March 29, 2018
VIA COURIER
The Honorable James Richard Perry
Secretary of Energy
United States Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, DC 20585
Re:

Request for Emergency Order Pursuant to Federal Power Act Section 202(c)

Dear Secretary Perry:
Pursuant to Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), 1 Section 301(b) of the
Department of Energy (“DOE”) Organization Act, 2 and certain of the DOE’s Rules of Practice
and Procedure, 3 FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. (“FirstEnergy Solutions”), on behalf of its named
subsidiaries (“Applicants”), 4 respectfully requests that the Secretary of Energy (“Secretary”) find
that an emergency condition exists in the footprint of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”)
that requires immediate intervention by the Secretary, in the form of a Section 202(c) emergency
order directing: (a) certain existing nuclear and coal-fired generators in PJM, 5 as detailed herein,
to enter into contracts and all necessary arrangements with PJM, on a plant-by-plant basis, to
generate, deliver, interchange, and transmit electric energy, capacity, and ancillary services as
needed to maintain the stability of the electric grid and (b) PJM to promptly compensate at-risk
merchant nuclear and coal-fired power plants for the full benefits they provide to energy markets
and the public at large, including fuel security and diversity, as detailed herein.
PJM has done little to prevent this emergency despite the numerous signs for many years
that the emergency was coming. Nuclear and coal-fired generators in PJM have been closing at a
rapid rate 6—putting PJM’s system resiliency at risk—and many more closures have been
1

16 U.S.C. § 824a(c).

2

42 U.S.C. § 7151(b).

3

10 C.F.R. §§ 205.370-205.373.

4

The named subsidiaries are: FirstEnergy Generation, LLC, FirstEnergy Nuclear Generation, LLC, FirstEnergy
Nuclear Operating Company, and FirstEnergy Generation Mansfield Unit 1 Corp. The foregoing entities are all
wholly owned subsidiaries of FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. which, in turn, is a wholly owned subsidiary of
FirstEnergy Corp., a publicly-traded, utility holding company headquartered in Akron, Ohio.

5

A list of the nuclear and coal-fired generating plants in PJM believed to be currently operating is provided as
Attachment A hereto. As explained in Section II.F, only a subset of these plants would be subject to the requested
Order.

6

In the past four years, over 11,000 MW of coal-fired generation within the PJM footprint has closed, the
equivalent of a dozen large power plants. MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2017 STATE OF THE MKT. REPORT FOR

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 2
announced. 7 PJM continues to claim that all is well with its system, 8 but at the same time shows
it does not have a clear view of what resilience is, how to measure it, or how to ensure it.9 PJM
has demonstrated little urgency to remedy this problem any time soon 10—so immediate action by
the Secretary is needed to alleviate the present emergency.
I.

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY

It is in the national interest to ensure a dependable, affordable, safe, fuel-secure, and clean
supply of electricity produced by a diverse array of energy resources, including coal, natural gas,
nuclear material, flowing water, and renewable resources. Such diversity of generation enhances
dependable and resilient electric supply, reduces electricity price volatility, ensures the Nation’s
economic and physical security, and promotes economic development. As you stated recently,
“America’s greatness depends on a reliable, resilient electric grid powered by an ‘all of the above’
mix of generation resources” that “must include traditional baseload generation with on-site fuel
storage that can withstand major fuel supply disruptions caused by natural and man-made
disasters.” 11 Indeed, “[o]ur economy, government and national defense all depend on electricity.
Therefore, ensuring a reliable and resilient electric supply and corresponding supply chain are vital
to national security.” 12

PJM, VOL. 2: DETAILED ANALYSIS 544 tbl.12-5 (Mar. 8, 2018), (listing coal unit retirements of 2,239 MW,
7,064.8 MW, 243 MW, and 2,038 MW in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively)
http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2017.shtml (“2017 PJM Report”).
7

See Section II.B, infra.

8

See, e.g., Comments and Responses of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. at 4, Grid Resilience in Regional
Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, FERC Docket No. AD18-7-000 (Mar. 9, 2018)
(“To be clear, the PJM [Bulk Electric System (“BES”)] is safe and reliable today – it has been designed and is
operated to meet all applicable reliability standards. However, improvements can and should be made to make
the BES more resilient against known and potential vulnerabilities and threats. In many cases, resilience actions
are anchored in, but go beyond what is strictly required for compliance with, the existing reliability standards.”)
(“PJM Comments”); Initial Comments of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. on the United States Department of Energy
Proposed Rule at 25, Grid Reliability and Resilience Pricing, FERC Docket No. RM18-1 (Oct. 23, 2017) (“[T]he
performance of the PJM system in response to incredibly taxing events like the 2014 Polar Vortex demonstrate
the reliability and resilience of the system created by effective transmission planning and development and the
energy and capacity markets.”).

9

See, e.g., PJM Comments at 3-4. Contrast Response of the New York System Operator, Inc. at 1, Grid Resilience
in Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, FERC Docket No. AD18-7-000
(Mar. 9, 2018) (referring to “efforts already underway (or being considered) to ensure continued reliable operation
and bolster resiliency in response to the evolving nature of the bulk power system in New York”).

10

PJM indicates that it will follow any FERC mandate to study the resiliency issue and, if changes are needed,
pursue solutions. PJM Comments at 5-6. But the emergency exists presently, not in the future, and immediate
action is needed now, not more time to study.

11

Letter from Rick Perry, U.S. Sec’y of Energy, to Chairman & Comm’rs of FERC at 1 (Sept. 28, 2017) (“Secretary
NOPR Letter”).

12

Id. at 2.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 3
The Nation depends heavily on a steady and dependable supply of electricity at all times.
Electricity both figuratively and literally powers the Nation—its homes, its businesses, its
industries, government buildings, and defense installations. Electricity is thus vital not only to the
health, safety, and welfare of the Nation, but also to its economic and physical well-being. Our
adversaries understand this too. As explained by Dr. Paul Stockton, former Assistant Secretary of
Defense, the Nation’s adversaries “may seek to disrupt U.S. defense capabilities by attacking the
critical infrastructure on which our military bases rely. . . . The power grid and fuel supplies for
power generation are potential targets for these adversaries.” 13 The importance of the electric grid
and its fuel supply network to our Nation’s well-being cannot be overstated.
Yet, as DOE is undoubtedly aware, threats to the Nation’s power supply and grid are real
and can no longer be ignored. The Nation’s security is jeopardized if DOE does not act now to
preserve fuel-secure generation and the diversity of supply. 14 The very diversity of supply that
baseload nuclear and coal-fired units provide is being lost more and more each day as more and
more of these plants retire because their fuel security and resiliency are not properly recognized
and valued by the current administrative market rules. Rather, we, as a Nation, “need to properly
recognize the value of each resource, being mindful of its role in our national defense [and]
economic security” and, in this regard, “account for the value of on-site fuel storage capability” of
nuclear and coal-fired generating resources. 15 To this effect, immediate action is needed to ensure
that such traditional baseload generation receives compensation commensurate with the value it
provides to the Nation and thus remains in service and available to power the Nation in times of
need. As you have noted, “urgent action must be taken to ensure the resilience and security of the
electric grid, which is so vitally important to the economic and national security of the United
States.” 16
The recent cold weather in the East has provided a real-time, real-life demonstration as to
why immediate action is so critical to ensure the health and safety of the Nation. From December
27, 2017, through January 8, 2018, the eastern U.S. saw extremely cold temperatures and spiking
electric demand, which would likely have been far worse had it occurred only two weeks later
after the holiday season ended. If not for the over-performing nuclear and coal-fired generating
plants in PJM, 17 the eastern portion of the country would likely have seen grid reliability impacts,
13

Comments of Exelon Corp., Testimony of Paul Stockton at 5-6, Grid Reliability and Resilience Pricing, FERC
Docket No. RM18-1-000 (Oct. 23, 2017).

14

Secretary NOPR Letter at 8 (“If, for example, we lose our educated workforce or no longer have the ability to
build and operate our baseload plants because of short-sighted policies, it will not only weaken our workforce,
but will threaten our energy dominance and national security.”).

15

Id.

16

Letter from Rick Perry, U.S. Sec’y of Energy, to Kevin McIntyre, Chairman, FERC at 2 (Dec. 8, 2017) (“Secretary
Extension Letter”).

17

See, e.g., Tim Loh, Chris Martin & Naureen S. Malik, America’s Deep Freeze is Aiding Coal and Sending Power
Up, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-28/america-s-deepfreeze-is-aiding-coal-and-sending-power-surging (“In the PJM market . . . coal has once again surged past natural
gas to become the biggest fuel for power generation.”); Tiffany Hsu, Deep Freeze in U.S. Creates Heating
TIMES
(Jan.
3,
2018),
Squeeze
for
Homeowners
and
Utilities,
N.Y.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 4
as natural gas plants significantly underperformed in large part due to natural gas price spikes and
supply interruptions. 18 As a recent DOE study of this cold weather event found (the “NETL
Report”), nuclear and coal-fired generation provided 70 percent of output during the event and
“coal units in PJM were uniquely positioned to provide the resilience needed at this critical point
in time,” providing “74 percent of incremental energy.” 19 The study went on to conclude that:
In the case of PJM, it can also be shown that the demand could not
have been met without coal. At peak demand, January 5, 2018,
natural gas prices exceeded $95/MMBtu in eastern PJM. Had coal
been removed, a 9-18 GW capacity shortfall would have developed,
depending on assumed imports and generation outages, leading to
system collapse. 20
As the report stated, “[e]xperience with such blackouts indicates the potentially enormous toll in
both economic losses and human suffering associated with widespread lack of electricity.” 21

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/03/business/heating-homeowners-winter.html (noting that due to high heating
demand, “[m]any utilities turned to coal and oil to generate electricity as the price of natural gas, their usual fuel
of choice, surged”); Jeremiah Shelor, Extreme Cold Drives Record-Setting Week in NatGas Cash; Futures See
Warm-Up Ahead, NATURAL GAS INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 5, 2018), http://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/112977extreme-cold-drives-record-setting-week-in-natgas-cash-futures-see-warm-up-ahead (“With blizzard conditions
arriving late in the week along the East Coast just in time to pile on after recent bitterly cold temperatures, natural
gas spot price blowouts ran rampant . . . . The conditions driving the exorbitant cash prices appeared to be a
perfect storm of widespread weather-driven demand and pipeline constraints.”); PJM INTERCONNECTION, PJM
COLD SNAP PERFORMANCE DEC. 28, 2017 TO JAN. 7, 2018 13 & fig.10 (Feb. 26, 2018), available at
http://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/weather-related/20180226-january-2018-cold-weatherevent-report.ashx (reporting that nuclear and coal generation combined constituted 63% of the online fuel mix
during the 2018 cold snap) (“PJM COLD SNAP PERFORMANCE 2018”).
18

See, e.g., Naureen S. Malik, Blizzard Triggers 60-Fold Surge in Prices for U.S. Natural Gas, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-04/natural-gas-in-u-s-soars-to-world-s-priciest-assnow-slams-east; Cold Weather, Higher Exports Result in Record Natural Gas Demand, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(“EIA”) (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34412 (noting record natural gas
demand due in part to recent cold weather); PJM COLD SNAP PERFORMANCE 2018 at 16 (concluding that “[g]as
supply issues were the largest” cause of forced outages due to fuel supply issues during the 2018 cold snap,
“particularly the weekend of Jan. 6 and Jan. 7, as temperatures reached their lowest points,” and that supply issues
“include transportation restrictions and interruptions as well as spot gas commodity availability”).

19

NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., RELIABILITY, RESILIENCE AND THE ONCOMING WAVE OF RETIRING BASELOAD UNITS
VOLUME I: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THERMAL UNITS DURING EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS 12 (Mar. 13, 2018)
(“NETL
Report”),
available
at
https://www.netl.doe.gov/research/energy-analysis/searchpublications/vuedetails?id=2594. To the extent necessary, Applicants incorporate the NETL Report by reference
as if it were filed in full as an attachment to this Application. The findings in the NETL Report fully support the
Secretary determining that an emergency exists within the meaning of FPA Section 202(c) that warrants
immediate action.

20

Id. at 17 (emphasis added).

