Case 2:18-cv-02217-SJO-FFM Document 29-1 Filed 04/08/18 Page 1 of 27 Page ID #:432

AVENATTI & ASSOCIATES, APC
Michael J. Avenatti, State Bar No. 206929
2 Ahmed Ibrahim, State Bar No. 238739
520 Newport Center Drive, Suite 1400
3 Newport Beach, CA 92660
Telephone: 949.706.7000
4 Facsimile: 949.706.7050
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Stephanie Clifford
a.k.a. Stormy Daniels a.k.a. Peggy Peterson

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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STEPHANIE CLIFFORD a.k.a.
STORMY DANIELS a.k.a. PEGGY
PETERSON, an individual,
Plaintiff,

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vs.

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DONALD J. TRUMP a.k.a. DAVID
DENNISON, and individual,
ESSENTIAL CONSULTANTS, LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company,
MICHAEL COHEN and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive,

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Defendants.
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CASE NO.: 2:18-cv-02217-SJO-FFM
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION
FOR EXPEDITED JURY TRIAL
PURSUANT TO SECTION 4 OF THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT,
AND FOR LIMITED EXPEDITED
DISCOVERY
Hearing Date: May 7, 2018
Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location:
Courtroom 10C

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR
EXPEDITED TRIAL SETTING AND DISCOVERY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND.................................................................................... 2

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A.

The Settlement Agreement .............................................................................. 2

B.

Mr. Cohen’s Role and Public Statements Regarding This
Dispute. ............................................................................................................ 2

C.

The White House Denies Any Involvement With the
Settlement Agreement or A Relationship With Plaintiff. ............................... 4

D.

The Parties Met and Conferred In Person Regarding the
Issues Raised in this Motion............................................................................ 5

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III.

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 5

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A.

Plaintiff Requests the Court Set a Jury Trial Pursuant to
Section 4 of the FAA Regarding Whether an Agreement
Was Ever Formed. ........................................................................................... 5

B.

The Court Should Grant Plaintiff Leave to Conduct Limited
Expedited Discovery. ...................................................................................... 7

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1.

The Court Will Decide Whether the Dispute Must Be
Arbitrated Because Plaintiff Contends No Agreement
Was Formed. ......................................................................................... 7

2.

Plaintiff Is Entitled to Conduct Discovery. ........................................... 8

3.

Good Cause Exists for an Order Compelling
Defendants to Provide Expedited Discovery. ....................................... 9

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a)

The Discovery Is Needed on an Expedited
Basis Because there is Urgency to Resolve the
Question of Arbitrability........................................................... 10

b)

The Breadth of the Proposed Discovery Is
Reasonable. ............................................................................... 11

c)

Plaintiff Has a Valid Purpose for the Proposed
Discovery. ................................................................................. 11

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR
EXPEDITED TRIAL SETTING AND DISCOVERY

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(1)

The Discovery Is Necessary to Resolve
Factual Disputes Concerning Whether
Mr. Trump Was Aware of, and
Consented to, the Agreement ......................................... 11

(2)

The Discovery Is Necessary to Resolve
Factual Disputes Concerning Whether
the Agreement and the Arbitration
Clause Had a Lawful Purpose ........................................ 14

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d)

The Discovery Requests Do Not Impose an
Unreasonable Burden on Defendants. ...................................... 18

e)

The Fifth Factor Relating to Timing of the
Discovery Weighs in Favor of Expedited
Discovery. ................................................................................. 19

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IV.

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 19

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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Cases

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Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.,
24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000) ................................................................................................... 15
Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court,
62 Cal. App. 4th 348 (1998) ........................................................................................ 13
Barraza v. Cricket Wireless LLC,
No. C 15-02471 WHA, 2015 WL 6689396 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015) ..................... 6, 8
Britton v. Co-op Banking Grp.,
4 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1993) ........................................................................................... 17
Brown v. Freese,
28 Cal. App. 2d 608 (1938) ......................................................................................... 17
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440 (2006)..................................................................................................... 15
Casa del Caffe Vergnano S.P.A. v. ItalFlavors, LLC,
816 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2016) ..................................................................................... 13
Chaganti v. I2 Phone Int’l, Inc.,
635 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2007)....................................................................... 12
Clinton v. Jones,
520 U.S. 681 (1997)..................................................................................................... 18
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs.,
553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009) ....................................................................................... 7
Doherty v. Barclays Bank Delaware,
No. 16-CV-01131-AJB-NLS, 2017 WL 588446 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) ................. 8

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Duffens v. Valenti,
161 Cal. App. 4th 434 (2008) ...................................................................................... 14
Esparza v. Sand & Sea, Inc.,
2 Cal. App. 5th 781 (2016) .......................................................................................... 14
FEC Advisory Opinion 1990-09 ..................................................................................... 16
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc.,
No. CV00-13096AHM(CTX), 2001 WL 867103 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2001) ............... 6
GIB, LLC v. Salon Ware, Inc.,
634 F. App’x 610 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................. 6
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno,
747 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2014) ......................................................................................... 7
Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
561 U.S. 287 (2010)....................................................................................................... 7
Gutierrez v. Carter Bros. Sec. Servs., LLC,
63 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (E.D. Cal. 2014) ......................................................................... 15
Hicks v. Citigroup, Inc.,
No. C11-1984-JCC, 2012 WL 254254 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 2012) ............................ 8
Infineon Techs. AG,
No. 216CV02859CASPLAX, 2017 WL 1371247 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017) .... 10, 11,
18, 19
Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
705 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2013) ..................................................................................... 17
McKee v. Audible, Inc.,
No. CV 17-1941-GW(EX), 2017 WL 7388530 n. 2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2017) ........... 9
Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc.,
469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................... 15

