THE KURTZ LAW FIRM

David Email: dkun?z@kurlzl 
Telephone: (480) 585-i 900
Facsimile: [480) 585-9910

 

July 10, 2017

Of?ce of General Counsel

NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE

West Building

Washington, D.C. 20590

Re: Goodyear G159 22.5 Medium Radial Truck Tire

Dear Counsel:

In accord with the Order of the Maricopa County Superior Court, this correspondence
is provided by me independently, as an of?cer of the legal system, on behalf of my law firm,
David L. Kurtz, P.C. It is not submitted on the behalf of any clients nor on behalf of my
family. Its purpose is to set forth from what I discovered in my capacity as counsel for the
Haeger Family during 12 years of litigation involving the Goodyear Tire Rubber Company
relating to the 6159 22.5 tire (6159).

I am submitting two separate versions for NHTSA's consideration. The ?rst is a
complete version of this correspondence and supporting exhibits. The second is a redacted
version, which deletes any materials previously designated as con?dential, pursuant to
protective order, and references thereto. Goodyear is being provided a copy of both
submittals.

On July 6, 2017, the Maricopa County Superior Court vacated the blanket protective
order and Goodyear?s con?dentiality designations, made pursuant thereto. Goodyear is
appealing that decision. Thus, to assure in the interim that Goodyear?s right to assert its
claims of con?dentiality is protected, and In accord with the Court?s order, I request NHTSA
grant Goodyear 30 days to provide it an opportunity, as the owner of the information, to
support its claims of con?dentiality pursuant to 49 C.F.R. 5512. Each of the documents for
which Goodyear asserts claims of con?dentiality are clearly marked as:

CONFIDENTIAL. THIS DOCUMENT IS PRODUCED FOR USE IN THE MATTER
OF THE ESTATE OF LEROY HAEGER, ET AL. V. THE GOODYEAR TIRE AND
RUBBER COMPANY, ET AL., SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
MARICOPA COUNTY, CASE NO. CV2013-052753 ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED IN HAEGER V. THE GOODYEAR TIRE AND
RUBBER COMPANY (HAEGER I), CV05-2046-PHX-ROS. THIS DOCUMENT
SHALL NOT BE USED FOR ANY PURPOSE INCONSISTENT WITH THE
REFERENCED PROTECTIVE ORDER.1

 

1 Exhibits 9 and 12 are summaries prepared by staff. As they address materials Goodyear asserts are
con?dential, they too have been so designated.

7420 East Pinnacle Peak Road, Building D, Suite 128
Scolisdale. Arizona 85255

1' Doc

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 2

Due to the clarity of each such designation, the pages have not been separately
marked ?confidential? as Goodyear clearly claims the entirety of each such document is
entitled to such. Any NHTSA response to or Inquiry of Goodyear should be directed to Mark
V. Cherveny, Manager, Global Regulations, Standards a Compliance at The Goodyear "lire
and Rubber Company, 200 Innovation Way, Akron, OH 44316. I would also request that
you acknowledge to my of?ce that you have received these materials.



The G159 Is a radial medium truck tire. As such, It has been exempt from the'
detailed reporting required for passenger and light truck tires, as more fully speci?ed in the
TREAD Act. The gap In the statutory scheme, along with claims of con?dentiality pursuant
to protective orders Issued In 6159 cases across the nation, has, in my opinion, deprived
NHTSA of important Information necessary to adequately perform Its public safety function.
NHTSA remains unaware of thousands of adjustments, more than 700 property damage
claims and approximately 98 Injuries and deaths alleged to have been caused by 6159
failures. Similarly, NHTSA has apparently been deprived of any opportunity to Investigate
the cause of these hundreds of failures which has left the public at risk of serious Injuries or
death from 6159 tread separations.

The now disclosed failure data reveals that the claims arise from failures occurring at
high speeds on motorhomes across the United States. The failure claims commenced In
1996 and have continued through 2015, the last year for which Goodyear has disclosed
data.2

- Goodyear has kept this failure data from public and regulatory view by claiming It to
be ?con?dential? whenever any portion of It was disclosed In litigation. Any meaningful
partial production of failure data or testimony regarding the 6159 has remained con?dential
by Goodyear?s designations in accord with protective orders acquired by Goodyear, which
have universally prohibited disclosure to other victims, the public and any interested
governmental entity.

The data, testimony and documents referenced hereafter are now being disclosed
only as a result of a court order Issued by the Honorable John Hannah of the Maricopa
County Superior Court, who authorized this disclosure In accord with NHTSA Enforcement
Guidance Bulletin 2015-01: Recommended Best Practices Protective Orders and Settlement
Agreements Civil Litigation: As noted:

ability to Identify and de?ne safety related motor vehicle defects
relies in large part on manufacturers self-reporting  given these constraints,
safety-related Information developed or discovered In private litigation Is an
Important resource for NHTSA.

[I]n order to fully exercise its regulatory authorities and powers, the agency
must be made aware of the need to do so in the ?rst instance. Both Agency
experience and that of several other commentators provide several examples
of a manufacturer falling to accurately and timely report relevant safety-
related Information to NHTSA. The Agency cannot request such Information

 

2 Goodyear has recently disclosed approximately 60 additional claims for property damage, injury or
death occurring on other Class Seven Vehicles used in commercial highway applications. The
underlying claims submittals have yet to be disclosed.

sum-i HWdeo?NhWoouan?Mi LDoe

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017 
Page 3

from the manufacturer If it is not ?rst made aware of potential under the lying
safety-related Issues.



NHTSA  is tasked with, among other things, setting motor vehicle safety
standards identifying and Insuring ?the remedy of safety-related
defects, and monitoring and enforcing compliance with new standards to
safeguard the well-being of the American public. The only way the Agency
can fully achieve these objections if It has access to all necessary information,
including information discovered or identified in private litigation.

This correspondence serves to ?ll the void crafted by Goodyear in the dozens of suits
arising out of alleged G159 failures. Judge Hannah is the only judicial of?cer that has
authorized full disclosure of this public safety-related information to NHTSA to assist in the
performance of Its regulatory function. Moreover, I believe that my of?ce is the only
recipient of complete claim data relatlng to the 6159, a task which was not completed until
early 2017.3 .

1 Though the Court has now vacated its protective order and con?dentiality
designations, Goodyearfs soon to be filed appeal will address whether all of this Information
will be released to the public. Separately pending before the Court Is a Motion to Intervene
and related Motion to Unseal Court Records ?led by the Center for Auto Safety on July 7, 
2017. (Exhibit 2) I expect that the Center for Auto Safety will also be a participant in the
appellate proceedings.



On behalf of the Haeger Family, I ?led suit In the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona in the summer 2005, arising out of a (5159 tread separation and
associated motorhome rollover which occurred in June 2003 on Interstate 25 in New Mexico,
which Involved seriousinjuries to the Haeger Family. The case was before the Honorable
Roslyn Silver in the United States District Court, for the District of Arizona, until It was
settled on the ?rst day of trial in 2010. It was thereafter discovered that Goodyear had
concealed requested test documents and presented Goodyear corporate representatives
who testi?ed falsely about the existence of such tests. The discovery fraud was brought to
the attention of the Federal Court and following substantial discovery, depositions and an
evidentlary hearing, the Court entered its order in a published opinion, Haeger V. Goodyear
?re 8: Rubber at at, 906 F.Supp.2d 938 (D. Ariz. 2012). (Haeger I.) It sets forth
dozens of pages of factual ?ndings and associated legal analysis. It chronicles much of the
fraud by Goodyear and its lawyers In various 6159 cases, including multiple
misrepresentations to the Court, false declarations and frivolous pleadings. The Court
ultimately awarded $2.7 million in sanctions against Goodyear and Its attorneys for related
mistonduct. .

Goodyear and its attorneys appealed the matter to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's opinion and Issued a new published decision, Haeger v.

 

3 In June 2014, I received the ?rst compelled partial disclosure of claims arising out of alleged 6159
failures. I sought the consent of Goodyear to report these matters directly to NHTSA, requesting It
waive the terms of the protective order. Goodyear refused. 1)

SMI 

Office of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 4

Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., 793 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit opinion
provides an additional scathing review of Goodyear.

Thereafter, Goodyear appealed the matter to the United States Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court accepted review to address a legal issue relating to the fee award, but
declined any review of the factual ?ndings, well documented by the United States District
Court. The Supreme Court reversed and the case has now been remanded to the Federal
Court, effective June 30, 2017 to further address sanctions for Goodyear's fraud. I expect
those proceedings will continue as much of what is contained In this correspondence,
though requested, was never disclosed during the course of the Federal Court Proceedings
and the Federal Court remains unaware of the existence of the actual adjustments, property
damage claims, Injuries and deaths alleged to have occurred as a result of 6159 failures as
a result of various deceptions (in my opinion). The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court
were also unaware of this data when the opinions were issued.

