House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Report on RuSsian Active Measures March 22, 2018 Classified by. 5888841 u �:::::;: =�:: ,ees ! PROPERTY OF Tl IE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATNES Table of Contents Abbreviations Referenced Persons Preface (U) introduction and Overview Summary Table of Findings Summary Table of Recommendations Chapter 1 - Russian Influence Campaigns in Europe Chapter 2 - Russia Attacks the United States (U) Chapter 3 - America Reacts Chapter 4 Campaign Links to Russia Chapter 5 - intelligence Community Assessment Leaks (U) Chapter 6 Summary of Related Committee Oversight Efforts (U) Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations Appendices (U) Appendix A: Scope and Methodology (U) Appendix B: Russia Investigation Parameters Appendix C: Russia?s Media Propaganda Apparatus Appendix D: Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 1011 (U) Appendix E: HPSCI Majority Memo About FISA Abuses (U) Appendix F: Minority Memo About FISA Abuses Appendix G: Senate Judiciary Memo About Christopher Steele Referral Appendix H: Committee Correspondence with 00PROPERTY OF THE US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 11 22 33 ED 99 111 114 131 FARA FBI FEC PISA FISC FSB FY RU HPSCI HUMINT 1AA iC ICA ICD . Intelligence Community Abbreviations Associated Press Advanced Persistent Threat Central Intelligence Agency Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph Deputy Attorney General Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Department of Homeland Security Defense intelligence Agency Democratic National Committee Director of National Intelligence Department of Justice US. Election Assistance Commission European Union Foreign Agents Registration Act Federal Bureau of investigation Federal Election Commission Foreign intelligence Surveillance Act Foreign intelligence Surveillance Court Russian Federal Security Bureau Fiscal Year Russian General Staff Main i intelligence Directorate . House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (the Committee) I-Iuman intelligence Intelligence Authorization Act intelligence Community Assessment intelligence Community Directive Intelligence Community Policy Guidance Internet Research Agency NASS NATO NCCIC NGO NIST NSA NSAC NSC ODNI PTT RNC RT SCI SIS SSA SVR UK VOIP VPN National Association of Secretaries of State North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Nongovernmental Organization National Institute for Standards and Technology National Seourity Agency Candidate Trump?s National Security Advisory Committee National Security Council Of?ce of the Director of National Intelligence Presidential Transition Team Republican National Committee Formerly known as Russia Today Sensitive Compartmenteo? Information Signals Intelligence Moldovan Intelligence Service Supervisory Special Agent Russian Foreign Intelligence Service United Kingdom Voice Over internet Protocol Virtual Private Network PROPERTY OF THE US. OF REPRESENTATIVES ii (U) Referenced Persons Founder of WikiLeaks i Steve Form er Senior Counselor to theirs-133 nt and White House Chief Strategist {January-August 201?}; former Chief Executive Of?cer of II Donald Trump 5 2016 presidential campaign; former Executive Chair-I! man of Breitbart News II I Le Brennan John Former DirectoI of the Central agency [201-3 2017i Cameron David Former Prime Ministm of the United Kingdom {2010 2016} Chailra Yuri" I Prosecutoi General of the Husslan Federation [2556 present} Clapper ?ames - F?nrnter Director of National Intelligence [2010- 201?i Clinton _H Ilarv illuminated :Is the Democratic candidate ior PresidenL In 2016,- for- Secretary of State (2009-2013); former First Lady of the United States :Sam .Iunlor White Hou. se Adviser to the United States Dr p1: tment oi?? rip;- rinuittire {2013' present], Notional Co chair of Donald 201G presid en ?ai campaign Cohen Michael Executive Vice PresTi'ent of the Trump Organization and Special Counsel to Donald Trump Co may James Former Dire?tier of the Perle?rel Brlreau_ of invIe?stigation {2013- 201 Conway iieilvanne Counselor to the President Camp sign tIianagerof Donald Trump 5 2016 presidential campaign {August 2316 November B. 2016] ?earbatn Rick. White House Depuwaiei of Staff for Legislative, Intergovernmen tai Dive-1min Dmitriev Downer Fatah oI-Sisi 'iiMh I Djulmnouic [lg?Dr [l?li-presen Li; Executive Director of the 2016 Presidential Transition 733m .- Deputy Chief for Internal Policy of the Russian Federation I Milo Kiilii Alexander I AI iced-Ir I (Ii?tier Eitecutive Officer of the Russian L?IirecL Investment Fun-ti. Former President of Montenegro irom 1998-20-02; former Prime Minister from 2003-2006, 2301:1?2010, and 2012- 2D1ia' I Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom Chairman of the Boord oi Directors oi Russian Railways I President of Egypt [201a-prese nt] I: GF THE US. HOUSE OF REPRESEN (U) Referenced Persons (cont} Gordon j undsay Grnham Director of Nation.:,! Security of Donald Trump's 2.016 presidentia l campaign __;_ _____________ - IL . C~_rolina_(~9~3·2.~0]_ ... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 United Stateg Senator from Iowa {:1981-present}; former member of the United States House of Represe ntatives from Iowa (1973-1981) - - · ·- White House Director of Communications (201 1-present}; former White House Director of Strategic Co mrnu nicc)tion!I (J;muary 201'· September 2017); National Press Secretarv of th e Presidential Tra n5ltlon Team; Communications Director of Donald Tl'u mp's 201G prr:sldcn~i a! cnmpaign; former employee of the Trump Organi1.atlo n Chucl< !Hope II Hicks .I I__ I ... _____ United States Senator from South C~rolina (2003 -present}; former member of the United States House of Representatives from So uth - -- ·- f.ormr.r Sccrntory of Homc1land Scc1J rlty {2013·201,) J~~n,o~ j Kellogg Keith E1~ul -Milshburn - - -- JJ~ n _ McCabe I. lvanka Trump in 2009); real-est ate developer Sergey _ _ __ · Andrew IChuim)Un of~ naldTrump's 201G pr~Gldentii ~ilmpolr,n (June • - Augu!:t 2016) co : led, \;;-i th Senator thef orelgopolicy advisory panei..o f . _D_o_r_1a_ld_Trump'.s 2016 presidential camp aigfl ·sessions. __ 11 Former Deputy Director ol th e Federal 13ureau of lnvostigatio11 (2016 -2018) PROPER r Y 01- f HE U.S. HOUS E O F REPRESENTr'\T1VES Iv (U) Referenced Persons (cont} r-· - - ---·- - ·McConnell ---,..· .Sena - te- Majority ---· . --- -----------~ Leader (2015,present); UnHed Stales Senator from Mitch l Kentuc:l(y ( 1985-prcsent) M cCord I Former /\cling As~istant At1orney Genr.ra l of the U1)ited.Statcs {2016 M ary 1-2017); former Principal Deput'f Assistant Attorney Genr.ra r for rresldtmt __ 111- -- ·- --- ·- S~ct~a-s yof Stcite no~lne; (M ~rch 2018); oiract;r of the Centra l lr'lt~lllgt:nce Ag1.mcy (Janu arv 2017·prC5Cl'lt ); former member of t he ,..___ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ __ _,~d SE1.?S Mouse of Representatives from Kan9a, (2011-2017) PROP~R1Y OF THE U.S. HOUS E OF REPRESENTJ\TlVES V (U} Referenced Persons (cont} ~P-L1~n - - -· -- - ..,._-~-'i'a-d-rn-,1-r·--·~ ~----'T"=PresldOfll of the Russian Federollon (7.012,-prr.s(m·t)- - Reid Harry Rice St1~1~1~SUM l'AI tVGB viii morrow and continue their watch to protect the American people against further threats from Russia and other adversaries. (U) Nevertheless, the Committee remains concerned that Russia will continue to undermine western democracies by stoking social strife, political unrest, and division. As a country, it is time for us to reflect, understand what happened, fix the discovered problems, and unify around the common purpose of countering any future influence campaigns by Russia or any other nation. PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES lx (U) Introduction and Overview (U) Russia's interference in the 2016 during the 2016 U.S. presidential election U.S. presidential election was nothing novel triggered the Committee to announce a spe- for the Kremlin. The Kremlin aspires to sow cific inquiry into Russia's campaign (see Ap- chaos and discord and advance its agenda in pendix B). The bipartisan parameters fo- targeted nations, particularly in Europe and cused the investigation and this report-this former Soviet republics such as the Baltics Committee examined: (1) Russian cyber ac- and Ukraine. To do this, Russia effectively tivity and other active measures that were combines decades of experience in propa- directed against the United States and its ganda and psychological warfare techniques allies; (2) whether the Russian active with its vast media apparatus, a strata of measures include links between Russia and well-educated and proficient technicians, individuals associated with presidential and a robust intelligence and security corps. campaigns; (3) the U.S. government re- (U} In the United States, Russian cyberattacks related to the 2016 elections starkly highlighted technical vulnerabilities in U.S. digital infrastructure and bureaucratic shortcomings that were exploited by the Kremlin. Russia's active measures campaign achieved its primary goal of inciting division and discord among Americans. For more than a year, U.S. politics have been consumed by bitter recriminations, charges, and counter-charges about the attacks. The reliability of the democratic vote-the bedrock of the U.S. republic-was widely and sponse to these Russian active measures and what we need to do to protect ourselves and our allies in the future; and (4) what possible leaks of classified information took place related to the Intelligence Community's assessment of these matters. 1 The Committee interviewed 73 witnesses, conducted 9 hearings and briefings, reviewed approximately 307,900 documents, and issued 20 subpoenas. This allowed the Committee to find answers crucial for identifying and addressing institutional weaknesses to assist the United States with identifying and responding to inevitable hostile acts in the repeatedly questioned. future. (U) At the time of the 2016 U.S. presi- dential election cycle, the Committee was already concerned with Russian malfeasance and aggression in levels that had not been seen since the Cold War. In fact, the IAA for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 included multiple provisions to improve the United States' ability to counter Russian aggression. However, the Kremlin's malicious activities (U) While the 2016 U.S. presidential election helped focus American attention on Russian cyber and information operations, the Russian government has conducted active measure campaigns in Europe for years. Believing it is engaged in an information war with the West, Russia's influence activities employ an array of tactics-usually tailored PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1 to the target country's population and envi- threat and defend their syst ems. State and ronment-in an effort to accomplish t he local governments were slow to grasp the Kremlin's goals. These goals generally in- seriousness of the threat and when notified clude influencing an opponent's leadership of breaches continued to resist any action and population, advancing a narrative, or that implied federal direction or con- inducing a behavior change. The factors trol. Some states opted not to cooperate that make these campaigns successful also with important defensive measures offered make them hard to counter. However, gov- by the DHS. While no tabulation systems, or ernments, non-governmental organizations, systems that count votes, were impacted, and media organizations in Europe have be- the overall security posture of the U.S. fed- gun taking actions to address and mitigate eral, state, and local governments was the threat that Russian influence campaigns demonstrated to be inadequate and vulner- pose. able. (U} The Committee' s investigation also {U) The Russian active measures campaign against the United States was multi- reviewed the opening, in summer 2016, of a faceted. It leveraged cyberattacks, covert FBI enterprise counterintelligence investiga- platforms, social media, third-party interme- tion into-Trump campaign associ- diaries, and state-run media. Hacked mate- ates: rial was disseminated through this myriad network of actors with the objective of un- - dermining the effectiveness of the future matter," the FBI did not notify congressional administration . This dissemination worked leadership about this investigation during in conjunction with derisive messages post- the FBl's regular counterintelligence ed on social media to undermine confidence briefings. Three of-original sub- in the election and sow fear and division in jects of the FBI investigation have been American society. charged with crimes and the Committee's (U) The U.S. government's subsequent response to the Russian active measures campaign during the 2016 election was slow Because of "the sensitivity of the 2 review of these cases covers the period prior to the appointment of Special Counsel in May 2017. {U) While the Committee found no evidence that the Trump campaign colluded, coordinated, or conspired with the Russian government, the investigation did find poor evolved, the FBl's notification to victims and judgment and ill-considered actions by the oversight committees was inconsistent in Trump and Clinton campaigns. For exam- timeliness and quality, which contributed to ple, the June 2016 meeting at Trump Tower the victims' failure to both recognize the between members of the Trump campaign PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2 and a Russian lawyer who falsely purported to have damaging information on the Clinton campaign demonstrated poor judgement. The Committee also found the Trump campaign's periodic praise for and communications with Wikileaks-a hostile foreign organization-to be highly objectionable and inconsistent with U.S. national security interests. The Committee also found that the Clinton campaign and the DNC, using a series of cutouts and intermediaries to obscure their roles, paid for opposition research on Trump obtained from Russian sources, including a litany of claims by high- ranking current and former Russian government officials. Some of this opposition research was used to produce sixteen memos, which comprise what has become known as the Steele dossier. (U) The effectiveness and relatively low cost of information operations, such as the dissemination of propaganda, make it an attractive tool for foreign adversaries. Unless the cost-benefit equation of such operations changes significantly, the Putin regime and other hostile governments will continue to pursue these attacks against the United States and its allies. Based on the investigation, the Committee recommends several solutions to help safeguard U.S. and allies' political processes from nefarious actors, such as the Russians. 1. 2. HPSCI Press Re lease , Intelligence Committee Chairman, Ranking M ember Establish Parameters for Russia Investigation, Mar. 1, 2017. HPSCI, "Russian Active Me asures Investigation Open He aring," Mar. 20, 2017. PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIV ES 3 (U} Summary Table of Findings (U) Finding #1: The Kremlin exploits free or independent media spaces and open democracies to conduct active measures in Europe. (U) Finding #2: Russia supports fringe political parties and non-governmental organizations in Europe to further the Kremlin's agenda while also disparaging or discrediting politicians and groups seen as hostile to Moscow. (U) Finding #3: Russia conducts increasingly aggressive cyber operations against European governments; a tactic that will continue to present a profound threat. (U) Finding #4: Russia targets disaffected European populations and exploits social, political, and racial divisions in an effort to sow discord, encourage unrest, and incite protests. (U) Finding #5: Russia leverages business and economic ties in Europe to achieve the Kremlin's goals, message displeasure, or inflict punishment. (U) Finding #6: European governments and media outlets are conducting a variety of activities to combat Russian influence campaigns. (U) Finding #7: Russia conducted cyberattacks on U.S. political institutions in 2015-2016. (U) Finding #8: Russian-state actors and third-party intermediaries were responsible for the dissemination of documents and communications stolen from U.S. political organizations. (U) Finding #9: The Russian government used RT to advance its malign influence campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. (U) Finding #10: Russian intelligence leveraged social media in an attempt to sow social discord and to undermine the·u.s. electoral process. (U) Finding #11: The Federal Bureau of Investigation' s notification to numerous Russian hacking victims was largely inadequate. · (U) Finding #12: Communication between the Department of Homeland Security and state election officials was impeded by state officials' mistrust of federal government overreach coupled with a unprecedented level of Russian cyber intrusions. PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 4 (U) Summary Table of Findings (cont) C~APTER 3: ·AM~Rlt;A REA<;:TS'(CONT) (U) Finding #13: The joint Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Department of Homeland Security public statement attributing election interference to Russia was ineffective. (U) Finding #14: The Executive Branch's post-election response was insufficient. (U) Finding #15: The majority of the Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on Russia's election activities employed proper analytic tradecraft. (U) Finding #16: The Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on Putin's strategic intentions did not employ proper analytic tradecraft. (U) Finding #17: The Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an enterprise counterintelligence investigation into the Trump campaign after receiving information related to Trump (U) Finding #18: As part of the enterprise counterintelligence investigation into the Trump campaign, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an individual counterintelligence investigation into Carter Page. (U) Finding #19: The dossier compiled by Christopher Steele formed an essential part of an application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to obtain electronic surveillance on Carter Page. (U) Finding #20: Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted Paul Manafort on several charges, none of which relate to allegations of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Russian government. (U) Finding #22: General Flynn pleaded guilty to making a false statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding his December 2016 conversations with Ambassador Kislyak, even though the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents did not detect any deception during Flynn's interview. (U) Finding #23: Executive Branch officials did not notify the Trump campaign that members of the campaign were assessed to be potential counterintelligence concerns. (U) Finding #24: The February 2018 indictment of the Internet Research Agency and Russian nationals exposes Russian actors and their intent to spread distrust towards the candidates and the political system in general. PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5 TOP SECRET /NOFORN (U) Summary Table of Findings (cont.) CHAPTER 4: CAMPAIGN LINKS WITH RUSSIA (U) Finding #25: When asked directly, none of the interviewed witnesses provided evidence of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Russian government. (U) Finding #26: The Committee found no evidence that President Trump's pre-campaign business dealings formed the basis for collusion during the campaign. (U) Finding #27: The Republican national security establishment's opposition to candidate Trump created opportunities for two less-experienced individuals with pro-Russia views to serve as campaign advisors: George Papadopoulos and Carter Page. {U) Finding #28: The change in the Republican Party platform regarding Ukraine resulted in a stronger position against Russia, not a weaker one, and there is no evidence that Paul Manafort was involved. (U) Finding #29: There is no evidence that Trump associates were involved in the theft or publication of Clinton campaign-related emails, although Trump associates had numerous ill-advised contacts with Wikileaks. (U) Finding #30: Carter Page did not travel to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the Trump campaign, but the Committee is concerned about his seemingly incomplete accounts of his activity in Moscow. (U) Finding #31: George Papadopoulos' attempts to leverage his Russian contacts to facilitate meetings between the Trump campaign and Russians was unsuccessful. (U) Finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a June 9, 2016, meeting at Trump Tower where they expected to receive-but did not ultimately obtain-derogatory information on candidate Clinton from Russian sources. (U) Finding #33: Donald Trump Jr. briefly met with a Russian government official at the 2016 National Rifle Association annual meeting, but the Committee found no evidence that the two discussed the U.S. presidential election. (U) Finding #34: The Committee found no evidence that meetings between Trump associates-including Jeff Sessions-and official representatives of the Russian governmentincluding Ambassador Kislyak-reflected collusion, coordination, or conspiracy with the Russian government. TOP SECRET /NOFORN PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 6 (U) Summary Table of Findings (cont.) . .), • - .cH.~·~~E~.'A:.€AM PAIGNi· tl N1 ~MERlt'!.I,\ RE~€lS 1 .- - ~ f~0Nw!) . _, 1 .! ~ (U) Recommendation #19: All U.S. presidential campaigns should receive unclassified counterintelfigence briefings at an appropriate time prior to a nomination convention. (U) Recommendation #20: When consistent with national security, the Intelligence Community should immediately inform U.S. presidential candidates when it discovers a legitimate counterintelligence threat to the campaign, and promptly notify Congress. (U) Recommendation #21: Both houses of Congress should consider requiring all staff to receive an annual counterintelligence awareness briefing. - . "'·-··- . .• ..., · I i GHA.J'iliER-iiUe~ MPAIGN~UNKS if©!RUSSV~ - - -~- .- ~- -- h h = (U) Recommendation #22: Political campaigns and law enforce me nt should ensure th at their counte rintelligen ce defens es a pproprlately account for the role of cut-outs and Intermedial'ies. - T ~ . (U) Recommendation #23: Congress should conside r amending curre nt ca mpaign finance laws to furthe r increase transparency rega rding services provided by fore ign persons or e ntities. [ GH~p:;fLE~ S.:il ~fu~lfULG~Elil GE:(tQr,11'1\itUNl1F'f,'~SS ESS tylE Nl .ti~~r(S - . ~ "'- ·- ·-- (U) Recommendation #24: Each component of t he Intelligence Community should update its guidance regarding media contacts to ensure the guidance applies to every employee, including senior officials. (U) Recommendation #25 : Congress should consider legislation to increase the pe nalties f~r unauthoriz~d disclosures of classified information. (U) Recommendation #26: 'rhe Executive Branch should consider instituting manda tory polygra phs for all non-confirmed polltlcal a ppointees that have top secret d earances. ·-- . ... . ·- --·-· --·-~··· ·- -···- -- -··- PROPERTY OF THE U .S. HOU SE OF, REPR.ESENTAllV ES 10 {U) Chapter 1-Russian Influence Campaigns in Europe Key Question #1: What Russian cyber activity and other a~tive measures were directed against the United States and its allies? (U) While Americans became ncutely aware of Russian cyber and information operations a-fter the 2016 U.S. presidential election, these activities were not new to {U) l~ussla conducts information warfare in an effort to manipulate the populace and leadership of the nations lt targets. To - these ends, Russia employs on am:iy of tactics for its influence activities in an effort to advance the Russian government's inter- UNCLASSIFIED SOVIET PROPAGANDA TARGETING THE WE;ST AFTER WORLD WAR II ests. When successful, these aclivities can influence an opponent's leadership and population to advance a narrative and induce a b'ehavior change, concurrently serving multiple Russian objectives. (U) Russia's goals for: these campaigns include: to advance the Krernlin's intereslSi discredit the West ; confuse or distort events that threaten Russia's image; break Western political cohesion; and defend Russia's role · as a vital global power. More specific and country-tailored goats also include to: weak· en, divide, and halt further expansion of consensus-driven institutions like NATO and Tj~•<}.J('.,... !'.u.,1,,.1 S..1 ':l\:IHt'(I! /\h(,~....,,,f\f'Q'I•' Ui'lit,"'-4( f:l;t,ft., ,l.,l,«Ju UNCLASSfFIED the EU; sow confusion and amplify divisions among segments of Western populations; challenge establishment politics; damage U.S. foreign policy goals; advance Russia's version of world events; distract from controversial Russian policies and activities; reverse perceived anti-Russian policies; improve bilnteral relations; and strengtt1en economic ties. PROPERTY OF TH[: U.S . HOUSE or: REPRESENTATIVES 11 (U) Aiding in Ru ssia' s influence aclivi- spaces and open democracies through a lhe Internet and socia I media for news and network of Russian state-owned news out· lets and media p la tfo rm s, such as Sputnik communications has allowed Russia to: and RT, whld1 promote Russia's image quickly and easily weapon;ze data stolen In abroad and show foreigners world events cyber breaches; disseminate propaganda, from a Russian perspective (see Appendix misinformation, and disinformation; and C}. tives, the modern world's widespread use of aggravate social, racial, and political divisions. (U} The Kremlin 's active measures, or Information warfare, strategy includl':!S sev- · eral tactics: (U) Finding fll: The Kremlin exploits free or Independent media spaces ancf open democracies to conduct active mea sures in Europe. • (U) After alleged Russian interfer- ence in the Brexit vote, in October 2013, the U.I<. Electoral Commission announced a probe into this activity. According to open source reporting, Russian-based Twitter accounts posted more than 45,000 messages about Brexit in 48 hours during the 2016 referendum vote. 7 {~) Russia also exploils free media PROPFRTY OF THF U.S HOUSF OF ~1:-PHl~SFMTA11VI::; 12 to Moscow. (U) Plant and propagate false news stories: Russia uses "troW' armies to set up fake soc ial media accounts and biogs, Including through an organization loP<>.-1<.,.1:,,...,,...,,1 THE .;:~~ ~ ·p EOOES·T .A, .. MA~ ;;;\ 9, demonstrate fluency. Gucclfer 2.0 "1 . terminated the Interview when challenged on thi s point;b Sourca: T~!cr UNCl.ASSIFIEO • (-U-) Wlltch of emails from Clinton campaign <.h3lr ~ ! ~ l . t c + Mtfo'l.~ ~ , ; , / 1 ~ ~ . ~ .o.., ~ ~ 1 1 ;U:w,l"'"1-11lll ~-t".2!M"'h••.W ftt -tvf ~ti• Source: ti...,.,~~,'--'*""~C.... r'N'\ ll"Y\ Twitter UNCLASSIFIED (U) The Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Russra-based ''troll farm" with ties to the Kremlln, was ,·e.sponsible for placing ads and maintaining both human operated and au- . to mated social media accounts for the malign influence campa[gn/'11 . (UJ Twitter (U) The 2016 Russian Twitter operatio n of other socia l m~dia platforms to undermine the U~S. powas coordin ated with the use litical process :and divide Americans. Both presidentia I candidates (@Hilla ryClinton and @realOonaldTrump) were directly engaged through "retweets" :a nd "likes," as were various p·olitically active and divisive . PH0Pf:R1Y OF THE U.S. HOU SE OF REPREGEN TATIVl::'.S 32 factions of American society. Wikileak~. (U) In total, Twitter identified 36,746 automated Russian accounts which were responsible for producing 1.4 milllon unique {U) Facebook (U) Russian operators also used Face- tw~ets. In addition, Twilter identified 2,752 book Pages and advertising to advance their human-operated accounts. Some of these malign Influence campaign. The company' s accounts masqueraded as the news media, internal revtew found activists, and political organizations. One motion 9f 120 ~nique Facebook Pages by Russian accolint, @TEN_GOP, successfully the IRA. These pages 13enerated approxi- Impersonated the Tennessee Republican mately 80,000 posts over the two year peri- Party and grew.to have significantly more colmt. After tweeting "We Love You, Mr. od preceding the election. These posts appeared ln 29 million users' Facebook ''News Feeds." When Facebook calculated the cu- President" to Donald Trump, @TEN_GOP mulative lmpact of "Shares" " Likes" and followers than the legitimate Twitter ac~ received a thank you from the preside'n tial the creation and ·pro- "Follows,'' the company estimated.that 129 million people may have been served Rus- 35 candidate. sia's malign Influence content.JG (U) @TEN GOP and other Russianlinked accounts incited racial divisions, antiMusrim, and anti-immigrant messages. They also promoted the dissemination of material stolen from U.S. political organizations by the GRU. The Russian cyber per- sonas DC Leaks and Guccifer 2.0 used Twitter to promote stolen material, as did UMCLASSIFIED RUSSIAN TWEETS USING @HlllaryClinton and @realDonaldTrump l•) 1_- ro1,~ 32,:?5,, ((1 Tw<:Oll. /4 416.632 f! TwOOIG • ~ 1' 1,326 480,3-16 l ~ea l.,i(es Russl~n T\1Jlt1e, Acco.unto T~fGC!lng @Hill~l')'Clinton follower.. A I TBrgortina@<2alOonnldTrump fonowen; {U} According to Facebook, much of the Russian activity was-designed to promote divisive soclal and political me~sages across the ideological spectrum and that advertising was intended to drive f611owership of divisive Pages. Four of the top lrnpressiongenerating (or number of times an ad was on screen) advertisernents\1o1ere from fictitious personas claiming to represent organizations lncll1dln3 "B.ick the Badge," "Bfacktivist," "Being Patriotic," and "Woke Blacks.'' 