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Newton v. Clearwire Corp.,
No. 2:11-CV-00783-WBS, 2011 WL 4458971 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011) .................. 9
Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.,
763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) ..................................................................................... 12
NobelBiz, Inc. v. Wesson,
No. 14cv0832 W(JLB), 2014 WL 1588715 (S.D. Cal April 18, 2014) ...................... 10
O’Brien v. Am. Exp. Co.,
No. 11-CV-1822-BTM BGS, 2012 WL 1609957 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2012) ........... 9, 19
Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc.,
812 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ......................................................................... 9
R. M. Sherman Co. v. W. R. Thomason, Inc.,
191 Cal. App. 3d 559 (1987) ....................................................................................... 14
Rovio Entertainment Ltd. v. Royal Plush Toys, Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2012)....................................................................... 10
Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc.,
483 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................. 5, 6, 7, 8
Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc.,
208 F.R.D. 273 (N.D. Cal. 2002) .................................................................................. 9
Smith v. Superior Court,
41 Cal. App. 4th 1014 (1996) ...................................................................................... 16
Switch, LLC v. ixmation, Inc.,
No. 15-CV-01637-MEJ, 2015 WL 4463672 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2015) ................. 8, 12
Synergy HomeCare Franchising, LLC v. Aviatech, LLC,
No. CV-12-1601-PHX-SMM, 2013 WL 12284536 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2013) ............. 6
Three Valleys,
925 F.2d ......................................................................................................................... 8

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Williamson v. Superior Court,
21 Cal. 3d 829 (1978) .................................................................................................. 16

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STATUTES

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9 U.S.C. § 2 ..................................................................................................................... 15

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9 U.S.C. § 4 .............................................................................................................. passim

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52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i) ............................................................................................. 15

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52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A), (4), (5)......................................................................... 15, 16

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52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A), (c) .................................................................................... 15
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Cal. Civ. Code § 1550 ............................................................................................... 12, 14

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Cal. Civ. Code § 1558 ..................................................................................................... 12

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Cal. Civ. Code § 1580 ..................................................................................................... 12

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N.Y. Penal Law § 255.17 ................................................................................................ 17

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RULES

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ..................................................................................................... 8

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REGULATIONS

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11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1) ................................................................................................. 15

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11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(3)(ii) .............................................................................................. 15

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OTHER AUTHORITIES

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Restatement (First) of Contracts § 557 (1932) ......................................................... 16, 17

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I.

INTRODUCTION

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Plaintiff Stephanie Clifford, also known as Stormy Daniels (“Plaintiff”) files this

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renewed motion for expedited jury trial pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4, and for limited

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expedited discovery.

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requesting the same relief without prejudice on the sole ground that the motion was

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premature because defendants Essential Consultants, LLC (“EC”) and Donald J. Trump

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(“Mr. Trump”) had not yet moved to compel arbitration. Now that a motion to compel

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arbitration has been filed (as Plaintiff predicted), and Plaintiff’s return date on the motion

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has arrived, Plaintiff’s motion is ripe for decision.

On March 29, this Court denied Plaintiff’s previous motion

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This case centers on a dispute concerning whether a settlement agreement,

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containing a mutual release and terms of non-disclosure, was ever formed between the

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parties. Plaintiff contends she is not bound by any of the terms and conditions of the

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agreement, including the provision of the agreement providing for arbitration, for a

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variety of reasons.

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At issue is an agreement entitled “Confidential Settlement Agreement and Mutual

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Release; Assignment of Copyright and Non-Disparagment [sic] Agreement” (hereafter,

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the “Settlement Agreement” or “Agreement”). As detailed in her First Amended

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Complaint, Plaintiff contends that (1) the Settlement Agreement was never formed, and

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(2) even if such an agreement had been formed, there was no lawful object or purpose for

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the Settlement Agreement in general, or the confidential arbitration clause in particular.

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By this Motion, Plaintiff seeks two forms of relief. First, Plaintiff seeks an order

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setting a jury trial as soon as possible, on a date that is convenient for the Court and its

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extremely busy calendar.1

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1 Plaintiff recognizes the incredible amount of work and demands that are placed on this
Court by way of the Court’s docket and its caseload. By way of this motion, Plaintiff is
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treatment or that the claims in this case are deserving of an inordinate amount of attention
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Second, Plaintiff seeks an order granting her leave to conduct limited expedited

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discovery in connection to assist with opposing EC’s motion to compel arbitration (in

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which Mr. Trump joins and “consents”) and to present evidence in support of her position

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at the aforementioned trial pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4. Specifically, Plaintiff requests: (1) a

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deposition of Mr. Trump of no greater than two hours, (2) a deposition of Mr. Cohen of

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no greater than two hours, and (3) no more than ten (10) targeted requests for production

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of documents directed to Mr. Trump and Mr. Cohen on various topics relating to the

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Settlement Agreement.

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Because the requested discovery is needed in connection with opposing EC’s

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motion to compel arbitration and the trial, Plaintiff requests that consideration of EC’s

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motion to be stayed pending consideration of the present motion and the completion of

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the requested jury trial.

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II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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A.

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The agreement at issue in this action is entitled “Confidential Settlement

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Agreement and Mutual Release; Assignment of Copyright and Non-Disparagment [sic]

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Agreement.” A true and correct copy of the agreement, referred to hereafter as the

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“Settlement Agreement” or simply the “Agreement,” is attached to the First Amended

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Complaint as Exhibit 1. The provisions of the Settlement Agreement relevant to the

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motion are discussed below in connection with Plaintiff’s arguments below.

The Settlement Agreement

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B.

