- . - 1J??.?i959. mesons or secuam Ann IMBODUGTION 1. These principles shall be the basis of all regulations for the security and dissemination of Cmnmunications Intelligence issued by or under the authority of USIB or LSIB and other appropriate authorities of the Govarnments of the two parties. The scope and phrasing of such regulations may vary in accordance with requiranents of the parties, agencies, departments, and ministries to whom they are designed to apply, but all shall be in accord with these basic principles in every respect and shall observe the standards herein as a As an aid to uniform interpretation, each party shall forward all pertinent Board regulations and directives to the other for information. 2. Conservation of sources is of suprans importance and there is no time limit for their safeguarding. It is essential that the production, exploitation, and dissan?nation of GEMINI, resultant intelli? gence, and related techr?cal information and material be specially con? trolled as specified herein. DEINITIOIS 3. Communications Intelligence a. Comunications Intgligence shall be construed to mean technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communi- ..cations and coamunications systems by other than the intended recipients. b. activities shall be construed to mean these activities which produce WENT by the interception and processing of foreign contami- cstions passed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated halo-w, by the study of foreign communications systems. and by the processing of foreign comunications, however transmitted. Approved for Release by NSA on 04-04-2018, FOIA Case ?00386 (Litigation) NUMQER NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00001 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc 6613373 Interception comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. :P'roceseing emprisee'ran'ge estimation, transmitter/operator identification, Signal analysis, traffic encircle, study of plainteogt, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results. I I 3. c. I are defined. as allricoxmnmications except;- (1) Those of the Goverments of. the-11.3. and the British Commonwealth. (2) Those exchanged among private organizations and nationals, acting in a private capacity, of the 0.5. and the British Commonwealth. (3) Those of nationals of the and British Coman- wealth appointed or seconded by their Govenments to serve in inter? national organizations. . d. CCMINT cencerning weather is meteorological information (Mrometeorological data and all Womation concerning meteorological organizations and activities) which is deriVed from foreign except information and data which is used for recognized weather purposes and which is derived from thoee portions of broadcasts (the schedule of which have been published. by the world Meteorological Organization (mo) or made internationally available by a. recognized civil weather organization) which contain: (1) unenciphered codes or (2) no code or cipher or disguised indicatives or (3) weather codes which have been made intermtionaqu' available by recognized civil weather organisations. e. Special Weather intelligence is that concerning weather which is assigned to the weather sub-categon of Category II. The purpose of this sub-category is to handle separater that CIMINT concerning weather?which may be disseminated to users who do not require access to other r_ .. 2 ?fr-0 0 new at; THE 1300th 'm NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00002 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc To; 6613373 m. . a 3. f. to provide close support for the commanders of combat forces. (See is tactical produced by units which are designated Appendix P.) g. COMINT and activities as defined herein shall not include: (1) Intercept and prooessing of written I comunications, except written plain text versions of comnunications which have been or are intended for subsequent (2) Intercept and processing of press, propaganda and other public broadcasts, except for or "hidden meaning" passages in such broadcasts. (3) Certain operations conducted by us, U.K., or Common- wealth security authorities. Censorship. (5) The peacetime exercise of resources in NATO commands, which involves the interception analysis and exploitation only of radio trans? missions (albeit "foreign") on established or used for exercises within or between those commands, provided that: ?Y?type' information produced during-ins safer-ciao or and information about the resources involved, is adequately safeguarded by NATO security regulations paralleling those for wartime Operations, and the U.S. and U.K. retain the right to express their views to the Cmand concerned as to the adequacy of the security classification applied. Techniques used in the productiOn of exercise during the exercise do not exceed in complexity the COMINT techniques involved in producing Category COMINT as defined in Annexure B1. (6) The interception and study of non?comumcations trans? missions . NSA 01A Case [00386 Page 00003 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613373 - mes-10f. There are two types of come: Intelligence and Traffic f' . Intelligence. They are defined as follows: a. 039+. Intelligence is that which results free: analysis or including the solution of speech and facsimile 7 security systems. I Traffic Intelligence is that OOHINT Iproduced by all means except or of intercepted comunications. Categories I For purpoaes of s??uity handling and control is divided into categories and sub-categories. (See innexure Bl) a. COMINT is assigned to one of the following three categories as agreed between USIB and LSIB. (1) disclosure of which would risk grave damage to national interests Categorz CCMINT is that GCMINT the unauthorized and specifically-to activities and which, therefore, requires hand- ling under special rules affording the highest degree of security protection. It is classified TOP SECRET, and is designated by a distinctive codeword. (2) disclosure of which would risk serious damage to national interests and Categog II GCMINT is that CCMINT the unauthorized specifically to activities, but for which a less rigid standard of security is adequate. It is classified SECRET and is designated by a distinctive codeword. (3) Category I MINT is that COMINT the unauthorized disclosure of which would risk little or no damage specifically to GGJIINT activities and for which, therefore, normal security classification pro? cedures may be used. It will be classified at least and will not be designated by a codeword. b. As mutually agreed by 113113 and LSIB, setarate sub-categories of COMINT may be established within Categories and II in order to pemit NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00004 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc 1p; 6613373 . 'd-ifferentietion in the precessing, as. s_se:nination_, exchange 'or-useijo'f Insterial; 7 I Technical Material Technical material is ?nderstood to mess - I: it if; a. systansCamunication system, procedures meshes. c. Methods and equipment designed for CCMINT activities - information related to any of the above. 1 - 3 7. Information related to scram- or comm Activities -. 'Ihat?ini?oinia- 7 tion, other than COMINI: itself, which reveals, directly on by inplication, the existence 'or nature of any U.S. or U.K. activity. I 8. CCMINT Channels - A method or means expressly authorized for handling or transmission of comm and information related to comm activities whereby the information is provided exclusively to those persons who are approf- I prilately cleared and indoctrinated for access to COIEENT. I 9. Codewords Codewords, as used herein, are designator-e assigned to identify the source as to distinguish between the CCMINT categories and. I sub-categories; and to facilitate the application of regulations for the dissemination and use of COMINT. 