21

Id. at 3.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 5
Overall, DOE estimated that “the value of [coal- and oil-]based power generation resilience” in
PJM during this cold weather event was $3.5 billion. 22
But this is not the first time nuclear and coal-fired generation has saved PJM. In January
2014, a “Polar Vortex” spiked customer demand, dropping system reserves in PJM to just 500
MW (on a demand of over 140,000 MW). 23 PJM calculated that 9,300 MW of generation was
unavailable during this event due to interruptions in the natural gas supply to generators. 24 While
this loss of generating capacity could have been catastrophic, multiple coal-fired generating units
slated for retirement were dispatched to meet electric demand 25 and nuclear generators also
“performed extremely well.” 26 “Sixty-five million people within the PJM footprint could have
been affected if these traditional baseload units were not available.” 27
Combined, the Polar Vortex and this past winter’s extreme cold have shown the value that
nuclear and coal-fired generators bring to the electric grid. Just as temperatures plummeted during
these periods, the output of nuclear and coal-fired generators spiked. Specifically, during the
period December 26, 2017, through January 6, 2018, coal-fired and nuclear generation in PJM
averaged output levels of 46,038 MW and 35,485 MW, respectively. 28 These levels are over 50
percent greater than the average output of coal-fired generation during the 24 months ending
September 2017 (of 29,849 MW) and over 10% greater than the average output of nuclear
generation during those 24 months (of 32,167 MW). 29 Further, the output levels of coal-fired
generators over this 12-day period are well above historical January levels, which tend to see the
highest average outputs of such units of any months of the year. 30 By any measure, the output of
coal-fired and nuclear generating facilities in PJM was exceptional over these recent 12 days.

22

Id. at 1, 16.

23

PJM INTERCONNECTION, ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL EVENTS AND MARKET IMPACTS DURING THE JANUARY
2014 COLD WEATHER EVENTS 4 (May 8, 2014), available at http://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reportsnotices/weather-related/20140509-analysis-of-operational-events-and-market-impacts-during-the-jan-2014cold-weather-events.ashx.

24

Id. at 26.

25

Secretary NOPR Letter at 3.

26

See id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STAFF REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND
RELIABILITY 95 (Aug. 2017) (“Staff Report”)).

27

Secretary NOPR Letter at 3.

28

See Generation by Fuel Type, PJM INTERCONNECTION, http://dataminer2.pjm.com/feed/gen_by_fuel.

29

See PJM INTERCONNECTION, STATE OF THE MARKET REPORTS FOR 2012 THROUGH Q3 2017,
http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2018.shtml (as converted from GWh to
MW).

30

Specifically, during the three Januarys from 2015 to 2017, coal-fired generation in PJM averaged output of 37,234
MW (and nuclear generation averaged 34,845 MW). See id.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 6
The chart below illustrates the spike in nuclear and coal-fired output over this period.31
Notably, coal- and oil-fired generation spiked, and nuclear generation rose materially, but gasfired generation dropped, not only from its average output levels but even from levels seen only a
few days prior. As Andrew Ott, PJM’s President and CEO, recently testified:
[D]uring this recent cold weather event, obviously more than half of
the total supply was coal and nuclear. Certainly, [PJM] couldn’t
survive without gas; [PJM] couldn’t survive without coal; [PJM]
couldn’t survive without nuclear. [PJM needs] them all in the
moment. And I think the key, and what [PJM is] focused on, is each
of these bring to the table reliability characteristics. Each of these
was online when [PJM] needed them. 32
The strong performance of the nuclear and coal-fired units in PJM was a needed counterbalance
to the situation for gas-fired units. Specifically, during the cold snap, dramatic price increases
were seen in natural gas prices; including for example a spike in PJM at the Texas Eastern M3
interface, in Southeastern Pennsylvania, from a normal level near $3/MMBtu to $96/MMBtu. 33
Further, “in eastern PJM . . . gas and electric transmission were severely constrained, leading to .
. . elevated natural gas and electricity prices across [the] region.” 34 The price increases would have
been even more dramatic but for the over performance of nuclear and coal-fired units.

31

See Generation by Fuel Type, PJM INTERCONNECTION, http://dataminer2.pjm.com/feed/gen_by_fuel. This chart
excludes March 29, March 30, and April 2, 2017 because no data was reported for those dates.

32

Press Release, Sen. Lisa Murkowski, Hearing Spotlights Importance of Energy Infrastructure, Diverse Fuel Mix
(Jan. 23, 2018) (quoting Andrew Ott), https://www.murkowski.senate.gov/press/release/hearing-spotlightsimportance-of-energy-infrastructure-diverse-fuel-mix.

33

NETL Report at 14.

34

Id. at 6. See also id. at 7 (showing a four-fold increase in daily load weighted average marginal electricity price
in PJM between December 30, 2017 and January 6, 2018).

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 7

PJM Average Hourly Output By Fuel Type (MW)
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0

Coal

Gas

Hydro

Nuclear

Oil

Other Renewables

Solar

Wind

But the very same nuclear and coal-fired power plants that allowed PJM to maintain
reliability during these extreme weather events are at imminent risk of permanent closure if
something is not done now. The Energy Information Administration “projects 41 GW of coal and
10 GW of nuclear retirements by 2025,” but, as the NETL Report notes, this projection does not
“adequately capture[] the risk” of retirements. 35 The report further projects that “as much as 75
GW of coal-fired generation could be retired” by 2025, and notes that another source estimates
between “30 and 50 GW of nuclear could face retirement.” 36 Without these plants, thousands if
not millions of customers could have been without power during sub-zero degree temperatures.
And absent immediate and decisive action by DOE, the 11,000 MW of nuclear and coal-fired
generation that have kept PJM operating during this period will begin to retire in the very near
future. As Andrew Ott, PJM’s President and CEO, recently testified, 1,410 MW of nuclear
capacity and 3,688 MW of coal-fired capacity that operated during the recent cold snap in the
eastern U.S. are scheduled to deactivate within the next five years. 37 This testimony is consistent
with the NETL Report’s finding that:
The 30 GW of coal that ramped up to meet the surge in PJM load
[during the recent cold weather event] clearly includes the units most
likely to retire due to insufficient market support, given those units
were not running at baseload levels before the event. As more of
35

NETL Report at 25.

36

Id. at 30.

37

U.S. Sen. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., The Performance of the Electric Power System in the Northeast and
Mid-Atlantic During the Recent Winter Weather Events, Including the Bomb Cyclone, Questions for the Record
Submitted to Mr. Andrew Ott, Response to Question 2 from Sen. Mike Lee (Jan. 23, 2018).

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 8
these units retire, the ability of the system to respond to extreme
events with reliance, let alone economically, deteriorates. 38
Further, it is a matter of public record that FirstEnergy Solutions, which through Applicants
indirectly owns 12,300 MW of generation, likely will file for bankruptcy by the end of March
2018. 39 Indeed, Charles Jones, CEO of FirstEnergy Corp., recently stated that he would be
“shocked” if FirstEnergy Solutions did not file soon. 40 FirstEnergy Solutions already submitted
notice to PJM that it would deactivate its nuclear assets—Davis-Besse and Perry in Ohio and
Beaver Valley in Pennsylvania—in 2020 and 2021.
“Distorted price signals” in the organized markets overseen by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), such as PJM, “have resulted in under-valuation of grid
reliability and resiliency benefits provided by traditional baseload resources, such as [those
powered by] coal and nuclear” fuel. 41 As you have recognized, “[b]ecause wholesale pricing in
those markets does not adequately consider or accurately value those benefits, generation units
that provide the benefits are often not fully compensated for them.” 42 The NETL Report similarly
summarized the problem: “Markets do not currently compensate resilience, and thus that
capability is steadily diminishing due to competitive pressures of ongoing, baseload power plant
early retirements.” 43
This lack of appropriate compensation, among other things, has resulted in the Nation’s
nuclear and coal-fired generation closing at an alarming and unprecedented rate. For example
“between 2002 and 2016, 531 coal[-fired] generating units representing approximately 59,000
MW of generation capacity retired from the U.S. generation fleet.” 44 In addition, “[i]t is
anticipated that approximately 12,700 MW of coal[-fired generation] will retire through 2020.” 45
Further, “between 2002 and 2016, 4,666 MW of nuclear generating capacity was announced for
38

NETL Report at 18.

39

Gavin Bade, FirstEnergy CEO Says Generation Subsidiary Headed for Bankruptcy Protection, UTILITY DIVE
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/firstenergy-ceo-says-generation-subsidiary-headed-forbankruptcy-protection/517743/; Jeffrey Ryser, FirstEnergy Continues Push Away from Competitive Generation
Subsidiary, PLATTS MEGAWATT DAILY (Feb. 22, 2018).

40

Recording of Fourth Quarter 2017 Earnings Webcast, FIRSTENERGY (Feb. 21, 2018),
https://services.choruscall.com/links/fe180221.html (Mr. Jones stating, at 25:18, “Well, I said in my prepared
remarks that I expect that [FES] will be removed from the unregulated money pool between now and the end of
March, and that will be the last tie that we have with that business. While I can't speak for FES, I will be shocked
if they go beyond the end of March without some type of a filing.”).

41

Secretary NOPR Letter at 1.

42

Id. at 3.

43

NETL Report at 3.

44

Secretary NOPR Letter at 2 (citing Staff Report at 22).

45

Id. (citing EIA, Monthly Update to the Annual Electric Generator Report, Form EIA-860m (June 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/).

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 9
retirement” and “[e]ight reactors representing 7,167 MW of nuclear capacity . . . have announced
retirement plans since 2016.” 46
These retirements must stop immediately in PJM lest the grid be placed at risk of failure
through a lack of generation diversity and over-reliance on generating units that lack secure fuel
supply and often compete with other industries and customers for limited firm fuel delivery
capabilities. As your staff found, “fuel supply chain disruptions can impact many generators
during a single widespread fuel shortage event,” but “[n]uclear and coal[-fired power] plants
typically have advantages associated with onsite fuel storage. . . .” 47 Such generating units with
on-site storage capacity kept PJM from shedding load during the 2014 Polar Vortex when available
generating capacity was only a hair’s width more than demand. And such units have been critical
to keeping the grid supplied during the severe cold weather in the East this past winter. But the
continued existence of such fuel-secure, baseload units cannot be taken for granted. Unless
immediate action is taken, they will continue to retire and PJM and the Nation are likely not to be
so lucky as to avoid load-shedding (or worse) the next time generation supply is stretched to its
limit.
FERC has for several years failed to heed this warning and to act to prevent this impending
crisis. Indeed, FERC has had the opportunity to prevent this crisis on numerous occasions,
including the opportunity you provided it through your Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”)
issued pursuant to FPA Section 403. 48 Although you granted FERC’s request to extend the NOPR
proceeding, you stated that you would continue to examine “all options within [your] authority
under the Department of Energy Organization Act, the Federal Power Act, and any other
authorities to take remedial action as necessary to ensure the security of the nation’s electric
grid.” 49
Despite the fact that the time for such remedial action has come, FERC terminated your
rulemaking proceeding and chose instead merely to study the issue further. 50 And although FERC
acknowledged that “resilience remains an important issue that warrants the Commission’s
continued attention,” 51 it dismissed evidence establishing the threat to resilience posed by the
46

Id. at 3 (citing Staff Report at 29-30).

47

Staff Report at 91. See also NETL Report at 14 (“As for natural gas-fired electricity generation, two significant
constraints inhibit its fuel resilience contribution during extreme weather events . . . . Most importantly, demand
from competing sectors, especially from residential and commercial space heating, takes priority over electricity
for natural gas use, limiting and even diminishing the capacity potential for natural gas-based electricity.
Compounding this constraint is that of pipeline capacity. Even though abundant natural gas may be available, it
must flow through the same limited pipeline capacity already delivering to increased heating demand.”).

48

See generally Secretary NOPR Letter. See also NETL Report at 3 (“The need for reasonable compensation to
maintain resilient capacity to endure such periodically-certain threats to the nation formed the basis of [DOE’s]
resilience compensation proposal to [FERC].”).

49

Secretary Extension Letter at 2 (italics in original).

50

Grid Reliability and Resilience Pricing et al., 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 (2018).

