order of “indirect
criminal contempt” against Szczesniak and sought to have the Court make an immediate referral
to the United States Attorney for a criminal investigation to be launched against Szczesniak. (Id.
at 4.) The Court summarily rejected Brodsky’s motion and reminded him that there were proper
ways to challenge an expert, none of which were followed, and that if he believed that criminal
activity occurred, he himself could call the USA and make a complaint. (Dkt. 110.) Nonplussed
by the Court’s refusal to act as his bully, Brodsky filed a motion seeking sanctions against
Szczesniak and against Plaintiff for retaining him. (Dkt. 121.) Brodsky’s motion for sanctions
again accused Szczesniak of attempting to intimidate Weinberger by threatening her and
purportedly damaging her fence. Rather than file a motion seeking to bar the expert testimony
pursuant to the Court’s gatekeeping function in Daubert, Brodsky instead simply sought an
order barring Szczesniak from testifying due to his alleged improper and even illegal behavior.
(Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff responded to Brodsky’s motion for sanctions, asserting that Brodsky’s
accusations were false and attached affidavits from Szczesniak, his wife, and son Luke who all
attested that Szczesniak was home sick at the alleged time Weinberger’s fence was damaged.
Plaintiff’s response also pointed out inconsistencies in the story Weinberger told the police as
compared to the affidavit she completed for Brodsky, including Szczesniak’s alleged location on
the night of the incident and the timing of the incident. (Dkt. 137 at 3.) In fact, there is no

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evidence that Szczesniak was ever questioned by police in the matter, let alone arrested. Plaintiff
also denied Brodsky’s allegation that Szczesniak anonymously faxed him an article, pointing out
that Brodsky’s affidavit was not grounded in facts, and submitted sworn testimony that
Szczesniak was taking his elderly mother to the doctor at the time the fax was sent. (Id. at 5.)
In the face of evidence contradicting his motion for sanctions, Brodsky again doubleddown. In his reply, he called Szczesniak a liar and accused Szczesniak of submitting a false
declaration and committing perjury. (Dkt. 138 at 2.) To use his own words against him, “in what
can only be described as strange and bizarre” Brodsky asserts that “an examination of the
LexisNexis public records search that was done on Donald Szczesniak, states that while he does
have a wife named Jennifer, a mother named Ruth Ann, and a son named Zachery, there is no
son named Luke.” (Id.) Brodsky went on to insinuate Szczesniak had fabricated the affidavit
filed by Luke and that he indeed had fabricated Luke. Brodsky then went on to accuse Plaintiff’s
counsel of bringing the lawsuit “to extort money, based entirely on false evidence, and an expert
who is [sic] tampers with witnesses and presents false declarations and/or engages in false
lawsuit . . . is no small matter.” Meanwhile, Szczesniak, a proposed witness in the matter,
sought representation based on the allegations against him that went to the heart of his work –
testifying as an expert in odometer fixing cases. Szczesniak appeared in Court with his retained
personal attorney and sought leave to file a response to the accusations against him. Rather than
back down, Brodsky opposed his efforts to file a response and increased his level of accusations
against the witness, this time alleging that the instant case was “not the first case in which
Szczesniak has fabricated persons and events in affidavits filed with the Court, nor is it the first
time he has been accused of witness intimidation. It appears to be a habit.” (Dkt. 142 at 1.)
The Court permitted Szczesniak to file a response to defend his reputation and Brodsky filed

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another reply, again accusing Szczesniak of damaging Weinberger’s property and fabricating his
expert report, along with other allegations of impropriety regarding unrelated cases. (Dkt. 150.)
Following this flurry of serious allegations, the Court held a status on April 6, 2017. At
that status hearing, the Court again reminded the parties that it was considering sanctions based
on the conduct of counsel and noted that the filings were the most acerbic and nasty accusatory
filings the Court had ever seen.