10. Suitable Cover I Suitable cover is the concealment of any relationship betwaen an action and the GCE-IINT which motivates or influences the decision to take the action. It is achieved: a. By ascribing the action to: (1) existing intelligence from a source, or (2) existing sources which could, beyond reason?? able doubt, have produced the information leading to the action, or b. By the existence of sources to which the action could be expected beyond reasonable doubt to be'attributed. -5- NSA FOIA Case [00386 Page 00005 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) DocIDz6613373 o. By the. assent; of a situation which the action could be expected beyond reasonable'doubt to be attributed to sources; or' of a situation in which the action taken is so?plausible that it would not be attributed to its CCMINT source. I ll. Proper Authoritx The term "proper authority?, as used herein, shall be the level of authority permitted to authorize usage of?the several categories of CGMINT during hostilities and in special and emergency situations. The determination to make these exceptions and the authority to grant these exceptions shall lie only with senior officers and officials.at levels to be established by USIB or LSIB. 12. Indoctrination Indoctrination is instruction as to the nature of COMINT and the security regulations and practices which govern the handling of COMINT material and CCHINT activities. 13. Debriefing Debriefing is the process of reminding persons no longer authorized to have access to COMINT or CCMINT activities that they continue to be bound by all security regulations pertaining thereto. The debriefing shall include cautions that there is no time limit on the requirement to maintain security and that public disclosure does not free the individual from his obligation. 1&1 Hazardous Activities Hazardous activities are those which place a person in a position where he runs a substantial risk of being captured or otherwise subjected to interrogation. 15. ggpoSed Areas EXposed areas are those which are susceptible of being quickly overrun or those wherein the local political or military situation is such as to pose a distinct threat to the security of COMINT activities conducted therein. NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00006 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID26613373 - below or serum CATEGORIES lo. I In assigning to Categories-(see paragraph 5), the follow- ing considerations will apply: a. The difficulty of solution or intercept to include: (1) Sensitivity of techniques employedlin solution and exploitation. (2) Sensitivity of source of intercept. (3) Relationships to other COMINT. I b. The advantages to be gained versus the risk of disclosure and consequent damage through utilization under a given category taking into consideration the following factors: (1) The potential loss of intelligence. (2) The extent to which the target country is capable of improving the security of the communications in question. (3) The security grading given to contents by the country originating the traffic involved. How wide the dissemination of certain 0th should be to permit essential use of the intelligence contained therein. (5) The capability of certain Third Party comm groups to exploit the COMINT in question with the attendant security risks beyond the direct control of 15.8. and U.K. authorities. I (6) The value of providing technical guidance or COMINT information to Third Party COMINT activities to insure receipt from them I "or unique intercept and critical comm information not otherwise available. 17. shall have prepared and maintained in current status mutually agreed lists to indicate CCMINT placed in the several categories and in such swan-categories as may be established. CLASSIFICATION AND CODEWORDS. 18. Separate and distinctive codewords shall be employed to designate Category and Category II and each sub-category thereof. -7- NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00007 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613373 ?Category-ism shall not be designated byes. -~Codewords shall .be replaced when in the. opinion of either reg?rment .m?gtg I. fora change19. Documents and Technical material which-reveal actual er. neg; I nos'ticated success, progress, scale and direction orother . sensitive details about the production of mm shall bear the classie- 'fication or the classification and codeword appropriate to the i i category or sub?category or CQJIINT to which they relate and shall be I handled accordingly, even though such documents and technical material may not contain CEMENT as such,- 20. Raw traffic intercepted traffic showing no evidence of processing for CCMINT purposes beyond sorting by clear address: elements, eliinination of unwanted messages and the inclusion of a case number and/or an arbitrary traffic designator) shall be classified not lower than CONFIDENTIAL, and is understood not to be any specific category of GEMINI and need not be designated by a codeword. 21. Codewords. The fact that codewords are used to designate mm categories shall not be made to non?indoctrinated persons nor shall ?tness codewords be used in the presence of non-ind0ctrinated persons. 22. All persons, including intercept Operators, to be assigned to duties involving categories of? other than Category I shall be in? __doctrinated. Recipients of Category I COMINT only will not be indoctrinated. 'Producers of Category I CCMINT onlyr need not be indoctrinated. 23. Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of persons indoctrinated for to the essential 21.. It shall be permissible for persons who have access only to a lower category 01: ?sub?category of to work within Agencies or Centers in which there are located other persons engaged in the production or exploitation of a higher category or sub?category of only so can NSA Case 100386 Page 00008 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613373 long as due precaution shall be taken (by providing segregated, secure areas 'or otherwise) to ensure that the activities and howledge of such persons are confined to the C(1me material and activities to which they are authorized to have access. I I 25. Except as determined by USIB or 1.813, all persons to be assigned to duties involving CCMINT shall be the subject of security investigation and clearance. As an aid to promoting uniform minimum standards of eligibility, each party shall inform the other of the standards prescribed by it for this purpose. 7 26. Under extraordinary conditions, as determined by USIB or LSIB, it may be essential for an individual to take up duties involving COMET be? fore the requisite investigation can be completed. In such cases, the person concerned may be suitably indoctrinated on the authority only of senior officers or officials as designated by the respective parties; In all such cases, steps shall-be taken to ensure that security investigations and clearances are completed as soon as possible/after indoctrination. 27. All persons who have been indoctrinated for CCMINT shall be de~ briefed when they no longer have the requisite need~to?k1mw. 28. Each party shall ensure that complete lists of indoctrinated persons are maintained. 29. [18113 and LSIB shall keep each other fully informed of the appronmate number of indoctrinated persons in each of the departments, ministries, agencies, and offices receiving CCMINT, by category or sub? category where applicable. 30. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the organizations or to the Categories and II CCMINT of the other party, unless he has been approved by his parent organization or Board and has been properly indoctrinated. Such access shall be limited to the cate? m. goriss or sub?categories of CEMENT agreed by his parent organization or Board. NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00009 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) I - 31. Every effort _shall be made to ensure-that no person who has a - knowledge of current value about ,-.except 7 recipients of Categogg- .I orig, such that his capture or interrogation. could be a. substantial risk to the Security of CCMINT, shall be assigned to or engage in hazardous activities. All possible action shall be taken to discourage or prevent am? individual with a knowledge of current value about COMM, except recipients of Category lmonly, from engaging in hazardous activities in any unofficial capacity at any time. Security principles governing participation in hazardous activities are set forth in (Annexm'e B2. 