51

Id. at P 13.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 10
imminent loss of additional nuclear and coal-fired generation and found instead that “the extensive
comments submitted by the [regional transmission organizations and independent system
operators (“RTOs/ISOs”)] do not point to any past or planned generator retirements that may be a
threat to grid resilience.” 52 Further, FERC concluded that it lacked the legal authority to act on
your proposed rule for lack of a showing that current rules were unjust or unreasonable. 53
FERC’s response was disappointing. FERC’s reliance on comments by RTOs/ISOs—the
very entities that preside over the flawed markets—is misplaced. 54 More fundamentally, FERC’s
decision to study the issue further is too little, too late. As Commissioner Chatterjee noted,
“[m]ajor regulatory reform efforts often can take several years to complete.” 55 The record before
FERC, however, demonstrated that the time to act is now. Multiple commenters expect that the
trend of premature, economic retirement of nuclear and coal-fired generators will continue if left
unaddressed. 56 Indeed, seven nuclear units (representing 10,500 MW of nameplate capacity) are
planning to retire by 2025. 57 And owners of other nuclear units have stated publicly that they do
not intend to invest further in their nuclear units unless and until their host states pass legislation
that subsidizes the units.58
Even more troubling is that PJM has followed FERC’s lead and decided to kick the can
down the road on this critical issue. In its Comments and Responses to FERC’s initiation of a new
proceeding on grid resilience, PJM concludes that its bulk electric system “is safe and reliable
today—it has been designed and is operated to meet all applicable reliability standards.” 59 While
PJM acknowledged that “generation and other resources” supply essential attributes that support
reliability and that “the maintenance or assurance of these attributes into the future are important
to resilience mitigation,” PJM has committed to nothing more than further study of the issue. 60
And PJM’s position is all the more questionable in light of its admission that it does not conduct

52

Id. at P 15.

53

Id. at P 14 (“For the reasons discussed below, the Proposed Rule did not satisfy those clear and fundamental legal
requirements under section 206 of the FPA. Given those legal requirements, we have no choice but to terminate
Docket No. RM18-1-000.”).

54

Among other justifications for taking no action, FERC noted that the RTOs, and the industry more generally, do
not have a clear definition or understanding of the resilience issue. Id. at P 22. As such, FERC’s decision to take
no action was based on incomplete information.

55

Id. at Chatterjee Concurrence.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Public Service Enterprise Group Inc., SEC Form 8-K, at 2 (Feb. 28, 2018).

59

PJM Comments at 4.

60

Id. at 46 (“PJM will need to continue to conduct analysis of the anticipated future availability of these attributes
so that it can proactively address the maintenance of these attributes through the markets. PJM will also consider
the operational lessons learned from other RTOs in regard to resource mix and essential resource attributes to
continue to analyze future trends in resource mix and their impacts on both reliability and resilience.”).

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 11
system planning or operations subject to formal resilience criteria, and that it would need additional
FERC authorization in order to do so. 61
PJM’s conclusion misses the point. As you noted, “urgent action must be taken to ensure
the resilience and security of the electric grid.” 62 It is insufficient and wholly illogical to say that
action is not needed going forward because PJM meets today’s reliability criteria. PJM’s
comments demonstrate that it has yet to identify and measure resilience, much less taken steps to
preserve the resilience of its electric grid. 63 Indeed, many of PJM’s requests to the Commission
do nothing more than pass the buck back to FERC on this critical issue. 64
Further, PJM’s requests for action “to enhance resilience of the grid and interrelated
systems” 65 will not address your concerns regarding the resilience and security of the Nation’s
electric grid. These requests, which call for additional FERC proceedings and RTO/ISO filings,
in some cases require no action by any party for nine to twelve months after the conclusion of the
current FERC proceeding and will do nothing to stem the tide of premature nuclear and coal-fired
plant closures in the interim. 66 This is particularly alarming because PJM acknowledges that its
Capacity Performance changes have failed to produce a long-term solution “to meet the evergrowing demand for gas transportation by the generation sector.” 67 Indeed, natural gas availability
61

Id. at 33-34.

62

Secretary Extension Letter at 2.

63

See, e.g., PJM Comments at 37 (“Because PJM does not have formal resilience criteria, PJM adapts existing
analyses . . . to derive conclusions about the ability of the PJM BES to withstand a high-impact, low-frequency
event, and is working with stakeholders to determine how best to incorporate resilience into PJM’s planning
process and what criteria should be used.”); id. at 66 (“RTO wholesale electricity, Ancillary Service markets,
capacity markets, and shortage pricing mechanisms were not originally designed specifically with resilience in
mind.”).

64

See, e.g., id. at 5 (requesting that FERC “[a]rticulate in this docket that the regional planning responsibilities of
RTOs . . . includes an obligation to assess resilience”); id. (requesting that FERC “[e]stablish a Commission
process . . . that would allow an RTO to receive verification as to the reasonableness of its assessments of
vulnerabilities and threats”).

65

See PJM Comments at 5-8.

66

See, e.g., id. at 6 (“Request that all RTOs . . . submit a subsequent filing . . . to implement resilience planning
criteria, and develop processes for the identification of vulnerabilities, threat assessment and mitigation,
restoration planning, and related process or procedures needed to advance resilience planning.”); id. (“Request
that all RTOs . . . submit a subsequent filing, including any necessary proposed tariff amendments, for any
proposed market reforms and related compensation mechanisms to address resilience concerns within nine to
twelve months from the issuance of a Final Order in this docket.”).

67

Id. at 57-58 (“Although PJM was hoping that the Capacity Performance changes would spur a corresponding
array of new service offerings by pipelines (and generators seeking such options), at least on the public record
such new pipeline services have not been offered as new open season requests . . . . [N]ew flexible services, to
the extent they have been offered, appear to have been confined to the secondary market in which available gas
from LDCs or industrial customers is made available, for a price, on the non-transparent bilateral secondary
market. Although this is an effective short term strategy to ‘move around’ available capacity and take advantage
of diversity in demand, it cannot, in the long run, serve as the sole means to meet the ever-growing demand for
gas transportation by the generation sector.”). PJM’s admission that the Capacity Performance program fell short

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 12
during the recent cold weather in the eastern U.S. has prompted PJM to consider enacting
emergency operational cost procedures for use when emergency conditions affect the grid or gas
pipeline system. 68 PJM’s efforts to “to engage interstate pipelines and LDCs to review gas pipeline
contingencies” 69 similarly have failed to produce a long-term solution.
The lack of protection for at-risk nuclear and coal-fired plants during this time actually
undermines the effectiveness of other PJM requests. For example, PJM requests that FERC require
it to file proposed tariff amendments “to permit non-market operations during emergencies,” which
“could includ[e] provisions for cost-based compensation when the markets are not operational or
when a wholesale supplier is directed to take certain emergency actions by PJM for which there is
not an existing compensation mechanism.” 70 FERC’s and PJM’s inaction, however, has
significantly increased the risk that the very plants needed to take these emergency actions will
have shuttered by the time PJM files and FERC approves these tariff provisions.
These events demonstrate that, absent immediate intervention by the Secretary, nuclear and
coal-fired plants will continue to retire prematurely. In view of this regulatory failure, and as
further detailed herein, Applicants seek action from the Secretary to ensure the continued operation
of baseload nuclear and coal-fired power plants in PJM. Such immediate action is necessary to
address an emergency in the bulk power system overseen by PJM and to serve the public interest
by preventing power disruptions and system blackouts. Absent such an order, health care facilities,
emergency services, and other critical infrastructure could be without power affecting portions of
the 65 million people that reside within the PJM footprint.

contrasts sharply with its prior assurances to FERC that the Capacity Performance program would result in firm
fuel supply. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Reforms to the Reliability Pricing Market (“RPM”) and Related Rules
in the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff (“Tariff”) and Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load
Serving Entities (“RAA”) at 53, FERC Docket No. ER15-623-000 (Dec. 12, 2014) (“Capacity Market Sellers that
now will face more harsh financial consequences for a failure to perform during emergencies (with no limit on
when such emergencies arise) will likely need to invest in plant design changes or new equipment, or increase
operating budgets to accommodate more staff, firm fuel delivery arrangements, greater inventories, or changed
operating practices.”).
68

Jared Anderson, PJM Mulls Emergency Operational Cost Issues, PLATTS MEGAWATT DAILY (Jan. 10, 2018).

69

PJM COLD SNAP PERFORMANCE 2018 at 21-22.

70

PJM Comments at 6.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 13
II.

APPLICATION FOR EMERGENCY ORDER

In the United States, RTOs work to ensure the operation and security of the bulk electric
power system. PJM operates the electric grid and centralized electricity markets in all or part of
13 different states and the District of Columbia, 71 overseeing over 178,000 MW of installed
capacity and serving approximately 65 million people. 72 Over half of PJM’s generating capacity
is nuclear and coal-fired generation, 73 and nearly one-quarter of the Nation’s nuclear and coalfired generating capacity is located within PJM.74
PJM’s power markets, however, consistently fail to compensate nuclear and coal-fired
generators for the full value of the benefits that they provide, such as fuel security and diversity.
As stated by a former Commissioner of FERC, “I believe that fuel diversity is really key in
ensuring reliability going forward, even in these dynamic times . . . . [I]t is imperative that we
protect fuel diversity.” 75 Such continued fuel diversity in PJM, however, is at risk.
PJM’s independent market monitor recently found that between six and nine nuclear plants,
with a total capacity of 7,058 MW to 14,027 MW, did not recover their avoidable costs—the costs
to keep the generators operating—in two of the last three years. 76 Additionally, four nuclear plants,
with capacity of 3,554 MW, are not expected to recover their annual avoidable costs on average
from 2018 through 2020. 77 The market monitor similarly found that a “significant number of coal
units are at risk of retirement” because 17,302 MW of coal-fired capacity is expected to receive
less than 90 percent of its avoidable costs. 78 Overall, the market monitor found that, in addition
to units currently planning to retire, between 22,929 MW and 30,785 MW of capacity in PJM,

71

PJM’s territory includes all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Who We
Are, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2018); PJM’s Mission &
Vision, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/mission-vision.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).

72

Capacity by Fuel Type, PJM (June 1, 2017), http://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/ops-analysis/capacity-byfuel-type-2017.ashx?la=en; Who We Are, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx (last visited
Mar. 22, 2018).

73

Capacity by Fuel Type, PJM (June 1, 2017) (showing nuclear and coal-fired generation represent 19% and 33%
of PJM’s installed generation capacity, respectively).

74

Compare id. (showing that nuclear and coal-fired generation represent 33,992 MW and 59,835 MW of PJM’s
installed generation capacity, respectively), with Preliminary Monthly Generator Inventory, EIA (June 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/ (showing, when filtered by “Technology,” 284,439 MW of
conventional steam coal generator nameplate capacity and 104,628 MW of nuclear generator nameplate capacity
as of June 2017 nationwide).

75

Oversight of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power,
114th Cong., Prelim. H’rg Tr. at 54 (2015) (testimony of Colette D. Honorable, Commissioner, FERC).

76

2017 PJM Report at 2.

77

Id.

78

Id.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 14
primarily from nuclear and coal-fired generation, is at risk of retirement. 79 In fact, the market
monitor found that over 90 percent of the “at-risk” generation in PJM was either nuclear or coalfired. 80 But new nuclear and coal-fired generation will not replace this lost capacity because, as
the market monitor found, “[i]n 2017 . . . a new coal plant and a new nuclear plant would have
been significantly unprofitable.” 81
By contrast, nearly all oil, natural gas, hydroelectric, and pumped storage generators
recovered fully their avoidable costs in 2017. 82 This marked difference is a result of the fact that
nuclear and coal-fired units are baseload plants. As such, they are designed to run “24/7” on a
consistent basis with 25 days of on-site fuel availability (when running “full bore”), making them
the backbone of the electric system. 83 PJM’s energy market, though, is designed not to consider
or incentivize operational diversity, fuel security, or system resiliency. Rather, it dispatches
generation units based only on short-term marginal price without regard for the fixed costs of the
facility, or the firmness of its fuel supply or transportation. Specifically, PJM uses a reliabilityconstrained least-cost model to dispatch the lowest-cost units required to satisfy electricity
demand. 84 But because nuclear and coal-fired units are designed to run continuously, they often
continue to operate through lower-priced periods—such as the middle of the night—sometimes
requiring them to sell their electricity output at a loss. This is particularly true in states with large
amounts of wind-powered generation, as wind tends to generate at its peak overnight when
electricity demand is low. 85 The unavoidable requirement to operate during lower-priced periods
places significant financial strain on baseload units such as nuclear and coal-fired generators that
are not properly compensated in the existing markets. 86 All indications are that these trends will
continue.
79

Id.

80

Id. at tbl.7-36.

81

Id. at 6.

82

Id. at tbl.7-30.