Despite these warnings, Brodsky continued to impugn

Szczesniak and claim that the case was fabricated in open court. The Court ordered counsel to
bring their clients to the next status, which was held six days later. At that status, the Court
informed the parties of the need for a sanctions hearing regarding Brodsky’s accusations and
asked the parties whether they were aware of the protracted proceedings and why they were
taking so long to deal with such a minor dispute. Brodsky’s client informed the Court that he
was unaware of the ethical issues and had never been conveyed an offer to settle the suit –
something he was willing to do long ago. (Dkt. 165.) Following the April 12, hearing Plaintiff
filed a motion for sanctions. After retaining counsel, Brodsky filed a motion to withdraw his
filings involving accusations against Szczesniak.

(Dkt. 172.)

He also withdrew from

representing S&M. Shortly before the hearing, Brodsky filed a short response and the sanctions
hearing was held on July 7, 2017. In his response, he denied that any of the filings were
submitted for an improper purpose and highlighted his efforts to “address issues raised by the
Court.” (Dkt. 208.)
At the hearing, which lasted several hours, the Court heard testimony from Peter Lubin,
lead counsel for Twyman, and also testimony from Szczesniak. Lubin testified regarding his
good-faith basis for filing the lawsuit, discussed Szczesniak’s integrity and qualifications, denied
being in a criminal enterprise (a rant that Brodsky repeated throughout his filings), and discussed

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the emotional distress he suffered from Brodsky’s poor treatment. Szczesniak testified about the
importance of his reputation to his work as an expert witness, denied damaging Weinberger’s
fence, denied sending Brodsky an anonymous fax, and confirmed that he has a son named Luke.
Szczesniak also averred that Brodsky’s filings had damaged his employment and put undue
stress on his family. Brodsky declined to testify but gave a statement where he said he let his
frustrations get the better of him and that he “went too far in this case.” Brodsky also apologized
to the Court “for anything that [he] did that caused this Court concern or stress” and apologized
to Lubin for “going too far in this case” and also to Szczesniak. Brodsky did not submit any
evidence contradicting Lubin’s or Szczesniak’s testimony nor did he provide any explanation for
his behavior throughout the case, including the allegations against Lubin and Szczesniak.
Although not reflected on the transcript, throughout the hearing, Brodsky was occupied with his
cellular phone and made several audible exasperated sighs during the course of the hearing as the
testimony was being presented.
Outside of the events leading up to the sanctions hearing, the Court warned Brodsky
several times that his behavior could result in sanctions. (See, e.g., Dkt. 118; Dkt. 165
(informing the parties that the Court has reviewed the docket and the need for a sanctions hearing
because “Mr. Brodsky has been overly aggressive in this case, that he’s not following the rules of
professional conduct, and he is filing a lot of motions to exacerbate the discovery process. And
so it’s going to be a [sanctions hearing] primarily to determine whether sanctions should be
applied to him” and noting the seriousness of the accusations Brodsky made against Szczesniak
but noting that the Court has “no problem levying the appropriate sanction against a lawyer who
misrepresents or lies to the Court in such a manner as to hijack a litigation”); Dkt. 216 at 9-10
(warning the parties that settlement of the matter, including attorneys’ fees would not moot the
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Court’s desire to consider sanctioning counsel, because the “Court always has jurisdiction over
protecting the integrity of the proceedings before her” and that the Court intended to “protect the
integrity of this courtroom”).)
LEGAL STANDARD
I.

The Court’s Inherent Authority to Sanction
“A district court has inherent power to sanction a party who ‘has willfully abused the

judicial process or otherwise conducted litigation in bad faith.’” Secrease v. W. & S. Life Ins.
Co., 800 F.3d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Salmeron v. Enterprise Recovery Systems, Inc.,
579 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir. 2009)). These sanctions are appropriate where a party or their
counsel has practiced fraud upon the Court, acts in “bad faith by delaying or disrupting the
litigation,” hampers enforcement of a court order, or when a party is responsible for defiling “the
very temple of justice.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (quotations omitted).
“This power is ‘permissibly exercised not merely to remedy prejudice to a party, but also to
reprimand the offender and to deter future parties from trampling upon the integrity of the
court.’” Flextronics Int'l, USA, Inc. v. Sparkling Drink Sys. Innovation Ctr. Ltd., 230 F. Supp. 3d
896, 906–07 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (quoting Salmeron, 579 F.3d at 797).
Due to “their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and
discretion,” but “[a] primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate
sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45. These
powers should be invoked when “in the informed discretion of the court, neither [a] statute nor
the Rules are up to the task.” Id. at 50. This authority includes circumstances where “conduct
sanctionable under the Rules was intertwined within conduct that only the inherent power could
address,” because “requiring a court first to apply Rules and statutes containing sanctioning