32. Collection, processing, and dissemination of COMINT in exposed areas shall be undertaken only after a careful evaluation of the advantages to be gained and the risk to the security of COMINT. Security principles governing the conduct_ of CGIINT activities in exposed. areas are set forth in Annexure B2. 33. Except as implicitly involved in the operation of paragraphs 34?37, and 39 below, codeword material shall remain exclusively in the 7 custody of indoctrinated persons, secure from examination by non?indoctri- nated persons . fl,- stsnum'rxos AND USE OF owns 32;. General a. The basic principle governing the dissemination of COMINT is the ?need?to?know't Each item shall, thereforejbe made known only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties. b. Except as specifically provided in paragraphs 3m and 35?37 below each? item of shall be made known only to persons who are indoctrinated and authorized to have accesa to the particular category or sub-category of COMINT to which such item appertains. Such persons may include nationals of collaborating British Commonwealth countries (Canada, Australia and New Zealand). -10- NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00010 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613373 'Except as pandas {ena- the CO?INI_source say be taken on?the hasis of dategorg or Categdnf IIVI- (including sub-categories thereofaccordance'vrith- the practices.Hasnregardsiintellir .7 genes information of similar classificatimp?stegorj I . 1 disseminated to hon-indoctrinated persons", foreign and action may be taken thereon. However, wh?neuer Iii'e?aeihle, desirable to keep Category I COMINT in COMINT channels and to devise.suite )able cover before action is taken. ?Whenremovedfrom such channels, this material should not contain references to, or otherwise disclose the I existence of higher categories of COHINT. I e. The need may arise, in-individual cases of special? sensi? tivity, or more generally, for either party?to handle CWINT'items, or information related to COMINT or COMINT activities, in a more restricted - manner than required by the provisions of this Appendix and its Annexure'e. In such cases the other party will, on request,- provide similar for the specific items concerned. 35. Special Usage a. specified by either Board, suitably indoctrinated persons may use Category II or Category COMET in the preparation of intelligence appreciations, studies and estimates, and such additional documents as may be. specified by either Board, issued at TOP SECRET classification (Category II COMINT at classification) but without CEMJNT codewords, provided that the statements. contained in them are so generalized that they cannot be traced - to their CWT origin. These documents may be released to or discussed with ., Third Party nationals according to normal national security regulations. Specific COMINT detail must be restricted to supporting papers appropriate COMET codeword and circulated and handled accordingly 7(i.e. not released to or discussed with Third Party nationals). NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00011 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613373 35. b. As specified ?oy either Board, information derived from Category II or Category CCMINT, for which there is suitable cover, nay be entered without the comm codeword in the following types of classified documents: departmental and theater plans, maps, and target folders, but only in such form as does not indicate or reveal the OCMINT origin. c. Upon determination by?prcpe'r 31% that suitable cover \1 7 exists and that the advantage to be gained clearly outweighs the possihle risk of loss of the COMINT source and consequently of valuable intelligence, I action may be taken on the basis or Category II or Category COMINT. In determining the "proper authority" for this paragraph (see paragraph 11)- particular attention'will be paid to the need for the authority to be such . a that the consequences of the possible loss of the COMINT source will be taken d. As specified by either Board, technical instructions based upon Category II or Category CMNT may to non?indoctrinated intercept operators (including?D/F, RFP operators, and the like) Without 'use of the appropriate in such ford-and of such nature as to give no indication of the specificl?QCl?NT origin, lend provided they are essan'tial to the tasks of those concerned. e. Category II or Category material, exclusive of end product, .may be handled by indoctrinated?persons CONT collec? tion or processing agencies without the use of?the appropriate codeword. f. As specified by either Board, weather forecasts or conclusions I I based in whole or in part on analysis of maps, which Special Weather Intelligence material has been plotted, may be issued to non?indoctri? nated who require such information in the performance of their duties, ?o .. 12 ?mm $89 sagas; ?gr; 1'98 (bH31450 USC {13) 55-36 NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00012 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613373 ,i I, . I provided the form 91? issue gives no indication whatever of the CWT origin. 35. g; Certain less sensitive Category.:II CGEINT LSIB may be assigned to a sub-category to permit more effective utilization (see paragraph 5b of Annexure Bl). Upon determination by proper authority that it is in the national interest, or necessary for the protection of armed forces, action, without cover, may be taken on this material and it maybe included in Inch?codeword documents, and it may be disseminated without codeword to non? indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, provided: (1) that the material is classified at least that direct evidence of the specific COMINT source - commlmication data such as frequencies, callsigns, network identifications, etc.?, is omitted except in cases where that data is pre- requisite to its use by the non-indoctrinated persons involved and (3) that as much other detail is omitted as is consistent with effective use. Whenever action is taken or dissemination made under the pro?sions of this paragraph, NSA and GCHQ, through technical channels, will undertake to keep the other party informed, at least in general terms, of the material involved. h. When required for planning purposes the U.S. and ELK. national authorities may furnish technical material to the level of the 1" sub?category mentioned in paragraph above to SACEUR and SAGLANT for provi? sion on a need?to?know basis to Third Party nationals in SACEITR and SACLANT commands. Such material will not carry a COMINT codeword. i. Sub?paragraph 34d above applies ?with respect to special usage of Category I COMINT. 36 . Emergency "he: a. In an extreme emergency (lategcry CCMINT may be dissemie nated to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action without cover may be taken, based solely on that provided that proper authority has determed that such utilization [is necessary to counter an imminent threat to vital national interests. b. In an emergency Category II CCMINT, including Special Weather Intelligence, may be disseminated to non?indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action without cover may be taken based solely on that -13.. NSA FOIA Case [00386 Page 00013 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Refease A) Doc 6613373 provided that proper authority has determined that such utilization is necessary to the national security or, in the case of a solitary cmander, to - 7' the security of forces under his curmuand. 