37 (U) Russian malign influence activiti es on Facebook were significant but they were not well-funded or large-scale operations relative to the overall scope of electionrelated .:ictivlty on these platforms: • Prior to the election, Russian opera- tors used paid advertising on Face- book to reach s million Americans PROP E;Rrf OF '1116 U.S. HOUSE OF REPR"$ENTA'rlVES 33 U NCLASSI Ff ED RUSSIAN ADS ON FACEBOOK . M..--.th~ , . , • "-""' f l"IJ-.0. ""41 '"'l"'"= -~~-~ .......... """"' ~ ." u....s Mi6,4 "4 fcniJA 1,1, PW t ei: • • , Ofl.'\li:I .... ' "· • U••"'- ·"f'~~\,C:; - . l ~ · ~ r.t V"ffl l<.·~ lffl C1 l• I ( ~ 'i... ~ .,_.,,..,._ 23 w , 1v C.. !i' ~ z . ,_ r~ fct a i l ~ r,~ , ; , i l G8 t' ro,rr-~ o,;rir.,, ll"o - . lOU Vflf!dd ~ .,. , ._ :-4, N"3,i),,,~ t] r-....... ... t"I.I ~ ~-........ -W.9'MY.t!_-,_,,_,M_ l'lwlo"-- c-, t ~,~!l.) ~At.:!, ~ ~IJQIINl-ot -- Source: Facebook UNCLASSIFIED PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRl::SENTA1'1VES 34 {based on Impressions). At the same found that. Twitter, Facebook, Google, and on Facebook Pages and ust~rs aver- other social .media platforms face slgoificant aeed 220 per day; • (U) The Committee's Investigation time, 33 trillion stories were served 56% of the 11.4 million impressions associated with Russian Facebook advertisfng occurred after the elec- challenges In tt1eir effort to identify and act on malign influence campaigns. Some of those challenges include: • tion; • Sophisticated actors adapt to auto· mated defenses; 99% of Russian Facebook ads were • funded with less than $1,000 and 25% were never seen . Social media does not requlre true name usage; • Users can easily conceal thef r physi- {U) Google cal location wrth virtual pr.ivate net- {U} Google also was used as a media work connections; platform for Russia's malign influence campaign. The company's investigation re- • vealed that $4,700 was spent promoting 18 channels and 1,100 YoliTUbe videos (43 hours of content). Social media seeks authentic exchanges and does not want to censor speech; and • Social media platforms do not have access to intelligence reporting. {U) Google describes this as a limited investment compared to overall electionrelated spe nding on Google. In total, 0.0002 percent of 2016 U.S. election advertising was found to be associated w ith Rl1S- sian malign actors. In addition, Google noted that this Russian-funded media had very low view counts with onty 3% reaching views of 5,000 or mo~e. (U) However, it sl)ould be noted that Google and its services have been and continue to be used by Russia for the dissemination of propaganda through RT. This is partly evidenced by RT' s 2 .2 million subscribers on You Tube, but also by the fact that RT propaganda is served to Americans by Google in the same manner as legitimate news sources. PROPERTY 01' 1HP. U.S. HOU9F. OF REPRESENTATIVES 35 ....... _,_ }_ 4. 5_ 5_ 7_ 8_ 9.. 10. ll. 13. HP.SO, Full Ccmmitte.! Briefing cm Russia Cyber .Al:tivhy (Oosed Session), Sept 6, 201~: HPSO, f ull C=mitto!e Brwmr.gon Russia Cyber Acti\'ity {Close-d Se~n), Jan_ 10, 2016; Hj,.so, fun Commiuee Bri~ng oo Russia CV~r Act1Ylty {Closed SesSicnL Dec. S, 2016; -DroftJnd!Jent i fl'Jestiga:jon Reportfer the De,'?UJ0vi::c Nationof Ccmmittee, Aug. 24, Wl6; , Droft tn::Ident lnr.1esO{;(Jt1"on Report f or tile OeJtlocrG!ic Congcesslor.a! C!I«:f!Glgn Committee, 1\ug. 8, 2016. l9aticm Repor.fer the Demomror; Cangresslcnaf Compqign Camr_rnttee, Au!;. 8, 2016; Lexis Nexis, D1scover.fSer,f.res FJ:le! S.°iie.et: MJ.Jow Mani' P<19es i n a G,gal:ryte}" 0..-"<. :W, 2017 _ PROPERTY Of r riE US. !iOUSE;. o,= REPRESENTPiTIVES 36 16. ODNI, Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections, Jan. 5, 2017; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activities (Closed Session), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed), Jan. 10, 2016; ; ODNI, Intelligence Community Assessment: Cyber Threats ta the 2016 US Presidential Election (/CA 2016-37HC), Sept. 12, 2016. 17. 18. HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activities (Closed), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016; , "The definitive Trump-Russia Timeline of Events," Politico, Dec. l, 2017; , "Hacking Democracy: The Post's new findings in Russia's bold campaign to influence the U.S. election," Washington Post, July 11, 2017; owing Risk of Strategic Surprise in Cyberspace Operations (NICM 2017-06), Jan. 30, 2017. 19. , "Interview with Gucci/er 2.0," VICE, June 21, 2017. 20. Twitter, @DCLeaks_ 21. 22. 23. 24. "Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee," Crowd Strike Blog, June 15, , Inside Story: How Russians Hacked the Democrats' Emails, Associated Press, Nov. 4, 2017; "All Signs Point ta Russia Being Behind the DNC Hack," VICE, July 25, 2016; "Interview with Gucci/er 2.0," VICE, June 21, 2017. -; "Two Years of Pawn Storm," Trend Micro, Apr. 25, 2017; ThreatConnect, "Gucci/er 2.0: All Roads Lead Back to Russia," July 26, 2016; 25. , "Interview with Guccifer 2.0," VICE, June 21, 2017. 26. ThreatConnect, "Does a BEAR Leak in the Woods? ThreatConnect Identifies DCleaks as Another Russian-Backed Influence Outlet," Aug. 12, 2016 ~ D. Becker, Steven Erlanger, and Eric Schmitt, "How Russia Often Benefits When Julian Assange Reveals the West's Secrets," The New York Times, Aug. 31, 2016. 28. Wikileaks.org, About Wik/Leaks (www.wlkileaks.org), Dec. 22, 2017; Felke Hacquebord, "Two Years of Pawn Storm," Trend Micro, Apr. 25, 2017; ThreatConnect, "Guccifer 2.0: All Roads Lead Back to Russia," July 26, 2016; ; HPSCJ, Full Committee Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016. 29. HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016; Matthew Nussbaum, "The definitive Trump-Russia Timeline of Events," Politico, Dec. 1, 2017; , "Hacking Democracy: The Post's new findings in Russia's bold campaign to influence the U.S. election," Washington Past, July 11, 2017; 30. RT.com, About, Dec. 23, 2017; 31. U.S. Department of State, Media organizations controlled and funded by the Government of the Russia Federation (Report 002580), Nov. 7, 2017. 32. 33. 34. Written testimony o Acting General Counsel of Twitter, Inc., Nov. 1, 2017; HPSCI, "Russia Investigation Task Force Hearing on Social Media," Nov. l, 2017. 35. Written testimony of , Acting General Counsel of Twitter, Inc., Nov. 1, 2017. 36. Written testimony of , General Counsel, Facebook, Nov. 1, 2017. 37. HPSCI, "Russia Investigation Task Force Hearing on Social Media," Nov. l, 2017. PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 37 (U) Chapter 3 -America Reacts Key Question 113: What was the U.S. government response to these Russian active measures and what do we need to do to protect ourselves and our allies in the future? (U) As disct1ssecl in Chapter 2, the IC w cybersecurity intrusions of voter registrntion data main- tained in state election systems."" Secre- tary Johnso,, encouraged election ofiictals to reach out to OHS and also offered a variety of cybersecurity services to state and election officials, Including; • Scans on internet~facing systems, including reporting of vulnerabilities and mitigation recommendations; • Risk and vu lnerabiiity assessments; • Support from the National Cybersecu1·1ty ,md Comn1lr'nications Integra- tion Center {NCCIC) to provide onsite assistance In identifying and re- mediating a cyber Incident; • Information sharing of relevant (U) On OGtober 1, 2016, Secretary Johnson e:I lt111111llrir iMolt11 UJ~... nn :nDLl our process. It's ou,· sovereign responslbll- lty. We're not Interested in the Federal 24 Jh l ,h"-"S \'IM ,.. ta keove r." A clear exampl e of mistrust was 1"!11~tl ~rlJIM.l ,\ocr~..ntl:U.Ati~,~ ,rNo1oi1i.o '2Jl) t'.,,t.,•• ~b':"U rt-t-t.C..l~ rltllf \:J':J,1 :Xi1HI a letter sent from Georgia's Secreta1y of 1 thc.1 3 t\c>()u~n1l'IJ\1th1,,mc~'( ,.-,.,,..,~·:.-,.·frf,'-•,1~ u, 1~ State Brian Kemp to Secretary Johnson on n'l1.thfw o.rta;:.., rtJU1 December 8, 2016, w hich accused DHS of ,:, u;-c~lkf11\lc<..:1\'n,1.uC\.1 t'i'Vn;t~il:.%t lt bt,V'•Sil l ,c.:,1.. \J IT1*'1 1b t\'l 1 V'I h " " ~ 1\:1l11-n1 ltln-,:-a,nl? f1,• -(E.,.t'( ,,,r: attempting to breach the Georgia Secretary t, tr.ir,.u,",.,·~,~1nill '"t''"'~ of Stat e's firewall. "I am writing to ask you N•i1b'Td:-,1.-Jc...h;;, ,._....-w":w:lf .'1;.lic',11c.i&'1'w.1,•bi. ,\,.,11,,u.,, L-... <_.,1,~ ~111 :,,~AnJf)C(IJ~ ~~r , 1.tlii;T.f:c'lt-.-J t?' "· n\ 1r... ~.,n..., Jr:.,-r.ilif,; \, 1U'.,;.$,blu• ..J::n: .1 ..&.,..~h; : 11 ~ ) -1.t ,11 1.. c,jiC1,•.,, t1i i,"'' ~ 1...,.,•1l n, u~.ru.lJ : t.r.~,r,l~,i l,~:J.1(~.1'~1""""""Ni:ya"r"u 1:... a·,h~,.,...l(,1'( 1ttl't(;:~~ ~ ,w~-.IJ.:~:...n:,,:1""'1 ,~ ~ 4tJ,ti.l1Ju~'\l«:1c.t1,-.1u~ i ~,~,.d·~ 7t"4'- ~f J:.'"t-! r...'t, •t ~ fl(IJ~.,halW't:l:~ta:.:r. :,:,U\:!"» .;.,.:<>l.:c::L'lilh3'J·.. ,~ ~ , ...~ ,t.ao: ...·.11 Ul,'!...'.1, 11_ 1.l'f UL 0 / and, if so, why DHS was attempting to ~ l l t ~ ~ 1..'C J1 J!l{l~, ;{b::oh.;lr~•P:..,• :C."\.IU,V.f4, :., ddr,;:1N:"1,1c:.=r~i'E:'~A11.-.J:1.•, ~('( ,\(W '(;'rl'(l~\.u 111.'JU,11,.I\~·~ :! il:X.:'.&,,d!::wJ 1!":ai:.~'1:l,t ) l.,t•C"ls.l:,')~,N,,{'t.f oll"J..y\," t l,,it.hJ: lt:::..JfLt {'; .,,,"(t:L:A:tcliL:l.6 ,.=~:n..~ U.:,,.1r1.Ca'ufN~ rt.:PtJ:.. u rCt rii•+:-Tu r+(w~l,!\A, : r : 'Jr i....:\U Cf1"'t"I, cCh1 1~ 11.: fl.l,ntrr~r.-r.(t \ C'U.. ~1i:'1-r:.te;c..-~l t"11,, lkr.,:, a1..tr:ciw, r,d J1.:..1~,,.lr f.~pc-4 n~ •r1l:TL1 :a., ml~ i U\,A'r.,,.a.;• breach our firewall," Mr. Kemp stated.i.s 0 ~u, •!'~ 1-X t '-tf ~o: r~ :to: W );1 f11~N,n A.1t1C"'47~l ~ t, · """'1 h:, "'I Cfl fn.1"\0rl,...r.,)'.fN"l\y 1"'11~4 )'~·.1.Jln.l( \\tJA:r,u;«f~,'l'l) ~ l"f ~d4\i!fJ~i.11': J!"~ J l') ~C,J~t)N,J ','.if'J,t, •JO,fH r.r:i,J.111){)..-,..wh 1,•, Nevertheless, oh January 6, 2017, OHS designated election infrastructure as a subsector of the existing Governmen t Facilities critic~I Infrastruct ure sector?• (U) Finding 1113: The Joint Office of the Di· rector of National 1ntelligence and Departm ent of Homeland Security public statement attributing election Interference to _ ··-· ) Russia was ineffective. UNCLASSIFIED (U) No major public actions were taken PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENrATfVES 43 between October 7, 2016 and election day. It is unclear exactly when policymakers began focusing on Russian efforts to influence · the election . As further dlscl1ssed below, Attorney General Loretta Lynch recalls being briefed by Fl31 senior leadershi~ While Dl1S was providing assistance to states to conduct cyber reviews of their electoral mechanisms, the Prlnclpals Com- that mittee was awaiting "with urgency whatev- the Counterintelligence Division had essen- er the lntellrgence Community could pro- tially uncovered some information or re- vide" that "would illumrnate !their] under- ceived information involving Russian intelli- standing of {Russian interest in the elec- gence operatives." 27 tion]."i3 (U) On May 18, 2016, speaking at the UNC LA.SSIFf ED Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, D.C., DNI Clapper stated, "we've [the IC] already had some indications of that [attempts of cyberattacks on presidential campaign websites] and the combination of lC CONFIDENT OF RUSSIAN PREELECT!ON HACKING Joint Statement from the Department O( . Hom£1land Sccuri('! an~ Office! of th~ Dlrector of National lntelllgencc on Election Securlly DHS and FBI a re doing what they can to educate both campaigns against potential cyber threats." 28 .,. __ l)"l..._, tw,..., C..,U,1<1 W.il) (U) By summer 2016, CIA Director Bren• nan had l:>ecorne aware of information aboul " specific Russian efforts to Influence "'-\oj_ ~ · C . ~t lAO•U-..•,.,h ~ l ( ~ - . . -- ~.....,_y ~--""""\4·-•- 1-.--....rn.-.,,..,,.\ t ...... ~ T ' - . - t - - a . l t\..,...~ .....,. ... .._.,,. CCl-• ... ,.-J..w.-•,,.,'t••~••...,_~,,.,_.._.,.,.- ._.. _ .. .-...~ .._.,,..,._..w"- .. - .a.,o t._.,._,,.... - ._,....,u,.,..... ... ,,. "'~ ....,..,.....,.~-,·-\)~,-.'--,._.~,_.....,,."-""~~ l>.'"w tAN. V•..- • •....,__. ~¥_,.._..,..~-.,,,,.t..-'",,,,..__..,'1., the election," 7~ and the National Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee began UNCLASSIFIED discussing actions to take In response to what the Russians had been doing. 30 As Di- {U) On August 4, 2016, Director Bren- rector Brennan continued to brief the Prin· nan, in a scheduled call with Alexander Bort- clpals Committee on Russia, the CIA-:-as nikov, the head of Russia's Federal Security discussed previously in this report- "pulled Bureau (FSB), became the first U.S. official together experts rrom the Central Intelli- to raise the Issue of Moscow's meddling::~ gence Agency (CIA}, NSA, and F B - Brennan told Bortnikov that a campaign - to focus on the issue, drawing in mul- ti pte perspectives and subject matter ex· perts with broad experti~e to assess Russian attempts to interfere iri the U.S. Presidential election." 3 PROPC!RfY OF 4 against the United States would certainly "backfire" and that all Americans "cherished their ability to elect their own leaders with- out outside interference or disruption."35 Additionally, former Attorney General me U.S. HOUSE OF REPl The timeline of t his investigation can be found on the next page. flRQPS'(TY OF THE U.S. H-OUSE or- ~6PR~6JITATl',f"t::S 47 (U) The derogatory inforn1ation result- ~d from th e relationship between Papado- the·Russian government and campaign officlals.57 (U) On April 26, 2016, over brea kfast at was anonymized In Papadopoulos' charging doc- ~o Based on the charging documents, the two firsL met in ument as "the Professor"}. Italy on or about March 14, 2016, and "P~padopoulos was interested in because . . . fhe] claimed to have substantia l connections with Russian government officials, which Papadopoulos thought could increase his tmportance as a poiicy advisor. 1 • •" ~ - was interested in Papadopou- los because of his r~le in the Trump campaign.52 The first meeting withlailllloccurred approximately on e week pri'or to a London hotel, told Papado pou los "that he had Just returned from a tr ip to Moscow where he had met with high-level Russian government officlals."ss - fur- ther indicated he had learned that the Russians had obtained 'dirt' on candidate Clin- ton. Specrfically that '"the Russians had emails of Clinton,' 'they have thousands of emaits.w 59 Howeve r, t he Committee was unable to discern if the referenced emails were the missing emails from candidate Clinton's server while sh e was Secretary of State or the emails that w ere stolen from the DNC . . candidate Trump publicly naming Papadopoulos as a forergn policy advlsor.!:,3 late March, Papadopoulos had a follow-on meeting w i t h - London, where-ntroduced Papadopoulos to (U) In a woman who claim ed to be a relative of President Putin "with conn ections to senior Russian government officials."s,i Papadopoulo!? inform ed the campaign about this meeting, with a campaign supervisor proclaiming that Papadopoulos conducted " great work. 1155 Papadopoulos coi:1tinued to correspond w i t h - who connected Papadopoulos with an .individual- 1111 claiming to.have connections with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.56 Papadopoulos communicated with this Russian con tact throughout the summer of 2016, attempting to arrange meetings between PROPERTY OF TH E U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 48 . m0 WWDOI LO Emwm?mnn counterintelligence investigation into the Trump campaign, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an lndlvidu;:il counterintelllgence Investigation Into Ca~er Page. (U} By the time Page was announced as a Trump campaign foreign ·policy advisor on March 21 1 2016, he was already a subject of interest for the FBI. Page previously lived and worked rn Russra and maintained contact with known Russian intelligence offic- ers, including -who was described in a 2015 court filing as an SVR officer posted to the Russian Mission to the United Nations. Page previously worked with the FBI in the prosecution o f - and other Russian intelligence officiais. 68 · - {U) finding #18: As part of the enterprise PROPERTY 01' THE U.S. HOUSI:! OF REl-'Rl:~E Nf'ATIVES so tions of collusion, coordination, or conspir- acy between the Trump campaign and the (U} finding #19: The dossier compifed by _Russian government. Christopher Steele formed an essential part (U) Paul Manafort joined the Trump of an application to the Foreign Intelligence campaign on March 29, 2016, and was ete- Surveillance Court t6 obtain electronic sur- vated to _campaign chairman on May 19, veillance on carter Page. 2016. Manafort became campaign manager (U) In late October 2016, DOJ sought from the Foreign Intelligence SurveiUance Court (FIS(} an order authorizin- after the campaign removed - on June 20, 2016. The Committee agreed to avoid, to the greatest e;..1:ent practical, any potential interference with Special Counsel Mueller's investigation. Given the ongoing litigation concerns associated with Manafort, the Committee.will only discuss information in this report t hat has been mittee did not find-any evidence of any publicly disseminated by the Special Coun- cooperation or conspiracy between Page and Papadopoulos. Additionally, the so- sel' s office. Although the Committee would have appreciated the opportunity to inter- called "dossier" complied by Christopher view Manafort regarding his role on the Steele formed a substantial and essential Trump campaign, the Committee is fimited (For additional information about the St eele dossier, see Chapter 4.) in this regard due to Special Counsel M1:1eller's investigation and indictments . {U} On Oct ober 27, 2017, a gran·d jury indicted Manafort and his associate, fellow lobbyist and deputy Trump campaign man- ager Rick Gates, for various financial crimes, as well as making false statements. 74 All of the financial crimes took place prior to Manafort serving as Trump campaign manager, and nothing in the indictment relates to any potential collusion, conspiracy, or conspif"Q- - cy between the Trump campaign and the Russian government. {U} On February 22, 2017, a grand jury (U) finding #20: Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted Paul Manafort on several issued a superseding indictment for Mana- charges, none of which relate to aUega- fort and Rick Gates, which included additional allegations of financial crimes, indud- 51 ing bank fraud. Sfmilar to the October 27, Corney, General Flynn's resignation oc- 2017, indictment, the superseding Indict- curred after it came to light that he hacl mis- ment does not include any reference to the led Vice President-Elect Pence about his Trump campaign, Including no mention of contacts with Russian Ambassador Sergey collusion, coordination, or conspiracy be- lY•llt1tirm';· r:l1!~1tP.t)~ Sopl. 16, 1016. 19. Puul O. Rynn, Nancy 1>01osl, Mitch McConnull, Harry Rold, Li:11,1r to Toud Vulci1t/11a, Sept. 281 2016. 20. DHS, Statement by Sacretory Johnson About EICGtton Systems' C}'IJC!rsccurlty, ~ !!d.lli!Y.l:.~.l?-OJ.6ll..QL!11.L ~li>kpir.nt·secr<~lilrY- 1ohn;o1\.,,~0lrt•sl,1c11oq-&YW\ (JI S•c;:r:b N ~ Oct. l, 2016. 21. DH~. Joint Stotemunr from the Deportment of liomeland Secut/1)' otld 0,(Jice of tile Director of Noo·onal lntelllat:nce on Election Security, Z!Jt1l~Jb·1ww,t1hu:cw/"Q~ 01 C,/10/07llnl Qt;llilteme~ P..a!.!mJl 111-lrotM ln nd•security·il nd-office · dlrector-na1fonaJ, Oct. 7, 2016. 22. DHS, Update Dy Secretcrry Johnson On OHS Election Cybersecurlty Services, btt1?$://wv,w.d l!J!.4.Qy/t1ewsn.01G/lO/lO/ Jtl2f!.itiP,·5PC{P,tary· loh nson,d lls,eJectlon-cybe rs1 Jeh Johnson.'' Jtme 21, 2017. 25. The Office of Secretary of State of G eorgla, Letter to Secretary Jeh lohnsor\ Dec. 8, 2016. 26. DHS, Statement by ~ecretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsec- Lor, .l:!StmJb:.VV-'W.d hs.gov/ncws/2017l01/0&/~totament-~?.cret:irv•loimson-6oslgnallon-election-lnf;astructure crirtc.al, Jan. 6, 2017. · 27. HPSCI, Executive Session lntarvlew of Loretta Lynch, Oct. 20, 2Q1/. 28. '"The Global DlglLaJ Challenge Initiative - Xey11ote Address,'' .llil)arl:isan Policy Center video, 38:2S, http://br.ove.me/ zff9r41)q, May 18, 2016. 29. HPSCI, E:lne1 level h1teragc11c~· forum for r.o nsldcrln r, pollc11 l$~u os that MftH:t the national u:curlty lntcro~ts of the United Stutes. Regular attendees of tho Prlnd p.ils Commlttcofori~f.', tho At\ornuv Goncrol, thu Sor.retary ol l:norgy, tho C:hfaf of Staff to the Pro~ldcnt. tho Director of Notion ul rntclllgtmr.o, the CJiurrmon of the Joint Chlo#$ oi Stnlf, the Director of th~ Centro I lntolll11oncv Ai;oncy. the Nat1onol Soc~ulty Advisor, tho Homeland Security A.TIVt:S 56 . ,esemati~s. the Majcf.ty .,rui Minority lead= of the U..S. Senate, 3J:td the Chai!mrll\ and V:~ Chairman of !:he Sc!Ed Com mitt~ on ln.effigC11ce of tr£ U.S. ~ate. 33. >-IPSO, Ex!:cutive 52S1icn lnteNle:.v of Susan Riro, Sap. 8, 2017. 34. l-ll'SCT, "Russian Aclive Measures Ou ring the 2016 Election Cam~ai!;O.~ May 23, 2017. 35. HFSO, ·Russi,:m Aai'-'e r·Jl.!asurcs Duri:,g 'the 2016 Election Ca."n~;;ign." May 23, 2017. 36. H?SC!, Ell!!f,...,., ofS!tSa n Rke,Sep. 8, 2011. 38. Dl"iS,Joinr Statemellt from the OeporrmeflC of Hame/cr.d Secvrizy and Ojficeof the Ui:ecto, of Nutionof lntelfig.:m:e on Eleaion Secority, N ~ps, f / ww,.-.,.dt-s.go·,./ r'l;!w.!}201 G/10/07 Ao.:-Ct, uRussia Investigative T~5k Force Hearing wflh Fomter Secretary of Hoimiland ~curity leh Johmon,° June 21, 20l7. 42. HPSCI, "'Russia lm.·~tigative Task Force Hearing wi,h Fe~padopc•.Jlos (1:11-cr-1S2, Dislrict ofColum~}. S9. 60. t!>- - 61. 52.. o3. J PP.O?ERTY OF TIIE U.S. HOU~ OF REPRE:.S~NTATl\fES 57 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. U.S. v. Evgeny Buryakov, a/k/a "Zhenya," ·, and U.S. Southern District of New York, January 23, 2015; "Russian Spies Tried to Recruit Carter Page Before He Advised Trump," The New York Times, Apr. 4, 2017; DOJ, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, Oct. 21, 2016, which was made available for review by HPSCI members and staff on.March 17, October 31, November 2, December 14, December 15, and December 18 2017. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. U.S. v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates ill (l:17-cr-201, District of Columbia). 75. HPSCI, "FBI Counterintelligence Investigations," Mar. 2, 2017. 76. 77. 78. 79. Michoel G. Flynn, Email messages !o Russian Embassy in United States, Flynt) Intel Group Production, FLYNN_HPSCi_OOOOOSOO, 00007542. 80. Michael G. Flynn, Email message to Russian Embassy in United States, Flynn Intel Group Production, FlYN N_H PSCl_00000.500, 00007542 . 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. U.S. v. Michael T. U.S. v. Michael T. U.S. v . Michael T. U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn Flynn Flynn Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 88. Barack Obama, "FACT SHEET: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment," The White House, Dec. 29, 2016. 89. U.S. v. Michael T. Fiyr,n (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. PROPERTY OF THE U.S.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 58 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct. 20, 2017. 103. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of toretta Lynch, Oct. 20, ·2017. 104. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct, 20, 2017. 105. HPSCI, Staff meeting with Bill Pries tap, FBI Assistant Director, Head of the Counterintelligence Division, Oct 31, 2017. 106. U.S. v. Internet Research Agency, et al. (1:18-cr-32, District of Columbia). · 107. DOJ, "Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the United States Politi ca I System," Feb. 16, 2018. PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 59 (U) Chapter 4 - Campaign Links to Russia Key Question 112: Did the Jlussian active measures ;nclude links between Russia and individuals associated with political campa;gns or any other U.S. persons? (U) A key focus of the Committee's investigation was whether Russian active measures directed at the 2016 U.S. election therefore an ambiguous tenn, not a precise legal one. Trump Campaign (see Chapter 3) ''include[d) links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns or any other U.S. (U) The Committee cast a wide net, generally asking each witnesses whether persons." The first part of this chapter they had evidence of any "collusion," reflects the Committee's answer to that campaign. The second part of this chapter "coordination," or ''conspiracy" between Russia and candidate Trump or any of his associates. The Committee also addresses the Clinton campaign. investigated potential Trump campa;gn links 1 question w ith respect to the Trurnp (U} The ''llnl1~ that cementing a dea l with a hostile U.S. (U] Trump Organization lawyer Mlc:hael According to Cohen, 10 This asserlion apparently the concept of the project was that "[t]he adversary would Increase candidate Trump Organ ization would lend its name Trump's foreign policy bona fides. and management skills, but It was not going to borrow any money and it would not have any resulting debt for the purchase of the land and th e building of the facility.";~ Cohen worked on this idea wlth 1111111 and his company, the Bayrock Group, a real estate consultancy that had previously worked with the Trump Organization. 111111 41 (U}. . testified that his communications with Cohen regarding President Putin were ''mere puffery," designed to elicit a respo nse from the · Trump Organjzation to move the project 1111 along. 42 explained that " (u]ntil the bank wrftes the check, it's all salesmanship and promotion to try to get many, many, PROPCJRTY OF ffol l:. U.S. I tOlJSF.: OF REPRl:S!:NTA'TIVES 64 many parties towards the center to try to Russian government. 3 get the deal done.,,.: Cohen similarly characterized. . as "a salesman" who "uses ver1 colorful language." 4 ~ { U ) - testimony likewise made clear that neither Presldent Putin nor any element of the Russian government was {U) When the project started actually directly involved in the project. For proceeding too slov..r[y for the Trump in~ance, in one exchange,~ testified he 5 Organlzation,4 Cohen and . . began to 46 exchange acrimonious text messages. As part of those text messages- told was offering the Trump Organization access to one o f - acquaintances. This acquaintance was an acquaintance of on a real Cohen that President Putin's people were someone else who is "partners backing the deal, including "this is thru estate development with a friend of Putins [sicJ administration, and nothing gets done there without approval from the top," Putin1s."52 . . testified that he was unaware of "any direct meetings with any as well as meetings in Russia with [Russian) government officials" in " Ministers" and "Putins (sic] top connection with the Trump Tower Moscov.: administration people.":] 1111111 also 5 proj ect. > In addition, neither candidate mentioned Dmitry Peskov (President Putin's Trump nor Cohen traveled to Russia in spokesman) would "most likely" be support of the deal.54 48 included. (U). . . was unequivocal in his {U} Cohen thus attempted to reach out testimony that none of the Russians to members of the Russian government in affiliated with the Trump Tower Moscow. an attempt to make the project proceed, project had any communications with him but apparently did not have any direct uin which {heJ w{as] asked to do something points of contact. for on behalf of the Russian government that example, Cohen sent an email to a general press mailbox at the [he] knew was on behalf of the Russian Kremlin in an effort to reach Peskov.4n Government1' with respect to the U.S. Cohen's message notes that he has been election.S!, None of those communications working with a local partner to build a "were intended for - Trump Tower in Moscow and that have a ccmmunic:ation w ith or take some communications have stalled with the local action to influence the 2016 Presidential 50 partner. The email further seel'-s contact to take action to 6 election."":. The Committee t herefore ._•.,ith Peskov so they may " discuss the assesses tha. . . was attempting to specifics as well as arrang{e] meetings with leverage polttical contacts for business the appropriate individuals."!,1 Based on the purposes, rather than the othe-r way documents produced to the Committee, it does not appear Cohen ever received a around. response from anyone affiliated with the {U} It appears the Trump Tower Mo~cow project failed in January 2016.57 i'.'ROPERTY OF 11-IE U.S. HOUS£ OF REPRESENTATIVES 65 Trump Jr. testified that, as of early June March 8, 2017 letter from Trump's lawyers 2016. he beffevecl the Trump Tower regarding his Russia-related fina1)cfal Moscow project was dormant. 53 The dealings over the previous ten years. 67 project failed because "[t]he due dfligence POLICY POSITIONS did not come through 11 and the Trump Organization's representative "lost (U) During the campaign, candidate confidence in the licen.see, and {he] abandoned the project." In fact, the Trump Organization did not have a Trump and several of his campaign advisors expressed policy views towards Russia quite different than those espoused by much of confirmed site, so the deal never reached the Republfcan foreign policy establishment, the point where the company was including previous Republican nominee Mitt dlscussins financing arrangements for the project.uo The Committee determined that Romney, wt;io labeled Russia "our number <.me geopolltkal foe" durrng the 2012 the Trump Tower Moscow proj~ct did not election, In factJ a significant nu niber of progress beyond an early developmental Republican foreign policy experts made phase, and that this potenli"al licensing dear statements d~irh,g the campaign that they 59 was not related to the Trump campaign. 61 (U) Other Alleged Financial Dealings: In addition to the Miss Unlvl:!l'S<:l and Trump Tower- Moscow projects, a number of witnesses were asked about Trump family financial dealings, sometimes stretching back decades. 