Like other courts, Judge Silver entered Goodyear's version of a blanket protective
order that provided Goodyear the opportunity to advance claims of confidentiality without
setting forth a good cause basis. Goodyear utilized the blanket protective order to assure
that critical admissions made by Goodyear?s corporate spokesperson and Goodyear's
retained tire expert in HaegerI would not be revealed to other litigants across the country,
nor could such information otherwise be revealed to NHTSA or other Interested
governmental entities. These ?confidential? admissions included adcnowledgements that the
6159 would be prone to heat-induced failure if exposed to prolonged operation
temperatures above 200? F. . This ?con?dential? testimony was never disclosed again,
despite repeated requests by attorneys for other families embroiled In 6159 motorhome
litigation.

The same was true in each of the other 6159 cases we have seen. Goodyear's
regular practICe was to acquire almost identical protective orders in every 6159 case.
(Exhibit 3)4 These were utilized in courts across the country to prohibit the dissemination
of information Goodyear claimed to be confidential to other litigants, victims, governmental
entities or courts with varied interests and responsibilities associated with the 6159 failures
and related litigation.

. Judge Silver declined to reopen the Haeger case, advising that I should proceed to
pursue the newly discovered fraud claims in a separate action. That suit was ?led in May
2013 and has been handled by Judge Hannah (Haeger II). It was stayed pending the Ninth
Circuit appeal and discovery did not commence in earnest until the late summer 2016.
Though Judge Hannah would too adopt GoodyeaI?s form protective order, he also
determined that I was entitled to disclosures of what occuried in the other 6159 cases and
all 6159 failure data from 1996 to date.

All of which follows would remain a secret but for the thoughtful efforts of Judge
Silver and Judge Hannah. Judge Silver?s opinion documents the then known frauds of
Goodyear and its attorneys, which Span a period of years. Judge Hannah was the ?rst
judge in any of the 6159 cases who was willing to take control of protective orders issued
by other courts to assure that discoverable Information was actually disclosed. To the best
of my understanding, I am the only attorney in the country who has gathered the universe
of relevant data regarding the 6159. 

 

The protective orders in each 6159 case are available at my office.



Office of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 5

Though this letter will focus upon what has been discovered during Haeger II, much
of the other information discovered in the Federal Court proceedings (Haeger I), is set forth
in my Amended Complaint ?led In Marlcopa County Superior Court in May '2013.
(Exhibit 4) It sets forth a complete index of the contents and a 400~paragraph tutorial of
what we discovered during HaegerI regarding Goodyear's conduct. I have not provided the
supporting documents regarding the factual expressions contained In the Amended
Complaint, but there are hundreds of available documents which substantiate the claims
which are available, if requested. -

The following pages document the recent Haeger II discoveries including, actual
6159 failure data and varied Goodyear deceptions.

On June 8, 2017, Goodyear represented to the Marlcopa County Superior Court that
the 6159 is still on the road. NHTSA is well familiar with the serious risks associated with
tread separations on motorhomes. The motorhomes which utilize the 6159 generally weigh
approximately 31,000 pounds. The failure data reveals that the tread separations occur at
highway speeds when the tires experience the greatest Operational temperatures. The
drivers are regularly retired; not trained commercial drivers who face these sudden
emergencies. When'these motorhomes crash, they literally explode.

It Is my opinion that Goodyear has failed to disclose the defective nature of the 6159
to as otherwise contemplated by the statutory scheme and I ask that NHTSA initiate
a Timeliness Query to determine whether Goodyear has complied with applicable law,
indudlng Early Warning Reporting, and consider apprOprlate civil penalties in accord with
NHTSA's discretion to address Goodyear?s omissions and related deceptions.



The appropriate place to begin is to detail what we have only discovered within the
last year regarding. the 6159. You should be advised that I requested disclosure of
litigation, adjustments, property damage claims, bodily injury and death claims at the
commencement of my lawsuit in 2006 (Haeger I). Goodyear did not disclose this
information. Rather, Goodyear's practice was to de?ne its own world of relevance.
Goodyear limits its discovery responses to the ?subject vehicle.? In the Haegers' case, that
was a Gulf Stream Scenic Cruiser motorhome. Goodyear would than direct its efforts to
persuading the court that the only relevant failure data would be on other Gulf Stream
Scenic motorhomes. The same tactic was utilized in related 6159 cases by Goodyear with
great success. In Haeger I, Goodyear disclosed 14 property damage claims and one injury,
when responding to discovery.

In July 2016, Goodyear ?nally disclosed what was expected to be a complete list of
lawsuits, adjustments, property damage claims, bodily Injury and death claims in litigation
regarding the 6159 tire. (See Exhibits 5 through 7.) There have been at least 41 6159
lawsuits. There were 3,484 adjustments and hundreds of property damage claims. The
?light? highlights on Exhibit 6 represent death and injury claims that were settled outside of
litigation. The ?dark? highlights represent injury and death claims settled during the course
of litigation. According to our estimate, based upon a review of that data, I believe that the
exhibit reveals 98 injury or death claims arising out of alleged 6159 failures.5 26 of the

 

5 The Injury and death claims are estimated as Goodyear continues to refuse to precisely quantifythe
claims from the documents disciosed In July 2016. In September 2016, Goodyear disclosed a new
combined list of property damage, Injury and death claims, expanding the prior disclosure by revealing

SMITH 

Office of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 6

injury'and death claims were settled outside of litigation and the rest were the subject of
various lawsuits across the nation. (Exhibit 7)

The preliminary information revealed the following:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lea: mm mm 
1997 a; 7 0
1998 I 110 18 2
1999 .165 63 4
2000 436 78 6
2001 462 - 144 8
2802 96; 123 18
2003- 2015 1287 240 57
TOTAL: 3,484 618 (excluding those in 98 (estimated)
litigation)

 

 

These figures reveal a trend line of continuing death and injuries that was evident
years before the Haegers' accident in 2003.

I asked my staff to prepare a chart of the Injury and death claims disclosed by
Goodyear, which re?ects the name of the victim, the loss date and the report date.
(Exhibit 9)

This data reveals that the Haegers? accident was the 453rd accident involving
property damage claims, death or injuries relating to 6159 failures. There had been 32
death and injury claims which preceded the Haegers? accident in the summer 2003.

On September 29, 2016, Goodyear produced a new chart which expanded the
universe of property damage, injury and death claims. It sets forth the claimant's name,
loss date, report date, DOT code, condition code involved in the failure, vehicle make and
model. (Exhibit 8) This chart has 830 entries. My staff advises there appear to be 51
duplicative entries, leaving a total estimated property damage, death or injury claim count
of 779.

Attached as Exhibit 10 are Goodyear-'5 condition codes. In order to evaluate any
claim for property damage, Injury or death, Goodyear required the tire be returned to
Goodyear. It thereafter ascribed condition codes based upon Goodyear?s evaluation of the
mode of failure of the tire. The condition codes employed were those for North America

 

approximately 60 additional claims. It is unknown how many of these new claims are for bodily injury
or death, if any. (Exhibit 8)

5-5517 

Office of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 7

(N AMER), as opposed to codes which may be utilized in Latin America, Europe and Asia.
The following ?condition 1" North American Condition Codes were utilized by Goodyear:

CA - Crown separation other;
QA - Crown separation below the belt;
QB - Crown separation between the belts.

Goodyear also occasionally speci?ed condition 2, condition 3 and condition 4 on
certain tires evaluated. Goodyear?s conditions 2, 3 and 4 referenced:

CA - Crown separation other;

CV - Belt edge separation 

CX - Crown separation below or between the belts;
GC - Sampling crown:

QA - Crown separation below the belt;

QB - Crown separation between the belts; and

CZ - Crown separation above the belt.

Conditions 2 to 4 include an additional 133 conditions observed in the tires which
were evaluated.

This most recent disclosure reveals G159 failures in what appear to be 17 different
motorhome manufacturers and 39 separate motorhome models commencing July 1996 and
continuing through September 2015.6

In late 2016, Goodyear disclosed the property damage claim forms which were
submitted by customers. (Exhibit 11) Those claims reveal the 6159 was failing in all
positions on the motorhome (front, rear inner, rear outer). They document 173 reported
rear end failures. (See Exhibit 12 attached, Summary of Claim Form Submittals
identifying location of the failures.) Goodyear originally was compelled to disclose
these documents by court order in the matter of Woods v. Goodyear Tire 8: Rubber, Inc. et
al. (requiring disclosure of such claims for 61595 on motorhomes). To the best of my
understanding, they have never been disclosed in any other G159 case, despite requests for
production. Each of the claims provide adequate information to understand the
circumstances of the failure. Almost universally all of the failures occur at highway speeds.
Notably, many of the claims report multiple different failures of the G159 at different
locations on their motorhome, often over a period of days.?

 

6 The manufacturers included Americoach, Allegra, Holt, Tradition, Holiday Rambler, Keystone,
Coachman, Newmar, International, SMC, Beaver, Safari, Traiiking, Monaco, Country Coach, Gulf
Stream and Fleetwood.

7 Mark Salem was an expert witness in Haeger I. He Is a certi?ed master mechanic and an owner of a
Fleetwood motorhorne. He too experienced multiple 6159 failures on various positions on his
motorhome (one front, two rears over three trips). His coach was weighed. There were no overload

$361754 .