36. c. The decision to execute the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 13 above shall be made only after a determination that the advantages to be gained clearly justify the risk of compromise of the source. Due regard shall also be given to: The relative value of the particular source involved n? and the possibility that its compromise may lead to the loss of other COMINT (2) The poesible repercussions on current and future operation and also on other cemmands and areas. - d. In order to minimize the risk of compromise the following pro?v cautions shall be observed: (1) A studied effort shall be made to insure, insofar as possible, that the action taken cannot be attributedvto information obtained from a source. Suitable cover, if not available, shall be arranged air reconnaissance) if time permits. (2) A minimmn number of non?indoctrinated personnel shall be given the information, and when practicable the information shall be so presented that it cannot be traced to COMINT as a source, or if it is necessary to cite as the source in order to validate the information, the specific COMINT source shall be revealed 'only when absolutely necessary. (3) The amount of information necessary to justify the contemplated action shall be revealed. e. If communications by electrical means are involved they must be enciphered in the most secure system available. If time permits the commander or official making this decision should consult with his supporting authority for technical advice. -14.. NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00014 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ED: 6613373 13-6. whenever any of the provisions of sub-paragraphs 36am: above, iare'axecuted, 03113 and LSIE Will keep each-other informedr' This I I information shall contain a description of the CWT material involved, and, 0/ in general terms, the extent and nature of the action taken. If_Third Parties are-involved USIB and LSIE Will consult beforehand if time allows. h. Sub-paragraph 35g abbve, applies with-respect to emergency usage of the material in the sub?category of Category II described therein. 1. Sub-paragraph Std, above, applies with respect to emergency_ usage of Category I CCBINT. 37. Hostilities It is recognized that in the event of hostilities certain material will be downgraded. In connection with the mutually agreed lists referred to in paragraph 17, USIB and LSIE will agree upon types of materials suitable for down-grading during hostilities. When hostilities appear imminent or occur the two Boards will immediately consult upon downgradin? meaenres to be taken. I b. Category COMINT designated by USIB and LSIB as "conditionally releasable may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons in NATO commands, including foreign nationals. The conditions specified in Appendix must be observed. c. Category II COMINT may be disseminated to 'I'?indoctrinated persons in NATO commands in accordance with special security regulations in Appendix provided it is not expressly excluded by USIB and LSIE. d. In an extreme emergency Category GOMINT may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action without a cover may be taken, based solely on that CCMINT, provided that proper authority has determined that such utilization is vital to the succesei?ul prosecution or the war. Prior to invoking this provision, due consideration shall be given to the conditions described in wine-paragraphs 36c-36f. -15- mm NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00015 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613373 _m 3.7. In an emergency Category may be disseninated to none: indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action without cover hay be taken, based solely on that provided the proper authority 7 determined that such utilization is necessary to the national security or, in the case of a military commander, to the security of forces under his command. 'Prior to invoking this provision, due consideration shall be given to the conditions described in sub-paragraphs 36c'-36f. Whenever any of the provisions of sub?paragraphs 37d and 37s, . above, are executed, USIB and 1.818 will keep each other informed. This . information shall contain a description of the material involved, and, in ,general'terms, the extent and nature of the action taken. g. In the event of hostilities the proper authority may direct the ?Ji appropriate COMJNT organization responsible for providing his support to down;- grade to Category I that material in the sub-category of Category II descrited in paragraph 35g which is relevant to the situation. Such information? then be disseminated or actiOn be taken thereon in accordance with the pro- cedures established for Category The cognizant COUNT organization will immediately, without prior consultation with higher authority, make avail? able as Category I such material of this sub?category as is required. USIB and LSIB will keep each other informed of downgrading actions taken. h. Sub?paragraph Bid, above, applies with respect to wartime usage oi" Category I Whenever suitable channels are available, they will be used for this dissemination. 38. The appropriate classification and codeword shall: a. Appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses Category or II CDMINT or a sub?category thereof, and be applied to documents and technical material as defined inparagraph l9. Eccept as pro- vided in paragraphs 35?37, above, this rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information derived from these categories of COMINT. 15 .. NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00016 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613373 . . I I 38. b. as in the text of every? communication cone. 'veping.0ategory or II GOMINT and appear in plain language at the head of. the version. This rule shall apply in_all instances except as provided in paragraphs 35?37,. above, and under the followingcondition-s: CUMINT organizations may, without the appropriate codeword in the text, transmit TOP SECRET and SECRET technical matter over channels or ciphers expressly and exclu? sively provided for such technical matters. (2) COMINT organizations and intercept or Q/F_stations may, at the discretion of the officer in charge and after full consideration of the risks involved to the source, omit the classification and the appro- priate codeword from its hark-sheets and similar documents need exclusively within each agency or station. The classification may be omitted from raw traffic passed between agencies or from intercept and stations to agencies. . 39. Category CCMINT and related technical material shall not be transmitted in plain language except as follows: a. Sealed, by safehand channels, over routes specifically approved by USIB or LSIB. b. Over completely protected local communication systems exclusively internal to agencies or offices producing or utilizing COMINT. Over landlines specifically approved in each instance by USIB or LSIB. 40. Category II CCMINT and related technical material shall not be transmitted in plain language except as provided in paragraph 39 above, or - by protected poetal channels internal to, or under exclusive control ofother collaborating British Commonwealth countries. _Category I COMINT and related technical material should be trans? mitted hy COMINT or channels wherever possible, but may be transmitted by conventional channels used for intelligence materials of similar classi- fication. 17 NSA Case 100386 Page 00017 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613373 3 It may be transmitted. in plain language by a means exposed to interception 1 only when there is no suitable means of secure communications available 1) and when there is an urgent operational need to do so. Whenever possible if such plain language transmissions should be in the form of operational orders so worded that the subject matter cannot be traced specifically to a as its origin. 