6~ For example, Trump Jr. was would not work for the Trump campaign. As a result, the c;;m1palgn relied on many lesser-k11own-or in some cases unknownadvisors on foreign policy issues. {U) Additionally, a plank of the 2016 Republican pl~tform pertaining to the Ukraine has been the subject of substantial asked about Russians: ·buying units in controversy. The question for the Trump Tower in 1984 (wh~n he was seven Committee was whether candidate Trump's 3 years old)/ btJylng properties in soutf,ern pollcy positions-and the campaign's Florida for which the Trump brand was a involvement fn the debate over the Ukraine !icensor;6'' being involvQd in the Trump platform plank-reflected legitimate policy lntern~tional Hotel in Toronto for which the Trump Organization was the brand and not 65 the developer; and having unspecified Involvement in a licensing project for the Trump Ocean Club in Pariama. 66 The Committee does not have any evidence that positions, or somuthing more nefarious. The Committee found no evidence that the policy positions of the Trump campaign were the reslAlt of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy with the Russians. In the words of Trump campaign there is a nexus between these activities policy offici~I involved in the platform issue, and the 2016 <:.impaign, or information that "lt]here was no coordination or tt,ought for contradicts representations made in a coordination. The idea to have better relations with Russia was a Mr. Trump idea PROPERTY OFTHe U.S. HOU5EOF REPRESENTATIVES 66 that I thought was reasonable to support 0 63 {U} Finding #27: The Republican national security e.stablishment's opposition to candidate Trump created opportunities for two less-experienced indi\liduals with proRussia views to serve as campaign advisors: George Papadopoulos and Cart~r Page. (U) The Republican foreign policy Trump. There is no evidence that anyone on t he Trump campaign was aware of Page's past ties to Russian intelligence services-or Papadopoulos' more r.ecent contact s with a Russian-connected professor-when these two individuals were included among the advlsors that wt:!re publicly announced on March 21. In fact, as Kushner candidly put it, "we put together that list because we vi1ere getting a establishment was critical of candidate Jot of pressure from the rr.edia to put out a Trump, w~o had to turn elsewhere for list of foreign policy advisers.'' 12 support. On March 2, 2016, 122 self. de.'icribed "GOP National Security Leaders" UNGLASSIFtED signed an uopen Letter to Donald Trump" GOP National Security Leaders refusing to support then-candidate Trump.;S' Open Letter to Donald Trump The next day, Trump announced Senator Jeff Sessions as chairman of his National Security Advisory C9mmittee {NSAC}. A few we_e ks lat er, following continuing media 5().1To).l~r.r UY f O!tr.ll:R :>tA"flllNAl ill 'l,JRnY i:ffll1ALS foe o,,jHt"~ 11¥:1t1.:!~1, l:.:,,c :JI ..,m-J "'.«<'I"" ~ -ul ,...,...,11y .i:1~ ·oc f'1ra~ pol).y ~ itic~ lo Atpl)::0.!ltl.'.) ~~irour-~U'\1. (r~ l Rttlwd N<>= to !'lcrrrp: Yi.' llLNt \\~ b r" mal ~ ,_,,, r,;:; ,oncl ~ """""'-'','ll!ll!-.,...lt~ d= s ...-ar.xn..e l>l\..l <,;:):1 11"",od~or==, l~.=.:cl> w..•.,..,cs:::,; t'..tillK... W~b,w 11': ~ ~ it.n ~ ;;im ..f-a ~ ')( ~ criticism of his failure to publicly name a foreign policy team, named 10 t2 1'.':1.'r.len1 o!'(!)( , •n :i: J S1&".o candidate Trump five foreign policy advisors i n a March 21, 2016 meeting with The Washington Post editoria l board: Wa[Jd Phares, Carter Page, George Papadopoulos, .1oe Schmitz, and Keith Kellogg. 71 (U) The opposition to Trump's candidacy by the ,.,ast majority of the conservative national securitv establishment paved the way for lesserknown individuals, such as the then 28 -yearold Papadopoulos, t o join the Trump campaign. Page was another unknown . brought into the periphery of the Trump campaign to fill the vacuum left by more experienced national ~erurity specialists who were unwilling to acivise candidate UNCLASSIFIED {U) These five advisors were subsequently incorporated into the NSAC, which was part of the campaign's O.C.based policy shop. 73 · The NSAC was chaired by Senator Sessions and directed by J.O. Gordon, a retired Navy officer and former Department of Oefense spo!cS However, in lhe opinion of one advisor, the actual campaign or in'fluence they had wafid Ph,ues, the primary purpose of the ·o n anything that happened in the campaign meetina was about optics rather than was virtually nonexIstent. 1179 Gor don substance: 11 tl1e meeting was about the testified to the Committee that he agreed picture and to send the rnes/jage that: I ha:ve with the a f ore,gn · po II cy tearn." 75 minimally Influential In the context of the ass~rtior, that the • .... . .....-... ~ ~ _ . . .........,"' .. . ,•a.,:;.,1 .:,:. --•-,;-1.1"'<1•'" • ••- _ : .. . . . . , . _ - 1, U/1#- \- /l{l broader campaign. UNCLASSIFIED NSAC MEETING WITH CANDIATE TRUMP -'-'" ~, ........"t u.. NSAC was , • • _,,. .....~~C.T. .C.."'10':il ·~.) -_...,., "'"''' ... W\.""''lo'... ""'"'"~,.-.,,, ...... , . ~... ~ e . . .. - - · · - - - - - ' v J l,.la - r . . i...- . ,, ..... (U} Finding #28: The change in the Republlca·n Party platform regarding Ukraine resulted in a stronger position · against Russia, not a weaker one, and there is no evid~nce that Paul Manafort was involved. {':J} It has been widely reported that the 2.016 Republican Party plotform was weakened with respect to Ukraine, perhaps as a favor to Russia or some other nefarious UNCLASSIFIED (U) Page was, according to NSAC director Gordon, "very loosely affiliated with the campaign and had really no roles or responsibillties." 76 The Committee assesses that Page played no major role rn the campnign, and had no meaningful access to senior leadership. {U) Pag·e did not attend the March 31, 2.016, NSAC meeting with then-candidate Trump, and has never met him.n Although members of the NSAC occasionally gathered for meals in the Washington, D.C. area, they never again met as a group with candidate Trump. 78 Kushner provided a blunt assessment of the role, qr lack thereof, played by the individuals on t~e initial Ii.st of ·publicly-announced foreign policy advisors: "[Tihe amount of Interaction they had with reason. Arter reviewing th e Republican Party platform amendment process, Interviewing tho se involved, and revfewing document productions, the Committee determined that the original plank was strengthened, rather than weakened-and there is no evidence that language advocating for th e provisions of "lethal defensive weapons'' was Improperly removed. (U) on July 11, 2016, the Republican National Committee Platform Committee met to discuss and debate amendments to the platform. As drafted, the platform referenced "a resurgent Russia occupying parts of Ukraine/ but incfudep no langu.age about support to Kiev.{see inset}. 11111 of Texas, a member of the National Security/Military Platform Subcommittee, offered an ~mendment that would "support Pf~OP!oRTY OF nu: U.S. HOUSG OF REPRESENTATIVES 68 maintaining {and, if warranted, increasing) sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's all but three v.iords o amendment.s.1 sovereignty and territory integrity are fully restored."3 l ~ r o p o s e d amendment further called on the United States to provide "lethal defensive weapons UNCLASSIFIED Final RNC Plank to Ukraine's armed forces and greater (U) Wr:;. support maintaining and, ff warranted, increasi ng sanctions, togcthff with our allies, coordination wjth NATO [North Atlantic against RllSSia unless and until Ukraine's sover- Treaty Organization] on defense ei.gnw and territorial integ_rity are :u'.ly re~t.ored . planning."u We also support provldi:'lg approprla~ assistance. U NCLASSIFll:D to the armcci forces of Ukraine and great& coordination with NATO defense planning. Original RNC !)tank UNCLASSlF1ED (U) In the int~mational arena. weakness invites aggression. The results of the (Obama} Administra- tion's unilateral approach to disarmament are already clear: An emboldened China in ti\e South China Sea, a resurgent Ru:.s!a occupying parts of Ukraine and tnreatening neighbo:s from the Baltic to the Caucasus, an aggressive lstamist terrorist networ.~ !n Middle East. All our adversaries heard th~ message in the {Obama] Arlminlstratio"n's cutbac!G: Americil is weak~ arid retreating: UNCLASSIRED (U} Much o f - amendment was (U} The Committee also investigated ,...,hat role, if any, Paul Manafort played in the Trump campaign's response to 0€nman's amendment. Manafort, a veteran of numerous Republican camp.algns, 85 had long represented the government of Ukraine, the pro-Russian former presid~nt of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich, and Yanukovich's Party of Regions.86 In late March 2016, candidate Trump hired Manaforno-lead "delegate- sdopted, but-foll owing debate among the corralling efforts at the Republican National delegates-the final version called for the Convention."s Then--campaign manager 7 United States to provide "appropriate assistance" rather than "lethal defensive 83 weapons." The Committee assesses that testified that, when Manafort was hired, ~ a d e no attempt to vet him and was entirely aappropriate assistance" provided flexibility, unaware of Manafort's past work in and could encompass lethal defensive Ukra.ine.85 In May 2016, Manafort was weapons as well as humanitarian aid, medical supplies, and meals-ready-to eat. promoted to campaign chaim,an and, after ~ a s fired the next month, In any event, even without the words aevolve[d}" into the role of de facto "lethal defensive weapons," t he final draft of the platform UV".las tougher against campaign manager.69 0 Russia than the orlginal after incorporating {U) Manafort left the campaign in August 2016 following news reports that he PRO?€Ri'Y OF "THE U.S. 1l0US£ Or REPRESSI.TAnv-eS 69 ,, !M had rece_ived $12. 7 million In secret hlrn to resign. payments for his work on behrilf of (U) Given Mana fort's past work in Yanukovlch's Party of Region s; news reporling also alleged that Manafort and hls aide Rici< Gates had "dirnctly orchestrated a covert Washington lobbying operation" on behalf of the partv-:-while failrng to register . press as foreign agents. 90 Campa1gn secretary Hope Hicks recalled that, after receiving press inquiries about Manafort's "professional history," a major story broke . on the evening of August 14, 2016. 91 According to Hicks, "Trump had made a decision to make a change ln lendership on the campaign outside of Paul's ;ssues that were being publicly reported," but those issues "certainly contributed to expedllinn and Intensifying the way in whfch his roJe changed, and then ultimately he was fi red Ukraine, If the Ukraine plank change was made as a favor to the Russian government, it seems likely that then-campaign chairman Manafort would have known about it. However, campaign records produced to the Commlltee show that Manafort had no role in, or contemporaneous knowledge of, the platform change. On July 30, 2016, Manafort sent an emall, copying Gates, to Rick Dearborn, then a senior campaign policy official and Sessions' chief of staff: "I gather that there was a change In the platform that ren,oved arming Ukraine. I don1 t know anythlnc about this change. Who pushed for it and wIw was It done.?11 fl!I (U} In response, Dearborn generated a at the end of thnt weck.''92 Trump directed memorandllm, dated August 1, 20:l.6, his son-in-law Jared Kushner to ensure outlining a detailed sequence of events th3 advisors, however, were peripheral figures, and neither was in a position to influence (U) On July 9, 2016, while In Russia, Trump o r his campaign. The Russians sent an "executive summary" of " Feedback From Russia" that stated in part engaged Trump associates via official ''Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES channe[s and-niore notably-used apparent cut-outs and intermediaries to [New Economic School} Board Member Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke before the make contact with senior officials. event. In a private conversation, However, questionable contacts like the Dvorkovich expressed strong support for Trump Tower meeting resulted in collusion, conspiracy, or coordination with the Russian Mr. Trump and a desire to work together toward devising better solutions in response government. to the vast range of current international (U} Finding # 3 0 : - did not travel problems. Based on feedback from a diverse array of other sources close to the to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the Trump campaign, but the Committee is concerned abo ut his seemingly incomplete accounts of his activity in Moscow. (U)-traveled to Moscow in early July 2016 to deliver a conimencement - Hussian Presidential Administmtion, It was readily apparent that this sentiment is widely held at c1ll levels of government." 1(',11 a l f ldmltted to briefly greeting Dvorkovlch before or after one of their PROPER1Y OF THE U.S. H OUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE::3 76 I V ,J speeches, but minimized the interaction in testimony before the Committee. (U) Ultimately, - failed 165 repeatedly and consistently denied meeting either Sechin or Diveykin, including under to clearly explain whom he meant when he referred to sources close to Russian government in his executive summary. He denied having any private meetings w ith any senior Russian officials during his July 2016 trip, oath in testimony to the Committee.!e9 The Corn mittee has no information that confirms the Steele dossier's assertions rega rding the purported meetings in Moscow, much less an offer by Sechin to - for such a role in a potentially lucrative transaction. After ret urning from Moscov:, and stated that he mostly met w ith - "scholars." 1 c-E The Steele dossier, a document compiled by former British intelligence officer Christopher St eele, took a " leave of absence" from the Trump campaign, and played no role in the transition or administration. 170 alleges that while in Moscow in July 2016, (U} Finding #31: George Papadopoulos' Page secretly met with Igor Sechin, CEO of Russian state oil comp~my Rosneft, and Igor attempts to leverage his Russian contacts to facilitate meetings between the Trump Diveykin, a senior Russian Intelligence campaign and Russians ,,yas unsuccessful . official. :QJ Further, t he Steele dossier claims that Sechin offered Page a brokerage fee in connection with the sale of 19 percent of Rosneft in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. i6!! {U} Papadopoulos made minor contributions to the Trump campaign as a foreign policy advisor. He briefly served as a Trump campaign surrogate, a role cut short in May 201 6 when he publicly insulted UK Prime Minister David C3meron. UNCLASSIFIED CHRISTOPHER STEELEJ THE MAN BEHIND THE TRUMP DOSSIER 171 He also- in an apparent effort to increase his standing within the Trump campaign- tried to insert himself into any· number of international engagements. As described below, his particular focus was t rying to broker meetings \fJith foreign officials, but he often acted on his ovm w ithout the official backing of t he Trump campaign. (U) On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email to several members of the UNCLASSIFIED policy team pitching a " [m]eeting with Russian leadership-including Putin" -and (U) Since the allegation of meeting w ith Sechin and Diveykin was first w idely reported in September 2016, - has also volunteered to travel to meet the " next prime minister of Vietnam,,- alongside Mifsud (whom he had first met just ten days PROPi:RTY OF TH£ U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATNE5 77 before but nonetheless described as a "good friend of mine"). negotiations. So I pushed back pretty i"' Campaign co- sharply on t hat.'' 178 Sessions' account of his chair and chief polfcy a d v i s o r - response has been corroborated by another responded that "we probably should not go a t t e n d e e , - . l/'j- forward with any meetings with the attended and similarly recalled that when Russians until we have had occasion to sit Papadopoulos raised the issue of obtaining contacts with the Russian government on with our NATO allies, especially France, 11 also In the same behalf of the campafgn, Senator Sessions exchange, Papadopoulos then Immediately Interrupted and began "talking about the switched gears, indicating that "[i)f we need Logan Act," which criminalizes unauthorized any assista nce with setting up meetings negotiations with foreign governments. Germany and Great Britain." :, 180 here in London or Paris, I have some good contacts that can open doors immediately to the leadership." 174 (U) Although the Committee has no information to indicate that Papadopoulos was successful in setting up any meetings (UJ Durh1e the NSAC meeting with Trump on March 31, 2016-the only time Papadopoulos is known to have engaged b~tween the Tl'urnp campaien and the directly with the candidate- Senator broker a September 2016 meeting between Russian government, he worked with campaign chief executive Steve Bannon to Sessions told the team that they were not ~uthorized to speak for the campaign . 175 In candidate Trump and Egyptian president Abdel Fatah el-Sisi. 181 Trump was his words "[t]hls committee was not . . . a apparently pleased with the meeting, which croup of people ~uthorized to speak for he described In an Interview as "very [candidate) Trump, and they absolutely productive," describing el-Sisi as "a fantastic weren't authorized to go around the world guy."1s2 pretending to represent him." 176 That sentiment was, according to Sessions, ''a good statement to make quite clear." 177 (U) When Papadopoulos offered that he could engage, and possibly travel to, Russia (U) While on a trip to Athens, Greece in May 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email to Manafort stating that he expected to soon receive "an official invltijtion for Mr. Trump to visit Greece sometime this summer 18 should his schedule allow." was swiftly rebuffed by Sessions, who email to Manafort, Papadopoulos also ~ In the same on behalf of the campaign, his suggestion testified that "I felt like·-and I'm the forwarded a meeting Invitation from rvan chairman of this group-I should not do Timofeev, Director or Programs for the anything that indicated to Mr. Russian International Affairs Council, and Papadopoulos that he was authorized to go claimed that "Russia has been eager to to Russia or anyplace else to represent the meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and Trump campaign and do some sort of have been reach ing out to me to discuss. PROPERTY OF TME U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 78 thought it would be prudent to send to expense without asking permission first."ts you." 1e4 replied t o - with one word : "agreed.''l!>~ (U} As of May 2016, Manafort had not yet been elevated to campaign chairman, (U}~espondedto but had a long track record of wor'f( abroad. Papadopoulos that he could take the Manafort forwarded Papadopoulos' email me~ting, but he "should do that as a private to his business and campaign deputy. citizen.''® Making the point explicit, noting that a(wJe need someone to - communicate that D[onald} T(rump] fs not doing the.se trips." agreed 185 Manafort a n d - to assign a response of a "general - wrote: "You' re not authorized to meet with him by {sic] the campaign, nor can you reflect the views of the campaign on security issues in that meeting." letter" to "our correspondence 191 {U} finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared coordinator.'' the person responsible for Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a June 9, 2016, meeting at Trump Tower " responding to all mall of nonimportance."1ss {U) In June 2016, Papadopoulos sought where they expected to r&-eive-but did not ultimately obtain-derogatory a paid position and reimbursement for information on candidate Clinton from expenses from Russian sources. aide, who along with the Trump campaign's -a sessions , ran D.C. policy shop-for an upcoming trip "to DC for a high level (U) tn July 2017, the Committee became aware of a June 9, 2016, meeting in Trump Tower, which became a key focus of the meeting (with) the director of the Israel investigation. The Committee's findings National Security Counciin and past trips to " the UK, Israel and Greece over the past were informed by interviews with six of the eight participants in the meeting. month engaging in some senior level 11 meetings .. . . 1 1B -forwarded the {U} Although they did not attend the message to Gordon a n d _ meeting, the Agalarovs w ere the driving Mashburn then replied as follows: "He cost force to arrange it. ru previously noted, _the us a lot more in having to deal with what he ~aalarovs and Gof~tone had gotten to said about [then-UK prime m inister David) know businessman Donald Trump when the Cameron 2 months ago ... he got no in[i]tiative .. .. Let him eat the cost and Agalarovs worked with Trump to host the .Miss Universe pageant at the Agalarovs' building, the Crocus City HaU, in Moscow in maybe he will learn to play nice with the 2013. team, not go off on his m.vn. ·would never have approved possible development of a Trump Tower in his going off on world travels at campaign Moscow.m The 2013 M iss Universe approval for the travel and did it on his own PROPERTY OF THE 192 The Agalarovs also had discussions with Donald Trump in 2013 to facilitate the u_s.. HOUS~ OF REPRESENTA'i'!VcS 79 UNCLASSIFIED PARTICIPANTS OF THE JUNE 9, 2016 MEETING AT TRUMP TOWER Oonllct J, YNmp, Jt , Longtlm6 l1oputilic a11 on1paig11 ~~r at~ ln:unll'lionol tol>ttrl~. M\l'\JIO>"t '41"'1d l'lS llilMtOf of 1he Tturl'lp c~p;11gn Son 9< c,nd ldr:\"I Ootlt ld Trump, TNll'I), Jt: !:etv@od :!.$ 3 Sllnior Q1.l~rtott111c1mpa,;, runmng di,y,to-d/ly-OP"'...Uans ~,ln-ur,. t~ crondfcllltt> 0ol'llld_l'n,n,p, i(W,g ~N!d a 1u11Mc. DdvlJOno l/lo Londo~ prolltlltfr wl'IO M~~d Ol)p l.tX Eiflin {A,t11,rovj. Lho V.c11 c~pmr,n i'roiJdCJnt of !hu Cr0tn Ntw York G 1011p . R/n.u A~m,uhfn AUAl ll(l l t,Nyar, Wh~ Ctt,fotni~uitd RutJl anj,rr,orican r~i:ra1et1t'1d ~ man~~, .of \he Ctoc.JJ s Gtoui,. IQ!lbyt!Z. PrllYCIZ!>n in ~(Ml leldelwr~ rn~ II\ Hta fl!aign on issues relating to court hearing in New York on the morning Trump, that they wot1ld be a good fit."m of June 9, 2016, prior to her meeting at Trump Towef. 283 He fu rther recalled having lllwas looking fo r a consultant to, among other things, sort tf1rouuh the multitude of drinks and dinner with her and others, public records perta ining to Trump's including Akhmetshfn, in W(lshlngton, D,C, a business dealings.<92 Although he had not previously worked with Fusio n, he chose to day or two later. m However, he denied PROPERTY OF THE: U.S. HOUSE. OF R!:PRESl::NTATiVF.S 88 300 hire the company based on its familiarity were passed on to - , with Trump's dealings, including "his ultimately to the Clinton campaign and business holdings, his financial holdings, and DNC. 301 In total, Fusion paid Steele (and the kinds of litigation he had been involved c h a r g e d - ) approximately 293 in." • · further testified that "[t]hey were recommended ... [and} thought highly of in the community." 294 $160,000; Steele's efforts were part of a larger opposition research project for which - (U) The Committee determined the "wealthy Republican" who funded Fusion's and · paid Fusion over $1 million. 302 { U ) - testified that Fusion bega n its opposition research work by "review{ing] what we had learned over the previous months," presumably including "information about candidate Trump's the Beacon retained Fusion to conduct opposition research on Trump. 295 business ties in Russia," although had not been aware of Russia-specific research leadership have publicly stated they "had no at the time he engaged Fusion. 303 Fusion knowledge .of or connection to the Steele "began to develop more specific lines of dossier, did not pay for the dossier, and inquiry," and eventually hired Steele, whom never had contact with, knowledge of, or provided payment for any work performed had known since approximately 304 2009. by Steele." 296 signed off on the decision to hire Steele as a testified that-based on a careful review of the relevant documents-he had sub-contractor in June 2016-around the identified "zero overlap in the work beginning to focus its opposition research product" between the dossier and what on Trump's ties to Russia-but was not Fusion providecl 297 same time he learned that Fusion was aware of Steele's identity until Ju ly 2016. (U) lllllsought and received "budget 305 {U) Finding #38: Christopher Steele claims approval to be able to spend money in to have obtained his dossier information order for me to retain consultants," from second- and third-hand from purported Clinton campaign m a n a g e r - high-placed Russian sources, such as but did not specifically identify Fusion to government officials with links to the 298 - .• Fusion's Simpson was "definitely aware t h a t -· represented the DNC and that they were the client in this matter" based on a general understanding 299 t h a t -· represents the DNC. Fusion's expenses, including the hiring of Christopher Steele as a sub-contractor, Kremlin and intelligence services. (U) Between June a·nd Novembe r 2016, Steele produced sixteen reports for Fusion, which comprise what has become known as the Steele dossier, "concerning Russian efforts to influence the US Presidential / l\l PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 89 election and Hnks betwC?en Russia and Donald Trump." 30 G Steele did not travel to (U) Finding #39: Christopher Steele's information from Russian sources was Russia to con~plle these reports.io, Instead, provided directly to fusion GPS and Simpson stated that "!Steele] hire(d) people - who can travel and talk to people and find campaign. out what's going on.1130R and indirectly to the Clinton (U) Fusion began receiving written (U) Of the separate claims the reports from Steele in June 2016. 313 At the Committee identified within the dossier, same time, Fusion provided updates- almost all are attributable to Russian or Russia-based sources, such as: a "senior approximatety weekly and usually orally- to Russian governn,ent figure," a "senior receiving some of the information later Russian leadership figure," an "official close included ln the dossier ' 1maybe late June, to [the] Russian Presidential early July. ". 3 • 1A - 115 - recalled exchanges with Fusion a "Kremlin insider," a were not one-way communications: he "former top Russla1"1 officer," a "senior specifically recalled directing follow-up Russian financial official," a "senior Russian work on lnformalion eathered Foreign Mil\istry figure," a 1'Kremlin official Elias recalkid persont1lly bl:tlng briefed by involved In U.S. relntions," cind a "former Steele on his findinf.ls d~iring a late top level Russian Intelligence officer still September or early October meeting at Administration," active inside the l.l)l.7. HP-SCI, Ex2cuti1ie Session lnterif.sw of Jefferson 8. Sessicns, Nov. 30, 2017. HPSCI, executf,,e $eS,s!on lnt~-iew of Don ~rd f n:m p, Jr•• !)~::.. 6, 2017; HPSCI. Executr,re $e$slon fnterviev, cf Jeffe.rson B. Sessions. Nov. 30, 2017. H!K.,CI, Execufi,,e Ses.sian ln1i:l'~ w oflefferson B. Ses-.slcr.s. Nov. 30, 2017. HPSCI, E>?-cutive: Session !nt.<:Pliew of !ared Kusimer, July 7.5, 201?. HPSCI, · 1wssi.1n Aclfve Measu t~ During the 2016 Election Campaign," May 23. 2017. HPSCi, .,,... I\Ussian Active Meawres Ounng the 20!6 Election Campaign;" Mav 2.3, 2017. HPSC!, &.ecutiVe Session fntetvie\'1 afJames Clapp,;r, July 17, 2017. HPSC!, Executive Session rnter\'iew cf James Clapper, Ju~'( 17, 2017. HPSCI, E.-.:ecutive Session Int~ ~ ... of Donald Trump,.:!,., Dec. 6, 2017. HPSCI, o:ecutlve: Session lnteIViE't/ of Michael uihen, Get. 24, 2017. HPSO, ~cutlve Session !ntenne,., of Michael Cohen, Oc.t.14, 2017. Morgan, lewis & Bockius UP, Letter fro m Sheri A. Dillor. ~mi Williom !'. Nelsof\ to President Don<1ld J. Trump. Mat. 8, 2017. HJ>SO, fxecudlli? Ses1ion lnteNicwof !\•1!chael Cohen, Ocr. 24, 2017. H!7S.CT. Executive Se~sion lnte.-view cf Ike Kaveladze, lfov. 2, 2017. I-IPSO. Execudve Sessron ln!el'VH!w~f lite KaYel;;d:ze, l-lD'1. 2, 2017. HPS.O, Executive Session lnter\'iewof Rob Goldstone Dec- 18, 2017. HPSO, ExecuUYe Session Lnter>Aew cf Rab Goldstone. Dec. 18, 1017. HPSO, Executive Session lnter.iew of Rob Golc!stone, Oec.18, 2017; HPSCI, uecutw.: Session Interview of 1-1:lidiaef c~ hen, Oct. 24, ion. H·Psa, ~utive S:asslon lntennewof I ke Kavcf.idz11, Nov. 2, 2017. HPSO. f:xecutive Session Interview of Rob GoJdsrone, Dec.18, 2.017. Twitrer.@re.al DonaJdr,ump, .fune 18, 2013, 8 :17 PM. BPSO, W!uttve Session ln,e1viawcf Rob Goldstone,Dec.. 1S, 20!7. HPSO, EY.ecutfveSession lnter.Jiewof Rob Goldstone, Oec. 18, 2017. 2..!.. 2)_ 2.3. 24. 2.5. HPSO, b.;;cutive Ses~lon lnt~vaf Rob Goldstone, Oec. 18, 2017. 26. HPSCJ, EY.ecutive Session lrm:rJiew of Rob Goldstone, Dec. 18, 2017. 27. H?sa, E.xecut:•1e Ses~lon lntecrviewof Keith Sdiiller, Nov. 7, 2017; HPSCI, £xe-cunve ~on Inte rview of Roll Go!dstone, Dec.18, 2017. 2$. H!K...O, Executive Session lnt eiview of Rob Goldstone, Dcc. lS. 2017. 29. HPSCJ, &.ecut1•1e Session Interview of Keith Schiller, Nov. 7, 2017. 30. HPSO, becutive Sessicn ln~nf.e...,- af Y.eitk Schiller, Nc-1. 7, 2017. 31. HPSO. Executive 5'>....ssion lnt2n-ie'.v o~ Rob Goldstone, Oec. !8, 2Cl17. ~2. HP5Cl, Executive Session ln~e-.v af Oonalc! Trump, 1r., De~ 6, 2017. 33. !IPSO, &.ccucive Session lm:e.-vie-A' of Michaef Cohen, Oc-.. 24, 2017. 34. HP50, o:ecutive Session Inti::\~ "' at Micbae! Cohen. Oct. 24, 2017. 35. Hl'SCl, Execuctve ~e!.sian lnterv'~w of , Oec. 20, 2017. 36. HPSO, E.'.50-Ul:raine Arnendme::tt (l}.pdf] 97. M emo from J.D. Gordon,. ''GOP Pl~tfo,m: National ~rlty, Ur.r/ York Time5, July 27, 2016. 105. HPSG, Execut:iye S~:on lnteN~v,' of Matlh£!w F. Tait, 0 Li. 6, 2017. 106. HPSCI, Ei,;ec1:ti" e ScS>ion Interview of Hope Hid:s., f€!:J. 'l7, 2018; HPSCI, Ex=Jti>.,e Session Interview of Dorn,1Jd Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017; H~Cf. Execudve '.!SCI, Eicec mve Se~o.~ I rview of Donald Tn..'llliJ, Jr., Dec. G, 20i7. 112. Em aU from ~o Donald J. Trump, e:t2!., ''Trump : AnotllerWll:il..eaks DNC Upload,NSept.14, 2.016. [TIWMP_ORG 113. Email from o IJooald J. Trump, et al., "Trump: Another \'!ikileaks DNC Uplo a d." Se;,t. 14, 2016. [TRUMP _ORG_ l3_0...fit,Q1] 114. O!ive r D~rcy, aC NN corrects story on email w Trumps about W1kilea~.s.N CNN, De<. 