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 8

It was not untll Goodyear's disclosure of Exhibit that Goodyear has provided
adequate Information for me to provide to NHTSA to evaluate Early Warning Reporting
compliance.

Goodyear's Manager of Global Product Performance was deposed In August 2016. He
testi?ed that Goodyear disclosed seven injuries to NHTSA as part of EWR. (Exhibit 13)
Goodyear's September 2016 disclosure Included approximately 60 more property damage,
injury or death claims. The location and existence of the claim forms relating to those
failures are presumably in thepossession of Goodyear. We have inadequate information to
assess whether the failures were consistent with the hundreds of failures involving
motorhomes in a high speed highway application.

In August 2000, Firestone recalled approximately 14 million tires which had been
utilized on Ford Explorers, to address a defect that related to motor vehicle safety.
Firestone reported the tread separation claim rates were below .02% of the tires
manufactured. Considering the limited production of the 6159, an .02% Claim rate for the
6159 would have produced 32 such failures, a mere fraction of the actual G159 claims for
tread separations.8

Following Firestone?s recall, NHTSA investigated whether there was a defect related
to motor vehicle safety in other Firestone Wilderness AT tires manufactured before May
1998, that were utilized on sport utility vehicles. (Exhibit 14, Engineering Analysis.)
That investigation compared the performance of those Firestone tires against other ?peer?
tires utilized on sport utility vehicles. NHTSA determined the tire suitable for comparison
with the subject tire was the Goodyear Wrangler RTS.

During this period, Ford used approximately the same number of these
Goodyear tires as did Firestone (about 2.4 million tires), yet there has only
been one tread separation claim involving a Goodyear tire on an Explorer
compared to 486 such claims involving Firestone tires used on Explorers
during that'time period.

The report set forth tread separation claim frequencies for the previously recalled
Firestone tires, the subject tires and the Goodyear Wrangler RTS tires. (Exhibit 14,
Table 5.) The several relied Firestone tires had claim failure rates of 35.5 ppm, 62.1
ppm, 93.2 ppm, 253.5 and 700.5 ppm. The Goodyear ?peer? tires had a claim
rate between 0 and 10.2. The 6159 claim rate is exponentially higher.

In September 2000 (one year prior to the Elmo-023 report), Goodyear separater
documented for Ford the adjustments, tread separations causing property damage and
death or injury claims relating to the Goodyear Wrangler RTS tire utilized on the Ford
Explorers. (Exhibit 15) The contrast between the Goodyear Wrangler RTS and the 6159
is telling.

 

conditions, no left to right weight imbalance and the tires were properly pressurized for the load. Each 
claim submitted was denied. Goodyear claimed the failures were customer used. Mr. Salem's auto

.repalr facility sold Goodyear products, including belts and hoses. Ultimately, Goodyear's belt and hose
division would provide Salem a credit against future belt and hose purchases In excess of $3,000.00
for property damage caused by the multiple 6159 failures. 

9 This comment assumes all 160,683 6159's were used In a motorhorne application. As later
discussed, only a fraction of these tires were used on motorhomes and therefore, the actual equivalent
would be substantially less.

75" 

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 9

 

Crown Area
Tire Total Warranty
Production Tires and Goodwill

WMWW

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wrangler 1994 46,580 23

1995 1,330,612 409
1996 1,024,701 291
1997 470,915 124
Total: 2,872,805 847
Prod. Date Produced Est. Adj'd
1996 13789 99
1997 11639 48
1998 18745 I 54
1999 27242 113
2000 24781 72
2001 26233 38
$302 35925 29
2003 2329 0
2004 0 . 0
2005 0 0
2006 0 0
Totals 160683 453

 

 

 

 

 

Maximum adjustment date: Dec. 20069 .
(Exhibit 16)

 

9 We are unable to as of yet Identify the precise number of 61599 sold as OE for motorhomes. We
know 25,293 of the 86,939 tires produced between 2000-2002 were used as sudw. Goodyear has yet
to disclose the sales of OE for motorhomes for 1996-1999. 

8M I751 7.00:

Office of General Counsel
July 10, 2017 -
Page 10

Comparisons:

WWII 
2,872,808 160,683

Crown Separation Adjustments (warranty returns):

G159: 1 Crown separation adjustment per 354 tires manufactured.

Wrangler RTS: 1 Crown separation adjustment per 3,391 tires manufactured.

Tread Separation Property Damage Claims:

Wrangler RTS: 1 per 718,202 tires manufactured.

6159: To be determined, but appears to be more than 700 per 160,683 tires
manufactured.

Injury and/or Death Claims:

Wrangler RTS: 0 per 2,872,808 tires manufactured.
6159: 98 per 160,683 tires manufactured.?
Lawsuits:

Wrangler RTS: 0 per 2,872,808 tires manufactured.
G159: 41 per 160,683 tires manufactured.

Goodyear admits It cannot identify a single Goodyear tire with death or Injury claims
that approach those revealed by the G159 on an equivalent production basis. Goodyear
cannot identify a Goodyear tire. that has property damage claims on a parts per million basis
that approaches anything like the G159. Nor can Goodyear identify any Goodyear tire that
has injury or death claims on a parts per million basis like the G159.

The de?nition of a ?defect? is set forth in United States v. General Motor Corp, 518
F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that a tire is considered to
be defective if subject to ?a signi?cant number of failures in normal Operation.? The defect
determination does not require any ?nding of an engineering, metallurgical or mechanical
failure, but may be based exclusively on the performance record of the tire. Id. at 432. A
determination of whether the tire Is defective is answered by consideration of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the tire. The relevant considerations include the failure rate of

 

'0 If the Wrangler RTS performed like the G159, there would have been 1,752 Injury and/or death
claims. When Goodyear discloses to NHTSA the OE G159 sales for motorhomes for the years 1996 -
1999, we expect that it will be discovered that approximately 29% of the G1595 were OE on
motorhomes. The calculation, if our estimate Is correct, would be 98 death or injury claims per
46,598 tires. Stated another way, that would be approximately one death or Injury claim for every
46% tires sold versus the Wrangler RTS which had zero injury or death claims from 2,872,808 tires
so .



Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 11

the tire, the failure rate of other tires, and the Importance of the tire to the safe operation
of the vehicle. Id. at 438. ?The number of failures need not normally and, normally, will
not be a substantial percentage of the total number of the components produced.? Id.

The failure rates of the 6159 Speak for themselves. Considering the operational
environment of highway use on 30,000 pound vehicles, a tread separation Is, In my opinion,
one of the greatest threats to the safe operation of the vehicle that an unexpectant operator
can experience. It not lives of what are usually multiple occupants of a
motorhome, but poses serious risks for other highway users as a front end separation pulls
the vehide either left or right. This is exactly what happened to the Haley family in 2006 In
Arizona. A left front tread separation caused the motorhome to cross the centerline and
cause a head-on collision. Mr. Haley, who was driving a compact car was killed Instantly.
(Exhibit 17) The mass and velocity of a motorhome all but assure devastation in such a
circumstance. And even In single vehicle high speed motorhome accidents, injury or deaths
are highly likely. (Exhibit 18) Motorhomes are not designed to endure any kind of high
speed accident and provide almost zero protection from. Injury for occupants other than the
front seat passengers. Even they can experience horri?c injuries. (Exhibit 19, DST re
Haeger injuries.)

 

Exhibit 20 is Goodyear's Global Procedure for Withdrawal or Recall of Noncompliant
Products.

Section 5.3.8 provides:

If a potential quality issue Is identi?ed from ?eld or customer reports or
adjustments, notify the Director/Manager Government Compliance and
Product Performance. All relevant data Is gathered which includes
inventories, production history, adjustment data, test data, etc.

Section 5.3.9 provides:

The Director/Manager will review all relevant data and con?rm that
the potential quality issue exists.

A quality issue Is de?ned as following:

Issues where the product may be noncompliant to government regulations,
issues which could affect the functional purpose or safety of the product In
service, issues that may not meet the speci?c requirements for Original
Equipment, ?eet, wholesale or retail customers or Issues that may not need
Intemal Goodyear speci?cations or requirements.

Section 3.1.1 sets forth the key responsibilities. All decisions for product
withdrawals determined to be related to motor vehicle safety must be referred to the
Corporate Safety Committee.

Section 4.1.1 sets forth the function and membership in the Corporate Safety
Committee.

SMl?rl 

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 12

CORPORATE SAFETY The only group that has the authority
to make a determination that a product contains a defect related to motor
vehicle safety  -

The Committee consists of: I
Chairman; Senior Vice President and Chief Technical Of?cer;
Senior Vice President Global Operations;

General Counsel;

Vice President Product Quality and Plant Technology;

Senior Vice President Public Relations;

SBU President;

Director of Government Compliance and Product Performance.

Thus only senior management is participant In defect determinations. There Is no
protocol for defect determinations. Regardless, the G159 was never addressed by the
Corporate Safety Committee. The deposition testimony of various Goodyear witnesses
reveals that at no time was any concern expressed relating to the performance of the 6159.