1+2. Raw traffic may be transmitted in plain language as provided in paragraph 39, above. Raw traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL may also be trans-? mitted in accordance with the normal procedure for this classification, except that when transported acroas the territory of the country traffic, it shall be with the express sanction of USIB or LSIB. This sanction will be granted only in cases of compelling need. 1.3. Except as provided in paragraphs 35-37, above: a. Category and related technical material transmitted in form shall be in special channels expressly provided for these subjects. b. Category II COMINT and. related technical material tranSmitted in form shall be in special channels expressly provided for these subjects, those listed in paragraph above;- or in the moat secure channel available. c. ?1 However, in the case of systems mutually approved for the purpose, the transmission of GEMINI, related technical material and raw traffic over the same channel is authorized, provided that such channels are reserved for these subjects exclusively. In order to facilitate a concerted effort directed toward the determination and assessment of the causes and effects of known or presumed GOMINT compromises or losses, it is agreed that: a. Whenever any breach of its CCMINT security regulations or any other circunstance which in fact has, or can be presumed to have, compromised or codewords, or to have revealed COMINT successes to unauthorised -13- NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00018 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID16613373 . persons, becomes lmown to either party, it shall infozm the other by means of a report embodying the pertinent facts and conclusions in each case, except that when the party concerned concludes that there is a. geod reason to believe that such or revelation has not reached and will not in fact, reach foreign nationals, no report need be made to the other party. Whenever a significant change Occurs in foreign or cumm?cations security, the party discovering such change shall notify the other. Each party shall then analyze and assess the known and suspected having a bearing upon the change; these analyses and assessments shall be exchanged by the parties; and each party shall thereafter keep the other fully informed of any additional infonnation bearing upon the case- -19- NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00019 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) ,Doc ID: 6613432 A 1 July 1959 B- ANNEIURE 131 THE 4551mm: 0F seam TQ CATEGORIES AND 1. This Annexure delineates the basis for the establishment of sub?categories, the assignment of CQMINT to categories and sub- categories, the classification of COMINT assigned to categories and sub?categories, and the application of codewords to categories and sub?categories. This Annexnre is not intended to accomplish the detailed categorization of all COMINT. However, along with the criteria described in Appendix B, it governs the preparation and maintenance or current, mutually agreed lists to indicate the precise assignment of all CGMINT to categories and sub?categories. 2. Category I COMINT shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET as appropriate in accordance with national security classi- fication procedures and shall n93 be designated by a codeword. It shall contain the following, provided that interpretations of material of higher categories are not included: a. Direction finding results, regardless of the category of technical guidance involved. This material shall normally be classified as b. COMINT concerning weather derived from Category I sources. c. Such COMINT from_the less sensitive sub-category of Category . II as may be so assigned in accordance with Appendix B. (See paragraph 35g) d. Such additional CCMINT as has been or may be specified and mutually agreed by USIB and LSIB. - 20 Approved for Release by NSA on 04?04?2018, EOIA Case #100386 (Litigation) NSA 01A Case 100386 Page 00020 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613432 3.- Category II colour shall be classified steam and shall he desig? nated by a distinctive codeword. It shall-contain all CGMINT not otherwise assigned to Categories I and or sub?categories within Category II. A. Category COMINT shall be classified TOP SECRET, and shall be designated by a distinctive codeword. It shall contain: a. Intelligence derived from highegrade systems, involving the application of sophisticated techniques, as specified and mutually agreed by USIB and LSIB. b. Traffic Intelligence derived from callsigns or message headings in codes and ciphers of high security or complexity, as specified and mutually agreed by USIB and LSIB. c. Traffic or Intelligence which reveals success against unusual, sensitive, or complex transmission procedures or devices. d. Material obtained from special sources or against targets considered by the procuring organization to be so sensitive as to warrant ?the protection afforded this category. e. Intelligence from diplomatic and attache communica? tions. f. Other or Traffic Intelligence which USIB and LSIB agree should be given the highest degree of security protection because of the potential loss of intelligence which would result from compromises 5. Sub?categories of Category II shall be established as follows: a. Sub-Category CCMINT shall contain all COMINT concern? ing weather, which is not specifically assigned to other categories by USIB and LSIB. It is classified SECRET, designated by a distinctive code- word, and referred to as "Special Weather Intelligence". .The purpose of this sub?category is to handle separately that CCNINT Concerning weather which may be disseminated to users who do not require access to other codeword CGMINT. NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00021 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) D6c ID: 6613432 . b. Snb+Category CGMINT is that Category II COMINT?nhicn_is considered less sensitire than other Category II COMINT and may, therefbre, be given more extensive dissemination in order'to provide for effective- Iutilization. It is classified SECRET and is designated by a distinctire codeword. It is this sub-category which is described in paragraph 35g of Appendix B. Provided that no information obtained from Categories II and COMINT, such as complex changing_callsign and frequency systems or unusual, sensitive or complex transmission procedures or devices, is included, this sub-category shall contain the following: . (1) Information derived from the following elements of foreign military, naval, air, police, border guard and guerilla communica?- tions or communications systems: Communications data Plain Text Any grid or zone references Cover Words Procedural codes used for brevity purposes Jargon codes (2) Plain Text and associated communications data obtained from international commercial and foreign internal or external non-military circuits except that specifically assigned to other categories as mutually agreed by USIB and L513. (3) Such additional COMINT as may be specified and mutually agreed by USIB and LSIB. -22.. NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00022 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) 21 March 1960 APPENDIX ANNEKURE B2 SECURITY PRINCIPLES GOVERNDIG THE CONDUCT OF CCEENT OPERATIONS 11?! EKPEBED AREAS 1. It is recognized that effective interception of foreign communica? tions and effective support of field commanders may require the establish- ment. of COMINT activities in locations which may suddenly fall under hostile control with consequent loss of COMINT personnel and/or associated classi- fied materials. It is agreed that, in addition to the pertinent, general provisions of Appendix B, the specific provisions which follow shall govern the conduct of COMINT activities in such locations. DEFINITICNS 2. Exposed areas as defined in paragraph 15, Appendix 13 comprise the Sine?Soviet Bloc, other countries under bloc domination, areas beyond defense lines expected to be tenable, and areas wherein the local political or military situation is such as to pose a distinct threat to the security of CCMINT operations conducted therein. The degree of risk is dependent upon the capability of support and security forces to pro? tect the CCMINT unit through sufficient delaying action to allow time for the destruction of classified material and prompt evacuation of COMINT 'personnel. The following situations may exist in exposed areas: a. Risky situations, those in which it is considered possible that timely and complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and removal or effective destruction of classified material will be accom- plished before a unit can be overrun. b. Dan erous situations, those in which it is unlikely that timely and complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and removal PAGE 1: CUMENT memory. - Approved for Release by NSA on 04?04?2018, FOIA Case #100386 (Litigation) NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00023 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) effective destruction of classified material will be accomplished before a unit can be overrun. rw?. Hazardous activities as defined in paragraph 14, Appendix rrclude: a. Duties behind enemy lines, or in-shore operations off an enemy or unfriendly country. - b. Flights over enemy or unfriendly territory unless on recognised corridor routes. c. Raids, minor formation attacks, underwater demolition operations, and service with a unit or formation forward of Division HQ. a d. Duty in or visits to unfriendly countries and also other areas where from time to time local conditions are considered to involve gf an unacceptable risk. or Transit through the Soviet Zone of Germany unless in authorized military or diplomatic transport on regular routes. 