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As alleged in the FAC, Michael Cohen is an attorney licensed in the State of New

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York. [FAC, ¶16.] Mr. Cohen worked as the “top attorney” at the Trump Organization

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from 2007 until after the election and presently serves as Mr. Trump’s personal attorney.

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[Id.] He is also generally referred to as Mr. Trump’s “fixer.” [Id.]

Mr. Cohen’s Role and Public Statements Regarding This Dispute.

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Mr. Cohen is alleged to have prepared the Settlement Agreement and presented it

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to Plaintiff. [Id., ¶¶17-18.] Mr. Cohen is also alleged to have formed EC on October 17,

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2016, just weeks before the 2016 presidential election. [Id., ¶18.]

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On or about February 13, 2018, Mr. Cohen issued a public statement regarding Ms.

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Clifford, the existence of the Settlement Agreement, and details concerning the

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Settlement Agreement. Mr. Cohen stated in part: “In a private transaction in 2016, I

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used my own personal funds to facilitate a payment of $130,000 to Ms. Stephanie

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Clifford. Neither the Trump Organization nor the Trump campaign was a party to the

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transaction with Ms. Clifford, and neither reimbursed me for the payment, either directly

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or indirectly.” [FAC, ¶27.]

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On March 9, 2018, regarding the $130,000 payment, Mr. Cohen said “[t]he funds

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were taken from my home equity line and transferred internally to my LLC account in the

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same bank.” [Declaration of Michael Avenatti in Support of Renewed] Motion for

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Expedited Jury Trial and Discovery (“Avenatti Decl.”), Ex. A.] An e-mail confirming

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the transfer by Mr. Cohen to Plaintiff’s attorney in connection with the Agreement,

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however, showed Mr. Cohen used his Trump Organization e-mail account to conduct the

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transfer. [Id.]

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In a March 19, 2018 Vanity Fair article, Mr. Cohen again suggested Mr. Trump

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had no knowledge of the Settlement Agreement or $130,000 payment. [Avenatti Decl.,

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Ex. B.] In it, he is quoted as saying: “What I did defensively for my personal client, and

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my friend, is what attorneys do for their high-profile clients.” [Id.] The article also states

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that Mr. Cohen “claims that Trump did not know that he had paid Clifford the $130,000”

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and that Mr. Cohen and his counsel determined “there is no bar-association violation for

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his action.” [Id.]

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C.

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The White House Denies Any Involvement With the Settlement
Agreement or A Relationship With Plaintiff.

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White House and campaign representatives purportedly speaking on Mr. Trump’s

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behalf, have denied that Mr. Trump had any knowledge of, or involvement with, the

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Settlement Agreement. [See Avenatti Decl., Ex. C.]

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On April 5, 2018, Mr. Trump, making his first public comments regarding this

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dispute, denied having knowledge of the $130,000 payment to Plaintiff under the

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Settlement Agreement. [Avenatti Decl., Ex. D.] Mr. Trump stated he did not know

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where the money came from, denied setting up a fund from which Mr. Cohen could draw

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from to make the payment, and directed reporters’ questions to Mr. Cohen. [Id.]

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In light of these seemingly contradictory and implausible statements, many things

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that bear directly on the formation of the Agreement and its existence—issues soon to be

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before the Court—remain uncertain. By way of example only, it continues to remain

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unclear:

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•

Whether Mr. Trump is “David Dennison” or “DD” as referenced in the Settlement
Agreement;

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Whether Mr. Trump knew about the Settlement Agreement;

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Whether Mr. Trump truly did not know about the $130,000 payment;

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Whether the payment was made with Mr. Trump’s own money, money from his
presidential campaign, money from The Trump Organization, another source
linked to Mr. Trump, or from Mr. Cohen;

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What was the scope of Mr. Trump’s participation or involvement in the Settlement
Agreement, and did Mr. Trump consider himself a party?

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What was Mr. Cohen’s role?

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What is Essential Consultants, LLC, who are its members, and what other business
does it conduct?

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•

Did Mr. Trump approve or authorize Mr. Cohen’s actions?;

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Whether Mr. Trump consented to be a party to the Settlement Agreement;

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•

Did Mr. Trump consent to the contractual obligations imposed on him by the

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Settlement Agreement?;

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If so, did Mr. Trump actually communicate any assent to the Settlement
Agreement to Plaintiff given that he never signed the Settlement Agreement?;

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Was Mr. Trump personally involved in an effort to silence Plaintiff in order to
benefit his presidential campaign by preventing voters from hearing Plaintiff speak
publicly;

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Who (if anyone) was acting as Mr. Trump’s attorney in connection with the
Settlement Agreement?

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D.

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On March 20, 2018, the parties met and conferred in person concerning the relief

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The Parties Met and Conferred In Person Regarding the Issues Raised in
this Motion.

requested in this Motion. [Avenatti Decl., ¶10.] Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel advised
counsel for Defendants that Plaintiff sought limited discovery on an expedited basis as
follows: (1) a deposition of Mr. Trump of no greater than two hours, (2) a deposition of
Mr. Cohen of no greater than two hours, and (3) no more than ten (10) targeted requests
for production of documents directed to Mr. Trump and Mr. Cohen on various topics
relating to the Agreement. [Avenatti Decl., ¶6.] Defendants contend that no discovery
should be conducted in the case, and no trial should be set, because the case should be
summarily ordered to arbitration.

[Id.]

The parties, therefore, were unable to

successfully resolve their dispute. [Id.] Since the Court’s denial of the prior motion as
premature, the parties’ positions have remained the same. [Id.]
III.

ARGUMENT
A.

Plaintiff Requests the Court Set a Jury Trial Pursuant to Section 4 of the
FAA Regarding Whether an Agreement Was Ever Formed.