Goodyear?s Legal Department is the entity that handles and resolves all property
damage claims above $15,000.00 and all injury and death daims, whether In litigation or
not. A different department at Goodyear handles the inconsequential property damage
claims. Goodyear's Legal Department is the entity which maintains the totality of the
information related to the 6159. Goodyear's Legal Department Is the entity which
determines what data will be disclosed to NHTSA for Early Warning Reporting and controls
all data which would be the subject of any Corporate Safety Committee review for a defect
determination affecting motor vehicle safety. -

When compelled to do so, Goodyear presented former General Counsel Tom Harvie
for deposition. Mr. Harvie operated as General Counsel from 1995 to 2009 and attended all
Board of Directors meetings, commencing the same year. He retired on December 1, 2009.
(Exhibit 21, Harvle Deposition.)?

It was Mr. Harvle?s admitted obligation to assure Goodyear's compliance with laws,
including reporting defects that affected motor vehicle safety and to assure proper reporting
regarding Early Warning Reporting. Mr. Harvie acknowledges his awareness of the civil and
criminal penalties for misleading the Government regarding the safety related defects and
was familiar with the TREAD Act.

During his deposition, Mr. Ha rvie acknowledged that the Early Warning Reporting
presented an opportunity for the manufacturer and the Government to work together to see
If a problem existed that needed to be addressed. He understands the purpose was to allow

 

1? The videos of all Goodyear depositions from Haeger II are available. All were taken remotely from
Arizona with Goodyear witnesses appearing for deposition in distant states.

SMWEI 

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 13

an opportunity to' respond to performance data for public safety if the tire
manufacturer failed to do so.

Mr. Harvie testi?ed he presumably knew what was and what was not disclosed to
NHTSA regarding the 6159 relating to adjustments, property damage claims, personal
Injury and death claims and lawsuits. Mr. Harvie testi?ed that whatever needed to be
disclosed to NHTSA was disclosed. He acknowledges there was no Board meeting where the
6159 was ever discussed because from his perspective any issues associated with 6159
failures were not signi?cant enough to require Board attention.

Mr. Harvie states he never suggested any personal concern arising'frorn the failure
data. Moreover, no one at Goodyear ever expressed to him concerns about potential
problems based upon the ?eld performance data.

Mr. Harvie, consistent with the testimony of others, was unaware of any Goodyear
policy regarding the number of deaths which required Goodyear to present the tire to the
Corporate Safety Committee to evaluate related motor vehicle safety issues and to
determine whether the product should be recalled.

Mr. Harvie advised that Deborah Okey operated as Associate General Counsel from
2000 through 2010. Ms. Okey supervised all of the 6159 cases during those dates. Ms.
Okey kept Mr. Harvie apprised of signi?cant material issues relating to the tire.

Though Ms. Okey was the supervisor of Goodyear?s outside counsel In two
independent published decisions relating to discovery misconduct, at no time was she
reprimanded or disciplined.

Mr. Harvie was replaced by Mr. Blalowsky, who became General Counsel in late
2009. Since that date, he too has attended all Board meetings. (Exhibit 22, Bialowsky
Deposition.)

Mr. Blalowsky acknowledges Goodyear's obligation to recall tires which display
defects affecting motor vehicle safety. Blalowsky testi?ed that no one in the employ of
Goodyear brought him up to speed on adjustments, property damage claims, injury or
death claims and no one has expressed any concern about the 6159 In prolonged highway
uses. He has attended the quarterly reviews of failure data since the fourth quarter of
2009, and which address ?eld performance issues. There has never been an issue raised
regarding the 6159 between 2009 and 2017.

Mr. Bialowsky does not agree that NHTSA considers a tire defective if It is the subject
of a significant number of failures in normal operation. He does not agree that defect
determinations may be based exclusively on the performance record of the tire.

When Mr. Blalowsky was presented with the recently disclosed failure data, he
testi?ed that he did not know if he would convene the Corporate Safety Committee to
evaluate whether the 6159 is defective.

Notably both Mr. Harvie and Mr. Bialowsky were speci?cally told years ago that there

were over 400 property damage and injury claims, but took no action whatsoever.
(Exhibit 23, Settlement Authority Requests.)

33613-1 HaWGon?upmdunuth?chl-fmmd?iwm 1.00:

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 14

On October 4, 2016, Lovell, the Director of Goodyear?s Global Government
Compliance and Product Performance, was deposed. (Exhibit 24) Her primary
responsibility is to monitor ?eld performance data. She was also selected-by Goodyear to
specify Goodyear policies and procedures, Including Goodyear?s policies to bring
performance problems to the attention of department heads, Goodyear lawyers, General
Counsel, officers and the Board of Directors for Goodyear. Ms. Lovell eXplains that
historically Goodyear would meet or quarterly to review performance data from the
?eld. Goodyear has no requirements relating to the analysis of performance data.
Goodyear has noacceptable adjustment rate. Goodyear has no policy which requires it to
contrast the 6159 performance record with any other similar Goodyear tire. Goodyear has
no policy to contrast property damage claims with property damage claims of other similar
tires. Goodyear has no policy to contrast Injury and death claims in the 6159 with other
such claims arising from similar tines. Ms. Lovell also states that there is no standard for
when a tire like the 6159 is recalled, regardless of the number of adjustments, property
damage claims, deaths or injuries. Goodyear has no de?nition when a tire poses an
unreasonable risk of harm. Goodyear?s Corporate Safety Committee never evaluated the
6159.

Ms. Lovell was also separately deposed In her capacity as the Director of Global
Government Compliance and Product Performance. (Exhibit 25) She testi?ed that the
100 claims of death or injury did not indicate a quality issue with the 6159. She testified
that she lacked the data to Identify any Goodyear tire that had produced 100 death or injury.
claims per 160,000 tires it manufactured. She similarly was unable to identify any
Goodyear tire that produced property damage claims at the rate displayed by the 6159.
Ms. Lovell acknowledged that Goodyear never disclosed to NHTSA the more than 600
property damage claims relating to the 6159, never volunteered the property damage claim
Information to NHTSA, did not disclose adjustments to NHTSA, but asserts that if NHTSA
had any inquiries, Goodyear is fully transparent to report anything the Government
requires.

Ms. Lovell was queried about the contrast between Goodyear's Wrangler RTS tire
utilized on Ford Explorers as opposed to what has been displayed by the 6159. She
testi?ed that the failure data does not suggest a performance problem related to motor
vehicle safety with the 6159.

In January 2017, we took the deposition of Sim Ford. (Exhibit 26) Mr. Ford was
the Manager of Global Regulations, Standards and Compliance. His duty was to understand
the regulations and make sure Goodyear's departments were in compliance. His primary
duty was to make sure Goodyear complied with Early Warning Reporting and regulations
relating to performance. Although Mr. Ford would relay data to NHTSA, it was collected by
others in Goodyear's Legal Department. He was not involved in product performance
evaluation. -

Mr. Ford states that Dane Taylor of Goodyear's Legal Department was the corporate
attorney responsible for government compliance. Mr. Taylor and the Product Performance
Group were the pe0ple that assembled the data and would decide what Ford would report to
NHTSA.

Mr. Ford had never seen any of the failure data associated with the 6159. He states
that Goodyear's Legal Department and the Product Performance Group had the
responsibility to identify death and injury claims that Goodyear was required to disclose to
NHTSA as a part of Early Warning Reporting. 

amt?! 

Office of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 15

During the course of the HaegerI ligation, Goodyear had selected Richard Olsen to
explain Goodyear?s process as to how Goodyear assembles and analyzes failure data.

In 1994 and 2000, Mr. Olsen was the Manager of Goodyear?s Customer Engineering
Department with responsibility to analyze failure data. (Exhibit 27, pp. 31-32.) He had
the responsibility starting In 1996 to oversee all reports, all data and all analyses. His
department also followed ?eld performance. p. 70.) He would have been aware of
any inordinate amount of adjustments, property damage claims or personal injury claims.
(Id. at 428.) Between 1998 and 2007,-there was-nothing In the adjustment data that led
him to believe there was any problem with the 6159. (Id. at 434-435.) Similarly, there
was nothing In the ?eld performance which suggested a problem. He has never identi?ed a
performance problem with the 6159 in motorhomes. (Id. at 435-436.)

In September 2015, there was a front page article in the Arizona Republic regarding
the G159. (Exhibit 28.) The reporter submitted 20 written questions to Goodyear, each of
which was answered. Goodyear denied that the G159 was responsible for accidents or that
It has misled or deceived the customers regarding the tire. ?Goodyear prides itself on Its
commitment to the product performance and places product safety and quality at its highest
priorities.? 

Goodyear?s public representations were consistent with its posture in litigation. In
each of the 41 lawsuits, Goodyear denied the tire was defective In any way. Yet, when
failure data, death and injury claims were requested Goodyear would not be forthcoming.
Even in Haeger II, Goodyear would not disclose such data until compelled to do by the
Court.

By the end of 2006, there had been 87 reported claims of death or injury from 6159
failures'and more than 600 property damage claims, and thousands of adjustments for this
limited production tire. Yet, Goodyear would deny the existence of such data. In the ?rst
discovery dispute In January 2007, Goodyear would claim such data did not exist.