4. For the purposes of paragraph 3, unfriendly countries are under? stood to be the Sine?Soviet Bloc and other countries where similar risks to U. S. or U. K. nationals are likely. Lists of the latter countries will be exchanged between USIB and LSIB. SAFEGUARDS FOR ASSIGNMENT OF PEBSGEHEL TO HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES 5. As an aid to controlling assignment of personnel to hazardous activities, persons who are or have been indoctrinated will be divided into three groups: a. Group - (Unrestricted) Individuals who are producers of Category I CORINT and have no knowledge of other Categories, or persons who, although indoctrinated for other Categories of COMINT, have so little access that they do not possess knowledge of current value, and are not subject to restrictions against hazardous activities. 25 NSA TS CONTR cosy NO. NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00024 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) i b. Group - (Minimum Restriction - one year) Individuals who have knowledge of current;va1ue about Categories II or COMINT or their subcategories, who shall not be assigned to hazardous activities for a minimum period of one year following debriefing. c. Group (Permanent Restriction) Individuals with precise knowledge of COMINT processing techniques, competence or potential regarding the more sensitive Category CCMINT who shall not be assigned to hazardous activities at any time. 6. Exceptions to the above safeguards may be authorized by senior officers and officials at a level prescribed by USIB or LSIB. In con? sidering such exceptions the protection offered by diplomatic status should not automatically be considered sufficient, but should be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances involved. In the case of' Allied Commands to which UKUSA is provided through an 530 or GCU, the senior COHINT indoctrinated U. S. and U. K. officers shall be authorized to make such exceptions. OF EXPOSED AREAS 7. The decision whether a giVen situation is risky or dangerous shall be made by USIB or LSIB or by such other authorities as are responsible for the security of the COMINT activities concerned, and 'shall be made in the light of the political, military, and other factors affecting the safety of the CCEINT personnel and materials involved. FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS TO CCNDUCT COMINT OPERATIONS IN EXPOSED AREAS B. operations shall be conducted in exposed areas only after due consideration of the CCMINT losses which may result if the area concerned is suddenly attacked, and of the probable effect of such losses upon the conduct of COMINT activities elsewhere. no nails? 1. so. dy/ NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00025 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613058 SAFEGUARDS FOR Bldg! SITUATIONS 9. In the case of CCMINT activities established in risky situations, the following safeguards shall be applied save as exceptions thereto are authorized by senior officers and officials at a level established by USIB or ISIB: a. Only intercept, analytic and reporting tasks which cannot be performed satisfactorily in safe or protected situations shall be assigned. b. No Category COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held except those essential to the assigned task and of current application thereto, and the latter shall be maintained in such? condition as to insure immediate destruction, if necessary, upon sudden threat of seizure. c. No person in Group F, as defined in paragraph 5c above, shall be assigned, unless required by technical considerations. d. Sufficient means of destruction shall be provided in order that complete destruction of classified CCMINT materials may be carried out in the shortest time possible by the minimum number of personnel. e. Appropriate steps shall be taken to insure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis. SAFEEUARDS FCR M033 SITUATIONS 10. In the case of COMINT units established in dangerous situations the following safeguards shall be applied save as exceptions thereto are authorized by senior officers and officials?gja level established by USIB or LSIE: a. Only unique intercept tasks which cannot be accomplished elsewhere shall be assigned, and only such analysis as is locally required to support these tasks and pern?t essential technical reporting shall be performed. b. Chly COHINT documents or technical aids essential and of current application to these tasks shall be held. -26.. NSA Case 100386 Page 00026 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613058 c. No Category COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held. d. Personnel technically informed in COMINT of a higher leVel or broader scope than is required for the limited mission of the unit should not be assigned if avoidable. e. No person in Group as defined in sub?paragraph 5b above shall be assigned unless his presence is vital for the effective function? ing of the unit. f. No person in Group as defined in sub?paragraph 5c above shall be assigned in any circumstances. g. Sufficient means of destruction shall be previded in order that maximum destruction of classified COMINT material may be carried:gn> in the shortest time possible by the minimum number of personnel. h. Appropriate steps shall be taken to insure that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis. 27.? 95551 :15 Ease as, NSA Case 100386 Page 00027 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613060 TOP Senegal:an- '5 APPENDIX PRINCIPLES OF UKUSA COLLABMICN WITH COMMONWEALTH I OTHER THAN THE UK l= This Appendix records the general principles governing UKUSA COMINT collaboration with Commonwealth countries (other than the UK). General 2. Commonwealth countries other than the UK are not parties to the UKUSA CCMINT Agreement but they will not be regarded as Third Parties. Canada, Australia and New Zealand with whom there are special agreements on COMINT policy are referred to as collaborating countries; 30 LSIB will keep USIB informed of any arrangements or proposed arrangements with Commonwealth countries and will obtain the views of USIB prior to initiating or pursuing with any non-collaborating couIItry COMINT arrangements involving the release of material or the provision of guidance in accordance with paragraph 9 of Appendix Prior ti the release to a nonecollaborating country of data as described in sag; paragraph 8(a) of Appendix F, GCHQ will obtain the view of NSA regard? ing the suitability of the data for release. A. Arrangements for collaboration between the 0.8. and the joint Australian/UK/Hew Zealsnd agency, Ibisnce Signals Branch Melbourne, and for 11.8.. liaison in Australia and New Zealand are set out in Annexure J1. Any major changes in or additions to these arrangements for 0,5. collaboration with Australia and New zealand will be the subject of prior consultation between USIB and LSIB. 5. USIB will obtain the views of prior to completing an arrange- ment with Canada. 6. USIB will conduct its arrangements with all other Commonwealth countries in accordance with the principles set out in Appendix to the UKUSA COMINT Agreement. 