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), “[i]f the making of the arbitration
agreement . . . be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.” 9
U.S.C. § 4; see also Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 483 F.3d 956, 962 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“[W]hen one party disputes ‘the making of the arbitration agreement,’ the Federal
Arbitration Act requires that ‘the court [ ] proceed summarily to the trial thereof’ before
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compelling arbitration under the agreement.”) (brackets in original); GIB, LLC v. Salon

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Ware, Inc., 634 F. App’x 610, 611 (9th Cir. 2016) (where triable issues existed on

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whether agreement was formed, district court erred in compelling arbitration without first

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proceeding under Section 4 of the FAA to resolve the dispute). The Ninth Circuit has

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“interpreted this language to encompass not only challenges to the arbitration clause

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itself, but also challenges to the making of the contract containing the arbitration clause.”

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Sanford, 483 F.3d at 962. For this reason, “challenges to the existence of a contract as a

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whole must be determined by the court prior to ordering arbitration.” Id. (emphasis

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added).

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“If no jury trial be demanded . . . , the court shall hear and determine such issue.”

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9 U.S.C. § 4. If on the other hand, one party demands a jury trial in a timely fashion,

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“upon such demand the court shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury in

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the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may specially call a jury

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for that purpose.” Id.; see also Barraza v. Cricket Wireless LLC, No. C 15-02471 WHA,

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2015 WL 6689396, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015) (setting “summary jury trial” less than

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45 days from date of order to determine whether plaintiffs agreed to terms and conditions

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contained in guide enclosed with their wireless phones). 2 “If the jury find that no

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agreement in writing for arbitration was made . . . the proceeding shall be dismissed.” 9

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U.S.C. § 4.

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Synergy HomeCare Franchising, LLC v. Aviatech, LLC, No. CV-12-1601-PHX-SMM,
2013 WL 12284536, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2013) (denying motion to compel arbitration
pending a jury trial and setting the “matter for a pre-trial status hearing in order to
schedule any necessary discovery, depositions, etc., prior to trial on the existence of an
arbitration agreement . . .”); Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., No. CV0013096AHM(CTX), 2001 WL 867103, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2001), aff’d, 298 F.3d 778
(9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the “plaintiff has raised a genuine dispute regarding
whether an arbitration agreement governs her claims and is therefore entitled to a trial of
the issue” but declining to order a trial because, even assuming an agreement, the claims
were not required to be arbitrated).
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Here, Plaintiff has demanded a jury trial pursuant to section 4 of the FAA. [FAC

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at p. 18; see also Dkt No. __ at __.] Moreover, Plaintiff disputes the “making of the

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arbitration agreement[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 4; Sanford, 483 F.3d at 962; see also FAC, ¶¶36-57.

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Such a trial “shall proceed summarily” upon a showing that the making of the arbitration

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agreement is at issue. 9 U.S.C. § 4. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to an expedited jury

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trial regarding whether the Settlement Agreement was ever formed.

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B.

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The Court Should Grant Plaintiff Leave to Conduct Limited Expedited
Discovery.
1.

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The Court Will Decide Whether the Dispute Must Be Arbitrated
Because Plaintiff Contends No Agreement Was Formed.

11

Based on the parties’ meet and confer discussion and the arguments made in EC’s

12

motion to compel arbitration, Plaintiff anticipates Defendant will argue that discovery

13

should not be ordered because the arbitrator, not the Court, will resolve the parties’

14

dispute over whether an agreement exists. Defendants are incorrect.

15

It is axiomatic that “[a]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be

16

required to submit any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” Sanford, 483 F.3d

17

at 962. Thus, “[t]he strong public policy in favor of arbitration does not extend to those

18

who are not parties to an arbitration agreement.” Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W.

19

Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Importantly, “[i]f the

20

parties contest the existence of an arbitration agreement, the presumption in favor of

21

arbitrability does not apply.” Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 742

22

(9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original).

23

For

this

reason,

although

it

is

true

that

questions

“regarding

24

the validity or enforcement of a putative contract mandating arbitration should be referred

25

to an arbitrator,” this is not so for “challenges to the existence of a contract as a whole”—

26

which “must be determined by the court prior to ordering arbitration.” Sanford, 483 F.3d

27

at 962 (emphasis in original); see also Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561

28

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1

U.S. 287, 296 (2010) (“[W]here the dispute at issue concerns contract formation, the

2

dispute is generally for courts to decide.”); Three Valleys v. E.F. Hutton, 925 F.2d 1136,

3

1140–41 (“[A] party who contests the making of a contract containing an arbitration

4

provision cannot be compelled to arbitrate the threshold issue of the existence of an

5

agreement to arbitrate.”). 3

6

Therefore, Defendants’ contention that discovery should be denied because the

7

arbitrator will resolve the parties’ dispute concerning the formation of the Settlement

8

Agreement is without merit.

9

2.

Plaintiff Is Entitled to Conduct Discovery.

10

As a logical and necessary corollary of Plaintiff’s right to a jury trial in the context

11

of this dispute and of opposing EC’s motion to compel arbitration, Plaintiff is also

12

entitled to conduct discovery. Permitting a party to conduct discovery in conjunction

13

with an opposition to a motion to compel arbitration “is consistent with the FAA and

14

within the Court’s discretion.” Hicks v. Citigroup, Inc., No. C11-1984-JCC, 2012 WL

15

254254, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 2012). For that reason, “[c]ourts have permitted

16

limited discovery as to arbitrability where parties have placed the validity of the

17

arbitration agreement in issue.” Id. at *1; see also Barraza, 2015 WL 6689396, at *6

18

(ordering “summary jury trial” and that “[b]oth sides should cooperate in expedited

19

discovery on the factual matters in play on this motion, and failure to cooperate may lead

20

to preclusion or adverse inferences as a sanction.”).