Mr. Kurt-.2:  And so we have been asking for data after the date of the
accident because it Is dlscoverable as to the strict liability defect claim. You
know, the volume of failures, there Is nothing magical about the accident
date. It bears upon the defective design of the tire. Some of these
motorhornes have not been used very much. So I might have a thousand of
them fall after the date of the accident under the exact circumstances, and
that's why we seek the data up until now.

The Court:  The question is, whether or not documentation needs to be
produced after the date of the accident  and Is there such data available Mr.
Hancock?

Mr. Hancock; Your Honor, it depends on which of the various discovery
requests plaintiffs are talking about._ In other words, what Goodyear said
generally speaking is this tire is made to a speci?cation. We made changes to
the speci?cation but we started making It In 1996. We quit making it in 2003.
We have produced all of the data we had as of the date of the accident so you
can say, knew or should have known through negligence, whether that?s
enough data so if there is some kind of a problem in the production it's
Obvious. 

SHIN-I 

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 16

(Exhibit 29, Transcript of Proceedings, January 3, 2007, pp. 31-33.)

The Haegers' accident In June 2003 represented the 453*? property damage, Injury
or death claim arising out of a 6159 failure. There had been thousands of adjustments
which had not been disclosed to the Court and hundreds of bodily injury and property
damage claims which too remained concealed throughout the history of the Haeger I
litigation.

Internally, Goodyear defense attorneys would report how they deceived Judge Silver
that there was not a universal problem with the G159. This document was shared with
senior management and General Counsel (both Harvle and Blalowsky).

Plaintiffs hope to use the Fieetwood recall and the Monaco Customer
Satisfaction Program (and especially the claims and lawsuits involving those
manufacturers) as evidence that the subject tire was not suitable for motor
home applications. We have resisted these attempts by explaining that these
experiences were Isolated Instances unique to the vehicles involved, and are
not Indicative of a universal problem with this tire on all motor homes
generally. The presiding judge, Roslyn Silver, has accepted our position and
has repeatedly denied attempts to expand the scope of discovery to
include the Fieetwood and Monaco experiences. Presumably, she would
similarly hold that the claims and lawsuits related to motor homes
manufactured by these companies are not admissible at trial. Goodyear has
produced a list of 14 property damage claims Involving the subject tire on
Gulf Stream motor homes, but we were not required to produce actual claims
files themselves.

During the course of Haeger II, we were required to identify expert witnesses which
would testify about the signi?cance of the failure data and Goodyear's methodology of
concealing such information In related judicial proceedings and from NHTSA. Attached are
those expert disclosures which set forth the opinions of experts addressing defects in design
of the tire, the significance of the failure data, the date It should have been obvious that
there were performance problems with the tire which compelled Goodyear to act and the
opinions of a retired Arizona Supreme Court Justice regarding the ethical improprieties
associated with how Goodyear handled itself In litigation which led Judge Silver to conclude
that Goodyear had been deceptive in every 6159 case which the Court reviewed.
(Exhibit :30)12

 

The Office of Defect Investigation of NHTSA was conducting an engineering analysis
regarding front tire failures that occurred In Country Coach motorhomes utilizing certain
Toyo tires. NHTSA sent a peer request to Goodyear In 2006. The inquiry was to:

Determine the approximate ?failure rates" due to tire blowout, tread
separation, abrupt loss of air, and the like, for front tires manufactured and
sold by Goodyear and Installed on Class A motorhornes:r and to

 

15' The expert witness disclosures were made before Goodyear disclosed the much smaller number of
G159s used as OE on motorhomes, which was not disclosed until January 2017. That disclosure
revealed that percentage of claims was vastly higher than understood at the time of these disclosures.

swans-i J'Doc

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 17

Determine the approximate comparative failure rate due to tire blowout, tread
separation, abrupt loss of air and the like, for equivalent tires manufactured
and sold by Goodyear and installed In other (non-model) motorhome vehicle
applications.

(Exhibit 31)

NHTSA made clear the scope of Its Inquiry regarding ?failure reports" with an
expressed definition: 

Reports from all sources, including but not limited to, warranty claims; owner,
dealer or manufacturer complaints; and/or reports of a front tire failure
caused by an abrupt loss of air, whether driver's side (left) or passenger side
(right), whether confirmed or alleged, Including but not limited (1) air loss
resulting In the Inability of the tire to support the wheel load; (2) blow-out;
(3) tire rupture; (4) rapid de?ation; (5) tread separation; (6) sidewall
cracking; and the like.

?Failure reports? should Include reports of tire failures that Goodyear has
determined in its normal and reasonable Investigation of warranty claims,
complaints, and/or reports, were caused by normal wear, misuse or abuse,
road debris and/or other similar causes, but should provide a short
description, explanation or other identi?er that distinguishes reports due to
these types of causes. 

The Inquiry was focused upon multiple sizes of Goodyear tires that were suitable for
motorhome use. Amongst them was the 6159 22.5.

The communication made clear that failure to truthfully respond would subject
Goodyear to civil penalties pursuant to 49 U.S.C. Section 30165.

On May 30, 2006, Goodyear responded, requesting confidentiality, stating:

The release of this data to the news media and/or others  would be totally
detrimental to Goodyear. Any of the data, standing alone, or in combination
with other data submitted to NHTSA could be taken out of context and used
by those so Inclined to discredit Goodyear?s Image In the minds of the
consuming public.

32)

By May 2006 (the date of Goodyear's response), there had been 74 death and Injury
claims submitted to Goodyear and it was- defending, unknown to NHTSA, dozens of suits
across the nation. It had only disclosed seven (7) injuries from 6159 failures to NHTSA.
Goodyear's report to NHTSA provided:

Request In 1(b) and 2(b) seeks ?failure reports? for tires installed In the
front vehicle position and that data we are able to provide contains
Information for both front vehicie position incidents as well as incidents where
the position is not known.

(Exhibit 32)

suns-i 

Office of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 18

Goodyear disclosed 48 failure reports on front positions and 10 failure reports (58
total) on unknown positions relating to the 275/700. 22.5 In response to the request for the
number of failure reports on 22.5 rim sizes which are original equipment on Class A
motorhomes for the 275/70 22.5 tire. Of these 58, 16 failures were alleged to be due to
normal wear out, misuse or abuse, road debris and/or other similar causes.

The 6159 22.5 was manufactured from 1996 through January 2003. It was
replaced by the 6670 275/70 22.5, which was a new tire speci?cally designed for RV use. It
had different tread and utilized different compounds, ?To reduce heat buildup in service.?
(See Exhibit 33.)

In 2006, Goodyear disclosed in Haegerl total production of the G159 by year. (See
Exhibit 16, 160,683 total.) The NHTSA disclosure separates which portion of production
was as 06 for motorhomes and which portion for other applications for the years 2000-
2005. By contrasting the NHTSA disclosure with Goodyear's total production numbers we
can identify how many 6159s were actually put on motorhomes for 2000-2002:

2000 3,492
2001 7,414
2002 1.3.3.82

25,293 of 86,939 61595 manufactured.

During the course of Haeger I, Goodyear represented it could not identify the
number of tires produced annually that went on motorhomes. (Exhibit 34, Olsen
pp. 80-81, 84.) Though requested in 2006, did not receive these
?con?dential? NHTSA submittals until January 3, 2017, alter the Court compelled Goodyear
to disclose these materials.

One would expect Goodyear could identify the same production information for
1996-1999. Understanding the number of tires sold for motorhome use gives new meaning
to understanding the property damage, injury and death claims disclosed. _Those
documents specify the DOT number for each tire and vehicle manufacturer. (See
Exhibit 8.) If Goodyear were to produce the rest of the data, then could determine
the actual claim rate for the G159 22.5. For instance, assume 40,000 of the
61595 were OE for motorhomes and there were 400 property damage claims on
motorhomes, such would equal 10,000 ppm. Goodyear states there were over 400 such
claims. (Exhibit 35, Settlement Authority Memo.)

We do know that Goodyear was aware of 453 crown separations for the 6159, 74
injuries and deaths before May 2006 and hundreds of property damage claims. The report,
if compliant with directive, should have re?ected the ?number of failure reports" on
all Goodyear 22.5 tires sold from January 1, 2000 through the date of the report,
which would include responsive adjustments, property damage and injury or death claims
arising from front and failures "of the tire for ?blowout, tread separation, abrupt loss of air,
and the like.? The data disclosed seems under-inclusive. Goodyear?s adjustment chart by
production year (Exhibit 16, shows 160 crown separations alone for
the 6159 for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. Obviously, NHTSA needs to assess the
accuracy of Goodyear's disclosures in light of the data now available. 

 

 

saws-1W? 'cnu?m

 Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 19

Goodyear's latest complete disclosure of the failure data (Exhibit 8, 
12655-12669) identi?es for each of the 779 losses, the vehicle make and model as well as
the DOT codes. We have not attempted to quantify precisely the information contained
therein, but it appears from review of the DOT codes that there are vastly more than 48
front tire failures within the definition speci?ed by NHTSA.