8, 2017. 115. HPSCI; Execufa·e Sess!ot1 fn~n1iew of Dona!d Trnrnp, ;,., D~c. 6, 2D17. 116. HFSCI, Executive Ses:slan ln~entiew of Donald Trurni;, ir., Dec. 6, 2017. 117. H?-SC!, E~ecu tive Session !nteNiew of Donald Trurnp,ir.• Dec. 6.2017. . ill. Direct Message from l.'Tii.'.ileaks to Donald Trump 1f., Sept. 20, 1016, 11:59 PM; Direct Message from Dcn?ld Trump Jr. to Wckileaks, Sept. 21, 2016, l l:50 AM; Direct Messar;e from Wikileaks to Do.,a!dTrump Jr., Oct. 3, 2015, 1:25 PM; Direct Mes.sage from Do9ald Trump Jr. to Wikileaks, Oct. 3, 20l6, 3 :0! PM.; O:rei:tMessagc from Donald Trump Jr. to Wik-· il£aks, Oct. 3, 2016, 3:03 PM. [Dm R01265-65.j 1.19. Ok ed Message from V.'ikil.eaks to Donald Tromp Jr., Sept. 2.0, 2016, 11:59 i'M; Oilcct Me ssage from 'Niki!.cal-s to Ooneltl Trump Jr., Oct. 3, 2015, 1:25 PM. 12<}. HFSCI, Executi~·e S~on lnh!r,ie:w of Donald Trump, Jr., Oec. 6, 2017, p. 101. :l2'i. Direct Message from l!J'ib1.eaks to Oonald Trump fr., Sept. 20, 2016, 11:59 PM. [OITJR01265] 122. Direct Message from Dooald Trump Ir. to INikileaks.. 5'.!pt. 21, 2016, 11:50 AM.. [DJTJR0126~j i23_ KPSCJ, Executive Ses,ii!)n lntenliew of Dona!c Trump, Jr., Dec-. 6, 20l'l'. 1£4. Email from Conald Trump Jr. to Keflyanne Conw.1y, ct al., "Wiln tnterliew of Hope Hlcks, ~ . 27, 2018. 127. Direc t Me!>sage from 't .ftkileak.s to Donald Trump Jr., Oct. 3, 2016, l:25 P~- {OJTJR D1265-66J 128. Direct Mern,ga.frvm C-or.ald Trump Jr. to \Vikit.eaks, Oct. 3, 2016, 3:01 PM. !OJTJR01266] H 9. Dr:ect M~ssage from Donaid -Trump Jr, to \"d'iidlea!::s, Ott. 3, 2016, 3:03 PM. {DJTJR01266] 13u. HPSCI, fxa:lltivc Session lnte.Niew of Donald irump,lt., Dec. 6, 2017. 131. Direct Message from Wi'.~il.eaksto Donald Trump Jr., Oct.12, .20!6, 8:31 Al•t {DJTJRO:i267] 132. Orrecr Message from w r,M~ileaks lo Donald Trump k, 02c. 16, 2016, 12:38 i'M. [0JrJR01271] 13ii. Di;-.;ct M ~ssage from l;'.Jiklte.:ks to Don;1ld T; ump Jr.,.Apr. 26, 2017, 12:0 l AM. {DJTJR0!272J B7. Direct Message from \,V'oole.1ks to Donald Trump~., .lu:y 11, 2017; 9:2.9 A.I\~. {DJTJR0121S-74j ~ HPSCJ, Exs!cul:i·,•e Sess,on lntet·.sio..-1 lnten:iew oi-Ale>:~nrlet Nil: Ci:c. 14, 2017. 144. HPSCl, f~cuti,,e Sessicn Inte rview of ct. 24, 2017. 1115 . ~.PSCI, E:oc1:cutvc: Session lntervt<:w cf Alex~nder Nb:, O~c. 1-4, 2017. 146. ~iPSCI, E:tecuti~"e Sets1cm Interview cl A'e>!2rn:ler Nix, De.c. 14, 2017. 147 .1-i."SCI, !::xecu~ Sei.s:on lntervi~w Rci3er Stone, Sept. 26, 2017. 148. HP$CI, l:xer;ut'...-~ Se!.Sicn Interview cf !!oiler ~ one, 5-ept. 26, 2017. 149·. ..tP:SCl, ~cut',>,e Se55lon lnte.Niew o f Reger Stone,~pt. 25, 2.0l7. l~G. HPSO, Executive Session lnte-rview cf Roger Stone, S2pL 26, 2017. 151. Ke nn 11th P. Vogel. "'Under Mueller Sc:1..-tiny, Cemocrath; O. Andrew Shike. ~~oger Stene, Tr.imp comldant, ackr.owledge:s 'in=ous' Twitter con•,er.;at:ion wi:th DNC hack~,,· Wo,hirrgmn Tur.es, C\far.10, 2Gl"/; Hl'SO, Eicecutiva S=lon !., te,v:ew cf R.n ger St00<:, Sei:;t. 26, 2017. 157. Letter f:°ions, Nr;-v, 30, -!017. 164. E.m;iil fr-0m Caner Pa~e to Jeff:"ev D. Gordon, Ter.:i Dal1I. and Walld Ph;ires, "Feedb-ad< from Rllssi::- Executive Surruna:y,: July 8, 2016. [Dfl FPOOC'' of Caner Page, Nov. 2, 2017. 17'.l. Sha rOll larra nl€.re, Mark Mau£ttf, and Matt Apuz20, gi-low the Rus:sfa lnqu'u-y Beg,m: A Cam!)a ign Aide, Drinks a nd ialk of Pclltical Olrt,» V.!ashingtr:;n Post, Dec. 30, 2D17; Err.3i! frcm Jah11 tvlashburn to Rick Dearb:::rn and Jeffrey 0 . Gordon, »?.e: Tra'lel re:imbursce rllent ~ceived emai1 from Michael G:aSSllcr],"" J1..r:i:e 24, W:iG. [ DJTFPD002i91, ~~ov. 2tl, 2017. i77. HPSC, C!:CLJtive S~ssian lntentiew ;:,fJe.-'fers:;;n B. Sessions., Nov. :W,- Z0.17. 17S. }-:il$CI, B,.;wti-.•e Session l ritt"!f'Jt~W oi J«fersot1 B.. Ses$!oni, Nov. .JO. 2017. !79'. i-!PSCJ, Elrecutive Se~iM lnter..OUlos to Paul ManijfOrt, "Fwd," May. 21, 2016. [GAT-HPSCl-0000025B] 184. Email from George P;ipadopou1osto Paul Mar,afort. "Fwd,'' May. 21, 2016, [GAT-HPSC1·000002S8·SgJ l8S. E:m.:ill from Paul Manaiort t 'Fwd," May. 21, 2016. [GAHiPSC:1·00000:!SB) 186. En,all frt>1'r1 P~ul MoMfort to 'll a:H M.i~·. 21, 2016: (GAT·MPSCl·OC0002SSJ 167. Email from George Papadopou os o re Dtrnrbom, "Trtwel reimbursement {received emiill from Mld,~el Gl3s5ner)," June 24, 7.016 [OJTf P00022915-16} 1SS. Email fro nd Jeffrey D. ~ordon, "r-WD: Tra'lel reimbursemem (received email from Michael Glassner)," June 24, 2016. [DJTFP00022915] 189. Emilll from ind Jelfroy D. Gordon, NIie: Tr.wol reimbur~ormint {rc,1,1lvod urnnil fcom Michat!I C31.is~n,u)," JuM :.!4, 2016. [OJTFP00022~1S] 190. Emallfronj o George Papadopoulos, "Re: Travel reimbursement (received email from Michael Glassner)," June 24, 2016. [DJTfP0002291BJ 191. Email f r o m ~ Georgl! Papa<;lopoufos, "Re: Trave!I reimburS!!lll4'rlt (reci,iv!!d l!ffiail from Micha!!I Glasrnl!r)," June 24, 20 ~29181 192. HPSCI, Executive Se~slori Interview of Rob Gold~tone, Dec. 18, 2017; Executive Session lritervlewof Donald Trnmp, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017, Email from to Rob Goldstone, "FW-Message-from '26-Cople r·E>:ec,'" Apr. 25, 2016 (p;;s5ing along haodwritten response from candidate Trump to email from Aras Agalarov) [RG000033i 193. HPSCI, Erncutivl! S1,s,sion lnt!!rview of Rob Goldstone, Dec. 18, 2017. 194. HPSCI, E~etutive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. G, 2017, l9~. rll'SCl, l!Jrnov, Nov. 2~, 2017. 21i. HPSCI, E:tl.!Cutive Session lnlel'1lew of Ike Kijveladze, l~ov. 2, 2017. 212, HPSCf, Executive Se.5sion Jntel'V[e•.v of Ike Kavcladz!?, Nov. 2, 2017; HPSCI, EKE!Cutive S!!!>Sion lnt1:ccl11ive Sc~~lon Interview of Ike Kaveladze, Nov. 2, 2017; lir-SCI, Execunvo Sa~lon lntorvl ~w oi Oon~ld Tr-urn1l, Jr., Dr,c. 6, 2017; Hl'SCI, Executive 5cS$IOn Interview of Amrtoll S..~rnochornov, Nov. 28, 2017; HPSCI, Execl1tivc Session lnteN lew of J<1red Kushner, July 2S, 2017. 214. HPSCJ, l:x!!cutfve Sesslon lntervl!!w of Rob Goldstor,..,, Dec.18, 2017. PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE O F R EPRESENT ATIVES 95 . ..., - ,-,,, 21S. HPSO, e")(ecutive Ses.slo1,.lr.te.n:few of Roh Goldstone, flec.18. 2017. 216. Text r..,1es.sage Exchange Betv.een lar~ Kushne:-,;nd 1'4ul ;".1an.;;.furt, June 9, Wl5. (!'lHPSCTOOD0014Sj i17. 1-iPSO, E,cec utive S-essiol) lntr:tvlew of Jared Kushne.r, July 25, 2017. 218. !IPSO, &.ec1Jtfve S£ss,on ln:enii-ew of Donald Trump,Jr., Oec. G, 2017. :?J .S'. HPSQ, E;icee:.itive Session lnt.etvl'i'!w of r.~e Kavaradze, ND'.'. 2, 2017. 220. HPSCI, &.ecutive ~IM lnt=..:Niew of L\:e l~vefadz.e, NQv. ?, 2017. 221. Email from Ike Kavelaoze to A. Ka~!adte, llRe: how are yo:i=," June 14, Z016. [K:C-il:t.Goklsto1,e, ~"Re: Rll:iSia- 0 1nton - pr,vate :mtl CCl'\fidential,~ Ju:ie 7, 2016. [DJTJR0'14S9J. 225. HP.SCI, Executive Session lotcnSsion int:2rvr'2w of Donald Trump, Jr., occi 6, 2017. 24S. HPSCI, a.~utiYe Sessi on lntciview of Jefferson B. SBslOlli. Nov.30.2017. 246. h"P50, executive Sess1on lnt.:n.·i:w of Jared Kllshner, J:ity 25, 2017. 247. HPSCI, EY.ecu Hve SP..5$ion Interview of Jarad Kushner, Ju~· 25, 2017. 248. HPSO, i:xe.:utive Session lnte'"'oliew of Jefferson B. Y-"-.$Sicns, Nov. 30, 2.017. 249. HPSCJ, &.erutive Y..5.Sion !nte.-view of Jeffecson B. S2S...eu>rts, Nov. 30 :io11. 250. F~e!1il Election Commission, "HiUart for America Disbursan;.. DU5. Senator 8!)b Cor!:er S;:i-eaks at Global Cleveland's Global Parmers in Oiplomacv Event." Grc,!Jalclevefa r.d.org, Jan. 31, 2017. 0 253. !6S Schaoule," Juty 16, 2016. [Sessions Production: 20!6-07-16-Untitled ( 15)-ATiACH~ ..ENT JBS Ccnve-nl!on Sdiedulc ·,•mh Drop B~·} 23ol. HPSCI, Exerutive Sasslon ln!~ -,.-,,;w of Jeffer,;on. l:L Sessions, l'Jov. 30, 2017, p. S6 i~l met '>'ilth him, as i recall. twice. rnere w-i!S an ~cOLJn1er af.er I m;eccie a sp~ech at the Repubt~n Conventfon. .1 didn't-d":d.n't know he W2S golr.g to be ;;1ere. ~kE to .i nulll ber of ;;.mba»a:.ecuti'le Session lnreNiewof Nov. 30, 2017. 269. HPSO, ExE,cutive Sessiori l~ewof Jared Kushner, July 25, 20!7. 270. HPSO, T~-timony of l:.rik P(inc;'!, N!?~. 30 2017. 271. HPSO, Executive Sesslori ln!c1viewo. Jo,.,_ 14, 2.017. 272. 1-lPSCI, Execuw,e Session tm.,vie,•ro, Jvv.14, W17. 273. HPSO. Executive Sesslori ln~rvie1u o 'ov.14, 2017. 274. HPSO. Ex~cuti1Je Session lnta"~ , l.:n. 14, 2017. 275. HPSG, Executive Se.sslon lntel'llie>N o , 1c-\.'. 14, 2.0.17. 2.76. HPSCl, Executive Ses~ion lnterv',ew of .lake Sut!ivan, Dec. 21, 2017~ntral rot1:: In the dossfer was first re-.-ealed in a pros a rticle. Adam Entous. D.:~lil Barrett, and Rosalind S. Helderm an, NCllnton camp;;ign, DrK paid for re.seorm tf-..;it led to RU£Sia dossier.~ Woshll,gton Po:;;t, Oct. 2.4, 2017. Pn o;-to its pub!i.c.itk;n, £rras elected to reprcsent thre2 witn~es induc1ne form2r Clil\ton campaign ,chairman 1ohl) Podesta-before, the Committee In CO!ll'H!ction with this im'!!.;tiiration. HPSO, :.,te~t!= Se~lon lrl!e......;ew John Pooeste, Jur.e 27, 20l7; HPSCf, Exea.,.iv<,S2Ssro11 lnte rvili!w Aug. JD, 2017; HPS01 Execi.lti\R ~ sion lnterv~w ofYarlHi Tamene Wolcle-Yohann~. A ug. 30, 2017. Th.a!: decision was q ~onable, since Eli,1~w as h.imselfin possession of facts relevant to. the Comm itice's inve.tig.ation. HPSCI, ~ecutive Sessl:m Interview of Marc Ellas. Dec.. 13 2017. 277. HPSO, Executr,e Session lnteiview , 4ov. 14, 2017. 278. liPSO, Executive Session Interview or lo-1. 14, 2017: HPSCI, £.xewtive Session Interview crf ffinat Akmet· sJ'jr~ !'.ov. 13; Jcel Schectman and Na " .S. sattles Russian money laundanng case," Reuters, May 13, 2017. 279. HPSO, Executive S~ssio n Interview tlov. 14, 2017. 280. HPSCI, &:ecutive Session lntcl"\/i~w o Nov. i4, 2017; HPSCI, E.xecuti...-~ Session lntel\llew o; Rit\at AIage 1: "Nonetheless, Putin publicly lndlct1ted "preference that RllSSla's BO.ii hero was to fnvor one ,::nndldate for Presfdent-cJoct Trump's stated poJJcy to work with Rus$ia, and pro-r •...... , -- . - ~ ''4-·, ' - , . """ ...-... ~ "U.S. Officlnls: Putin Personally Involved ir'I U.S. Electior, Hack" • • ~ -- ,,r.:·.. -· - 1~~~1~1~Mlr~n:~~~ m,c4::_w'..,illt~ml . ..- · ==-1 ·~ ·. • •... ~!l(., . . • . . ' . .~-~J~iffl,. .... ll ,_. ;~_,:, ,n ........,,... ;,. r.~..... c· c· .. • • .. ··- ·- - ____ _. ________________ ____________ -~ ·v .. ;T;\--vll .:p~! •-·.&.J~~:..r.....J.lq, .~., . . -...:, Article Datu: Oocernl.>er 15, 2016 Outlet: NOC News • . J -_ J ' f!.ff:,t,.,...r,,==.,. , . :I .. ''Two seniot officials with direct access to the _..f L~ ··j{1"; "1 1.... +-h~t, M:Y~n~ lf"I\ 1 1-"3 I 1-1\ I .:...':':' ""'.. ·-" . . .. ! Page 1: "We assess with high confidence thot Hussian Pl'es- iThe intellige~r,r. cam e from diplomatic sources Iand spies working for U.S. allies, the officials i said." :t, ~ fl 1 ~ "Pul1n'~ obj~ellv.es were mul tlfDr.eted, u hleh· level lntelllsenc0 source told NHC News. What began as a 'vendettc1 1 against H{l/ory Clinton ,, 0 ~ Imorphed into an effort to show corrupHon in m j American poHtfcs and to 'split oft ke\' American != I i!llles by creating the lmi'lge th.:it !other coun, fl} r;igc 1: ~Pul1n most like ly wnnted to discredit Socrut.iry Clinton because he lw.v publ/cly blamed her since 2011 for inc1iin(! moss pro,cst~egalnst hi$ regime ln l,He 2011 and I early 2012, and because he holds a grudge for co mments j' he almost certainly saw as disparaging him." · ::t l tries] couldn't depend on the U.S. to be a credi- i Page 1: fn lrl ; bl~ globi.ll ltii'lder unymort:,' th e offlclill said," : the J1isory" called the ?enn Quarter Group {PQG). ls a former a:ipJoyee cf The Dasdlle G:-cup, U.S. Senate Select Committee on lntcltigence (SSO). and FBJ; while a~ SSO, he serv~ ~ the "chief author" of "The Ccrnmitte-e Studi' of the Central lntefligence At;ffiqs Detention and lr,tef"Ogatt,111 P1oyan"_~ The Pclln Quarter GrOVJ), aour t.eade~hip, th~:1..:cq,/te,am/leaciershJO; Linlcedln, httns:i/ N w\w1.h11<.:din .c.:itr1/in/danie!if~~s. tn late _March 2017, Jones met ,•Jlth FBI reg.anilna PUG, which M descr~ as ~exposil\3. forei8J1 influence in Woti:m elcctions.1111111 mkt, FBI that PQ.G was being funded by 7 t o 10 we:il!hy dortors located prcmarily in New Vork and California, who provided appro:ve the financial sustainamlity of le- gitimate news outlets. (U) Countries that contain sizable ~ussian-speaking populations are more vulnerabte to the effec-t.S of media-enabled Russian rnformation operations. As described ,..._ •JI ~ROPERlY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RI:PRE:SENTATI'o'ES 114 above, for many of these populations, Rus- bat Russian information, technica l,. and sian media saturates local markets, provid- cyber operations. ing few alternatives for news and entertain- ment and non-Russian editorial viewpoints {U} For countries with large Russian- (U} Re<:ommendation #3; European governments, non-governmental organizations, businesses, think tanks, and academia speaking populations, strengthening legiti- should jmplement more stringent cyber mate Russian-language broadcasters and security practices., such as multifactor au- independent media outfets that disseminate thentication and encryption of sensmve fact-based content would provide both bal- data, as well as educating workforces on ance to the media space and more viewing basic cyber s&urity topics and best practic- options for r esidents of those countries. es. (U} Recommendation #2.: European govern- (U) In the last decade, Russian cyber ments, non-governmental organizations, operations have targeted governments, mil- businesses, think tanksr and a.cademia itaries, industrial control systems, business- should implement and encourage multi- es, think tanks, and universities worldwide. pronged, country-wide efforts by both pub- Whjle Russian intelligence services can em- lic and private entities to combat Russian ploy extremely sophisticated means for propaganda, technical, and cyber opera- gaining access to sensitive data, often sim- tions. ple tacti~s such as spear phisiling can prove (U) Russia utilizes a \l'.'hole-ofgovernment approach in its information op- just a$ effective. (U) Given that cyber operations are rel- erations, mobilizing a variety of tools to atively low risk/high reward, difficult to achieve its goals. From hacking of govern- attribute, and even harder to consistently ment nen•.:orks, think tanks, and universities combat, it is likely that Russia will continue to spreading propaganda via social media, to utili2e this t actic in its influence C3m- Russia 's tentacles are many and far reach- paigns. Network defenses have to b e right ing. 1_0 0% of the time; a cyber intruder. o nly has {U) It is therefore imperative that West- to be right once. Therefore, it is imperative ern n ations implement country-\•Jide efforts that governments, NGOs, businesses, think to educate its populations and inoculate tanks, ~nd academia invest more r-e.sources their governments, media outlets, and other in cyber security-defenses, imp1ement organizations from Russian influence cam~ stringent cyher security practices, and con~ paigns. To do this, Western nations should duct regular workforce education and train- encourage increased partnership between ing on these topjcs. public and private entities in order to com- (U) Recommendation #4: European govern~ PROPERTY OF TliE U.S . HOl>SE OF REPRESEtITATIVES more 115 ments should look to long-term solutions to lessen economic dependence on Russia . .(U} Russia utilizes economic ties to its advantage. Economic vulnerability - such as reliance on Russia for trade or energy- can be leveraged to change behavi-0r, send a message of displeasure, or inflict punishment. This is especially true for smaller countries within Russia's periphery, such as Moldova, where Russia is among their largest trading partners. Yet even large, economically secure countries like Germany depend on Russia for a large percentage of its energy needs. '{U) The United States should look for opportunities to lessen European countries' eco·n omic dependen-ce on Russia. Exploring alternative sources of energy and diversifying trade relationships would diminish one of Russia's tools for imposing influence on its neighbors. Russia Attacks the United States & America Reacts (U} The Committee's findings conterning the Russian government's malign lnfluence campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential election are largely consistent with the facts outlined in the IC~. The Russian effort was multifaceted, persistent, and effecnve in sowing division. The effort included cyber operations (hacking}, the use of social media, the creation of automated accounts and fake cyber p_ersonas, the use - (U) Evidence reviewed by the Com- mittee also shows that the Russcan govern- o f third party intermediaries, and state-run ment and its proxies used social media to media. advance Russia's malign interests. While PROPERTY Of THE·u.s. HOUSE OF REPRESE:NTATIVES 116 these efforts were limited - some even vulnerability. The- response of social media came after Election Day-they were effec- platforms to this threat should be examined tive at SO\.'!ing divisions within American so- closely and evaluated against ongoing ciety and promoting false information. threats. Furthermore, social media (U} America's reaction t o the Russian active measures campaign consisted of a whole of government response, with vari- platforms should consider implementing m~thods to help counter malign foreign activity. ous activities conducted by the IC, law en- (U} Recommendation #6: Congress should forcement, and policy ma kers. Despite ar- consider updating the foreign lntetligenc~ guably the best of intentions in addressing Surveillance Act to cover malicious interna- the Russian cyber menace before and dur- tional cyber actors. ing the 2016 election cycle, the Execu_tive Branch's response fell short of deterring the Russians from conducting such activity in the future. {U) As part of the Committee's initial FISA Amendments .C\.ct reauthorization discussions in 2017,·the Committee sought to address the changing threat environment as (U) After analyzi.ng the Executive it relates to malicious cyber activitv Branch' s responses to the active measure threi;iting the U.S. national security. Given campaign, the Committee identified various the difficulty in attributing a specific cyber gaps in current lai.v and policy that must be actor, the lines betv,een independent hack- addressed in order to help protect U.S. elec- er and government cyber operator are often tion systems and increase the efficacy of blurred. U.S. ad,Jersaries are consistently victim notifications in the future. In addi- attempting to obfuscate their i~entity and tion, the Executive Branch must diligently location in order to evade detection. Unfor- inform U.S. presidentiaf campaigns in the tunately, current national security authori- future of counterintelligence threats, to the ties are inadequate to counter the growing extent consistent w ith national security and cyber threat. law enforcement equities. (U) Recommendation #5; Congress should identify options aiJailable to the private sector and federal government that would address the social media vulnerabilities ex.plaited by the Russian government. {U} The exploitation of social media platforms by the Russian government for malign purposes demonstrated asignificant PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 117 I O needed flexibility and will help keep the United States ahead of its adversaries. (U) Recommendation #7: The Federal Bureau of Investigation shoufd improve cyberatlack victim notification. (U) When a state-sponsored cyberattack is dire.cted against U.S. critical infrastructure or systems rela ted to _n ational elections, i~ is (U) Unfortunately, the proposed addition to the FISA "foreign power'' definition did not make it into the final version of the essential for the appropriate federal officials to work quickly to both understand the nat ure of the threat and aid the vi~m's defense. FJSA Amendments Act of 2017 given con- cerns that such a designation would dHute the ·key distinction between two djfferent legal purposes: intelligence collection and law enforcement. This concern, while understandable! fails to take into account the changing th reat environment, as evidenced by Russian cyber actors, such as the Internet Research Agency, that attempted to meddle in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. {U} The-Commfttee renews its call for (U) Although the FBI maintained an on- Congress to update the definition of "foreign power" and agent of foreign pow- going dialogue with t he DNC related to the er' in FISA to account for entities engaged Russian intrusions, the engagement re- in international malicious cy'o er activity that mained at the-working level. These interac- threatens the national defense or security tions continued for m onths, despite no signs of the United States. Adding this n ew entity of effective mediation to the problem. 11 In to the definition of "foreign power' would permit the IC to ta met intemational cyber groups without having to connect that group to a foreign government or terrorist organization, so long as the C'{ber entity is • threating US. national security or defense. known at the time the seriousness o f the Such an addition provides the IC with much Director Corney testified that, had he - problem, he wouid have "walked over PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RE?RESENTATM::S 118 there" himself. eL {U) One way to implement these procedures is to p rovide specific guidance to FBI agents conducting victim notifications as to the circumstao,es under which t he agent should elevate the situation. Additionally, if the cyber intrusion is attributed to a foreign government entity and the victim is a politi- {U) On the other side of the notification process, the Committee found that cyberattack victim organizations did not a!- · ways grasp the information conveyed by the cal party or campaign, FBI senior manage- ment should be responstble for victim engagement immediately. {U) The Committee therefore recom- FBr, even when that information was rea- mends that notifications associated with sonably dear. As a result of both govern- state-sponsored cyherattacks should be ment- and private-sector failures, Russian conducted as soon as possible, and at the Intelligence agencies were afforded critical highest levels of the victim organization. If time on breached systems. During this intelligence sources and methods are time, extensive amounts of data were sto- threatened by dissemination of information, len for later use as part of Russia' s malign the IC should work with the Department ·of influence campaign. Homeland Security (DHS) {U) While the DNC failed to handle the intrusions with the level of seriousness it deserved-given the severity and national security implications of the particular intru- sets-the FBI should have engaged more vigorously at the senior management sion level. The FBI cannot, and should not, force to p~ovide specific recommendations on what actions can be taken by system owners to defend their net- works from the state-actor. The DHS and IC should designate personnel and resources to carry out this task and should establish a triage system to prioritize tasking during periods of high demand. a victim of a malicious cyber event to take (U) Recommendation #8: Threats identified specific remedial measures. However,. the by the Intelligence Community to state and FBI should update its internal processes to lo~al elections infrastructure should be im- make it clear that if a victim is neither will- mediately briefed to appropriate state and ing nor able to take remedial measures in local officials. When threats are identified, the event of a significant national security the federal government ~hould conduct an cyber event, FBI leadership should contact expedited decJassification review to ensure the victim and engage at the leadership lev- that the threat information can reach all PnOPERTY OF THE u_s_ HOUSE OF REPRESENTA"O\r"::S 119 necessary state and local officials in a time- those officials to respond to election- ly manner. related threats .. · (U} The Committee fou nd insufficient (U) Even if all parti es recognize the in- information sharing between the federal terest in sharing information, the classifica- government and state election officials ln tion-or even the knowledge of the exist~ 2016 regarding cybersecurity t hreats to fed- ence-of a threat may impair timely sharing eral elections. The Committee has attempt- wi th state and local election officials. Con- ed to address this deficien cy in the FY 2018 sistent with the need to protect sources and Intelligence Authorization Act {IAA}. methods, the Secretary of Homeland Securi- (U) Section 502 of the House-passed tAA ty should provide certain state and local would require the Director of National Intel- election officials w ith necessary security ligence {DNI}, dearances in order to share information. jn coordination with the Un- dersecretary of Homeland Security for Intel- (U) The Senate Select Committee on ligence and Analysis and the FBI Director, to lntelligence~passed FY 2018 IM also post on the internet an advisory report on attempted to address this issue. Specifical- foreign counterintelligence and cybersecuri- ty threats to election campaigns for federal ly, Section 402 of the IAA would require the DN! to support the Under Secretary of offices. Homeland Security for intelligence and (U) The provision also allows the FBI Analysis and any other DHS officfal in spon- and DHS to make available additional infor- soring a security clearance up to the top se- mation to appropr[ate representatives of cret level for each eligible chief election offi- any ca mpaign for federal office if those cial of a state. In addition, the DN I may is- agencies determine that such campaign is sue interim clearances to a chief election subject to a heightened foreign counterin- official for the purposes of receiving appro- telligence or cybersecurity threat. priate classified information regarding cy- (U) The Committee has seen some re- bersecurity threats to election systems. cent improvement in this area on a general (U) Recommendation #10: Significant level. In February 2018, the Office of the threats to U.S. elections identified by the Director of Nati~nal Intelligence, FBI, and Intelligence Community, including DHS held a classified briefing for election cyberattacks directed at political organiza~ officials of all 50 states. tions, should be immediately reported to the congressional intelligence committees. (U} Recommendation #9: The Secretary of (U) The House and Senate Intelligence Homeland Security should provide certain designated state and local election officials Committees should be informed whenever appropriate security.clearances to enable the IC dete,mines with medium confide,:ice PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSe C!'" REPRES::.NTATIVES 120 - ··- 3 that a significant cyber intrusion or active aging systems. To encourage adoption and measures campaign by foreign actors is in- in recognition of the federal government's tended to influence an upcoming election responsibility to protect the nation against for any federal office. Accordingl'I, the foreign threats, the Congress .shou ld consid- Committee recommends that the FBl Direc:- er providing significantly more resources to tor, the DN!, and the Secretary of Homeland state and local governments. These invest- Security jointly provide a briefing to the ments could be tied to appropriate en- Congressional intelligence committees no hancements in election system security. later than 14 days after a determination of a significant cyber intrusion. (U) Recommendation #12: Congress sho~ld consider additional funding for the Nation- {U) Recommendation #11: Congress should al Institute of Standards and Technology to encourage the adoption of National Insti- enable better outreach to state and local governments. tute of Standards and Technology tyber security standa~ds, such as those adopted by the Elections Assistance Commission, by providing federal resources to state and local governments to facilitate such adop· tion. Funds should be tied to the adoption and certification of elections svstems to appropriate standards. {U} With additional resources, NIST could host more frequent engagements around the United States to promote the adoption of new standards and to provide more technical support to state and local officials. Furtherm ore, separately identifying the budget for this activity within the (U) Election systems are owned and op- NIST would further convey the importance erated by state and local governments. of this effort and allow Congre.ss to more Their acquisition and installation is costly closely track progress. and recapitalization is infrequent. (U) The federal government largely op- {U) Recommendation #13: Congress should consider a one-time grant to state and local erates within the limits of establishing vol· election agencies to conduct a risk assess- untary standards through NrST, providing ment of those agencies' computer systems. technical assistance and sharing threat information. {U} Because voting is admrnistered at the state and local level , even for federal (U) NIST is working with state and local candidate elections, there is a patchwork of election officials to develop further en- electronic voting systems: In addition, hancements to election agencies' system those varied systems are not subject to con- security. sistent maintenance and replac~ment re- (U} The adoption of new standards may involve system replacement, particularly for - gimes. (U) Congress should consider allocating - - - -~ F ROPERTY OF THE u.s_ HOIJSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 121 funds to be transferred to state and local election agencies to conduct a risk assess~ ment of their systems. Doing this would, the Committee believes, further demonstrate the need for the implementation of the NIST cyber security standards for elec- tion agencies. (U) As noted above, OHS Secretary Jeh Johnson designated U.S. election systems as critical infrastructure on January 6, 2017, which was one day after the ref ease of the classified ICA and the same day as the re- (U) Recommendation #14: Congress should lease of the uncla~-sified version. By labeling consider strengthening the Help America election systems as critical infrastructure, Vote Act of 2002 to ensure that both state- DHS can "prioritize cybersecurity assis- wide voter registration and tabulation sys- tance11 for those who request it, as well as tems are better protected from foreign provide election systems the same interna- cyber threats. tional legal protections afforded to other critical infrastructur e. Implementation of such a designation takes time. As of September 1, 2017, the U.S. Election f!..s.sistanc.e Commission reported that th e election criti- cal infrastructure subsector plans v,rere progressing, in hopes of finalization in time for the 2018 elections. The Committee applauds this designation because it helps ad- dress the threats to the nation's voting infra.structure. (U) However, as articulated in recent news.reports, even with election systems designated as critical infrastructure, the DHS "risk and vulnerabiiity" assessments take time and resources, and there appears to be a lengthy wait list. Therefore, in preparing for the 2018 m idterm elections, OHS should continue to work with the states on prioritizing these assessments for election systems - and other stakeholders must do more. {U) Recommendation #15; The Department ., PROPERTY OF TH E U.S. liOIJSEOF REf'Ri:SENTAnvES 122 of Homeland Security should provide the dancy is a contemporaneously created pa- owner or operator- of any electronic elec- per record reflecting the voter's selections. tion infrastructure affected by any significant foreign cy.ber intrusion with a briefing and include steps that may~ taken to mitigate such intrusions. {U) The Committee found that commer- {U} The vulnerabilfty of state and local erection infrastructure has been well documented. These systems, which are not frequently updated or replaced, are not devel- oped to defend against state-sponsored cial providers of electronic election infra- cyber threats. The fact that voting ma- structure were not informed of foreign chines themselves, as well as tabulation sys- cyber intrusions to their systems. While the tems, are IC and federal government may be aware of ternet does not offer adequate security. malicious cyber activity targeting election Rather, it can create a false sense of securi- systems, the information is of little value if ty. appropriate threat information cannot be shared with the owners and operators of affected systems. Accordingly, the Committee recommends that OHS provide a briefing and mitigation steps to the owner or operator of election infrastructure sys- tems targeting by a foreign cyber intrusion. {U) In addition, DHS has offered state not directly connected to the in- (U) To help p-rntect the integrity of t he process, state and local election au thor ities should consider building in additional redundancies to ensure an audit trail in the event of a compromise of the electronic voting systems. An example of this is a contemporaneously printed record of votes that is securely stored at the polling place and local governments a network monitor- and transported to the relevant election ing tool t hat alerts election system opera- office at the end of Election Day. The Com - tors about known forejgn threats using in- mittee is mindful of the reason most juris- formation obtained by the IC. Not all states dictions replaced the paper ballot, but have adopted this tool. building [n a redundancy using a paper rec- (U} Recommendation #16: State and locaf ord of a vote will help guard ag~inst the po- governments should be encouraged to es- tential for manipulation of voting results in tablish redundancies that are not depend- the event of a breach of the electronic ent on current elections ~nfrastructure, voting machines. such as a mechanism that re~ins individual vote records, ensuring the Integrity of {U} Recommendation #17: While it is im- the vote in the event of a compromise of the Executive Branch's response$ Congress voting infrastructure due to a foreign cyberattack. An example of such a redun- portant to implement iessons learned from should not hampet the Executive Branch's . ability to use discretion in responding to a ?:'Con~....s5. 