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Such discovery is appropriate because “it is relevant to a ‘claim or defense.’”
3

District courts in this Circuit are in accord. Doherty v. Barclays Bank Delaware, No.
16-CV-01131-AJB-NLS, 2017 WL 588446, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) (“Plaintiff is
challenging the existence of a contract with Defendant. Therefore, following relevant
Ninth Circuit case law, the Court must first decide whether a valid contract exists.”);
Barraza, 2015 WL 6689396, at *3 (the “existence of a contract as a whole must be
determined by the court prior to ordering arbitration”) (quoting Sanford, 483 F.3d at
962); Switch, LLC v. ixmation, Inc., No. 15-CV-01637-MEJ, 2015 WL 4463672, at *3
(N.D. Cal. July 21, 2015) (same).
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1

Newton v. Clearwire Corp., No. 2:11-CV-00783-WBS, 2011 WL 4458971, at *6 (E.D.

2

Cal. Sept. 23, 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). More specifically, courts will

3

permit discovery that “is relevant to the formation or making of the agreement.” O’Brien

4

v. Am. Exp. Co., No. 11-CV-1822-BTM BGS, 2012 WL 1609957, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May

5

8, 2012); McKee v. Audible, Inc., No. CV 17-1941-GW(EX), 2017 WL 7388530, at *3

6

n. 2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2017) (permitting discovery on issue of “mutual assent” in

7

connection with motion to compel arbitration).

8

Similarly, when the party opposing arbitration raises unconscionability

9

arguments, “the parties must be afforded an opportunity to gather the appropriate

10

evidence.” Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069–70 (C.D. Cal.

11

2011) (granting parties four months to conduct discovery on enforceability of arbitration

12

agreement); O’Brien, 2012 WL 1609957, at *2 (“Based on [the] available defenses to the

13

validity of an arbitration agreement, courts have permitted parties opposing a motion to

14

compel arbitration to take discovery on the unconscionability of an arbitration

15

provision”).

16
17
18
19

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery in connection with EC’s
motion to compel arbitration and the FAA section 4 summary jury trial.
3.

Good Cause Exists for an Order Compelling Defendants to
Provide Expedited Discovery.

20

Having established Plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery, the next question is

21

whether the request for the limited discovery should be expedited. As shown below,

22

Plaintiff’s request should be granted.

23

To obtain discovery on an expedited basis, Plaintiff must show “good cause.”

24

Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

25

“Good cause” exists “where the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of the

26

administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party.” Id.

27
28

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“In considering whether good cause exists, factors courts may consider include:

2

(1) whether a preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the breadth of the discovery request;

3

(3) the purpose for requesting the expedited discovery; (4) the burden on the defendants

4

to comply with the requests; and (5) how far in advance of the typical discovery process

5

the request was made.” MACOM Tech. Sols. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, No.

6

216CV02859CASPLAX, 2017 WL 1371247, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017) (citing

7

Rovio Entertainment Ltd. v. Royal Plush Toys, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1099 (N.D.

8

Cal. 2012); see also NobelBiz, Inc. v. Wesson, No. 14cv0832 W(JLB), 2014 WL

9

1588715, at *1 (S.D. Cal April 18, 2014).

10

Here, Plaintiff seeks the following limited discovery on an expedited basis: (1) a

11

deposition of Mr. Trump of no greater than two hours, (2) a deposition of Mr. Cohen of

12

no greater than two hours, and (3) a maximum of ten (10) targeted requests for

13

production of documents directed to Mr. Trump and Mr. Cohen on various topics relating

14

to the Agreement. Good cause exists for this requested discovery.

15

a)

16

The Discovery Is Needed on an Expedited Basis Because
there is Urgency to Resolve the Question of Arbitrability.

17

The first factor courts may consider in the “good cause” analysis is “whether a

18

preliminary injunction is pending[.]” MACOM, 2017 WL 1371247, at *2. Although no

19

motion for preliminary injunction has been filed in this case, this factor nevertheless

20

weighs in favor of granting expedited discovery.

21

resolving the present dispute over arbitrability because EC—without any notice to

22

Plaintiff—initiated an arbitration proceeding in Los Angeles before ADR Services and

23

obtained a temporary restraining order on an ex parte basis (again, without any notice to

24

Plaintiff) purporting to restrict Plaintiff from speaking.4 [Avenatti Decl., ¶5.] Because

25

Defendants threaten to enforce the order (which Plaintiff does not recognize as valid

26

because, among other reasons, there was no agreement to arbitrate formed between the

27

4

28

Specifically, there is urgency to

It is widely understood that prior restraints on speech are generally unconstitutional.
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1

parties), it is important that the FAA section 4 trial be set as soon as possible, and that

2

discovery be ordered on an expedited basis to use at the trial.

3
4
5

b)

The Breadth of the Proposed Discovery Is Reasonable.

The second factor the Court may consider in the “good cause” analysis is the
“breadth of the discovery request” at issue. MACOM, 2017 WL 1371247, at *2.

6

Here, Plaintiff makes very modest, limited, and targeted discovery requests.

7

Although entitled to seven (7) hours of deposition for each witness, Plaintiff requests

8

only two (2) hours to depose Messrs. Trump and Cohen, a small fraction of the time she

9

is allotted under Rule 30.

Plaintiff also does not seek broad document discovery.

10

Plaintiff intends to propound no more than ten (10) document requests narrowed in scope

11

by time period and subject matter.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

c)

Plaintiff Has a Valid Purpose for the Proposed Discovery.

The third factor is the “purpose for requesting the expedited discovery.”
MACOM, 2017 WL 1371247, at *2. This factor is also met. Simply stated, the purpose
of the expedited discovery is to enable Plaintiff to oppose EC’s motion to compel
arbitration.