 

The G159 was released for sale In 1996, designed solely as a tire for ?step and go"
pickup and delivery service. (Exhibit 36, Beverage trucks.) It was listed by Goodyear as
a ?metro? tire in its publication. (Exhibit 37) The tire was released for production with
only limited testing. (Exhibit 38, Release Telex.) There was no high speed testing
required by Goodyear to release the tire. Rather, high speed testing was ?optional.?
(Exhibit 39, Stroble Deposition.)13 With this limited testing, the tire was sold as a 65
MPH tire. 

Chapter 15 of the Pneumatic Tire is titled ?Introduction to Tire Safety Durability and
Failure Analysis.? It was authored by James Gardner (Goodyear's expert in many of the
6159 cases). The publication provides: .

3.4 Heat 

Elevated and extended heat generation is a primary factor In the bread down
of a tire. Increased heat decreases rubber tear resistance which promotes
crack initiation and propagation. Permanent degradation of material
properties from exposure to elevated temperatures occurs as well depending
on the exposure history.

3.5 Speed

Tire rotation affects the centrifugal force of frequency of the de?ection cycle.
Corresponding changes in the stresses and strains developed in the tire
components affects the tire?s heat buildup characteristics.  

The publication includes Figure 15.9: (Belt edge temperatures of a tire operated
with increasing speed at various in?ation pressures.) (Exhibit 40) The chart re?ects a
passenger tire operated signi?cantly underln?ated at 11 psi displayed temperatures of 200?
F. at 45 MPH and elevated to 240? F. at 75 MPH. The same passenger tire when properly
in?ated displays temperatures only up to approximately 170? F. at 75 MPH.

During the course of discovery in Haeger 1, our accident reconstructionist provided a
publication titled Heavy Duty Truck Tire Engineering authored by Goodyear Tire a Rubber
engineers Thomas Ford and Fred Charles. The publication speci?ed as follows:

Fatigue and separation:

 

?3 Strobie believes though optional, high speed tests were performed before releasing the tire. No
record of any such tests have ever been discovered and no participant in any pre-reiease high speed
testing has ever been identi?ed.

Si?l?-l 

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 20

Fatigue and separation are somewhat allied properties of tire endurance.
Both can be adversely affected by excessive conditions of load, de?ection,
In?ation and speed. 

Heat:

Heat is the great enemy of tires. Excessive heat will cause a degradation of
material properties. Heat is generated by the tire due to the work expended
during operation. An equilibrium temperature is developed continuous
operation of a truck tire. The temperature rises very rapidly Initially and
gradually levels off to an equilibrium temperature. At equilibrium
temperature, the heat generated within the tlre?s structure is equal to the
heat dissipated from the tire's surfaces.

Tires are developed to withstand this equilibrium temperature which for radial
heavy duty truck tires is a maximum of a 194? F. Exceeding this temperature
for short periods of time is not a problem, but exceeding it for long periods of
time begins to cause a loss of strength in material components and eventually
separation of the tire's structure. (Emphasis supplied) -

41)

Jim Gardner. Goodyear's expert in the Haeger 1 case, generally concurred.
Mr. Gardner 

A new commercial medium truck tire. operating at 75 MPH and properly
pressurized would generate an lntemal shoulder temperature of 140? to
150? F.

Once a tire exceeds a temperature of 200? F., most commercial medium truck
tires will begin to experience degradation of material properties that can lead
to tread separation.

(Exhlbit 42, Gardner Deposition.)

Mr. Gardner's deposition was declared con?dential. It wasto never be disclosed in
any other 6159 case. 

We subsequently took the deposition of Goodyear's 30(b)(6) corporate spokesman
Richard Olsen. Mr. Olsen was a member of Goodyear?s Product Analysis Group. Their
function Is to evaluate failed tires and assist Goodyear in litigation?related matters. Olsen
testified:

Goodyear tries to keep the lntemal truck the temperatures below 200? F. and 
a medium truck tire operating above 200? F. for an extended time can lead to
a loss of strength in the materials In the tire which can lead to separation of
the tire?s structure. A temperature in excess of 250? would create a concern
about the capability of the tire to even stay together.

(Exhibit 43, Olson Deposition.)

mo:

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 21

The testimony of Olsen and Gardner was consistent with Goodyear's internal
publications and with other temperature data.

In fact, Goodyear?s own publications and communications with Fleetwood advised
that the expected temperature of a Goodyear medium truck tire operating at 75 MPH would
be ?up to" 185? F. (Exhibits 44, 4.5 and 46.) The same representations were to
customers between 1998 through at least 2004.

When I requested Goodyear disclose Its tests of the 6159, Goodyear would originally
limit its disclosure to only the tests taken at 30 MPH which reflected no
temperature data whatsoever. It was not until years later that it was discovered that
Goodyear was concealing the vast majority of all other test data (the subject of Judge
Silver's Sanction Order).

Later Goodyear would disclose its high speed tests, which revealed that the 6159
was developing temperatures well In excess of 250? when tested at speeds of 50 MPH on the
67-inch wheel. (Exhle 47) Although Goodyear suggested that test did not re?ect of real
world operating conditions, it would later intemaiiy admit that the temperatures re?ected at
50 MPH in Goodyear's high speed tests were the approximate equivalent of the expected
temperature of the tire at 75 MPH. (Exhibit 48) 

Signi?cantly, Goodyear did not commence Its high speed tests of the 6159 until eight
months after sales commenced. The first two tests were taken In August 1996. Both tires
tested failed the 75 MPH leg of the test. Goodyear?s corporate representative regarding
testing stated that based. upon this test, the tire could only be rated as a 65 MPH tire.
(Exhibit 49) The only other high speed tests which were performed on a tire of like
production to that of the Haegers' tire, were performed in December 1996. The two tires
tested on that data did not fail until 81 MPH. In June 1998, Goodyear upgraded the tire to
approved use at 75 MPH without further testing. Thereafter failure claims skyrocketed.

It was not until after the Haeger I case settled that It was discovered that Goodyear
was concealing its extended enduranca tests, crown durability tests and heat rise testing of
the tire performed in 1996. All of those tests were perfonned between 30 and 40 MPH and
revealed temperatures in excess of the admitted design limitations of the G159 and
predictive of failure. (Exhibit 50) (Heat rise 35 MPH/temperatures up to 225? crown
durability 40 MPHItemperatures up to 255? extended endurance 30 
temperatures up to 250? F.) -

In spite of Goodyear?s repeated avowals that the 6159 Is a safe tire, its own internal
documents reveal that of Goodyear's radial medium truck tires that were. even exposed to
the optional high speed testing, the 6159 stood as a clear outlier, re?ecting it was subjected
to such testing In multiples of any other Goodyear truck tire. (Exhibit 51) There were 66
different high speed tests performed regarding the 6159, during the years it was sold,
re?ecting a secret endeavor to test alternative constructions to explore the design defect.

The few experts which have seen the results of Goodyear's long-concealed heat rise
durability, crown durability and extended endurance tests opine that those tests revealed
temperatures in excess of the design capabilities of the G159, which would have revealed to
Goodyear the risks aSSociated with its utility in a continuous high speed application as
opposed to its original stop-and-go design purpose.

camel HamcmdoneoWhhoohWMI LDoe

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 22

Though these tests were what were requested in the various 6159 lawsuits across
the country, they were only disclosed on two occasions, and then only when the Court
compelled the disclosure over Goodyear?s objection. What was not disclosed In those cases
were the admissions of Goodyear?s experts In the Haeger I case, who admitted that the tire
could not endure exposure to prolonged temperatures in excess of 200? without
degradation of material properties and potential tread separation. Those depositions
remained concealed and to the best of my understanding have never been disclosed In any
other 6159 case In the country. 

 

A year after the 6159 first went Into production, there was a significant design
change. On January 13, 1997, there was a ?revision to the tread compound that allowed
this tire to withstand the heat of high speed operation.? (Exhibit 52)

On February 15, 1999, Goodyear Issued a report regarding return of 61595 for
evaluation from the failures on Fleetwood motorhomes. Both tires showed evidence of belt
separation. Goodyear described the likely cause of failure was overloading, characterized as
a ?severe service? condition. Goodyear's decision was to modify the belt package geometry
and construction to make the tire less prone to belt edge separation from severe service
and overload and to thereafter monitor the tire. (Exhibit 53)

On March 24, 1999, Goodyear would issue its next return tire report. It evaluated
two more failed 61595, both of which displayed belt edge separations. It notes, ?Field
locations should monitor actual load and speed conditions to make sure the proper tire Is
being used for these applications. Design changes to the tire are being considered to
improve performance In overload conditions." (Exhibit '54)

On April 7, 1999, Goodyear told Fleetwood the separations were caused by: ?Heat
buildup which are a result of overloading and/or underln?ating the ?re. Heat is the worst
enemy of a tire. Excessive heat will cause a degradation of material properties which In
turn can impact a tire's endurance and durability." (Exhibit 55) Goodyear was telling
Fleetwood the failures were caused by customer abuse.