4. The IC comprtses n dlfforent o:-gani?ot:ons, or IC e lemo,ts, to include the Offu;e of~ Director of Nation.ii !n-re:ligenre, the Ce.,!ra I Intelligence /\gency, Federal Bureau of Jn-.odgation, ttie Office of lnteillgence and Count~nte3fge nce at the Department of EMrgy, !he! Office of National Security Intelligence a t the Di!partrnent of Justke's Drug Enforcerr.eot Adm,r-.istration, the Office of !.T.elfjgenc.e and Analysi5 at the Department of Hcmeland Securtw, the Bureau oi lnt!:111· ger.ce ar.rl Research <1t tl\e Oepamnen, of S~ate, the Olr.ce of IJ'lte!Ugenc.e and Analysis the Department ofT~ury, Air force fmefligence, Arm\' lntelrigence, Coast Guard lnt-OW' fntende;J ii~rJienur_ Tnc inteudcd imciCilcc is tlre Members oi BPSC! and- . to the extent jl:mJiUt:c by classification and .~ecurily ruks-thc b.rwocr House ofR~tativcs itml th: An:~ pceople. · What (JTe tilt! key qu.1?Stio11s y<1ll l·e:ek to answer?_ • \','hat R.;ssfan cyber activity all:d other active measmes ,\'C!"C di,cctcd i,ga)n:it the·tJniled Slllles mid lts anic:s? • \'lhai: co.m:e..•inrelligc:1ice conee.-ns eXist related to Russia and.the 20l6 U.S. election);. including any intelligence regarding lin.1<5 ~ctwccn Russia a."'!!! intff\.'itl!!l!l~ a;;sociated v.1th !)Oliticul =npaign3? • What was tlk USG respot1~e IO !hes;: Rns:;ian active mea;;ur,;s an:d t>,11a! impact, if any, did the Ri.s.,i:m activity have oo intellig=e relationships li!iO u~ditfom,l ul!iances? • ·V..ilJat po5:>:.b1e ieaks of classified info!m:iti.o.:i took place rc1Rted lo th: lnlcllig~t1ce Community·s z..,~essmCflt of th= maue.s? WltaJ is your inrerutd olltcomeprot!ud(s)? . The Con1mi1tce i:niends to C<\mplelc a FepOrt al the highest c]asi;i lic:ition net.-e.ssat;' to ans~cr the key qu~-tions ~ where possio!e, rcpo.t(s) at !ewer clas.~iicntlon );;Vcls rel~--ai:ile to the House ofRcprescntati,;cs a:id d1e public, as ;apjl!Oy-i-at::. i PROPER1Y OF THE U..S_HOn will also consider what USG officials believe to be the impact . to U.S. intelljgence of both Russian active measures related to the election·and the associated recent disclosures. How: The Committee will investigate the methods by which Russia -targeted the aforementioned groups. Why: The investigation will consider Russian leadership plans and intentions, including whether and in what ways Russia intended to influence U.S. policy or undermine U.S. political systems and democratic institutions. USG response: The Committee will examine how the U.S. government responded to Russian active measures. It will also·include an assessment of the process used to generate the !C's report and any deviations from standard practices in the !C's report. 2 PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 135 and an accounting of whether a person or persons in the IC or the.White House leaked information on the report prior to its dissemination to the Gang of Eight, Congress, or the public. o The report also assess whether intelligence relating to U.S. persons was collected and disseminated in accordance with applicable laws and policies. Recommendations: Several recommendations are likely to come out of this investigation. will • Agencies: • • • The Committee expects to be in contact with CIA, NSA, DHS, FBI, DTA, and ODN!. However, The Committee will pursue all avenues of inquiry, which may include agencies not listed here, The Committee will also engage current and former JC and USG personnel, private industry, and any other parties with knowledge relevant to the investigati9n. The Committee will examine the process by which the Intelligence Community Assessment, "Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections." was created and the intelligence underlying tbe assessment to determine whether the JC comported with all relevant Intelligence (:ommunity Directives and security precautions when researching, writing, analyzing, and releasing their product, and whether the assessments meet a reasonable stand~rd of credibility as determined by the investigatory team. The Committee will focus on evaluating the IC's work on the Asse~sment with regard to IC rules and procedun:s, but not create a new or separate assessment of Russian activities. Given the above, a11d competing priorities, whe11 do you expect to complete the project? The Committee expects the investigation to take several months, at least, and the drafting of a report and any declassification review to ·takc additional time thereafter. Above all, the investigation will prioritize comprehensiveness over completion by a particular date, while still · seeking to move as quickly as possible to ensure the report is timely and useful. What if!a11y political or jurisdictio11al issues exist? The inquiry's subject matter carries political sensitivities. ~everthelcss, staff will proceed in a bipartisan and objective manner, both in conducting the inquiry and in drafting the report. • The CommitteJ's investigation will not interfere with any ongoing criminal or counterintelligence investigations. Staff wiil, however, seek relevant law enforcement or coun\erintelligence information consistent with the Committee's oversight jurisdiction and investigative responsibilities. The objective of seeking such information will be to assess whether any collusion occurred between Russians and USPs, and the leaks of classified information. • The investigation could implicate the work of the agencies within the jurisdiction of Homeland Security, Judiciary, Oversight, and Forcigry Affairs Committees. However, because the investigation will focus on an active measures campaign by a foreign adversary, the investigation clearly lies within the jurisdiction ofHPSCI. Additionally, House Rule IO provides that HP SCI shall study the sources and methods of the IC on an "exclusive basis." 3 PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 136 Wllat if/a11}' c.ampa.ro11entJJ.tio11 l.'in4:s aist? Staff ::nd l\·1embcrs conductinft the invo.;6.gflliun \viii nee,j access to G:img of Eigln: mat,;rial. This . :iecessi1atei; a sn\llll, nimble group, w,. bold all ~evant non-(r.iog ofEight planninsand scoping documcrms, wlth the propt:r p,.."DJl.issious ba:ied on re!pOnsihilitie,; and hfajority!'.Ylinori.Iy st~rus. Tl:MELINE Prol•ide specific intended deadlines for e!lt:ft phase ofyow revi;w (drita gmlur/11g, amil,sis.. writifzg. Ct1m·di.Jiation/editb1g,publis/Jing.-) Tr.e Committee will pim;\fe ii ~ed. bialdiog-biocks c1:pproncl1II) the inves!igmion, \.,.hlle prio.itizing compreh1!nsiveness zbove completion by a fixed end hout nil three phases; the Committee. will engage Members for ru1y fc\'.:db~s:k imd incolJlorn\~ thnt f~back lnlo our proccsii'. · Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Com:mittee' s Ruh:s of Pro~un:., I 15th c:ong~s. we hereby jointly agree to the scope of investigation descnoed above. - t;i?J!6_ tb-lc c-au~c ord.:r (!:!fi uud~r Tille VII) oi.."tilori1_iilg : fectrorlic sur\-c:1llnn~ ,'!l ~~ P~g.; fa:,m tb.~ P1SC. t>ag;;, is ~ U.S. citizeil vmo serve..! flS a vo!t~r adv~no th~ Tromp p1esid~ial ~ip:ugn. C.On.-ir.'--ot witll_r.:quircm~c..~ und~FISA, tl1~applic:uio11 l-~~ t., he fi_r,;tcc:tjfi=d oy the Director or Drput1 Di!tctor orth.: FBT. It lh~"'ll !\.'l{uir.;,d ihc appro•~ ol'th:: Attorm:y G::neml, D~p~• Attom:y ~eml (??AG}, 01· the S=nn!s!-ccmfrrmcd - ~ ~ t Att~~~ (i~:ieral for the ~a:tioro\ Sec;n:ity Di\'i.sio11. '!be E'Br rid OOJ o'ht.rirn:d on.c :niti!il FJSA wammt .argeting c.:rt.:r l'asC every 9(1 day;; ,incl ;..-:!!cl) r.:T>Ct\•111 £>aqw.res a 1"~t)'.1I"<1te finding orprubab!..: cause. Th~n-Dir.::.:ior Jamc:s Corney sig..ed tbrc:e FISA app!icatiom u.1 qnestion :.'.!11. b.!lwf oft11'! FBl, and Deputy Dir¢C1or .-\!u:hew Mewl>:: signed Oll<}. Tncn-DAG Silly Y~. th~-Acting DAG !>meBoe:ne, ana DAG Rod Rommcin c~h !-igw.d orw or rr public•; a.:cnfid~uce in !he wt~grity ofth~ fiSa\ proc~ <.!~pends on me court's llbtlityto hold the ~ovi:rn.·nan IQ the hlghes!,;,mndl'Jd p.'.ll!icu[ruiy ~ ii rc)nt::s to "tl:('vciil=.cc of Amcri~.!n ci ~ How.:..-cr. the FI'SC's 1isor hi prot.:~1i:l~ 1he righls of Amcric:cns, wbich i~ remfurc::d b:.g.Q.J::y reG:::WillS of=cillar= ilrd!:n;, is n=sarily d~dent on the s o v =t' ~ production to tfle court of al! m:\t,ri.:tl :iad ~-v.:u1l fa~. •• 11rls shocld inoh1de in.formation potentially fuvornbl~ th,e !Mgd. of the FJSA ,o t;XCLASfiTFlED PROPERTY OF THE lJ.S. !-=.OUSE: OF RcFRESEl';fATIVES 142 UNCLASSIFIED application that is known by the goven.uuent. In the case of Carter Page, the government had at least four independent opportunities before the FISC to accurately provide an accounting of the relevant facts. However, our findings indicate that, as described below, material and rel evant info nnation was omitted. 1) l11e ..dossier" compiled by Christopher Steele (Steele dossier) on behalf of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) a nd the Hillary Clinton campaign fom1ed an essential part of the Carter Page FISA application. Steele was u longtime FBI source wh9 was paid over SI 60,000 by the DNC a nd C linton campaign, via the law finn Perkins Coie and r esearch firm Fusion GPS, to obtain derogatory infonuation on Donald Tnimp's ti es to Russia. a) Neitl1cr the initial application in October 20 t6, nor any of the r enewals, disclose or reference the role of the DNC, Clinton campaign, or any party/campaign in funding Steele's effo11S, even though the political origins of the Steele dossier were then · known to senior DOJ and FBI officials. b) l11e initial FISA application notes Steele was worlcing for a muned U.S. person, but docs not name Fusion GPS and principal Glenn Simpson, who was paid' by a U.S. law finn (Perkins Coie) representing the DNC (even though it was known b y DOJ at the time t hat political actors were involved with the St.::ele dossier). application does not meution Steo:le was u!timati:ly working on behalf of-and paid by-the DNC mid Clinton campaign, or that the FBI had separately B\lthorized payment to Steele for the same inJ:onnation. ·me 2) The Carter Page FISA application also cited c>."tensively n September 23, 20 l6, Yahoo News article by Michael Isikofl: which foc uses 0 11 Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow. ·111is article docs not corroborate the Steele dossier because it is derived from infonnation leaked ~v Steele himself to Yahoo News. 111e Page PISA application incorrectly usscsses that Steele did not directly provide information to Yahoo News. Steele has admitted in British court filings that he met with Yahoo News- and se\leral other outlets- in September 2016 at the direction of Fusion GPS. Perkins Coie was aware of Steele's initial media contacts because they hosted at least one meeting in Washington D.C. in 2016 with Skele a nd Fusion GPS where this matter was discussed. a) Steele was suspended and then tem1inated as an FBI source for what the FBI defines as Ilic most serious of violations-an una uthorized disclosure to the media of his relationship with the FB[ in an Octobe r 30, 2016,Mmher Jones article by David Corn. Steele should have been terminated for his previous undisclosed contacts with Yahoo and otlJ.eroutlets in September- before !lie Page application was submitted to UNCLA SSIFillD PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 143 UNCLASSIFIED the FISC in October- but Steele improperly concealed from and lied to the FBI about those contacts. b) Steele's numerous encounters with the media violated the cardinal rnle of source handling-maintainingconiidentiality- and demonstrated that Steele had become a less than reliable source for the FBI. 3) Before and after Steele was terminated as a source, he maintained contact with DOJ via then-Associate Deputy Attorney General l:lmce Ohr, a senior DOJ ollicial who w~rked c losely with Deputy Attorneys Gen eral Yates and later Rosenstein. Shortly after the election, the FBJ began interviewing Ohr, documenting his communications with Steele. For example, in September 2016, Steele admitted to Ohr his feelings against thencandidate Tntmp when Steele said he "was desperate tlmt Donald Trump not get elected and was passionate about him not being president." TI1is clear evidence of Steele's bias was recorded by Ohr at the lime and subsequently in official FBI fil es-but not reflected in any of the Page FISA applications. a) During this same time period, Ohr's wife was employed by Fusion GPS to assist in the cultivation of opposition research on Tmmp. Ohr later provided th e FBl with all of his wifo's opposition reseal'ch, paid for by the DNC and Clinton campaign via Fusion GPS. The Ohrs' relationship with Steele and Fusion GPS was inexplicably concealed from the rise. 4) According to the head of the FBl's counterintelligence division, Assistant Director Bill Priestap, corroboration of the Steele dossier wns in its "infancy" at the time ofthe initial Page F[SA application. After Steele was tem1inatcd, a source validation roport conducted by an independent u nit within f:BI assessed Steele's reporting as only minimally corroborated. Yet, in early January 2017, Director Corney briefod President-elect Trnmp on a summary of the Steele dossier, even though it was- accordiug to his Ju11e 2017 testimony-"salacious and unv,:ri!ied." While the FISA application relied on St.:ele's past record of credible reporting on other unrelated matters, it ignored or concealed his anti-Tmmp fmancin! and ideological motiva\ions.· Furthennore, Deputy Director McCabe testified before the Committee in December 2017 that no surveillance warrnnt would have been sought from the FISC without the S1c:ele dossier information. UNCLASSIFIED PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 144 UNCLASSIFIED 5) TI1e Page FISA application also mentions i.nfonnation regarding fellow Tmmp campaign advisor George Papadopoulos, but there is no evidence ol' any cooperation or conspiracy b.itwecn Page and Papadopoulos. ]11e Papadopoulos infom1ation triggcrcd the opening ofan FBI counterintelligence investigation in late July 2016 by agent Pete Strzok. Slrwk was reassigned by tbc Special Counsel's Office to fBI Hurnnn Resources for improper tell.1 mess.ages with his mistress, FBI Attomey Lisa Page (110 !mown relntion to Carter Page), ,vherc they bolh demonstrated a clear bias against Trump and in favor of Clinton, whom Strzok had also investigated. TI1c Strzok/Lisa Page texts also reflect e:1.1e11sive discussions about the investigation, orchestrating leaks to the m edia, and include a meeting with Deputy Director McCabe to discuss an "insurance'' policy agaiiist Presidf!nt Trump's election. rm UNCLASSIIve to rclc= tot~ House cf Rcp~..itivcs its llllcs:3tioo.:s agair.st lhc Federal Burent1 ofinv1mis;itio~ (Fnl) end the Di:~rmmt of Ju.siicc (DOJ) is a rrans~cnt effort to und.?rmin~ those agcncks, the Special Cou,1!CI, a.'lrl. Congress' in\-cstig.itions. II 11lso risk! publ:c C.'. to wr.du.ct lcmporccy sur,..cilhl=: of uutcr ~..~c. someone tlte f.BI asse.'i$1:d to be an 11gcru oflhc RUSS'".an go\'rmumnL DOJ met the .!imrs lransi,arenc.:, ~ud C\i£i.!J~i bmis ·11~ to nteet FlSA ;s prooob!e i:.iuse rTaquiremen(. by dem:::.i.slntt!ng: o contampor:uteolli evirlenc~ of ~!.Si.o's ek-..tion interf=~; o concerning Ru~an link:, nnd o~ac-h Ir> Trwnp co.m~in c>niciJi.ls; o Paie's history wilhRussian int.cllf-sencc; nnrl o P.age's su::plcious nctMtlcs io 2016, including in Mi&Ow. ·rt:i.e Committee's Minority 1!53 thcrefore Jm!parcd !his memorandum to corrc:1 the record: • • rn.rs Cb'r.tslophcr Steele•, raw iotclligm~ rcpo rli.Dg did not lnforn1 the decision ,a initle1c !a counf~rinlcUigcnce im·estig•tion in lste July 1016. In fuct. ~ rBl'si:loscly!leld inV1:S1ipth~ team only received Steele' s ·rqioning in mid-Scp1tml;,,;r- more lnmt S-e\'tn weeks le1er. TI:e FBI - 8ml, subscqmntly, the SpccfaJ Coun~I 's - i nvesti~tion in!o links between I.he R~inn GOVC!iJ,"r11:nl ll.n.d Trump cMOp..1ign '1Ssoi:btcs bas be.en based l>ll troublins law enfortr:mrnt and intcllig_cm:c inform:?tlon t1nn:1'ltcd lo the ...dossier."' DOJ's Octo~rll, 2016 FISA 01>plii:.,Hloa..11.11d tflr~c suln-cqu_ent renm-nls cru-~fully outlinetl f()r the Cnurt ~ multi-pronged mtlonnlc !o:- sitl"\·eilling Page, who, at me tirne of d~c fir.it npplicatiot1, v.ns oo longer ~ith the Trump CArn))llig~ DOI detrukd Pege's past rebt!onslilps \\ith Russi!ln S!Res nnd imcrnctfo:, with Russinn officie.ls during the 2016 campaign • DOJ cited multiple soonxs to support lhc; c~c for s!!::vcil!ing Pnge-buI ~de only narrow ll!lo ofinfonnatlon fr~m Srccle's source:;i !!bout Psge's specific acfo'i1il:s in 20 l 6, chiefly his s~nlh ~ndidale Don'1d Trump n ~ bim a fordgn policy &.,·iso,. As OOJ informed tlic Com in suhseqneru rene,~-a!s, Ste.cl~·., reporting 11b~I11 Page's MC5cow nte~tia~ • DQj's appliea1ions did not o!h=n..ce rely on Steele's rcpotlin2. incl"Jding any "si!oi:iou:s" nlle~:itio11!; l ' 1/ P"OP::RlY OF THE U.S . HOUSE OF RFPRESENiATll/ES 146 nbout Trump, 11mJ 1h1: F8l n1:var pttld Stcuh: fo1this reporting. Whllc: t;(pln[ninB why Iha FBI vlcwed $tC(tk's roporting ond ~ources ~ relir1hh: ant\ m·dibh:, DOJ ruso dl~loscd: o St~le'$ J1rior rclntionsltip with lhci Fl31: o tho foot of ond rcfuion for his termlnotlon ns n :s.ou~; nnd o 1h1a1 uss~sstd polilh:al motiva\ion of thos~ who hln:tl him, • TIJ.t Co111mlll1:c MnjoriJy'~ xur:.111onind1.11111 which druw, .,c1~1lvrtr on highly llrn~ltlw ('l11JsffietJ 1nrorm11tJon, tr1clude~ orhcr Lllslorrlons on v.ilh gu!tfon~e und inpul from R~p. Trey Oowdy), 11od lheo ru.:slw.J 1111any-ti.ru: volo \~hhout pripr noti~c. Thi.s was by dc-!ign, The oYcrwhelntlng nmJorI1y or Commillco Mornbtrs oovcr rccckro DOJ nuU1orlin1lon 10 ncc~ss the: uoderlyhli ~liu,lfied lnform111\01'1, Md th~~rorc could 110-t judgo lh~ vomc'tty of Chrurm1m Nuoc~' clni~. Due to son~Wve souroC:1 nod 111ctbod.~, DOJ providt;d m:cess only 10 Ul1l Commilll!ll1$ Chnir nod Ttmud11s Mcmb\lr (orrespeciive d~~is.um} 1 l:\nd limitcc! :;to.ff, to fllcllltntc thu Com111lh~':1 itwc~li!!otion Into Rus,ln's coven cumpnisn lo lnnucnce the '201 G U.S. cleciions? M DOJ ILi!, cauf1m1~ publicly, it did nol t1ulhorize tho bron~~r relt.Uc ofrh).$ informuUon within Congress or to lhtl' public, nnd ChlllJJDll[I Nwic., r~u.s«i to nUow OOJ mid lhc FBI lo review his tlocumen1 lllllil lie p<:rmiw:d lhe F61 Director 10 sec it for \he first time lo HJlSCl's secure spnccs late on S11ndny, Janu11ry 28 - 10 dayi; nncr diS(:losurc 10 \he J:lou~.' ln its Oclober 20 J6 FISA opplicBHon aod sub~µenl ri!IlewaT!!, DOJ ll(curntely fnfo.nncd the Court t)lat 1h.e FB[ initiated its collntcrin1elligc_n~c investiga1ion on Juiy 31, ~0·10, nfl~r r~~ving i n f o r m a t i o n - - - .. OcoJllc P1ipadopolllos re~ealetl _ _ _ - t h p l ~ l l . who,t~oklntcrest ioP11pad~ulo~mp =Jia.ign foreign- polic 1uMser, infilJ"lll~ him in lute April 20l61.ha1 Russitt . Papadopoulos's disclosure, mo:n:over, ~cllm:d 11s11irin Jhc: b11~kdrop o( ijiw;iit's os.grei:th·C) c:9vcrt 1:1nnpalgn fo I nffucn tt• our c:Jc:dions, which th~ FDJ WM 11tre11dy monitoring.. \Vo W(l\l]d J:11cr lcwa in Pnpadop,.11ilos'1, pliai th~tlh~l t~I) infonnat!ort th-c Rttresm1aH011 WtJS consisleol wilh the fBl's undcrl,Ying , inve.stlgutivc rccor~, wlJich curm1111ml fonncr:rcnior officiuls IMei· corruoonw~i.J In extensive 2 I' PROPERTY OF THE U.S. 1-JOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 147 Committee testimony. Christopher S!eete's Rp,;rting, wlrlgi he beg;m to sh~ ,\ilh ru:i Alf Ggtnt thro!J&b the end of October 1016, planed no rnlc in launching tho FBl's c:ounterint.elligence investigation into RtiSSian in!erferencc ~rid lin;:s to thr! Trump campaign. ln f5ct, Steele's rcponing did no1rcru:h the counieri~tellig~nc:c; tcam_invc:stiS'ling R=ia_ at FBi headqu:mers until mid-Septcmbcr2016, more tbll!l seven Weeks: nfter the fBI Q?ened its um:sti'gatfaa, ~!lu~ 1.he prore's existence ,,m; so cl0£e!y held wilhin \he FBf.6By tr~n. the FBl had ~dy opened rub-inquiries into U)divldll,11$ linked to th, TrumP can;pnign As Committee tcslimo:iy bea.ra <>ill, tM FBI WQuld h.wc conlinucd iu investignticn, incluiµng ::gain intlividu:ils, c:i;e..,. ifit h;ui :,e\-er received in(ormation from Stcefa, ncve: :ipplied for a FISA warmn[ lJe!!ll!! Pu..~. or if the FISC hnd rej:ctcd tho a~l~tion.' DOJ's FJSA Aru,ILC!ltion !lnd.R£newal5 The initial w-arrnnl ~pplica1ion :md sul>seq11cnt rC'llCWills ctt<:lved indcpemle.n1 sautiny m:d llJ)prova! by fullt' different federal judges, three ofwhom were appoin_1cd by l?=it!enl G~rp:; W. 8~h ilnd oi::e liy Pr~i-p..-o,id tr.tee renewids- in cariy January 2017, early April 2017. a.-id Jot~ Juae 2!H7 -'-'ill'cl1 authcnizi:d the FBI to mafoiain ~ ,\'eiUane¢ on Page until !Ille: Scptem~r101?. Seni<1rD0J m,d FBl offid.als spp<1int~ by lte Obama end Tr.llTI pA~nisunlions, including accing Atton-.~y Gero...rol Dan.. B-0ente and Deputy Attorney General Rod Rd5enstcin, certified th:: applic:ntions with the Court, FlSA wns not used le spy on Trump or ho carn1111ign. Af the Trump c.-.mpai~ and Pa~ ®''C 1aclmowtcdg.cd, Pn£e: :ndcd his £omni 11ffilk!ti~:; wilb lh:=paign months~ OOJ spplied for a \v:rmint. DOJ, moreo\-cr, ,;ubmitted the initial applica~o l~than lh.ree ....ui:s be(ore !bi: . clcctlon. e,·crr ilioug!t the FBJ's im·estlg.ntioo had bcc:n ongoing sin:a lbc c:nd ofJuly 2016. DOJ's v ~ t requ::s1 wos based on cornpellin5 e\idcm:eand prob.:bl<: caus~ to bcUc\·c Page was knowingly i=isting ciandcstinc Russi/In i.nlcUiicr.cc o~livitles in l.l:e U.S.; • Page's Connections ro Russi::in Go\·~rnm~nt 11.ml tnlcllig.cncc Officla~ TI,e FBI h:!d on indep;.'lrlent basis for investieotjng Pose's mo1ivnfio11s and actions durin2 the cnmpajm lrnnsition. and followinl! the irul'Jgµration. As DOJ d=ribcd in detail to r!::c Court, ~l!l? had nn c.xtl!DSi\·e recmd es •>i prior te> jornin~ th~ Tnunp crunpsis,,. He ~d~ in Mcw...ow from '20042007 and pursued husin.:5.'i dcaJs with Ruma's sUtC-il\"llcd tnel'g.y comp.my O~.oro- 3 PROPERTY o.= aHF.: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 148 Redactions match previously released version-no additional redactions taken Page rcmsiotd on (h~ rndllr oJ Ruisi11n in lelligen~c nnd the F8l. ln 20)3, prosecutor.. indicted thr~ omu 1qissian spies, two of whom 1;lfgetetl llESg-e for re....uitmenL The FBI also intc.viewcd Pagi:; mcl.tiple times ai>D11t hi! Rw.siun. intelllgr:ncc con~. ir.tluding in Marth 2016.u The FBI's can~ about and kno\dedgi;:- of Pag,e's cc:1iYi1~ tlrerc:forc long predate the FBI's 1ccei5=t ofS!~tl:'s 1nrorm!l.llon. • Page's StJSpiciom Ac.ri-Yity Do.ring the 2016 C:impnign: The FJSA .app!;c;,lions also detail Pl!gc·s 5USpic:om nctivity nl'\l?r joining the Trump ccmpaign io March 2016. Pose oaw:Ied ra Y...o:scow u; July 20!6; during wliich he gev~ e uniYCJStt"J comm~e<:lcd hnpcu1o.nf iri~·~igat:\>t= in{armotfon and !tads by cc·nducring Court-nppro\'ed sun-ei!lancc. FOf insta.ricc. Pllge's c.ffoits to sworn testimony to our Comn,jtl.ec. DO.l't Tr.a.nspnr~ncY about Chri.~1onhC!r Stvtlli! FAr (rom ..omitti.Dg" m~tc~nl fucu nhcut St~Ye. ,u thi:: Majority da.lm,,~ DO.I rcptatcdly lnformccl the Court 11boutSt~c?c'll bnt1,gro1md, ~rcdlbllity, 11nd porenti:il bills. DOJ explained in dellli._l Stecl~s p,-for ri;lntionsl1ip ~ithu.1d compcllSlltion from lru: FEH; hrs credibility, reporting hi:slory, illld source m:lwnrk; tl'l!! fact ofand n:-~ fil'r his h:rminlllcon as fl sourc¢ in late October20I6; ruid the likely pmi~ • motivn1ion."I of lt.ose who i>Jred Sleele. DOJ w~t tmrupnrcnrwlth Coutt2hootSt~lc's.$0Urdng: Tl'le Committe~Mnjori:y, which hcd ea.ii.ie-r att1.tScd ObllJlU\ A-: /dcnl{jled U.S. Pt:rwn n!!,'eJ' IUNf.red St,111'~ JI.I as !o tl!i! l!:J)!im/!an bchir,,J lite re.march m:c Candldaro -fl] '.r ties 10 Jlus:r:D... 11r,1. FBf s~CJrm/es ll-,a; ,Fr,, filirr;1i((ed U.S. Pcr,roq w<1s li~/y lookfrr~ {or fnformt1tion ,r.m °rou!,J be user! lo ,(isr::rr;dil Cgr.:Nefarc IiI 's f(lf12J?(~n. "" Co!ltr.>..ry tc> th.: Majority's osscrtiort tltill DOI falls to mentlo:-i ~ Steele' s r~c-h {\'2.$ commissi'1ned by "P:Olit:cCal w::tors" ,o "obmrn derogatory informa.ioo on Donald Tn.1mp's lies to Rusn11,~ DOJ t, fnct lnfomird Ott Court e~urnhily th::it S!ccle WA! blrctl by PIWPERiY OF THE; U.S. liOUSE OF R£::PRESENTAllVE.S 150 polilic:tlly-moth--:itcd U.S. per.sons .11.nd c,nl!tks nod th:it bi! r ~~rth np~nrtd"inrN1tkd for use "lo disercdil" Tnimp 1s ,:ump11lgn. • DOJ CXJ)llliocd lhc flll', rca~onnbk bllsb for findin Stcdi: credible: The npplicalions correctly dcscn~-"d Stecle os . The 2ppltc11ions also ~ S'jen~d Stcclc:'11 rimIll-yea; hi.story of cro:iible .eponins on RU$sia and oll:tr msttcrs, includins..info.rra:itioli OQJ us~ in criminal pro~c:-cdings. 27 Senior FBI and DOJ ollicirilis lia~·c r.:~rolly affirmed tot~ Committee the reliab:@y and credibility ofSt~le·s ~porting, nn ~ ; i i \ also rdle1;,cd in !lie FOl' s ur.der}y;ng sawce documcnlS.21 The FB! Jms uml~na1:cn li rigomos proc~ 10 vet allesolions fro:n Steele's reporting, includir.g wilh regard to Pcge.'1 • The FDI propErly uodficif thi f'ISC i:ifttr II rennf11.2..ltd Sttck .U"ll s~lln:t for n1aklog un{lothol"l:ted disdosu«:S to tlii mtdill.. 1hc MajoriLy dt~s no ~ ·ider.~ fr..il \he FB I, prior 10 filing in; initial 0 ~ 21, 2016 oppli~i~n, ~loolly knew or should bave kriovm of nny nUesedly iru1pp~oprie1c mediCL contacts l>y St.e:I~. Nor do they ei~ niden::e tlult S1cele disclosed 19 Yill-.DD! d~111Us iru:luded 511 lhe FlS!, wm'ront, since the.British Couit filings to wbich they refer rlo ilDl edtlrcss. wont Steele may have said to Yahoo!. DOJ informed the Coun in iis rencwD}s lhat the FBI ~I~ promptly to t ~innlc Steele afu:r l"1tning f(om hlm {afle; DOJ fili:d tht·first ~ t application) tr.at he mrl discus..~ his work with a media outkl in [ate lxtom. Tu Januuy 2018 r~wt1\ f11rt.