83

See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., POLAR VORTEX REVIEW 36-37 (Sept. 2014),
http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/January%202014%20Polar%20Vortex%20Review/Polar_Vortex_Review_29_Sep
t_2014_Final.pdf (“[A] growing dependence on gas‐fired generation can increase the [bulk power system’s]
exposure to disruptions from insufficient fuel supply, transportation, and delivery. . . . Unlike coal and fuel oil,
natural gas is not easily stored on site.”). Cf. PJM INTERCONNECTION, PJM’S EVOLVING RESOURCE MIX AND
SYSTEM RELIABILITY 35 (Mar. 30, 2017) (“[R]ecent studies, including the Black Sky/Black Start Protection
Initiative, suggest that 30 days of fuel inventory would be required to adequately respond to Black Sky type
events.”).

84

See Market for Electricity, PJM, http://learn.pjm.com/electricity-basics/market-for-electricity.aspx (last visited
Mar. 22, 2018).

85

See, e.g., Scott DiSavino, Texas Power Demand to Hit 2016 Peak Amid Heat Wave: ERCOT, REUTERS (Aug. 4,
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-texas-power-heatwave-idUSKCN10F202 (noting that wind
generation in ERCOT “typically produce[s] most energy overnight”).

86

Markets only provide signals that lead to efficient decisions on the part of market participants if the markets
“efficiently price all valuable services provided to the system.” FirstEnergy Reply Comments, Ex. 1 (“Hunger
Reply Aff.”) at 9, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, FERC Docket No. RM18-1-000 (Nov. 7, 2017).

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 15
PJM’s market monitor cursorily dismissed this undeniable trend of nuclear and coal-fired
generation retirements because of under-recovery, stating that “[m]any generating plants have
retired in PJM since the introduction of markets and many generating plants have been built since
the introduction of markets” and that “[t]he fact that some plants are uneconomic does not call into
question the fundamentals of PJM markets.” 87 This response is alarming to say the least. Nuclear
and coal-fired generation provides substantial resilience and security benefits to the electric grid
and to the Nation. Indeed, as the market monitor itself recognized, “[s]ignificant reliance on
specific fuels, including nuclear, coal and gas means that markets are at risk from a significant
disruption in any one fuel.” 88 By treating the lost nuclear and coal-fired capacity the same as the
non-nuclear and non-coal-fired capacity that has replaced it, the market monitor ignores the
significant threat to the electric grid and the Nation’s security posed by the loss of resilient, fuelsecure baseload generation.
As explained below, Applicants request that DOE determine that an emergency exists in
PJM within the meaning of FPA Section 202(c) with respect to a threat to energy security and
reliability, and thus direct the subject baseload nuclear and coal-fired generators to enter into
contracts and all necessary arrangements with PJM, on a plant-by-plant basis, to generate, deliver,
interchange, and transmit electric energy, capacity, and ancillary services to maintain fuel diversity
and grid dependability and resiliency within the PJM region.
A.

The Secretary’s Authority Under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act

Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act grants the Secretary the authority to determine
“that an emergency exists by reason of a sudden increase in the demand for electric energy, or a
shortage of electric energy or of facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy,” 89
and, once such a determination is made, “to require by order such temporary connections of
facilities and such generation, delivery, interchange, or transmission of electric energy as in [his]
judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest.” 90
The Secretary’s authority and discretion under Section 202(c) is quite broad and is not
limited to emergencies caused by war or limited in duration. Section 202(c) states that it may be
invoked during times of war or during emergencies, and empowers the Secretary “whenever [he]
determines that an emergency exists by reason of” certain specified market conditions “or other
causes” to order actions “as in [his] judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the public
interest.” 91
87

2017 PJM Report at 2.

88

Id. at 5.

89

16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1).

90

Id.

91

Id. The legislative history of Section 202(c) confirms this interpretation, explaining that in crisis conditions DOE
should be “ready to do all that can be done in order to prevent a break-down in electric supply.” S. Rep. No. 74621, at 49.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 16
DOE’s regulations define emergency broadly, stating that an emergency “can result from
a sudden increase in customer demand, an inability to obtain adequate amounts of the necessary
fuels to generate electricity, or a regulatory action which prohibits the use of certain electric power
supply facilities.” 92 In addition, the regulation also states that “[e]xtended periods of insufficient
power supply as a result of inadequate planning or the failure to construct necessary facilities can
result in an emergency . . . .” 93
The current situation in PJM constitutes such an emergency.
B.

An Emergency Exists Due to the Recent and Imminent Critical Reduction in
Nuclear and Coal-Fired Generation Capacity

The Nation’s bulk electric system is undergoing rapid change. As the DOE recently
recognized, the provision of electricity provides various benefits that are not recognized or
compensated by the markets created by these politically driven actions:
Society places value on attributes of electricity provision beyond
those compensated by the current design of the wholesale market.
•

Americans and their elected representatives value the various
benefits specific power plants offer, such as jobs, community
economic development, low emissions, local tax payments,
resilience, energy security, or the national security benefits
associated with a nuclear industrial base. Most of these benefits
are not recognized or compensated by wholesale electricity
markets. 94

Indeed, the DOE’s January 2017 Quadrennial Energy Review states that “[s]hort-run
markets may not provide adequate price signals to ensure long-term investments in appropriately
configured capacity” and “resource valuations tend not to incorporate superordinate network
and/or social values such as enhancing resilience into resource or wires into investment decision
making.” 95 IHS Energy has found that, as a result of this “missing money” problem, “the loss of

92

10 C.F.R. § 205.371.

93

Id.

94

Staff Report at 11.

95

U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, TRANSFORMING THE NATION’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM: THE SECOND INSTALLMENT OF THE
QUADRENNIAL
ENERGY
REVIEW
4-41
(January
6,
2017),
available
at
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review-Second%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 17
power supply diversity is accelerating because too many power plants are retiring before it is
economic to do so.” 96
This market failure is reaching a crisis point. Dr. David Hunger, a former FERC Staff
member and Vice President within the Energy Practice of Charles River Associates, found that
“there were more [generator] retirements in the seven-year period from 2010 to 2016 (457 units)
than in the 20-year period from 1990 to 2009 (358 units). Likewise, the quantity of nuclear and
coal-fired generation capacity retired in 2010-2016 (68,540 MW nameplate) was more than double
that in the prior 20 years, 1990-2009 (26,721 MW nameplate).” 97 As the DOE concluded,
“[g]enerator profitability could become a public policy concern if so much generation is financially
challenged that the reliability or resilience of the [bulk power system] become threatened.” 98 The
rash of nuclear and coal-fired generator closings and other recent events in PJM are evidence that
it already is a public policy concern. But these are not the only warning signs.
January 2014 Polar Vortex in PJM: A severe cold snap spiked customer demand, dropping
system reserves in PJM to just 500 MW (on a demand of over 140,000 MW). 99 PJM calculated
that 9,300 MW of generation was unavailable during this event due to interruptions in the natural
gas supply to generators. 100 While this loss of generating capacity could have been catastrophic,
multiple coal-fired generating units slated for retirement were dispatched to meet electric
demand 101 and nuclear generators also “performed extremely well.” 102 “Sixty-five million people
within the PJM footprint could have been affected if these traditional baseload units were not
available.” 103
Extreme Cold in December 2017 and January 2018: From December 27, 2017, to January
8, 2018, the eastern U.S. saw extremely cold temperatures and spiking electric demand, which
again illustrate how such weather impacts natural gas supply to electric generating units. Nuclear
96

IHS ENERGY, THE VALUE OF US POWER SUPPLY DIVERSITY 7 (July 2014), available at
https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/Backgrounders/Reports-Studies/IHS-Fuel-Diversity-Study18-July-2014.pdf?ext=.pdf.

97

FirstEnergy Comments, Ex. 4 (“Hunger Aff.”) at 22, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, FERC Docket No. RM18-1000 (Oct. 23, 2017).

98

Staff Report at 118. NERC has also classified the changing resource mix as a “high risk” issue for the electric
grid. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., STATE OF RELIABILITY 2017 7 (June 2017), available at
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/PA/Performance%20Analysis%20DL/SOR_2017_MASTER_20170613.pdf.

99

PJM INTERCONNECTION, ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL EVENTS AND MKT. IMPACTS DURING THE JAN. 2014 COLD
WEATHER EVENTS 4 (May 8, 2014), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/weatherrelated/20140509-analysis-of-operational-events-and-market-impacts-during-the-jan-2014-cold-weatherevents.ashx.

100

Id. at 26.

101

Secretary NOPR Letter at 3.

102

Staff Report at 95.

103

Secretary NOPR Letter at 3.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 18
and coal-fired plants out-performed natural gas plants during this period by a significant margin. 104
For example, on the morning of Friday, January 5, 2018, nuclear and coal-fired generators were
running at 135% and 111% of their committed capacity in PJM’s 2017-2018 capacity auction,
whereas natural gas plants were running at merely 45% of their committed capacity. 105 In fact,
while over 64,000 MW of gas-fired generation cleared in the 2017-2018 capacity auction, only
approximately 29,000 MW were running that morning. 106 As the recent NETL Report on the cold
weather event concluded, demand in PJM “could not have been met without coal.” 107 These facts
are quite telling, as much of this difference can be attributed to natural gas price spikes and supply
interruptions. 108 While the PJM grid has not experienced load-shedding, thanks to lower electric
demand over the holiday season and the performance of nuclear and coal-fired generators, this
may not be the case during future extreme weather events if the trend of nuclear and coal-fired
plant closures continues. 109

104

See PJM COLD SNAP PERFORMANCE 2018 at 13 & fig.10 (showing that nuclear and coal-fired generation
combined constituted 63% of the online fuel mix during the 2018 cold snap, while natural gas-fired generation
constituted 22%).

105

See Data Miner 2, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/etools/data-miner-2.aspx (when filtered to
Generation by Fuel Type for 8 a.m. on January 5, 2018, showing nuclear and coal-fired output of 35,543 MW
and 50,254.8 MW, respectively); Commitments by Fuel Type & Delivery Year 2007/08 - 2019/20, PJM,
http://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/rpm-commitment-by-fuel-type-bydy.ashx?la=en (last visited Mar. 22, 2018) (showing cleared UCAP for 2017-2018 planning year of 26,401 MW
for nuclear generation and 45,354 MW for coal-fired generation).

106

See Data Miner 2, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/etools/data-miner-2.aspx, (when filtered to
Generation by Fuel Type for 8 a.m. on January 5, 2018, showing gas output of 28,624.3 MW); Commitments by
Fuel Type & Delivery Year 2007/08 - 2019/20, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/-/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpmauction-info/rpm-commitment-by-fuel-type-by-dy.ashx?la=en (last visited Mar. 22, 2018) (showing cleared
UCAP for 2017-2018 planning year of 64,089 MW for gas-fired generation); see also PJM COLD SNAP
PERFORMANCE 2018 at fig.11.

107

NETL Report at 17.

108

Operational flow orders (restrictions/limitations placed on gas consumption by pipeline operators) have been in
place on numerous natural gas pipelines throughout PJM since late December 2017, including Transco, Texas
Eastern,
Dominion,
and
Columbia.
See
Transco
Pipeline,
Critical
Notices,
http://www.1line.williams.com/Transco/index.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2018); Texas Eastern, Critical Notices,
https://infopost.spectraenergy.com/infopost/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018); Dominion, Critical Notices,
http://dekaflow.dominionenergy.com/jsp/info_post.jsp?&company=dti (last visited Mar. 22, 2018); Columbia
Gas Transmission, Critical Notices, http://www.columbiapipeinfo.com/cpginfopost/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
See also NETL Report at 14 (“[N]atural gas in PJM spiked from a normal level near $3/MMBtu to $96/MMBtu
at the Texas Eastern M3 interface, in Southeastern PA, at the [bomb cyclone] peak on January 5.”).

109

NETL Report at 18 (“To maintain the resilience seen in this event, any retiring units that were dispatched during
the event would have to be replaced with other resilient generation sources and their associated infrastructure (e.g.
pipelines, transmission). Due to the timeframe required for permitting, development, and construction, these
projects must be well underway prior to potential unit retirements to ensure their availability.”).