On October 26, 1999, Goodyear would Issue an additional return tire report. It
evaluated two more failed 6159s, each manufactured the ?fth week of 1999. Both
displayed tread separations caused by belt edge separations. The corrective action states,
?The belt edge of the 275 70R 22.5 were narrowed to improve belt edge durability on
February 15, 1999. This is just after the production date of the subject tires. Crown area
adjustments ?will be followed? to determine If a change in belt width has improved the
durability of the tire.? (Exhibit 56) Even after narrowing the belt edge, catastrophic
failures continued while Goodyear sat silent.

Internal communications at Goodyear on January 15, 2001, evaluate ?ve more
returned tires. These tires were all manufactured after the Implementation of the narrowed
belt widths In February 1999. (Exhibit 57) Goodyear would again suggest the tire failures
are caused by overloading or underilnflation. ?In general this tire Is exposed to relatively
severe service, therefore, a program to enhance resistance of this tire to heat generation
with ?exing has been in process. Implementation In production is expected by the end of
January 2001.? It was obvious that the prior modi?cations to the belt package had not
cured the performance issues associated with the 6159. -

SMITH 

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 23 

Goodyear's reference to ?severe service" (overload and under-in?ation) suggest
problems caused by customer abuses. Yet, in none of the documents Goodyear has
disclosed has there been any discussion about altemative source of heat arising from
improper design. Certainly substantial overload or underinflation can cause excess heat In a
tire which could lead to its premature failure. Still, nowhere in disclosed documents does
Goodyear discuss what its tests revealed. That is a properly pressurized 6159 operating at
design load will create temperatures beyond the design capacity of the G159 leading to the
degradation of material properties representing a fully documented and consistent
explanation as to why the 6159 was failing.

WE.

- On October 5, 1999, Fleetwood initiated a recall due to 41 tread separations and two
fatalities arising from utilization of the 6159 on certain models of Fleetwood motorhomes.
Fleetwood had estimated that approximately 40% of those units may be potentially
overloaded. (Exhibit 58)?

Fleetwood reported to NHTSA that after its recall, It had only four further reports of
6159 failures. 59) Though post recall reporting of 6159 failures by Fleetwood
was limited, we now know 6159 failures on Fleetwoods continued to be reported to
Goodyear. (See Exhibit 8.) Goodyear has now disclosed more than 100 reported 6159
failures on various models of Fleetwood motorhomes following the recall, inciudlng two
reports in 2014.

The Fleetwood recall upsized the 22.5 tires on some of Its units to 275I80R
22.5. Separately, Fleetwood would utilize this 22.5 as a replacement tire for
Fleetwood motorhomes utilizing either the 245, 255 or 265/709. 22.5 tires. This utilization
of the 6159 as a replacement tire served to only compound the failures.

In my opinion, all of this is indicative of heat induced failure. First of all, when
Goodyear chose the larger 275 to replace the 245 through 22.5 tires, It had
selected an arguably more robust tire capable of carrying signi?cantly greater loads In those
replacement applications. If the problem was failure due to heat (severe service) from
overload, then the problem should have been solved. Second, the repeated rear end
failures of the 6159 suggest an alternative other than overload or There are
no true shear forces on the rear end of these motorhomes. Yet, we know of approximately
170 rear and failures resulting In property damage claims (albeit not all on Fleetwoods).

What Goodyear told Fleetwood during the course of Its investigation Is also
Important. Goodyear never disclosed what it knew from its tests about the temperature the
6159 was generating or disclosed the maximum design temperature of the tire.

On November 23, 1998, Goodyear advised Fleetwood based upon Goodyear?s
?Commercial Tire and Management" publication that the tire can obtain temperatures ?up
to? 180? F. running continuously at 75 MPH. At 55 MPH belt edge temperatures average 160?
F. (Exhibit 60) Thus Goodyear?s expressions to Fleetwood are In contrast to what was
revealedby Goodyear-'5 own tests about the 6159, all of which were undertaken in 1996. In
those tests temperatures in excess of 250? F. were generated at 75 MPH.

 

1" Admittedly there Is evidence of underinfiatlon and overload by some RV operators, but It Is distant
from any kind of a global explanation for this unprecedented volume of failure.

SMITH 

Office of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 24

On November 16, 1998, Goodyear advised Fleetwood regarding ?tire blowouts.?
Goodyear's correspondence stated: .

Fatigue and separation are somewhat allied properties of tire endurance.
Both can be adversely affected by excessive conditions of load, de?ection,
in?ation and speed. All of these conditions relate to heat buildup, and heat is
the greatest enemy of a tire. Excessive heat will cause a degradation of
material properties which In turn can impact endurance and durability.

Tires are designed to perform at specific operating temperatures which are
sometimes called equilibrium temperature. At equilibrium the heat generated
within the tire structure is equal to the heat dissipated from the tire surfaces.
Exceeding this temperature for short periods of time is not a problem, but
exceeding it for long periods of time begins to cause a loss of strength in the
material components and eventually separation of the tire's structure,

(Exhibit 51)

This letter quotes directly from Goodyear?s Ford and Charles publication which set
forth the 194? maximum temperature design limitation of the tire. That sentence is
notoriously absent in Goodyear?s expressions to Fleetwood. Rather, the same letter goes on
to explain, ?Tire blowouts can be related to a number of facts, however the key ones being
overload, underin?atlon, vehicle speed and road hazards.? Each of these are solely within
the control of the motorhome operator and sent a clear message to Fleetwood that failures
of the 6159 had nothing to do with the tire itself. Rather, Goodyear was blaming the
customers.

Privately,r Goodyear would acknowledge that Goodyear had taken a pretty good hit
on the subject of Fleetwood tread separations and tire biowouts. Goodyear acknowledged
?product liability claims are very heavy" regarding Fleetwood. The internal memo
concluded, ?The product liability claims should probably not be discussed with the vehicle
owners.? (Exhibit 62)

 

Although not the subject of a recall, Monaco customers too had extensive failure
reports associated with the 6159.

In August 2000, Goodyear was in communication with Monaco regarding the (5159
issues. Its correspondence stated:

Heat is the worst enemy of tires. Every time a tire ?exes it generates heat.
Tires are designed to perform at Specific ?exions and operating temperatures,
which are. sometimes called ?equilibrium temperature." At equilibrium the
heat operating within the tire's structure is equal to the heat dissipated from
the tires structure. Exceeding this temperature for short periods of time is
not a concern but exceeding it for long periods begins to cause a loss of
strength to the material components and eventual separation of the tire's
structure. 

(Exhibit 63)

 

 

.. TWIZDOI:

Of?ce of General Counsel 
July 10, 2017
Page 25

Again, Goodyear was quoting from Its Ford and Charles publication, but omitting the
sentence which would Identify the 194? F. design limitation of the 6159. Again, Goodyear
would not share with Monaco what it knew about the failures, death and Injury claims that
had been advanced as of that date. Similarly, It would not reveal to Monaco what It knew
about the temperatures the 6159 was generating from Its' own tests.

By January 2002, Goodyear agreed to replace the 6159 with the 22.5 on
multiple Monaco motorhomes. Monaco referenced prior communications with Goodyear
stating:

As you know, we requested Goodyear?s review of the performance of the
tire. Goodyear?s position has since been clearly stated that
Goodyear does NOT believe a safety issue exists with the tire In its
current application. It Is our understanding that Goodyear attributes failure of
this tire to improper usage by our mutual customers.

(Exhibit 64)

Again, Goodyear was less than forthcoming about what It knew about the
performance of the 6159 and apparently renewed Its blame for 6159Ifailures upon its
customers. 

On May 10, 2002, Monaco forwarded a letter for Goodyear?s approval advising its
customers that it would replace the 6159 tires on certain Monaco motorhomes.

On June 18, 2002, Goodyear returned the letter, revised to suit its purposes.
Goodyear inserted an additional paragraph that expressed:

It has come to our attention that a number of customers are decreasing air
pressure In their tires for better comfort and as result are operating the tires
In an overloaded condition.

(Exhibit 65)
The modification to the letter was via Goodyear's legal department and upon

information and believe was expressly Inserted by Deborah Okey, Goodyear's Associate
General Counsel.15

 

By 2003, the property damage claims, Injury and death claims and lawsuits had
escalated to such a level that Goodyear decided to retain National Coordinatln Counsel.
Roetzel Andress served this function and Basil Musnuff operated as the point person,
although other senior management In the Roetzel firm participated in signi?cant detail.16

 

?5 Ms. Okey would later retain National Coordinaan Counsel commencing in 2003 to handle the 6159
cases across the country. As noted in Judge Siver's expressive decision, Ms. Okay acted as the
decision-maker in 6159 cases.

?5 The redacted Roetzel Andress' bills for these ses are In our possession. They show the regular
role of senior supervisory partners at Roetzei working with Mr. Musnuff and the local attorneys who
work with National Coordinating Counsel in each of the cases across the country.

5A5 

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 26

The documents In our possession (available upon request), reveal the usual practice
of objecting to the production of test and failure related data. Such admitted data would
not be disclosed absent court order. In certain cases, data was not disclosed in spite of
court order.