~r e~plaincd to 1he Coun that Slccle I.Old 1.he FBI lhVJ he made his unauthorized mC'd.io disclosure betouse of his fMlralion 111 D ~ Camey's public rmacunccment ,hwtly before the e!c~tion lira! the ffil rcopc~ its investigation in((} cnttdidate Clin:on'.s email use•. • OOJ·n~nr p,-.hJ S~e !or the "dossier": The Majority assms that 1l1s FBl had "separately outho~ pn>menr !a-St~ele fer his n:~rclt on 'Tnnnp but ne_gl«tS to ffi!mtion Ui:it payment wns ~~~l!ed ond never Uittde. As the FBl's records m-:1 Commiltee tcsti,mllll)I confum.s, althoogh the fBI inilialfy considered c:omp:nsntlon St~clo ullho~lcly ncv~r rccclvctl p:iymcnt from the FBI tor nny "dosilcr"-rcbkd iDfonnntlo11•.ll DOJ acaimtely infon:ocd the Coi:rt th111 Steele hntl been o.n FBI. c ~ human source ~irice• • for which he •,\';li ...cmnpensatcd by I.he FB1" - payms for pre\;ow;!y,th:u-cd information of \·sl u.e Wlt'l!lated tQ 1be FBI'~ R:nssui invc-stigotion.:;, ,-\ dd itional Omission!.. Error.1 1 11nd Dislortions in the l',1Ajoritv•5 Memorandum . .. ~ • - . - DOJ :lppropriaid)" provided lfo: Court wilh .Q cor:nprcb~11slv~ CXJllll:Il:lllon of Russi.n's election interfcrcn~. rocludi.llg c~·itlcnce th:11 R11UI11 courr.-d :in.o!bcrTrump c:nmpoign ~tlt·uor, Pap~ct\l!X'"ulOJ, .\IHI nrnt Ruuilln ~sen~ p rcYiC\Ytil tbtir hnck rui(I d~semfo11tion ohtokn cmP ib, In cfaimiog 1J-~ there is "no cvi~ t}f any coop~ro1ion or conspiracy bct\\,:en Fagc aml PapadopoulllS,.-.).1 lhe ~iajori1y milii.ates t1E ffl!Son wiiy DOJ spmfa:ally expl~td Russia's ~ounfag of Papadopoulos. Popadopoufo.s's imerattion _\.,ith ~!l!.11 agents, COllpkd ·with real-time cvidzn;,; ofRltSSian d~i~n i nte.fere!JCC, provided th1: Ccurt withe bro* ~1."Xt in whicll 1t> 1:l~luatc RI.ISSia's c!antfeitir.-e octMlies PDd P:lge's- hi~ory and alleged con~ct ,,ith RUS$t.""lll offic:iols. Mori:o'rtt, ~ only i'iigc6 PROPER1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESeITATIVES 151 I no cvldtnec ofll..so~tc co~piracy lieiwc:cn him and _ Pepadopou'los was required. DO.f ,'l"(Ju!tl hnv1: bun utgligi:nt in omillcng ~-lh•l in{'ormalion :1bouC Pupmlopoufos nnd Ruulo'5 conc.erutl efforts. • In it, Court filingi, DOJ made prop~ use of n~,·s con rage. The l!.tijcrity fals:ly claims rhet thi:. f"ISA materials '"'relied hea\'jly" on B Scp!cm_licr23. 2016 Yahoo( News .micle by Mkh:ic:l Tsikoff :uid th.at thi~ artick ''docs not conoboratc lho Stcctc Dossi~ becQusc·ii is derived from infonn~tioo leaked by S(Cck: hlllL"Clf." lS In fuc!, DOI fl:fcreo~cd 1sikofi's 4'.lticle, nlongside onothc:r article th¢ Majoril)' fruts lo menlion. not to provide sc~te co:-roboration for Steel:'s repqning. but instenct 10 inform the Court of Page's public da.1it1l ofhi3 ~uspected meetings in MoS(:()w, which Ps" 11lso ecr.o...e.,1 i1111 Septeml:>ct 25, 2016 letter to FBI Direc.torConiey. I -"' • Tbc Majority' 5 n~rcncc'to Bruce Ohr ii mislelliemoaa.I rdotionship with Srecle and information tillt S~ele sl1ared \\ith him (i!'tiuding S-teele.'s ccncezc: a~t Jruinp bci11g ~mpromisrd by Russia), He nlso described hill wife's con!rac~ wt1rk with Fusio~ GPS, th: Hnn th~t him! St~?e separate!)'. This oCCWl'ed ween after U1e ele..-tion mid more than a month ~ tho Cau."1 ;ipprovcd ~ initin\ F!SA DP?1i~ion. The M11jo:ity des~n"bes Bruce Ohr as a g n.for DOI officfot wl:-0 "\\~rl:cd cfoscfy ,,.;th lhc: Dcpul;- AUom~i' Otncrel~ YGtts 11nd lnter .,.,,th Rosenstein," io order to imJ)!y tht11 Ohr \\,1lS somehow involved in.1he FfSA process, b!!l there is no indication this is the e2..ce. Bru~e Ohr is o well-respected career professional whose ponful io rs drugs and orgmized ~rimi:, not counterln1ellig~u. There i! rro ~\'idence t.1i!lt he woa[d ba\·ct!cnown o.bou! tfa::. Pag~ F(SA niiplicntions and their c:onter.ts. The Y..sjo:ity'iii;ssmicms, mo~ver, Qr1! izTo..kv:mt in detcrm1:iing lb: '\'l:rw:iiy ofSlee[e's reporting, By 1he: time O_hr.debri.efs \'rich the FBl, i1 had nll'¢ilci)' termic~ Steele as a sow-c:e Q.r\d ,vns iridependcntl;• corroborating Steele's ~n.ini about P.ng~·~ oc1hities..13ruc1l Ohr rook the initiative!o inform tra: FBI of whs.t he krew~ mid the Majo:ity do:::s hi1112. gr.n,~ diss:e..-i.1re by suggcslin! he is part ofsom~ malign ccnspir2C.y. • Finalty,1'eterS.tn.okan~ Lba Pc.gels h:~t messages arc im:levant'to ~e FISA . upplkation. The f\.fajority gratJJitD'.J.S!y includ1$ rc~nce to Strzok 1µ1d P.ige ot the end of theh· memoran-dum, in mi effort 10 imply that pclitie,.l ~ias infec:ed the f81'5 lii=tig_ation orA DOJ's FISA applications. J11 ract, neither Strz.ok nor P0&e se:-\'fd as cllil).lits en lh-:opp!ic::ations, wnkh \\'ere the prodl.lCl ofe.xtensh·c! and senior DOJ and FBI m•il:'lv.37 !n dcmonizir:g both cam:i ptefc:ssionllls. th.: Majority ac~ thtm o·r~otclf:=5trnlin:g tc-aks to the media." -:nscriou:; charge, omits ir.convcniect !ei,:im,:5.~~. in which they critiqtr!:d ;i wide :range ofother officicls a11d candidates from bolh parties; docs nql disclo.sc !hat FBI Deput}' Din:c:or McCibe te!\if!cd to the Committee toot ~ had n-0 idea wlut P:i.ga ml:1 Stnok were referring to in their l'insurencc policy.. tcxtsr1 emi ignores Strzok's 11r:tnowl~dged ro!e in prep:.1rins Cl public.declnrallon, b)' 1hen Director Corney, about forme r So=wy Clinton's ·•e.~: careJeSSlle3S'' h-:.'ld!1og clasiitied inform.alien-which greatly ~a.'1la~ed Clmion' s·puolic ~11\ti~n in lhednysjust prior to the presider;lbl el~1ioo. in 1 ?ROP ERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 152 1~ t r 111 HPSC I Ch1dmllln Dcvln N11n~. Awlrwll Auomcy Gcm~I Su:pl1en 80yd, ~pnrunc1u of Juui,t, Jll!lunry 2•1, 2013. Cholrmlln 0.:'l'in Nune;s, AMnllll\t J\,HPm~y O~rul Sttplicn 8Qy,I, Dcpnnmcr,1 of 11.t$1it~. Jomr.uy24, 2018. OOJ ~lie ccnflJlTll!d In \\'rillns l.O Ml"Of!lY ~ffDOJ ~ml FDl's c,erm~orrtv[c1.1; , l.ctti!i to IIPSCI the D:p111tmt~t h,-u ntcO!)lmodU1ttl HPSCI'~ 01'C·~iSht rcqun-1 b'y ~Uuwms ttpa:llei;f Jn ,;,i,rr,;e-.·in N11nt1,, tU.1~111 AICl>m~y Ornml S1cp~11 tlo)'I), ~p~n111en1 or JtGrf~~. Jflrwnry 24.2018. rap~dopoulos'$ Otlob(r -'• 2017 1111lt1y PIN ~ddJ fi111'lt'f Jo:\lt11c 10 •hit Jolllal tip, by dnrlfyin11111111 o Rm,ln11 J1$~n1 j 111hl l'lljl(td'1JIOuli:n ll111t "'They frhc Rrmuini] li.11-0 dlt1 oo hr,2 t, iolo, p.Ji . RepcniCll in 'l'Ul>5equcn1 n:ncw~I Dpplft11lloru '' Dcpwirr~ot of Ju.Mltt, l'otei&n lnt~l111Jc1Ki: S111"·cill~1m, C®rt ,\prlkatlim, Jv11c 29, 2017, ~P· 20.2 1. 8 PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 153 !be FOi ~ b=der ln:e.'li_se11,c Co,n;:,:;·.tt111)"s hle,b ,; c.:,nlode-ncJ ==en1 th.tl ~ R.u$~i~n ~~nu:,1,r.uc~S3scJ in :, «:\-:rt inksfcn:occ camptign lD bi!=a: the 2016 c[eclico., in.:::"uding tlizt R~e., mttlligc:ncc aC"oJIJS ~~mpromi>:11 the DNC- !:!.'.cl in !oly10l6 •·4tro~nofONC cziails. Dcpmm:::l of JII.Sl.i-:e. Fortl£)'\ l.e!tl!iae~Su:rvcilllllci Cn:.i:t A;:plrcnlfoo, 0-et!lbCT 2 (,2016, pp. ~ i , ~led a:l c;,dsted 11il.h r.cw infcrntl'.:,:m ir. sc:imq2':r.l n:nc1>'Z1 ~~OOiMi. O~ r n l ci"JU5t[::&, F=i.!,i, T.nfclligcrcc Survcllbc;,:: Court Apps~ioo, Jun; :?9, lO [7. r;i. Ji!.:? I. u Dt~rln::nl c{.fuslitc, Fc.-rig;i Tn:e.l!i:,acc S:.n-~e Cmirt Aj!fliutior.-, l = 29, 2Dl 7, ll?- 36, 46, 4S. s, O ~ ! ofJ!lSllc~, Fo:e)a,n ln~cll!5"..-:cc SU!\IO!ii1•..-rc C. Fcirdg:J l,,i~lligt.~ Sl;m:i!{c1Ji.-.; ,!~ Abusc.t o. 1J:,: ~y,;1c:w11 of~=::e c-..1. I~ Ftdmu lhre,."110/lrtr~lfa:,.. J:i.n=)' 18, 20J9.. ~.2. ;; P:pllrll'llt1ll of!'..1Mlcc. Fo:-:{an l~emse= ~-eilb-~ Cc= Ap;ir.:!uon, O.:-..:-oa2l, 20i6, p. IS. r ~ e s. Rci*-lted tD ~ e n t r~al applicm-...m. fr:lo-vicw ot.~.s,fn:w M!Oik (Fl3l ~ ly Pirffi1r}. H o ~ ~ St:leciClmltlillee~.!l Lit?l!ia;<~ Oc«mbct 19, 2011, p. 46. 100; L'"ll(rvl:£< o(Sillt Yatc, {fo:m{r D~.;[)· Alto~--y G:l.opm.,.'cs..") ;c t!PSCI ;s !lPSCT M1jnru'1 Mtmo:"'.J:nUlll. F«~ f11u!fi~~ S:,n.-eil~~ .id A~1t1~ c: JJ,z Dq>;1r:3.lm c>fJasria <1)'.!l ;;;~ Fed~r:;.f S.~ -:,u off,ry~li"{', 1=11 Is., :!.O 1g, i'-.2. Ne,ithcr b ilcrliT lfflf Y.=.'::;o(>I ~"C specir= lly t&!iliflro in !b.: FIS/I. M:itcricl~. in ke"ep~ "lil.'l 1he fBJ's g~mif i;octicc of .:M 1~:isit)'bl U.S. pc= ~= J.c ixp:lrtment ofJ i.st1ts Ftnigr. lnic!tig,.*!1~ Su.,·ci!t:ctt C-0un AppC-c:uciC111, Ccober 21, iGI 6,_p. 2~; mt ci lt:11!ce, F ~ lnl~lliru=..S,.;;v~flm.~ Col..'i /\pp!'?:aion.1"1=r"f Ii. 201;, p. JI~ C~TJ;;r ?a~ Lsu (l) FBl 0:=1cr J"-!Tlt1Corn~j,. Sc~ crr.tu2.S, :l:OH!. 9 PROPERTY OF THE U.S. 1-'.0USE Cr REPRES8'ITATIVES 154 1a lr.tcrvic,irof Ao~ MeCa!:c(F81 Oq>u!}' l)lr,,cwJt f.= f'tm:::a1m11Se~ ~~ on ["telliie1:~ Oe.-emlxr 19, 2017, f , JS7. 10 PROPERTY OF THE U.S . HOUSc: OF REPRtSENTATIVSS 155 {U) Appendix G-Senate Judiciary Memo about Steele Referral TOP SECRET//NOFORN (UNCIASSIFraDwhcn ~rated from atmchmen1} J=:sry 4. 2C l8 YlA ELECTRONIC TRA."iSMISSIQN Th? HOOCl'nlble Rod J. Rosmrui.n. Deputy Attorney C-=al U.S. Otpc:<.mart of I~cc 950 ~mmylvm!aA~ NW Washington, DC 2053-0 Toe Hoconblc Chm~ A. Wray Dirtd.ct Fcdml!B~ofm~ 9'35 Pecnsyh-anm A ~ NW W~on, DC20S35 DCl!t 0epazy Atnr!M)' G=al Roscnstcin ilad ~ Wra'j: AtlXbcd p ~ fil)d I i:u.t:11.ficd mcm~ releicd. to email!. comcurua:tiom ~tween Chrimpbcr Stccle aod multipk U.S. ncwsOIIL.lct! reprding the ~led "'Trump~~ ~ Mr. S~le tOnlptled Oil behili offmfon OPS {qr Ebe Clinron Ca,np.-dga Md the Dem~ NNtioiw Com.m.itte: amt iblo prmi.ecle-~ n:ga.diog l.u:i ~!:xmon cf i.nfonnatlon t£1rusir'.! d l!\ l~ ~~. 11:itnk. yoa fw ;-our prompt are:mion In 1h:h nflPQrtl!!nt matter. If}"OU. h.we =.ny qµatlom. p l = ~ Patridt Dam c:rr DcLis3. L:.J ofChlinnan Ormley·• rtalT il{l02) 224-S225. S:ikomminec an Cril=~T~ Comm.!~ on die Judiciuy TOP SECRET//NOFORN {UN'Cl..~PIED ~separated fn:im a t ~ t J PROPERTY Ot= THE'c ll.S. tiO-USE O F REPRESENT:'>Ti\lF.S 156 ~ All~ Oolltrll R.on m11in M:I Olrc<;ot Wr&y hnuuy o!, 'lOUI ~2af2 cc: The HonQroblc Di~oc f'cinltcln Hllnkina Member Committee on the JudkllU)I The Ho.'lOTa.bhi Rlchatd Burr Chaimwi Senate Se!«! Committ(I; oil In1clligcne<: The ll~Mf*blc Mmk W~r VioeCho.irrruw S=te Scl«t Cooimi~ Oil l!Uelli~ 1be Honomblc Devi.SJ Nunai Chainnan House Pcrmnruml Scled Conunitt.ce on ~Ulgt'.nu The Honornblc Acwn Schiff R1mking Mcmbct Jlouse Pcrinlllle'.III Selca Commin« on IMcllig~ f I PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 157 • . . . ,1• rc......o.a 1:: JC...... .c,r:...... : ..... .ta,·•r.sn • s...... .... e.... a... ,;· •I.~ o t ,s: ~{ORA,'\fDUM (tf) FROM: Cb!!rks 2. Gr-J.!.Slcy, Chainr.n, U.S. S«:nr.te Commiu~ 011 the J::diciuy Li~y 0. Gnilurn, Chaimwi. Su~mmitl~ un Crim:: and Tcirerism, U.S. Semie CoUUil!u« on Irie JuiditilU')' TO: Th.e Honorable Rod J. R~nstein, Ixputy Attorney osJ obotn Mr. Steele·~ relotkmship v..ith the FBI rcluling 10 uri, p:inis..m douitt 9t0ject. lhe JU(i~ilU)' Coi'?'IMictee began taf.s.ing :i seri.?s of questioll!l to the FBI and thl!' Jn.ruce ~ l abcut ~ mane.IS ns part o!the Committee'9 c:onstitutioncl. o,-enisht respcJJSibiliCies.s (U} The .FBI has~ providd th: C«nmillr:1: Jiec~ ~ c:~jlic;d documents re!eWl. or 1hot w.: cl.a.s$ilicd d..~umcn,5 m ·icw«J by ~ Commiuee coninin mnteru!ly false statements. the I (U) ~ . Vzlxva Cl. ,IJ ,-, Orru B ~ la!l~ U J citr..,J cUd O..mffJb;,hu Stttlz.. Crum )la. 11Q1mooo3.Qll(e:a·, &nsb(Apr. 4. 2(111}, p:= 9{Hcn:i:o~·~-,:1c S!Jl:m.ccn 1~ ,.i '(ll) tit ;,: pan.. 10: Kffl B ~. ~rlam Eti."f, l!lxi M11..1. ~ ~~ .'~~s ,r[{c,g,, .-p /i4$ n lI r.... o.....,., nu ta lilatf/11" R=-k tbat L4:J u, Jam..' o lJn:.Iitf', T:r.; WA.'<1~ rt'IST(O:t. 2..t,1i:l17).. '\ U) Y-cm Hamb~ cd Rol.ll1r~ S. lkldtm=. FBI Orrct i'!~ ,a P.zy Ft!ff/Jf!'I BrJrW. ~· >tlto A ~l:.£tttl ('ns 11bs.m1 mcanlui;rul c11nohor11Llon-Md in lliil1l oftl~ h!ghly politicnl ,.n od~ rurrour.dint! iU cn.-.illoll-\l1en-Dirci:ior Cnmcy s1111~ tl\ll \ho FBI inclu~ llJc dossia l\lleJ?Blions about Cl'.ll1t:t ~ lo lhc F1SA upplic.\tfon~ ~use: Mr. St1:elc hims<:lf was (Oll!icltffl.l reliable du.c to hu pns1 worl; wilh 1he Uurc4111. -[ndocd, th!: doc=lll.! we hiwe revie)\~ sbow lhn1 the FBI ~ool< impQtt:ml iJm:st.ignth-e steps wgely oos«t on M.r. Steele's. infonr.o.tlon-onr.l ~lyiTJll h:JWily Qn his credlbillly. Spei:iJkally, on Cktobt, l J. 20l6, Ille FBI filod iu first · ~1applic:uion untie• flS/\ for Cener .Pnge. This iniLi&l appliCLJtion relks in Pift on cllc:gc:d past ~ am.~mpt:!i lo recroit ~e )'ellJ'S aso. That portion is lc.5:i llwl five JP..J;C$. llie bulk of Im: L1PW01.1ion con~ of!)llcgruions o.g4m51 Pngc lllll-t l.\~re di~lD~cJ !o the FBI by Mt. Sx~!e 11nd aro 111~ outlineW$0, in orde; to Gnnl cre.ficility mw:I presumably haling fl!ith in ~ls ~ of obl.un.ing the mfcrmlilim. -In ---ct (U) But ti,ae is YJbsun1ial ~i:kooe suggc:ning lhst Mr. Stedc mntc.ricl[y misled~ FBJ t of hi$ dossic:r effons.. one which b:llr.l on hiHrc:e three l'C.1141wals, ai\er relaying S\i:c:Jc·s dorner o.llcgsrions agaimt C!neT Page, lhe Fl:31 suircs: '"!Stttlfi told the FBJ tb1t he/she on.Iv prgyidNI this iftlorntttioo ta the bu~ln~ MJ2t\S'1 Jfu.sf913 GPSI !]Id Uic fil!!."7 (c:mplwis added>. tndm thi: fJS/\ iw.ewa! appfie:tlion fa lanu:.r, 2017 fl()lf:S 1hZ1t a Steele had received· the PISA 4t>plialio.ru not-e the- aistence of4 ne,,s .:rticle d:!!cd Septeltbcr 23, 20 t 6, whM1 in pmicu!az containod some of lhc .wne d~iei: infonn:l!iDn eboul Mr. ~ oompikd by Mr. S1e11le and on which li:e FBI re.lied in iu 4pplica1ioo.. Whllc rc0t c.wlicitfy slated. !his is ~3bcy lht! micle by Miclt;;d f.s:ikoff of Yah~ N~.e.:., fiU:d .. U.S. In•cl Offic h1ls .[>ro~ Tics &IWrtll Tl'Ualµ A.cvisc:r ~ KmnliD, /\flc:T mning thzu }.'tr, S~lc hsJ cll!.imed to the F.B.l he lu!d. only provide<.f lhls informatlon ICI lhe FBI and M.. Simpson. ~ applicatian . a t ~ to explain uway It~ ir.c{lnsis.mcy betw~"n Mr. Sttel.e'i ~ion lo the FBI and lh~ c:~ce cftr.c mi.cl~ DpPl)rcr.ily to shidd Mr. S:..eclc'l i;red.ibJ1ity o.nv.i1kh it roU . relied for !he im='Sl mt!le$1. The applic:atian to the l:1SC .!:.lid: " ~ that t~ infoml!tion conlainod in th: Sq,!rmber 23rd n.}\l,'S a-tlefe ~ml!y ~tehe, lhe infurmatiuu about '11~ !hat M {Steele J discovert"d coing histher re~h., ) f'ROf'E:RTY OF TiiE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 160 17re FBI dJHS no/ trli= that fSteelc} dmctly provided this inform111ion to lhc yICSS" {miphnsi, tld oy the FRJ 's notifies!] cm to C('l'".gre!S in October 2016 ebo\21 tlM: rcoJ=m& of~ Ciinl~ invcstigm.ion, i.nd as aresull "{Sk:eicJ ind:pmdrnUy e n d ~ the prior admonishment from ilie rBl lO only wilh th.i: F.!ll on thiJ ll14tlef, ~lwi:d tiN rcpcnu,g dlSCU$SCO hmm {do$.'lier cllegarloos £1.sninst ~ ) Ill s:n ilknlified oor.-s ~-mi1.alioa." HOWt:\'CS', \he FBI coatinutd 10 cite to Mr. Sit.tie'!!.~ wrk l!5 i:vi~c.c ofhi3 rclinbility, e:rid st111etl t.~t "l;hc iilcidenl thzt led to the FDJ ~ i n g iU in:ti.omhip .,.,;lh [Mr. ~e.elcJ uccum:d after [Mr. Sttclcl pro\i«I in the i5JlPlicalion. The FBI furthc- a;scrtal in fuotoote 19 t1mt it d_,;d rot bclh:\"t: tha1 Steele dm!c1ly ga'Je informE!lion lo Yaht>o Ntw~ thst "p-.ibli~~ du; Scpc.cmbcr 23 Ne\'15 Article." ~ !!.$ documc:nt.¢d in the FlSA R:DC\va.!:;, th 1: Fm &rjll ~ to bc:I ic\~ Mr. S t e e ' J e ~ tba1 be had only provided~~ ioform.Eilion to the FBI and Fuson,;m nol to \be ~ 0 7 lD bis ~ med:11 C'01UBc.t !hid resulted in me FBI suspemii123 the mlitiOllS'jp. Accordingly, cl,;: FBI still d«mi.>d die information he p.>nvided prior to th¢ October dlS':lQ!JU!C LO bo ~li.Bhk. Aim all. the FB1 all\'Zdy believed Mr. Steclt Wi!S mirdlle, he had previo~y ioJd the fBl he ~ not shattd the mfonnatlon v.i 1h the press - rad l)ina to the Fm is , crime. 1n dd1?odio& Mr. Slce[e's credihility lOlhe F'lSC. l1P! FBI h:srl po-~ an ii,n~us cxplaoafum for 1he Sept2mber 23 emcle, based on the nsromptlon Jr.Ol Mc. St.oelc hfl.d tt,Jd lhc FBI the trUfh abou1hB}'.tt:SS con\ru:l.&. The FBI 1heiJ ..~ ior him twia: mo~. U$Ulg lbo ~c rationnte, in s11bscq=t l'eDe'.\'3.1 npplieatiom fil.~ \.\-il.b. llx P-0mgn Jn~m,~ Sur.·dltmcc Coll:11. in Aprll llJ)(} l= 2011. lallllo.. (U) How~'l!f. ?"J.bii; rcpor1s, COlct ~ l!l1d infonnlll:ion obiainai O}' the Commitlee duriDg wunc:ss iDkr.:ic:ns in the coune ofi~ ongo1:tS io-.~i;rst~n i.ndi~ thtl Mr. Strcle oo1 cnly pro11ideddo.s:sier infomration 10 lhe F.BI. bUI also to n.u:m~rOU3 media orgimiz.etioD.3 prior to U-.f end of his relation.ship with the Fm in Oclobcr 2016.s (t,') Jn Steele's m-om cou.-t filingsm lilip.tion in.London, bt"lldmi!ierl!hat be ugaveoff lhc ~ord briefings 10.t 9.Ill'lll number of journalists itbout tbr.! prc-ct,eclion 0H:moram.L1 [i.e.• !be ei'.IS5kr] in lat,; ~ v·au~ 2016.'~ 1n Zlliltht:r sworn filing in nw case. ~tr. Sl~le further : (l.l} Sn Su:el~ SW=c."'J:l J; O.:r~· lte$pom,: 5o ~ I~ ' 11.:q.x:,I Cw fur..'!tf ~ f ~ , Pun~ so CPR P2n. t &, Gdxzr.?v ft, Al 'I'. o.-b-~ l ! ~ 1 l111dhg-..., 1.!!,;:Ud arxl Ckilrt;pf,rr SUrk. 0.l:i:l Na. HQ 17WD413. ~ D'$ 8ei:Y.h {M~y la.;.'017), ~ "Slcdl? ~.atlml.2'11~~ 131'; Ttllll fu:&..~v imd·Roulilld .S. Hcldennan. FBJ Or,= Pll'Jf!l,.-zl to Pt1J1 ForYt>r. Braim Sn ,rle:; ..fwhr,mlC ~ Tr2!f1.Dw.rfu , "OE W ASJIINOTO.~ l'OST (f!b-2!, l011); ~ T ~ eJ filo .,.itf. Sc,i. C'M!l!l.. a; ur.> k<:Jcmy. ~ {U) Steele St..mmtnt I ?! µa J2. FRCPERiY OF THE U.S. HOUSE Of REPRESENTATIVES 161 • staled th.sl jourMfu.13 from "'1.,ic N!:W YOlk Timo, lhe \Vashlrie,ton ~ . Y:aboo New11, the New Yorker, and CNN-were -brl~feQ 1c tbecll.11 or SeptcDlb~r- 2016 by {Strot!} and r1.1&ion nt Fuslon' s instruttic~" 10 The filing futlrer Slates that Mt, St:eefe "subs!n ~ith F.1 1 AcrotifJtlS to these cowt filings, ~itlhc briefing$ in;-uh-ed the disclosure of limi!ed inti:l!i~e rl.!1:Jlt'ding, imfia,.tions of Russinft interf~ in tht: US dc,;fion process md tht; p:;,s;sil>k co-otdirumon of mcmb:rs orTni.mp's campaign teM\Md Rlmim .govemm~toffidals.~r. his intcnitw ·.iri.th tlu: Comminee, Glenn Simpson of Fmion GPS confinnNi this lh.'l:Ount by Mr. S!eele and l"d! c:.otnpM}' as filed in the Brifuh COOl't. 11 rn ~ fir!% of tl>.ts~ tilings WilS pooiidy reported in the U.S_ m~ia in April of 2017, re did 110( subsequcn1ly di~lo~ tY: l:l, ~Cll 5)• F0-.302 {u«.. 12,. 20 (6; FD-l-07{Ncw_ 22, 201si 5 "'ROPERTY OF Tl-iE U.S. HOUSE Of REPRE:SENTATl'JES 162 ror 111 - h ~ · t h e t Mr. Sleek lied to 1bc FBI ubout hi$ rnedii1 eon\.lri:l) i~o:lcvunl Jca,i \v.t> rct\!Ul'"· f'irsl, hi~ rc:lc:\'Ulll lo hiJs crcu1 thct do9sie: /Tlffl1Cln:lndll "io lnh! summer/muumn 20l6. " 18 Uusw-ptisingly, durills Im: summa- of2016, n:port.'I of111 lemt some oflhc: ~c:r allegations bcf:l!UI cimilllling amQll3 rcponcrs and people invclved io Ru.s.siim i~cs. 19 Mr. Steele oJsn admi11cd in the llri1i!ih li1igruion ro t,riefing joumnlisis.from 1hc WaJJt/11gran Pc.v, Y'1MO New~. tlie New iar*-u, IS1\d CNN m Scpttmbcr of Wl6.:w Simply put. tlte mo~ p:opl~ who contcmpOranco!J!ly .k.miiv tluit Mr. Steele: W8.'l. ~mpilins his do:isia, the more 1ikdy it \\Ill:\ vul11erable 10 ro.nnipQlo1ion. 1n· fact, in I.be British litigaiioo, whicb ID\'O.h"t'.S s J'IO!lm Jon S SUlli! Dc:p.1rtmcn1," Jluu the repott won the StCQntl In u $t'Ji,c ti I n t c ,e from o forcl2l) sub,,s(lUY(:e who ·~.~in 101.1 frl~ ot' th~ Clioiom, who ~13od h 11 11 i~ troubling cnoull,h thul c Ch111011 Com1):)18Jl ful'\dcil Mr. Stet:le'~ work. btlt 1hu1 thQ~ Cliruon A:Uo~ln.tc! were c:-0ntcmpo™1towly feeding M,. Stttle alltSolions roi~ oddilioMl concmu nbout hi5 credibility. 11 (U) SUolt Suuomcnt I Cl p:,t'I, ii. (lJ) St~k s~1cmm1 r at JlC1L. )l tt (U) hhknlP~hiri Tl'IIO~ On fi~ whb 11'.: Sat. Cc,otru. Cfl 1hr 1\ldlcW')' (Mt. ~ bfn IJ\r~rn,cd 1hr, Comrnliltt fh~I flt!~ hwt~ l\'oin J!Nmdilu IIOOll1 thl: \10$.Jlll' bet~ It 'II'~ p,_blbhod, DiKI 1/ioos&,'IJ h Y'11S lll~ i. ·5 \IJlllllCf af:?ll 16). "'{IJ)Stcck swemem 2 a1 ~ 111 tcurpba.lu lldd1:d). 1, {IJ) ~ l , S1t1mocn1 I 111 ~ I~ Md 20C. . u (U} Id; -s~1c S~til!lttll 2 ~t 4 rStM:b lne~IH"1)C.C . - M>I e,.;ti\Tly iOUgb\. i\ \l"t.! rncnly ~ !"o:d." ) 6 PROP!:RTY Of iHE: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRl:SENTA11VES 163 ~ - Steele Ihm apparently p=ec.i lhls repo:t to the FBi. -.S:mply put, Mr. Steele to.Id the fBI he ood oo1 roi..~ ~ Cmn- PAgl? doss-ier i n f o ~ d his clit:m imd the Fl3l Th: Dfpamnra repc:!led Iha! dnim to u~ FISC. Yet Mr. St~Je ad.:nowla:lgai in =m fili~ thaJ he-did bnt?f Yahoo Nn,,~ and other.media Ol't]animtions nbom die dtetnber 23, 2016, >".koo Nfm pubtls.hal Hs ortlek entiikd "'tl.S. in tel Official$ Frobe "Tie$ &tween Tromp AdYise:r and Kii:mlia.»ll That Ql'ti~e ~Dt'rl cl!lllI15 about meetings bc-t\,ttn C.mer J>uge md Russians, includ.ing rgor ~ n . Mc. Si:cnin is described in tlR: article a5 <>a longtime Putin aS!OCfate nnd form~ Russian d~..1ty pri.mc rrunJncrundl:1' ~ r u i by~ Treasury Departm..."llt in respon:si:. ID Rusm's e,ai_cuis in lhc Ukrainc.2 i ~ article ouribittc:i (he lniormaticn lo ''ll \\"elt-ttlaad WC$C~l intelligence sour.;e," who repotto.ily said tool "'[~rt their =Ileged ~tins, Seehin r:w=i lhe issi:re o f!he lining of~ tiol'ls wilh Page:.z, Ta:is infurm-ation also appears in or~ltip!c "'m!'. (U) &o.,m&tt ~- :::i, lit.:Tfte:o. 7 PROPERlY OF THI::: U.S. HOUSE OF RE:PRCoSr:;NTATIVES 164 1kto?rmins? wh!!thcr 1'.lr. Steele proviucd falsi: informu1iu11 lu tl:t: FBI rcprcsematkms 10 ll1e eourt \\,·-N nf k'li& Ru!J!a mil Eurasia Programme at the RQYal 11'1:!llillJI& !or lnlemafiCl1lll Aftainl el Chca'il'.sm Ho~ He ~ oho on A;sociale ol Oro!~ 1 I/ PROPERTY OF r...;E U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 167 6. FUJi:)(; GPS {'FU3/,cn'}l$ a alffli.1£sl1C'j l::i85ad In Wastihglcn DC p r o ' ~ fll$(M!TCl1. 11fro:eitci n \ ~ arxt tlL11;1 ::!~'tee SCfV!ce~ ro cllM\l$. 7. Pnc:v to 1,) 6 O't'OO~ In 1$Sw I n ~ =~ Ifie Oefendanls ,'la'tl . 10. The De~s.;dsn1~ produced ~ lhJctl marnorar.da. ThwJ '1£J be re'..elTBd to for i;oo\~JerO 2018 us Prc~a1 erect!a.'l. TI"dS iatt ooc ~ ~ in aie tauar p,srt or Cc»~ rote. Nc:1D won, p;od~ h N e \ ~ 2018. Noc» a1 tl'le p it R.&\iit of the:r (f~fOris S1r Arl:!.rew anM.,g,!!d for the Sacood ~ &ri meet Mr Knsmer, as Iha ~resootatlw of ~ « McO.ln, In ~ to 6hc:?H him the p~ ill9clioo msmcranda on a conf.lon to ,:wt.!l_s Sm. Mt"Caln ~:I\ tl'W ~ of the P'JHll~ r:;-emnranda QO ~ 0 0 / l ~ ~ V:>3 +k Ktmnsr. 17. On b1!11',a.'f of Son ! l ~n, Mr l~h 8.2.S!s noted.~ Defendants did no\. ltG'_,.'!f, prov!t1a .n)' ot l~ p.-la~ r . ' . 8 ~ b:) !Ueda Olg"'...Jl~~ or p.ime.li5ls. far orl lhby ilUtho,.rt?o an,'Me to oo ao. ~ did l?i§y prowlo u-11i l;Otl!ide.?°..:al Dece.-n'ixif mF-roorenc!tim fl) medb o ~ n s or Jo~. Nor di! !hey auihorizll am.,-one to do 60. 4 ?ROPEP.lY OF THE u .S. HOUSE OFREPRES::NTATIVES 170 32. Sl!Vtl lhltt it b 41<1mitt«l U'lcrt Iha SQQan(I Ool00!1Dnt (Jt1vo off IIIQ r~etm.l IA!lingi; to ll ll!niili · m11111>0t of Joumnl~ riboul !hi, pr0-0IC1Clion mnmornndo r, llltl'!I :iurnmor/® h.rnn 201e, AUl).~rogn.ipll o.2e 13 u WI Ur«>t ~ nllllMl:.ot lh«lo uovommonta ~ •vcll rnnpoooiblrillu.!l. SO. The fncldc,nt.et f)vbllcolloNI v.i F ~ ulld Mt Kmmor WCl«l rcosol\(1blo Oft a moann of bnnl)kl{) U1hs uDMUVft d()aumon1, '10\mll)' to lho • Uon.Uon o( S&n. MoCul11. 39. Tho Dofernhmll) old ·"ot publr.h tho DtlCC1mb01 momo~ to any of !ho wxl rociplenlo wRh mo lnt"1l)on II ~k1 bo ropubil~hod lo tho world at 1D:rzy, not" r:Sld tt,(ry n!Jc llMY ol them to ropub~!!h lhfl Ou<>ernb?:r 1nemorv11dum to o\l'IOJ'S. It any or loo rociplonla dill with lhlJ roa\JI lhAt It ~ s pubfi~l1od ~ tho world al laly11 Iha '° Oofondon w, In tho clrwtn~ llCell.. rl!mln I.lie pro'..!)Ct!cn of qi.ziuC'lll:d pi'filege. 40. L, J1;1lation to parzigrapn 9, It ~ @t!mltti;d ihet publ[callon Qf .l>i& '>\'Oros comp'~ oo of by 8uzzfood ("' EJJY 51.Jbs&qu~I ft>ltm'lill repubflcalion ~ tl'IOOO IIIO«hl by U,..ird parties) WBS likely !ti ca" ~wor sadtQf too ~ .sd"~ic(o.s it! ~> Eur~'\ Uni= in Y.°h!i;l'l lhe ;wrtis c.om~ ol wen, rx,ibll&hed ~ iir.d IS, ~ fe: as m1t:9dal, \hs S£1lle as Ole ia.,, r:J England ard W.ile5. 42. /n7tlilal!On t o ~ f1: t>. Sub-porag;e;>'I n2 l3 ednulled bul it is ~1'ia:I l!tru ~ Qe(e~·.a ~ llshll:l or CG~od ft;:i '11)b!icnfo:a of Iha wo,'d:; OOi!lp.:.linod ofeoan:mefyw;dely. 44. !fl re>.all:>n 1!l tllO secoo1 Snnlllfl::& of ~ are ~ ~Jeo to ~ t; 12. II is ~>ad !Bll lt\15 C!L,."Tialn ®meg~. w ~r aggr.r.~led or Q ~. agatzw. !!l8 Oa~6f'ldalts ll~ o ~ lo Bu27.Fe8d. 45. I n ~ t o ~ ~ 1i,1 ana 12.2. u"' adrntUl!lG !!lat !he D ~ dld not contac! the Ctai;411l"i$ p.rklr ?D 11",e l)l.lbbl!® of Ire 'fflmls ~ined of by Bu::zFaed. In f:::Jltl of :he mal!el'S p!aa.delS aboYa ih8 0~111 h:::d n) ~ to con~ lt\11 Oei:m~ I'll rclaS~, ta Iha p1.-b..";callon oflho Deoomber tr..:~trm I:?/ Bum~. '6. P a ~ 1'2.3 l a ~- The Fil!t. Sl?C.)l1d ar.d Thkd C',a:msr,'!s mr.ta IQUer blita IH:!JDI\ lo !M 0e1~rlda,:r,~ . Oi1 ;l3 J!JU..l!t'/ .2017. fhe i)efeodanls A<:k/JaMedgad ~ I of '111 !«tor bofn u ~ lhrouQbl! letiet fran !hair fomietllofTci'.Qte. ~ a . en :m JMua.rJ 2017. Tho Oo!enda....,.3 !tEn J)tQ'Vlded a d ~ response 10 the let\er beflx8 aeljon fO'Jt day& ~ on 3 F ~ 20T7. Jha Defendani$ t,Oln~ o:Jt tl'ISl t?lD Ctalmsr.ts' b!l!orl, action ifxl not me..: the mqlin!manls ca:itei.-:ed the ~ A.cl.lo!\ Prot~ toe Ol:!£amt1tlon. tn ~ a ilar rJte liUe.r M!att ;ietion; 1au,1 rn a. stst&d tl'lal t~(JOO;l Y/Q) 3, en«Y ~l'& ~..ictcd tr'/ •e_ff ilfire~ ot ~ ~lld and Thirtl Ov~ts.. bU1 ca not pro'lidA! Iha ~ or Mr/ d019!'~ t;f :i'loi!:o 'ell:~ . Nor (ijcf ft 5La1$ ~ r M~!l1\0tt Wil & Ems,y ~ r.struct9d by ea Fau.~ Cta~nl; b. not !~n(f'/ Liie ~ r ~i.on{e) lt!Sl ~ I.ho ~J~ o£ lllB ~pe~ c;:oo!la:ry to p:irag;-aph 3.2 of illo l':,t-Acc&:t» Prot~ool fo.0:sfamBl<::n: @ om, c. c.id net ~ffy L'18 ~ t.10l Iha F'iB! !o Thi:d Cfa~b !db'tlul&d ta ~ 'l!ffllS co.'T!p!2i;:-ad of, cx:otmry IO ~ra;,.'l 3.3 eJ lhG ~,oaoo ~ ti:" C>Efama~ The Def enc'an.!q lhe!oCoro n : q ~ l!l6 ~ n r s to proi.ic5e Ula r i ~ c:der IO ieuab:e tll<;J Defffldar!l5 to a rl.lll ~ io ir~ prov.oo. :otomiatGn In 6 I•• PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF R E?RES=NTA1WES 172 11111 IU proposed cln•m Notwithstond,ng thP- l:1cl thi\l the Oefondants provl dad a tJolcl1lcd response lo ll'ie C!alm11nls' lelter belo10 action wllhm 11 clay:i of ti1nt teller being ser.l, end nolwil.'lstancllng the r,umorous dr.llclenc1cs 1n tno lotte:r oefore aaion, on J Febni.iry 2017 lh9 Claimants Issued nnd served proccedi1Y;JS on tho Defendants. In the circurnstanccs. tho Oaim.inls' decisi on to ,ssue procoedings less than rNo wooks anor the !cUer before oclion was 11recipitous, i ncompa:ib)e the ove,,1e11r.g ol>jcct1vc In lho Civ,I Proccduro Rul!ls, ond b,e.,chod tllo roqu1rllrncn;!; of tho Pm, ac!ion Pro:urol /or Dc:lwnullon. .,. ,,ti 4 '( 11,s <1F.riP.culors of Claim ore hue. Sign9d: t~tv~-Chrtstopt,er Steele Po~1tion: Director, Orbls Business lntcllig1Jn::o L1r1 Dille: 03 Apill 2017 7 PROPERTY OF THE U .S . HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 173 ur on. m. Fun?; UNCLASSI Fll?l) I I I I 174 PROPERTY OF THE US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Cl:ilm no. HQ17000413 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE llUl:EN'S B!!NCH DIVISION BETWEEN 11) Ai.EKSEJ GtJBAAEV (2) WEB21L.1.A B.V. (3) WEBZJLL.11.1.IMITED (4) X8T HOLDING 8.A {1) ORB15 BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE l.lMIT!:O (::Z) CMRISTOPH!!R S"tEEll: OEffHDANT5' ReSPONSE TO CLAWANTS' REQUEST fOR FIJRTIU!R INFORMAllON PURSUA~T TO CPR J>AAT 18 ---------- ----- ·- -- -------(Jndo, p.11rngr•ph, ? ond ll Of: 'Al IJII mmonnt tlmoc F111'JM ~ :wl>}tlcr 10 ar, oOJ/gation ntX 10 ~Q(JO 10 //lY'tJ (/0/lilN• r:or1/if.fq,,,//(II lntonlgcmo ,rwsorr.,1 prol'idacl 10 tt by /ht, O(r{DJldar:ni ltl tho 0011{111> ol /fhtl WOffllnr, l ~ ~ p \VIIIIOI.~ tllo oOMCllllM/ o//JIO Dllfflfldi1J1/~ • ~ I. Wtinlhetr Iha o,ooed \)' of CClt1Jldontio11ty is smd 10 flt!~ by eon1roe1 or in eqully. 2. !I by coolmcl. sum, \lthelhot too duly llf0$0 under (P) n gooorru coocroct ol rotuln171; o< (b) '$pCCir11. coolnlQa relt,llno lo Ute ~oflc wot~ 3. In eIDler e,'!N'll ~la\D lllhe\her ony C1)1l!r~~) ie!oo on were wr11~ Ot ~ II Of'lll, sb1firl$ ~ $nil betv..eulllll= \llitn Uis DefElll(Janl& and, ln miatlon to ~ di,clo.sure cf !ho memo..inda le ftlt t ~tullhll lr,!cffigorGQ lh8y pro•,fdoo. S:'.nt:e i4 vra.G not p ~a ~ t t o Iha enguQerrrent wi!h FuS>Qn ~ ' b ~ l!-l ~ p h SI c4 tho Oorenco. Ibo '0$fcll} d~ Ifie ln\'Olligana;• .m;j, ii ..o, eiva lilm ~ n as b h£Nf ll'lal l.oii,oo 1dal\01y (r.oe pornornpn 6 ot tl'lrJ Dn/ol'\CI)) Fu~l\'o Glioro{n) ,n rt11t11ion to thlt pa11i<:tl!ll1 {l~on'(lnl. RESPONSE 111.6 roquosi IS /leithor rGOsooab!y net1>1>SB,y nor 1>1opo,lion~1e lQ enab!;e \ho Cffl~iwn1~ to propore 1h0lr own.c.uo nos 10 iR'Hlmlana tho case \llo)' l'IBW 10 moot OI ·11re Otlfend.inls fTO(SuCf!d sixleiin ~di memoroflda. Thew ~ bf> lllfem:d IO fa: come~ es ~ h a ~ memr:rrutdt1~ l)BVinp been prepe,-ed bolot6 Ille 2016 US Pr.zsfdonllal e#eclfon. T1't9 ~sf l)f)O 'or.ls prodllCe{J in lrie 1$(18( ~ o/ Oclobar 201ti NDna = producoo .it) NfJVM?l),:.< WtCl. /'luu no rnEJT!Omnda - e pl'Ddul;oo 10 Novembat 2010, p:el'it:a 111111t1 !rt& nature CJf 111e ol"l!lll9omOl'll rn oart,. UO'tl9'1\txlr 2018 on 1"8/erred lei In j}Mlgraph 9, ontt wt)Gthflr t.llls ongngement Wl!.!I porfoJmcd end what intollkJcmcc ll roolod lo. uese0Ns1; nm nllluro o! tno Dolondnnt&' OJ1g11gernont by Fu.skin dl dld nol rlM'lClivo eny r~l&Vllnl lrttollgoooo c<111~mlng flu,ah111 otlOftll ID lnlNllJICO tht US PruklMlint olt.llllloo pt(.)C4>M 11nd llnka btllwvnn Rui1la ond Donnld Trump tl~ng lhlo pe(.rxl, oo mt11no1111lda we,o p,oduCQd p111t1J~I to tho Ofl!)l)(JOl'llOOI rinC)( 20 OClobor 21) 1O. Un~r l)l)1111Jfl'.1Ph, 12 ond 13 OI ·s~nr1Ior John Ml:Caln Js I/to Cl'laJt Qf thlr us SOrniU, Nfnr,q Serviwo Ccmmiltoe Q/ld a mombor ol //IQ Us Sonll.la Commiltoo on HomoJIJnd 5ocl.uftr ar,d Gl)Yt!(1Ut'l(N'Js1 A(fahv anti '~vi,J ~ k, O fomvl,r US Sffllr;r Psps,frrlDl'I( r::MI tllmrMl tlncl WM US A!d:sltdll $(1(:ttilety 6( Stitto !tr ~ . Huil>M RJQhw. arid Lr.W from iooo lo ~009. Ho f!J tho Serr:« ~ fCI ffuman Rights and HU71JfN1 Ftwr!Qw.l 1;11 ~enalt:Y McC£Jfn·s fnst/Ulra fer tnJemollonaJ t.DfJtkJrohJp". REQUEST 9. Pfeesa confl,m (as l)!IJ'9Qroph 29b{ij of \Jla O.ifoocs ~ I S ) ~t S:JNlor McCain and ti< Kremor a~ il\leg(ld (a) lo hsva bo.M e.cons In ~11 offic;L,I capaclUe~; a.,o (b) Mly In · relation to ~ C8')0d~ In tn,: ccurse or the mntlorn ploo ~ i:md S'ldudklg llle !1'Jll!icaoon af lhe Ol?cernt,,,;; m=o-nmsndwl IQ Mr le momorailda at:er me US PresidCMfie! oiocBc,, 0/ttJ /tie as...