7. It is noted that LSIB has obtained from the CUMINT authorities of collaborating Commonwealth countries formal assurances that they will abide by the terms of paragraphs 5, 8, and 9 of the UKUSA COMINT Agreement, and of Appendix and paragraph 7 of Appendix thereto. Approved for Release by NSA on 04-04-2018, FOIA Case #100386 (Litigation) NSA Eco I cow Maw PAJSE TOP Docu Mm ANNUAL. marge, NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00028 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613060 8. USIB and 1818 agree: not to pass to any Commonwealth country COMINT end-product items originated by agencies of the other party without the consent of that party, except as may be agreed from time to time; to pass to collaborating Commonwealth countries, via agreed COMINT channels, only such technical COMINT materials as are deemed to be relevant to the tasks of the Cannon- weelth country concerned or as may be otherwise agreed between the two perties from time to time; the relevance of technical COMINT materials to the tasks of thoee Commonwealth countries shall be determined by the Director, GOHQ or the Director, releVant materials shall then be releasable sehject to whatever restrictions may be specified by the agency which produced the material (1.50 GCHQ or NBA). SQ?cotuo, NSA TS come (13PY I PAGE ?Ll PAGEE SUBJECT TI) SEAAL ANNUAL NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00029 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613062 7 u-I. 3r APPENDDC Jl UKUSA MEETS AFFECTEQ 11de mp momma 1.. It is noted that Defence Signals Branch Melbourne (DSB) is, in contrast to Commnioations Branch Ottawa, not a purely national centre. It is and will continue to be a joint Hit-Australian-New Zealehd organi- zation, manned b; an integrated staff. It is a civilian organization under the metrelianDepertment of Defence and undertakes GG-IINT tasks asagreed between the CW governing authorities of Australia and New Zesland on the one hand and 1.313 on the other. On technical matters only, control is exercised by Government Communications Headquarters on behalf of 1.81128. 2. GCHQ will keep NSA informed of the tasks that have been agreed for DSB and will notify NSA in advance before any new or altered task is agreed for DSB. 3. NSA and DSB will collaborate directly on those DSB tasks which, I as determined by NSA, fall within the field of collaboration and will exchange raw material, technical material and end-product of these tasks. In addition NSA will provide DSB with raw material, t'echnioalfmaterial and end-product as appropriate on other tasks determined by NSA to be relevant to the tasks of DSB. A list of tasks under both these heads will be maintained currently by NSA and GCHQ. 4., NSA and DSB will also exchange technical interception data re- lating to the General Search effort of each in the Far East? 5. Exchanges between NSA and DSB under the above paragraphs will be complete in scope but in special circumstances each agency will have the right to withhold material at its discretion. 6. The direct collaboration and consequent exchanges between NSA. and DSB will be regulated by the provisions of the following appendices to the UWSA Agreementnoted that, in interpretation or Appendix I to the UEUSA Agreement, DSB and NSA have mutually accredited liaison officers. 5? km 8. It is further noted that, in interpretation 01? Appendix I to the Approved for Release by NSA on 04-04?2018, I I pom Case #100386 (LitigationCOPY wok PAGE A was DOEMENT: :s s?m to mix-3' ANNUAL INVENTORY. NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00030 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613062 -- 7 UKUSA Agreement, USIB may accredit a senior ILS. representative for cenducting liaison on matters pertaining to COMINT with Australia and New Zealand and, as me},r be agreed by 1.513, with UK officials in those - countries. Similarly, the terms of reference for the D313 liaison officer accredited to NSA may be modified at some future date to permit the conduct of liaison with 11.5. authorities on matters pertaining to COMINT. PAGE We DOCUM - ANNUAL a To 59?" NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00031 (reissued from 12 January 2018 Release A) Doc ID: 6613059 . 5 Mabel. 1959 CLASSIFICATION AED OF INFORMATION RELATED TO COMINT 0R CCMINT ACTIVITIES INTRODUCTION 1. This Annemre establishes minimmn standards with respect to the handling and classification of information which is neither CHEM nor that contained in the "documents and technical material" as desoribed in paragraph 19 of Appendix B, yet reveals, directly or by implication, the existence or nature of COMINT or of COMINT activities. 2. The nature of COMINT and activities and their susceptibility to loss recruire that certain infomation regarding these activities and their product be restricted to persons who have been cleared and indoctrinated for access to CCMINT. Certain other infonnation concerning these activities and their product may be handled mthin conventional channels for information of similar classification. It is essential, however, that reference to the existence or nature of CCMINT or any COMINT activity, either direct or indirect, be avoided except among those to whom the lmowledge is necessary for the preper performance of their duties. 3. Information related to comm or COMINT activities which indicates a. degree of success or progress in the production of COMINT, a sophisticated COMINT technique or the scale and direction 'of effort to a degree which may stimulate countermeasures, as specified in Annex A hereto, must be safeguarded precisely as though it were COMINT. Except as provided'ior hereinafter, docunents containing such infomation, including messages trans? mitted electrically, shall be transmitted only via COMINT channels, and shall bear the classification and codeword approPriste to the moat sensitive category or sub-category of to which they relate, Information related to CCHINT or GWINT activities, specified in Annex hereto, shall be kept exclusively within COMINT channels, except as provided for hereinafter and in that Annex. Dooments which contain such information, 1 5115 Approved for Release by NSA on 04?04?2018. FOIA Case #100386 (Litigation) NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00032 Doc ID: 6613059 including messages transmitted electrically, shall bear the apprOpriate classification but no GOMINT cedeword, and shall be clearly identified by I the caveat VIA COMINT CHANNELS stamped, typewritten, or printed on each page. In the case of bound documents, the identification will show on the cover and title page, if any. 5. Information pertaining to CCMINT or COMINT activities, specified in Annex hereto, may be handled in accordance with normal practice for other informa? tion of similar classification. However, nothing herein should be construed. as prohibiting an authority from passing such information in COMINT channels. (In such cases, the caveat CHANNELS om" will not be used.) SPECIAL USAGE 6. Should it become necessary to furnish information of the types listed in Annex A to non?indoctrinated persons, such action will be taken only after specific authorization in each case by preper authority designated by USIB or LSIB. When a document containing such information is released from COMINT channels, the codeword must be removed. NSA and GCHQ, through technical channels, will undertake to keep the other party informed, at least in general terms, of the material involved. 7. Information related to COMINT or COMINT activities of the types listed in Annex may be furnished to non-indoctrinated persons, only with the prior approval of the originator or proper authority and in accordance with the procedures established by USIB or LSIB. When a document containing such information is released from COMINT channels, the handling caveat must be removed or rendered illegible. 8. Every reasonable precaution must be taken to ensure that document released from COMINT channels are given mir?mmn distribution and receive the security protection their contents warrant. 9. Working papers and similar documents containing information of the types listed in Annexes A and'B need not, at the discretion of the officer in charge and after full consideration of the risks involved, bear the classi? fication, codeword or handling caveat when handled exclusively within a CCMINT secure area by indoctrinated persons. -2- NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00033 [Doc CLASSIFICATION 10. 