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provisions to discrete occurrences before invoking inherent power to address remaining instances
of sanctionable conduct would serve only to foster extensive and needless satellite litigation,
which is contrary to the aim of the Rules themselves.” Id. Therefore, “the inherent power of a
court can be invoked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct.” Id. at 49.
Attorneys can be sanctioned pursuant to the Court's inherent authority. Carr v. Tillery,
591 F.3d 909, 919 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A court has inherent power, which is to say a common law
power, to punish by an award of reasonable attorneys' fees or other monetary sanction, or to
prevent for the future by an injunction, misconduct by lawyers appearing before it.”). Indeed,
severe sanctions can be imposed against attorneys pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority
when an attorney acts in bad faith. See Salmeron, 579 F.3d at 793 (affirming sanction of
dismissal with prejudice after court found that attorney acted in bad faith). “[B]efore a court may
impose sanctions sua sponte, it must give the offending party notice of its intent to do so and the
opportunity to be heard.” Johnson v. Cherry, 422 F.3d 540, 551 (7th Cir. 2005)
DISCUSSION
Our legal system provides ample opportunities for litigants to vociferously challenge the
testimony of expert witnesses. Brodsky, however, never availed himself of the tools available to
him to legitimately challenge the qualifications or opinions of Szczesniak. Instead, he resorted to
inflammatory, unsubstantiated, and false allegations against Szczesniak. Brodsky’s allegations
against Szczesniak were made in bad faith, in an attempt to improperly impugn Szczesniak’s
reputation before the Court, to have the Court potentially disqualify him as an expert, or at least
intimidate Szczesniak to the extent he would not testify.

These acts of intimidation and

harassment, included allegations of improper conduct in unrelated matters, allegations related to

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Szczesniak’s personal litigation history divorced of any relevancy to this matter, and
unsubstantiated and even false claims of intimidation.
Brodsky attempts to shield his conduct by pointing to the police report and affidavit of
Ms. Weinberger. His alleged reliance on Ms. Weinberger, however, is unavailing. Apparently
relying on Ms. Weinberger’s allegations that Szczesniak damaged her fence, Brodsky asked this
Court to find Szczesniak in criminal contempt and refer the matter to the United States Attorney.
This was wildly inappropriate and an attempt to harass Szczesniak and poison the Court’s view
of him. First, Ms. Weinberger’s purported allegations against Szczesniak have nothing to do
with this matter and even if her allegations were substantiated, they are irrelevant to his
testimony as an expert witness before this Court. Second, based on testimony and evidence
adduced at the sanctions hearing, Ms. Weinberger’s allegations against Szczesniak are
unsubstantiated. There are material inconsistencies between her police report and the affidavit
she provided to Brodsky, and there was uncontroverted testimony that Szczesniak was at home at
the time of the alleged incident with his family.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that

Szczesniak was ever questioned in the matter, let alone arrested. Third, if Brodsky was aware of
criminal conduct by Szczesniak he could report it to the proper authorities; there was no reason
other than to harass and intimidate for him to bring the allegations to the Court’s attention.
Fourth, even if it were somehow appropriate to bring Ms. Weinberger’s allegations to the
attention of the Court, Brodsky apparently failed to investigate their veracity.
Brodsky’s allegations regarding Ms. Weinberger were not the sole basis for his request
for his request for holding Szczesniak in criminal contempt or for barring his testimony. He also
submitted his own allegations and later an affidavit, completely divorced from fact and reality
alleging that Szczesniak attempted to intimidate him by sending an anonymous fax to his office.