•cfwn, t(l{t/ft()(l lo hi PMJWtl/.)11 8.1. OIi hi8 own Inll/11Uvo or (l!Olllltl 13 Doco~, :io1a·. °" = 12. Plllntilt c.1,110 whlltoor tho ~ 'on hl:i lnlllallvu' moan tnat tho [)(Jcember memororuhsm ""1fl not (fl) C!&Hltw; or (t>) pro,.ided lo Fuoion r,umun11t lo eny r..:,ntmcl. II 001, plimae vpoe1fy \ho CQnlrool in que:iUon. ~~PONSE Tho Dllcember memorandum wa~ not created any cootta ct 01 ~1/Jdoo to Fus.on p,x&uanl In uni:ier pnrooreph 20 Of "The Del'ornto..ts considered, COITTlGl,ly. 1/'ull tho rlJVI inloll/g!Jnc& in !ho Dilccmbpr m.imortmd~m: e. was of crmsi,;!erab!e im~onct)· ln m/Mlon to ~ Ru:;st;Jn mltll181'0t1Cf> In Illa US f>ros/dsn~·lil ~ ; b. (1£Jd ~km~ [Qr nw nE16onat sec,.sify a! lJw US 8ltd thtt UK; Md o. r,seded IQ l,e or.~/ysw end Tc.trl:tr&r inv&sti:}s!edlv~rifleo'. 13. Ptoo&ll 6\ale wt-.e!Nlr 1M Sbooro De(oodant only r!!rl'lehod thla eonciuSliOn on bohell or n-.a Flfs\ Dafc,ndB.il lodl.On momoomdo ontJ ;ny . r.ubr,oq110l'II rolcuwt tnlOU!oor,eo wtrlch lho~ ~C>d MOIJl.'J bo ~ lo the lndMdu11I) ntlom,d lo a l pffllOmph 21 of !hi> .Oofa~ wno roochod lolJc\Mp ooi,~rcito l!bcu,ulo~ botwoon lho Sowfl"d OOfoOQlu.\W of S0l)Clto1 Mr.Com) oncJ (IV) Ulo lJI< n&tbnal 11acun1y ost~illl ,ctfuntld to ul poruvruph i llbl ot tho C)orcncu. Mr Burrow, e.htlro~ tno SuceoDo:iuonc 11\lbllil)onco rallbng to thOMi mauttG oul))n 10 be dlsdo(md lo lho lndlvk11.lllb rolonoo 10 01 p011>i]rnph 21 of 1ho Doloncu. Eoch OI Iha tndMdlJlll& \IIIU1 miom \fin 80<:0lld OctondMI ol&CIJWJd Ulo lllOve Nll"llod &ill vlS¥J 11t rho IIMo and, 10 lhcl Soc:oocl Deiond!Ull'a lulov/edtra Md ool'81. contiouo to ilo!d lh:81 "4cw. ·~· PROPERTY OF TME U.S. HOUSE OF Rl:PRESENTATIVl::S 179 B.EOUEST 14. ~se elote ~!~ !he O..accrr.t>er memoran~um ,~ ~llY~ kl (sl 1Jl8 UK ~!loriru 5et.~ clfrot?t and,!c,r to) F!ISlon: aM/C!l' (tj Mt Kra.,na( ili'ld Sonil!o" ~ i n wiih the 30'.Hl:.e ;,,a e ~ ew;imt Ire r.&u1man1s C< or ~l racacroo ,r.torma!ion ~ ! I l g b tho 2bl11JS ol Lit!! ~ce{s} n! !he ~t~~,ce to:nl:a UK ~1)31 ~ cit~ ,mdlnr F ~ aridl01 M( Kra-t:lor ~ 59nator ~ - Tos 1n l ~ n contained wntun ctl!l 1n . ~1co mix,ru i,;ertalC!~ le tl'le stl!tus of U,e soun:e{sl v,zs coll$Wlt ~ith lhe Oe{u,65,.1!5' COT\G~ eff~ !O ~c:! tha rcerilly d O ! B ~s}. . wa, 1 ~ P.aaso sl.a!a whslhel l!,s !Afl...ru;;!'.M to rutaon co!ltclned any e~s:s: l'Sf«~ to eodld8!'.lialily {cootr.tst para,grapn 21.> ~ a ~ ri!fcrs to 'c,11 11 c o r , ~ ~·}. RES?ONSg !n Ole Seo:,od Dere.-.dan\'5 ::cmmu~ wrtli F ~ ,;tino<,mn9 U'!9. pro>tl6ion of tne ~ tiy ~nerea en-~ f( ~~a~~ 1110.t !.'1~ 4lemoranda ~-e oo.'y ID be r,,~:,oad 10 Mr -K~ fa:- 100 ~ ¢ pa~'-lg L1'.im oo !o s~~ f ~ . ~~ ~ -werssi ~ ~ lll9 ~ Oefenaant arr:s Fusitn na:,J;a~ Eo lti5 ma\.~ wera !:alduded us!r.,g .!:l!al.'B teleptic;:ie c:cmar..r-l0"j;n$. ~ o-~ =re- com:nu n t ~ ~ Sna:-n:I Oefrm!1ant ~,.l'GSSly e.r~~c.a ~ l fOO Da-~"er IJ=ll'.012ldi.1m ~s stil;f~ \0 Uie ~a ~ tew1ctlon:s.o n ~ to iliird ~ a& -..aro eoo.!all>.e!'S In IJ")e wri2n 8g=na~ de$cr.~ ~ ltut l'IMl)O("Ga ~ /~~ 1 !O l abO\le. U.nd-ttr p::in11mph 21a Md b Of 'J.!;l;q1Jinfly the S=;n.rt Def~/Tlhr,t PTJomed 8C®'r <;;( ll1e D o ~ ~ we~ r n rt.J l/ar/21 ~ t oJf/Ciei acfintJ f.'l hl:s ( J . ~ ~ . ca ,n lwo .;;cyy fwn: eJlrJ b. F=m, by sn-::lpllemd cma!/ ~th l1'!l 1:J~h'JC!iat to ~ n ;<:>rr.wftfr, 11 h;r.J copy r.o SM. ~ \/kl 1...'r Kra:rot ". 10: a ;1 sen/cY 3 CQt1r'l!kul1;.'I/ ~~ 16.. R eag~ state ~.her !nt&~ pn:::':id8d t,y l!',ii Olt~i1at1~ to ~ g3,~r~::, pro-.i~ in ~ e r e ! ~ n W'3S -e - FROPERTY Of TtlE U.S. llOUSE. OF REPR~ NTATIVES 180 Ri:SPQNS; lotllllll)onoo pro·,lela.d by 100 OotQr.<11Jot8 to Fv,lon w11ri provlro«od oloct101'1alll'/ ii w11~ p,0\-ttled li'I on<:lpllllrod (crm. Unaar pMonmptu 23 nttd 24 Of '1l IS donilld tllor In lhDfr f)(l(l,lf'O/ Md QlrPrrtJfy mr:ottlfll'/, In tholt f)IOpor 0011/eJd. Uio words complo!nod of lxYD at !I/Em (;{1l,l/tlJh1 d ooarmg the meanmg pie.oded at pera!J(t}Ph 7" and ·Re.act In GOMm tho rA<1tuts/ er.cf crdinwy me&J!ng of thIJa of was lnl!l l!We weu, grO\Jflda lo trwo:ffgat& whether too Clsim8llf3 fi-0!1 mn ~ by RU3Sia info lulclri/'lf/ tho compulo,.s USBd by Jh(> us DortlWll/&: PaJty lon(J~fp, lrtlm.millirrrJ wu~on, {X(IIllft~ bull$, s!oallf'l/1 ""'" ~clln1111111Nin9 o:>C,TUtlons~ ooo 17, Please kfBnlify the context Ol!iO!l on and Iha 1'1l8118,<1.1) !O ~ n wa:a o!leli,led!;• knooNn. Tile reaclers ~:.cm.I ID sre lhe roadors of ti'ID O~bet rt'l8mornndU1'r1 Yltio acx:eue· ('nfl-lcil lnflludod !he Oar.oml>8r mornororiOn /nvostJaorlrrg IM Rliogcd 18cl~ In {he rkwi9r but hmlll vri1«J lhDlfl.' Tho w1!du rtlportad thal lhei Pr~1-c1ec1'11 01tome1. P.!lctiee! Cohs.'l, hll11 !!(lid ~at "°' OF,~ oHegattom In th~ ll~ler · ~ ~ false·. 111 lhOAO cifcumulll11~0. fll.i'-dO[l) of thu word3 complDlnod of 1w10 lhorororn 1nvim.1 OIOJ (I) U>c! i::onkinto d ll'lo Ovetlmbe< momomOdum dll1 nol roprn&/lS men!!onoe(l in Iha o«itlmb<::t rl\tmlOl'Mdum WGl'O ~:y to hOIIO been 11ppmachod IOI CtJnliTlOO!,. rutd ttmmfom mony or ttio.~o PQr&Qns \11$~ lilloly lo dony 1tio·t1U &cJoo ()..lf'!md2r,r fl3'.f9 o.7 rt.e recad or~, la s !Jrn-~ nu.r,-.w /JI jc,.Jmafisls a.."v.;,.Jt Uia p!l>-;te:tlon rr.oot,;r~ !it1 la!~ svmmf;:f&:ttmtn 20t~. S®-pstllgr;;p/1. IJ.2.6ilrcferwd". ~ tB. P1~ a,,d l!!enliJy !he Jc...~(,&t& t;ri$!8'1 by ! I l e ~ Deter.6ant and ata:a wr-l her"' t!1:e ~!"!!lg ~ don,e in eaai CMa 111-..d m glsl 'Jf wtml ~ co;;yeyed. R!;§PQ7§!; ni... lol,l!llll~~ illi!laffy l:.ooroo at l:"ll et1t1 cl Se\:lrembJ>..r 2018 b1 t.')e se.tona er.o Fu~lcm l!l F®,:-,cr's i.- .21T1Jciioo W'l!!'O Crtirn 11'.G, ~ Y«,; Tlmos, l2'l'l W~!on Post. YaJ\oo News. t!'..o ~ YGl"1.er tir~ CNN. To; Sacctid D.?:!onder,t so~u~1 p:µtcpaled in ru~r n-.e(;1.~9s el F\J~'s tr..\'-'Uctt.lr> ~ FIJS!en l>.~ !he New YO!'!( Tim!!!. 1/\e W~w\Oll Pou BOO Yoh::ic ~ ' 6, whlch fe>:l( ~ ln rrJ~-Ocl®'lr 2016. In ~h Q( 0'.0$6 C2i6:i ltia or'~ ~ Yl'i!S =idueied \erc:a,ty !fl !)Ot"'..on. rr; ~ . a:tt:I SIJa)'i al Fusion'~ w!r..don. in iel!e ~ r 10 f6 the Second Da!®danl br'oe!od a jootnalist Crom MoU. ~looOeS l:J,J ~ . 1..o ~ ol the p:s~~loll memor.1r.da ~re e\'el' s;.)'ll'J1 or p.'Olllded !o any joumef:Jb tiv. o, ~ \t'>8 ll~\lon oJ, !rl(I Do~~ n, n b0Rl eHlc:R..~ Dnl'e{!di.:i: REQUEST 1S. P'~a e!st!! l'lt'.et '5 rn=I ~ 'off In~ reot!,"ti' !Ult!, ln psrtlcu\Sr ~ i! maa~: (a) Tho i~ te) Tho 1rJ~ Coo ptt:,i.~ was rot to be p u ~ {butm~I be vae:l~ ~ J 011 QIJbf:s.'Je~ tM ~~ i;m-d:JutS&r~"dY!ta tr, arwway: {~> AFi (bl, tJ;i;t Liu! Daa:mnts tt:hM t~ ~flGl'1>:3Jly ~ctUYA, tll.rl tio1 IJ'i nam&. RESPONSE ~ S.."="rd D!lftt!IWlt u n o ~ ltat lb1I imoona-.i(m pro\1/(fed ffiiihl re used for lhe pUfPDSC cf f\Jcther rel!e!!mh, bl'tl brt&f,-,g ~ (OOK pi.."1:$ COOOiMin,g IM Oecsrnbo: tneff'.orandum, llnti M ~ cf any oi ti» ) ! t ~ o r , mgrnotaDM er-Oi8 C«el'!l!!et me~dum wero e-.~ pn:;\'ded le l~~ b),. t'if v.Wt U'l9 euthcr'cu&.a cl, !h.o 081~.:fimh;. REOUEST 20. ~ SGt& ...mstr.8t ll".ese le.tm:i ~ agru,d IO~ mo ~ i : d . ~ t : l ~ - -S- PROPERTY OF THE LJ.S. tlOUSE Or- REPRl=.SENTATIVES 182 Tho Stlcond l)cll)rufonl W1l4 totd by fu 5'oll llloll U10 lt1rm11 htld boon uxpl/J1noc.l l0 tho tOloVMI }oumu~I& In OOvt}t\C() by ~l)Jl'I llnd UIO Socond Dofcndonl rf>JoforCGaJ": n~ ..a<1 ··.·· ..." ::. ~1 J:-:n:u . 1~;ENC1c -• i'-lt,(..:.-.;. ;. et: ;f,f',J ::' ""1.,.l,! M "'C:: k)'\t ·~· •• ,_ .. •. ,. . .. . ... ·..., ... -· . . .... :- ·... .... .... · - ••• • . - 1.. •J , er.)v.isors, or e:mP.loy::es; U."f TTWnp Org_4nization si.-m,gn1es. sdvfaor5, or employees; a.>til fe.rnily. friends, 1111d business ~ates ot Mr.Trump. Acoo::dingly, (bi: Committee m:.=ts ~ fo!lo,\fog ln~orm::ti regarding then Pr--..sid~lial c:indidnle Dmla!d J. Trump or his s=fates. 3. kl.y and .;11coplesof ~ we:mnt is!l.1Cd by a Fdcni.l Judge or MllgiS!l""...!e ~.muan1 to Tit!~ UI of the Omn.ibt.ls ~rime- Ceontrol a..-,d Safe Street:. Act of 1968 in :W f6 ~ding then Prcs.idai:i:11e£ndtd:itx: Donald J. Trump or his a,.socfarcs. We seek coi:,:~ of the for~ins do=umenis, iith,:y c:ds1, r.o la!¢r than Merch 13, 20 i7. P:vlnNtz= Chai!'Tlll!Il Copy to: Tne Ho:iorcl)lc 1AmfS Co~. Ditedca-, Fcd.:~l l3= of lrwi:s.tig:ition UNCLASSIFIBD [__ - - - --- -- - - - - -- - - - - -- - -- - _ ___________ _ j ,,,...., PROPE.~TY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REFRESENTATM:eS 187 ------- - - - - (I U.S. D~:irtmt-il'on~ 1,;.t,.·, u., . 1..0 ,.. :ir,rr, t":l1rr.111o, V.l•(Jl.t-." '-r.,...-v w r,i,L..-.1,~,,. C'•'•hlt't'• f,1•,o h""'~"''~"~'"' .111,.. , ••r.,A,, v,.~.,_,,,,rori :., r.,,...,.s•._.. . ,•• e.;~ o : .r:-4; ,,•,i., ..,....,,,::11, c-,,..:, ,u,•.·.,..,,,..... March 15,2017 The Honorable Admiral Michael Rogers Director, National Security Agency Fort Meade, MD 20755 The 1Ionorablc James Corney Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535 The Honorable Mike Pompeo Director, Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20SOS Dear Directors Rogers, Corney, and Pompeo: As you know, the Committee bas been very concerned regarding the purported unauthorized disclosures of classified information, po.rticularly when they pertain to intelligence collection on, or related to, U.S. persons (USP). To take a prominent example, a January 12, 2017 article in a mojor newspaper was the first to claim that "Retired Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, [then President-Elect] Trump's choice for national security adviser ... . phoned Russian Ambassador Sergcy Kislyak several times on Dec. 29." Such stories would appear to contain the unauthorized disclosure of USP identities. This potential misuse is a key reason why the Intelligence Corrununity (IC) has developed robust ''minimization procedures" for the protection of USP information, including requiring the "masking" of USP identities in most circumstances. However, as recent news stories seem 10 illustrate, individuals talking 10 the media would appear to have wantonly disregarded these procedures. The Commillec is concerned that USP identifiable information may have been mishandled in violation of approved minimization and dissemination procedures pursuant to statulc and/or Executive Order 12333, as amended. Therefore. no later than Friday, March 17, 2017, each of your agencies should provide the Committee with the following: UNCLASSIFIED .,. PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 189 - ·----~- - - .. ~--- ----, UNCLASSIFIED I. All spt un~kand disseminate 1hc i1kmi1y ofa USI'; ~ifically, the Commluee rtqueru the :ipprovnl process requirt'd co autll-Orizc such a di.s£eminalion within a11d outside the: llflcn,;y, mchidi11g lhc nU111bt.-r ofimlh•idWt(g who cen uw,ove an unmu:t!een June 2016 and Janiwy 2017, and thet n.:lntc to Prc:si\31:ntinl candidntcs Donald J. '!'.!'ump w.rl HillBJ}' Rodho.m Clinton a11d their C$0cillles in 2016; 1 4. lflh~y oxist, tl1c rumics ofiiny lC ngcnciC81 law er:uorccmcm agencies, nnd/or senior Executive Brunch ofl1ciD.ls 1lwt r1:qucstcd nnd/or nu1hori1.ed the w,rm1sllins nnd dl&.'!t'lttinutlon of USP infomintion n:la1ins to too specific [ndlviduals and entities 11pcctfkd in request t,J abov~. AS well II$ the 11~,:~ ofull ~pcclftc retlpient.s oflhat 11nmiukcl LISP informnllon; m\2) ?.2S•412 I, Sin~~n:ly, Devin Nunes Ad4m F3. Schiff Rooking J't,kmber Chainnnn Cupy to: ~ Honorable Michael Dcm!l!lcy, Aeling Director of-:-Jatiunal lmclligeIB:r: ' For 1bc 11~1j)0.1Q or this )011~,, ··iu,orlJ>1•'1• lnduIG~. 11dvi~. «· cn,pto~~"ct; "2id fo111llr, frl~As. lllld bu~lru.'11~ 11.!MlClacc, of Mr. Tnimp lllld Mn, CUncorL lJNCLASSIFLHO - -- -- --- ·- -- ---- -- -- - -- ·- ,- --._ . _J PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 190 ,--- --- -- -- ! I 1 I I I April 4. 20! 7 I I HoMriL.Ole Devin l\'tu1i:s I Chm.an l'=ent So:Jec; Cvmmiu~ 011 Jntcllie = U.S. Home of Rcprescnt~th-es - ' WE.tillglO:l, DC 105!5 I H="l!.hlc: Adam B. Sc..l1iff l{Jm);ing Member r ~ Stlecc Comrni!lfc en !:nti:mb=c: U.S. llouse:ofR.~tati-,.-cs ; ' I l t W:ciiing1t1n. DC 10S13 I I l I ' Thls re.spor.ds toy= le~d~tcd March iS, 2017 to Admiral Rog-ers, National S=ily A~~J; Director ?o~pco, Ccntra.l lntcllig~me Agency. :..'ld Di,relor Come:y, Fcc!en:l Bure~ of Jn\·~~tio;i {FBI), ,:=qt.:cstlns. ir.:orm:.1ion con~"11ing ~ci> ~ncy's po!iciese.rid pra.."'\'.ldUr=! cdz.1.ms lo the di~=unawm of U.S. :;;,erson infor.nsticn. J\s 'l\'l: ha\-e dlscu~ with your s1s.ffa on :s¢,'eraJ oc:::asioos, vn: .ve?co= :au oppoctllliliy to hr.ff lb~ Commi1rec <:0.nceming !he F'Bl's poric:icsMJ! procc-!ur,;s motd~r t.J identify inf=.ni<>n h~lc.l by me- FBI th..·u is of in~;:;;t co the Committee. '},le 2;)i)rccutc )'OU::-.:orttinued supp,on for the FBl aiKI ill llliS£Dn. P ~ <:anact this oiikc is we c:2.0 be of furtha nssis'.a!ire. I I Siaooely, ~\ ~ -~---- I • Gregory A. Bro= A ~ t i)i~ctor ' .I I• Off.ce of v.ing.r=ro,1:al .A..mir.s 1 I I I i I jI ' - - - - -- -- - -- - - ----- --- PROPERTY OF lHE U.S.. HOUSE OF REPRESEN:ATWES I 191 UNCLASSU:CED//COMMITIEE SE.NSll'lVB HVC•'.)04, Tu" CA1'1ToL U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES YIAmt:N0.101'1, 0C 20$i0 Pl!AMANEN'I' St!UlCT COMMrrTGG ON INTI!LLIG!l'NCE Clu.atwN'I\....... (202f 22!>* 1121 fl1Nf0ftla1r'..I l Moc1¥n~ t.-t'lqtmlw•tun"QII May9.20l7 P"Jl,081N1.Sfu.c.1ct f•IHor'.I H'1"1:'fhQl.~1c:1.tA~ VIA CElQlFJBD u.s.~ND ELECTRONIC MAIL The Honorable Jeff Sessions · U.S, Department of JUSlice 950 Pennsylvania Avenu,: N.W. U.S. Artorocy Gcoeral Washingwn, D .C. 20530 Denr General Sessions: Ju part ofits bipartisan investigation into R\1$UU1 nclh·e m~surcs directed at the 2016 U.S, election, the House Permanent SeleQt Commit!~ on lntelligence requests that you prodUGC certain documents nnd 01her matcrla.ls 10 the Commlttet: nnd nmmgc for your partictpation in o voluntnry, transcribed Interview at cho Committee's ofrtces. First we respectfully ask that you produce lo the Committee, 1,y L10 later tha.11 the olo~c of business on M!ill, the following;: Any documents, rccor&, elce(ronlcally stored inform.1tlon 111cludiog <:•mo.ii, communic111iou. rccordingo, dotn nnd tnnglblo Lhlngs (tncluding, b'Jt OQt limlt\XI to, grnf)hs, clu:u1:J, photogruph.s, images and other documents) rlll£tlrdlc:is of form, other thnn tho:.e widely ovnilnblc (e.g., nowspnpcr nrtlcles) that reasonably could lund to U1e discovery ofuny fucts within lh.c iovesUgntion's publlcly..unr1oun~d pnrnmct~. In complying with this rcqu.cst, we nsk th:.t }'OU furnish to the Committee, in Ulll'1!dacted form, :my OJ\d o.11 resix>nsive materi11l in youacrual or constntctive possei.sion, custody, or control or otherwise available to you. including rcsJ>Onslve material possessed by any ~ party to be transferred to your possession and shaced whh the CQmmin~. This ~uesl ;s also made on an ongoing b-.!sis: If after making an initial production to the: Committee you find addltional responsive material. you should produce that material to the Committee. To the extent not encompassed by the above requesi. this leuer also ri::quests ~ervatio.n of all docuine.nts, rcccmis, electronically stored infonnation, recc.rdings, data and 1angible things (including, but not limited to, graphs, cfwts, photographs, images .and other documents) regan:lless offonn, other than those widely availaole: (e.g.• n~wspapcr llI1icle3), ralateQ to the Cornmittee"s investigation, your interview, and any anclllmy mauers. PROPERTY OF rne U.S. HOUSE or, Rf.iPRGSE NTATIVES 19:2 ... UNCLI\SS!l-1ED/JCOMMITTEE SENSITrVE Shoufo ft hcromc nec:tssery t~ do m, ti:~ <:9mmi1~ m::n, suppl£mcnt the rlo"im~nt reot1est ronl:iincd in tyis lcttcc::it :mv tim£: Cornmilli:>.: staff will work wiih you 10 m:\uge }'O\lf illt.:'.rview, at a t irnem111 .:m to · The m£i:..1::w m11y co~·cr miy hlpic within the Ett.blic:ly•:wiou."'JCC'd paramc:: i.l~ ·wilh p,ol!ti~ I cam~sns. lh~ U.S. g.ovemmcnt•s ~n.se 10 these Ru.ssfan ict!\•c m~o..u=, aod relared leclcs of classified it1fi:rn.,a1ion. )'0\1.f prcduc:Lion of do-..-;::n~n\s tO tll~ Commi:!.i!~. Shollld }'GLL !1:..-,'S3ified cnfumi2.tion. Shoufd you have ar,yquestions m any lime, pk::ii~ i;on~-ct Commiuee staff at {202) 2254121- ff you ~ ~resented by an attorney, ph:asc for\,.'an.l lhis le.·t:!T 10 yo,,.ir uttomey, and tia-.•e bic:. or her contact tfo:- Commi!itt on your l:cl,alf. 2 ?RO~!:RTY Of TI-IE U_S.. HOUSE a.= REPRES::NTA71\'ES 195 • U.S. l>cpnnooont of Juslicd Office ofLcf,i:1l~tivc Affuir.i Wa$hin.r:ton. D.C. ,10S50 JUL O·7 2017 Tho Hon.orablc K. Mlcliacl Conaway · Pcrrr.llncnt Select Committee o:i lnt.:lllgencc U.S. Efo= ofll~entntiv~ w~~bi.ogton, DC 20515 11ic Honor&1le Ad~m Sc.hiff Ra..~J.:w.g Member P=~~t Select COJllll\illee 011 lntclligcnt.o CJ.S. House ofRcp1-u.."C®tives WllShington, DC 2Q5l5 near Congressman Coruiway and CongmmI'.an Schiff: Thi, rc::pouds l.o youz lcttlll's to the Attowoy Gooorol and to 1hllll•Actin,e Assfot:1111 Ar.lnniey Cicnmil l'>'llll'Y McCord ofthe N111ionnl Sc;,cmity Division, both dated f\{Jly 9, 2017, will.oh. requested do~umeots in oonuecUon with \fa~ C:ommiUc:e'N 1m·1:Nlig11\ion int.o Rll!lslmt acrivc moos rues directed 111 tho 20 16 U.$. eleotlrm. A:i )'OU )mow, on Moy 17, 2017, 'Ille Dcpartmoot of Juutico (O.iplll'tmcnl) announced the ni1pol11.trr11:nt of Robert S. Mudlcr mto sc:we 11~ S11cclol COWLSel to ovorsc;Q too ;rrovh)tL'!ly- . oon11nnod FBI invosllgat!on of R~i~n !)O\'t:mmcnl offor(IJ to infl~1011ca the 20 L6 prc.?idcntiot election nnd rolntml numerJ. We o.ro odvlSlld Ihat tho 8pcci:tl Cow1sol ho, ~sun to lnke r.tep~ tn l\1JJill U1cse rospcmm'bilitics. Under these c!rcwnstanoc~ ruid co1wistcnt with the IJ<:plll'll.Ue.ul's hmg-~t~ndiog polity rcgnrdlng thu '°nfitlcntiwily uncl scn1iliYity oflnforrnntion rc:ioting to J)Olldh1g n1.1ltCTS, the Depnrunen( is not p ~ t W rc:&ponJ furthor to yo11r rcquosts ut Uus time. 1 • I . :I I I We nppreci.nte the Commiltee's luterests in Ulis ut.11tcr ond hope that tb4; infonnetion !R helpful. Plc&e do not hesitnto to oontn.ct this office Jf we may provide a:fditioual :is~ist:Ulce 11bout nny otbc-r m.1tter. & sm~.~ uel R. Rnmer g Ass.stant Attorney (!Cll~al L_ PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RC:PRESEN l'A'l'IVl:S 196 ~..UUl'lfll,c..t.l:;:1.lL~ r..w.t:n11t,~· - - ~~~:t~~,_ iJNCI.AS SlFIEO/IL"()MMlTIEE SENSITiVE :"IIUl:.UJ.•ra~~ ,~ •<'I ...&·• t-...~.r.=...&..tow,. .c..n·n ,..,.-.c::t.~ .O:Q U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES I Mr.a ~ !:~l2cS-i121 ?!:AJ.~~:;;r,..'T 5:LECT Co'w~!TIEE CN f,'fTE!.!.,G:eic:c :2'#,t:.-r\.U"",.A ff:)-0,,.b'.i.~ Tts,~~11nc~ U·•'od inll:n'icw at~ Ccmmittce's (If.ice:;, . As part oi'its bipmis~n investigation ic..10 Fi~ we respectfully cl that you prorlu.-:e to tf'l..e Committee, by no tarer i.,an \.he; close of I r ~ on Jl.!av 23. the following: Any d0¢s.!l:.!Ct1lS, :i:cotds, elcdr~i:.nlly st¢rcd infcrmE!icm including e-mail. ccn:muni~oo. t1:corclir,gs.. dau. and t.ogiblc lrungi {incl~ but Mt lil:ruted to, ~ . clw1s, pruitograpru, umacs and ocl1er documr:n.~) ~~ ofform. oth<:r lhwt those widely a-.'.llW>le (e.g., De'>\'S;>al)U .!..4:ic!es) that i:ea.ou~bly eould !e9d to the di;oovery of any ucts witliin the bvestigatio:J's publicli'· llnC~ Faram.e:cnt. fn complj'ing with lhi:1 ~ul;St. we Ask tct yo;i furaisb to the Committee, in ~edat'.ed fOffll,. =y arui an ~'l~"e nweri4l in your ect\l8I ar~ons(nlCti \"<: possession, cc.s:tody, or control i)r olh:::wisc ~"~ to )'Ou, inclumoi rcsptmsi;·c ma!:ml possi:ssod by .any u:ircl paey to be ~ca to y ma& ca im orsoing leis: if ~tter mtki og a.'I illitial i:;roduc:tion ~o Ille Committee rou finrl additi=al re;sponsive roaterial, you ~ u!d _produc:: tha.t m~~tW to the Commi~ encompasso:! To the no:cnt not by tlte shove request. thjs ltUJ:ralso TI:1,.u:sts ~ent:tion cf al[ d1:a1rncotS. r~ords, c!cc:tr.lni<:al:y stored information, n:cordmgs, da~ and l:l.ngible c..'lings (mcludinE, but Mt lil-...ited to, ~s. charts. photographs, im1:ges ar.i.ct.'ler6'.lcume.ltS} regardless of fuim, OOlcntial links b~eeo Russia nnd lndivldunls llll!ociated with politlcal ~J.'Vgns, 11\e U.S. go\'trna1cnt's rcsponoo to th~ Russian active me11surcs, and reh1tcd leaks ofclassified infomu1tlon. ShO\l.lcl. you irnvc 11n:r q~~ns ~t .any time, ple8Se contact Committee stoff at (202) 225-4)21. If you~ represented by an anomey, please fol'WlUd this lette? to your attorney, and lun•e him or her i:.on~t the Committee on your bob!!lf. Sincerc:ly, K:7.':!7 Member ofCMgtc:!i'S Mam Schiff Ronkins Membct AWichmcnt: Parameters ror Russl11 lnvcstisation ) 2 L PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF nEPR~SENTA'rlVES 198 ·l I U.S. DepQrtm:nt of J.ustlce • Ofiloe of Legis!ative A.ffiim Washlr.grc,n, D_C. 20530 JUL 2 7 2017 The Hm:orab'.~ l<. ~ l Cmlll.way ! ' ~ s~J:e,::t Col:Il71itt~ on Int=lligca.o:. U.S. H'omie ofR.er,!r&l:ffitiv~ Washiog(oo. DC 20515 The &itoral>!: .tui= Schiff R:.r~lci~ M,:;;rnbc:Peml2!!-'....at Se~"f Committee ;:in brelligoooo V-S. H= of~,.,:s \V;;shin_giO!!., DC 20515 ~ Congrcssirum COil3W'f:Y arid Congr~ Sclilii: Thli responds lo your .cttcr to Fcd..-zal Burcm of f u . ~ {FBI} Ac~g Oiteen kl:lr~'t McCuic, dJ;red Mr.y I~ 2017. ,-.-hit::l ceqvtiled doe:uIUenIS i.n ~ o n ..ith tk Qir.lnlith=c:'s imi=stigatfon into Rus..qan activ:ro~-urcs diroe:l.o:,l iuihe 2016 U.S. cie¢il>n. As )'Oil ~w. 11:0.:Moy 17, 2Dl7 !lle Di:panment of JllS1lce tD:pattm!!Ilt) :m;)Qtlet~ tile ,'JfJ>Oizmm:nt cfRJ)b=t S. Mveller JlI to &.."IW ~ Sp--~ Cmmscl.to O\iasee oc prcvi=lyc o ~ FBI i.o.,~.,aiion of~gm'<::C!lmelll elmru to .influ.~~ tbc 2016 F=1l~ electicc mid rilit.ed ~ . ~- We en::i::hrii;cil thut t::.e Sp,;:;;.id Co~fh~-: bcgoa b tak.c ;teps to fu?fiU fu.;sc ~onsibilities. Unrler mes~ c i r ~ ~ eoo C-Ollsimo.t with l!?e ~!:llt's long-~flg po1ic-t ~ I l g 1!1e ~fidcn!Wity ~ .scnsithity oiinfo:rmoc,n rclatittg 10 pcndin&matte=s, the Depa.rttniem is not prepared to r,espond funh.t:r Yt>UI t1:qu~~t ct this om e. ,o We tipprec;iate the Ccr.I,miue's illt.ere."!9 io ibis mQtlft aud irope ~ this inf=zfum is n~pful. Please ,fil ~t.~~.~ ~Ccc,a.:..c;u ~~~a~Jft Mayl7,2ul7 Mr. Robcrt.M\t.eller Special Cou.osel U.S. ~aitmcnt ofJUSl!te Washington, D.C. 20530 Mr. Andrew McCebe Acting Director Federal Bureau ofTm-cstigt:!i~ WasbingtOll, D.C. 20S3S 0--...ar ~- Muellr;;r and AC!ing !)irel:(or McCabe: Mr•.M.uelJ~·s sppo{C!meI!l a.i S!)':l:litd OJun~e:1 fa e.1'lCOc5S81Y an!! Jioslt.'Y.: de\'~en.t in the Depe.-tmcm ofJustkc·s ia~1egttding Russi!I. As~ qf.'.hrs O'Ml. ~ inquiry into Russian utive ~ io ir.crudt cowteiil'!teIH~ i:anccms, theCamtnittecl'>iU be =dutting rigorousO\'~&htto ensUR: !i.Mlfle D e ~ o f Juslice's1.Vorl; ~mcludeili.: ongoing COl!Iltmatellig=e im-eEtlgat!O!I rcg&nling Rwsiaby the f~1 Bur-"..au of Invc:stig!itior,. is not ~ d cc interfen:d w.th in eny way. A.c:cotclitl&l:r t h e ~ teqne~ts tha!:til~ ~-rmer.t of Justice, including the.Fodetal Borom ofin'l2St.igatio;,. pre=ve&ld produce !Xl th: Cammin:ee: ' (I) cc,~ ofall docu==.nt$, reeo.."lis, elec-.m::~cally ~QTCd in.!i)~cm i::clwiing e-rr&lil, ecmmumicmca, ~rdlati, dat11 end ~ l e thingS. ~cdl~s of fROFERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE c;= REPRESENTATr,'Es 200 We would appreciate your written reply, and the fulfillment of this request, by no later than the close of business on May 23. Should you have any questions at any time, please contact Committee staff at (202) 225-4121. Sincerely, +:.Kj~C;,! Adam Schiff Ranking Member Member ofCon:~! 2 PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 201 l U.S. DopartnM,nt or Justice Fcn lM Pre$idcnl rn>d then P.Bl Director Com<.'Y, We 11te advl~cd that -:be Spociat Counsel'~ Office :md the Department of Justice have provi1 ,.._T..110.1n.~t-tvt rnn" "'~"'''"'''~"'''" ~-o:~r~::;··;~im. ~1:,,~un,, ...... &1· t!t~(l\t, t 'Jl{a t, uw\...'!I ·;:.... ,... U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES l'H!W,,1,NEt rr Saeo,· OoM!JJlTE.e ~Ci12-.,.../~1,c.•,•1\) •r- ,4,.~a.,,.......,v. .. OM INTf::U.lliiENCE Y\11M.'l.C,.JMU Hvt"-~. n,t c~mo~ \'IM,000"1'°'4 Ot! 20~1 5 11011220-.1121 ,..., t,tit.h~ :S1•Uliolll.._, (lillll f..,-t, 11• 8,:!o~o, "'Crved su~nas on tbe Atton1ey Qenml, In bis ~p~cicy ~ h~ ofthe Ixpartm1m1 of J~J.i;e ("DOJ"), and tho Diroctar ofthe P~deral Bureau of !nvesdgation ("F.Br') fM J)t"O(f11t-tlon of de>cumeuts retcvtwt lo the Conuuittl.le'11 ongoiug luve.-run:itilm ofR\10ail'ln ln1cif1:renco i.a t.hQ 201G U.S. presldcnlfal Qloction, fnc:ludlng ullegations of coUus(on between tbe Trump cr.tnpal.gu 3nd me~ The:: :;iibp<.1~:i.s di~ccfOOJ and FB1 to produce any o:m.l !LU doc.ur.umts reWing IQ the: ilgcncie:1' 1-elnllo11.111iip with funner Brltbh ~n:t lntcllitt:n~ Scnicc offica Chrilltoµbor St<10Jo c.mdlor the so-calkd '"l"tump Duu~icr." inolut.ling thMC meml)tlollilng Fi3l' !l tClt\tlon!lblp w.ilh Mt. Steel•>, any p.iymtnts OlOdo to Mr. Slilele, and effort':! to oorroborare lnfotmation pJ'Ovided by Mr. Ste,e.le l!nd hi.~ ~ub-SOlll'l:(&-whcilicr directly onia l-\1.Sion GPS. The subpoelll.lS also directed "DOJ and FB1 to prnvide c~pie.s of any Foreign Imclligi:nr,e SUNelll~ Acr (FISA) &pplications subm:lted to the Fnreign Tntemgenoe Survcilloo~ C~ (FJSC)-wheUler or l);O( opproYW by tbo FlSO-incorporatiag informntlnn f,t'lwidoo 1:>y Mr, ~tcclc, tila S\lb-:;QurccG, a.octlor f'uslon GPS. "Re90rt to compuloorypro~ was ~563'}. bCQIU~ ofDOl's ~d FBr$ in:.ull'i.eient TCll\1¢ns1venc:ss to llie Committee's !;\umaou, Russia-1nveAisatlou tclllted reque$1.! ove.r the patt sovoml m®ths. On .ruultiplo ~iQns, throurJ1 wri11.cn ?'1;QUC513 11nd dlr<:cl c:og11E!1:1TI¢11l11 the Cort'lmitt40 ha: soueh1 but fui.lod to r«iclv~ ~po!l!Jvo tcl&tuntrred to It"toponcl furth~ to yourrcquc,i t1l thia tfmo." PROPERTY OF THE U .S . HOUSE OF REPRESENTA"lWES 204 Prcvi=ly. on March 8, th; Com.mi~ sought fu>m DOI ·certnh documents, incrudin;g rcle-1ao.t FISA applicatio:tS e.idflSC or&:rs, and Oil Mucb.17 "~ allotted t~,_, billets to Ie'.tie\11 respinsi.c d o ~ on a read"'1!....i on Aagu:sl JA ~uiJ~ production JIO !stcr than l2:00pm c m ~ 1, 2017. Neithet DOJ nur FBI provid~ a n y ~ by thedeMline. Onrl:e ~ n n of August 31. lessthrui 24 hears bcfo~ lhe d~ dw:, the Co.-nmittc::.{t:eei~dz.'l initial ~ns:: fCO!Il the UOJ Office ci ugislmve Affaiis 1 : e q ~ a . bcb.tlf of oolh DOI an.i FB[1ui::ii.t:cy;:at time tr> ~ply w.hh-tite ~~· The Commiue.: requires timely ~ C ) l l <1fth.e :iubpo-ecaed ~"-Ul:C>:r.!$ in Qrdc:c to ~"'UCC irs o·~bt ttspaMifr.!itfcs <1n bcllalf c! 1:.-ie A ~ J)Qblic :zid ni[ly w,cl:us.u: the s.ctioll3 of both DOJ an<. C•rrrm WA:.i.. ~r,1011, oc 2c~,s 1:mm,u~1 lHC"?MtC.U.•1 :;,,,,.,ClliN.,~ i,.u-"l,:LC,(F.Qt«,lr k.O.,.... c:-.,.1r CMP:ti1i' Ac1.cr O..~K,C .... ,.,.;,, ~-....,::,~·,-.. hJ'~ C.,.W"\,.Doi,•u•.::r11 ...n,•,1~ Nll"Q"7tl""\D1,..,,~uy M~. St«le. hi~ Mlb-SO'.lt«S, o.m!/or Pu.~lon GPS. !w;ott to compulsory prllc.¢$$ W!IS ne~ry l;,ec:a~e ofOOJ'.s and 1'81's iusufficlcJ:u: respo.c.siv.nie~~ to the Comniuee's numerous Ru:isia-inVtStigati011 relati:d 1c:qutsts over1h¢ put revi:m.l mcmt11s. O.ri muldple ocmv1/on.'i1 throu)lh writtell l"e1jUests and dlte,.'t etlg:ig~ments. lhc Commitc~ ha, ::our.I.It but ~ilcct:on no lem tru'::!:112:OOpm 011 S:pten:ilitr l, 2017. N.."I'Jm OOJ nor fBT ptQvided imy ~ o t s by !he df:adlir.-::.. On the aftcmf:Jon of Aognst31, less ihan 24 lx>urs ~fore ~~d>Jc ~ . J}x'. Co1m11itt~ i=ivcd an ini"tial from the DOJ Office of Lcgislauve Affilits reque!l.!ing-..Mingfully engage :he Com.'Tlitrc: until ti:o e-.•c oflhc.ie:icllinc or begin p~l.ion a3 a sh~ ofgoc.d faith. Moro/Jvtr, thm i3 no l~ilime~ basis for FBrs mt~ fi>:r additiot\3l 1:im~ to comply, f=rse DO.I ~ the FBI ve well aware of the k!l:Dtity of the requem-:i dOCillD.CtllS.. fudced, 4S noted cl!~ u !east WRi: of.r,an have alccady bi:en compiled ml m.adet=pc:-.rmi!.>• n•..-iub.blc for the C:lmmia.='s ~iew, 212d the remaining 1¢:!U!:Skd ch::t.'Ill~ts me n:edily idectifisbic. Notwithstanding~ com:i:rns, the Committee lu:«b}- g:rao~ an eddlciona\ Ulirtecc (t..,") days fur full ccmplience all'! production, to oceur no li:!er (Olm ~:00 e..m. cm Se?lt:mh~ 14, Wl 7. i.. !1,e lo-ccl ~cifi~d in the orisi~ s u ~ Thl3 rc-.-is~ deadline will not be exr.eod::,d. !n che 1:l.t=l!live, if rut teSpOClSii,e dCQ!!:re8U ..re not prod~cd by th:: rcvi~ deiutlini::., the /-~y Gt:llero! .and !he Direct« ofdte FBl sl:!tt.l. ~ ~ii>.re th: Commilrec at 9:00 am~ Sep-~ 14, 2017, in Room HVC-210 of the U.S. Cspilt>l durinB sn open lteering. to t:Xplcin w;dei- oll!h DO.ts ll.tl:d FB£'s unuillingncss or in:ibllity to oo:nply in full 'l'.'itb tilC subpoena,; issued on Augt!St 24. P!ettSe be adv.Iseli th4?, in 1he evmt th3l OOJ or FBI fulls to provide~ docuuimts i.: full or ~csrimoir/ described abo\-e, the Cuill!IliUce c:i..~ly ide!'VeS i~ ri.._w to prccecd with. any ei:d i;ll avai!?.cle Cegal options-including reporting to the fu!l.Housi: of R e ~ = a a"e$01ulicn ta ho:!d ~ Attomcy Gcm:ral m:d D [ ~ . oftl:t f-BI hl co"templ of Con~, purro:nt ro 2 u.s.c. §§ l.~ 194. - ---- - - ~ PROP~1Y O~ "In!: 1J.S. HOU$EOF R O!RESEITTA71VES 207 1-· 1 C111hr.u.M, C'dlur1-.. Qt.-•• • ~:;:,·:. •i1~~U!'..,~1~--· n,,,.,,. 1.ol'Mt,h1, ,....... ,f'111 "'~• J, .. PIK.1111, Hmt ~.;~~~:.~~.~' e,1, ~ ,·,,~1,uu, ~,. :r::~~~ ~'~. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES F'ER~t/\NP.ST Si:WC'I' COM.'.IITTbli 01~ INTELLIC:lE.NOE t'f', GctA'A,, t\·r nt1(;.1•11ft '",_ K. 'l,r)"k '~"'""' \Y1~MJIG. ft.i. HV~. TII~ CA~ITC,. w,1.~111•mo11, oci~~:~ tm) 2:lll-4\11 f\,,.,.-.,,.., ..,"' fJ .,,,n1~ ,-,_..,!J DIMMlHI w~,~.,,t\,1c,u:t .-...._ 11 Ot\f'l C•"''""-' l\,"'1M11f("""" ~~::!.icn:,',G:~!111 .,,,_...,c.,~l\ltdu• .'cl:la.t,.tir,C,r'l\lr.'11 ~~1'~;1', ~OJ~~ • .e>w, -.,:u1...C.nu, 1n,. , l:'f.\'li)tJ'l\tJ!ef'I S•lvnnu:. Ave:, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20SJO De& Attorney General SC11sioas: A$ explained in nw lett~ of [September t, 2017], if lhe Otpartment of J1mioe uils to comply in full \\1th w ~-:ubpoc1111 for produc\ign cudocurncn(s is~ by 1hu Ho\1Si: Pmn~ent Scl~t Committee on Tntolligence (Committee) on August 24, 2017, the Committee rcqu[rns thlrt Atto:ncy Ocnorol Jeff Session.~ appcnt before Ille Comminee on September 14, 2017 to cxpl.llin tlllll failure, The nccon,~nylug ~ubpoen.a, !s&iietl todlly, 18 ialt2uJt:d lrJ L'fl)= cu,;nplioocc: wilb lhO: l'C.."'41.a: ;\ 0'{11 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES C,f\1: ~4-"\ ~ , P~MENT SE.I..ECT CcMr.1.'11'EE J.aC"'.