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 19
June 2017 Yorktown Un-Retirement: The Department of Energy issued a Section 202(c)
order to force Dominion Energy to keep its Yorktown coal-fired units in PJM online to address
future reliability needs. 110
System Design Changes: The bulk power system is undergoing a rapid transformation and
the impacts of this change are not being fully studied or understood. The system is moving from
one that was driven by sound engineering practices and multiple redundancies to a system using
an economic model with no consideration for system needs. The North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) has noted that the “changing resource mix is altering the
operating characteristics of the bulk power system.” 111 NERC warned that these changes must be
“properly managed in order to assure continued reliability and ensure resiliency.” 112
Pipeline Vulnerabilities: A report published by Quanta Technology noted high levels of
vulnerability in PJM from a shortfall of pipeline capacity supplying the Atlantic coast, a shortfall
of pipeline capacity to access storage and production, disruptions in supply or storage during
winter peak season, and a lack of firm gas supply contracts. 113
Future Price Volatility: A recent report by IHS Energy states that the current diversified
portfolio of the U.S. power supply lowers the cost of generating electricity by more than $93 billion
per year compared to a less diverse case with no meaningful contributions from nuclear and coalfired generation. 114 As such key baseload plants continue to retire, price volatility is expected to
rise as the system becomes more reliant on a single fuel source. 115 Dr. Hunger similarly concluded
that, “[w]hen resources retire, [market] prices can fluctuate in an unpredictable manner.” 116
Baseload Plant Closures: In the past four years, over 11,000 MW of coal-fired generation
has closed in PJM, the equivalent of a dozen large power plants. 117 Many of these plants were
110

Order No. 202-17-2 (Dep’t of Energy June 16, 2017), reh’g dismissed sub nom. Order No. 202-17-5 (Sep. 15,
2017). See also Order No. 202-17-4 (Dep’t of Energy Sep. 14, 2017) (renewing initial order), reh’g dismissed
sub nom. Order No. 202-18-1 (Nov. 6, 2017); Order No. 202-18-2 (Dep’t of Energy Dec. 13, 2017) (further
renewing order).

111

Letter from Gerry Cauley, President and CEO, NERC, to Rick Perry, U.S. Sec’y of Energy, Attachment
(“Synopsis of NERC Reliability Assessments”) at 1 (May 9, 2017) , available at
https://www.nerc.com/news/Headlines%20DL/DOE%20Grid%20Study%20Comments %2012OCT17.pdf.

112

Id.

113

HENRY CHAO, COMMENTS OF QUANTA TECHNOLOGY ON PJM’S EVOLVING RESOURCE MIX AND SYSTEM
RELIABILITY
11
(May
17,
2017),
available
at
http://quantatechnology.com/sites/default/files/QuantaTechnology_Comments_on_PJM %20Whitepaper.pdf.

114

IHS ENERGY, THE VALUE OF US POWER SUPPLY DIVERSITY at 5.

115

See id. at 9-10.

116

Hunger Aff. at 33.

117

2017 PJM Report at 544 tbl.12-5 (listing coal unit retirements of 2,239 MW, 7,064.8 MW, 243 MW, and 2,038
MW in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively).

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 20
operating during the 2014 Polar Vortex and are no longer available to run in the event of system
stress.
Problems Associated with Location of Replacement Resources: Generation resources used
to replace retiring plants are frequently located far away from the location of the retiring
generation, which poses multiple problems. First, as Dr. Hunger states, this “may cause temporary
or persistent congestion, increasing uncertainty related to locational pricing, a primary signal
against which generation investment or retirement decisions need to be made.” 118 Second,
significant new transmission infrastructure may need to be constructed. For example,
approximately $1 billion of new transmission infrastructure was needed to maintain reliability after
closure of certain generating units in northern Ohio in 2014 and 2015. 119
Additional Plant Closures: Numerous baseload plants in PJM have announced that they
are financially challenged and are closing or contemplating closure. If action is not taken,
thousands of additional megawatts of reliable baseload power will retire in the next several years,
leaving PJM without fuel-secure baseload resources. 120
•

It is a matter of public record that FirstEnergy Solutions, which through Applicants
indirectly owns 12,300 MW of generation, likely will file for bankruptcy by the end of
March 2018. 121 Multiple plants are at risk for permanent closure as a result of this
expected action.
•

FirstEnergy Solutions submitted notices to PJM on March 28, 2018, that it
would deactivate its three nuclear plants, Davis-Besse (908 MW), Perry
(1,268 MW), and Beaver Valley (1,872 MW), by 2021.

118

Hunger Aff. at 33.

119

Direct Testimony of Gavin Cunningham at 3, Application of Ohio Edison et al., Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio No.
14-1297-EL-SSO (Aug. 4, 2014).

120

In addition to the closures listed, Dominion submitted deactivation requests in January 2018 for four coal-fired
units with capacity totaling approximately 400 MW. PJM FUTURE DEACTIVATIONS (Dec. 29, 2017),
http://www.pjm.com/-/media/planning/gen-retire/pending-deactivation-requests.ashx?la=en (“PJM FUTURE
DEACTIVATIONS”). These units were placed in “cold reserve”—meaning they could be restarted if necessary—
based on a number of factors including the cost of solar and wind generation and the abundance of natural gas.
Sarah Rankin, Dominion to Eliminate Nearly 400 Positions After Review of Power Generation Group, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 17, 2018), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/dominion-to-eliminate-nearlypositions-after-review-of-power-generation/article_60633a02-01d5-50a8-bcfc-f2ccf04b8fb5.html.

121

Gavin Bade, FirstEnergy CEO Says Generation Subsidiary Headed for Bankruptcy Protection, UTILITY DIVE
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/firstenergy-ceo-says-generation-subsidiary-headed-forbankruptcy-protection/517743/; Jeffrey Ryser, FirstEnergy continues Push Away from Competitive Generation
Subsidiary, PLATTS MEGAWATT DAILY (Feb. 22, 2018).

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 21
•

FirstEnergy Corp. announced that Units 5–7 at the W.H. Sammis coal-fired
plant (1,490 MW) are in danger of being closed. The company previously
announced that Units 1–4 (720 MW) will close by May 2020. 122

•

FirstEnergy Corp. has announced that the 2,510 MW Bruce Mansfield coalfired plant is at risk of closure due to the exposure to changing market
conditions. 123

•

Allegheny Energy Supply Company, LLC, a FirstEnergy Corp. subsidiary, recently
submitted a deactivation notice for Pleasants Power Station, a 1,300 MW coal-fired
plant in West Virginia. 124

•

Dayton Power & Light has announced the closure by June 2018 of the J.M. Stuart coalfired plant (2,318 MW) and the Killen Station Unit 2 coal-fired plant (600 MW), citing
market conditions making the plants not economically viable. 125 Stuart Unit 1 was
closed even earlier, on September 30, 2017. 126

•

Owners of the 1,884 MW Homer City coal-fired power plant attempted to sell the plant
in 2016, but were unable to find a buyer; Standard & Poor’s analysts cite lower power
prices and increasing expenses as driving forces behind the facility’s ills. 127

•

Westmoreland Partners recently announced the sale or closure of the 209 MW Roanoke
Valley coal-fired power plant. 128 As anticipated, on March 1, 2017, these units
retired. 129

122

FirstEnergy to Deactivate Units at Two Ohio Power Plants, FIRSTENERGY (July 22, 2016),
https://www.firstenergycorp.com/content/fecorp/newsroom/news_articles/firstenergy-to-deactivate-units-attwo-ohio-power-plants-.html; PJM FUTURE DEACTIVATIONS.

123

Tom Henry, FirstEnergy Exec Calls for ‘Urgent’ Aid, TOLEDO BLADE (Mar.
http://www.toledoblade.com/Energy/2017/03/25/FirstEnergy-exec-calls-for-urgent-aid.html.

124

Id. In addition, during the first quarter of 2018, FirstEnergy Corp. took a $120 million pre-tax impairment charge
on the value of the Pleasants Power Station. FirstEnergy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 4 (Feb. 20, 2018).

125

See Wendy Mitchell, DP&L Determined to Close J.M. Stuart and Killen Power Plants, THE LEDGER INDEP. (Mar.
20,
2017),
http://www.maysville-online.com/news/local/dp-l-determined-to-close-j-m-stuart-andkillen/article_99f244ef-b832-5477-aa8b-831b8fe796be.html; PJM, FUTURE DEACTIVATIONS.

126

PJM Generator Deactivations, PJM (Dec. 18, 2017), http://www.pjm.com/-/media/planning/genretire/generator-deactivations.ashx?la=en (“PJM DEACTIVATIONS”).

127

Anya Litvak, Homer City Gets Bids But No Deals, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 14, 2016),
http://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/companies/2016/09/14/Homer-City-gets-some-bids-but-nodeals/stories/201609110096.

128

John Dixon, Weldon Power Plant Closing, THE DAILY HERALD (Roanoke) (Mar. 10, 2017),
http://www.rrdailyherald.com/news/local/weldon-power-plant-closing/article_6a9f1208-0511-11e7-a204b762cd148f4a.html.

129

PJM DEACTIVATIONS.

25,

2017),

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 22
•

Exelon has announced that it will close the Oyster Creek nuclear plant (608 MW) in
October 2018—a decade before the end of its operating license—citing negative
economic factors. 130

•

Exelon has announced the premature closure of the 837 MW Three Mile Island nuclear
power plant in September 2019, citing deteriorating economic value. 131

C.

The Emergency in Nuclear and Coal-Fired Generation Threatens Generation
Diversity, Resiliency, Dependability, and Electric Security in PJM

A recent PJM report noted that the system was able to maintain operational reliability with
a system comprised of 86 percent natural gas-fired generation, however the report did not fully
capture risks associated with gas deliverability. 132 PJM itself admits to this issue, stating, “We
found that the risk to the system wasn’t that resources couldn’t necessarily provide reliability
attributes but that the potential concentration of a single fuel source or low-probability, highimpact events could cause significant impacts to the system.” 133
Without baseload nuclear and coal-fired generation, the United States is taking the most
sophisticated and redundant bulk electric system in the world and putting it on top of an
unsophisticated bulk gas system that lacks the same level of redundancy, creating additional
security risks. An electric system that is not resilient to high-impact events is not a reliable system,
and is one that threatens the national security of the United States. In short, the continued
retirement of nuclear and coal-fired generating facilities in PJM has resulted in an emergency
situation that has placed the continuing security of PJM at risk. As you noted in your September
28, 2017 letter to FERC, “the resiliency of the electric grid is threatened by the premature
retirement of these fuel-secure traditional baseload resources.” 134
130

See Press Release, Exelon, Exelon to Retire Oyster Creek Generating Station in 2019 (Dec. 8, 2010),
http://www.exeloncorp.com/newsroom/Pages/pr_20101208_Nuclear_OysterCreekRetirement.aspx;
Robert
Walton, Exelon to Close Oyster Creek Nuke in October, a Year Early, UTILITY DIVE (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/exelon-to-close-oyster-creek-nuke-in-october-a-year-early/516236/; PJM
FUTURE DEACTIVATIONS.

131

See Press Release, Exelon, Exelon to Retire Three Mile Island Generating Station in 2019 (May 30, 2017),
http://www.exeloncorp.com/newsroom/exelon-to-retire-three-mile-island-generating-station-in-2019; PJM
FUTURE DEACTIVATIONS.

132

PJM INTERCONNECTION, PJM’S EVOLVING RESOURCE MIX AND SYSTEM RELIABILITY 5 (Mar. 30, 2017)
(“[A]dditional risks, such as gas deliverability during polar vortex-type conditions and uncertainties associated
with
economics
and
public
policy,
were
not
fully
captured
in
this
analysis.”),
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170330-pjms-evolving-resource-mixand-system-reliability.ashx.

133

Press Release, PJM, PJM Study: System Reliable Even with Much More Gas, Renewables; Resilience Key to
Operational Reliability (Mar. 30, 2017) (emphasis added) (quoting Michael Bryson, PJM Vice President of
Operations), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/about-pjm/newsroom/2017-releases/20170330-pjms-evolvingresource-mix-and-system-reliability.ashx.

134

Secretary NOPR Letter at 1.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 23
PJM itself has recognized the need for resiliency, finding that, “[i]n addition to delivering
energy services reliably during strained system conditions, to which probabilities can be attached
(e.g., plant outages, weather variability), a resilient energy system also must be resistant to larger
scale shocks to which it is difficult to attach probabilities . . . .” 135 PJM recently concluded that
“reliability attributes supplied through generation and other resources . . . support reliability” and
“the maintenance or assurance of these attributes into the future are important to resilience
mitigation.” 136 Fuel diversity and security are key components of a resilient grid. PJM
acknowledged the connection between diversity and resiliency when it committed to “analyz[ing]
future trends in resource mix and their impacts on both reliability and resilience.” 137 As PJM’s
market monitor stated, “[s]ignificant reliance on specific fuels, including nuclear, coal and gas
means that markets are at risk from a significant disruption in any one fuel.” 138
NERC goes further, recognizing not only the importance of fuel diversity in maintaining a
resilient energy system, 139 but also the critical contributions of nuclear and coal-fired resources to
mitigating risks to the electric grid. 140 Overreliance on natural gas, by contrast, increases risk to
the electric grid because, as NERC states, “within a relatively short time, a major failure” in the
natural gas transmission system “could result in a loss of electric generating capacity that could
exceed the electric reserves available to compensate for these losses.” 141 As explained by Dr.
Henry Chao, Executive Advisor and Vice President at Quanta Technology and former Vice
President at New York Independent System Operator (“NYISO”): “Abundant supplies of natural
gas provide many advantages to electric consumers, but . . . natural gas delivery systems lack the
reliability and redundancy of the bulk electric system. Specifically, there are no systematic
reliability criteria for natural gas delivery system planning and operations; whereas the electric
power industry has mandatory reliability standards that are developed and enforced by NERC.”142
135

PJM INTERCONNECTION, PJM’S EVOLVING RESOURCE MIX AND SYSTEM RELIABILITY 33 (Mar. 30, 2017).