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First and most importantly, there is no evidence that Szczesniak sent Brodsky the fax. In fact,
this notion was disproven at the hearing and Brodsky failed to submit any evidence to allow the
Court to come to another conclusion. The only reason the Court can see to explain why Brodsky
would make such an allegation, which was made under penalty of perjury, was to harass
Szczesniak, attempt to have him barred from testifying, or otherwise impugn his reputation with
the court.
The Court also finds that Brodsky’s attempts at mitigation were wholly inadequate for his
egregious conduct. After retaining counsel, he moved to withdraw some of the pleadings where
he accused Szczesniak of misconduct and eventually withdrew from representing the Defendant.
While this could potentially have abrogated Szczesniak’s Rule 11 motion, his attempt to
withdraw some pleadings is inadequate to spare Brodsky from the inherent authority of this
Court to sanction him.

To date, he has not provided any explanation for his repeated

inflammatory and unsubstantiated accusations.
Furthermore, at the hearing, Brodsky gave an apology in name only. He did not appear
contrite and did not offer any explanation for his conduct directed toward Szczesniak. In fact, he
has failed to provide any explanation for his egregious conduct whatsoever outside of blaming
his frustrations with opposing counsel. He also attempted, without subjecting himself to crossexamination, to blame Ms. Weinberger for his allegations against Szczesniak. His failure to take
responsibility for his actions amplifies the need for sanctions in this case. Additionally, his
conduct as an observer during the hearing was entirely inappropriate and undermines any
apology he provided to the Court. Throughout the hearing, Brodsky was occupied with his
phone and frequently shook his head and sighed when evidence or argument was presented by
Plaintiff’s or Szczesniak’s counsel.

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Exacerbating the need for sanctions, Brodsky had numerous opportunities to avoid a
formal retribution from the Court. Throughout the course of the litigation, Brodsky was warned
numerous times to curb his vitriolic conduct. Instead of heeding the Court’s advice, at every
opportunity, he increased his acerbic behavior, culminating in his unhinged attack against
Szczesniak.
In doing so, Brodsky acted in bad faith and if left unpunished, his actions would serve to
undermine the integrity of this Court. See Mach v. Will County Sheriff, 580 F.3d 495, 501 (7th
Cir. 2009) (bad faith includes harassment, willful disobedience, and “recklessly making a
frivolous claim”); Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that party acted
deserving of sanctions when filed pleading “so lacking in merit . . . that its pursuit . . . indicates a
motive to harass”). Although the imposition of sanctions against Brodsky for some of his
conduct, including frivolous filings and unprofessional conduct could be sustained under Section
1927 or Rule 11, his allegations levied against Donald Szczesniak demand the invocation of the
court’s inherent authority to sanction. That is because “[t]he imposition of sanctions in this
instance transcends a court's equitable power concerning relations between the parties and
reaches a court's inherent power to police itself, thus serving the []purpose of ‘vindicat[ing]
judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court.’”
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 (quotation omitted). Brodsky’s actions undermine the integrity of the
judicial system and such behavior cannot go undeterred.
Sadly, the Court learned of numerous other instances in state court where Brodsky has
been left unscathed by sanctions which might have led to his belief that he could act with
impunity when acting as a litigator in court. That stops here. Protecting the integrity of the court
as a place where litigants can fairly and professionally access justice remains this Court’s

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paramount concern. Respect for the court, the rule of law, and lawyers themselves is essential to
an orderly society. Once an individual is given the privilege to serve as a lawyer, as an officer of
the court, he is held to professional standards that are essential to the preservation of justice and
the protection of those clients he serves. Any deviance from that course of professional conduct
should not be tolerated.

CONCLUSION

Due to the repeated violations of this Court’s orders to refrain from the aggressive,
unprofessional and vitriolic behavior, the Court grants the motion for sanctions [194] and
imposes the following sanctions: 1) Brodsky shall pay a fine of $50,000 to the Clerk of the
Court; 2) Brodsky shall attend an ethics course approved by the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission and provide the Court with verification of completion of the course; 3)
Brodsky shall attend an anger management course and provide the court with verification of the
successful completion of the course; and 4) the Court shall refer Brodsky to the Executive
Committee for consideration of being barred or suspended from practicing in the Northern
District of Illinois for his failure to abide by Court rules.

Date: March 28, 2018

____________________________
Hon. Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Judge

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