As explained below, the requested discovery is narrowly targeted to

establishing that (1) the Settlement Agreement was never formed between the parties, and
(2) even if such an agreement had been formed, there was no lawful purpose for the
Settlement Agreement in general, or the confidential arbitration clause in particular.
There are several examples of factual issues likely to arise which demonstrate why such
expedited discovery will be necessary.

22
23
24

(1)

The Discovery Is Necessary to Resolve Factual
Disputes Concerning Whether Mr. Trump Was Aware
of, and Consented to, the Agreement

25

The first reason why the requested discovery has a valid purpose is that there is a

26

factual dispute between the parties regarding whether Defendant Trump was aware of the

27

Settlement Agreement, whether he was a party to the Agreement, and whether he ever

28

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consented to the Agreement. This issue goes directly to whether a valid contract was

2

ever in fact formed between the parties. “In determining whether a valid arbitration

3

agreement exists, federal courts ‘apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the

4

formation of contracts.’” Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir.

5

2014). The elements “essential to the existence of a contract” are as follows: (1) that the

6

parties are capable of contracting; (2) their consent; (3) a lawful object; and (4) sufficient

7

cause or consideration. Cal. Civ. Code § 1550; see also Switch, 2015 WL 4463672, at

8

*4. Consent is an essential element. Id.

9

Here, statements in the public record from the White House and Mr. Cohen show

10

in stark terms why EC’s motion to compel arbitration cannot possibly be decided without

11

facts and evidence, and thus, discovery. Reading these statements at face value, both the

12

White House (theoretically on behalf of Mr. Trump) and Michael Cohen appear to call

13

into question whether Mr. Trump knew of the Settlement Agreement, whether he

14

consented to it, whether he authorized it, and, more fundamentally, whether he even had

15

any relationship at all with Plaintiff. 5

16

For his part, Mr. Cohen has suggested that he paid the $130,000 to Plaintiff out of

17

his own pocket (through a home equity line of credit), that he did not make Mr. Trump

18

aware of what he was doing, and that he did it as a favor to Mr. Trump as a “friend.”

19

[Avenatti Decl., Exs. A-B.] Indeed, if Mr. Trump was completely unaware of Mr.

20

Cohen’s actions, the question naturally arises as to how it would be possible for a

21

“meeting of the minds” to have occurred between parties where one of the parties does

22

not even know about the existence of the agreement? Chaganti v. I2 Phone Int’l, Inc.,

23

Indeed, Defendants will not even confirm or deny whether the “David Dennison”
mentioned in the Agreement is Mr. Trump. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1558 (“It is essential to
25 the validity of a contract, not only that the parties should exist, but that it should be
26 possible to identify them.”) (emphasis added). In fact, despite repeated requests from
Plaintiff’s counsel as to their position, Defendants refuse to state whether Mr. Trump is
27 even a party to the Agreement.
24

28

5

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635 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“In order for a contract to form, there must

2

be a meeting of the minds with an intent to be bound by a legally enforceable

3

agreement.”); Cal. Civ. Code § 1580 (“Consent is not mutual, unless the parties all agree

4

upon the same thing in the same sense.”). Therefore, Plaintiff must be permitted to

5

request documents from Defendants and to cross-examine Mr. Trump and Mr. Cohen at a

6

deposition regarding these topics that are at the heart of whether an agreement was ever

7

formed.

8

Moreover, the absence of Mr. Trump’s signature is a highly relevant topic of

9

discovery in this proceeding. This is particularly so where, as here, the Agreement

10

requires the signature of all parties as a condition to it becoming valid and binding.

11

[Agreement at ¶8.6 (“[T]his Agreement, when signed by all Parties, is a valid and

12

binding agreement, enforceable in accordance with its terms.”) (emphasis added).] See

13

Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 348, 358 (1998) (“When

14

it is clear, both from a provision that the proposed written contract would become

15

operative only when signed by the parties as well as from any other evidence presented

16

by the parties that both parties contemplated that acceptance of the contract’s terms

17

would be signified by signing it, the failure to sign the agreement means no binding

18

contract was created.”). Moreover, by failing to sign the Agreement, Mr. Trump failed to

19

supply essential consideration to Plaintiff in the form of a release, covenant not to sue,

20

and representations and warranties. [See Agreement at ¶¶2.3, 2.5, 4.3, 8.6.] See Casa del

21

Caffe Vergnano S.P.A. v. ItalFlavors, LLC, 816 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2016)

22

(“[W]here the parties to a ‘contract’ have not mutually consented to be bound by their

23

agreement, they have not formed a true contract.”); Banner, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 362

24

(reversing order compelling arbitration on the grounds that in the absence of a signature,

25

there was no agreement at all.).

26

Therefore, the lack of a signature from Mr. Trump, along with his testimony and

27

Mr. Cohen’s testimony explaining why he did not sign the Agreement when the

28

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Agreement plainly included a place for his signature, is an unmistakably relevant area of

2

inquiry in connection with resolving EC’s motion to compel arbitration.

3

Further, the source of funds for the $130,000 payment is highly relevant to the

4

motion to compel arbitration. If Mr. Trump did not supply the funds or did not even

5

know about the funds, this would be another relevant fact demonstrating that he never

6

consented to the Settlement Agreement. On the other hand, if Mr. Trump, The Trump

7

Organization, or another Trump related entity is the source of funds for the $130,000

8

payment, then Mr. Trump may be said to have consented to the terms of the Agreement.