-..i.U"4.A.~ '"ttt~r~•C-,,1-ht ON INTELUSE!'.CE 1,~ .... ~-a:.1..- ·...~· ,.),:.u,q_ T.r.:n 1ro21 2~1; ; .......,.....,.. ~~-~oa• t"U.OA ' T 3 ~ ~ ~ Y:llt ~ ~tc:> .. ,.-iii!.l\..f..J.~~ . _~ ~:>."t,30~, T.c c~...,o. W"""1.,<;rcr,;;,OC U-!II!:. l.hr-"111.2 ~ .... :) Sl...' \ , ~ l::.OC'r 'Ckl:t ...,.,~,- ~ t , ~ Sep.e!nbcr s. 2017 Toe Horumtble C-~t1" Wrey Di~or .Federal Buteau of1Dves.:igatfo.!I 935 P~lva.nh! Ave, N.W. Wa.sbin&b:Jn, D.C 205~ Deer DL"eCtot Wray; AsGXJ)iaiQQd ii.my lett:f o f [ ~ l,2011], cth.: F ~ l D=u l)fl.:ive:stigatianfai.!s to comply m full with ~ subpocm for (?IOduo.tion of ili!--..unu:ms i:Ji.u:d by !be ! I = P=nt Selei..i Ccmmitt= oo IiuUigeice (Can-.mitte?j oo Ang'.!St 2-f.i 2017, the Committee requl~ (i,,.at Dlreclor Chdstaphe.r Wnry app:ar before the Olm.mittec on Sc;,tember l 4, 2017 to e.'..-:or's 811?-=<=<: will O;Y. be ttoocssarf, and lb, aJ)]St!:lNll~~ ~td S ~r 5. :2017, will be willidrewn. ffiOPl:R'TY a:=THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPR'ESENTATIVES 209 Qr-.all11"9\C•tbrl,o.,....,,., Jt.Wl-a,.: =-.u~ ?'Jn, ,..... ~.ota t,.... Y\fic rfYI? '-,!£.Wb.-d:l, 11t1#.J1H1•.~ T•....,.,.... "*~ U.S. HOUSE OF REPAESENTATlVES ~:!i':-i:~~~~·U• 11,u.,, •,,,,.11'li.,uu, a:: - , 9ic"""'fU U!Jlh Pi!l'lMI\NONT $1!UIOT CClMl,{ITTliP. ON lt.n'EUIGENOE ~t, ('1'"'4,>ilhU•u ~t.-~ltl:~M~· ,n,n..ne. ,..,.,. HYC-..'>)O, TIO! C,,,n()\ \'11.:>t1m.101•, DC 2061S t~lt?...'8..CIZI ) \1,1'"":o,:;, .iu119,-..~,,.. =-~t . ~ v.,.1',tr.1,1, 0.01~ ~n>!,,~1;11 Ctllc~ RU.<•,:ti!Vlta r'DJ.tQ. t'y2\ S,.,..n 11 ct.,...,r... « r.11atn, .,.at,\D1'-'!:-u.~ ... ;,.i.u.1t ~ptcmba 15, 2017 'llto J-IQ1t0mmit(ce conli111:es lo ::eok an)' (l~ IQ)"ICIJ~ ,i;gwlins lhQ ox tent or your 11u.cncii.w.;' rolnllonshtp with forom Bnttsb &x:ri:t llltelligcocc S01, 1lusl.y mode aVllUllbler-fiu into u oontinllm8 puttcru ofiosufficico1 t.;Sp<>N5lvena111 ta wrilfcn Comm!~ J"OI\IICSC, daili1g bock over S mootho, lnalwllne ll>i· documco~ md t~U1v.ony 6'om A1101uoy PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOU Sc OF l=lC:PRESENTA.TIVES 210 (k;o.e:a! S~[ons, FBI Di:pu;y Dircetor A'!Uire;v Mc0:t1le, end funner Acting Ass:..<1ll..a"!t Arrorrey ~ ~JBI)' lV..cC-0.rd. The Commitr.ee ~ aommitttrl to exezclsi!lg its ~on.al ov~tre~Msibi[itles, a!ld wiU c:onnr.uc seckhl,gyour co,;ip=.tio.n \'ti.th there df~:tts.. :oOJ !nd FBI a.e theref~ ~t¢i eu c:x-.raordinaty e.\.emion r}j en add.'tiora.l se,..-en (7} days :or prod.uctkin tJmt .smsfies d:e Aug;..ist 24 ~ s , , t.o oocm no 1filf:rthan 9:C-0 a.m. on St:ptembf:r 22, 20 l 7. ID mea.!tenl3live. !!D;I. ~ t to dtetmimonrel s~iss>;:s;d on Sep~ S, th.c At.tome,,/ ~era!~~ DircctoT rC co nrr:mic for me to tncct \\ilh yo\1 tn di~cl.l~$ 1111: Commitll:~'11 inqu,h'ie:1. Tundtrntond thn1 ynu h:ivc been ot1 foreign tJ·,net tbl3 \.\-eek l ,~1ll llc on for,:ign lrt\vcl for the 111:.-:c nv1: d11y3. I 1htreforc rcque~t lh~t you c'1ltc11d lhe deodllne 4te1ed In your Scpt~ub~r l 5 letter 10 the ,\\lorro:y Gc11e1'8l .111d the fBl Dircctur, s1.1 tlmt we can ~rmng11 tu ~uclfC!!~ ynur requc=1~; withoan nndul~ damasi11!) notioMI sec uiity mtd dil!(up(ing .'.l.11)' ongoing criminal i11vesli;i,i1ion. I 11pr,,recitl1~ our btid' 1clcphonc: \'.01WCt5alic111 la:i1 w~ok. l 1'now lhM y-,u unJcisrsnd th~1 tht' exWJth,e br.mch's ~,blii;ntlon tl> ~tegu3rcJ ih(e!Hgenee wurces and m1;tbods :IDd protei..1 ~~ integrity of invc.stigatious sometimes wnm1111s =ommode.tion. Tnii; is not a no,-el issue, nnd II is ncil a p~«isim ir.sue. Law enfon;emcnt ruid nurion:11 securil)' mo.11cr; 11rt: kt..-pl ll0110:.:LC:a~e...w1. r44..--.if, 0. -.o,.r-..c. P,i,,1 1r'.t..:;r41-~c., nm: .ti...:.::i::1~1tu b-"ni' n,.r.,,ai.:..fo.t~!".:-ea l\:,.,. k..L.tfac,~.,h 'EAt.V,«c,'>IT 5al:CT Col.\Mi'i,cE ON lr,n.n.-LIGENC!: nc..';l:Mio:i-$.~ r... ec-t,.s-c.ec-~ il"J•\t~~~ . l\\. Ii~ w,.~,. ilC:t051f- U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES .t:n:..! . . ~ .b.l. z_.-c:...:.1.21 ~H.S'.U.Tn:::2 ll.'Cl'l .. ~. .........__ L ~flt~ •rfC:~r~ J.d.n::..~Y.C>tb-olla. ~H'llt-"¥"• al.-...&~ .h.~-ON',.~=-.& 1..lm~l.~ ~.s,....-., .~~-~ '-\S.tC..V•r. lJ~ hwrl~~ 1:•c-!;~•.Cllf;n :io .)t} ...~ ~ b a , , -: . . . -~~"''·•'·"°"" ra;:t D,l>ffl. !>-6,.,,U ato a ~ N -"'1:,, l°'t",:1L~""""""~:.:..,..U41 'fb.! H!inorable Rod RilSe!!Stein D~puty A1teraey &!ueml Umte'l Surt~ De:,mrneot ofJu..=•s =nsy to cor~uct its ongoiug lav ~ o a into~ 2016 p.."csirlemfa! electi.m, in.crc.:dif'.gllighly-classtfied info!1m'.tion ofo:ttannilnlnJ' saisl-ti.ify. ~ Com."'Iliru:c has ~ to greaI Jeng,i~ t Q avu:d irJi:r£l:~ Wlih Uk'j «igoi~ a=im~ brancll i n v ~ ~. oo.i we~ r:tSrly to won. with :i,-~u ill this reg::ID!. r l!lso takcthl5 o~-tlty to ~ooro that ow: requests for i:nfurniatfan are lil«ily to be fu-.lJCI' itt 1l!lillber and smsli~ in .scc,pe th!tJ,. l!I(:: l;pic:tl qusonsJudges and attnm..ys 'Pi'Qll).i 3* i;,1 crunmal pr,,bi:s.. Furihfnncre.,jillt fS the ~ ofJDstiee (00.J)-ruid Fe~ Buretiu of !nv~tii:;.Licn (FBI) b3.\•e eonsf.i.tltionlll o~tiom, so too rloes Congre~, whlch is respons:i~!e Co. ov=e.zg beth DOJ =! FBL \Vb11e tb:: Cc=!!mittce h:.~ been vt:ry pe&n! Ov'Ct ~ hrstsiX. llJ;:llll]-,.s, !kt patience is cot wil:hottt limiL Todi!C', r=ittgful c:o~ c e wrt.~ mi: Commfucti's re,;~ts has been ~ and th: Coll!mitte: has not =ivro my docu.mc:n!s pu.=t to ~~a month i:tgo fer which the-deadltne h?$ k= twice e.'.!endfd. The fs:ci. U'.!d ~ mf.xrmatfmt may h~ ~ i . n g u1 c:i.stDOJ er FBI en-. ligm )'f raspott.S!veness from the w-0rld's p=i.i~ law e.:i:on::crnmt agency is una-r-ccptmle. == For cxlm'.lpl~ Clct to the pending subpo~ tbe l'Cf,e.:itcd latt·D1illute re:!pQJl&es by DOJ and FBI to gcnerou:i .lt4'' Cd'l::'n • .)c.Tf'N"f"I Ut,._,.ff;•- - ,.-.- ~ ~t." f~~H'VWT r~.:.n,,n,.':"u,1~ ~,,,~rU\~·• ~n.:L Tltnr. "1.:a i,.. . R.~....... !'-:u: .:u...c.s.~. .i.cm. U:.t ~ M".d, :..•El!ll ;,:,1~,~- ':',o U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Pi;i"2,W-IENT SELs:;.° C<-.uw:rrr££: o.r,...,,.,~~ ::,..,.~ cm INTElLGH~E' !' ' f ' t ~ . ~"'1~1'4' 'i~..,..,.a.::nh,C't.lhw1'1M'\ c,.;,.r.-... WJ.Slrsx;n:i."1.0C lt~lS ; 20211Z5-&12l •,-.o· ...-1,.~'a?' • ·ta,11J.~T1M:,. """"'"7,5r..,,~..,...__.. """"'~ f:\J~ ~ •• :.i.~~ ..~ ..... .,~~,~b.t 1,.t-, ~ : ... : 1,,.$).rrlO-...::U, 4...CriC.h.«. ~T1, ••#~Nl•. ~ W:W.Chb,.,.., :t..""U& Llv.T-_ C,-nt ;,.~,. UtW:>p"'!I\ l"bJC ~ ~•. 4'1-"o&1'~--~ b'IX(~w;.~r,ct,,r:Nr,, NG'1e~2, 2017 'DcirutY Dictttor Rod Ros:t'.s.o:?in U.S. [xpartment of J~1itt <>SO Pel'ltUYlv-cnia Av~c, NW Waswnglor., DC 20530-00m Dtptit)' Dir.:ctar RtNl Rosca.'-t_.:in, I herelrJ Jcsig.we Cooircssr-.An Trey C"!O,.tly as my proxy fot un in ewicra. WJic.w of dc=erus ~ :i.vlrila:ile per tllc subpocias is~ to A\'~ober 2. 2011. Best Rcguds. b,AI[/~ Th:11in r.'u:i~ ,.. Chaim= PRO?ERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 215 liVC~d, THI ~-1QI U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WA!l""-'a!DN, DC ~S15 12(J~j:12S,-.4121 Pl!FIMMJEliT SE:I.EtlT Co!AIAmE.E on INTEL1.1GEN¢E Deoembct· 28, 2011 The HQllorab!eRod Ro~tein Oojltlty l\ttomey Geuernl U.s. Deptutment of Ju3ticc l 20l POlllJay!vMin Ave, NW Wamlnnton, D.C. 20004 Dear Mr. Rosc:m.toin: The Hoip;e Perm.Anent Select Committee on lnlellis~ {the Commiltee) writeJ 111 to th-.: Depwtrocnt of Ju.1rloe's (DO)) ;md the Federal Bur"o.uof lnvestigutlo11's(Fal) foiluro ti> fully produ~ responslvc doCUJllcnl.$ o.nd provIde. lho requested wltnOS1Jos lo CQ:7lJ)llnnco with tho subpoenas issued overfour nron!h.t ago, 011 Au11,ust 24, 20] 7. rc:i,pollD\l Several v;,,clcs l!l!C>, DOJ informed the Commlttce that the ba~c investigatory ~ocurmmt:1 de.mimded 't;y dt.e .subpoen.o.s. F}}J Fom:1 F0-302. interview ~ c s . did not Howevtf, shortly before my mooting with }'Ou in early Dcccmbo::r, DOJ sub..sc:quently local~ flJld produced nwnei:oua f'D..J02s pact.a.inmg to the Steclc doom, lMreby rendering the initial respan~ disingenuous sr bc:st, As it cums out. aot O:lly di;t dc)cum,:nts e:,:igt tha.t wett. directly r~13onsive to the: QiaJ1:nitn:e's subpoenM, bi.1 lhey Lll',olved =ior DOJ and FBI o~cials who w-c.e swiflly ressGigor:d whm th.air rofas in mnttera under 1he Commi«e~'s lnvesligaticn. w.tre bs:ousht to !igbl. Olven th~ conlent and 1.mp:a<:l of these suppoi:erll.y newly-di!covered FD-302s, the . CoJtunil.te\: is no longer ru:re to accept yoor pmporled basis. for DO J's blfillket retir.sal to pim1de .responsive FBI FO!Tll FD-l023s-urees aid.FBI o1l1cim ~ t o ~ ~le cl«s:icr, • All responsi1,~ FP-3023-not pn.'Vivu.sl.y provided to theComrnitree; 81'.d • In adcfition 10 the R>.302s e,,d FD·l023s. cemm ~cf,rc: er.alyt!~ end reference dacumenls ll:e.t w~rc ~ l y identii-'ied end rur.icsted by Irie Cammittt.c,andt.~Y subjea to ~ m t ~ o n . es of Da=b:r IS. Sb®ld DOJ decid:: lll withhold my mpanm"C ~ ot po.lions thereof, from the Cc:nmittee, it must, c o ~ with .be n:bj)ocne irmuctions, provide c wrluca respaiu.e. un~ yuur s i ~ dewfuJ.s tile Jegalju.,~(>11 re. Lriling to comply wilh ~ ~o~~ su'\)poi:ns~ AdditL":laily, by Il2 = e ~ ~p:ovtdo-,-.;.D wtitiri~l.ehla~ in J ~J ~ 18 fad~;:ws with the. following offi::ws. • Filttner DOJ .~soci~ D~,cy ~ y 0 ~ Bm~Ohr. • A3l S-0.peNOO?Y Sp::ci?.1 ~ P:ti::r (SSA) S02Xlk; • fB( AUcmey James Bah:r. • F.Bl Atmmey UsaP~ • FBI AJumJ..sy Sally Mc.yet; and • FBI Assisti:nt Direcw. fot ConS[CSS:oll31 Affairs G!eg 8ro'9r=t. 11'.e ~ e f.ath.er ronim3s you (}f ti= othu outstanding reqi:essfur ~ o n : Details mnrernin.& e n ~ April 2.irl 7 meeting with the media iJn,o}.ing 001/FBl ~nnel, ii:rclu.iing DOI Anorr,ey Al:ldrewWc:is=E:n (d~ Occe:.nber 13) ecd • Toe ~ g ~ l mi:osages be~ SSAS~ and M~ ~-c {doc D=mbet • 15). Unforomately, DOYFBl's ~ p e e with respc,:t lO 1he Auguc.;t 24 ~ow;s is pert oiabroader~ af~wr that ~1U)lot1!!(T:>e tolerated. As I said mapublic~mt S";"~-;:.al we(:}cs sgo, when the reasDn fu1 SSA Strzd:'s n:moval from L~ Sp?cisl Collll~ irr.'CStigntian Wl.3 leeked to lfui JYashtngtvt-t J'()Sl be!bte .hat reason was provided tn this Co;:J:nittee, at1ni! paint itseem11ihe00111mJ FBI~ to hr: invcrlipti!!.g themstlY~ I look forward tD }"OU?. timely wrr.t= response. ! L__ _ __ PRO~cRlY OF THc U.S. HOUSc OF REPRES!:r,JTAYIV~ 217 l U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ?ERM.ANENT SEl.2Cr COW,fiTTE~ 0Fi lN'l'RU.ICENC~ H'JC•304, THe C!J'l"j'lll. w~~o~0a,. OC~15 ~02) :2:l5-4 t:?.! Js.nll8.tjl 4, 2i.ll 8 The Honorable Rod R~em Deputy Anorni:y G=al U.S. Dep;uunent o f ~ 120! Pennsylvania A·~-e. NW W2.Shinstor., D.C. 20004 Dear Mr. RoS!:llS!ein: Pwsuan1 to our phal?- call ;-esterdey evsning. .i writ:? to memorial~ th= a ~ wt! teacbccl rcgerdi.ng compli11llec wi!.b the subPo=na:s i ~ by the Ko= Permso::ill Select Comrnitttt: an futelligcnce (the Co=ittee) on Augu.st 24. 2.017, to 1hc Department ofl ustke(DOJ} and Federal. Bu..-eau of In¥estign!ior. (FBl}, as well ~$1:Vt:tal other o~nding tc:qta::S'.s by L'1e Committ~ fur infummfion and in[crvi~ws. JI fa my hope tr.al thls ~ e n , w,Jl provide the C.Omnuttce wirlt tall o,.J1mnding docum.cius and"'~ n~=ll?Y to .xirnpl.ete itli invi:stig:mons lo.to =n= ~alving DOJ ll!ld FBI. Al agreoo. d-:slgns.ted Co=ninee i.cl""es-Jgators w-m:ffwill be p~videil ~ to all ~~g inv~siir;ati vc d~\l!Ilen!S, in unredncted form, furtt'l'i,ew at DOI on Fn&y. ] ~ f S, 2018. The documo:ors to be wli~~ Y>ill include all FBI Fo.m FD-J 0"'"3s ll.Jld all remainh::g FBl rorm FD31)')...s responsl~ to.~ Co=ittee'~ Au~ 24, 20!7 subpo;:.1as. The o.tly ~ n e:cecption pcnains to a singi~ FD-302, which. dui. ;o ruaiomd security~ ~ill be ~o,m ~aratcly by D~r Wca.1 IX) myself 2nd lllY s,ex;for inv~tiga{QIS during the: w~ c,f JIIJtl1AtY'&, 2018. Yo\lfurt.1:er eonfam~ ~ tbtrc mt: ~Qthere:d !t'i::n yo~ offi;c is I I (e$S.--clwig reco~ds re!aled ~ the d£tail, of Bil A.prll '2017 m~g b~--=en 001 Atto., iey Arakcw Weis:mia,; (now &be seniar m11;)mey for S~~ Counsel Rob--~ M.uet!er) and the ~~a. wti:b will also b: pro•lid::d to this Committee by close of busi!::ss on 111\m;day, Jamiuy ! ~ ,· 2018. I rt wa."t furtba ~¢,d ll-.1.1 d! :,,,,J,•.=..r H','C-~.1)i~ C...,C-"'"1. WAS>Ml~~ 1:,,127.s-,!, :a PERMAN.Em" SELcCT COllt.l.'JTTE.E .:t.,~..,,,..->~ ON INTEU.!SEIIICE 'l)e,i,~~~')LJ ;;... N.,E."4;..,;,c,.tJ&r either~ week of~ocmbo: 4 or December 11. ~ iim:mew may c;ov;;r s:ny topi~ within the pi.1blic}y-llJ100'..inc:cd paraIDa<:I:i cftbe ComJnj&c's nr,~oo (see~), im:ludingRllssian cyWac:rl.iti?S directed a~t the 2016 U.S.. ~an. pm~tfol :illlcs 1 : ~ Russia Md i11dh.:i.duaa asoociatcid \l,ilh p,,!itical csmpaigns. the U.S. gpverruuent's mspo,.:ise to these- Russian s:tive m=es, and rel~tod I~ of c!:;tjffad i:nfurmation. 0 We n:specliully ask~ yo.: pmdw:,c to th~ Com~ by m> Istcr lhn th<:: ¢klse ofbus'.r1;,ss on. Nonmbu· 24, ~ availabilit'Y for lhe i.mi;rn~.v ~ring the time: idc.mificd ah:>-.:c.. This lett.,;_, also ~ quc::;.s prcsq,,ation aixl producruri of ell dix:un1ems, records, cl~onically st=d information, re::o."'limgs, data ;ind tangibletaiugs. (mcluding. bu1 not limib:d to, gt!!plu, c:iart.,;, pr.nrogx-.q>bs, im5ses ~ 0 ~ dc-cwnetlts} !'egnrdle~ orfomt, otbatha!I thoso wid~ly available (e.g., nev.sp,..peratleles), related to the C<>mmiru:e's inves!i&=,tio», yow interview, Jllld ~Y anctll:ny matt=. Should you have a n y ~ at any !h:u:, plei= contact Committee S'.zff itt ('202:) 225-4121. If you are ~e:;1:nted by en lll!Omil)', p!csse fotwud this 1 ~ co ~·oiir ~-OtT $Eu;CT CO.\~.;: 01'-1 [Ni"El.UCJSitcE i!'Jc-JC-1, Tfl.C.U..Ta::t:. WA!.W~OC2C6t5 !2:-~22~121 -,:......,., tnt;-,-,... J I I I I I l I I I I I i I i I Deee:mbe? S,i=ial CmmscJ. R.obe.t Ml.16..llet III, !,ndrew W ~ 1hc:n bud of1)().)'ll Crimin&l DMSt'-cu provide HPSCI viith ~ to the fulrowillg qusions: • • I I ,, Did lfur. ~.ccrun,g bcti\.'(';Cfl DOJ r,v.,/c. FB! officials N.d ~t=oel!;lll'? Iftms·~o::==d: I I I I In F ~ 20 li, Imoto a fci.!.i!r to tf->..n-Fec!t'nl Bur(all ofl"l~g.atlcn (FBI) Direcw. J,~ Comeyex~my eoni:em cegaromg~ "epi~~of ~ d i s cio~ t o th: press:", i:.:::;1uy ofwh~ pwpar.cd to cootcin ;Iass:ifiEd infom£ti0ll, partirule.rly thea!!c~ lcelc: ..n. Mi~ FJ..vnn's namer~ e oonve!:S!Iionmat ~ repaztl'Aly bad ":\1th fomicr RUl!S2n Amb~r Setf,ci Kislyek. In ~ 2017, r .,,-rote mother I ~ to the mwtigmce Co=uciiy lnspectcr Ge=al mid y~ ex.P=5U"..g 11 gi:ave CWCEm a.bOct a i=di:l& .a,ticl¢ biased en a., mir,ropcr lellk. Unful1llrul"..e[)', itis .stilit10tclee:z~ tbeHOt!Se PermMC;:t Se!~ Com:ni:r...ce on h.-iclli~c.i (HPSCI) "lmell:~Jie Dcp;!:$:r..eitl of !1L."il.c.e{DOJ) fa investig;:dng I I I I i r I - - - -- - , _ _ J - ---- --- ·-- -- - - 223 · - - - - - - · · - ···" ..... - \Vb.y \vt\S it Wll b1fofod to l[l'SCI oroth11.r relevant ov1::1'5ight committees? Who from tho oor nnd/or 1:-"Hl approved ~ meCiing? Which tepc;>rl!s:s and n:prcserusuves ftom DOI and/or FBl attended. the: 01eetlng? Did the ammgll)i and CQndactoftbe meeting follow all R:le·r.urt DOJ and/or r-m ~roiocola? - At lhc mcetili.g, dld nuy OOJ and/or FB) ottio!a!s provide nny inforrnntfoll to du: rcpo1·ter:1 ubou1 tho FBI lnve:J\lgation or confirm MY infom1ution provided by ll'e rep~ ~ Dl.d anyone from OOJ ond/or- FBI file a cornplni11t about thls meeting? - :Did any DOJ and/or FBI rc~tivce tA.\e nows during the meeting? - lo ill.is mc.eti.11~ the ~1~ 01' a. lG mvc-~ti{:llti~? • Cop~ to: The Honorable Mk:hw::l ~. rJotOWil"Z., !n&p1.-etor Gee.era.I, U.S. ·oepmtmcnt of Ju.,lice 224 1 ·- -1 r ' I l l I I .i I I ·' l 1 -- --- ---- - -- - -- -- - -- -- ----- - - IP.a U.S. D~_partm.eat of Ju.'ltl~ • Office min Nm1es Chmm2:o ?~..anent Sel«t C=tnl~ on lnt=lli.geoce U.S. Ho:= of Rcprcsentati.vcs Washlag,-..un~ DC 20St5 Thls r~Dds to Yi!W: lener-to the D-'vpmy A:mroey Geoet':!! d!lted Deeer.i~ 6, 20!7. Yen:1~ e.'(presses concern abau.;: anaumorizcl dlsclOS'Um! of classi.fi.ende:rsrending. i t ~ Eot sppe.s-1r.-.a1 D e ~ ofikiels ll'llpi-operly d[sclcsed aiy .:vnfiderrtild fofumiati.{11). .1 I L!_----- - - - -~- - PRO?ERTY OF THE U.S. liOUSE Or REPRE3ENTATIVES _ J I ' i / I I __ __j 225 The Honomblc Devin Nunes 'PnBc Two rnc: Oepu:me1\t ba:11efcrred 10 thd lnspcctor Gcnernl youc o,.uc~Uom, os tn whether an}'Ona :6b:d n oompl.nlnt about the mcotlnS ond wll\!th81' [he mcctin(I; fa Ule .robj~ict of Lin Inspector Genera] inves1ig.11ioo. J>l~ do nnt hcsitme to contact tbi~ offi0t:: ifwc may pwvic!e additiolJ!ll as~istan~ r1,:9;111iiing this or any nther..matter. · Sincciily, Stcpb<'.n E. Hoyo Assistant Attorney General ~= The IJonor..ible Adam B. Schlff Ri!L' m-:,lm:-e~ r n ~ ea:em, ano~ otl>et-ca.p.urc,:l = . . " I t ~ ) ~ FBI~ Pctu-SD:mkami PSI At!i;-m;y ~ P~ SSA S-trznk s;.:dMa. ~ bl!-.-e hr:,::;;m!::11:ified in mt dfa.reponilig astwo=ilar--lc\'cl !'a[ cmp~'ets'Yit..o botll ~ ia ~ FBl'sez:11.m~rcllis= i ~ o:,n~i.irtg3l0 Hillmy Cli:J!!m e--mEib i!!Dd lite 2016 prtsl~lal ele.:tlll11. I f I I ' J SSA S1120.hras inc Deputy !l~=cfifter.Bl'a ~igcnceDivis~ v.i,~. o ~ ~Cr:!! rl\V"'~ Ms. P~ ls a FBI ~ cf ~ [ C.., ~ JBl:iJcney, wflalil lhctim,;.. . . - ~ ~ ~ to i>.i:ur.,· l):i:a'.:1t'Ji' n11drew M~'s om:c end pnmd--d 1C£!d sup;;,an: » ~ io~~1J'-o,,..s. &tll SSA S'.r~ ~lld !,,!s. l'ag,1.1sLf !Ill ~uest:d ctr:mD1mic,,ticll5, ~ wiJJ ~ t to ~mpnl=y proeos ifell .si:cli filX:im!Ul~ m:e m;t del fverc::! b th!, Cacmi~kforo9:00 AM, ~~e:- 15, 2,017_ I / I I I J [ l I. / 1 'L--- - --- ------ - ~ ~ - - - --- - - - ~ - --- -- -- - -- - PROPERTY OF THE U..S. J;OUSE OF RE'f >REt:ENTATIVES 227 - - - .. ·--- ----- ---·------- ----- .·- --- --· ·---- • U.S. Ocpartwcnt or JusllNJ Ofike orL~&lslath·o Aflblrs Office of the Ati~IIDlt At1nmey Oe:iorol JF"ashfngton. .b.C. 20S30 DEC I 2 2811 Tut: Honocl>le lxvin Nunes Cl!.ajnnan Pemmnent ~1C"..t C11mmittte on lm.cllisencc U.S. Hou5e of~~vcs W;:.shingtoo, OC 2{1515 D:nr Cruu.nrum NUDo", Thi5 r~onds to the Couu.11.iltoo's rcqucst that1he DeprutJ.nent of Iwaice (Dcparuncnt) pr11g1>. Wu o~u s;nxllng icltc4;11 nnd Identical analosum, to b n~ml,er or Coogrc8nioool Cornmitttiou Ulut t..nvo mfldc bimll:1r ,re.quests. M, )'OU mny kllQW, on.Jru,uuty 12, 2016, UmDcpmmcntof.T~CA:'t,, Oilko oflcupwtnr OcTJer:it (OIG) pub11uty =~1U1rod lhnt the 010 would cevicw ''uUup;1\lc:m.~ thin:D1ipt1rtmcntc,r POI [1-0llclcs or pin«d~, 'M 1101 follow¢\! ~l 001\llOQt/cm with, or 1n actil"n~Jcntlln,i up co or :relntcd co, tbe Fnl Dircctnt'!t publlo onnounoc.mcnt on July$, 20161 1 :uid thll lllructor's fonom to Crmgn:~1 on Octoher28 ru.ul.Novcrober 6, 20l6, 11.tld Umt ccitn:in. untl.llrl)IUIS iovc:UliBJLtlve deut~ion.o v.i:rc b;iscd 011 ~ p c t con$l~ro.tlooJ1?" ,\$ fll1t oftli.'\t ~vfow, the QIO o'bw.incd, lllllC1J1g oth rr tb.ing:1, taxt mcw1gl:.'I t:f u_priVllc emc'1 . 'UO/ OIO A=ooic~ 1uitlarloo orRcvio)f. Jarnmy 12, 2017, n"-'11.ti~ a~ htlps:f/ciiju)..;o,,,i:o,·/tnu.VWli/201 '1• Ql-11,J!dl --==~~-- ~ -·--~~~~---------------_·_··___________ u_::-_-_-_-_-_--_-_ PROPERTY OF THE U ..S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 228 .------ - - - - - - - - -·- ~ - - ·-·- - -·--- -- -----------------------I '1 ~ ~ - - ~- ~ - - - - - - ·1 I I I I I ' I. ! previously 9t:i"'cl Q1l tl-.;: ur,esti~iv::: ttai-u !.o:i by Spec>.=! C~.:mel Romt M~TI~- ~ Om mfon..cd th,; Spe61 ~clef the ~s== Qf lh:atd=:.i l::o;t~On;>:' aoottJuJy27, 2017. ?,:fr. ·!.{ucl]::rirr.m«liat,:.ly«m.cl~ ~ ).fr. Sttriik oo;.ld 11!1 IOD£Cf pi:rticip= ~ ~\Cesli¢ol!, .r.d !:.e rc:r.ovcd f.-=r ilic ~ ;\?; he.,; b'ero pct-~:ly t;:pQ:tz:c, Mr. s~ m = .I T"ois ~c:-.rdinsiy a = ~ 9 n of pmvidi!lg. tb.e ~o;oo ~ .J~s is ll!i~'In the ~ cm! cir=n~ qfwis ~E?"!Il2lter- 1be~~s:ppnciatestho WO"..koflh:e OJG on thl;i ;::aU~, !ooh fot,,.'Cl"d to~ :lhdi11g5 ~ r=mi=c.d3tiom:aj.. to or 7elatei to, 1ho FBI Uircctw's pablic arm=i::emem on July 5,2016, 1 and~ !F_ Coi:si=, on Octo~ 28 w Novembi::r 6, 2016, md lWlt ~ein undctl)'ing Un5t:g;itive decisioos 'M:n: 00$:d n::I llEpOf.CI c0n.,;ide1llt!DnS..~ As pan o.f fhe.t Te'\.i-:,.,.•, Ule 0[G ob(afoed, among c,(hez thin_s:s, t::!ttm~~ 1:etw= Mr. Snzok :ind :Ms. Page. = I:c. Deccmbct1017, provxlcd you ,'ide yc,.1 thoac n-=sagr.s thai were cilher-work-n:Jntod or 1h21 p;ovi&d llIJY insi&hf llllO Im: politi(::11 Vtc>\S oftile plltl:CiPQDl5. 1 on tlla~ ~~. lb-:a·FBl DiJ= I=s 3, Ccmq anoc-mc:,d tl!st di<> FBI wa~ r e c o ~ t o t!tt Dq,artm;::n of .'imi,o 1im no ~h.n~s ~,d ~ fil:d reol~lir.~coio.-merS~ ilfS::U: Hil~· Cllr.:ro's = · = :;f~ PITT;ir¢ ~ro:Jl 1 DOJ O!G Anooul!.C:S lufmlio:: k 11:.-><1 Ms. l'".r.i_;~w Jul)' I, 201?, mlfth: m:!stgcs ef.o- J~25, '.20!7• 'oJCrep:m>n.!I in a = f I I -- - - - - - --- - - - ---'-- - - -- -- - - -- -------------- PROPERTY o:= THE U.S. HOUSE Or REPRESE:NTATIVES 230 r-- . - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - ·- . . I / I I I '' I J - . . -·- -1 ... _ ·- ·- · ·--·-· _ _ ...- - - - - - -.. The H=tzabl~ DcVi."l N i:nes Ps,;:cTwc 1 Tre Dep,irtnient ti not pa>\'u:lillg ~ ~ " ' ( S .nat ·=c pu:-dy pew.mal in cmure. Far.Ji.e=-., .m!I. in 5.'l was per.wly r~ctoo o, abo:n the cmun: ofr.cr5omJ text mess:ige v.ithheld, tllC Ikpartm~ will worl:: with t:ba.t COlllt:litt.ee to ~UJP.J' furlhcr de=:ire cz disclose ud21:1:trl infommtio:a in !1 closed ~ . Afllu)ugh the onpl ;p!~cetconll1iilcd ocly w1w. the D~e::t believed to be ~'Qri::-o:Jak.d tc~t ~ . ~ teviews identified Si:Jme l:IC!dillonlll p,::r9~ t«:rtn::=ll£l'S within !ht ~ , - : i n . I I , . I I Ta.erefore, lhe doc.umcnl produt.6i today c:cmt.s:Jl.9 a ~ lll.lllL~i- offully r~ed W-!'l~'\'S 61tt were cleteonined to be y.:i:st ~ll=ed. Tni:s probkm wuld line btoen ~ with t!'.i: .rolliro1 cflhe Snn:..cung 7JJ m ~ I 01 ; I I . I ' I l_ _ _ __ ____-_-_··· · - -- - - --- - PrtOPERTY OF THE U.S.. HOUSE: Of REPR=SENTATIVES 231 - - - -- - - - - - - - -- --· - · ·· .. .. ·n1c Honorable De.,.in Nunes Plle11 TIU'« Mr. Smznk's San~ung S phouc Inst coo.nt,(;ted to the stonii;e sy:.1c:nl oo June 18, 20 16. He recch·~d his new SatnSWtg 7 phoi:u! on or about July 5, 1017. Ms. :Page·~ Samsun~ .S pbone last conn,?Ctt'd to tho stOJ11ge aystem on December 13, 2016. She tee&i,-i::.d her n~w S:J.1T1Sung, phono on or abouc M:ty 22, 2017.' Tut! O.ffic:e of r.o,~or Gc111ll'!l! pit:e,;d together I~ te.\'l mc:mi.gcs l)C(wocn M1·. Stt1.ok and Ms. Pase fromJwie 18, 2016. 10 necembel 13, 2016, ll.illlgtbe data from t.u. P11gc', p.hcne notll the connt"Ction to lhesto~ sysn:mstowctl ot1 Dcccm\x-.r 13, 2016. Ou May 17, 2017, Mil, P11sc's dnm cDll.:ctinn n:-iiutiotcd v.hcn she roccivcd her new pho11e. Plc11SC !cl !his office know If you b:wt: ony qu~llons TCgnrtllug tl1J:; prod1101ion, ce: The Honomblo Adam Sob.16" R.nnki.u& Mcmbt.'1' • Altl\oup,h FBI ldcniHlcd M•)' l.2, 2011 nHhc u;illt() dncg tor M~. Pt,~·, rho,ic, uollie C(!!ll".CDlS. To eC1:,"1ll'e ti!l!1 my Committi:.: ic.quiry is as thorollB,h a:l!i cc..-.ipk:tc llS r,os.c the ~t mes~ I I Thf) Dejl3J"u-m:ill And FBl !.lwuld in!crpret '']ll\!Senratfo::1ft in !ht: b ~possibie i::o.annc:., includrag e:i...'>nri.ag the discoll!imi!tfon of imy z:uto-®!z-..e or~rmDar fimctions tt>.n era,e n;;m;rlals = I I I i reroros, ilftcr a cer.ain pet.i-Od of time. Tcis ~'alion requ~ Bll ~ t s , e!e()1ronic..fly stored mfal'1'1: ~e P1 l's Ofllce of\he o--~eral ~;!D!>'CI fOl" ~opria:c: nctlcn. Plt:3-.~ n~le, llov.-c\ld", that p=t'o'ai1~ rcquc:st.:; nolai~~ the FBi-isi.1.ll?d mobile dcvkt:s 1:SSiSncd to Ms. Page e:1d Ms. Strzok dunng th,; rcl.:\•Mt ~riods 1 shollla be di~t.."1 10 the OOJ Olficc oft/!~ !nsp~or <'.reocral, as se de,,icc11 arc not in 1he th1 physical C\!SiOify of ttr- FBl. ThB1lk ~o\.l foryourccntioual suppDttof~ PB!. ,. Sincerely, l • The I lonanblc ,\dam Sdli l'f Rankins Mtt11bcr Pcrrn:mcnl Select Cornmith!e on i.,uclligc11cU.S. HOU$:! Rcp.~tatives or I. 1· i \V11shinstcn. DC 20515 l I f'RCPERTY OF THE U.S. HOOS:: OF REPRESENTA1iVE.S 235 r---- I l I - - - - - - - - - - - - -- ----- -- - - --- ~M'_nUC£-~.i._Tn.s. ~ = ~ . Nrw"!'DT ,.-..~Ld'~-to,>r.:... _ ~ ~ . . : . ~ flrt~ t.o:a~i;~tlhlt.~ U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ~1:.T,,-,D~ ~"--..,,.,. ~~lf11..,.,. PE~'tEMT S::!...:C! Co~ITTES ~ ~ ""1 >C.•111:t u.,q,..~~111."1..,'ltti CN lf-rtaU13ENCE ...su,,. ....,...,.. " J I I 1r.~l11,. Tir.;;;:t. 'll.>J:i<..no!I. CC.:!<)!;16 m2 ) 2."S-<1n1 ~94.f~.s;::., ~-~ ..-o._6..!:o,~t.c~,nc,. -...,..,...,,, ~~e::.~ c:a..,:u:o1..on..t:rctflt• ~~...-..~ .... ai.l::1Q.t)...... Ur(ff ~ ~.a.:s..:11:\.~t'k,,·"""' t4 1~..... 11~,L1 :,.a,,:t)n Cllln.. 1.:µt UTIW\ tQc-1. ,'fuH I'll,., rebru51')" 20, 20 lS Deur DinN«n CO!noy; Enolo~ please fmd Heri~ afquestions ~~ing1h.c infoimariDn conrairu:d in ll\e Sle\lle dor.sicr, wt,i.cl\ was fundro by the Democnuic Nntiolllll Comm1n~ (PKC) and Hillsry fer America (Clinton c&n1p11lgn) and n~ed in II Foreign Intelligence Surveilhmcc Act(FlSA) e.wllce.don targeting C~er l"u~ Please provide ¢0tt1plc1e written respo~es llS soon es possll,la, and no l~tcr lll,on !:Ii~, Martll 2. 1013. tG 1he stnmthm ofthe Committee's chief cler~ Ni-.1:. Ci~tUU1tc. Jf you do not pcovide timely IIJ:IS\t/eta on a volUPtllrY ba~,. 1M Cornmittte wm initiate compulsol)' ~i:.s. Thnnk. you for ~our prompt nl!cntlon 1h16 m11t~r. lfyo11 h:we c,ny questioru, pf~i\ con!AC't Con1mh~~fht202-22S-412,. . . . . ·- ---- --- --·--·- ----' PROPERTY Of" THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESE~ITATIVES 238 r -------- J - - - ~ - - - -1 I I I i i ! J I I I I I' I 1. Wtt:ti and bow aid yo~ fira1 b;;ome a!A.~ Qf !:Dy of th.: mfunnation contained in 11:: S!c:ele dil5:stet? . I I ! I I 2. In ,,,hat furm(s) wis 1h~ inibnnAtion in Ute Stec.\! dom::r pr~tea lC yoi// By whom? (Please ~rfbe ~h i.nsmnce) I 3. 'M:r.o did )"01.1 sm:e this iafom:ation mfrt7 Wh;n? Tn ;1:h:at fb::m? (Pki;.se ~ b e ~;h [l!Sa.-11!.e) - 4. What official acticms did you ttke .as a result of ro:eMng the infu.m.E!ion confainci in tho ~le i:lcwkr-? I i ,1 I S. Ord you eanvane any =eti.ugs wit.11 the Intdlige!!ce ~mmt.:city :md/c.r lr.tW .:nfo=em o:>mmn:riliies as a re3Ult ofthe lnfu=.tfon co,-...tainod in the Sti:ele dossier? r I I \lf1ten did you fut Jeam or ccme t<> believe !fu4 me S=Je dossier was fimckd by~ DfmOC!?lie N111iml.Bl Cammi~~ (ONC) IU\dfar .Hill~ry for Ametica {Clinton~~)? f S. Wh~ diet you first ~me-~~ tild $C1:::ck ~sicr we, tJS«l :p obtain .aPISA ord:::r I I 1, i' I 6. ~ n did }'mt fut I ~ « o.Jtne to bclie-.'e l:hat the St~le dm.:ri~ 'rffiS. fmid;:d by a Di:mot:rat-alignM entity'? L'{l {'.at1i;c Pllge? 9. Wl:.3 President Cham~ 1::riafw Oll any iniocmaliml ami:aincd mthe das3.ier prior to ]ElllUIJY 5, 20J7? 10. Did youdiscus3 me i.nt'cmna!i<:m contair.ed in the Stee.~dossier with any repo~ er other ~ v i : i of the media? If iso_ who md when? I I l - - -- -----~---- ----------1· - ---- -· u. ERTY OF THE U.S. _Hou_~ O.F REPREScNl'A llVES Z39 .. ~/r,»..'M"'tr,.Ol~.. -·- ·· · · - - - - -- - -- · r.~-J.I 'L·"M'-.rute~.._.r,,a,4" ~::'a) ~.~~1:::'\ ~~ J1rnir nM•I' ,.,.«nf,-, f111l1l1, ~~::~~,~~,~~Wirn H\1Co30l, 7l•e CArr:oL U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES \Vl-911.~TD rl, DC,r/.515 IW1)'2Hl2l t,/~ thu,:.O,, """tt.\1' 11J,..c\ rt1b PE.AMANEITT $ELE:CT COMMlTTEI: , w,n...-eutt c.fc't ,.,.... ~~LU-14* ON INTCLUGENCE ,.uow,.,\ s t'J,l-tJrll'-1 C1o-4lS,~l".Ultl, T~,~~o~lt,C,.-J rrn ~I\IIJe. S'tlri:Q, IO.Y"'~• ~ ~ , ,,cio,4 ~v,u,r..e~ fci.M J.~L:!NY.~Mtil• , l\.tlil.U f\t M w,n February 20, 201& Mt, Andrew McCnbo l!«Jera{ )3urcau oflnvcstigation 935 Pe.11nsylvani11Av1:, NW Wasl1lngton, D.C. 2053S Dt:ir Mr. McC.'l!x: Etieloscd please find n. series of q_~lou5 regardin!! tile information con1ained mthe Stec.to d~cr. wllich Wl.\5 ft;ndcd by the Oemocro.tlc Natiorul Commiueo (DNC) and }tillacy for America (Clinwn cnrup~igr,) on<$ CAr.fe-. ~an~12i I I J I , ~ , ~.. r \ ~ < : s - ~.. , ~~euzW•.ct-,:-.c..,o, The ![Qn.o.tebJc J;il"Sc=ic,n:s I .Atrom:y Omeral u.s. Depsrtrnea1 of1!:Sttee I I ~O i'c:i::insyh,ani1t.Av=2~ NW W~!m,p;tcm,DC 20530-0001 Ocpemiem of Jmt.ice (DOJ). i Toe~ tmredected ~ ofthe Dl-OG available 10 ~ Committee (d;aed ~ber 15. 201 l) d c i ~ ~ th-: "FBI rr.ust.ful!ow wf:en subtnilling-q,pli~mm to the Fo."eign !!uelligence Surveillance Court (rISC) for o.-ders to ~SJrlleilimce thrm:gQ £!-.e Fo.-eii!ll blt~~ee:Sun:eill~ Act. (F~A). ~ g t Q lheDO!G: -I I I Thef~ Sim:a-u oflnvestigatiou (FBI) i~clmged mm pnm:cting tile Am:ricanpeo)l!e·and i:n.tbmo.g our !~:: in accordance with the U.S. Coostm.1imi. To carry om:tbis ~ d mi1::tlon,. the FBI ~ a slriet 9et oriffil!ro8l rules imd p ~ cm.bodied in the Domsi~Inv~cms SJsl Op:ratic:ns Guide (DIOO). The DIDO v.'8S crelll.~ by cha Bureau~a n d ~ by tb.e I r I ON !tiTI::lLlc3cJ(CE • FJSA sl.lfVeill~ is a v,:ry irr'..w.siveme:lll!S of ~rinB il'~:.on .htt m;m hai!mce thi; r.ccil-11> ob1ain ~ l i v e ~ ~urity~ori ~eMI iib~i:::.. • W.hec striking 1hls b!ihnce, s applications. • "\>-enn~n ~ mu!-t be con~ fur alt FISA o Undar tht sub$ection ''P1SA V~rifi.catimi of A=iracy ~dµr es," the FBI jl::stjf acl'iiedges tbi5 m i ~ "Th;: rusen.-ac:y cfm.f"onnm()a co:rtakied wimin Frs.A eppllcatlom is of ~ imp-.:.i~..... O.nl1 doct=!'.ed and verified _ i:n~n .r-.ey be w:trl to sc:pp,.1rtFBI cpplicetfol!S lFISAJ to fue~ourt lFISq.n Tne DIOG pro\-ides d*-i!cd lnstnt~ for &FBI to followw th3tinfu:maµon epp..._.-uig in a FISA applics:ti ~ FISC? • If11{1!., wlurt st::ps ha the !)OJ Ellldfar the }:Bl ~ to hold i!lX:Qtmtaf)li: tho_se officla:ls who viollltc:d lb= proio.cols? · I I I will~ you tha1-esidc from uic violation ofthese protocol.!, the preser.tilWlll of fe!se and/or unverified i:J::lformuion m the FL..~ in tC!nn:aion with the Car.er Psgr: ~ nt ~ ceto:ozs cm.id dail viob:tiolJ.$ of!he following~ ~es; • 18 USC242 • • O"t'5tIU.Clion~f jmxice Co!:i!etnpt ofCourt ·~ • souse tro9 Toe FBI DIOG provi~--s mtemal o,,-ersight md corttrols cm: a11thomi:d FBI eci.itios so tl:e Amerirao. p;lhlic cm be 8SSU?ed .he Bweau is QODduc:mig ilS vital mission in w.ord.en:e mlh law a.nii ~_blishe,d pddelinas. Heiweve:, in thl3 illsw=; it's Cllenfutbasie ~ ~ wss viol.2.ed.. C o D ~ ov=ight is dc$iiC,.-d to bold~~ ~cnttible. I -i:ust 1m! y.ou lhm:e ~ view, ~ will .mitt me Committee's !nvcstigc:lon l.no ,iclatluns o! 0100 _prc~es related to thG us: ofth: S~el.: dos:rlcr in BSA ~ ~ ? : S. I I I I ' 1 l i- i cc: Mlcbe:l Horowitt, lilSJ>llCIC? C~l2ll -Of ili= Dcp:.:m=t of J ~ Th2 Himorahle Cl:cistopber \\'ray, Diicctoz. Federal &!eau ofim'atigalion I: I I I I I L~---- ~------~- -----------_-=-_-_.: - -~~----~~----.....~I 243