136

PJM Comments at 46.

137

Id.

138

2017 PJM Report at 5.

139

N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., SYNOPSIS OF NERC RELIABILITY ASSESSMENTS: THE CHANGING RES. MIX
AND THE IMPACTS OF CONVENTIONAL GENERATION RETIREMENTS 4 (May 9, 2017) (“Fuel diversity provides a
fundamental benefit of increased resilience. . . . Areas with limited fuel and/or limited resource diversity may be
challenged and should increase their attention to resiliency planning . . . .”).

140

Id. (“Coal and nuclear resources, by design, are designed for low cost O&M and continuous operation. However,
it is not the economics nor the fuel type that make these resources attractive from a reliability perspective. Rather,
these conventional steam-driven generation resources have low forced and maintenance outage hours traditionally
and have low exposure to fuel supply chain issues.”); id. at 2 (“Coal-fired and nuclear generation have the added
benefits of high availability rates, low forced outages, and secured on-site fuel. Many months of on-site fuel
allow these units to operate in a manner independent of supply chain disruptions.”).

141

N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2013 SPECIAL RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT: ACCOMMODATING AN INCREASED
DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL GAS FOR ELECTRIC POWER; PHASE II: A VULNERABILITY AND SCENARIO
ASSESSMENT FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN BULK POWER SYSTEM 3-4 (MAY 2013).

142

FirstEnergy Comments, Ex. 6 (“Chao Aff.”) at 11, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, FERC Docket No. RM18-1-000
(Oct. 23, 2017).

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 24
Unless immediate action is taken, the continued retirement of nuclear and coal-fired
generating units—by breeding greater dependence on generation fueled by natural gas, which is
subject to supply disruptions, constrained pipeline capacity, a general inability to store fuel onsite, and competing demand from consumer heating in winter months—will increasingly result in
significant, negative outcomes for the approximately 65 million people living and working within
the PJM footprint. These harmful consequences include increased electric price volatility,
lessened grid resilience and dependability, uncertain electric security in the future, decreased
economic stability, and severe job losses—especially in the coal sector—as both power plants and
fuel suppliers declare bankruptcy and cease operations. Combined, these conditions are potentially
disastrous for the electric grid and the economy. PJM itself recently found that as the “resource
mix moves in the direction of less coal and nuclear generation, generator reliability attributes of
frequency response, reactive capability and fuel assurance decrease. . . .” 143
This is not idle speculation. As illustrated over the period of extreme cold in the eastern
U.S. from December 27, 2017, through January 8, 2018, PJM was able to maintain reliability on
its system in large part due to the strong performance from nuclear and coal-fired generators—
performance that well exceeded those plants’ commitments in PJM’s capacity auction. In contrast,
natural gas-fired plants were operating well below expected levels. Without these fuel-secure
baseload generating resources, many of which are facing imminent retirement, the outcome may
have been much different. And with temperatures well below freezing throughout virtually all of
PJM during this time, a different outcome could have been catastrophic to public health and safety.
The challenges are not limited to just PJM, but are rampant in competitive electric markets
throughout the Nation. While traditional vertically integrated utilities continue to provide safe,
reliable, and affordable electric generation service every day, areas with RTO markets face
problems resulting from the failure to recognize the importance of fuel security and fuel diversity.
These incidents provide insight into vulnerabilities potentially facing PJM:
February 26, 2008 Wind Decrease in ERCOT: An unexpected drop in wind generation
coupled with a demand increase from cold weather caused ERCOT to have to cut service to large
industrial customers. 144 ERCOT had 10 minutes to curtail nearly three percent of the system load
to avoid blackouts. 145

143

PJM INTERCONNECTION, PJM’S EVOLVING RES. MIX AND SYSTEM RELIABILITY 5 (Mar. 30, 2017).

144

Eileen O’Grady, Loss of Wind Causes Texas Power Grid Emergency, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2008),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-utilities-ercot-wind-idUSN2749522920080228?feedType=RSS&feedName=
domesticNews&rpc=22&sp=true; E. ELA & B. KIRBY, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ERCOT EVENT ON
FEBRUARY 26, 2008: LESSONS LEARNED (July 2008), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/43373.pdf.

145

See Eileen O’Grady, Loss of Wind Causes Texas Power Grid Emergency, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2008),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-utilities-ercot-wind-idUSN2749522920080228?feedType=RSS&feedName=
domesticNews&rpc=22&sp=true.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 25
February 2011 Cold Weather in ERCOT: Rolling blackouts affected 3.2 million customers
and, had ERCOT not shed load, a widespread, uncontrolled blackout would have occurred. 146
New England ISO Winter Reliability Program: Since 2014, the New England Independent
System Operator Inc. (“ISO New England”) has had to establish winter reliability programs in an
attempt to ensure continued operation of natural gas-fired generators during periods of cold
weather. 147 Pipeline capacity issues, first identified in 2004, remain issues today and have yet to
be solved by the competitive marketplace. 148 As ISO New England recently noted, “[i]n New
England, the most significant resilience challenge is fuel security—or the assurance that power
plants will have or be able to obtain the fuel they need to run, particularly in winter—especially
against the backdrop of coal, oil, and nuclear unit retirements, constrained fuel infrastructure, and
the difficulty in permitting and operating dual-fuel generating capability.” 149 ISO New England
thus concluded that “while New England is meeting its resource adequacy requirements for
capacity—which are based on expected summer peak demands—with the market mechanisms that
are in place today, from an energy availability standpoint, the shift from generators with on-site
fuel to generators relying on ‘just-in-time’ fuel delivery is challenging the system’s adequacy and,
therefore, its resilience, particularly during winter peak demands.” 150 Indeed, in nearly all of the
fuel mix scenarios studied by ISO New England, there would be “[e]nergy shortfalls due to
inadequate fuel . . . requiring frequent use of emergency actions to keep power flowing and protect
the grid.” 151 These emergency actions could include rolling blackouts. 152
2016-2017 Aliso Canyon in CAISO: A leak at the Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility
was discovered in October 2015, causing the facility to close to subsequent injections until July
2017. 153 Although Aliso Canyon continues to operate, the California Public Utilities Commission

146

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N & N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., REPORT ON OUTAGES AND
CURTAILMENTS DURING THE SOUTHWEST COLD WEATHER EVENT OF FEBRUARY 1-5, 2011 1 (2011).

147

Press Release, ISO New England, Winter 2015/2016: Sufficient Power Supplies Expected to Be Available (Dec.
1,
2015),
available
at
https://www.iso-ne.com/staticassets/documents/2015/12/20151201_winter_outlook_release_final.pdf.

148

Peter Brandien, Vice President, Operations, ISO New England, Panel Discussion Remarks at 1, Winter 20162017 Operations and Market Performance in Regional Transmission Orgs. and Indep. Sys. Ops., FERC Docket
No. AD16-24-000 (Oct. 20, 2016).

149

ISO New England, Response of ISO New England at 1, Grid Resilience in Regional Transmission Organizations
and Independent System Operators, FERC Docket No. AD18-7-000 (Mar. 9, 2018).

150

Id. at 8.

151

Id., Attachment A at 4-5.

152

Id. In contrast to PJM, which is looking to FERC for guidance and direction, ISO New England is taking initiative
and studying fuel security issues. Id. at 26.

153

Rob Nikolewski, Utility Resumes Injections at Aliso Canyon, Site of Massive Gas Leak, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIBUNE (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/sd-fi-aliso-reinjections-20170801story.html.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 26
has opened a proceeding “to determine the feasibility of minimizing or eliminating the use of [the
facility]” 154 and legislation was introduced to shut down the facility. 155
May 3, 2017 CAISO Emergency: Normal system operations quickly turned into an
emergency when energy imports failed to materialize. 156 The impacts were heightened as the daily
rapid decline of solar power occurred as evening approached. 157 The California Independent
System Operator Inc. (“CAISO”) had minutes to deploy emergency reserves and quickly went
from normal system operations to a Stage 1 Emergency. 158
Natural Gas Plant Bankruptcies: In 2016, two large natural gas-fired plants in California,
totaling 1,778 MW, declared bankruptcy because they could not make sufficient revenues in the
CAISO wholesale markets. 159 In 2017, Panda Temple Power’s 758 MW natural gas plant in Texas
filed for bankruptcy. 160 GenOn Energy, with over 9,000 MW of gas-fired generation, filed for
bankruptcy in 2017 as well, 161 and recently announced the retirement of three gas-fired power
plants located in Southern California due to “economic reasons.” 162
D.

Emergency Action by the Secretary Is Required

Although FERC complied with the directive of the Secretary pursuant to Section 403 of
the DOE Organization Act in issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking addressing these issues, 163
it has failed to undertake any action that will stem the tide of plant closures and thus prevent the
impending crisis. You yourself said that “it is [FERC’s] immediate responsibility to take action
154

CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, Aliso Canyon Well
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/AlisoOII/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).

155

Chris Megerian, Proposal Would Close Aliso Canyon—But Not for A Decade, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-aliso-canyon-leak-1505427333htmlstory.html.

156

Jason Fordney, California Grid Emergency Comes Days After Reliability Warning, RTO INSIDER (May 8, 2017).

157

Id.

158

Id.

159

Herman K. Trabish, As Gas Plants Struggle, California Seeks New Flexible Capacity Strategies, UTILITY DIVE
(June 27, 2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/as-gas-plants-struggle-california-seeks-new-flexible-capacitystrategies/445760/.

160

Id.; Cody Weems, Panda Temple I Plant Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, TEMPLE DAILY TELEGRAM (May 11,
2017), http://www.tdtnews.com/news/article_efa76536-36a3-11e7-8b73-034537689093.html.

161

Herman K. Trabish, As Gas Plants Struggle, California Seeks New Flexible Capacity Strategies, UTILITY DIVE
(June 27, 2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/as-gas-plants-struggle-california-seeks-new-flexible-capacitystrategies/445760/; see also Andrew Scurria & Patrick Fitzgerald, GenOn Energy Files for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Protection, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/genon-energy-files-forchapter-11-bankruptcy-protection-1497445051.

162

Samantha Masunaga, NRG Subsidiary to Close Three Power Plants in Southern California, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9,
2018), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-nrg-plants-20180309-story.html.

163

Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940 (Oct. 10, 2017).

Failure

Order

Instituting

Investigation,

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 27
to ensure that generation resources with on-site fuel supplies and the ability to provide essential
energy and ancillary reliability services including voltage support, frequency services, operating
reserves, and reactive power are fully valued. . . .” 164 But FERC failed to do so and there is no
indication that meaningful and substantive action by FERC will come in time to stem the tide of
plant closures.
The DOE correctly recognized that the “recent Polar Vortex, as well as the devastation
from Superstorm Sandy and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, reinforces the urgency that
[FERC] must act now.” 165 Further, as you observed, “over the past several years, [FERC] has
developed an extensive record on price formation [issues] in [FERC] approved ISOs and
RTOs.” 166 And, as you recently noted, “[t]he voluminous comments filed in the [FERC NOPR]
proceeding provide substantial evidence of, and otherwise confirm, the threat to the nation’s
electricity grid and the urgent need for [FERC] action to reform market rules to preserve fuelsecure generation resources.” 167 Despite the urgency and its extensive record, FERC has failed to
take the action necessary to address the emergency in PJM.
As you correctly noted, “it is especially urgent to prevent premature retirements of the
resources that have these critical [fuel-secure] attributes.” 168 As a result of FERC’s and the RTOs’
failure to address this crisis, swift and decisive action is needed now to address this imminent loss
of nuclear and coal-fired baseload generation and the threat to the electric grid that this loss poses.
The Secretary needs to immediately issue an emergency order, pursuant to his authority under
section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c), to ensure that baseload nuclear and
coal-fired generators in PJM do not retire prematurely and are fully compensated for the benefits
and services that they provide, as more fully described in Section II.B above. The order should
find that an emergency exists because of the recent and imminent critical reduction in nuclear and
coal-fired generation capacity, which threatens generation diversity, resiliency, dependability, and
electric security in PJM. As this winter’s events revealed, without the availability of these critical,
fuel-secure plants during extreme weather events (which can happen at any time during the year—
not just in the winter), the PJM grid will likely experience reliability issues.
E.