9

Finally, if Mr. Trump was aware of the Settlement Agreement, given that he never

10

signed it, Plaintiff must be permitted to explore through document demands and

11

deposition testimony how he claims he communicated his acceptance and assent of the

12

Agreement, including his assent to the terms requiring him to provide Plaintiff with a

13

release of claims and a covenant not to sue. Esparza v. Sand & Sea, Inc., 2 Cal. App. 5th

14

781, 788 (2016) (the “consent of the parties to a contract must be communicated by each

15

party to the other.”).

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

(2)

The Discovery Is Necessary to Resolve Factual
Disputes Concerning Whether the Agreement and the
Arbitration Clause Had a Lawful Purpose

In addition to discovery on the question of whether an agreement was formed in
light of Mr. Trump’s failure to consent to the Agreement, discovery concerning whether
there was a lawful purpose to the Agreement’s confidential arbitration clause is also
highly probative of whether a contract was formed. Cal. Civ. Code § 1550 (contract must
have a “lawful object” which is “essential to the existence of a contract”).
The illegality of a contract “voids the entire contract, including the arbitration
clause.” Duffens v. Valenti, 161 Cal. App. 4th 434, 454 (2008); see also R. M. Sherman
Co. v. W. R. Thomason, Inc., 191 Cal. App. 3d 559, 563 (1987) (“If the contract was
truly void it created no right or claim whatsoever. . . . [I]t binds no one and is a mere
nullity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, for example, in Gutierrez v. Carter
-14MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR EXPEDITED
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1

Bros. Security Services, the district court concluded, in part, that “if a contract’s ‘central

2

purpose’ is ‘tainted with illegality,’ then the contract as a whole is unenforceable” and

3

thus denied a motion to compel arbitration. Gutierrez v. Carter Bros. Sec. Servs., LLC,

4

63 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1214 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health

5

Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 124 (2000))

6

Under federal law (including the FAA), the legality of the arbitration provision is

7

to be decided by the Court, not the arbitrator. See Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469

8

F.3d 1257, 1264 (9th Cir. 2006) (“When the crux of the complaint is not the invalidity of

9

the contract as a whole, but rather the arbitration provision itself, then the federal courts

10

must decide whether the arbitration provision is invalid and unenforceable under 9 U.S.C.

11

§ 2 of the FAA.”). In Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, the Supreme Court held that

12

“a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole” based on illegality “and not

13

specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.” Buckeye Check Cashing,

14

Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (emphasis added).

15

Here, Plaintiff’s challenge to the lawful purpose of the contract is not simply to the

16

legality of the contract as a whole, but also specifically to the arbitration clause itself.

17

[FAC, ¶¶57-61.] Under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), it is unlawful to

18

make campaign contributions—defined broadly to include “any gift, subscription, loan,

19

advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of

20

influencing any election for Federal office”— to a candidate for federal office where the

21

contribution exceeds the limits provided for by federal law. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i)

22

(emphasis added). see also 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A), (c). The phrase “anything of

23

value” includes “all in-kind contributions.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1).

24

Moreover, critical to the legality of the arbitration clause itself, any such campaign

25

“contributions” or “expenditures” (defined similarly to “contribution”) must be made

26

public. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A), (4), (5). This also includes any contributions or

27

expenditures to benefit the campaign made by the “candidate.”

28

11 C.F.R. §

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104.3(a)(3)(ii); FEC Advisory Opinion 1990-09.

2

Here, the discovery is needed to establish that the arbitration clause had no such

3

lawful object or purpose. [See FAC, ¶59.] More specifically, Plaintiff intends to prove

4

the arbitration clause was entered with the purpose of keeping facts concerning federal

5

campaign contributions and expenditures secret and hidden from public view by using a

6

confidential arbitration proceeding in violation of FECA’s mandates to publicly report

7

campaign contributions and expenditures. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A), (4), (5). In

8

other words, the principal aim and design of the arbitration clause is to keep confidential

9

that which, by law, must be publicly disclosed. Indeed, Plaintiff contends the clause

10

plainly is designed to prevent the public disclosure of an illegal campaign contribution by

11

mandating that disputes between Plaintiff and Mr. Trump be resolved in a confidential

12

arbitration proceeding shielded from public scrutiny. [FAC, ¶59.]

13

In short, deposition testimony of Mr. Trump and Mr. Cohen, along with document

14

requests directed to Defendants, is necessary to determine whether the Agreement and the

15

arbitration clause had a lawful object and purpose. These are issues the Court, not the

16

arbitrator, will be required to decide in connection with EC’s forthcoming Petition to

17

Compel Arbitration.

18

Further, Plaintiff also intends to prove that the Settlement Agreement, along with

19

the arbitration clause, are also without a lawful object or purpose and thus void ab initio

20

because they violate public policy by suppressing speech on a matter of enormous public

21

concern about a candidate for President of the United States, mere weeks before the

22

election. “‘Agreements to suppress evidence have long been held void as against public

23

policy, both in California and in most common law jurisdictions.’” Smith v. Superior

24

Court, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1014, 1025 (1996) (quoting Williamson v. Superior Court, 21

25

Cal. 3d 829, 836–837 (1978)). “A bargain that has for its consideration the nondisclosure

26

of discreditable facts, or of facts that the promisee is under a fiduciary duty not to

27

disclose, is illegal.”

28

Restatement (First) of Contracts § 557 (1932).

Remarkably,

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Illustration 1 in the official comments to section 557 provides the following example of a

2

bargain that is illegal:

3

6

1. A, a candidate for political office, and as such advocating
certain principles, had previously written letters to B, taking a
contrary position. B is about to publish the letters, and A fearing
that the publication will cost him his election, agrees to pay
$1000 for the suppression of the letters. The bargain is illegal.