As the years rolled on, the claims continued to come in. To the best of my
understanding, none of this has ever been disclosed to NHTSA. In fact,?the protective
orders have prohibited such disclosure. - 

During the summer 2007, it was brought to my attention that a Goodyear corporate
spokesperson had admitted that the 6159 was defective when used on motorhomes during
the course of a deposition. The deposition was stopped. Goodyear subsequently acquired
the court reporter's notes for destruction. No version of the deposition was transcribed and
it has literally disappeared.

Although I was led to believe there was not a trace of this deposition as a result of
Goodyear?s request that it be destroyed, the more recent detailed review of Roetzel 
Andress billing records reveal direct communication with the court reporter about her
maintenance of electronic data.? There are references in those billing records to internal
discussions regarding this electronic record. The court reporter is required to maintain an
electronic copy of the deposition for a period of five years. Since the deposition took place
in 2003, the electronic version was required to be retained and should have existed at the
time we issued a subpoena to the court reporter?s companyin 2007. Her employer
responded to the subpoena, advising that the company had no record of the deposition,
other than Goodyear's request that the court reporter?s notes he sent to counsel for
destruction. I have not been able to locate the court reporter in order to actually address
this Issue with her. In my opinion it is a worthy follow-up because if Goodyear's Legal
Department worked with National Coordinating Counsel to suppress disclosure of a
deposition which contained admissions regarding the defective nature of the 6159, this
would certainly be relevant Information for NHTSA's consideration relating to Goodyear?s
duty to report a defect within ?ve days of such a determination.

 

Attached is my cross-examination during the deposition of two plaintiffs attorneys
who were involved in G159 litigation. (Exhibits 66 and 67.) Each of the attorneys set
forth the varied deceptions experienced during the course of G159 litigation. I have also
provided the deposition of Tim Casey, counsel for the Haley family. (Exhibit 68)
Mr. Casey describes the control exerted by Goodyear?s Legal Department in concealing test
and failure data.



I have endeavored to limit disdosure/production so as to 'not overwhelm NHTSA.
Haeger I involved more than 1000 ?lings, 160 motions and multiple hearings. In total, I
have at least 35 banker boxes of materials, including 20 4-inch binders of trial exhibits.

 

17 Lawyers representing victims in multiple (5159 cases intervened in the closed case of Phillips v.
Goodyear, to modify the protective order to take depositions regarding Goodyear's admission under
oath at deposition. Goodyear filed its own complaint against the lawyer who shared this information,
asserting he violated the protective order by disclosing what the Goodyear employee expressed.

SMITH 

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 27

Haeger II is larger. I have received approximately 400,000 pages of disclosed
information. The motions, ?led in January 2017, are supported by an estimated
15,000 pages of exhibits. Attached as Exhibit 69 is the Sopplementai Statement of Facts
which identi?es most of those documents.

I have separately prepared 11 volumes of the most signi?cant exhibits regarding the
6159. They are all available upon request for your review.

I have attached an index of 59 depositions taken in those two cases, which too are
available for your inspection. (Exhibit. 70)

All six of the Haegers' 6159 tires are still In Goodyear's possession for your
inspection. I believe Goodyear retained other 61595 from the various suits as required to
avoid claims relating to the failure to retain evidence.

Each of the attorneys retained by Goodyear involved in the G159 cases between
1998 to date (see Exhibit 5), have been instructed to retain their ?les and presumably all
of that information is available. I am also in possession of the legal bills for many of the
6159 cases, which are also available upon request.

Since 2005, when the Federal Court entered its protective order, I have been
prohibited from disclosing anything to the Government which Goodyear claimed to be
con?dential. It has been a long road to receiving judicial consent to share with NHTSA that
which I have discovered. My wife and I have spent years wondering how many more people
will get hurt. We had the same discussion a few weeks ago following Goodyear?s
acknowledgement in the public courtroom, that the 6159 is still on the road in 2017. I have
no personal doubt that that is true. The (3159 is a regroovable tire. Goodyear advises that
Its initial tread life is 100,000 miles. The casing ls designed itself to last 300,000.

NHTSA Is familiar with the limited mileage of RV users, as opposed to commercial
trucks. Many of these motorhome owners are uniquely conscientious about their tires. My
client, LeRoy Haeger, would place his motorhome on blocks, lifting the tires off the ground
surface. The tires would separately be covered with material designed to protect the tires 
from any elements and ultra violet light. Goodyear has never told any of these folks that
the 6159 had a limited service life. Internal damage is not evident upon visual inSpectlon
and the tires may be in a state of degradation which is not evident.

In my opinion, based upon what I have been advised by other experts in the ?eld,
Goodyear should have recalled this tire by no later than the end of 2000. Dozens of lives
and injuries would have been avoided and countless ?almost? collisions.

I have often wondered what motivates a corporation to leave a tire like the 6159 on
the road. I have my own opinion. And it is nothing more than that. I know that Goodyear
received in excess of $100 million in revenue as a result of replacing the Firestone tires. I
know that Goodyear was suffering tremendous ?nancial losses in 2001, 2002 and 2003
billion plus). During the years of 6159 production, the stock price fell from $92.00 per
share in July 1998 to $5.00 per share in February 2003. With the Firestone recall, the
public became sensitive to tire issues. .

Wills-I 

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 28

Goodyear knew too. In its 2000 annual report it commented about the Firestone
recall: 

Overnight tires became front page news. Journalists, attorneys, politicians,
automakers and government of?cials scrutinized the entire industry and its
products.

The brand damage suffered by Firestone is estimated to be well in excess of one
billion dollars. As a primary replacement manufacturer for the recalled Firestone tires, it
was no time for Goodyear to advance a recall for the 6159. The decision to not recall a
defective product Is wrought with risks. The penalties become worse with each passing year
and an untimely admission of a defect years after it was manifest, would expose Goodyear
to unquanti?able publicity, brand damage, potential shareholder derivative litigation and an
almost indefensible tire in the various suits which were ?led. It was just simply cheaper to
run the tire out than to comply with what the statutory scheme required. I found it
uniquely offensive that Goodyear's top ?ve of?cers received in excess of $300 million in
bonuses while the G159 continued to run on the roadway after it was, In my opinion, clearly
evident the tire was defective. (Exhibit 71)

Handling this investigation over thelast 14 years has caused tremendous personal
sacrifice and ?nancial loss for my family. It has required me to work exclusively on this
single file since 2011, investing countless thousands of hours pursuing the job NHTSA would
have performed if it had been appropriately informed. I am pleased to ?nally be able to
hand it to NHTSA, as I have tirelessly performed the task of chasing the facts down so that
the appropriate regulatory response would follow.

I believe that a Timeliness Query Is appropriate to evaluate the timing of Goodyear's
defect decision-making and reports to NHTSA. I believe the existing data provides a solid
foundation to recall the 6159. Regardless of expense, there is simply no reason to leave
families exposed to unexpected crossover collisions or to the sudden tread separation of a
motorhome from the 6159. Each of these families is worth saving and protecting. It is
certainly an expense that Is appropriate for Goodyear to incur.

If NHTSA determines Goodyear failed to comply with applicable law, either by falling
to report a defect in the 6159 tires; or failure to comply with Early Warning Reporting; or
misrepresenting failure data to NHTSA when requested: I ask that NHTSA address such
deceptions and penalize Goodyear in accord with the agency's discretion.

Additionally, NHTSA should review Goodyear's approach and process regarding
defect detenninations'to assure it is meeting its public safety obligation. There needs to be
an actual standard at Goodyear where some kind of an Investigation is mandated. whether
it be for adjustments, property damage claims, Injury and/or death claims. Goodyear has
none.

Similarly, it seems inappropriate to me that only senior management sits on the
Corporate Safety Committee. There is no system of checks and balances to assure the
defect determinations are appropriately made. There is no methodology for a minority of
the Corporate Safety Committee to disclose any disagreement amongst the membership
regarding whether a product is defective.

le?M-i 

Of?ce of General Counsel
July 10, 2017
Page 29

Further, General Counsel for Goodyear takes Issue with NHTSA's own expressions
regarding when a tire ls deemed defective. If the senior legal of?cer of Goodyear does not
know when a tire is defective, then things need to change. 

- There needs to be a vehicle that assures that the Board of Directors at Goodyear is
properly informed of tires which are the subject of the Corporate Safety Committee review,
regardless of outcome. The process at Goodyear appears to allow General Counsel to be
the sole decision-maker as to what is presented to the Board, though I have evidence that
Goodyear's CEO, Richard Kramer, was personally familiar with failures regarding the 6159.

I believe there is a vast documented record of deception and misrepresentation by
Goodyear to its customers as well as to those who were hurt by G159 tread separations
about the safety of the 6159. Most of these are the kind of communications that resulted in
criminal prosecutions in recent years. To the extent such considerations exceed your
authority, I request you refer this letter and related documents to other investigatory
governmental entities, including but not limited to the Department of Justice.

I welcome any questions you may have. I appreciate you taking the time to consider
that which -I have discovered.

Simian
David L. Ku
kc
Enclosures

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