Information Required by Section 205.373

Applicants provide below the information called for by Section 205.373 of DOE’s
regulations. 169 To be clear, Applicants’ request in this application applies to all eligible plants in
164

Secretary Extension Letter at 1.

165

Dep’t of Energy, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to FERC at 11 (Sept. 28, 2017).

166

Secretary NOPR Letter at 6.

167

Secretary Extension Letter at 1.

168

Secretary NOPR Letter at 1.

169

10 C.F.R. § 205.373. Certain elements of Section 205.373 address the circumstances of an applicant facing a
shortage of real power and the prospect of firm customer curtailment, but do not address the emergency
circumstances described herein, which involve a threat to the system more broadly. Applicants have indicated
where these requirements are not applicable to the circumstances at hand.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 28
PJM, not just those that they themselves own and operate. However, at this time Applicants only
possess the required information for their own plants. To address this fact, Applicants request that
the Secretary require PJM to obtain such information immediately from all eligible generators and
begin negotiating agreements for the continued operation and appropriate compensation of such
units.
a) Legal name of applicants. The applicants are FirstEnergy Generation, LLC,
FirstEnergy Nuclear Generation, LLC, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company,
and FirstEnergy Generation Mansfield Unit 1 Corp. This application refers to these
entities, collectively, as “Applicants.”
b) Person to whom correspondence should be addressed. Correspondence with
respect to this application should be directed to the following persons:
William S. Scherman
Partner
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: (202) 887-3510
Fax: (202) 530-9557
wscherman@gibsondunn.com

Rick C. Giannantonio
General Counsel
FirstEnergy Solutions Corp.
76 South Main Street
Akron, OH 44308
Tel: (330) 384-5893
Fax: (330) 384-3875
giannanr@firstenergycorp.com

c) Political subdivisions in which applicants operate and conduct business.
Applicants own and operate certain nuclear and coal-fired generation assets, and
provide energy-related products and services to retail and wholesale customers, in
the states of Ohio and Pennsylvania.
d) Baseline data.
1) Daily peak load and energy requirements for each of the past 30 days, and
projections for each day of the Emergency Period. These requirements are
not applicable to Applicants’ request, which contemplates relief on a broad
scale. Nonetheless, Applicants provide as Attachment B a chart showing
the monthly output of nuclear and coal-fired generation in PJM for the
period 2012 through 2017.
2) All capacity and energy receipts or deliveries to other electric utilities for
each of the past 30 days. Applicants respectfully submit that such
information is not applicable to the present application.
3) The status of all interruptible customers for each of the past 30 days, and
anticipated status during the Emergency Period. Applicants respectfully
submit that such information is not applicable to the present application.
Applicants are requesting emergency relief to avoid the interruption of
power supply to the 65 million customers in the PJM footprint.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 29
4) All scheduled capacity and energy receipts or deliveries to other electric
utilities during the Emergency Period. Applicants respectfully submit that
such information is not applicable to the present application.
e) A description of the emergency situation, any contingency plan, and the current
level of implementation. The emergency situation faced by PJM and consumers of
electric energy within its footprint is described above in Section I and Section II.B.
Applicants do not have any contingency plan to provide power to the PJM market
and its 65 million customers absent an order of the Secretary in accordance with
the emergency relief requested herein. As explained above, nuclear and coal-fired
generating units in PJM are closing at an alarming rate, with efforts to “save”
generation for energy security having failed. Implementation prior to the Secretary
granting emergency relief is unworkable.
f) A showing that adequate electric service to firm customers cannot be maintained
without additional power transfers. As explained above, the recent and imminent
shut-down of nuclear and coal-fired generating units in PJM puts at risk the ability
to provide firm, reliable electric service within the PJM footprint without
emergency action to maintain the operation of these generating facilities.
g) A description of any conservation or load reduction actions that have been
implemented. PJM has implemented limited demand response efforts in recent
years, 170 but these efforts, and future similar ones, cannot come close to replacing
the nuclear and coal-fired generation at risk of loss.
h) A description of efforts made to obtain additional power through voluntary means
and the results of such efforts. Applicants respectfully submit that such information
is not applicable to the present application because it is the responsibility of PJM,
not Applicants, to balance load and resources within the PJM footprint. PJM’s
efforts to obtain additional power through voluntary means has been limited to
market redesign efforts, such as Capacity Performance, which have failed to add
sufficient fuel-secure generating capacity to the PJM market. Additionally, PJM is
“fuel neutral” and has undertaken no effort to maintain nuclear and coal-fired
generation, which provides fuel diversity and helps ensure sufficiency of supply
during times of spiking demand such as that experienced this past winter.
i) A listing of proposed sources and any amounts of power necessary from each
source to alleviate the emergency and a listing of any other “entities” that may be
directly affected by the requested order. See Attachment A for listing of nuclear
and coal-fired generation facilities in PJM. Applicants submit that firm power
supply agreements between PJM and the owners of each nuclear and coal-fired
generating facility in PJM satisfying the criteria set forth in Section II.F are
necessary to alleviate the emergency. Such generating facilities provide significant
170

See PJM Markets FAQ, PJM, https://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/buying-and-selling-energy/markets-faqs.aspx
(last visited Mar. 22, 2018).

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 30
benefits to energy markets and the public at large, including fuel security and
diversity, but receive no reliable cost support and, instead, must rely on PJM’s
power markets which fail to compensate these generators for the full value of the
benefits that they provide. 171
j) Specific proposals to compensate the supplying “entities” for the emergency
services requested and to compensate any transmitting “entities” for services
necessary to deliver such power. Applicants propose that, as long as an emergency
continues to exist, subject generators and PJM shall operate pursuant to contracts
developed and agreed upon by the parties themselves. As explained below, in the
event that PJM and the generators are unable to agree to the contractual terms
within fifteen (15) days of the issuance of the order, then Applicants request that
the Secretary step in and determine the just and reasonable compensation and
conditions.
k) A showing that, to the best of the applicant’s knowledge, the requested relief will
not unreasonably impair the reliability of any “entity” directly affected by the
requested order to render adequate service to its customers. The relief requested by
Applicants is to secure the reliability of every entity and customer located within
PJM’s boundaries; no entities are expected to be reasonably or unreasonably
impaired by the requested relief. Indeed, the requested relief is designed to enhance
the ability of the subject generators and PJM to serve customers.
l) Description of the facilities to be used to transfer the requested emergency service
to the applicant’s system. In order to retain the electric generation necessary to
prevent and alleviate the emergency, the Secretary’s order pursuant to Section
202(c) should apply to nuclear and coal-fired generators located within the PJM
footprint that have a supply of fuel on-site sufficient to allow twenty-five (25) days
of operation at full output, that are substantially compliant with all applicable
federal, state, and local environmental laws and regulations, and that do not recover
any of their capital or operating costs through rates regulated by a duly authorized
state regulatory authority, municipal government, or energy cooperative. Such
generating facilities provide significant benefits to energy markets and the public
at large, including fuel security and diversity, but receive no reliable cost support
and, instead, must rely on PJM’s power markets which fail to compensate these
generators for the full value of the benefits that they provide. Attachment A
provides a listing of all nuclear and coal-fired generation facilities in PJM but only
some of these facilities will likely satisfy the above criteria.
m) A general or key map on a scale not greater than 100 kilometers to the centimeter
showing, in separate colors, the territory serviced by each “entity” named in the
application; the location of the facilities to be used for the generation and
171

Although PJM’s markets fail to adequately compensate nuclear and coal-fired generators for the benefits that they
provide, a subset of these generators may nevertheless recover their costs plus an acceptable rate of return through
other regulatory mechanisms.

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 31
transmission of the requested emergency service; and all connection points between
systems. Insofar as this application seeks action by the Secretary regarding all
eligible plants in PJM, the type of map specifically requested is not relevant to this
application. Nonetheless, Applicants attach as Attachment C a map of the PJM
territory, and as Attachment D a map of Applicants’ nuclear and coal-fired
generating facilities. In addition, attached as Attachment E is a map issued by the
PJM Market Monitor showing actual and planned retirements generating units from
2011 through 2020.
n) An estimate of the construction costs of any proposed temporary facilities and a
statement estimating the expected operation and maintenance costs on an
annualized basis. Applicants respectfully submit that such information is not
applicable to the present application. Due to the nature of Applicants’ requested
relief, there are no anticipated construction costs, and annualized operation and
maintenance costs will remain roughly the same for subject facilities.
F.

Requested Order

Applicants respectfully request that DOE issue an emergency order directing (i) the subject
baseload nuclear and coal-fired generators to enter into contracts and all necessary arrangements
with PJM, on a plant-by-plant basis, to generate, deliver, interchange, and transmit electric energy,
capacity, and ancillary services to maintain fuel diversity and grid dependability and resiliency
within the PJM region and (ii) PJM to pay such qualifying generating facilities just and reasonable
cost-based rates that provide for full cost recovery consistent with ratemaking standards and
principles or as otherwise necessary to ensure continued operations. In addition, the order should
direct PJM to begin negotiating immediately with such generators on the terms of such supply.
Applicants respectfully request that each baseload generator eligible to participate—
nuclear and coal-fired generators located within the PJM footprint that have a supply of fuel onsite sufficient to allow twenty-five (25) days of operation at full output, that are substantially
compliant with all applicable federal, state, and local environmental laws and regulations, and that
do not recover any of their capital or operating costs through rates regulated by a duly authorized
state regulatory authority, municipal government, or energy cooperative—be compensated with
just and reasonable rates that provide for full recovery of its fully allocated costs and a fair return
on equity. The compensable costs used to establish this amount shall include, but are not
necessarily limited to, operating expenses, costs of capital and debt, and a fair return on equity and
investment. Just and reasonable rates shall provide for (a) full cost recovery consistent with
ratemaking standards and principles or (b) full recovery of all costs necessary to ensure continued
operations. 172 If PJM and the owners are unable to agree to the contractual terms within fifteen
172

Certain nuclear and coal-fired units have, for financial reporting purposes, impaired the generating asset values
based on the expectation that market revenues would not be sufficient to provide a return of and on invested
capital. The fact that these assets were impaired for financial reporting purposes does not change the amount that
was invested in the plant nor does it relieve their owners from their obligations to bondholders. As a result, the
traditional cost-of-service model needs to be modified to allow cost recovery based on pre-impairment asset

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 32
(15) days of the issuance of the order, then Applicants request that the Secretary step in and
determine the just and reasonable compensation and conditions.
Applicants request that payments begin on the effective date of each contract, and service
under the contracts begin no later than sixteen (16) days after the issuance of the Order. If no
agreement as to terms has been reached by this time, then the payment that the eligible generators
receive for such service will be subject to true-up based on the just and reasonable rate that is
ultimately prescribed.
Applicants request that the order become effective immediately and that, at a minimum,
the order should remain in effect for four (4) years from the date of issuance or until the Secretary
determines that the emergency has ceased to exist because the PJM markets have been fixed to
properly compensate these units for the resiliency and reliability benefits that they provide,
whichever is later. 173 Further, because the eligible nuclear and coal-fired generators must continue
to substantially comply with all applicable federal, state, and local environmental laws and
regulations, the provision in Section 202(c) limiting the duration to a 90-day period is not
applicable. 174

values or it needs to modified to allow a return on equity on the post-impairment asset value with an additional
allowance for recovery of maturing debt in addition to interest expense.
173

The Secretary has very broad authority to order “temporary connections of facilities and such generation, delivery,
interchange, or transmission of electric energy as in [his] judgment will best meet the emergency and serve the
public interest.” 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1). As prior 202(c) orders reflect, “temporary” emergencies may vary
greatly in length and may even be open ended. Indeed, in Cross-Sound Cable, the Secretary initially issued an
order with a duration from August 14, 2003 until September 1, 2003, but later extended the order “until such time
as the emergency identified in this order cease[d] to exist . . . .” Order No. 202-03-2 (Dep’t of Energy Aug. 28,
2003). In addition, the Secretary’s initial order to Mirant Corporation in 2005 lasted nearly 10 months. Order
No. 202-05-3, D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Docket No. EO-05-01, at 10 (Dep’t of Energy Dec. 20, 2005).