7

Restatement (First) of Contracts § 557, Illustration 1 (1932); see also Brown v. Freese, 28

8

Cal. App. 2d 608, 618 (1938) (contract offering to pay the plaintiff to refrain from

9

disclosing information the plaintiff discovered about transactions in which the decedent’s

10

husband had participated held illegal). The arbitration clause itself is illegal because it

11

facilitates the suppression of speech by mandating a confidential arbitration proceeding

12

shielded from public view.

4
5

13

Finally, the Settlement Agreement, and the arbitration clause, are also without a

14

lawful object or purpose and are thus void ab initio because they cover up adulterous

15

conduct, a crime in Mr. Trump’s home state of New York, N.Y. Penal Law § 255.17, and

16

because the Settlement Agreement was designed to cover up Mr. Cohen’s ethical

17

violations, including his violations of Rule 1.4 and 1.8(e) of the New York Rules of

18

Professional Conduct. [See FAC, ¶¶53-55, 61.]

19

In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiff also contends no agreement to arbitrate was

20

formed between Plaintiff and EC under the plain language of section 5.2 of the

21

Settlement Agreement [FAC, ¶56], see Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., 705 F.3d 1122,

22

1126 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Generally, the contractual right to compel arbitration ‘may not be

23

invoked by one who is not a party to the agreement and does not otherwise possess the

24

right to compel arbitration.’”) (quoting Britton v. Co-op Banking Grp., 4 F.3d 742, 744

25

(9th Cir. 1993)). [FAC, ¶¶57-58.]

26

For all these reasons, Plaintiff has established she has a valid purpose for

27

requesting limited expedited discovery and thus satisfies the third factor in the good

28

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cause analysis. Plaintiff must be permitted to present evidence at the FAA section 4 trial

2

supporting these bases for voiding the arbitration clause. To do so, Plaintiff must be

3

permitted to conduct the limited discovery she has requested.

4

d)

5
6
7

The Discovery Requests Do Not Impose an Unreasonable
Burden on Defendants.

The fourth factor – the “burden on the defendants to comply with the requests” –
also strongly favors expedited discovery. MACOM, 2017 WL 1371247, at *2.

8

As a preliminary matter, it is firmly established that a sitting president is not

9

afforded special protection from a civil suit regarding conduct before he or she

10

entered office. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 717 (1997) (The “Constitution

11

does not offer

12

distracting civil litigation . . .”) (Breyer, J. concurring) (emphasis in original). Indeed,

13

even prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Clinton v. Jones, there were

14

“several instances” when “sitting Presidents have given depositions or testified at

15

criminal trials” and the Supreme Court had previously “twice authorized the enforcement

16

of subpoenas seeking documents from a sitting President…” Id. at 717. Therefore, Mr.

17

Trump cannot reasonably argue that he is not subject to being compelled to provide

18

discovery in this case based on his status as President.

a sitting President significant

protections

from

potentially

19

The burdens of discovery are also minimal. Instead of the seven (7) hours of

20

testimony from each witness that she is entitled to under Rule 30, Plaintiff requests a

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modest two hours from each witness. Plaintiff is willing to accommodate the witnesses

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and their counsels’ respective schedules by conducting the depositions on any day of

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their choosing (even weekends) within 21 days of the Court’s order. Further, Plaintiff is

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agreeable to conducting the depositions in any location of Defendants’ choosing.

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Further, although under Rule 34, Plaintiff is not limited in the number of document

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demands she may propound, here, she requests leave to propound no more than ten (10)

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document requests. The requests will be limited by subject matter to only those topics

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pertaining to the Settlement Agreement as described in this Motion.

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Finally, the burdens imposed by the expedited discovery are not unreasonable

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because Plaintiff merely proposes to conduct discovery that will be relevant to this

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dispute regardless of where the case is ultimately litigated. In other words, even if later

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in the case or in arbitration, Mr. Trump and Mr. Cohen will in any event be required to

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answer the same questions and produce the same documents regarding this dispute.

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Therefore, there is no undue burden or prejudice to Mr. Trump or Mr. Cohen to compel

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them to provide this discovery on a limited basis now.

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e)

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The Fifth Factor Relating to Timing of the Discovery Weighs
in Favor of Expedited Discovery.

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The last factor the Court may consider in deciding whether good cause exists for

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expedited discovery is “how far in advance of the typical discovery process the request

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was made.” MACOM, 2017 WL 1371247, at *2. This factor is of minimal relevance

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under the particular circumstances of this case. Because this will case will require a jury

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trial under section 4 of the FAA, it is not unusual or unreasonable for Plaintiff to request

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expedited discovery at this early stage to support their position with admissible evidence

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through formal discovery demonstrating there was no agreement that was ever formed.

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See, e.g., O’Brien, 2012 WL 1609957, at *1; see also section III(B)(2), supra. Indeed,

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Defendants’ objection is not to the timing of the discovery; their position is that the

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discovery should not be conducted at all.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant

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this Motion in its entirety and enter an order (1) setting a jury trial pursuant to section 4

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of the FAA on the earliest possible date convenient to the Court’s schedule, and (2)

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requiring Defendants to produce Mr. Trump and Mr. Cohen for depositions within 21

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days of the Court’s order for no more than two hours of deposition time for each witness,

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and to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff’s requests for production of documents

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(not to exceed ten (10) requests) within 14 days of the Court’s Order. Further, because

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the requested discovery is needed in connection with opposing EC’s motion to compel

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arbitration, Plaintiff requests that consideration of EC’s motion to be stayed pending

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consideration of the present motion and the completion of the requested jury trial.

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Dated: April 8, 2018

AVENATTI & ASSOCIATES, APC
By:

/s/ Michael J. Avenatti
Michael J. Avenatti
Attorneys for Plaintiff Stephanie Clifford
a.k.a. Stormy Daniels a.k.a. Peggy Peterson

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