'Ihe?classification of each segment containing infomtion related to COMINT or comm activities must- became-sea indi?dually, areas due consideration of the damage which unauthorized disclosure of its contents could cause to national security, national interests, and the capab?ity of either party to continue to produce comunicatio'ns. intelligence. I I PUBLIC ll. Headmm feasible administrative action will be taken to reguire that all public statements which may contain infonnation related to or COMINT activities are submitted, for preliminary review and advice, to the a?propriate authority, as specified by either Board. In the event that such information already publicly revealed is included in a document su?onitted by a private source for review, an attempt by persuasion shall be made to eliminate such information or to express it in such general terms as to conceal, to the maximum degree possible, Specific associations with activities. In the event such a document is submitted by an official source, that document will be classified in accordance with paragraph 10 above. NSA Case 100386 Page 00034 - - .7 . Emir is . willWhen infernati'on is neither conteined in the "'docments I and technical material" referred to in paragraph Appendix B, indicates? I I a degree of success or progress being in the. production of comunications intelligence, or I II I a. sophisticated COMINT technique, or the scale and direction of the COMINT effort to a degree which may stmulate countemeasures, 5? it must bet?acoorded the protection of the classification and codeword appropriate to the highest category of CCMINT to which it relates, and. will be kept within CCMINT channels unless released therefrom by proper authority designated by USIB or LSIB. If the category of GOMINT to which the information relates is not imown, it will be accorded the protection of the highest category, 2. Examples of the kind of infomation which may reveal or above are:- Consumer requirements for infomation from a specific source. Information regarding the nature and extent of collaboration with foreign govermnents. Detailed characteristics and capabilities of equiment as applied in (31-18 Usc 795 the exploitation of COMINT. (ZN-50 USC 3024(1) lb) 85?36 Details of techniques used in COMINT research or . . production. Approved for Release by NSA on 04~04~20]8, FOIA Case #100386 (Litigation) NSA OIA Case 100386 Page 00035 Doc ID: 6613372 VB ANNEXURE ANNEX TYPES OF INFORMATION TO BE HANDLED VIA COMINT CHANNEIS ONLY l. Infomation which does not require codeword protection but which relates to COMINT or COMINT activities will bear the classification indicated (but no codeword), will carry the caveat VIA COMINT CHANNELS and be retained in COMINT channels unless exempted or released in accordance with pro- cedures established by USIB or 15113. TOP SECRET 2. Momation relating to COMINT or COMINT activities will be classified TOP SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of it could result in exceptionally grave damage to national security, national interests or the continued conduct of COMINT Operations. Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification are:? A plan, doctrine or policy or information on tasking or control which reveals specific COMINT operations. of major importance. Information revealing the extent or nature of CCMINT collaboration with specific foreign goverments, including written agreements establishing such collaboration. Details of COMINT arrangements with Third Parties. Construction and budgetary information of major importance relating to CCMINT collection and processing organizations and installations. Safe combinations permitting access to COMINT or information regarding activities. ems 3. Information relating to CCEMINT or COMINT activities will be classified SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of it could result in serious damage ?to national Security, national interests or the continued conduct of CCMINT operations. Examples of the kind 01? information which may warrant this classification are res-seem Approved for Release by NSA on 04w04e2018, FOIA Case #100386 (Litigation) NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00036 Doc ID: 6613372 A plan, doctrine, or policr or infonmation on tasking or control which reveals important specific .COMINT operations. Base rights negotiations for CQ-IINT sites, Which involve disclosure of the specific purposes for which the sites are intended. Impertant construction and budgetary information relating to COMINT collection and processing organizations and installations. Individual intercept assignments. (e Detailed plans and overall operational effectiveness of organizations . All personnel reports and doeuments, civilian and/cradlitary which indicate authorized and/or actual agency CCMINT strength in total, by job designation or by organizational element title where such designation or organizational element title would indicate details of the comm mission. Information which reveals the existence, but not the extent or nature, of collaboration or liaison on COMINT matters with specific foreign govemments unless a higher claseification is warranted by special circumstances . (11) References to the existence of Third Party CCMINT arrangements, with? out specific details unless a higher classification is warranted by special circumstances. CONFIDENTIAL A. Information relating to COMINT or COMINT activities will be classified the unauthorized disclosure of it could be prejudicial to national security, national interests or the continued conduct of COHINT operations. Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification arch- A plan, doctrine, or policy or information on tasking or control which reveals specific COMINT operations of a minor nature. CWINT indoctrination and debriefing statements. .w Lists of COMINT indoctrinated and debriefed personnel. Information which reveals extent of effort or special purpose features of electronic computers as utilized for COMINT processing, without revealing COMINT techniques. 6 NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00037 anna -. 1' i255; TYPES OF INFORMATION WHICH MAY BE BARBIE) IN ACCORDANCE mom SECURITY ammrigg 1. Information pertaining to COMINT which neither requires codeword protection I nor the caveat VIA COMINT CHANNEIS will be classified and handled in accordance with 11.5. or U.K. governmental security regulations in effect for information unconnected with GCMINT or CCMINT activities. seam. 2. Infomation, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to national security or national interests, will be classified SECRET. Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification are:- Construction and budgetary matters pertaining to COMINT collection or processing organizations and installations, provided no reference is made to their specific functions. (5) Base rights negotiations for COMINT sites, provided no mention is made of actual purposes for which the sites are intended. CONFIDENTIAL 3. Information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could be prejudicial to national security or national interests, will be classified CONFIDENTIAL. Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification are:- Personnel reports and documents, civilian or military, which indicate authorized or actual CCMINT agency strength in total, by organizational element, short title or symbol, by primary element, or by function. Regulations stating the general mission and functions of COMINT activities that do not reveal specific COMINT techniques or procedures. Correspondence on hazardous duty restrictions pertaining toindividuals released from assignments. I UNCLASSIFIED Examples of the kind of Momation which is UNCLASSIFIED are as follows:-- -7- It Approved for Release by NSA on 04-04-2018, - FOIA Case #100386 (Litigation) NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00038 e: Cover names assig-Led'tc . out of context; I The terms "Classi?cations intelligence" and Intelligenoe?iand when used out of Contact. I References in broad, general, non-specific terms to intercept; direction finding, horse operator analysis and radio finger printing as sources of intelligence. I Elementary principles of traffic analysis, military and Mention of interest in computer type circuits, if no indication is made to type of systems in which they are to be used. Individual job titles and descriptions that do not contain information otherwise listed above as requiring 'cJasificstion. Project numbers and titles used in justification of purchase of materials when no technical usage is specified. 'Ihe fact of association between any U.S. or 0.11:. COMINT agency providing it is not shown to be in the COMINT field. NSA FOIA Case 100386 Page 00039