174

See 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(4)(A) (limiting the duration of a Section 202(c) order to 90 days if such order “may result
in a conflict with a requirement of any Federal, State, or local environmental law or regulation”).

 The Honorable James Richard Perry
March 29, 2018
Page 33
III.

CONCLUSION

The time for talk is over. We find ourselves at a crisis point where significant baseload
generation will cease to exist in RTO markets without quick and decisive intervention. Baseload
generation does not have the luxury of time; the personal health and safety, economic
development, jobs and livelihood of the communities where they are located, as well as our
national security, hang in the balance.
It would also be a grave mistake to assume that there is no immediate emergency requiring
immediate action now that winter is over. Premature nuclear and coal-fired plant closures know
no season—as the announcement yesterday that FirstEnergy Solutions will deactivate over 4,000
MW of nuclear generation shows. The resilience and security of the electric grid can be
jeopardized at any moment by any high-impact event—not just those that are weather driven. The
health, safety, and welfare of the Nation, as well as our economic and physical well-being must be
protected at all times from all potential threats to our electric grid.
As explained herein, Applicants respectfully request that the Secretary utilize the authority
granted to DOE under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act and immediately issue the
emergency order described above. Such quick and decisive intervention is necessary to avoid a
crisis point where such baseload generation will cease to exist in RTO markets, and to ensure that
nuclear and coal-fired generators operating within PJM are compensated fairly for their costs and
the benefits that they provide such that they can continue to operate and ensure a dependable,
affordable, safe, secure, and clean supply of electricity.
Respectfully submitted,

William S. Scherman
Jeffrey M. Jakubiak
Jennifer C. Mansh
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: (202) 887-3510
wscherman@gibsondunn.com
jjakubiak@gibsondunn.com
jmansh@gibsondunn.com

/s/ Rick C. Giannantonio
Rick C. Giannantonio
General Counsel
FirstEnergy Solutions Corp.
76 South Main Street
Akron, OH 44308
Tel: (330) 384-5893
giannanr@firstenergycorp.com

Counsel for Applicants
cc:

Bruce J. Walker, Assistant Secretary, DOE Office of Elec. Delivery & Energy Reliability
Patricia A. Hoffman, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, DOE Office of Elec. Delivery
& Energy Reliability

Attachments

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 205.372, I have or will shortly cause
copies of the foregoing documents to be served on the parties listed below by causing copies of
the same to be sent via overnight delivery.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Delaware Public Service Commission
Illinois Commerce Commission
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission
Kentucky Public Service Commission
Maryland Public Service Commission
Michigan Public Service Commission
State of New Jersey Board of Public Utilities
North Carolina Utilities Commission
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission
Tennessee Public Utility Commissions
Commonwealth of Virginia State Corporation Commission
Public Service Commission of West Virginia
New York Public Service Commission
Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia
PJM Interconnection
ReliabilityFirst Corp.
SERC Reliability Corporation
AES Warrior Run
Avon Lake
B L England
Beaver Valley
Birchwood Power
Braidwood Generation Station
Brandon Shores
Brunner Island
Byron Generating Station
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Cardinal
Chalk Point
Chambers Cogeneration LP
Chesterfield
Cheswick Power Plant
Clover
Conemaugh
Conesville
Cooper
Covington Facility
CP Crane

 Davis Besse
Dickerson
Donald C Cook
Dover
Dresden Generating Station
East Bend
Edgecombe Genco
FirstEnergy Bruce Mansfield
FirstEnergy Fort Martin Power Station
FirstEnergy Harrison Power Station
FirstEnergy Pleasants Power Station
FirstEnergy W H Sammis
General James M Gavin
H L Spurlock
Herbert A Wagner
Homer City Generating Station
Indian River Generating Station
Ingredion Incorporated
J M Stuart
James River Genco
John E Amos
Joliet 9
Joliet 29
Keystone
Killen Station
Kincaid
LaSalle Generating Station
Limerick
Logan Generating Company
Longview Power Plant
Luke Mill
Mecklenburg Power Station
Miami Fort
Mitchell (WV)
Morgantown Generating Plant
Mountaineer
Mt Storm
North Anna
Orrville
Oyster Creek
P H Glatfelter
P H Glatfelter Chillicothe Facility
Painesville
Peach Bottom
Perry
Powerton

 PSEG Hope Creek Generating Station
PSEG Salem Generating Station
Quad Cities Generating Station
Radford Army Ammunition Plant
Rockport
Spruance Genco
Surry
TalenEnergy Montour
TalenEnergy Susquehanna
Tennessee Eastman Operations
Three Mile Island
University of Notre Dame
Virginia City Hybrid Energy Center
W H Zimmer
Waukegan
Wausau Paper Middletown
Whitewater Valley
Will County
Yorktown
/s/ Christopher Smith
Christopher Smith
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: (202) 887-3764
csmith@gibsondunn.com

 ATTACHMENT A
NUCLEAR AND COAL-FIRED GENERATING UNITS IN PJM
(NAMEPLATE CAPACITY)
Facility
AES Warrior Run
Avon Lake
Beaver Valley
Birchwood Power
Braidwood Generation Station
Brandon Shores
Brunner Island
Byron Generating Station
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Cardinal
Chalk Point
Chambers Cogeneration LP
Chesterfield
Cheswick Power Plant
Clover
Conemaugh
Conesville
Cooper
Covington Facility
CP Crane
Davis Besse
Dickerson
Donald C Cook
Dover
Dresden Generating Station
East Bend
Edgecombe Genco
FirstEnergy Bruce Mansfield
FirstEnergy Fort Martin Power Station
FirstEnergy Harrison Power Station
FirstEnergy Pleasants Power Station
FirstEnergy W H Sammis
General James M Gavin
H L Spurlock
Herbert A Wagner

Primary Owner (per EIA)
AES WR Ltd Partnership
NRG Power Midwest LP
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co.
Birchwood Power Partners LP
Exelon Nuclear
Raven Power Holdings LLC
Brunner Island LLC
Exelon Nuclear
Exelon Nuclear
AEP Generation Resources Inc.
NRG Chalk Point LLC
US Operating Services Company
Virginia Electric & Power Company
NRG Power Midwest LP
Virginia Electric & Power Company
GenOn Northeast Management Co.
AEP Generation Resources Inc.
East Kentucky Power Coop, Inc.
MeadWestvaco Corp.
Raven Power Holdings LLC
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co.
GenOn Mid-Atlantic LLC
Indiana Michigan Power Company
City of Dover, Ohio
Exelon Nuclear
Duke Energy Kentucky Inc.
Edgecombe Operating Services LLC
FirstEnergy Generation Corp.
Monongahela Power Company
Allegheny Energy Supply Co LLC
Allegheny Energy Supply Co LLC
FirstEnergy Generation Corp.
AEP Generation Resources Inc.
East Kentucky Power Coop, Inc.
Raven Power Holdings LLC

Coal
(MW)
229
680

Nuclear
(MW)

1846.8
258.3
2449.8
1370
1616.1
2449.8
1828.7
1880.4
728
285
1352.9
637
848
1872
1729.3
344
44.5
399.8
925.2
588
2285.3
27.5
2018.6
772
114.8
2741.1
1152
2052
1368
2455.6
2600
1608.5
495

 Facility
Homer City Generating Station
Indian River Generating Station
Ingredion Incorporated
J M Stuart
James River Genco
John E Amos
Joliet 9
Joliet 29
Keystone
Killen Station
Kincaid
LaSalle Generating Station
Limerick
Logan Generating Company
Longview Power Plant
Luke Mill
Mecklenburg Power Station
Miami Fort
Mitchell (WV)
Morgantown Generating Plant
Mountaineer
Mt Storm
North Anna
Orrville
Oyster Creek
P H Glatfelter
P H Glatfelter Chillicothe Facility
Painesville
Peach Bottom
Perry
Powerton
PSEG Hope Creek Generating Station
PSEG Salem Generating Station
Quad Cities Generating Station
Radford Army Ammunition Plant
Rockport
Spruance Genco
Surry
TalenEnergy Montour
TalenEnergy Susquehanna

Primary Owner (per EIA)
NRG Homer City Services LLC
Indian River Operations Inc.
Ingredion Inc. - Illinois
Dayton Power & Light Company
Hopewell Operating Services LLC
Appalachian Power Company
Midwest Generations EME LLC
Midwest Generations EME LLC
GenOn Northeast Management Co.
Dayton Power & Light Company
Dynegy Kincaid Generation
Exelon Nuclear
Exelon Nuclear
US Operating Services Company
Longview Power, LLC
NewPage Corp-Luke
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Dynegy Miami Fort
Kentucky Power Company
GenOn Mid-Atlantic LLC
Appalachian Power Company
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Virginia Electric & Power Company
City of Orrville, Ohio
Exelon Nuclear
P H Glatfelter Company
P H Glatfelter Company
City of Painesville
Exelon Nuclear
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co.
Midwest Generations EME LLC
PSEG Nuclear LLC
PSEG Nuclear LLC
Exelon Nuclear
U S Army-Radford
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Spruance Genco LLC
Virginia Electric & Power Company
TalenEnergy Montour LLC
TalenEnergy Susquehanna LLC

2

Coal
(MW)
2012
445.5
45
1841.4
114.8
2932.6
360.4
1320
1872
660.6
1319

Nuclear
(MW)

2340
2277
242.3
807.5
65
139.8
1114.8
1632.6
1252
1300
1662.4
1959.4
84.5
550
70.4
27.2
53.5
2621.8
1311.6
1785.6
1290.7
2340
2018.6
24
2600
229.6
1695
1775.1
2596

 Facility

Primary Owner (per EIA)

Coal
(MW)
194.3

Nuclear
(MW)

Tennessee Eastman Operations
Eastman Chemical Company
Three Mile Island
Exelon Nuclear
980.8
University of Notre Dame
University of Notre Dame
16.4
Virginia City Hybrid Energy Center
Virginia Electric & Power Company
668
W H Zimmer
Dynegy W H Zimmer
1425.6
Waukegan
Midwest Generations EME LLC
681.7
Wausau Paper Middletown
Wausau Paper Middletown
7.5
Whitewater Valley
City of Richmond, Indiana
93.9
Will County
Midwest Generations EME LLC
598.4
Yorktown
Virginia Electric & Power Company
375
Sources: 2016 Form EIA-860 Data (units with primary fuel of nuclear, or bituminous, refined, or
subbituminous coal); PJM, FUTURE DEACTIVATIONS (Feb. 26, 2018), http://www.pjm.com//media/planning/gen-retire/pending-deactivation-requests.ashx?la=en.

3

 ATTACHMENT B
OUTPUT OF NUCLEAR AND COAL-FIRED GENERATORS IN PJM
INTERCONNECTION (GWH) (2012–2017)
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000

0

Jan-12
Mar-12
May-12
Jul-12
Sep-12
Nov-12
Jan-13
Mar-13
May-13
Jul-13
Sep-13
Nov-13
Jan-14
Mar-14
May-14
Jul-14
Sep-14
Nov-14
Jan-15
Mar-15
May-15
Jul-15
Sep-15
Nov-15
Jan-16
Mar-16
May-16
Jul-16
Sep-16
Nov-16
Jan-17
Mar-17
May-17
Jul-17
Sep-17
Nov-17

5,000

Coal GWh

Nuclear GWh

Source: Monitoring Analytics LLC, STATE OF THE MARKET REPORTS FOR PJM (2012–2017),
http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2017.shtml.

 ATTACHMENT C
MAP OF PJM INTERCONNECTION TRANSMISSION ZONES

Source: PJM, http://www.pjm.com/library/~/media/about-pjm/pjm-zones.ashx.

 ATTACHMENT D
APPLICANTS' NUCLEAR AND COAL-FIRED GENERATING FACILITIES

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station

Bruce Mansfield Plant
Beaver Valley Power Station

W.H. Sammis Plant
OH

PA

 ATTACHMENT E
ACTUAL AND PLANNED GENERATION RETIREMENTS IN PJM, 2011-2020

Key on following page.
Source: Monitoring Analytics LLC, STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM, 2017,
http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2017.shtml,
Figure 12-1.

 Unit identification for map of PJM unit retirements, 2011 through 2020

Source: Monitoring Analytics LLC, STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM, 2017,
http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2017.shtml, Table 12-6.